PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS - ATTY. UNGOS III ○ ". . .
○ ". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
3RD YEAR 2ND SEMESTER 2019-2020
A. Requirements before admission to the bar or practice of law
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, [September 3, 1991], 278 PHIL 235-274
Petitioner: RENATO L. CAYETANO
Respondents: CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management
Facts:
● Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the COA. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
● COA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On the same day he took his oath, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
● Petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition praying for Monsod's confirmation and appointment as
COMELEC Chairman be declared null and void.
Issue: WON Monsod possesses the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
Held: YES.
● Black defines "practice of law" as:
○ "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney,
using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
● The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law."
● This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105
Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
○ "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
○ "Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
 can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys."
● Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
● Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
● Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Natanauan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 4269, [October 11, 2016]
Complainant: DOLORES NATANAUAN
Respondent: ATTY. ROBERTO P. TOLENTINO
Facts:
Complainant Dolores alleged that she is a co-owner (with her siblings
Rafaela, Ernestina, and Romulo [Dolores, et al.]) of a parcel of land located in
Tagaytay City. They sold this land to Alejo Tolentino (Alejo) for P500,000.00. At the
time, the title to the property had not yet been issued by the Land Registration
Commission. After the execution of the contract of sale between the parties, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. T-107593 in Alejo's favor. Despite
several requests from Dolores, et al., Alejo, however, failed to settle the remaining
obligation. Thus, Dolores, et al. filed a case against Alejo and his wife Filomena for
the recovery of possession of immovable property, declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale, and damages.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) promulgated a Decision declaring the
rescission of the contract of sale. Sometime in June 1993, Dolores discovered that
the TCT No. 107593 under Alejo's name was issued not on the basis of the January
3, 1978 contract but on a Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979, purportedly executed
by their father Jose Natanauan (Jose), Salud Marqueses, Melquides, Parungao and
Asuncion Fajardo (Jose, et al.). She further discovered a Joint Affidavit dated
August 6, 1979 purportedly executed by Jose, et al. attesting to the absence of
tenants or lessees in the property and another Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1979,
executed between Dolores, et al. as vendors and Atty. Tolentino as vendee covering
purportedly the same property.
Dolores claims that the foregoing documents were falsified as Jose, who
died in Talisay, Batangas on June 12, 1977, could not have signed the Deed of Sale
dated August 3, 1979 and the Joint Affidavit dated August 6, 1979. Furthermore, the
Deeds of Sale were all notarized by Notary Public Perfecto P. Fernandez (Perfecto)
who Dolores later on discovered was not commissioned as a notary public for and in
the City of Manila for the year 1979.
It was also around the same time that Dolores discovered that the title to the
property has been subsequently registered, under TCT No. T-21993, in the name of
Buck Estate, Inc., where Atty. Tolentino is a stockholder, 14 and mortgaged to Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation for Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Thus, Dolores filed the present disbarment complaint against Atty.
Tolentino and Perfecto for their alleged acts of falsification. In her complaint, Dolores
attached an Affidavit dated December 2, 1980, where Alejo and Filomena attested
that the subject property never belonged to them in truth or in fact, the true and
absolute owner of the same being Alejo's brother, Atty. Tolentino. Notably, this
Affidavit bears Atty. Tolentino's conformity.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Tolentino committed deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
through the aforementioned falsifications in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath which would merit his disbarment/suspension.
Held:
Yes. The practice of law is neither a natural nor a constitutional right but a
privilege bestowed by the State only upon the deserving and worthy for
conferment of such privilege. The Court extends only to the deserving, and that the
Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the
Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. It is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice.
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended from the practice of law for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in character, honesty, probity and good demeanor and thus
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. A lawyer may be disbarred or Facts:
suspended not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and dishonesty in his
Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located
professional dealings. He may also be penalized for gross misconduct not directly
at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to
connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his
respondent under a Contract of Lease dated April 16, 2005. However,
unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.
respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he
failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to
In this case, respondent Atty. Tolentino is charged with violating the Lawyer's Oath
vacate the leased premises despite repeated oral and written demands.
and Canons 1, 7, and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations under the settlement
Canon I — A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
agreement, constraining complainants to file an ejectment case against him
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br.
Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
40), docketed as Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
case before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court
Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify
honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his
The totality of evidence (consisting of the falsified documents, Dolores' testimony
obligations to complainants.
detailing the transactions surrounding the land, and the investigation conducted by
this Court) leaves no doubt as to Atty. Tolentino's involvement in, or at the very least, Despite notices, respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the
benefit from the acts of falsification imputed against him. Atty. Tolentino's direct mandatory conference, and to file his position paper.
participation in the falsification of the Deed of Sale and the Joint Affidavit could be
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision dated December
inferred from the fact that he was the one who personally entered into the subject
8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor of the complainants.
contract with Dolores and her siblings, merely using his brother Alejo and his wife
Filomena as dummies. During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an
Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon City.
We reiterate that a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court
In a Report and Recommendation dated February 8, 2011, the IBP
and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and,
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the
the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a
administration of justice is contumacious, calling for both an exercise of disciplinary
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. It was found that
action and application of the contempt power. For his acts of dishonesty, Atty.
respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as
Tolentino not only violated the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 10 of the Code of
highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged on.
Professional Responsibility, he also failed to observe his duty as an officer of the
court. Furthermore, Atty. Tolentino's deliberate non-participation in the disciplinary In a Report and Recommendation dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended
proceedings shows a lack of respect for the legal (disciplinary) process and sullies the that respondent be further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a period of six (6) months, thus, increasing
his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately. It found that since
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3) respondent received the order of suspension against him on October 16, 2014 and
YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a STERN WARNING that any similar did not move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely days therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension.
.
Issue:
Spouses Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, [June 8, 2016]
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
Petitioner: SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J.
EUSTAQUIO||| (Complainants)
Respondent: ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES|| Held:
Yes. It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he
must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law. The practice of law embraces any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution 26 dated
September 15, 2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months became final and executory fifteen (15) days after respondent received
a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have already
commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never
heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions
as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification
issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an
Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.
Respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of
law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension against him.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of
six (6) months from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year
from service of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993]
Petitioner: ULEP
Respondent: LEGAL CLINIC
Facts:
Petitioner prays that the respondent be ordered to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes A and B and to
perpetually prohibit persons/entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.
· Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
· Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancées. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
Petitioner submits that the advertisements above reproduced are unethical,
demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the Bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
In response, the respondent claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines.
Issue:
W/N the services offered by respondent as advertised by it constitute the practice of
law
Held:
YES
A person engaged in a lawful calling is not engaged in the practice of law provided
that:
1. Legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem
2. Services performed are not customarily reserved to the members of
the Bar
3. No separate fee is charged for legal advice or information
In this case, the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegal, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
Thus, the respondent is engaged in the practice of law.
In re: Cunanan, Resolution, [March 18, 1954], 94 PHIL 534-597
Petitioner: In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.,
Respondent: Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile
Inton for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag
Facts:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
Issue:
WON RA 972 is constitutional?
Held:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946
to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account
of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down
was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress
to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154 (Resolution), [June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.
MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR
Petitioner: FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
Facts:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member
of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not
disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three pending
criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases for Grave
Oral Defamation, and a Criminal Case or Less Serious Physical Injuries. The above-
mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleged that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he
is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Moson, their former professor, advised him
to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being
their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that
actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and
terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained
of do not involve moral turpitude. As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling
admits that some of his communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they
were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
Issue: Whether Meling may be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Held: No.
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that “a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.”
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is,
he is signing his communications as “Atty. Haron S. Meling” knowing fully well that he
is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use
of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
Meling however, did not pass the 2002 Bar Examinations. This renders the
Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right
but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
but who are also known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law,
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases
against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the
forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation “Attorney”, knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked.
The Court declared Philippine that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
“attorney.” The title “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Re: Vicente D. Ching, B.M. No. 914 (Resolution), [October 1, 1999], 374 PHIL
342-355
Applicant: Vicente D. Ching
Facts: Vicente Ching was born, in Francia West, Tubao, La Union, on April 11, 1964,
to a Filipina citizen mother and a Chinese citizen father.
Ching grew up in the Philippines all his life. He completed his Bachelor of Laws at St
Louis University Baguio, took the Bar Examinations in 1998 and passed. But his
application to take the Bar had been conditional, and subject to presentation of proof
of Filipino citizenship.
Ching submitted the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
Because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take
his oath as a new lawyer. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April
1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment
on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General opined that under the 1935 Constitution, the
legitimate child of a Filipina mother and Chinese father was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless, upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship. The OSG was of the opinion that the rule on construction of the phrase
reasonable period to elect Philippine citizenship after reaching the age of majority
should be relaxed given the circumstances.
In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, the phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice
has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship
under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June
1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Issue: Whether Ching validly elected Filipino citizenship for eligibility to take the bar
Held: No. Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not
a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.
Re: Dacanay, B.M. NO. 1678, [December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL 165-171
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now filed
a petition with the intention to resume his law practice.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay may practice his profession as lawyer
after reacquiring citizenship.
Held:
The petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. –
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
 against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
Further, Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing
is entitled to practice law.
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; passing the bar
examinations; taking the lawyer’s oath and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP, payment of the annual professional
tax; compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually
subject to judicial disciplinary control.
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed
never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage insuch practice." Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbangan Isabela Sugar Co.,
G.R. No. L-23959, [November 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 401-409
Petitioners: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENEZA
Respondents: BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & QUINTIN MUNING
Facts:
● Petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU,
et al. vs. Binalbaga-Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. When the said decision
became final, counsel of the winning complainants, Cipriano Cid &
Associates, filed a notice of attorney's hen equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas filed a manifestation indicating
their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award
of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's
petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is
not a lawyer.
● Records of the case show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Pacis. All hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made on behalf of the complainants were at first by Atty.
Pacos and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning. The Court of
Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered.
Issue: WON a non-lawyer may recover attorney's fees for legal services
rendered
Held: NO.
● Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467,
27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to
share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the
present case.
● The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that — "In the
proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification for
a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees:
for the same section adds that — "it shall be the duty and obligation of the
Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf
of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence." thus
making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
● The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing — "Sec. 24.
Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, . . . " imports the existence of an attorney-
client relationship as a condition in the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an
attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas
or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of
the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control
for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
● On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There,
it is stated:
○ "But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted
prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from
practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of
authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly legal services
cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice
before the court or in the jurisdiction where the service were
rendered."
○ "No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice . . .
and is an attorney in good standing at the time."
● The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated; that acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an act
done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it
would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case
of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact
that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
○ "And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the
services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an 'agent' and
not as an attorney."
● The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and
cannot justify an exception.
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738 (Resolution), [February 19, 2008], 569 PHIL 539-
551
Complainant: WILFREDO M. CATU
Respondent: ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA
Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building located at
Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723,
where the parties reside.
Respondent Atty. Vicente Rellosa, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned
the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that
respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when
he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
Issue: Whether Atty. Rellosa is guilty of professional misconduct.
Held: Yes, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from
the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
Section 90 of R.A. 7160 governs the practice of profession of elective local
government officials
Of the elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in
schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior
permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month.
A lawyer in government service who is not prohibited to practice law must secure
prior authority from the head of his department.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his
time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the
laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount
duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the
primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written
permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.”
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 7. A LAWYER
SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards
legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in the
law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, [December 20, 1978], 176 PHIL 619-624
Petitioner: JULIO ZETA (Complainant)
Respondent: FELICISIMO MALINAO
Facts: pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon, the attorney of
record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, court interpreter of
Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al.', for Forcible Entry, in the
the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To
"1 — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — Mr. Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply."
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of this town
for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney.
"2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being Issue: Whether or not Malinao should be dismissed from his position as interpreter in
employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar.
persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce.
Held: Yes. We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of
"3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it
fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the
that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even he
documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges before
has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he
whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from
would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those
appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his
absent days.
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of
"4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
SERVICE LAW. — We have reliable information it is prohibited when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a
for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We,
profession or business without permission from the Department therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator. LibLex
Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was
because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty
attorney.
and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from
above complaint: his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that
"Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary
respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he
of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge, Court of
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love
First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the
of justice. LLphil
Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice,
Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding indorsements, to In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is
wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also been recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the
noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or
indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this investigative body wherein only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent
provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he
In re of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant
hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much less
Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [July 13, 1995], 316 PHIL 43-52
Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his
Petitioner: ARGOSINO
participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
Respondent:
not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked
Facts
the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now
resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a
 ● In a RTC judgement dated Feb 11, 1993, Argosino was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Raul Camaligan in the
course of hazing conducted as part of uni frat initiation rites, and sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 2 years, 4 mos and 1 day to 4 yrs.
● Eleven days later, Argosino filed an application for probation w/ the lower
court, which was granted on June 18 1993 by Judge Santiago. The period of
probation was set at 2 yrs, counted from the probationer’s initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
● On July 13 1993, Argosino filed a petition for admission to take the 1993 Bar
Exam. In this petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
probation status. He was allowed to take the Bar. He passed the Bar but was not
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.
● On April 15 1994, Argosino filed this petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Santiago had terminated his probation period on April 11, 1994.
Issue
W/N Argosino possessed good moral character
Ruling
NO.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, w/ special education qualification, duly ascertained and
certified.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the Bar exams but also, and
more importantly, at the time application for admission to the Bar and to take the
atty’s oath of office.
In Re Farmer: Upright character is something more than the absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
In this case, Argosino had failed to discharge his moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a neophyte who had, by seeking admission to the frat involved, reposed
trust and confidence in him that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked
to death like a useless stray dog.
Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
question is W/N Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character
Argosino must, therefore, submit to the Court evidence that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of
● Sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have
a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Argosino for a
significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago
● How he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large
Finally, Argosino is directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Calatagan, w/in 10 days from notice hereof.
In re of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant
Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [July 13, 1995], 316 PHIL 43-52
Petitioner: Al Caparros Argosino
Respondent:
Facts:
Al Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals were charged with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of Raul Camaligan, which stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of “hazing” conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court, and hence
were sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Argosino and his co-accused filed an application for probation with the lower court.
The application for probation was granted.
Argosino then filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In
this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations and passed the said Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.
Argosino filed a Petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not Argosino should be admitted to the practice of law.
Held:
No, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law.
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in
cases decided by the Court. It is settled that the practice of law is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Argosino’s participation in the deplorable “hazing” activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of
those who inflicted such injuries. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge
their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a “neophyte” who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that,
at the very least, he would not be beaten to death. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Hence, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law lacking the requirement
of good moral character.
SYLLABUS:
Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; Practice of Law as a High Personal Privilege; Good
Moral Character
● The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.
● Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice is concerned.
● All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
● Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who
would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
● Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.
Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997], 336 PHL 766-771
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a
probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar
exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow
him to take the lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law averring
that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10
months of the probation period before it was terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the
practice of law.
Held:
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld
the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in
mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible
member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period
of time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to
take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys
and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
Diao v. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, [March 29, 1963], 117 PHIL 490-492
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO
Petitioner: SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ
Facts:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.
Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Martinez charged him with
having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the
Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a
report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, Diao had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, namely, that (1) he did not
complete his high school training and that (2) he never attended Quisumbing College
and did not obtain his A.A. diploma therefrom.
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao practically admitted the
first charge; but he claimed that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
Issue: Whether Diao’s name must be erased from the roll of attorneys.
Held: Yes.
As to the first charge, since respondent failed to exhibit any certification (to the
effect that the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school) by the proper school official, his claim was highly
unlikely.
As to the second charge, Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and
yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941)
of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. This explanation is not
acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making.
Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began
his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the
bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed
by the Department of Private Education”
Diao was clearly not qualified to take the bar examinations but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, pass it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, [July 12, 2016]
Petitioner: Patrick A Caronan
Respondent: Richard A Caronan
Facts: Mr. Richard Caronan was discharged from the Philippine Military Academy in
1993. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3)
children. Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.
Sometime in 1999, Richard enrolled in St. Mary's University's College of Law in
Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya. He used his brother Patrick Caronan’s identity and
credentials to be able to enter law school, since he himself never finished college.
Richard, using the name Patrick Caronan, was able to pass the bar and practiced law
under his brothers name.
Richard, acting under the name Atty Patrick Caronan, perpetrated crimes and
unlawful activities such as gun-running activities, illegal posession of explosives,
violation of BP 22, among other.
The real Patrick Caronan was then ordered to report to the head office of PSC in
Mandaluyong pursuant to an NBI investigation. Due to the controversies involving
respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for
his own safety and security. He also
became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced
him to resign from his job at PSC. Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the name “Patrick A. Caronan” should be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
(2) Whether or not Richard A Caronan should be barred from being admitted to the
Bar.
Held: Yes. His false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational
records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not
a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. In In Re: the Matter
of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations
and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez, good moral character is defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him,
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his
own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to
fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years.
Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. his is imperative in
the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his
client, as well as between him and the court.
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with
his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal
cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity
and dignity.
Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, [March 6, 2003], 446 PHIL 861-872
Petitioner: CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE
Respondent: ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against
Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted
complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon
they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.
During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he
passed. It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned
that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted
her about her relationship with respondent. On September 10, 1997, respondent, who
by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On December
9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl. By this time however, respondent had
started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support.
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between
them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single
since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children;
complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is
already married; the child borne by complainant is not his, because the complainant
was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. He admits that he
signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save
complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant
was seeing other men.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent is guilty of Immoral Conduct.
HELD:
Yes, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found and affirmed by this Court that the
respondent is GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION from the practice of law.The Court agrees with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
"CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
"x x x that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency."
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement
recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain
unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a
noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.
This Court has held:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards”.
Respondent seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are
polygamous,"and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust
and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible,
immoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting
arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his
marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question
in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is
not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral
relationship with him.
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to
take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an
applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of
good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. It is a qualification that is essential to maintain one's good
standing in the profession; it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and
therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a
rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and
now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and
promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Barba v. Pedro, A.C. No. 545-SBC, [December 26, 1974], 158 PHIL 1094-1098
Petitioner: PURISIMA BARBA
Respondent: HECTOR S. PEDRO
Facts:
 ● Hector S. Pedro is a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations
(81.16%). Unfortunately, he was unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath due to a complaint for immorality filed against him by
petitioner, Purisima Barba.
● It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations, accompanied by pledges
to marry, with Barba resulting in the birth of a child. Petitioner is now married
to another woman. He is also employed as a community development
worker with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) with
certifications of his good behavior from different instrumentalities. Barba
enclosed an affidavit attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and
expressing her non-opposition to petitioner's taking of oath as a lawyer.
● This Court, in a Resolution, allowed petitioner to take the lawyer's oath.
Unfortunately, before he could do so, there was a letter from Barba objecting
to taking his oath, premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as
to her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the bar did not
represent her true feelings. As such, this Court suspended their Resolution.
Issue: WON petitioner should be allowed to take his oath as a lawyer
Held: Yes but the SC imposed a condition.
● It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He
had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral
standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven false to his
word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the
other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956
examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse
from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
● It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has behaved
rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to him. There is
no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment, while deserved, has
lasted long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has
been exacted. He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the
bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that
should not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a
certain period.
● Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the
sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative
of life closely associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire,"
this Court feels that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a
lawyer would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite
moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in offenses
of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone.
● It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while
his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he
expects to be a member of the bar in good standing, that he complies with
the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the child
born out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima
Barba.
In re Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, [July 24, 2012], 691 PHIL 583-588
IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Petitioner: EPIFANIO B. MUNESES
Facts:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged:
● that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966;
● that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981;
● that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA;
● that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law.
Issue: Whether a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later
re-acquires his Philippine citizenship may become a member of the Bar.
Held:
Yes. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof
means termination of the petitioner's membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to
resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a
person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
resume his practice of law.
The petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Brunet v. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164 (Resolution), [March 10, 2014]
Petitioner: STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET
(Complainant)|| (
Respondent: ATTY. RONALD GUAREN
Facts: Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of
Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of
the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren
took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of
the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of
donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they
dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money
they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in
a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
ATcaHS
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance
fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling
of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and
P6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the
complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents
relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that
he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case
filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the
said hearing.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Guaren violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes. Atty. Guaren is found to have violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants' lot and despite the
acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years
to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent
from the latter.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. IHCacT
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform
his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5
years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him
11|
Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, [June 10, 2003], 451 PHIL 428-436
Petitioner: DONNA MARIE AGUIRRE
Respondent: EDWIN RANA
Facts
● Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar exam
● On May 21 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Ph Bae, Aguirre filed against Rana
a petition for denial of admission to the Bar on the ground of unauthorized
practice of law, among others. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not
yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice-Mayoralty candidate Bunan and
Mayoralty candidate Estipona-Hao before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvasser (MBEC)
 ● On May 22 2002, the Court allowed respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him.
● Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan and
Estipona-Hao, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
● The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation,
report and recommendation
● The OBC found that respondent appeared as counsel even before he took
the lawyer’s oath on May 22 2001. It believes that respondent’s misconduct casts
a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. It therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Bar.
Issue
W/N Rana was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
Held
YES
In Cayetano v Monsod, the Court held that the practice of law means any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, Rana was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, w/o license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Having held
himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice of law, respondent
has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Bar.
True, respondent passed the 2000 Bar exams and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it
is the signing in the Roll of Attys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Passing
the Bar is not the only qualifications to become an atty-at-law. Respondent should
know that 2 essential requirements for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely:
● Lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Court
● Signature in the Roll of Atty
Therefore, Rana is denied admission to the Bar
In re Medado, B.M. No. 2540, [September 24, 2013], 718 PHIL 286-294
Petitioner: MICHAEL A. MEDADO
Respondent:
Facts:
Topic: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the
Roll of Attorneys
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he
took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through
his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently
forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing
his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition
himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he
appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought
that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just
an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have
made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law,
he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the
Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to
pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to
engage in the practice of law.
Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011], 677 PHIL 1-9
Complainant: ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA
Respondent: ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment filed was filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was
the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in a Civil Case before the RTC of Pasig City,
while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Ulaso. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of the Civil Case was annulled,
which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), San Juan, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela
Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings
in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005.
Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa
as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification
with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant
for a few years but that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000. However
Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of
Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that
he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
In its Report and Recommendation,the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as
Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that
while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there
was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices
from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only
excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the
notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not
less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by
reducing the period of Busmente’s suspension to six months.
Issue: Whether Busmente’s acts warrant a suspension from the practice of law.
Held: Yes.
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that
Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance
with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-
CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet,
Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices
were still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s
practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only
came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status.
Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit submitted by Ulaso and
Eddie B. Bides which stated that their legal counsel was Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES
and not Elizabeth Dela Rosa, and that if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed
her signature in the notices or other court records as their legal counsel the same
could not be taken against them for, they believed in good faith that she was a
lawyer; and were made to believe that it was so since Busmente allowed her to
accompany them and attend their hearings. In short, they gave them paralegal
assistance.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence
to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP,
modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
In re Abad v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, [March 28, 1983], 206 PHIL 172-175
Petitioner: Atty. Procopio S. Beltran Jr.
Respondent: Elmo S. Abad
Facts: Atty. Procopio Beltran charged Elmo Abad, a successful bar examinee, of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Phliippine Bar. In
response, Abad explained that he believed in good faith that he was already a
member of the Bar, given the following circumstances:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office
as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as
shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of
P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership
Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by
Official Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable
Supreme Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as
Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn
to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by
one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty.
Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando
wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his
Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and
for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the
Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may
take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a
letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10,
1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with my
Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply
to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered
for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due
and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter,
as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise
respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No.
058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter
also included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of
officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on
January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent
submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April
27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be
allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-
1982 membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as
shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .
10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by
Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .
11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....
Issue: Whether or not Elmo Abad has satisfied the essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer.
Held: No. Two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer: (1) lawyer’s oath to be
administered by the Supreme Court, and (2) his signature in the Roll of Attorneys,
had yet to be performed. (Rule 138, Sec 17 and 19, ROC)
Consequently, Abad is guilty of contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), ROC)
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., B.M. No. 1370, [May 9, 2005], 497 PHIL 535-
544
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner, In his letter dated 22 September 2004, sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated
to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003.
He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice
of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for
the years when he was working in the USA. The letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law (that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003.)
Held:
No. Petitioner cannot be exempted from payment of IBP dues. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years
1977-2005, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the
practice of law.
The IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll
of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing
dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for
all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to
inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership
in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of his annual dues.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. There is
nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such
case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to
pay dues could have been discontinued.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure
to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
such drastic move.
Tan v. Balajadia, G.R. No. 169517, [March 14, 2006], 519 PHIL 632-637
Petitioners: ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN
Respondent: BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
Facts:
● Petitioners filed a petition for contempt against respondent. Petitioners
alleged that respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and
violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In the said complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City. However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to
the Philippine Bar.
● Respondent avers that the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that he is a
practicing lawyer was an honest mistake and that the secretary of Atty.
Paterno-Aquino prepared it, which was patterned after Atty. Aquino's
complaint-affidavit. Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were
drafted by the same secretary, for a parking incident that happened on
different times. He insists that the second complaint-affidavit correctly
alleged that he is a businessman.
● Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secretary, executed an affidavit, admitting the
mistake. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit as
he assumed that both of them contained the same allegations. He also
claims that he has no intention of misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
● Petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect
contempt for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit
and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino's secretary.
Issue: WON respondent is liable for indirect contempt
Held: NO.
● Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
xxx xxx xxx.
● In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by
assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes
indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The
liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are
punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the
court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining
liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a
necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes
it clear that he intended to commit it.
● In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent's claim
that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It
was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise
to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation respondent's complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.
● Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a
practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party
was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
 client; appearing before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before
the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission
to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself
as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to
do so.
● In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent
acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he
cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to
illegally practice law.
In Re: Publico, Re: Juan T. Publico 22081, [February 20, 1981], 190 PHIL 612-621
IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN
T. PUBLICO, petitioner
Facts:
Three Petitions for the reinstatement of Juan T. Publico in the Roll of Attorneys, have
been filed: 1) by Juan T. Publico himself dated May 28, 1979; 2) by the President and
twelve members of the faculty of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, where Juan T. Publico is also a faculty member filed on June 1, 1979;
and 3) by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila through its
President, Vice-President and Directors on April 23, 1979.
The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the Bar
Examination in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar examination. His uncle, Dulcisimo B.
Tapel, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16)
years of age, that he was eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by
utilizing the school records of his cousin and namesake, Juan M. Publico when, in
actual fact, petitioner had not completed Grade VI of his elementary schooling,
much less, First and Second Year High School. When required to file a formal
Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew
for falsification of school records or credentials.
In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar examination, passed it, took the
lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
On September 10, 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel moved to drop the complaint on the ground
that his witnesses had turned hostile. The motion, however, was denied. In this
Court's Resolution of February 23, 1962, the name Juan T. Publico was stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.
Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition
for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, nor had he been informed, nor
did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys until March 1969, when after taking his oath
of office as Municipal Judge of Gigmoto, Catanduanes, he was advised to inquire into
the outcome of the disbarment case against him; that he was shocked and humiliated
upon learning of the said Resolution; that he resigned from all his positions in public
and private offices, and transferred to Manila. He then prayed that the Court allow his
reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the time he
became a lawyer, his services to the community, the numerous awards, resolutions
and/or commendations he received, which were incorporated in the Petition, and
particularly, for the sake of his children. The Court denied the Petition.
On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second Petition for Reinstatement stating
that the Complaint for disbarment against him had been withdrawn by the
complainant, but that the Legal Officer-Investigator proceeded with the hearing
exparte and that he was unable to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
On November 17, 1975, Juan T. Publico wrote to the Chief Justice imploring his
assistance that he may be given another opportunity to enjoy the privileges of a
lawyer, and requesting that a hearing be held where he could personally plead for his
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 8, 1976, Petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement stating that he had
remained a person of good moral character and had an exemplary social standing in
the community where he resides, as shown by his election to various positions in
different associations. He also alleged that his moral character and integrity had
remained irreproachable, that he had been more than sufficiently punished and had
been undergoing economic difficulties because of his disbarment.
All the aforesaid petitions were denied.
For consideration now is petitioner's fifth plea for reinstatement filed on June 1, 1979.
In his Petition, Juan T. Publico avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in
Manila was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel, who accompanied
him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his
remonstrations; that the misrepresentation committed about his at academic records
was not his own fault alone, but was precipitated by his uncle, who as member of the
faculty of the Catanduanes Institute had access to the records of the school; that
being merely sixteen years of age, he could not be expected to act with discernment
as he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment;
that he had conducted himself in a manner befitting a member of the bar; that he had
striven to serve the people and the government as shown by the positions he held as
Municipal Attorney of San Miguel, Catanduanes, Deputy Register of Deeds of
Catanduanes, Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections, and Editorial
Assistant in the Editorial Staff of the defunct House of Representatives, and presently
as faculty member of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, State University.
Additionally, petitioner submitted evidence purporting to show his honesty and
integrity and other manifestations of his good moral character, particularly, the
Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes Chapter; the
Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Catanduanes; the letter of the
Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T. Tatel, addressed to the late Chief
Justice Castro, all attesting to his good character and standing in the community and
his capability as a lawyer.
Further submitted are certifications issued by the different government offices: Court
of First Instance of Catanduanes; Catanduanes Integrated National Police Command;
Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Virac, Catanduanes, and First Municipal Circuit
Court, Bato San Miguel, Bato, Catanduanes, certifying that petitioner has not been
accused nor convicted of any crime.
The petition filed by the President and Faculty of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines reiterated the same circumstances as those stated by Juan T. Publico in
his own Petition and further professed that Atty. Publico is a competent and proficient
teacher; that his moral integrity and honesty are beyond reproach.
The petition filed by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila
is substantially of the same tenor and added that petitioner was re-elected President
of that Association for four years from 1972 to 1975 inclusive.
No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
Issue: Whether petitioner Juan Publico should be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Held:
Yes. The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows:
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the
sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.”
Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981, shall have elapsed since petitioner
was barred from exercising his profession. Cognizant that the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle, we find that the evidence submitted by petitioner,
particularly, the testimonials presented on his behalf, as listed heretofore, his
good conduct and honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his active
involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to
be restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has been sufficiently
punished and disciplined.
People v. Maceda, G.R. Nos. 89591-96 (Resolution), [January 24, 2000], 380
PHIL 1-6
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA
Facts: Judge Maceda issued an order giving custody over private respondent Avelino
T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent
Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court's order
specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty. del
Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around
but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence. LLpr
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private
respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his
normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as
counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262, the latter accepted cases and continued
practicing law.
Issue: Whether or not Javellana was under the custody of law and hence cannot be
allowed to practice law.
Held: Yes. Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of
criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of
the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's
residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private
respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary
consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial court's order was clear
that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held
as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal
Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private
respondent would appear in court to defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is
deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty
in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must
be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed
that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest
and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must
be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 569-578
Petitioner: SOLIMAN SANTOS JR
Respondent: FRANCISCO LLAMAS
Facts
● Atty Soliman Santos Jr filed a letter-complaint for non-payment of bar
membership dues and misrepresentation against Atty Francisco Lamas.
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated Dec 1 1995, Nov 13,
1996 and Jan 17, 1997 bearing at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt number IBP
RIZAL 259060. He also filed a Certification dated March 18, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991
● In response, Atty Llamas invoked and cited that being a senior citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under RA 7432 wc took effect in 1992 in the payment
of taxes, income taxes as an example. Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief
of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner willfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues,
he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests,
charges and surcharges and penalties.
● The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner w/c found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
3 months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Issue
W/N Llamas is liable for non-payment of bar membership dues and misrepresentation
Held
YES
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec 9. Membership dues. – Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Sec 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. – Subject to the provisions of Sec 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for 6 months shall warrant suspension of
the membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from Roll of Attys
In accordance w/ these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is limited.
While it is true that RA 7432 grants senior citizens exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes provided that their annual income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the NEDA for that year, the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7. – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar
Canon 10. – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court
Rule 10.01. – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice
By indicating IBP-RIZAL 259060 in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent
is guilty of violating the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of his
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, the Court believes that the penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
People v. De Luna, G.R. Nos. L-10236-48, [January 31, 1958], 102 PHIL 968-979
Plaintiff-Appellant:
Defendnat-Appellees: Esutacio de Luna, et al
Facts:
The appellees in the consolidated cases, well knowing that they has not passed the
bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and
after haing been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No.
972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void
and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the
accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to
the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme
Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
contemptously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said
Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the
petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that
tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and
dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and
there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a
notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON There was contempt of court
Held:
Yes, there was contempt of court.
The appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they,
likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972,
known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the
resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a
prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court,
by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying
the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the
right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof.
When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary public, and
formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all
the courtr of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, violating
section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part:
· A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for
contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge.
Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, [February 24, 1997], 335 PHIL 1096-1106
Complainant: Sophia Alawi
Respondent: ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract
was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the mentioned firm, Villarosa & Co.; and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote that he intends
to withdraw from the contract on the ground that his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi.
Alauya also sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. and the
envelope containing it, which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead
at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage — PD 26," had been typed. He also wrote to Mr. Arzaga of NHMFC, a letter
where he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof.
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage — PD 26." She alleged that Alauya imputed
malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds, caused injury to her reputation,
abused enjoyment of free postage, and usurped the title of “attorney” which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Alauya contended
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. He denied any abuse of the
franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage — PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Domocao, Clerk IV, and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage,
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed
document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated.
In contrast to his two letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan, and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary
M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
Issue: Whether Alauya must be disciplined for his alleged acts.
Held: Yes.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness,
or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee,
it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof
in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use
of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming
a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
In re Purisima, B.M. Nos. 979 and 986, [December 10, 2002], 442 PHIL 75-84
Petitioner: Mark Anthony Purisima
Facts: Mark Anthony Purisima, intending to take the 1999 Bar Exam, obtained a
ready-made form/ Petition for application and upon affixing his signature, he gave it to
his schoolmate Ms. Lilian Felipe, for her to fill up the form, have it notarized, and file it
with the Office of the Bar Confidant. He was conditionally permitted to take the 1999
Bar Examinations. The Supreme Court required him to submit a certification of
completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty days from the last day of the
examinations which is a requirement under the Rules of Court for examinees who
failed the bar three times.
Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner
admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information
supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe
had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space
provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.
Although he passed the Bar, in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court
disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his
examinations null and void on two (2) grounds:
(a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar
review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations;
(b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him un􀀵t to become a
member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999
Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School
(PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not
offered such course since 1967.
Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he enrolled in
and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School was a
"self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not
tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood."
To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of
his payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c)
car pass to the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar
review course in UST that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the
review course; (e) separate affidavits of five UST students/acquaintances of petitioner
that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor
Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his review classes
and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g)
affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST Law Department
that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who would arrive early and
request her to open the reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes
started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty
Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the
effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-bar review
course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion
of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the
examinations because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the
Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga
which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre-bar
review course.
Issue: Whether petitioner did enroll in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST
as he herein avows, and whether he should be allowed to take his oath.
Held: Yes. Petitioner has completed the requirement necessary to become a lawyer.
Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement
under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for
three (3) or more times.
There is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification
as well as that of the other documentary evidence proffered by petitioner to establish
that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. The
testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the
subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after
the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by
documentary evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the
required course in UST.
Paguia v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 176278 (Resolution), [June 25, 2010],
635 PHIL 568-573
ALAN F. PAGUIA VS.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the
Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents .
Facts:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action
for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination
of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as
Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991.
Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in
March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his
argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner
theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or
non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against
the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition.
First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not Paguia has a legal standing to file petition against the nomination of
Davide.
Held:
No. Paguia has no capacity to bring legal actions against the nomination of Davide.
Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully
crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
conduct.
*note: The case has been declared moot and academic. Respondent Davide resigned
his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, [April 27, 2007], 550 PHIL 543-551
Petitioner: FERDINAND A. CRUZ
Respondents: ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES
Facts:
● Petitioner, Cruz, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in a criminal case where his father is the complaining
witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.
● However, in an Order, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appeal
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited
law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court
(Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
● Petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration but was
denied. Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against private
respondents and the public respondent MeTC. In a Resolution, RTC denied
the issuance an injunctive writ. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration;
and while pending its resolution, petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration. Both Motions were denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: WON the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant
Held: YES
● The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student,
from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant
in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
● However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the
Court En Banc clarified:
○ The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
■ Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of
a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
○ Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of
the bar.
● The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in
Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:
○ SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
● which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction
exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal
Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
● There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as
an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
● Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138.
The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred
to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should
not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as
private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is
not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.
● Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts
by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law
student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
Bulacan v. Torcino, G.R. No. L-44388, [January 30, 1985], 219 PHIL 224-231
See below. Same case under Law student rule.
B. Law student rule
In Re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A Be Actually
Supervised During Trial, B.M. No. 730, [June 10, 1997]
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts: The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was
represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-
College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising
lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the
hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On
December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring
Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In
compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public
Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule
138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. On the other hand, UP-OLA,
through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law
intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . .
. left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised
appearance."
Issue: Whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student
Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during
the trial.
Held: Yes. For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student
appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the
by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical
presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the
threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of
incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet
passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully
equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic
may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising
from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person
is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the
qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a
supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule
clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control
and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands
that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications,
are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control.
Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, [April 27, 2007], 550 PHIL 543-5512
Petitioner: FERDINAND CRUZ
Respondent:ALBERTO MINA
Facts
● Ferdinand Cruz filed before the METC a formal entry of appearance, as private prosecutor,
for grave threats, where his father is the complaining witness. He described himself as a third
year law student and justified his appearance as a private prosecutor on the bases of Sec 34 of
Rule and Bar Matter 730 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.
● The METC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Rule 138-A prohibits him, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his
father, the private complainant in the crim case w/o the supervision of an atty duly accredited by
the law school.
● Petitioner filed before the METC a motion for recon alleging that Rule 138-A does not have
the effect of superseding Sec 34 of Rule 138
● The METC denied the motion
● Petitioner filed before the RTC a certiorari and mandamus w/ prayer for prelim injunction
and TRO against METC
● The RTC denied the issuance of an injunctive writ
● Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 w/ prayer for prelim injunction
Issue
W/N the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party litigant
Held
YES
See Rule 138-A (Law Student Practice Rule), Secs 1 & 2
However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No 730, the Court clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
w/o the supervision of a lawyer.
The phrase “in the court of justice of the peace” in Bar Matter No 730 is subsequently changed to “in
the court of a municipality” as it now appears in Sec 34 of Rule 138.
No real distinction exists for under Sec 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term “Municipal Trial
Courts” shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, MTC in Cities, MTC, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Sec 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
may appear before the courts.
In this case, petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Sec 34 of Rule 138. Rule 138-A should
not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Therefore, the METC is directed to admit the entry of appearance of petitioner as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Cruz v. Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, [October 25, 2004], 484 PHIL 173-183
Petitioner: Ferdinand Cruz (complainant)
Respondent: Atty. Stanley Cabrera
Facts:
The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year
law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his
neighbor who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the
respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP
commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in the practice of law for
3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending
dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Held:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”
does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as
to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or
the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said
that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of
the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court
to condone even contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from
litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom
litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to
the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually
holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for
such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.
Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-51813-14, [November 29, 1983], 211 PHIL
373-380
Petitioners: ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
LUCILA
Respondents: HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Order of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz. Respondent judge held that the “fiscal’s claim that
appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there
is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the
guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying
professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught."
Petitioners Malana and Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P. College
of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to render
legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. In August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge sustained the respondent
fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases.
The basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
“In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.” Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action
is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts,
the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the
Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an
attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections
4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to
determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when
he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. And, they contend
that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the
case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
Issue: Whether the petitioners may appear as private prosecutors in the Municipal
Court.
Held: Yes.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court
a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City
Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence.
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance
as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the
private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the
case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private
prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control.
Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend
of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he
be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the
trial fiscal.
In the criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor
reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Cantimbuhan has
personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same,
he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
Dissenting Opinions
Aquino, J: I dissent. Senior law students should study their lessons and prepare for
the bar. They have no business appearing in court :-)
Melencio-Herrera, Teehankee, De Castro:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Cantimbuban, as the
complaining witness in the Criminal Cases is not a "party" within the meaning of the
said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A
complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect
of the civil liability.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific
provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule
138 and should be controlling. Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15
specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney,
in the prosecution of the offense.
Bulacan v. Torcino, G.R. No. L-44388, [January 30, 1985], 219 PHIL 224-231
Petitioner: Victoriano Bulacan
Respondent: Faustino and Felipa Torcino
Facts: Victoriano Bulacan filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte.
The complaint was signed by a friend, Nicolas Nunes Jr. and verified by the plaintiff
Bulacan himself.
After ventilation of the case, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to
demolish and remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed on the
land of the plaintiff.
On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an
admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false.
On September 24, 1973, Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to
dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the
answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be
raised for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also
stated that the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule.
The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the
plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar (Nunes) and who designated
himself merely as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the
municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule
7 which states:
SEC. 5. Signature and address. —”Every pleading of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address…..”
Issue: Whether or not the complaint must be signed by an attorney.
Held: No. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an
attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided
by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies
only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal
court.
In the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to represent
the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila. Court procedures are
often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past,
our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly
authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For
relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more
educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a
lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the
requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In
the verification, the plaintiff speci􀀵cally stated that he had caused Mr. Nuñes to
conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness
that Nuñes is not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the
pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed.
Where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is verified by the
party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect may be disregarded as
against a motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955)
Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to
protect the rights and interests of the parties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of
Appeals (80 SCRA 257): ". . . pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be
construed liberally, in
order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims,
and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may
be avoided . . ."
C. Solicitation of legal services
Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (Resolution), [September 4, 2009], 614
PHIL 327-337
Petitioner: PEDRO L. LINSANGAN
Respondent: ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his client to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a
loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card. Hence, this
complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card. The complaint was referred to the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services and
encroach the professional service of the complainant.
Held:
Yes. the court found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rules and other canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for
gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing"
(the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty
Although responent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, 157053, [August 19, 2003], 456 PHIL 560-568
Complainant: ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office
Respondent: ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO
Facts:
● On the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a paid
advertisement stated the following: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of
the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called the telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party where she was answered
by repondent's wife - claiming that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was
an expert in handling annulment cases and that he can guarantee a court
degree within four to six months. Respondent's wife also said that Atty.
Simbillo charges P48,000.00, the first half payable at the filing of the case,
and the second half after a decision has been rendered.
● It was also revealed that similar advertisements were published in different
issues of the Manila Bulletin and The Philippine Star.
● Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the CPR and Rule 138, Sec.
27 of the ROC.
● The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed a
Resolution finding respondent guilty of violation of the aforementioned
Rules, and suspended him from the practice of law for one year with a
warning. In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP.
● Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue: WON respondent was in violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the CPR and
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the ROC
Held: YES
● Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
● Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to
do so.
● It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.
It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession
from a business:
○ A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product,
and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
much money;
○ A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
○ A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
○ A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.
● There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While
he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again
after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention
to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised
his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
 Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's
authority.
● What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as
a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
● Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the
use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.
● WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, [March 11, 1991], 272
PHIL 628-639
Petitioners: FLORENCIO FABILLO and JOSEFA TANA (substituted by their heirs
Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, Cristeta F. Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo)
Respondents: THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third
Civil Case Division) and ALFREDO MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita M.
Murillo, Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol)
Facts:
In her last will and testament, Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a
house and lot in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte which was covered by tax
declaration No. 19335, and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in
Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte. After Justina's death, Florencio filed a petition for the
probate of said will. The probate court approved the project of partition "with the
reservation that the ownership of the land declared under Tax Declaration No. 19335
and the house erected thereon be litigated and determined in a separate
proceedings."
Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in
recovering the San Salvador property.
Florencio and Murillo entered into the following contract:
"CONTRACT OF SERVICES"
xxx
That I have retained and engaged the services of Atty. ALFREDO M.
MURILLO, married and of legal age, with residence and postal address at
Santa Fe, Leyte to be my lawyer not only in Special Proceedings No. 843
but also in Civil Case No. 3532 under the following terms and conditions;
That he will represent me and my heirs, in case of my demise in the two
cases until their successful conclusion or until the case is settled to my entire
satisfaction;
That for and in consideration for his legal services, in the two cases, I hereby
promise and bind myself to pay Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO, in case of
success in any or both cases the sum equivalent to FORTY PER CENTUM
(40%) of whatever benefit I may derive from such cases to be implemented
as follows:
If the house and lot in question is finally awarded to me or a part of the same
by virtue of an amicable settlement, and the same is sold, Atty. Murillo, is
hereby constituted as Atty. in-fact to sell and convey the said house and lot
and he shall be given as his compensation for his services as counsel and
as attorney-in-fact the sum equivalent to forty per centum of the purchase
price of the house and lot;
If the same house and lot is just mortgage(d) to any person, Atty. Murillo
shall be given the sum equivalent to forty per centum (40%) of the proceeds
of the mortgage;
If the house and lot is leased to any person, Atty. Murillo shall be entitled to
receive an amount equivalent to 40% (FORTY PER CENTUM) of the rentals
of the house and lot, or a part thereof;
If the house and lot or a portion thereof is just occupied by the undersigned
or his heirs, Atty. Murillo shall have the option of either occupying or leasing
to any interested party FORTY PER CENT of the house and lot.
 Atty. Alfredo M. Murillo shall also be given as part of his compensation for
legal services in the two cases FORTY PER CENTUM of whatever
damages, which the undersigned can collect in either or both cases,
provided, that in case I am awarded attorney's fees, the full amount of
attorney's fees shall be given to the said Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO;
That in the event the house and lot is (sic) not sold and the same is
maintained by the undersigned or his heirs, the costs of repairs,
maintenance, taxes and insurance premiums shall be for the account of
myself or my heirs and Attorney Murillo, in proportion to our rights and
interest thereunder — that is forty per cent shall be for the account of Atty.
Murillo and sixty per cent shall be for my account or my heirs
(Sgd.) FLORENCIO FABILLO
(Sgd.) JOSEFA T. FABILLO
WITH MY CONFORMITY:
(Sgd.) ALFREDO M. MURILLO
(Sgd.) ROMAN T. FABILLO (Sgd.) CRISTETA F. AGLINTE
(Witness) (Witness)"
Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for Florencio Fabillo Civil Case No. 3632
against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The case was
terminated on when the court, upon the parties' joint motion in the nature of a
compromise agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of the
San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land.
Consequently, Murillo proceeded to implement the contract of services between him
and Florencio Fabillo by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over
40% of said properties. He installed a tenant in the Pugahanay property. Sometime in
1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties and refused to
give Murillo his share of their produce. Inasmuch as his demands for his share
of the produce of the Pugahanay property were unheeded, Murillo filed a complaint
captioned "ownership of a parcel of land, damages and appointment of a receiver"
against Florencio Fabillo, his wife Josefa Taña, and their children Ramon (sic) Fabillo
and Cristeta F. Maglinte.
Murillo prayed that he be declared the lawful owner of forty percent of the two
properties and that defendants be directed to pay him jointly and severally P900.00
per annum from 1966 until he would be given his share of the produce of the land.
In their answer, the defendants stated that the consent to the contract of services of
the Fabillo spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into
believing that Special Proceedings No. 843 on the probate of Justina's will was
already terminated when actually it was still pending resolution; and that the
contingent fee of 40% of the value of the San Salvador property was excessive, unfair
and unconscionable considering the nature of the case, the length of time spent for it,
the efforts exerted by Murillo, and his professional standing.
They prayed that the contract of services be declared null and void; that Murillo's fee
be fixed at 10% of the assessed value of P7,780 of the San Salvador property; that
Murillo be ordered to vacate the portion of the San Salvador property which he had
occupied; and that the Pugahanay property which was not the subject of either
Special Proceedings No. 843 or Civil Case No. 3532 be declared as the exclusive
property of Florencio Fabillo.
The lower court upheld Murillo's claim for "contingent attorney's fees of 40% of the
value of recoverable properties." However, the court declared Murillo to be the lawful
owner of 40% of both the San Salvador and Pugahanay properties and the
improvements thereon. The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari. The Fabillos herein question
the appellate court's interpretation of the contract of services and contend that it is in
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
1. Whether the contract of services is in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil
Code
2. Whether Atty. Murillo is entitled to the 40% of both the San Salvador and
Pugahanay properties
Held:
1. No. The contract of services did not violate said provision of law. Article
1491 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 5 thereof, prohibits lawyers
from acquiring by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, properties
and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if
the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency
of the litigation involving the client's property.
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is
not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because
the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but
only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In
fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien
over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.
As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is
committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as
to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of
services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo.
2. No.
However, we disagree with the courts below that the contingent fee stipulated
between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo is forty percent of the properties subject of
the litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. A careful scrutiny of the
contract shows that the parties intended forty percent of the value of the properties as
Murillo's contingent fee. This is borne out by the stipulation that "in case of success of
any or both cases," Murillo shall be paid "the sum equivalent to forty per centum of
whatever benefit" Fabillo would derive from favorable judgments. The same
stipulation was earlier embodied by Murillo in his letter of August 9, 1964 aforequoted.
Worth noting are the provisions of the contract which clearly states that in case the
properties are sold, mortgaged, or leased, Murillo shall be entitled respectively to 40%
of the "purchase price," "proceeds of the mortgage," or "rentals." The contract is
vague, however, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold,
mortgaged or leased because Murillo is allowed "to have the option of occupying or
leasing to any interested party forty per cent of the house and lot." Had the parties
intended that Murillo should become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties, it
would have been clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract considering that
the Fabillos would part with actual portions of their properties and cede the same to
Murillo.
The ambiguity of said provision, however, should be resolved against Murillo as it was
he himself who drafted the contract. This is in consonance with the rule of
interpretation that, in construing a contract of professional services between a lawyer
and his client, such construction as would be more favorable to the client should be
adopted even if it would work prejudice to the lawyer. Rightly so because of the
inequality in situation between an attorney who knows the technicalities of the law on
the one hand and a client who usually is ignorant of the vagaries of the law on the
other hand.
Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof,
the length of time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is entitled to
the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees for
services rendered in the case which ended on a compromise agreement. In so ruling,
we uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of
rendering service and securing justice, not moneymaking. For the worst scenario that
can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all
trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy."
Yu v. Bondal, A.C. No. 5534, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 247-257
Petitioner: JAYNE Y. YU (COMPLAINANT)
Respondent: RENATO LAZARO BONDAL
Facts: On March 30, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent as counsel in the
following cases: (1) "Jayne Yu. v. Swire Realty and Development Corp," for
Rescission with Damages filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
(2) I.S. No. 00-22089-90, "Jayne Yu v. Lourdes Fresnoza Boon," for Estafa, (3) I.S.
No. 2000-G-22087-88, "Jayne Yu v. Julie Teh," for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, (4) I.S. No. 2000-D-11826, "Jayne Yu v. Mona Lisa San Juan" for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and (5) I.S. No. 2000-D-11827, "Jayne Yu v. Elizabeth
Chan Ong," also for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In the Retainer Agreement
dated March 30, 2000, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of
P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an Appearance Fee of
P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she
would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee. DTaSIc
Respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp; due to
respondent's negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely
appealed to the Department of Justice; respondent negligently failed to inform
complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for
purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was eventually dismissed by
Resolution dated August 14, 2000; and respondent compelled her to settle the two
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan
Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms.
Respondent thus demanded from respondent, by letter of June 14, 2001, for the
return of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases.
Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the estafa case against
Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan.
Complainant through counsel thus demanded, by letter 13 of August 8, 2001, the
return of the rest of the files, particularly that dealing with Swire Realty and
Development Corporation and Julie Teh. In the same letter, complainant also
demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI Family Bank
Checks amounting to P51,716.54, they being intended to represent payment of filing
fees for the case against Swire Realty and Development Corporation which
respondent failed to file.
As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with complainant's valid
demands in evident bad faith and to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint
charging him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bondal should be held liable for being grossly negligent
and violative of CPR.
Held: No. Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar Confidant that
complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. The charges against him must thus be dismissed.
From the records of the case, it is culled that except for the case against
Swire Development Corporation, the other 4 cases referred by complainant to
respondent were filed in court but were dismissed or terminated for causes not
attributable to respondent.
The case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon in I.S. No. 00-22089-90
was dismissed by the Makati Prosecutor's Office by Resolution dated August 18,
2000 due to lack of probable cause.
Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, docketed as I.S. No. 99-H-
2780, had been previously filed by complainant against Ms. Boon which case was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 30 As thus observed by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the filing of an appeal from the prosecutor's resolution would have been
inutile since the facts and issues raised in the estafa case had already been twice
passed upon by the Office of the City Prosecutor, hence, it would likely be dismissed.
No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in the dismissal
of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 against Julie Teh. By Resolution of August 14, 2000 of
the Makati Prosecutor's Office, it is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the
ground that the offense charged did not actually exist and complainant failed to
appear and present the original checks.
On the alleged failure of respondent to appear during the hearing of I.S. No.
2000-G-22087-88 and his failure to present the original of the checks subject thereof,
they being then in the possession of complainant who was abroad at that time: Such
failure to present the original of the checks cannot solely be attributed to respondent,
for she herself was guilty of neglect.
As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with the terms dictated by the therein
respondents Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong, upon the promise of
respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee in the complaint to be filed
against Swire Development, , she failed to show that the promise by respondent that
he would waive the 10% success fee was for the purpose of defrauding her or of such
nature as to constitute undue influence, thereby depriving her of reasonable freedom
of choice.
If, admittedly, the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the
amount of P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent
rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a
contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid
for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292 (Resolution), [February 26, 1999], 363
PHIL 369-376
Petitioner: JULIETA SAMONTE
Respondent: ROLANDO GATDULA
Facts
● Julieta Samonte filed a complaint charging Atty Rolando Gatdula with grave misconduct
consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict w/ his official
functions as Branch Clerk of Court. She alleged that the respondent gave her his calling card
with the name “Baligod, GATDULA, Tacardon, Dimalig and Celera” and tried to convince her to
change her lawyer.
● Atty Gatdula denied having assumed any position with the said firm but he did not deny
that his name appears on the calling card
● Complainant failed to appear at the hearings
● The investigating RTC judge held that while the respondent may not be actually and directly
employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as partner give the
impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under RA 6713. However, complainant failed to establish by
convincing evid that respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the
violation committed by respondent in having his name included/retained in the calling card may
only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must be admonished and censured.
Issue
W/N there was a solicitation
Held
YES
RA 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and
Employees declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others, engage in private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.
In this case, the respondent admits that it is his name appearing on the calling card, a permissible
form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. The card clearly gives the impression that he is
connected with the said law firm.
Thus, the inclusion or retention of respondent’s name in the professional card constitutes
engagement in the private practice of law which violates RA 6713.
Accordingly, the respondent is reprimanded. He is ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the
firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie, A.C. No. 2131, [May 10, 1985], 221 PHIL 62-64
Petitioner: Adriano Dacanay
Respondent: BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR
Facts:
Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which
contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney
Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie “and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law
office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by
the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30
cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine
bar, practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & McKenzie.
Issue:
Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the
Philippines.
Held:
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
RATIO: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondents’ use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation
that being associated with the firm they could “render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment.” This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to
practice law here.
Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, Adm. Case No. 1117, [March 20, 1944], 74
PHIL 579-581
Complainant: Director of Religious Affairs
Respondent: Estanislao Bayot
Facts:
The respondent Bayot, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which
reads as follows:
"Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation
on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105
Tel. 2-41-60."
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court and promised not
to repeat the same conduct again. In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any
case at law by reason thereof.
Issue: Whether respondent’s act amounts to a misconduct.
Held: Yes.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct."
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the
Court is of the opinion and so decides that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.

In re: Tagorda, G.R. No. 32329, [March 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 37-43
Petitioner: Government of the Philippines
Respondent: Luis B.Tagorda
Facts: Attorney Luis Tagorda carried around and made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which advertised his services as a lawyer.
He also wrote this letter to a barrio lieutenant.
This administrative case concerns whether or not Sec 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2828, as well as Canons 27 and 28 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics were violated by Atty. Tagorda with his representations and
solicitations for legal services.
Sec 21, Code of Civil Procedure: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
Canon 27: Advertising, direct or indirect ……”The publication or circulation of ordinary
simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional.”
Canon 28: Stirring up litigation, directly or through agents….. “It is disreputable to
hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for
personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients”
Issue: Whether or not Tagorda violated the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Held: Yes. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted
facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law
and those canons. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.
The respondent Luis B. Tagorda is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law
for the period of one month from April 1, 1929.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993]
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by
herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Held:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano
vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-
how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear
is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for
by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of
law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
U.S. v. Ney, G.R. No. L-3593, [March 23, 1907], 8 PHIL 146-150
Plaintiff: THE UNITED STATES
Defendants: C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE
Facts:
● In 1902, this court decided that defendant, J. Garcia Basque, was not
entitled to admission to practice in the Philippines on the ground that after
the change of sovereignty, he had elected to remain a SPanish subject and
as such was not qualified for admission to the bar.
● In 1904, he made an agreement with defendant Ney, a practicing attorney,
to carry on business together, sending out a circular which states that they
had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts and that
Bosque would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish Law. Since that time, Bosque has not personally appeared in
courts, and with one exception, occurring through an inadvertance, papers
from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any
designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque —
C.W. Ney, abogado."
● On two occasions, this court refused to consider petitions so signed with the
names of the defendant and the practice being repeated, ordered the papers
sent to the Attorney-General.
Issue: WON defendants should be punished for contempt
Held: NO
● Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions."
● Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to
punishment for acts so defined.
● As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this
court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order
that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the
right to practice law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him,
notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been
entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court
and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A
mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and
constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm
circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice
of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right
and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would devote
himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law
plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago,
standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing
law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not
amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands.
Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American
advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the
court of New York State. Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque
amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was
a party.
● Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not
answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other
hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is
liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it
did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner
Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature
itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who
repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our
indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by
him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to
the customary standard of members of the bar.
● The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum
of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten
days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
D. Attorney’s fees and compensation for legal services
People v. Estebia, G.R. No. L-26868 (Resolution), [February 27, 1969], 136 PHIL
375-383
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO, Member of the Philippine
Bar.
Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-appellant: REMIGIO ESTEBIA
Facts:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape and sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment.
On December 14, 1966, Atty. Lope E. Adriano was appointed by this Court as
Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to
prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable
him to examine the case, the record would be at his disposal.
Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19, 1967, Adriano
sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On
February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second). This was
followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also
for fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21,
he even sought a special extension of five days. All these motions for extension were
granted. The brief was due on April 26,1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from
notice thereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file
appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to
give any explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court on October 3,
1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen
days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said
resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic
disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed. Finally, on
December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from
notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross
misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this
Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He
ignored the resolution.
Issue: Whether Atty. Lope Adriano should be suspended from the practice of law.
Held:
Yes.
Counsel de oficio’s duty to the indigent clients
By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a
destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.
Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the
required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner," our
Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should ways exert his best efforts" in the
indigent's behalf.
His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that
responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It has been said that courts
should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys
appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who
is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain
ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.
Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long
delay need not be essayed. Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he
will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge and
discretion."
Counsel de oficio’s duty to the court
An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." The first Canon of the Code
of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance." By his oath of office, the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful disobedience of
lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or
disbarment. Counsel has received no less than three resolution of this Court requiring
compliance of its orders. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. Disrespect is
here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a
propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel
de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court. For the
reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law
throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.
Junio v. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, [December 18, 2001], 423 PHIL 808-818
Petitioner: ROSARIO JUNIO (Complainant)
Respondent: ATTY. SALVADOR GRUPO
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Salvador M.
Grupo for malpractice and gross misconduct. Complainant Rosario N. Junio alleged
that she engaged the services of respondent then a private practitioner, for the
redemption of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20394
registered in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and
located at Concepcion, Loay, Bohol. Complainant entrusted to respondent the
amount of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property.
Respondent, however, for no valid reason did not redeem the property; as a result of
which the right of redemption was lost and the property was eventually forfeited.
Despite repeated demands made by complainant and without justifiable cause,
respondent had continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him. In his
Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for
which it was given. After he failed to redeem the property he requested the
complainant that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he
had an urgent need for some money a himself to help defray his children's
educational expenses. According to respondent, it was a personal request and a
private matter between respondent and complainant. Respondent also alleged that he
executed a promissory note for the amount.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.||.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and ordered him suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from
notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed from
December 12, 1996. According to the Court, respondent's liability is not for
misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their
clients unless the latter's interests are protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did
he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has
also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan
"because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and that, because of the passage of
time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only underscored his blatant disregard
of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor.||
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29184, [January 30, 1989], 251 PHIL 532-
538
Petitioner: BENEDICTO LEVISTE
Respondents: ROSA DEL ROSARIO, DE GUZMAN BROTHERS AND SISTERS
Facts
● Leviste entered into a written agreement with Rosa Del Rosario to appear as her counsel in
a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima Reselva. Under the will, a piece of
real prop was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner’s contingent fee would be
30% of the prop that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.
● Petitioner filed the petition for probate
● De Guzman brothers and sisters opposed
● Petitioner received a letter from Rosa informing him that she was terminating his services
as her counsel due to “conflicting interest”
● Petitioner filed a motion to intervene to protect his rights to fees for professional services
● The trial court denied the motion on the ground that he had not filed a claim for attorney’s
fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien
● Petitioner filed a formal statement of claim for attorney’s fees and recording of attorney’s
lien which was noted in the court’s order
● Rosa and the special administratix-legatee, filed a motion to withdraw petition for probate
alleging that Rosa waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman
brothers and sisters shall inherit all the props left by the decedent
● The trial court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were
not satisfied
● Petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal
● Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the petitioner
was not a party in interest
● Petitioner opposed claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision
sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his
former client, Rosa
● The trial court dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner’s motion for substitution
● On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper
party to appeal the decision
● Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner argued that by virtue of his contract of services
w/ Rosa, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Art 1052 of the Civil Code he has a right to
accept for his client Rosa to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect
repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney’s fees
Issue: W/N an atty who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees,
prosecute an appeal despite his client’s refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court
Held: NO
Art 1052 of the Civil Code reads: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own
creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
In this case, the petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa. The payment of his fees is contingent and
dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was
dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Petitioner is not entitled to his fee.
In Paras v Narciso, the Court held that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere
in its probate.
Here, petitioner was not a party to the probate proceedings in the lower court. He had no direct
interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former
counsel for a prospective devisee.
Furthermore, the notice of an attorney’s lien did not entitle the atty to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is
awarded a certain sum by court.
Rustia v. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, G.R. No. 19695, [November 17,
1922], 44 PHIL 62-66
Petitioner: Juan Rustia
Respondent: THE JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Thirteenth
Judicial District, Honorable FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ, ROSA H. DE
PORCUNA and her husband JUSTO M. PORCUNA and EULALIA
MAGSOMBOL
Facts:
It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for
himself and on behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a
written contract, retained the petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in case No.
1435 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Batangas in which they were the
plaintiffs.. Later on, the plaintiffs presented a motion to the court saying they had
already settled with the defendant and requested the dismissal of the case without
any further intervention by their attorney. The petitioner alleges that he did not
discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an unsuccessful effort to
obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed the
present petition for a writ of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24, 1922, this court
denied the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the attorney is entitled to be notified of his client’s motion to dismiss.
Held:
No, he is not entitled.
Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client
may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is
nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own
litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right
to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large
proportion of the sum recovered in case of success, this does not give the
attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from
compromising the suit. (4 Cyc., 990, and authorities cited in Note 6; see also
Louque vs. Dejan, 129 La., 519; Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 19
Ann. Cas., 589 and Note.)
In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to
do. By appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their
lawyer. The petitioner's contingent interest in the judgment rendered did not appear of
record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to
notice of the motion.
Aro v. Nañawa, G.R. No. L-24163, [April 28, 1969], 137 PHIL 745-764
Petitioner: Regino Aro
Responents: THE HON. ARSENIO NAÑAWA, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court
of First Instance of Laguna, LUIS MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY, AURELIA
MARTINEZ, GREGORIO LONTOK, MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMO PORTO and
ROSARIO ANDAYA
Facts:
The services of petitioner, as practicing attorney, was engaged by respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs in the estate
of their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, consisting of properties which were in the
possession of the respondents Aurelia Martinez (aunt-in-law), spouses Gregorio
Lontok and Maria Mendoza and spouses Maximo Porto and Rosario Andaya. Since
respondents Magtibay (pauper litigants) were without means to prosecute their claim
against the persons concerned, respondents Magtibay agreed with the petitioner to
avail of his services and to entrust the prosecution of their claim on a contingent
basis, as shown in the agreement.
By virtue of said agreement, herein petitioner took the necessary steps to gather the
needed papers and documents to file a complaint. Defendants interposed a motion to
dismiss but was denied by respondent Judge. After hearing on said motion, there was
a conversation which took place between herein petitioner and the attorney of the
defendants for an amicable settlement.
On October 23, 1964, petitioner had waited for said plaintiffs (now respondents
Magtibay) to go to his office on or before said date for the engagement mentioned,
but they failed to come. It was only on October 28, 1964, when herein petitioner
received a copy of the order and to his surprise he also received on the said day a
second motion to dismiss dated October 26, 1964, together with Annex 'A' of said
motion, which is entitled KASULATAN NG PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA
HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, signed by the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia, were
they had made an extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Lucio
Magtibay and Aurelia adjudicated to the plaintiffs one-fourth share in the properties of
the spouses and three-fourth share of the defendant Aurelia Martinez, but making it
appear also that said plaintiffs waived their share in favor of Aurelia Martinez.
Because of the fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was deprived of his contingent
fees as agreed upon.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the second motion to dismiss and demanded that his
compensation as counsel be in the proportion of one-third of the shares of
plaintiffs, if in land, or in the amount of P1,000.00, if in cash, and to record the
same and expenses advanced by him for the plaintiffs in the sum of P22.15 as lien
over the properties in litigation. The respondent Judge, instead of denying the second
motion to dismiss and fixing petitioner’s attorney's fees and recording the same as
lien, dismissed the case.
In his petition for certiorari, Aro stated that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge in dismissing the case on the basis of the compromise
agreement of the parties, entered into at the back of petitioner, notwithstanding the
reservation made in his favor to file an action against both parties with respect to his
alleged attorney's fees, as well as a case of mandamus "to order and command the
said respondent judge" to take cognizance of and resolve his opposition and for the
court to fix the compensation he should be paid.
Issue: Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties to defraud Aro
can be set aside.
Held: Yes, but only insofar as it prejudices the payment of petitioner's claim of
attorney's fees.
Under Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at
any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant
from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer
However, on the same consideration of equity, and for the better protection of
lawyers, who, trusting in the good faith of their clients, render professional services on
contingent basis, and so that it may not be said that this Court sanctions in any way
the questionable practice of clients of compromising their cases at the back of their
counsel with the consequence that the stipulated contingent fees of the lawyer are
either unreasonably reduced or even completely rendered without basis, as in this
case — wherein the clients waived the whole of their rights in favor of their
opponent after the latter had acknowledged, in effect, the correctness of said
clients' contention — the Court has decided to grant the herein petition, in so far as
the rights of petitioner have been prejudiced by the questioned compromise
agreement. While the Court reaffirmed the rule that "the client has an undoubted right
to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer,” it was held that when
such compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive him of
the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees, and that
when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the
adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer's contingent interest or such
interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the better
practice is to settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after
hearing all the affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise
in so far as it does not adversely affect the rights of the lawyer.
Surely, "the client cannot, by settling, compromising or dismissing his suit during its
pendency, deprive the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless
the lawyer consents to such settlement, compromise or dismissal," for the attorney is
or "shall be entitled to have and recover from his client — a reasonable compensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney.”
True it is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute
another in his place," (Sec. 26, Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same
provision also provides that "if the contract between client and attorney had been
reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable
cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full compensation . . ." In
the case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement in question and even
inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner,
petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed him. Such implied dismissal appears to
have been made without justifiable cause, and so, the abovequoted provision of
Section 26, Rule 138 applies here. The terms of the compromise in question, as
spelled out in Annex A of Annex I of the petition, indicate clearly that Aurelia Martinez,
the defendant aunt-in-law of petitioner's clients, acknowledged that the rights of said
clients were practically as alleged by petitioner in the complaint he filed for them. In
other words, through the services of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a
recognition, which had been previously denied by their aunt-in- law, that they
were entitled to a 1/4 share in the estate left by their uncle. Under these
circumstances, and since it appears that said clients have no other means to pay
petitioner, since they instituted their case as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was
aware of the terms of their contract of professional services with petitioner, said
clients had no right to waive the portion of their such acknowledged rights in
favor of their opponent to the extent that such waiver would prejudice the
stipulated contingent interest of their lawyer and their aunt-in- law had no right to
accept such waiver unqualifiedly. Under the circumstance extant in the record, it is
clear that the compromise agreement in question falls short of the moral requirements
of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of the respondent court are hereby set
aside in so far as they prejudice the payment of petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in
the form of either one-third of the 1/4 share acknowledged as his clients in the
compromise in question or P1,000.00, which should constitute as a lien on the said
share, in spite of the waiver thereof in favor of respondent Aurelia Martinez.
Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R. Nos. 179892-93, [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 524-547
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts: Atty. Orocio represented several National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
employees in a suit against NAPOCOR and NAPOCOR Executives Anguluan and
Dy.
The suit was filed to compel NAPOCOR to liquidate and distribute funds from the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to those NAPOCOR employees who had contributed to the
fund and were entitled to their share of the same, having already retired, resigned or
separated.
Atty. Orocio had a “legal retainer agreement” with the NAPOCOR employees he
represented which states that he is entitled to: “Contingency or success fees of fifteen
percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid) are
recovered;” The employees agreed to this.
Orocio asked the RTC to issue an order declaring him entitled to collect an amount
equivalent to 15% of the monies due the NAPOCOR employees and the RTC granted
it.
The Court of Appeals however, annulled the RTC order, on the ground that 15% is
too
much.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Orocio’s professional fee of 15% of monies recoverable is
a reasonable charge.
Ruling: No. Atty. Orocio’s 15% attorney’s fees should be reduced to 10%. As such,
petitioner is entitled to collect only, as attorney’s fees, an amount equivalent to 10% of
the ₱119,196,000.00 or ₱11,919,600.00.
A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional
services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be
allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount to be unreasonable or
unconscionable.
If the stipulated amount for attorney’s fees is excessive, the contract may be
disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity thereto.
It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a
moneymaking venture. A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a
trustee of his client’s cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an
officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering
justice in society.
Pineda v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, [August 23, 2006], 531 PHIL 207-213
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as
JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo
de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner
regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their
properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently
filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court.
On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was
declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.They,
including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments
from petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner
additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million which the latter, however, refused to
pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as "full
payment for settlement.
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for payment of
lawyers’ fees for P50 million.
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus,
P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de
Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Issues:
 ● (1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for
additional legal fees and
● (2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
Held:
1. Yes
2. 2. Yes, but for a reasonable amount and should not be considered as
shocking to the court.
First, the Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees.
Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value
of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were
demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, YES the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer
deserves."1The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case,
where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not
meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them
was an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
However, as lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an
honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents’
despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people.
The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent
profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere
incident.
Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge
petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect.
The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioner’s
business — all of which were not denied by respondents — more than sufficed for the
work they did. The "full payment for settlement" should have discharged petitioner’s
obligation to them.
Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 104600, [July 2,
1999], 369 PHIL 1-13
Petitioner: RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA
Respondents: EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE COMPANY
Facts:
● Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the firm
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the RTC
Makati a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against PLDT. Atty.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI.
● After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA P100,000.00. The trial court issued
a resolution granting ETPI's application for preliminary restrictive and
mandatory injunctions and it was during this period when SAGA was
dissolved. Four of the junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa,
De Ocampo & Africa (RADA) and took over as counsel in ETPI's case,
where the latter signed a retainer agreement with the former.
● During the pendency of the case, petitioner received a letter from ETPI
signed E. M. Villanueva, President and Chief Executive Office where it
stated that ETPI was terminating the retainer contract. Petitioner filed with
the RTC a notice of attorney's lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to
the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the same date,
petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing
statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
● Petitioners confirmed that the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and
that the same was entered as a judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for the
enforcement of attorney's lien with the RTC makati and then appraised the
SC by manifestation. PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is
not a party to nor in any manner involved in the attorney's len being asserted
by Atty. Rilloraza.
● The trial court in its resolutions denied the motion for enforcement of
attorney's lien. Petitioner appealed to the SC and ETPI filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal. In an order, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.
● Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC but was remanded
to the CA, which dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees
Held: YES. But the SC is not convinced with the petitioner's arguments that the
services RADA rendered merit the amount they are claiming.
● We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its
inception until ETPI terminated the law firm's services. Petitioners' claim for
attorney's fees hinges on two grounds: (1) the fact that Atty. Rilloraza
 personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA; and (2) the
retainer agreement.
● First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the
complaint. When a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not
employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the
case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel
appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement.
Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated the filing of the complaint
considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more ETPI paid SAGA
P100,000.00 representing services performed prior to SAGA's dissolution.
SAGA assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle
the case for the firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally,
he did so for and in behalf of SAGA.
● Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement the firm is
entitled to the fees agreed upon, which provides:
"6.2 B. Court Cases:
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect
collection or judicial action be taken by adverse party, our attorney's
fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the
value of the property acquired or liability saved."
● However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Atty. Rilloraza
played a vital role during the inception of the case and in the course of the
trial. We cannot also ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship
between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination
by amicable agreement. To award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of
the sum of P125,671,886.04 plus P50,000,000.00 paid by PLDT to ETPI
would be too unconscionable.
● "In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a
reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their
professional services." "A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be
reasonable." A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for
his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a
quantum meruit basis.
● "Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis
for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his client." Recovery of attorney's
fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no
express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the
lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for
attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or
unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for attorney's fees is
void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for
justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when
lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's fees.
● In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered
are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy,
(2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of
the lawyer. A determination of these factors would indispensably require
nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondents can adduce
evidence to establish the right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to
oppose or refute the same. The trial court has the principal task of fixing the
amount of attorney's fees. Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Tan Tek Beng v. David, A.C. No. 1261, [December 29, 1983], 211 PHIL 547-551
Complainant: TAN TEK BENG
Respondent: TIMOTEO A. DAVID
Facts:
Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer and Timoteo David, a lawyer, entered into an agreement
whereby David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with
the clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There
were mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement,
Tan Tek Beng denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the
Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil
action to enforce the agreement.
Issue: Whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David.
Held:
Yes. The said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Malpractice
ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice". That
meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional"
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek
Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical
code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession"
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
De Guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc., G.R. No. 46396, [September 30,
1939], 68 PHIL 643-649
Petitioner: ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN (Complainant)
Respondent: VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC. and NICOLAS CONCEPCION
Facts: The Visayan Rapid transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., during
the time the legal services are claimed to have been rendered by the petitioner, were
operating automobile lines in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent,
Nicolas Concepcion, was at the time the president, general manager, and controlling
stockholder of these two transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion
engaged the professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in
the City of Manila. The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the suppression,
reduction and refund of certain tolerates on various bridges along the line operated by
the respondent transportation companies.
At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it appears that the
respondent transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges
up to December 31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-seventh of their gross
income up to that date, and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges
were detrimental to the transportation business of the respondent if not remedied in
time. The herein petitioner accordingly took steps to obtain first the suppression, and
later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund of P50,000 of toll
charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros.
Believing that the suppression of tolls on the bago and Malogo bridges could
not be effected, the petitioner filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, petition Exhibit B asking for the reduction of toll charges over the
eleven (11) bridges in Occidental Negros.
The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the transportation
companies' petition and urged the provincial board of Occidental Negros to act
favorably. The provincial board, however, declined to follow the suggestion. And on
April 10, 1935 "upon authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the Department
of the Interior" the provincial board refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected
from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc., and the Negros Transportation
Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future payments for tolls by said
companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been benefited
with an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months.
It is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation,
and the only question is the reasonable amount to which he is entitled. He claimed in
the lower court the sum of P20,000. The trial court awarded him P10,000. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to P3,500.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid to De Guzman is reasonable.
Held: No. Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for the services rendered, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, to the extent of the services rendered. and the professional standing of
the lawyer . . ." The following are the circumstances to be considered in determining
the compensation of an attorney: the amount and character of the services rendered;
the labor, time, and trouble involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or
business in which the services were rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount
of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the
employment, the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services;
the professional character and social standing of the attorney; the results secured;
and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than when
it is not.
As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of
the rates of the tolls of the bridges in the said province, the respondents were
benefited with an economy of P78,448. The refund to the said corporations of the
amount of P50,000 is a great relief and enhancement of their business. Facts and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of
the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which the
petitioner had already received.
Dee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77439, [August 24, 1989], 257 PHIL 661-671
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Issue:
WON there was Atty-client relationship between the parties
Held:

Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 120592, [March 14, 1997], 336 PHIL 705-725
Petitioner: TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT
Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL
NOEL A. CRUZ
Facts:
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent and Atty. Emmanuel Noel A.
Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby the Union obligated itself to pay Cruz
a retainer fee of P3000. During the existence of the agreement, the Union referred to
Cruz the claim of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) which was filed with the NLRC. The Union obtained a
favorable judgment from the NLRC and was challenged before the SC by TRB. The
SC modified the decision, deleting the award for mid-year and year-end bonuses but
affirmed the award for holiday pay differential. When he received the order of the SC,
Cruz notified the Union, TRB and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his
attorney’s lien over the award for the holiday pay differential. He filed a motion with
the labor arbiter to determine the attorney’s fees and prayed that the amount of 10%
of the total award be given. The labor arbiter granted his petition which led the Union
to appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter and
denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Union argues that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award for
attorney’s fees and argues that the said fees should have been incorporated in the
main case and not after the SC has already reviewed and passed upon the decision
of the NLRC. Also, there shouldn’t be payment of attorney’s fees anymore because of
anything due to Cruz is already covered by the P3,000.00 retainer.
On the other hand, Atty. Cruz argues that attorney’s fees are mere incidents of the
main case where the Union was awarded its money claims and to include such fees
in the case would presuppose that the fees will be paid by Traders to the Union. Also,
according to him, the P3000.00 retainer fee is not the attorney’s fees contemplated
for.
Issue:
Is the private respondent entitled to Atty.’s fees aside from his P3,000 retainer fee?
Held:
Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by
and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by
the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the
cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or
as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney’s fees which private respondent demanded before the
labor arbiter. A claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in
which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. While a
claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to
be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s
fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the
courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the
client.
Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for
the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the
award’s complete resolution.
The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover
the services the latter actually rendered before the LA and the NLRC in behalf of the
former. As stipulated in their retainer’s agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely
as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services.
There are two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future
services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the
routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future
services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the
client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee. The fees are paid whether or not there are
cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is
deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or
other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by
the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases demanding special or
individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for
attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
The P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and
the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers
only the law firm’s commitment to render the legal services enumerated in said
agreement..
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation
which lawyers should receive for their professional services. However, the value of
private respondent’s legal services should not be established on the basis of Article
111 of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:
“(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.”
The implementing provision 38 of the foregoing article further states:
“Sec. 11. Attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees in any judicial or administrative
proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.
The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.”
The fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney’s fees recoverable as
indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing part. The 10%
attorney’s fees fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney’s fees the victorious party
may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not revent the
NLRC from fixing an amount lower than 10% ceiling prescribed by the article when
circumstances warrant it.
The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client
should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit which means “as much
as he deserves,” which is used in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him
from his client. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being
agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis.
But instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter erroneously set the
amount of attorney’s fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He
completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of
attorney’s fees.
Article 111 of the Labor Code may not be used as the lone standard in fixing the
exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.
While it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney’s fees, it does not direct the
instantaneous and automatic award of attorney’s fees in such maximum limit. The
criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, in
assessing the proper amount. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services
rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the
importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing
other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary
charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the
lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i)
the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the
professional standing of the lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby
ORDERED to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees to private.
Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, [March 11, 1991], 272
PHIL 628-639
Petitioners: FLORENCIO FABILLO and JOSEFA TANA (substituted by their heirs
Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, Cristeta F. Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo)
Respondents: THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third
Civil Case Division) and ALFREDO MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita M.
Murillo, Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol)
Facts:
In her last will and testament, Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a
house and lot covered by tax declaration No. 19335 in San Salvador Street, Palo,
Leyte and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo,
Leyte. After Justina's death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. The
probate court approved the project of partition "with the reservation that the ownership
of the land declared under Tax Declaration No. 19335 and the house erected thereon
be litigated and determined in a separate proceedings."
Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in
recovering the San Salvador property. Acquiescing to render his services, Murillo
wrote a contract of service where it stated, among others, “That for and in
consideration for his legal services, in the two cases, I hereby promise and bind
myself to pay Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO, in case of success in any or both cases
the sum equivalent to FORTY PER CENTUM (40%) of whatever benefit I may derive
from such cases…” The contract was signed by Florencio and Josefa Fabillo.
Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for Florencio Fabillo Civil Case No. 3632
against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The case was
terminated when the court, upon the parties' joint motion in the nature of a
compromise agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of
the San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land.
Sometime in 1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties
and refused to give Murillo his share of their produce. Inasmuch as his demands for
his share of the produce of the Pugahanay property were unheeded, Murillo filed in
the then Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint where Murillo prayed that he
be declared the lawful owner of forty per cent of the two properties, that
defendants be directed to pay him jointly and severally P900.00 per annum from 1966
until he would be given his share of the produce of the land plus damages and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, the defendants stated that the consent to the contract of services of
the Fabillo spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into
believing that Special Proceedings No. 843 on the probate of Justina's will was
already terminated when actually it was still pending resolution; and that the
contingent fee of 40% of the value of the San Salvador property was excessive,
unfair and unconscionable considering the nature of the case, the length of time
spent for it, the efforts exerted by Murillo, and his professional standing.
In its decision, the lower court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
the Fabillo spouses' consent to the contract was vitiated. It noted that the contract
was witnessed by two of their children who appeared to be highly educated. The
spouses themselves were old but literate and physically fit. Ruling that the contract of
services did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code as said contract stipulated a
contingent fee, the court upheld Murillo's claim for "contingent attorney's fees of 40%
of the value of recoverable properties." However, the court declared Murillo to be the
lawful owner of 40% of both the San Salvador and Pugahanay properties and the
improvements thereon. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
Issue: Whether the contract of services violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Held: No.
Article 1491 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 5 thereof, prohibits lawyers from
acquiring by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights which
are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of the
property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's
property.
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not
covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the
payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only
after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under
the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds
and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.
As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is
committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as
to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of
services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo.
However, we disagree with the courts below that the contingent fee stipulated
between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo is forty percent of the properties subject of
the litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. A careful scrutiny of the
contract shows that the parties intended forty percent of the VALUE of the
properties as Murillo's contingent fee. This is borne out by the stipulation that "in
case of success of any or both cases," Murillo shall be paid "the sum equivalent to
forty per centum of whatever benefit" Fabillo would derive from favorable judgments.
Worth noting are the provisions of the contract which clearly states that in case the
properties are sold, mortgaged, or leased, Murillo shall be entitled respectively to 40%
of the "purchase price," "proceeds of the mortgage," or "rentals." The contract is
vague, however, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold,
mortgaged or leased because Murillo is allowed "to have the option of occupying or
leasing to any interested party forty per cent of the house and lot." Had the parties
intended that Murillo should become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties,
it would have been clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract
considering that the Fabillos would part with actual portions of their properties and
cede the same to Murillo. The ambiguity of said provision, however, should be
resolved against Murillo as it was he himself who drafted the contract. This is in
consonance with the rule of interpretation that, in construing a contract of professional
services between a lawyer and his client, such construction as would be more
favorable to the client should be adopted even if it would work prejudice to the lawyer.
Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof,
the length of time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is entitled to
the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees
for services rendered in the case which ended on a compromise agreement. In so
ruling, we uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of
rendering service and securing justice, not moneymaking. For the worst scenario
that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in
whom all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal
controversy.
Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, [December 9, 2004], 487 PHIL 40-49
Petitioner: Federico Ramos
Respondent: Atty. Patricio Ngaseo
Facts: Atty Ngaseo was engaged by Federico Ramos to handle a case involving a
piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
The civil case was dismissed by the trial court, which was unfavorable for Ramos.
Thus, an appeal was filed. On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
favorable decision for Ramos and ordered the return of the 2 hectare land in dispute,
to Ramos and his siblings.
Since the decision of the CA became final and executory, Atty. Ngaseo alleged that
Ramos failed to contact him to pay the remaining attorney’s fees which prompted
Ngaseo to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003. According to Atty. Ngaseo,
Ramos, assisted by a friend, communicated to him that he was offering 1000 sqm of
land, subject of litigation, as compensation for handling the case.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his
former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the
subject of litigation.
Issue: Whether or not Art 1491 was violated, on prohibitions of lawyers from
acquiring property which is the subject of litigation in which they intervened.
Held: No. Firstly, no transfer of property was ever made. Secondly, the demand letter
sent by Atty Ngaseo, for 1000sqm of land, was sent long after the pendency of the
case.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either
by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on
purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also
public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It
is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his o􀀵ce, an attorney may easily
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself
at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving
the client's property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.
Nonetheless, Atty Ngaseo is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession.
Lijauco v. Terrado, A.C. No. 6317, [August 31, 2006], 532 PHIL 1-8
Petitioner: LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO (complainant)
Respondent: ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO (respondent)
Facts:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant
Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent
sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit
with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in
Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered
as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the
Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events
say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings
deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the
compromise agreement.
Issue:
WON Atty. Terrado was administratively liable for charging excessive fees
Held:
Yes. Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of
complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be sustained.
Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the
compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-
2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to
complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the
recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees.11
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01,
9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY
WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further
ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to
complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance
within three (3) days therefrom.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees
(a) The time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be
entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility
assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance
or other compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from
anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, [June 10, 2002], 432 PHIL 840-851
Complainant: DOMINADOR P. BURBE
Respondent: Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
Facts:
● Respondent lawyer was introduced to complainant at the Respicio, Magulta
and Adan Law Offices who agreed to legally represent the latter in a money
claim and a possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract.
Upon respondent's instruction, complainant deposited the amount of
 P25,000.00 allegedly for the filing fees of the case to be filed. A week later,
complainant was informed by respondent that the complaint had already
been filed in court. In the months that followed, complainant did not receive
any notice from the court.
● Complainant also frequented respondent's office to inquire, but the latter
repeatedly told him each time to just wait. Sensing that he was being given
the run-around by respondent, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of
Court to verify the progress of the case and found out that there was no
record at all filed by respondent on his behalf.
● Feeling disgusted for the inconvenience and deception of respondent who
admitted that he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own use,
complainant filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation,
dishonesty and oppressive conduct. Respondent, on the other hand, averred
that despite performing his services, he was not paid by complainant.
● The Commission submitted its Report and Recommendation to the Court
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
Issue: WON respondent violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
Held: YES
● Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession. Members of the bar must do nothing that
may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
the honesty, and integrity of the profession.
● Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
● We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first
moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the
case for which his service had been sought.
● Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close
personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre,
the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare —
and had actually prepared — at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
● This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up
the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by
the rules of law legally applied.
● In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant —
as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent —
the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may
come into their possession.
● Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien
upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come
into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations
do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the
bounds of law.
● If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public. Respondent fell short of this
standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him
by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
● On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
● WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating
Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all
 courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to
include a copy in respondent's file.
Ceniza v. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, [October 2, 2009], 617 PHIL 202-212
Complainantr: MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA
Respondent: ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA
Facts:
In a verified complaint, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public
documents.
It was alleged that on May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the
respondent in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband
Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since her mother-in-
law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign
a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After
her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the
complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime
but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the
complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it
was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with
"Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when
complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket
number was filed.
Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be
recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani
Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place
where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the
signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the
RTC of Digos City, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202.
Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the rubber stamped
"RECEIVED" on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan Kirt Lester
Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him through cellular
phone and directed him to stop the filing of the complaint as the same lacked certain
attachments. However, one copy thereof was already stamped "RECEIVED" by the
receiving court personnel, who also assigned a docket number. She kept the copies
of the complaint, including the one with the stamp, to be filed later when the
attachments are complete.
Issue: Whether Atty. Rubia should be suspended
Held: Yes.
Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her
Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the
mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give
respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions.
Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind
the filing of the complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when
the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant
evidence respondent's claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn
after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. We find
this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear
thesignature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings
are received by the court.
Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed
and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the
truthfulness of respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the
complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint
was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.
Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that
respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.
However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should
be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent's act of charging an acceptance
fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances.
The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow
money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon
the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant's
mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to
render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not
depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to
be paid upon the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely
a month after respondent accepted the case.
Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-
client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer
Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received
as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation.
Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her
services.
Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client
regarding the status of their complaint.
Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposes upon every member of
the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR
GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore,
he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it,
regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to
expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning
and ability to prosecute or defend his (client's) cause with reasonable dispatch.
Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member
of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people
in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of
violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately, with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Navarro v. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, [January 28, 2014], 725 PHIL 358-371
Petitioner: NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO (Complainant)
Respondent: ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR.
Facts: On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to
follow up the release of the payment for the latter's 2.7-hectare property located in
Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay P700,000
for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for
P1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB's claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent
proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and
Presbitero agreed to an attorney's fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the
sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible
from respondent's fees.
In May 2006, Presbitero's daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also
engaged respondent's services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot
located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister,
Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent
undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property
once it is registered.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro to
finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the
principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the
checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and
signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000 from
Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first
MOA.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Presbitero
covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-
meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to
pay complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent
to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which
they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent's
attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006
but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other
hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants
then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by
respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the
loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Solidum violated the CPR and should be disbarred.
Held: Yes. With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent
agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the
MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA
he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent's
allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he
did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his
private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro
allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted
the MOAs knowing that the interest rags were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge
of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks
that were drawn from his son's account whose name was similar to his without
informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that
respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. 4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to
fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various
amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money
he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money
in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.
E. Confidentiality and “Privileged communications” between lawyers and
clients
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113, [September 20, 1996], 330
PHIL 678-7553
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the institution of the PCGG
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the several
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al.” Petitioners in this case are all partners in ACCRA Regala, Angara,
Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayudini (hereinafter ACCRA
LAWYERS). Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a partner in ACCRA.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted
as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033
alleged that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others
and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA LAWYERS
acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others,
to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of the Philippines. On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from
the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS
still were included still as defendants. ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent ROCO. PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA LAWYERS
on the ff conditions: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the
deeds of assignments ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings. SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion
of ACCRA LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and
fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information
obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Issue:
WON the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the identity of clients (name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients) under the facts
and circumstances obtaining in the instant case?

Held:
YES, may refuse on the basis of fiduciary duty! The GENERAL RULE in our
jurisdiction (as well as in the US) is that a lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: (1)
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice. (2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged. (3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s
client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime,
the client’s name is privileged. Other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule: (a) Content of any client communication to a lawyer relevant to the
subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. (b)
Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed
and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. Summarizing these
exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences. In the case at bar, the instant case
falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. (KP: Exception 1 & 3 above)
HOWEVER, An important distinction must be made between Case (1) & (2) in the
table shown below:
Compelling disclosure of the client’s name in circumstances such as the one which
exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance.
Genato v. Silapan, A.C. No. 4078, [July 14, 2003], 453 PHIL 910-919
Petitioner: William Ong Genato
Respondent: Atty Essex L. Silapan
Facts:
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as
downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6)
months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot
in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of
reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car.
However, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name and
financed through City Trust Company.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, the respondent made several statements accusing the
complainant of being a loan shark and of bribing government officials in another case.
Issue:
Whether or not the disclosure is a breach of fidelity.
Held:
Yes it was.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach
of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a
pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to
disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless
the latter consents.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does
not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.5 If
the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's alleged intention to
bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by
the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within
the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a
lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there
being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable
to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was
improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case
as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Uy v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 5280, [March 30, 2004]
Complainant: WILLIAM S. UY
Respondent: ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES
Facts:
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare
and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with
respondent, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed
before the RTC of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to Uy’s office and demanded a certain amount from him other than
what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with
him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that
instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent
filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for “Falsification of Public Documents.”
The letter-complaint stated that William Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land
consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated
at Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES. However instead of
registering said Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the
purpose of transferring the same in his name, Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land
Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, wherein Uy made it appear that
his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan,
Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila,
to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the
coverage of the Land Reform Program. It further alleged that Uy, conspiring with
others, procured the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so
that they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan,
TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his
children.
Respondent lawyer filed his comment, narrating his version of the facts, alleging that
On December 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property
situated in Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter
acquired by purchase from his (respondent’s) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.
On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of
TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption but instead of
doing so, he was given photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165.
Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the property,
covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced
and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over
the property, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title. On
April 14, 1999, he went to complainant’s office informing him that the petition is ready
for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked
him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found out
that complainant had already left. Complainant’s conduct infuriated him which
prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing
the petition and that complainant should get another lawyer.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant, and
that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Tayug, Pangasinan.
The Court referred the case to the IBP for report and recommendation. However, a
letter was sent by Uy stating that he had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he
filed against Atty. Gonzales and requested that the case be dismissed.
The IBP nevertheless continued with the administrative case, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states that “No investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.” The IBP found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended suspension for 6 months.
Issue: Whether Atty. Gonzales violated the rule on attorney-client privilege.
Held: No.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience. A scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship
between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or
dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent.
Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property which
complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainant’s) son. It is not refuted that
respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the
title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his
children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the
issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant
assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business
or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice
or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on
any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or
charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice
and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession.
Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for “Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents” filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by
respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent’s
immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had
earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the
petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Canon 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS
OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
The alleged “secrets” of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-
complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not
obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a
property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed
the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved
alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating
Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against
herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a
case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
The administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No.
5280, was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Hadluja v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, [July 3, 2007], 553 PHIL 221-228
Petitioner: Ma. Luisa Hadjula
Respondent: Atty. Roceles Madianda
Facts: Ma. Luisa Hadjula and Atty. Madianda were coworkers at the Bureau of Fire
Protection. Hadjula was the Chief Nurse while Madianda was the Chief Legal Officer.
Hadjula claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached Madianda for some legal
advice. Hadjula further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was
supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced
copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be
informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend.
Madianda was a member of the BFP Promotion Board. Allegedly, Madianda
demanded a cellphone from Hadjula, in exchange for the latter’s promotion in BFP.
Thus, Hadjula filed criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid
actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her
(complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, 4 falsification of
public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the
disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the
same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted
against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's
act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the
course of seeking respondent's legal advice.
Issue: (1) Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship existed during an informal
consultation between friends
(2) Whether or not Atty. Madianda violated the duty of preserving the confidence of a
client.
Held: Yes. Quoting from Burbe vs. Magulta, the Court said that a lawyer-client
relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business.
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which
his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer
with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is
established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the
former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-
client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
Nevertheless, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling
evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error
of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other
using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the
personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant
became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear
to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing
that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule
on confidentiality.
People v. Sy Juco, G.R. No. 41957, [August 28, 1937], 64 PHIL 667-678
Petitioner: People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appellee)
Respondent: SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant. TEOPISTO B. REMO, petitioner-
appellant.
Facts:
Narciso Mendiola, agent of BIR, filed for a search warrant based on the information
from a reliable source alleging that certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or
records were being kept in the building No. 482 in Binondo, Manila occupied by
Santiago Sy Juco. CFI Manila through Judge Albert issued a search warrant directing
peace officers to seize the above-stated articles to deliver them to the court, for the
proper action to be taken in due time. After making the required search the officers
concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney
Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers
belonging to his clients.
Remo filed a petition in CFI Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and
his agents be prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff
of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said property in the
meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is
null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition was later
filed in the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the same agents of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue
of the above-mentioned search warrant.
CFI Manila through Judge Jaranilla overrule both petitions, declaring that the art
metal filing cabinet and the books and papers claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co.,
Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company,
respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an examination thereof to be made
in the presence of the interested parties, that they contain nothing showing that they
have been used to commit fraud against the Government. Remo appealed.
Issue:
WON the search warrant was valid
Held:
No.
The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the Perez v. De la Torre, A.C. No. 6160, [March 30, 2006], 520 PHIL 419-425
appellant attorney on the ground that he is not the person against whom it had been Petitioner:
sought. It is Santiago Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be used, Respondent:
because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much so that Narciso
Mendiola, who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and again did so Facts:
in his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue and at the trial of
this case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the Issue:
premises occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an investigation was then pending
against him, for having defrauded the Government in its public revenue. The doctrine Held:
laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio (57 Phil., 384), invoked against the
appellant, is not applicable to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, Gonzales v. Cabucana, A.C. No. 6836, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 296-308
neither books nor record indicating fraud were found in his possession, and it is not Petitioner:
he against whom the warrant was issued. Respondent:

The court could not and cannot order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet in Facts:
question because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney and
that in it he keeps the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in Issue:
violation of his right as such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling him
to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his clients, which should be kept Held:
secret, unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a duty
imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications Gamilla v. Mariño, Jr., A.C. No. 4763, [March 20, 2003], 447 PHIL 419-434
made to him. Petitioner:
Respondent:

F. Conflict of interest in a regular lawyer-client relationship Facts:

Tulio v. Buhangin, A.C. No. 7110, [April 20, 2016], 785 PHIL 292-302
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, [July 24, 2012], 691 PHIL 572-583
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303, [June 15, 2006], 524 PHIL 37-60
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Seares, Jr. v. Gonzales-Alzate, Adm. Case No. 9058, [November 14, 2012], 698
Issue: PHIL 596-610
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:
Facts:
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
Issue: 151809-12, [April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 485-619
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Quiambao v. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708, [August 25, 2005], 505 PHIL 126-140 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, [April 27, 2001], 409 PHIL 466-477
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Artezuela v. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, [April 22, 2002], 431 PHIL 135-147 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Heirs of Falame v. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876 (Resolution), [March 7, 2008], 571 PHIL
428-444
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, [March 31, 2005], 494 PHIL 164-185
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040, [March 4, 1998], 350 PHIL 412-431
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Samson v. Era, A.C. No. 6664, [July 16, 2013], 714 PHIL 101-113
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:

Held:
G. Conflict of interest of corporate lawyers Respondent:
Hornilla v. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, [July 1, 2003], 453 PHIL 108-114
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Ramos v. Imbang, A.C. No. 6788, [August 23, 2007], 557 PHIL 507-517
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Funk, A.C. No. 9094, [August 15,
2012], 692 PHIL 502-507 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.

151809-12, [April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 485-619
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, [July 24, 2009], 611 PHIL 399-414
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, [March 8, 2005], 493 PHIL 172-185
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Palm v. Iledan, Jr., A.C. No. 8242, [October 2, 2009], 617 PHIL 212-221
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, [August 29, 2000], 393 PHIL 544-556
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
H. Limitations/restrictions of government lawyers in the practice of law
Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, [December 7, 2010], 651 PHIL 290-308 Facts:
Petitioner:
Issue:

Held: I. Notarial Law violations

Fabay v. Resuena, A.C. No. 8723 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2974], [January 26,
Huyssen v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707, [March 24, 2006], 520 PHIL 117-134 2016], 779 PHIL 151-162
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

In re: Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL 1-25 Japitana v. Parado, A.C. No. 10859 (Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2514), [January
Petitioner: 26, 2016], 779 PHIL 182-191
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Maderada v. Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459, [October 14, 2003], 459 PHIL 701-
719 Sistual v. Ogena, A.C. No. 9807, [February 2, 2016], 780 PHIL 125-132
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292 (Resolution), [February 26, 1999], 363 Mariano v. Echanez, A.C. No. 10373, [May 31, 2016], 785 PHIL 923-929
PHIL 369-376 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, [January 31, 2005], 490 PHIL
671-686 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Heirs of Spouses Villanueva v. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, [January 22, 2007], 541
PHIL 17-23
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Lee v. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281 (Resolution), [February 12, 2008], 568 PHIL 363-
378 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Pantoja-Mumar v. Flores, A.C. No. 5426, [April 4, 2007], 549 PHIL 261-271
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Angeles v. Ibañez, A.C. No. 7860, [January 15, 2009], 596 PHIL 99-110 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Lee v. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281 (Resolution), [February 12, 2008], 568 PHIL 363-
378
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, [February 24, 2014]
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Villarin v. Sabate, Jr., A.C. No. 3324 (Resolution), [February 9, 2000], 382 PHIL 1-
Held: 7
Petitioner:
Tan Tiong Bio v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6634, [August 23, 2007], 557 PHIL 496-506 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:
 Held:
Issue:
Chua v. Mesina, Jr., A.C. No. 4904, [August 12, 2004], 479 PHIL 796-808
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
J. The lawyer and the moneys or properties of clients
Yu v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 10912, [January 19, 2016], 778 PHIL 557-568 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 5655, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 283-295
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Sison, Jr. v. Camacho, A.C. No. 10910 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594], Facts:
[January 12, 2016], 777 PHIL 1-16
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Tarog v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253, [March 15, 2011]
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Salomon, Jr. v. Frial, A.C. No. 7820, [September 12, 2008], 586 PHIL 580-587
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (Resolution), [September 4, 2009], 614
Issue: PHIL 327-337
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, A.C. No. 7057, [July 25, 2006], 528 PHIL 814-822 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Bayonla v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808, [November 22, 2011], 676 PHIL 500-517
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
K. Acquisition of properties subject of litigation
Held: Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, [March 11, 1991], 272
PHIL 628-639
J.K. Mercado & Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, A.C. No. 3066 Petitioner:
(Resolution), [December 3, 2001], 422 PHIL 583-592 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Macariola v. Asuncion, Adm. Case No. 133-J, [May 31, 1982], 199 PHIL 295-324
Petitioner:
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, [June 10, 2002], 432 PHIL 840-851 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Guevara v. Calalang, A.C. No. 681 (Resolution), [September 30, 1982], 202 PHIL
328-332
Rivera v. Angeles, A.C. No. 2519 (Resolution), [August 29, 2000], 393 PHIL 539- Petitioner:
544 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Pabugais v. Sahijwani, G.R. No. 156846, [February 23, 2004], 467 PHIL 1111-
1121
Angeles v. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019, [April 6, 2000], 386 PHIL 221-235 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue: Held:

Held: Valencia v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 1302, 1391, 1543, [April 26, 1991], 273 PHIL 534-
546
Ordonio v. Eduarte, A.C. No. 3216 (Resolution), [March 16, 1992], 283 PHIL Petitioner:
1064-1069 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: L. Doctrine of privilege communications in pleadings and privilege speech in

Congress
Mananquil v. Villegas, A.C. No. 2430 (Resolution), [August 30, 1990], 267 PHIL Hadluja v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, [July 3, 2007], 553 PHIL 221-228
132-141 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 115439-41, [July 16, 1997], 341 PHIL 503-
Fornilda v. Branch 164, RTC IVth Judicial Region, Pasig, G.R. No. 72306 526
(Resolution), [January 24, 1989], 251 PHIL 335-338 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, [August 25, 2009], 613 PHIL 352-366
Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, [December 9, 2004], 487 PHIL 40-49 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
 M. Terminating and establishing attorney-client relationship
Gutierrez v. Abila, G.R. No. L-59161, [January 30, 1982] Orcino v. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 (Resolution), [September 24, 1997], 344 PHIL
Petitioner: 792-801
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Cuenco v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-29560, [March 31, 1976], 162 PHIL 299-335
Petitioner: Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R. Nos. 179892-93, [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 524-547
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, G.R. No. 146848, [October 17, 2006], 535 PHIL
624-643 Virgo v. Amorin, A.C. No. 7861 (Resolution), [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 182-
Petitioner: 194
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 (Resolution), [July 16, 1984], 215 PHIL
411-420 Hadluja v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, [July 3, 2007], 553 PHIL 221-228
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Urban Bank, Inc. v. Peña, A.C. No. 4863, [September 7, 2001], 417 PHIL 70-80
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303, [June 15, 2006], 524 PHIL 37-60
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Somosot v. Lara, A.C. No. 7024, [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 149-168
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
In re Briones, A.C. No. 5486, [August 15, 2001], 415 PHIL 203-210
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Venterez v. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421, [October 10, 2007], 561 PHIL 479-491
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Balatbat v. Arias y Sanchez, A.C. No. 1666, [April 13, 2007], 549 PHIL 517-527
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Francisco v. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, [March 14, 2006], 519 PHIL 547-559
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Requierme, Jr. v. Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427 (Resolution), [November 27,
Issue: 2000], 399 PHIL 578- 590
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., A.C. No. 5148, [July 1, 2003], 453 PHIL 98-107 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue:
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41862, The Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc. v. Mangallay, A.C. No. 10483,
[February 7, 1992], 282 PHIL 928-942 [March 16, 2016]
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Ceniza v. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, [October 2, 2009], 617 PHIL 202-212 International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission,
Petitioner: G.R. No. 97239, [May 12, 1993]
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Spouses Rabanal v. Tugade, A.C. No. 1372, [June 27, 2002]
Petitioner: Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 (Resolution), [July 31, 1997], 342
Respondent: PHIL 408-413
Petitioner:
Facts: Respondent:

Issue: Facts:

Held: Issue:

N. Grounds for disciplinary proceedings against lawyers Held:

Spouses Amatorio v. Yap, A.C. No. 5914 (Resolution), [March 11, 2015], 755
PHIL 336-348 Dumadag v. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614 (Resolution), [June 29, 2000], 390 PHIL 1-11
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Flores v. Chua, A.C. No. 4500 (Notice), [September 9, 2014]

Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, 1227, 05-5-15-SC, [July 25, 2006], 528 PHIL 763-
813
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Maniago v. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472 (Resolution), [March 30, 2010], 631 PHIL 139-
146 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040, [March 4, 1998], 350 PHIL 412-431
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Fernandez v. Novero, Jr., A.C. No. 5394, [December 2, 2002], 441 PHIL 506-514 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Cordon v. Balicanta, A.C. No. 2797, [October 4, 2002], 439 PHIL 95-117
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Manubay v. Garcia, A.C. No. 4700, [April 12, 2000], 386 PHIL 440-445) Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Tucay v. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 (Resolution), [November 17, 1999], 376 PHIL 336-
341
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
In re Atty. Leon G. Maquera, B.M. No. 793, [July 30, 2004], 479 PHIL 322-335)
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Ui v. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, [June 8, 2000], 388 PHIL 691-708 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Navarro v. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313, [January 30, 1998], 349 PHIL 520-530
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Tomlin II v. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, [February 23, 2006], 518 PHIL 325-333 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Dinsay v. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995 (Resolution), [November 27, 1996], 332 PHIL 740-
744
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Tan Tiong Bio v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6634, [August 23, 2007], 557 PHIL 496-506
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052, [December 11, 2003], 463 PHIL 385-416
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. L-27654 (Resolution), [February 18,
1970], 142 PHIL 353-393 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Abanag v. Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, [April 4, 2011], 662 PHIL 354-359
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, [March 7, 2007], 546 PHIL 431-448 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:
 Felipe v. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549 (Resolution), [December 2, 2013], 722 PHIL
Held: 439-447
Petitioner:
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, [August 4, 2003], 455 PHIL 411-658 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Anacta v. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, [August 14, 2012], 692 PHIL 488-501
Petitioner:
Halimao v. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825, [February 1, 1996], 323 PHIL 1-12 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017, [September
29, 1999], 374 PHIL 1-15
Manaois v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5364 (Resolution), [August 20, 2008], 584 PHIL Petitioner:
347-352 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: O. Judicial clemency and reinstatement in the practice of law

In re Rusiana, A.C. No. 270 (Resolution), [March 29, 1974], 155 PHIL 204-207
Cottam v. Laysa, A.C. No. AC-4834, [February 29, 2000], 383 PHIL 510-516 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Tan v. El. Sabandal, B.M. Nos. 44, 59 & SBC No. 624 (Resolution), [February 10, Facts:
1989], 252 PHIL 215-219
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
P. Affinity and consanguinity as a basis for disqualification under Canon 3
Issue: Section 5(f)
Siawan v. Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056, [May 21, 2001], 410 PHIL 210-
Held: 227
Petitioner:
In re Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, [September 30, 1982], 202 PHIL 322-328 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Latorre v. Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563 (Resolution), [May 31, 2001], 410 PHIL
570-578
Re: Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC, [September 19, 2007], 560 PHIL 1-6 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Yalung v. Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1342, [June 21, 2001], 411 PHIL 765-775
In re Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363, [July 31, 1962], 115 PHIL 647-651 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
People v. Berana y Guevarra, G.R. No. 123544, [July 29, 1999], 370 PHIL 696-
In re Avanceña, A.C. No. 407, [August 15, 1967], 127 PHIL 426-429 7147
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:
Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Q. Grounds for voluntary inhibition and disqualification of judges except

Canon 3 Section 5(f)
People v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05, [February 10, 1998], 349 PHIL 825-845 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, [September 27, 2010], 645
Petitioner: PHIL 550-559
Respondent: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Tiggangay v. Wacas, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ (Resolution), [April 1, 2013],
707 PHIL 245-255 Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, [August 1, 1996], 329 PHIL 48-65
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, [February Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, [July 27, 2010], 640 PHIL
11, 2010], 626 PHIL 177-211 33-61
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Agunday v. Tresvalles, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1236, [November 25, 1999], 377 PHIL In re: Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC (Resolution), [October 26, 1987], 239
141-157 PHIL 1-10
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:
Issue: Vda. de Bonifacio v. BLTB Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-26810, [August 31, 1970], 145
PHIL 422-438
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Austria v. Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536, [August 31, 1967], 127 PHIL 677-692
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Lazo v. Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, [December 15, 1998], 360 PHIL 359-367
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
In re Roxas, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC, [October 30, 1998], 358 PHIL 790-796
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Gutang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124760, [July 8, 1998], 354 PHIL 77-90
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112884 (Resolution), [August 30,
1994], 306 PHIL 78-84 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Villanueva v. Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221, [March 16, 2000], 384 PHIL 776-
787
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Barnes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 179583, [September 3, 2009], 614 PHIL 299-306
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Ong v. Spouses Basco, G.R. No. 167899, [August 6, 2008], 583 PHIL 248-256
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Tuzon v. Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 (Resolution), [November

26, 2001], 422 PHIL 92-97
Paredes v. Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710, [September 30, 1969], 140 PHIL 81-94 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Biboso v. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356, [April 16, 2001], 408 PHIL 547-561
Lorenzo v. Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123, MTJ-88-141 (Resolution), [June 27, Petitioner:
1988], 245 PHIL 503-510 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Macariola v. Asuncion, Adm. Case No. 133-J, [May 31, 1982], 199 PHIL 295-324
Petitioner:
Tenenan v. Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995, [September 25, 2007], 560 PHIL 296- Respondent:
301
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Abundo v. Manio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416, [August 6, 1999], 370 PHIL 850-872
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
R. Extrajudicial activities of judges and justices
Vidal v. Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591, [July 14, 2005], 501 PHIL 555-559 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:
 In re Estrada, A.M. No. 98-1-32-RTC, [July 29, 1998], 355 PHIL 45-48
Pertierra v. Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, [September 12, 2003], 457 PHIL 796- Petitioner:
804 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Alauya v. Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, [March 22, 2011], 661 PHIL 371-379
Petitioner:
Vistan v. Nicolas, A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 & A.C. No. 3040, [September 13, 1991], Respondent:
278 PHIL 531-544
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Berin v. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443, [July 31, 2002], 434 PHIL 772-778
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Galang v. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1197 (Resolution), [May 26, 1999], 367 PHIL
81-89 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Spouses Gragera v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1670, [June 26, 2003], 452 PHIL
957-9638
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ziga v. Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203, [June 10, 2003], 451 PHIL 449-464
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Carual v. Brusola, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500, [October 20, 1999], 375 PHIL 464-479
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Rosauro v. Kallos, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796, [February 10, 2006], 517 PHIL 366-379
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Gozun v. Liangco, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 (Resolution), [August 30, 2000], 393
PHIL 669-683 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Oktubre v. Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, [July 22, 2004], 478 PHIL 803-822
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Catbagan v. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, [April 6, 2005], 495 PHIL 1-10 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, [April 8, 2013], 708 PHIL 252-270
Petitioner:
Held: Respondent:

Garcia v. Valdez, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156, [July 13, 1998], 354 PHIL 475-481 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: S. Grounds for Disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices

Bello III v. Diaz, A.M. MTJ-00-1311, [October 3, 2003], 459 PHIL 214-223
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ladignon v. Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 (Resolution), [August 20, 2008], 584
PHIL 352-358 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue:
Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., A.M. No. Respondent:
RTJ-05-1955, [May 25, 2007], 551 PHIL 174-181
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Re: Cecilia Butacan, A.M. No. 12535-Ret (Resolution), [April 22, 2008], 575 PHIL
Held: 267-273
Petitioner:
Dacera, Jr. v. Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573 (Resolution), [August 2, 2000], Respondent:
391 PHIL 835-845
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, [August 1, 2007], 555 PHIL 713-732
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Bautista v. Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, [May 2, 2006], 522 PHIL
390-399 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Alday v. Cruz, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530 (Resolution), [February 4, 2002], 426
PHIL 385-391
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, [August 6, 2008], 583 PHIL 38-50
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Campos v. Campos, A.C. No. 8644 (Resolution), [January 22, 2014], 725 PHIL
Held: 132-151
Petitioner:
City of Cebu v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111, [May 7, 2008], 576 PHIL 728-741 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783, [July 29,
Held: 1996], 328 PHIL 978-992
Petitioner:
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J (Resolution), [April 12, 2011], Respondent:
663 PHIL 166-178
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Macalintal v. Teh, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-97-1375, [October 16, 1997], 345 PHIL
Held: 871-879
Petitioner:
Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512 (Resolution), [May 9, 2000], 387 PHIL 554- Respondent:
561
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Lagcao v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1840, [August 2, 2007], 555 PHIL 762-777
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Liwanag v. Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, [April 21, 1999], 365 PHIL 496-511
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Sps. Balderrama v. Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449 (Resolution), [January 18,
Held: 2002], 424 PHIL 800-811
Petitioner:
Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1, [April 2, 2002], 429 PHIL 498-510 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:
 Respondent:
Pertierra v. Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, [September 12, 2003], 457 PHIL 796-
804 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Miranda v. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1665, [November 29, 2001], 422
PHIL 327-334
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Flores v. Garcia, A.M. Nos. MTJ-03-1499 & P-03-1752, [October 6, 2008], 588
PHIL 639-650 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Spouses Daracan v. Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447 (Resolution), [September

27, 2000], 395 PHIL 352-371
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Velasco v. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, [August 15, 2007], 557 PHIL 1-29
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Rodriguez v. Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252, [December 17, 2002], 442 PHIL
Held: 307-316
Petitioner:
Re: Quitain, JBC No. 013, [August 22, 2007], 557 PHIL 478-495 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Seares v. Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 (Resolution), [November 22, 2000], 399
PHIL 7-15
Colorado v. Agapito, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658, [July 3, 2007], 553 PHIL 229-244 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Office of the Court Administrator v. Liangco, A.C. No. 5355, [December 13,
2011], 678 PHIL 305-327
Tuzon v. Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 (Resolution), [November Petitioner:
26, 2001], 422 PHIL 92-979 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: T. Criticisms against the courts/judges/justices

Fudot v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008, [October 24, 2008], 591 PHIL 82-
Richards v. Asoy, A.C. No. 2655 (Resolution), [July 9, 1987], 236 PHIL 48-55 106
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Jabon v. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713, 03-1744-RTJ, [October 25, 2005], 510 Re: Bagabuyo, A.C. No. 7006, [October 9, 2007], 561 PHIL 325-341
PHIL 513-545 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, [March 10, 2006], 519 PHIL 195-211
Re: Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, [January 31, 2008], 567 Petitioner:
PHIL 189-211 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:
 Held:
Held:
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, [August 25, 2009], 613 PHIL 352-366
Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, [September 23, Petitioner:
2008], 587 PHIL 663-680 Respondent:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Facts:

Facts: Issue:

Issue: Held:

Held: Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, [September 15, 2004], 481 PHIL 646-660
Petitioner:
Spouses Tiongco v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 (Resolution), [January 25, 1995], Respondent:
310 PHIL 652-664
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Baculi v. Battung, A.C. No. 8920, [September 28, 2011], 674 PHIL 1-10
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, [June 9,
2005], 499 PHIL 1-17 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39253 (Resolution), [November 24,
1978], 176 PHIL 415-419
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, [October
18, 2007], 562 PHIL 484-502 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Tolentino v. Cabral, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1528, [March 28, 2000], 385 PHIL 631-653
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management Association of the

Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, [August 31, 2011], 672 PHIL 1-20
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 1-8
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
In re: Dorado, Adm. Case No. 263, [October 28, 1958], 104 PHIL 743-748
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Bildner v. Ilusorio, G.R. No. 157384, [June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 369-391
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
Issue:
Sesbreño v. Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ-88-272, [February 6, 1990], 261 PHIL 1-13
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC,
[July 22, 2005], 502 PHIL 292-304 Facts:
Petitioner:
Respondent: Issue:

Facts: Held:

Issue: Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347 (Resolution), [November 12, 1975], 160-A
PHIL 691-694
Held: Petitioner:
Respondent:
People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, [December 6, 1995], 312 PHIL 977-1035
Petitioner: Facts:
Respondent:
Issue:
Facts:
Held:
 B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41862,
U. The lawyer and the [law] firm [February 7, 1992], 282 PHIL 928-942
Barbuco v. Beltran, A.C. No. 5092, [August 11, 2004], 479 PHIL 692-697 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
V. Conduct of lawyer and client in a lawyer-client relationship
People v. Gonzales, Jr., G.R. No. 139542, [June 21, 2001], 411 PHIL 893-937 Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, [February 12, 1990], 261 PHIL 266-283
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, [September 21, 1949], 84 PHIL 569-58110 Aca v. Salvado, A.C. No. 10952, [January 26, 2016], 779 PHIL 214-225
Petitioner: Petitioner:
Respondent: Respondent:

Facts: Facts:

Issue: Issue:

Held: Held:

Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347 (Resolution), [November 12, 1975], 160-A Ramiscal v. Orro, A.C. No. 10945, [February 23, 2016], 781 PHIL 318-32
PHIL 691-694 Petitioner:
Petitioner: Respondent:
Respondent:
Facts:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Held:
Held:
Sambajon v. Suing, A.C. No. 7062, [September 26, 2006], 534 PHIL 84-101
Petitioner:
Respondent:
 Held:
Facts:
Solidon v. Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, [February 24, 2010], 627 PHIL 284-293
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Que v. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7054, [December 4, 2009], 622 PHIL 1-25
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Pariñas v. Paguinto, A.C. No. 6297, [July 13, 2004], 478 PHIL 239-247
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, [June 25, 2007], 552 PHIL 512-526
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Rollon v. Naraval, A.C. No. 6424, [March 4, 2005], 493 PHIL 24-32
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 5655, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 283-295
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
De Juan v. Baria III, A.C. No. 5817, [May 27, 2004], 473 PHIL 161-169
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Donton v. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, [June 27, 2006], 526 PHIL 1-7
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Fernandez v. Novero, Jr., A.C. No. 5394, [December 2, 2002], 441 PHIL 506-514
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
 Held:
Facts:
Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., A.C. No. 5148, [July 1, 2003], 453 PHIL 98-107
Issue: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:
Ruiz v. delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, [January 27, 2009], 597 PHIL 27-46
Petitioner: Issue:
Respondent:
Held:
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, [May 4, 2006], 523 PHIL 1-17
Petitioner:
Respondent:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Somosot v. Lara, A.C. No. 7024, [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 149-168
Petitioner:
Respondent:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Reddi v. Sebrio, Jr., A.C. No. 7027, [January 30, 2009], 597 PHIL 168-181
Petitioner:
Respondent:

Facts:

Issue: