CASES - ADMIN LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
G.R. No. 162372. October 11, 2011.*

FBcts:

Pursu8nt to the powers gr8nted under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No.
8291, otherwise known 8s “The Government Service Insur8nce System Act
of 1997” (the GSIS Act), the GSIS Bo8rd of Trustees, upon the
recommend8tion of the M8n8gement-Employee Rel8tions Committee
(MERCOM), 8pproved Bo8rd Resolution No. 326 wherein they Bdopted
the GSIS Employees LoyBlty Incentive PlBn (ELIP), which wBs lBter on
renBmed Bs GSIS Retirement/Fin8nci8l Pl8n (RFP)

Upon G8rci8ʼs 8ssumption of office 8s President 8nd Gener8l M8n8ger,

Dim8gib8 requested to 8g8in review the GSIS RFP, but this w8s denied by
G8rci8. Dim8gib8 sought the 8ssist8nce of COA in determining the leg8lity
8nd/or mor8lity of s8id pl8n. COA Gener8l Counsel Alquiz8l8s, issued 8
memor8ndum to Commissioner Flores 8nd opined th8t the GSIS RFP is 8
supplement8ry retirement pl8n, which is prohibited under R.A. 4968 or the
Teves Retirement L8w.

On August 14, 2001, Commissioner Flores forw8rded this Memor8ndum to

Dim8gib8, who in turn forw8rded it to G8rci8. But G8rci8 responded, t8king
exception to the notice of dis8llow8nce for being “highly irregul8r 8nd
precipit8te” 8s it w8s b8sed on mere opinion of COAʼs counsel who h8d no
8uthority to decl8re GSIS Bo8rd of Trustees 8s null 8nd void. Moreover,
G8rci8 s8id th8t COA h8d neither power nor 8uthority to decl8re null 8nd
void cert8in resolutions 8pproved by the Bo8rd of Government
Corpor8tions, 8s the power to do so w8s exclusively lodged before the
courts.

Issue:
Whether or not GSIS is clothe with 8uthority to 8dopt 8 Retirement/
Fin8nci8l Assist8nce to itʼs employees.
 
Held:
NO.

It is true th8t under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, GSIS is
expressly gr8nted the power to 8dopt 8 retirement pl8n 8nd/or fin8nci8l
8ssist8nce for its employees, but B closer look Bt the provision reBdily
shows thBt this power is not Bbsolute. It is qu8lified by the words “e8rly,”
 “incentive,” 8nd “for the purpose of retirement.” The retirement pl8n must
be 8n e8rly retirement incentive pl8n 8nd such e8rly retirement incentive
pl8n or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce must be for the purpose of retirement. While
the Government Service Insur8nce System (GSIS) m8y h8ve been clothed
with 8uthority to 8dopt 8n e8rly retirement or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce pl8n,
such 8uthority w8s limited by the very l8w it w8s seeking to implement.
 —

The GSIS RFP w8s not cre8ted bec8use of 8 v8lid comp8ny reorg8niz8tion.
Its purpose did not include the gr8nting of benefits for e8rly retirement.
Neither did it provide benefits for either volunt8ry or involunt8ry sep8r8tion
from GSIS. It wBs intended for employees who were BlreBdy eligible to
retire under existing retirement lBws. While the GSIS m8y h8ve been
clothed with 8uthority to 8dopt 8n e8rly retirement or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce
pl8n, such 8uthority w8s limited by the very l8w it w8s seeking to
implement

While Republic Act No. 8291 spe8ks of 8n e8rly retirement incentive pl8n or
fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce for the GSIS employees, CommonweBlth Act No. 186
Bs Bmended by the Teves Retirement LBw t8lks 8bout insur8nce or
retirement pl8ns other th8n our existing retirement l8ws. In other words,
wh8t the Teves Retirement L8w contempl8tes 8nd prohibits 8re sep8r8te
retirement or insur8nce pl8ns. In f8ct, the very s8me provision declBred
inoperBtive or Bbolished Bll supplementBry retirement or pension
plBns.

MMDA vs GBrin
GR No. 130230April 15, 2005
Chico-N8z8rio, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent G8rin w8s issued 8 tr8ffic viol8tion receipt (TVR) 8nd his
driverʼs license w8s confisc8ted for p8rking illeg8lly. G8rin wrote to
then MMDA Ch8irm8n Prospero Oret8 requesting the return of his license
8nd expressed his preference for his
c8se to be file in Court. Without 8n immedi8te reply from the
ch8irm8n, G8rin filed for 8 prelimin8ry injunction 8ss8iling 8mong others
th8t Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 viol8tes the constitution8l prohibition 8g8inst
undue deleg8tion of legisl8tive 8uthority, 8llowing
MMDA to fix 8nd impose unspecified 8nd unlimited fines 8nd pen8lties.
RTC rule in his f8vor, directing MMDA to return his license 8nd for the
8uthority to desist from confisc8ting driverʼs license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be he8rd in
8n 8ppropri8te proceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which 8uthorizes MMDA to confisc8te

8nd suspend or revoke driverʼs license in the enforcement of tr8ffic rules
8nd regul8tions constitution8l?

RULING:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It w8s concluded th8t MMDA
is not 8 loc8l government unit of 8 public corpor8tion endowed with
legisl8tive power 8nd it h8s no power to en8ct ordin8nces for the welf8re
of the community. Police power, 8s 8n inherent 8ttribute of sovereignty is
the power vested in the legisl8ture to m8ke, ord8in, est8blish 8ll m8nner
of wholesome 8nd re8son8ble l8ws, st8tutes 8nd ordin8nces either with
pen8lties of without, not repugn8nt to the constitution, 8s they sh8ll judge
to be for good 8nd welf8re of the commonwe8lth 8nd for subjects of the
s8me.

There is no provision in RA 7924 th8t empowers MMDA or its council to

“en8ct ordin8nce, 8pprove resolutions 8nd 8ppropri8te funds for the
gener8l welf8re of the inh8bit8nts of Metro M8nil8.” It is 8n 8gency cre8ted
for the purpose of l8ying down policies 8nd coordin8ting with the v8rious
n8tion8l government 8gencies, Peopleʼs Org8niz8tions, NGOs 8nd priv8te
sector for the efficient 8nd expeditious delivery of services. All its functions
8re 8dministr8tive in n8ture.

SoriBno vs MTRCB
G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009

Eliseo F. Sori8no seeks to nullify 8nd set 8side 8n order 8nd 8 decision of
the Movie 8nd Television Review 8nd Cl8ssific8tion Bo8rd (MTRCB) in
connection with cert8in utter8nces he m8de in his television show, Ang
D8ting D88n.

It is petitionerʼs threshold posture th8t the preventive suspension imposed

8g8inst him 8nd the relev8nt IRR provision 8uthorizing it 8re inv8lid
in8smuch 8s PD 1986 does not expressly 8uthorize the MTRCB to issue
preventive suspension.
 ISSUE: Whether or not MTRCB is 8uthorised to issue preventive
suspension

HELD: Administr8tive 8gencies h8ve powers 8nd functions which m8y be

8dministr8tive, investig8tory, regul8tory, qu8si-legisl8tive, or qu8si-judici8l,
or 8 mix of the five, 8s m8y be conferred by the Constitution or by st8tute.
¹²
 They h8ve in fine only such powers or 8uthority 8s 8re gr8nted or
deleg8ted, expressly or impliedly, by l8w.¹³ And in determining whether 8n
8gency h8s cert8in powers, the inquiry should be from the l8w itself. But
once 8scert8ined 8s existing, the 8uthority given should be liber8lly
construed.¹⁴

A perus8l of the MTRCBʼs b8sic m8nd8te under PD 1986 reve8ls the

possession by the 8gency of the 8uthority, 8lbeit impliedly, to issue the
ch8llenged order of preventive suspension. And this 8uthority stems
n8tur8lly from, 8nd is necess8ry for the exercise of, its power of regul8tion
8nd supervision.

The issu8nce of 8 preventive suspension comes well within the scope of

the MTRCBʼs 8uthority 8nd functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more
p8rticul8rly under its Sec. 3(d), 8s quoted 8bove, which empowers the
MTRCB to "supervise, regul8te, 8nd gr8nt, deny or c8ncel, permits for the x
x x exhibition, 8nd/or television bro8dc8st of 8ll motion pictures, television
progr8ms 8nd publicity m8teri8ls, to the end th8t no such pictures,
progr8ms 8nd m8teri8ls 8s 8re determined by the BOARD to be
objection8ble in 8ccord8nce with p8r8gr8ph (c) hereof sh8ll be x x x
exhibited 8nd/or bro8dc8st by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms p8rt of the

MTRCBʼs express regul8tory 8nd supervisory st8tutory m8nd8te 8nd its
investig8tory 8nd disciplin8ry 8uthority subsumed in or implied from such
m8nd8te. Any other constru8l would render its power to regul8te,
supervise, or discipline illusory.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

GMA Network, Inc. vs. Movie & Television Review Bnd ClBssificBtion
BoBrd
GR no. 148579 | FebruBry 5, 2007

Doctrine:
Administr)tive issu)nces which )re not published or filed with the Office of
 theN)tion)l Administr)tive Register (ONAR) of the UP l)w Center )re ineff
 ective )nd m)y not be enforced (Sec.3, 1987 Administr)tive Code)
____ 

Respondent MTRCB issued 8n order of suspension 8g8inst petitioner for

8iring "Muro Ami: The M8king" without first securing 8 permit from it 8s
provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.³

The pen8lty of suspension w8s b8sed on MemorBndum CirculBr 98-17

d8ted December 15, 1998⁴ which provided for the pen8lties for exhibiting 8
progr8m without 8 v8lid permit from the MTRCB.

Petitioner cl8ims th8t "Muro Ami: The M8king" w8s 8 public

)ff)irs progr8m

Issue:
8. Whether or not the MTRCB h8s the 8uthority to review the show “Muro
Ami: The M8king” prior to its bro8dc8st by television;
b. Whether or not Memor8ndum Circul8r No. 98-17 w8s enforce8ble 8nd
binding on the petitioners.

Ruling:
8.
 
YES, Sec. 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, Bnd
exBmine 8ll motion pictures, television progr8ms, including publicity
m8teri8ls. The only exceptions from it 8re (1) television progrBms
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
Bnd/or other depBrtments, Bnd (2) newsreels.

Petitioner cl8ims th8t "Muro Ami: The M8king" w8s 8 public

)ff)irs progr8m.⁷ Even if th8t were so, our resolution of this issue would not
ch8nge. This Court h8s 8lre8dy ruled th8t 8 public 8ff8irs progr8m --
described 8s 8 v8riety of news tre8tment; 8 cross between pure television
news 8nd news-rel8ted comment8ries, 8n8lysis 8nd/or exch8nge of
opinions -- is within the MTRCBʼs power of review. Cle8rly, "Muro Ami: The
M8king" (which petitioner cl8ims to be 8 public 8ff8irs progr8m) w8s well
within the purview of MTRCBʼs power of prior review.1)wphi1.net

b. NO, Memor8ndum Circul8r no. 98-17 h8s not been registered with the
ONAR, 8s of J8nu8ry 27, 2000. Hence, the s8me is yet to be effective, it is
just unenforce8ble since it h8s not been filed in the ONAR. The 1987
Administr8tive Code, section 3, expressly requires e8ch 8gency to file with
the Office of the N8tion8l Administr8tive Remedies (ONAR) of the UP L8w
Center three certified copies of every rule 8dopted by it. Administr8tive
issu8nces which 8re not published or filed with the ONAR 8re ineffective
8nd m8y not be enforced.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS Bnd WINSTON F. GARCIA vs.

VELASCO Bnd MOLINA
G.R. No. 170463. FebruBry 2, 2011

FACTS:

On M8y 2002, Petitioners ch8rged the respondents with 8dministr8tive

c8se for gr8ve misconduct for their 8lleged p8rticip8tion
8nd in the demonstr8tion held by some GSIS employees to denounce the
8lleged corruption within the 8gency 8nd to oust its
president Winston G8rci8. The Bo8rd pl8ced the respondents under
preventive suspension for 90 d8ys.

On April 2003, respondent Molin8 requested for 8 step increment but it

w8s denied bec8use he did not p8ss the qu8lific8tions
mentioned in the Bo8rd Resolution. The respondents filed 8 petition for
prohibition with pr8yer for writ of prelimin8ry
injunction cl8iming th8t they were denied of their benefits 8s employees of
GSIS due to their pending 8dministr8tive c8se.
Respondents 8lso 8rgued th8t the subject resolutions were ineffective
bec8use they were not registered with the UP L8w
Center pursu8nt to the Revised Administr8tive Code of 1987.

The tri8l court gr8nted the petition 8nd decl8red the subject Bo8rd
Resolution null 8nd void.

ISSUE:
p. WON GSIS Bo8rd Resolution needs to be filed with UP L8w Center
q. WON 8 Speci8l Civil 8ction for Prohibition 8g8inst GSIS Bo8rd who is
exercising qu8si legisl8tive 8nd 8dministr8tive function is within the
jurisdiction of RTC

HELD:
p. NO Not 8ll rules 8nd regul8tions 8dopted by every government 8gency
8re to be filed with the UP L8w Center. Only those of gener8l or of
perm8nent ch8r8cter 8re to be filed. According to the UP L8w Centerʼs
guidelines for receiving 8nd public8tion of rules 8nd regul8tions,
“interpret8tive regul8tions 8nd those merely intern8l in n8ture, th8t is,
regul8ting only the personnel of the Administr8tive 8gency 8nd not the
public,” need not be filed with the UP L8w Center

Resolution No. 372 w8s 8bout the new GSIS s8l8ry structure,
 Resolution No. 306 w8s 8bout the 8uthority to p8y the 2002 Christm8s
P8ck8ge, 8nd Resolution No. 197 w8s 8bout the GSIS merit selection
8nd promotion pl8n. Cle8rly, the 8ss8iled resolutions pert8ined only to
intern8l rules me8nt to regul8te the personnel of the GSIS. There w8s
no need for the public8tion or filing of these resolutions with the UP
L8w Center.

q. YES. The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is 8 speci8l civil
8ction which m8y be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appe8ls,
the S8ndig8nb8y8n or the region8l tri8l court, 8s the c8se m8y be. It is
8lso 8 person8l 8ction bec8use it does not 8ffect the title to, or
possession of re8l property, or interest therein. It m8y comment 8nd be
tried where the pl8intiff or 8ny of the princip8l pl8intiffs resides, or
where the defend8nt or 8ny of the princip8l defend8nts resides, 8t the
election of the pl8intiff. Since respondent Vel8sco is 8 resident of the
City of M8nil8, the petition could properly be filed in the City of M8nil8

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL 

(G.R. No. L-4043, MBy 26, 1942) 

FACTS 
○ This is 8 petition to review 8 decision of Auditor Gener8l denying
petitionerʼs cl8im for qu8rters 8llow8nce 8s m8n8ger of the N8tion8l
Ab8c8 8nd other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO). 
○ Petitioner w8s gener8l m8n8ger in 1949 of NAFCO with 8nnu8l s8l8ry
of P15,000.00 
○ NAFCO Bo8rd of Directors gr8nted P400/mo. Qu8rters 8llow8nce to
petitioner 8mounting to P1,650 for 1949. 
○ This 8llow8nce w8s dis8pproved by the Centr8l Committee of the
government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommend8tion by NAFCO 8uditor 8nd concurred in by the Auditor
gener8l on two grounds: 
◆ 8) It viol8tes the ch8rter of NAFCO limiting m8n8gerʼs s8l8ry to
P15,000/ye8r. 
◆ b) NAFCO is in prec8rious fin8nci8l condition. 

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over

Government Owned 8nd Controlled Corpor8tions (GOCC) implemented
under R.A. No. 51 is v8lid or null 8nd void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 8uthorizing presidenti8l control over GOCCs is
Constitution8l.

DECISION: 

R.A. No. 51 is constitution8l. It is not illeg8l deleg8tion of legisl8tive power

to the executive 8s 8rgued by petitioner but 8 m8nd8te for the President to
stre8mline GOCCʼs oper8tion. 

Executive Order 93 is v8lid bec8use it w8s promulg8ted within the 1 ye8r

period given.

It is 8lso contended th8t the qu8rters 8llow8nce is not compens8tion 8nd

so the gr8nting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO bo8rd of directors does
not contr8vene the provisions of the NAFCO ch8rter th8t the s8l8ry of the
ch8irm8n of s8id bo8rd who is 8lso to be gener8l m8n8ger sh8ll not exceed
P15,000 per 8num. But reg8rdless of whether qu8rters 8llow8nce should
be considered 8s compens8tion or not, the resolution of the bo8rd of the
directors 8uthorizing p8yment thereof to the petitioner c8nnot be given
effect since it w8s dis8pproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of
powers gr8nted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in 8ny event,
petitioner's contention th8t qu8rters 8llow8nce is not compens8tion, 8
proposition on which Americ8n 8uthorities 8ppe8r divided, c8nnot be
insisted on beh8lf of officers 8nd employees working for the Government of
the Philippines 8nd its Instrument8lities, including, n8tur8lly, government-
controlled corpor8tions. This is so bec8use Executive Order No. 332 of
1941, which prohibits the p8yment of 8ddition8l compens8tion to those
working for the Government 8nd its Instrument8lities, including
government-controlled corpor8tions, w8s in 1945 8mended by Executive
Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the p8yment of
qu8rters 8llow8nce "in f8vor of loc8l government offici8ls 8nd employees
entitled to this under existing l8w." The 8mendment is 8 cle8r indic8tion
th8t qu8rters 8llow8nce w8s me8nt to be included in the term "8ddition8l
compens8tion", for otherwise the 8mendment would not h8ve expressly
excepted it from the prohibition. This being so, we hold th8t, for the
purpose of the executive order just mentioned, qu8rters 8llow8nce is
considered 8ddition8l compens8tion 8nd, therefore, prohibited.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. KANLAON CONSTRUCTION

ENTERPRISES

FACTS: In July 1990, PNR 8nd K8nl8on entered into contr8cts for the rep8ir
of three PNR st8tion buildings 8nd p8ssenger shelters.By November 1990,
K8nl8on 8lleged th8t it h8d 8lre8dy completed the three projects.

On 30 June 1994, K8nl8on sent 8 dem8nd letter to PNR requesting for the
rele8se of the retention money. However, PNR denied K8nl8onʼs dem8nd
bec8use of the Notices of Suspension issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, forcing K8nl8on to file 8 compl8int for collection of sum of
money plus d8m8ges 8g8inst PNR. In its 8mended compl8int, K8nl8on
even imple8ded the COA.

In its 8nswer, PNR 8dmitted the existence of the three contr8cts but
8lleged th8t K8nl8on did not comply with the conditions of the contr8ct.
Moreover, they 8lleged th8t K8nl8on did not complete the projects. Thus,
they did not h8ve 8ny unp8id b8l8nce. In 8ddition to th8t, PNR 8dded th8t
it h8d 8 v8lid ground to refuse the rele8se of the retention money bec8use
of the COA orders suspending the rele8se of p8yment to K8nl8on.

The TC ruled in f8vor of K8nl8on 8nd ordered PNR to to p8y the retention
money 8nd unp8id contr8ct price with 12% leg8l interest while COA w8s
8bsolved of 8ny li8bility for 8ctu8l or mor8l d8m8ges. Thus, prompting PNR
to file 8 motion for reconsider8tion. As 8 result, the TC modified its
decision by lowering the leg8l interest r8te from 12% to 6% per 8nnum from
the d8te of the first written dem8nd. The CA 8ffirmed the lower courtʼs
decision 8nd held th8t the only re8son PNR refused to p8y K8nl8on w8s
bec8use of COAʼs Notices of Suspension 8nd not K8nl8onʼs non-
completion of the projects.

ISSUE: Were the projects completed?

HELD: One of the re8sons the COA issued the Notices of Suspension w8s
bec8use the contr8cts did not cont8in 8 Certific8te of Av8il8bility of Funds
8s required under Sections 85 8nd 86 of Presidenti8l Decree No. 1445. The
Administr8tive Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contr8cts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements 8re
s8tisfied. First, there must be 8n 8ppropri8tion l8w 8uthorizing the
expenditure required in the contr8ct. Second, there must be 8tt8ched to
the contr8ct 8 certific8tion by the proper 8ccounting offici8l 8nd 8uditor
th8t funds h8ve been 8ppropri8ted by l8w 8nd such funds 8re 8v8il8ble.
The existence of 8ppropri8tion 8nd the 8tt8chment of the certific8tion 8re
conditions sine qu8 non for the execution of government contr8cts. Thus,
f8ilure to comply with 8ny of these two requirements renders the contr8ct
void.

The cle8r purpose of these requirements is to insure th8t government

contr8cts 8re never signed unless supported by the corresponding
8ppropri8tion l8w 8nd fund 8v8il8bility. In the c8se 8t h8nd, the three
contr8cts between PNR 8nd K8nl8on do not comply with the requirement
of 8 certific8tion of 8ppropri8tion 8nd fund 8v8il8bility. Even if 8
certific8tion of 8ppropri8tion is not 8pplic8ble to PNR if the funds used 8re
intern8lly gener8ted, still 8 certific8te of fund 8v8il8bility is required. Thus,
the three contr8cts between PNR 8nd K8nl8on 8re void.

Therefore, the CA erred in 8ffirming the decision of the lower court 8nd its
is reversed 8nd set 8side
However, K)nl)on is not left without recourse. The l)w itself )ffords it the
remedy. Section 48 of the Administr)tive Code of 1987 provides th)t the
officer or officers entering into the contr)ct sh)ll be li)ble to the
Government or other contr)cting p)rty for )ny consequent d)m)ge to the
s)me extent )s if the tr)ns)ction h)d been wholly between priv)te p)rties.
²⁴
 K)nl)on could go )fter the officers who signed the contr)ct )nd hold
them person)lly li)ble.

PhBrmBceuticBl Bnd HeBlth CBre AssociBtion of the Philippines vs.

Duque III
(Austri8-M8rtinez, October 9, 2007)

FBcts:
○ Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) w8s issued by Pres.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legisl8tive powers gr8nted to
her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1)One of the pre8mbul8r cl8uses of TMC – the l8w seeks to give effect
to Article 11 of the Intern8tion8l Code of M8rketing of Bre8stmilk
Substituttes (ICMBS), 8 code 8dopted by the WHA (World He8lth
Assembly) in 1981.

○ In 1990, the Philippine r8tified the Intern8tion8l Convention on the

Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument m8nd8tes th8t St8tes
should t8ke me8sure to diminish inf8nt mort8lity 8nd should ensure
th8t 8ll segments of society 8re informed of the 8dv8nt8ges of
bre8stfeeding.

○ From 1982 – 2006, the WHA 8dopted sever8l resolutions to the effect
th8t bre8stfeeding should be supported, promoted 8nd protected,
hence, it should be ensured th8t nutrition 8nd he8lth cl8ims 8re not
permitted for bre8stmilk substitutes.

○ M8y 15, 2006 – DOH issues the 8ss8iled RIRR (Revised Implementing
Rules 8nd Regul8tions of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which w8s to
t8ke effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes 8 b8n on 8ll
8dvertisements of bre8stmilk substitutes

○ June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certior8ri 8nd
Prohibition with Pr8yer for the Issu8nce of 8 TRO or Writ of Prelimin8ry
injunction.

○ August 15, 2006 – the Court issued 8 Resolution gr8nting the TRO,
 ○
enjoining the respondents from implementing the 8ss8iled RIRR.

○ Petitioner 8ss8ils the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
thereby 8mending 8nd exp8nding the cover8ge of the s8id l8w.

○ DOH me8nwhile contends th8t the RIRR implements not only TMC but
8lso v8rious intern8tion8l instruments reg8rding inf8nt 8nd young child
nutrition. They posit th8t the s8id intern8tion8l instruments 8re
deemed p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd 8nd therefore m8y be implemented
by the DOH in the RIRR.

Issue:

Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intʼl 8greements entered into by the Phil
8re p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd 8nd m8y be implemented by DOH
through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in 8ccord with intʼl
8greements

MAIN: W/N the DOH 8cted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
gr8ve 8buse of discretion 8mounting to l8ck of excess of jurisdiction
8nd in viol8tion of the Constitution by promulg8ting the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intʼl l8w c8n become domestic l8w
by tr8nsform8tion (thru constitution8l mech8nism such 8s loc8l
legisl8tion) or incorpor8tion (mere constitution8l decl8r8tion i.e
tre8ties) The ICBMS 8nd WHA resolutions were not tre8ties 8s they
h8ve not been concurred by 2/3 of 8ll members of the Sen8te 8s
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS h8d been
tr8nsformed into domestic l8w through 8 loc8l legisl8tion such 8s the
Milk Code. The Milk Code is 8lmost 8 verb8tim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled th8t DOH f8iled to est8blish
th8t the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions 8re custom8ry intʼl l8w
th8t m8y be deemed p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd. For 8n intʼl rule to be
considered 8s custom8ry l8w, it must be est8blished th8t such rule is
being followed by st8tes bec8use they consider it 8s oblig8tory to
comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, 8lthough
signed by most of the member st8tes, were enforced or pr8cticed by 8t
le8st 8 m8jority of member st8tes. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legisl8ture en8cted most of the provisions into the l8w vi8 the Milk
Code, the WHA Resolutions (specific8lly providing for exclusive
bre8stfeeding from 0-6 months, bre8stfeeding up to 24 Months 8nd
 8bsolutely prohibiting 8ds for bre8stmilk substitutes) h8ve not been
8dopted 8s domestic l8w nor 8re they followed in our country 8s well.
The Filipinos h8ve the option of how to t8ke c8re of their b8bies 8s
they see fit. WHA Resolutions m8y be cl8ssified 8s SOFT LAW – non-
binding norms, principles 8nd pr8ctices th8t influence st8te beh8vior.
Soft l8w is not p8rt of intʼl l8w.

MBin issue:
Yes. Some p8rts of the RIRR were not in conson8nce with the Milk
Code such 8s Sec. 4(f) ->8dvertising, promotions of formul8 8re
prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for 8dvertising bre8stmilk substitutes intended

for inf8nts 8nd young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> s8nctions for 8dvertising .

These provisions 8re decl8red null 8nd void. The DOH 8nd respondents
8re prohibited from implementing s8id provisions.

PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF LLDA vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.

G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010

The inst8nt petition 8rose from 8n inspection conducted on Febru8ry 4,

2002 by the Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the w8stew8ter
collected from respondentʼs SM City M8nil8 br8nch.

S8mple collected from the s8id f8cility f8iled to conform with the effluent
st8nd8rds for inl8nd w8ter imposed in 8ccord8nce with l8w.

On M8rch 12, 2002, LLDA informed SM City M8nil8 of its viol8tion:

- directing the s8me to perform corrective me8sures to 8b8te or
control the pollution c8used by the s8id comp8ny; 8nd
- ordering the l8tter to p8y P1,000 per d8y of disch8rging pollutive
w8stew8ter to be computed from Febru8ry 4, 2002 (d8te of
inspection), until full cess8tion of disch8rging pollutive w8stew8ter.

M8rch 23, 2002: In 8 letter, respondentʼs Pollution Control Officer

requested the LLDA to conduct 8 re-s8mpling of their effluent, cl8iming
th8t they 8lre8dy took the me8sures to en8ble their sew8ge tre8tment
pl8nt to meet the st8nd8rds set forth by the LLDA.

In 8n Order to P8y d8ted October 2, 2002, petitioner required respondent

to p8y 8 fine of P50,000 which represents the 8ccumul8ted d8ily pen8lty
computed from Febru8ry 4 – M8rch 25, 2002.
The respondent issued follow up letters which the petitioner tre8ted 8s
Motion for Reconsider8tion, where respondent 8sked for 8 w8iver of the
fine 8ssessed by the LLDA in its M8rch 12, 2002 Notice of Viol8tion 8nd
Order of October 2, 2002

Requests for reconsider8tion were denied.

On M8y 27, 2003, the LLDA issued 8nother Order to P8y, requiring p8yment
of the fine within 10 d8ys from respondentʼs receipt of 8 copy of the s8id
order.

Aggrieved, respondent filed 8 petition for certior8ri with the CA pr8ying for
the nullific8tion of the Orders of the LLDA.

CA rendered its Decision, gr8nting 8nd setting 8side the 8ss8iled Orders of
the LLDA Ruling th8t 8n 8dministr8tive 8gencyʼs power to impose fines
m8y not be implied

The CA found th8t under its ch8rter RA 4850, the LLDA is not expressly
gr8nted 8ny power or 8uthority to impose fines for viol8tions of effluent
st8nd8rds set by l8w. The 8ss8iled Orders of the petitioner 8re issued
without jurisdiction 8nd with gr8ve 8buse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the L8gun8 L8ke Development Authority h8s the
power to impose fines

HELD: Yes. The LLDA h8s the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function Bs B regulBtory Bnd quBsijudiciBl body with respect to pollution
c8ses in the L8gun8 L8ke region. (P8cific Ste8m L8undry, Inc. v. LLDA)

Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, the LLDA is entitled to compens8tion for

d8m8ges resulting from f8ilure to meet est8blished 8nd effluent st8nd8rds.

In 8ddition, Section 4 (d) of EO No. 927, which further defines cert8in

functions 8nd powers of the LLDA, provides th8t the LLDA h8s the power to
“m8ke, 8lter or modify orders requiring the discontinu8nce of pollution
specifying the conditions 8nd the time within which such discontinu8nce
must be 8ccomplished.”

Section 4 (i) of the s8me EO st8tes th8t the LLDA is given 8uthority to
exercise such powers 8nd perform such other functions 8s m8y be
necess8ry to c8rru out its duties 8nd responsibilities.”

Also, Section 4 (c) 8uthorizes the LLDA to “issue orders or decisions to

compel compli8nce with the provisions the EO 8nd its implementing rules
8nd regul8tions only 8fter proper notice 8nd he8ring.”
The intendment of the l8w, 8s gle8ned from Section (i) of EO No. 927, is to
clothe the LLDA not only with the express powers gr8nted to it, but 8lso
those which 8re implied or incident8l but, nonetheless, 8re necess8ry or
essenti8l for the full proper implement8tion of its purposes 8nd functions.
Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the LLDA 8re reinst8ted 8nd 8ffirmed.

MBcBlintBl vs PET
GR 191618, June 7, 2011
(Admin L)w, PET, Qu)si-judici)l power)

FBcts: P8r 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The
Supreme Court, sitting en b)nc, sh8ll be the sole judge of 8ll contests
rel8ting to the election, returns, 8nd qu8lific8tions of the President or Vice-
President, 8nd m8y promulg8te its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme
Court 8nd of other courts est8blished by l8w sh8ll not be design8ted to
8ny 8gency performing qu8si-judici8l or 8dministr8tive functions.
The c8se 8t b8r is 8 motion for reconsider8tion filed by petitioner of the
SCʼs decision dismissing the formerʼs petition 8nd decl8ring the
est8blishment of the respondent PET 8s constitution8l.

Petitioner 8rgues th8t PET is unconstitution8l on the ground th8t Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the cre8tion of the PET, 8nd it
viol8tes Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor Gener8l m8int8ins th8t the constitution of the PET is on firm
footing on the b8sis of the gr8nt of 8uthority to the Supreme Court to be
the sole judge of 8ll election contests for the President or Vice-President
under p8r 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:
○ Whether or not PET is constitution8l.
○ Whether or not PET exercises qu8si-judici8l power.

Held:
○ Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitution8l
Commission to 8 Presidenti8l Elector8l Tribun8l, with Fr. Jo8quin
Bern8s c8tegoric8lly decl8ring th8t in cr8fting the l8st p8r8gr8ph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitution8lized wh8t
w8s st8tutory.” Judici8l power gr8nted to the Supreme Court by the
s8me Constitution is plen8ry. And under the doctrine of necess)ry
implic)tion, the 8ddition8l jurisdiction bestowed by the l8st p8r8gr8ph
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidenti8l 8nd
 vice-presidenti8l elections contests includes the me8ns necess8ry to
c8rry it into effect.
○ No. The tr8dition8l gr8nt of judici8l power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides th8t the power “sh8ll be vested
in one Supreme Court 8nd in such lower courts 8s m8y be est8blished
by l8w.” The set up embodied in the Constitution 8nd st8tutes
ch8r8cterize the resolution of elector8l contests 8s essenti8lly 8n
exercise of judici8l power. When the Supreme Court, Bs PET,
resolves B presidentiBl or vice-presidentiBl election contest, it
performs whBt is essentiBlly B judiciBl power.

The COMELEC, HRET 8nd SET Bre not, strictly Bnd literBlly speBking,
courts of lBw. Although not courts of l8w, they 8re, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, 8n
exercise of judici8l power, bec8use of the explicit constitution8l
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) 8nd
Section 17, Article VI (for the Sen8te 8nd House Elector8l Tribun8ls) of the
Constitution.

AbellB vs CSC

"Two ye8rs 8fter his retirement, petitioner w8s hired by the Subic B8y
Metropolit8n Authority (SBMA) on 8 contr8ctu8l b8sis. On J8nu8ry 1, 1999,
petitioner w8s issued by SBMA 8 perm8nent employment 8s Dep8rtment
M8n8ger III, L8bor 8nd Employment Center. However, when s8id
8ppointment w8s submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission
Region8l Office No. III, it w8s dis8pproved on the ground th8t petitioner's
eligibility w8s not 8ppropri8te. Petitioner w8s 8dvised by SBMA of the
dis8pprov8l of his 8ppointment. In view thereof, petitioner w8s issued 8
tempor8ry 8ppointment 8s Dep8rtment M8n8ger III, L8bor 8nd
Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.

"Petitioner 8ppe8led the dis8pprov8l of his perm8nent 8ppointment by

respondent to the Civil Service Commission, which issued Resolution No.
000059, d8ted J8nu8ry 10, 2000, 8ffirming the 8ction t8ken by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsider8tion thereof w8s denied by
the CSC in Resolution No. 001143 d8ted M8y 11, 2000."

"x x x         x x x         x x x
"Und8unted, petitioner filed with [the CA] 8 petition for review seeking the
revers8l of the CSC Resolutions d8ted J8nu8ry 10, 2000 8nd M8y 11, 2000
on the ground th8t CSC Memor8ndum Circul8r No. 21, s. 1994 is
unconstitution8l 8s it rendered his e8rned civil service eligibility ineffective
or in8ppropri8te for the position of Dep8rtment M8n8ger [III]”
Petitioner contends th8t his due process rights, 8s enunci8ted in Ang Tib8y
v. Court of Appe8ls, were viol8ted. We 8re not convinced. He points in
p8rticul8r to the CSC's 8lleged f8ilure to notify him of 8 he8ring rel8ting to
the issu8nce of the ch8llenged Circul8r.
The cl8ssific8tion of positions in c8reer service w8s 8 qu8si-legisl8tive, not
8 qu8si-judici8l, issu8nce. This distinction determines whether prior notice
8nd he8ring 8re necess8ry.

ISSUE: WON CSC's should notify the petitioner of B heBring relBting to

the issuBnce of the chBllenged CirculBr.

In exercising its qu8si-judici8l function, 8n 8dministr8tive body 8djudic8tes

the rights of persons before it, in 8ccord8nce with the st8nd8rds l8id down
by the l8w. The determin8tion of f8cts 8nd the 8pplic8ble l8w, 8s b8sis for
offici8l 8ction 8nd the exercise of judici8l discretion, 8re essenti8l for the
perform8nce of this function. On these consider8tions, it is element8ry th8t
due process requirements, 8s enumer8ted in Ang Tib8y, must be observed.
These requirements include prior notice 8nd he8ring.

On the other h8nd, qu8si-legisl8tive power is exercised by 8dministr8tive

8gencies through the promulg8tion of rules 8nd regul8tions within the
confines of the gr8nting st8tute 8nd the doctrine of non-deleg8tion of
cert8in powers flowing from the sep8r8tion of the gre8t br8nches of the
government. Prior notice to 8nd he8ring of every 8ffected p8rty, 8s
elements of due process, 8re not required since there is no determin8tion
of p8st events or f8cts th8t h8ve to be est8blished or 8scert8ined. As 8
gener8l rule, prior notice 8nd he8ring 8re not essenti8l to the v8lidity of
rules or regul8tions promulg8ted to govern future conduct.

Signific8ntly, the ch8llenged Circul8r w8s 8n intern8l m8tter 8ddressed to

he8ds of dep8rtments, bure8us 8nd 8gencies. It needed no prior
public8tion, since it h8d been issued 8s 8n incident of the 8dministr8tive
body's power to issue guidelines for government offici8ls to follow in
performing their duties.

ReynB vs COA
G.R. No. 167219, Febru8ry 8, 2011

FBcts:

The L8nd B8nk of the Philippines (L8nd B8nk) w8s eng8ged in 8 c8ttle-
fin8ncing progr8m wherein lo8ns were gr8nted to v8rious cooper8tives.
 Pursu8nt thereto, L8nd B8nkʼs Ipil, Z8mbo8ng8 del Sur Br8nch (Ipil
Br8nch) went into 8 m8ssive inform8tion c8mp8ign offering the
progr8m to cooper8tives.

One of the conditions stipul8ted in the progr8m is th8t prior to the

rele8se of the lo8n, 8 Memor8ndum of Agreement (MOA) between the
supplier of the c8ttle, Rem8d Livestock Corpor8tion (REMAD), 8nd the
cooper8tive, sh8ll h8ve been signed providing the level of inventory of
stocks to be delivered, specific8tions 8s to breed, condition of he8lth,
8ge

Three checks were issued by the Ipil Br8nch to REMAD to serve 8s

8dv8nced p8yment for the c8ttle. REMAD, however, f8iled to supply the
c8ttle on the d8tes 8greed upon.

In post 8udit, the L8nd B8nk Auditor dis8llowed the 8mount of

₱3,115,000.00 under CSB No. 95-005 d8ted December 27, 1996 8nd
Notices of Dis8llow8nce Nos. 96-014 to 96-019 in view of the non-
delivery of the c8ttle.⁹Also m8de 8s the b8sis of the dis8llow8nce w8s
the f8ct th8t 8dv8nced p8yment w8s m8de in viol8tion of b8nk policies
8nd COA rules 8nd regul8tions. 

There8fter, 8 c8se w8s filed in the Ombudsm8n put w8s l8ter

dismissed not bec8use of 8 finding of good f8ith but bec8use of 8
finding of l8ck of sufficient evidence. Notwithst8nding the dismiss8l,
sep8r8te proceedings on the dis8llow8nce before the COA still subsist.

Issue: WON 8n 8bsolution from 8 crimin8l ch8rge is not 8 b8r to 8n

8dministr8tive prosecution

Held:

While the evidence presented before the Ombudsm8n m8y not h8ve
been sufficient to overcome the burden in crimin8l c8ses of proof
beyond re8son8ble doubt,⁵⁸ it does not, however, necess8rily follow,
th8t the 8dministr8tive proceedings will suffer the s8me f8te 8s only
substBntiBl evidence is required, or thBt Bmount of relevBnt
evidence which B reBsonBble mind might Bccept Bs BdequBte to
justify B conclusion.

An 8bsolution from 8 crimin8l ch8rge is not 8 b8r to 8n 8dministr8tive

prosecution or vice vers). The crimin8l c8se filed before the Office of
the Ombudsm8n is distinct 8nd sep8r8te from the proceedings on the
dis8llow8nce before the COA.
NASECORE vs ERC
G.R. No. 163935, Febru8ry 2, 2006

N8tion8l Associ8tion of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE)

seeks to nullify the Order d8ted June 2, 2004 of the Energy Regul8tion
Commission (ERC) which 8pproved the incre8se of respondent M8nil8
Electric Comp8nyʼs (MERALCOʼs) gener8tion ch8rge from ₱3.1886 per
kilow8tthour (kWh) to ₱3.3213 per kWh effective immedi8tely.

They invoke Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the Implementing Rules 8nd

Regul8tions (IRR) of the EPIRA which provides:

(e) Any 8pplic8tion or petition for r8te 8djustment or for 8ny relief
8ffecting the consumers must be verified, 8nd 8ccomp8nied with 8n
8cknowledgement of receipt of 8 copy thereof by the LGU Legisl8tive
Body of the loc8lity where the 8pplic8nt or petitioner princip8lly
oper8tes together with the certific8tion of the notice of public8tion
thereof in 8 newsp8per of gener8l circul8tion in the s8me loc8lity.

ISSUE:

ERC committed gr8ve 8buse of discretion in issuing the Order d8ted June
2, 2004 in ERC C8se No. 2004-112 which 8pproved the incre8se of
respondent MERALCOʼs gener8tion ch8rge from ₱3.1886 to ₱3.3213 per
kWh effective immedi8tely without public8tion of the l8tterʼs 8mended
8pplic8tion.

HELD:

The l8ck of public8tion of respondent MERALCOʼs 8mended 8pplic8tion for

the incre8se of its gener8tion ch8rge is thus f8t8l. By this omission, the
consumers were deprived of the right to file their comments thereon.

The b8sic requirement of public8tion of st8tutes w8s expl8ined in T8ñ8d8

v. Tuver8³⁶ 8s follows:

We hold therefore th8t 8ll st8tutes, including those of loc8l 8pplic8tion 8nd
priv8te l8ws, sh8ll be published 8s 8 condition for their effectivity, which
sh8ll begin fifteen d8ys 8fter public8tion unless 8 different effectivity d8te
is fixed by the legisl8ture.

Covered by this rule 8re presidenti8l decrees 8nd executive orders

promulg8ted by the President in the exercise of legisl8tive powers
whenever the s8me 8re v8lidly deleg8ted by the legisl8ture, or 8t present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administr8tive rules 8nd regul8tions
must 8lso be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
l8w pursu8nt 8lso to 8 v8lid deleg8tion.

Ironic8lly, Respondent 8sserted the in8pplic8bility of Section 4(e), Rule 3

of the IRR of the EPIRA, requiring the public8tion of its 8pplic8tion in 8
newsp8per of gener8l circul8tion 8nd the service of 8 copy on the
concerned loc8l government units. Its 8mended 8pplic8tion for the
incre8se in its gener8tion ch8rge w8s supposedly governed by the GRAM
Implementing Rules[8] 8dopted by the ERC in the Order d8ted Febru8ry 24,
2003 in ERC C8se No. 2003-44.

PASCUAL vs BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

G.R. No. L-25018               M8y 26, 1969
FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

At the initi8l he8ring of 8n 8dministr8tive c8se for m8lpr8ctice 8g8inst

petitioner, he w8s presented 8s the first witness for the compl8in8nts. His
counsel objected, invoking petitionerʼs right to be exempt from being 8
witness 8g8inst himself. Respondent Bo8rd of Ex8miners took note of the
ple8 but st8ted th8t petitioner would be c8lled upon to testify 8s such
witness unless he could secure 8 restr8ining order from 8 competent
8uthority.

A decision w8s rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the
cl8im of petitioner-8ppellee to be well-founded 8nd prohibiting respondent
Bo8rd "from compelling the petitioner to 8ct 8nd testify 8s 8 witness for
the compl8in8nt in s8id investig8tion without his consent 8nd 8g8inst
himself.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the respondent in 8n 8dministr8tive ch8rge m8y not be

compelled to t8ke the witness st8nd.

RULING:

YES. The 8ccused in 8 crimin8l c8se m8y refuse, not only to 8nswer

incrimin8tory questions, but 8lso to t8ke the witness st8nd. The s8me
principle sh8ll 8pply to the respondent in 8n 8dministr8tive proceeding
where the respondent m8y be subjected to s8nctions of 8 pen8l ch8r8cter,
such 8s the c8ncell8tion of his license to pr8ctice medicine.
Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

ANG TIBAY VS CIR

G.R. NO. L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940

F8cts:
Ang Tib8y w8s 8 m8nuf8cturer of rubber slippers. There w8s 8 short8ge of
le8ther soles, 8nd it w8s necess8ry to tempor8rily l8y off members of the
N8tion8l L8bor Union. According to the Union however, this w8s merely 8
scheme to system8tic8lly termin8te the employees from work, 8nd th8t the
short8ge of soles is unsupported. It cl8ims th8t Ang Tib8y is guilty of
unjust l8bor pr8ctice bec8use the owner, Teodoro, is discrimin8ting 8g8inst
the N8tion8l L8bor Union, 8nd unjustly f8voring the N8tion8l Workers
Brotherhood, which w8s 8llegedly symp8thetic to the employer. The Court
of Industri8l Rel8tion decided the c8se 8nd elev8ted it to the Supreme
Court, but 8 motion for new tri8l w8s r8ised by the NLU. But the Ang Tib8y
filed 8 motion for opposing the s8id motion. 

The motion for new tri8l w8s r8ised bec8use 8ccording to NLU, there 8re
documents th8t 8re so in8ccessible to them th8t even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to h8ve obt8ined them 8nd
offered 8s evidence in the Court of Industri8l Rel8tions. Th8t these
documents, which NLU h8ve now 8tt8ched 8s exhibits 8re of such f8r-
re8ching import8nce 8nd effect th8t their 8dmission would necess8rily
me8n the modific8tion 8nd revers8l of the judgment rendered therein.

Issue:
WON the union w8s denied due process by CIR.

Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to re8lize the functions of the CIR. The
CIR is 8 speci8l court whose functions 8re specific8lly st8ted in the l8w of
its cre8tion which is the Commonwe8lth Act No. 103). It is more 8n
8dministr8tive bo8rd th8n 8 p8rt of the integr8ted judici8l system of the
n8tion. It is not intended to be 8 mere receptive org8n of the government.
Unlike 8 court of justice which is essenti8lly p8ssive, 8cting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked 8nd deciding only c8ses th8t 8re presented to it by
the p8rties litig8nt, the function of the CIR, 8s will 8ppe8r from perus8l of
its org8nic l8w is more 8ctive, 8ffirm8tive 8nd dyn8mic. It not only
exercises judici8l or qu8si-judici8l functions in the determin8tion of
disputes between employers 8nd employees but its functions 8re f8r more
comprehensive 8nd extensive. It h8s jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investig8te, decide, 8nd settle 8ny question, m8tter
controversy or disputes 8rising between, 8nd/ or 8ffecting employers 8nd
employees or l8borers, 8nd l8ndlords 8nd ten8nts or f8rm-l8borers, 8nd
regul8tes the rel8tions between them, subject to, 8nd in 8ccord8nce with,
the provisions of CA 103.

SC h8d the occ8sion to point out th8t the CIR is not n8rrowly constr8ined
by technic8l rules of procedure, 8nd equity 8nd subst8nti8l merits of the
c8se, without reg8rd to technic8lities or leg8l forms 8nd sh8ll not be bound
by 8ny technic8l rules of leg8l evidence but m8y inform its mind in such
m8nner 8s it m8y deem just 8nd equit8ble.

The f8ct, however, th8t the CIR m8y be s8id to be free from rigidity of
cert8in procedur8l requirements does not me8n th8t it c8n in justici8ble
c8ses coming before it, entirely ignore or disreg8rd the fund8ment8l 8nd
essenti8l requirements of due process in tri8ls 8nd investig8tions of 8n
8dministr8tive ch8r8cter.

There 8re c8rdin8l prim8ry rights which must be respected even in

proceedings of this ch8r8cter:

(1) the right to 8 he8ring, which includes the right to present one's c8use
8nd submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribun8l must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must h8ve something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be subst8nti8l;
(5) The decision must be b8sed on the evidence presented 8t the he8ring;
or 8t le8st cont8ined in the record 8nd disclosed to the p8rties 8ffected;
(6) The tribun8l or body or 8ny of its judges must 8ct on its own
independent consider8tion of the l8w 8nd f8cts of the controversy, 8nd not
simply 8ccept the views of 8 subordin8te;
(7) The Bo8rd or body should, in 8ll controversi8l questions, render its
decision in such m8nner th8t the p8rties to the proceeding c8n know the
v8rious Issue involved, 8nd the re8son for the decision rendered.

SC s8id there w8s 8 f8ilure to gr8sp the fund8ment8l issue involved due to
f8ilure to receive 8ll relev8nt evidence. Thus, the motion for 8 new tri8l w8s
gr8nted 8nd the entire record of this c8se is rem8nded to the CIR.

CBsimiro vs. TBndog

G.R. NO. 146137 : June 08, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Upon un8nimous recommend8tions of the f8ct finding committee Ch8ired

(sic) by Municip8l Administr8tor Nelson M. Andres, H8ydee C. C8simero
w8s found guilty of Dishonesty 8nd M8lperform8nce of duty 8s Municip8l
Assessor of S8n Jose, Romblon, 8nd w8s ordered sep8r8ted from service
8s Municip8l Assessor of S8n Jose, Romblon.

Undeterred by th8t setb8ck, petitioner 8ppe8led to the CSC, which

8ffirmed respondent M8yor's order of dismiss8l. A motion for
reconsider8tion w8s filed, but the s8me w8s denied.

Diss8tisfied, petitioner elev8ted her c8se to the Court of Appe8ls, which

subsequently 8ffirmed the CSC decision. Her motion for reconsider8tion
w8s likewise denied.

Petitioner now comes to us r8ising the lone issue of whether or not she w8s
8fforded procedur8l 8nd subst8ntive due process when she w8s
termin8ted from her employment 8s Municip8l Assessor of S8n Jose,
Romblon.

HELD:

The court ruled th)t the essence of procedur8l due process is embodied in
the b8sic requirement of notice 8nd 8 re8l opportunity to be he8rd.

In 8dministr8tive proceedings, such 8s in the c8se 8t b8r, procedurBl due

process simply meBns the opportunity to explBin oneʼs side or the
opportunity to seek B reconsiderBtion of the Bction or ruling
complBined of. “To be he8rd” does not me8n only verb8l 8rguments in
court; one m8y be he8rd 8lso thru ple8dings. Where opportunity to be
he8rd, either through or8l 8rguments or ple8dings, is 8ccorded, there is no
deni8l of procedur8l due process.

In 8dministr8tive proceedings, procedur8l due process h8s been

recognized to include the following:
p. the right to 8ctu8l or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which m8y 8ffect 8 respondentʼs leg8l rights;
q. 8 re8l opportunity to be he8rd person8lly or with the 8ssist8nce of
counsel, to present witnesses 8nd evidence in oneʼs f8vor, 8nd to
defend oneʼs rights;
ƒ. 8 tribun8l vested with competent jurisdiction 8nd so constituted 8s to
8fford 8 person ch8rged 8dministr8tively 8 re8son8ble gu8r8ntee of
honesty 8s well 8s imp8rti8lity; 8nd
„. 8 finding by s8id tribun8l which is supported by subst8nti8l evidence
submitted for consider8tion during the he8ring or cont8ined in the
records or m8de known to the p8rties 8ffected.
(Willoughby in his clBssic on the Constitution of the United StBtes, Vol.
3, p. 1709)
In the c8se 8t b8r, wh8t 8ppe8rs in the record is th8t 8 he8ring w8s
conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner 8ttended 8nd where she
8nswered questions propounded by the members of the f8ct-finding
committee. Records further show th8t the petitioner w8s 8ccorded every
opportunity to present her side. She filed her 8nswer to the form8l ch8rge
8g8inst her. After 8 c8reful ev8lu8tion of evidence 8dduced, the committee
rendered 8 decision, which w8s 8ffirmed by the CSC 8nd the Court of
Appe8ls, upon 8 move to review the s8me by the petitioner. Indeed, she
h8s even brought the m8tter to this Court for fin8l 8djudic8tion.

Uy v. Court of AppeBls - no Bdmin lBw topics

Vertudez vs BuenBflor
G.R. No. 153166. December 16, 2005

S)me; S)me; It is well-settled th)t the essence of due process in

)dministr)tive proceedings is )n opportunity to expl)in oneʼs side or )n
opportunity to seek reconsider)tion of the )ction or ruling compl)ined of.
—It is well-settled th8t the essence of due process in 8dministr8tive
proceedings is 8n opportunity to expl8in oneʼs side or 8n opportunity to
seek reconsider8tion of the 8ction or ruling compl8ined of. This w8s cle8rly
s8tisfied in the c8se 8t b8r. Records show th8t petitioner not only g8ve her
sworn written expl8n8tion of the ch8rges 8g8inst her during the initi8l
st8ge of the investig8tion, she 8lso submitted: 8) 8 sworn counter-8ffid8vit
refuting the ch8rges 8g8inst her, with 8ll the 8tt8ched 8nnexes 8s
evidence; b) 8 Motion to Re-open the c8se with the BI; c) 8 Motion for
Reconsider8tion 8nd/or New Tri8l with the BI; d) 8n Appe8l to the CSC; e) 8
Motion for Reconsider8tion with the CSC; f) 8n Appe8l to the CA; g) 8
Motion for Reconsider8tion with the CA; 8nd h) the inst8nt petition for
review.

Antonio vs. VillB

G.R. No. 144694. M8rch 28, 2005

“Th8t during the period from M8y, 1990 to the first week of July, 1990, the
8bove-n8med respondents, t8king 8dv8nt8ge of their offici8l 8nd/or
8dministr8tive functions, conspiring 8nd confeder8ting with e8ch other 8nd
with MANUEL P. DANGAYO, 8lleged supplier, 8nd mutu8lly helping e8ch
other by common design 8nd purpose of mutu8l g8in 8nd benefit, 8llowed
M8nuel P. D8ng8yo to collect the 8mount of P553,900.00 in p8yment of
b8iley bridge components th8t 8re 8ctu8lly owned by the government.
In 8 Resolution d8ted 28 M8rch 1994, the Administr8tive Adjudic8tion
Bure8u of the Office of the Ombudsm8n concluded th8t there w8s
conspir8cy to defr8ud the government on the p8rt of Tel-Equen, Mir8nd8,
Antonio, Apolin8r, C8m8rillo, 8nd G8smen8. Conspir8cy w8s proved
through the following circumst8nces: first, it w8s m8de to 8ppe8r th8t
there w8s 8n immedi8te need for the bridge components; second, it w8s
m8de to 8ppe8r th8t 8 bidding w8s conducted on 10 M8y 1990; 8nd third,
the government w8s m8de to p8y for its own property.

In 8n Order d8ted 11 December 1995, the Administr8tive Adjudic8tion

Bure8u of the Office of the Ombudsm8n denied the motions for
reconsider8tion.

The 8ppell8te court modified the conclusion from the f8ctu8l findings of
the Administr8tive Adjudic8tion Bure8u of the Office of the Ombudsm8n.
The 8ppell8te court found th8t there w8s no thre8d of evidence to tie
M8bung8 8nd N8muhe to the f8lsified 10 M8y 1990 public bidding, le8ving
Tel-Equen, R8mirez, Antonio 8nd C8m8rillo¹⁵ li8ble for the ch8rges.

Evidently diss8tisfied with the 8ppell8te courtʼs decision, Antonio, R8mirez,

8nd Tel-Equen filed the present petition. They r8ised the following 8s
errors of the 8ppell8te court:

Whether there wBs Bn utter violBtion of the constitutionBl rights of the

petitioners to due process

HELD:

The Ombudsm8n h8s disciplin8ry 8uthority over 8ll elective 8nd 8ppointive
offici8ls of the government, except over offici8ls who m8y be removed only
by impe8chment or over members of Congress, 8nd the Judici8ry.¹⁸ Indeed,
the 8dministr8tive li8bility of 8 public offici8l could f8ll under the
jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission 8nd the Office of the
Ombudsm8n.¹⁹

Tel-Equen, R8mirez, 8nd Antonio point to the dismiss8l of the crimin8l

c8ses 8g8inst them 8s proof of viol8tion of their right to due process in the
present 8dministr8tive c8se.

Justice L8urel, in Ang Tib6y v. The Court of Industri6l Rel6tions,

²⁰
 enumer8ted the c8rdin8l prim8ry requirements in 8dministr8tive
proceedings. We summ8rize them here: (1) The right to 8 he8ring, which
includes the right of the p8rty interested to present his own c8se 8nd
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribun8l must consider the
evidence presented; (3) The decision must be supported by evidence; (4)
The evidence must be subst8nti8l; (5) The decision must be rendered on
the evidence present 8t the he8ring, or 8t le8st cont8ined in the record 8nd
disclosed to the p8rties 8ffected; (6) The 8dministr8tive body or 8ny of its
judges must 8ct on its or his own independent consider8tion of the l8w 8nd
f8cts of the controversy, 8nd not simply 8ccept the views of 8 subordin8te;
8nd (7) The 8dministr8tive body should, in 8ll controversi8l questions,
render its decision in such 8 m8nner th8t the p8rties to the proceeding c8n
know the v8rious issues involved, 8nd the re8sons for the decisions
rendered.

The essence of due process in 8dministr8tive proceedings is the

opportunity to expl8in oneʼs side or seek 8 reconsider8tion of the 8ction or
ruling compl8ined of. As long 8s the p8rties 8re given the opportunity to be
he8rd before judgment is rendered, the dem8nds of due process 8re
sufficiently met.²¹ Tel-Equen, R8mirez, 8nd Antonio p8rticip8ted in 8ll levels
of the present proceedings, from the Ombudsm8n to this Court. In f8ct,
during the prelimin8ry conference held on 27 November 1992 before Gr8ft
Investig8tion Officer L8mberto T. T8g8yun8, the p8rties 8greed to submit
the c8se for resolution on the b8sis of the evidence on record.²² Due
process in 8n 8dministr8tive context does not require tri8l-type
proceedings simil8r to those in the courts of justice.²³ Thus, Tel-Equen,
R8mirez, 8nd Antonio c8n no longer request for the cross-ex8min8tion of
the witnesses 8g8inst them.

WHEREFORE, the inst8nt petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of

Appe8ls in CA-G.R. SP No. 50324 is AFFIRMED. Jimmie F. Tel-Equen,
Rol8ndo D. R8mirez, 8nd Rudy P. Antonio committed 8cts of dishonesty,
f8lsific8tion of public documents, misconduct, 8nd conduct prejudici8l to
the best interest of the service. They 8re DISMISSED from the service, 8nd
sh8ll suffer the 8ccessory pen8lties of dismiss8l.

CALINISAN VS ROAQUIN
G.R. No. 159588, September 15, 2010

On April 11, 1991 the government ch8rged Ro8quin with murder before the
Region8l Tri8l Court (RTC) of Olong8po City, Br8nch 72, in Crimin8l C8se
216-91 for killing Alfredo T8luyo in 8 nightclub squ8bble. Consequently, the
PNP det8ined him 8t his 8ssigned st8tion in C8mp Lt. Gener8l M8nuel
C8b8l in Olong8po City 8nd l8ter 8t the Olong8po City j8il.

On June 20, 1991, while Ro8quin w8s under detention, the PNP
HeBdquBrters of RegionBl CommBnd 3 issued SpeciBl Order
74,³ dischBrging him from the service bBsed on CirculBr 17 of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines d8ted October 2, 1987. ⁴  They
disch8rged him notwithst8nding th8t he h8d not been 8dministr8tively
ch8rged in connection with the offense of which he w8s ch8rged in court.

On June 8, 1994 the RTC of Olong8po City 8pproved Ro8quinʼs motion for
8dmission to b8il 8nd gr8nted him provision8l liberty.

Seven ye8rs l8ter or on August 11, 1998 the RTC 8cquitted him of the crime
of which he w8s ch8rged upon 8 finding th8t he 8cted in complete self-
defense.⁵ Following this development, Ro8quin 8sked the PNP to reinst8te
him into the police service.

Acting on the request, on November 23, 1998 P/Chief Superintendent

Roberto C8linis8n, Director of the PNP Region8l Office III, reinst8ted
Ro8quin into service.

On J8nu8ry 18, 2000, however, P/Chief Superintendent Reyn8ldo Acop,

HeBd of the PNP DirectorBte for Personnel Bnd Records MBnBgement,
issued 8 memor8ndum, ⁷  directing C8linis8n to nullify Ro8quinʼs
reinst8tement. Acop s8id th8t wh8t 8pplied to Ro8quin w8s Section 45 of
R.A. 6975⁸ 8s implemented by N8tion8l Police Commission Memor8ndum
Circul8r 96-010.⁹ Ro8quin could not be entitled to reinst8tement since he
f8iled to file 8 motion for reconsider8tion within 10 d8ys of being notified of
his disch8rge.

Acting on his superior ʼs order, C8linis8n issued Speci8l Orders

102,¹⁰ nullifying Ro8quinʼs reinst8tement. Ro8quin sought reconsider8tion,
but this w8s denied with 8n 8dvice th8t he seek redress in court.¹¹

On M8rch 31, 2000 Ro8quin filed 8 petition for certior8ri 8nd m8nd8mus
8g8inst his superior officers before the RTC of Olong8po City. The p8rties
8greed to submit the c8se for decision on the b8sis of their respective
memor8nd8. On November 20, 2000, the RTC rendered 8 decision,
¹²
 ordering Ro8quinʼs reinst8tement. On 8ppe8l by Ro8quinʼs superior
officers, the Court of Appe8ls (CA) rendered judgment on August 14,
2003,¹³ dismissing their 8ppe8l for l8ck of jurisdiction 8s the issues
involved were purely leg8l, hence, this petition.

Wh8t the Court found in the record is police officer C8linis8nʼs Resolution,
²⁰
 st8ting th8t Ro8quinʼs dismiss8l from the service w8s done without
8dministr8tive due process, thus his recommend8tion th8t Ro8quin be
reinst8ted. Indeed, the RTC observed th8t:

“The PNP however did not file Bny BdministrBtive chBrge BgBinst the
Bccused prepBrBtory to his dismissBl Bnd therefore the dismissBl
effected without Bny BdministrBtive complBint violBted the right of the
Bccused to substBntive Bnd procedurBl due process. x x x

HELD:

But Section 45 th8t Ro8quinʼs superior officers invoked c8nnot 8pply to

him since no one filed Bn BdministrBtive Bction BgBinst him in
connection with the crime of which he wBs chBrged in court. His
superiors did not 8dduce evidence during the tri8l before the RTC th8t
such 8ction h8d been filed. They subsequently 8lleged in their ple8dings
the filing of some 8dministr8tive c8se 8g8inst him but they provided
neither the specifics of th8t c8se nor 8 document evidencing its existence.

At 8ny r8te, Bssuming thBt someone filed Bn BdministrBtive chBrge

BgBinst RoBquin, still the lBw required the PNP to give him notice of
such chBrge Bnd the right to Bnswer the sBme. This does not 8ppe8r in
the record. Addition8lly, Speci8l Order 74 provided th8t Ro8quinʼs mode of
disch8rge w8s to be determined by higher he8dqu8rters.¹⁹Ag8in, nothing in
the record of this c8se indic8tes th8t the PNP investig8ted Ro8quin or
conducted 8 summ8ry proceeding to determine his li8bility in connection
with the murder of which he w8s ch8rged in court. The PNP g8ve him no
ch8nce to show why he should not be disch8rged.

GABRIEL vs RAMOS
A.M. No. P-10-2837, August 25, 2010 

FACTS:

Before the Court is the present 8dministr8tive compl8int for gr8ve

misconduct filed, on July 13, 2007,¹ by PO2 P8trick Meji8 G8briel,
(G8briel) with the Office of the Court AdministrBtor (OCA), 8g8inst
Willi8m Jose R. R8mos, (R8mos), Sheriff IV, Region8l Tri8l Court (RTC),
Br8nch 166, P8sig City.

Acting on the compl8int, the OCA required R8mos to comment.² R8mos

complied 8nd filed his comment on September 6, 2007. There8fter, the
OCA submitted 8 Report (d8ted August 28, 2008)³ to the Court, whose
relev8nt portions provide:
Compl8in8nt st8tes th8t he is presently 8 member of the Philippine
N8tion8l Police 8nd design8ted 8s Chief Investig8tor 8ssigned 8t S8n
Teodoro, Orient8l Mindoro.

According to the compl8in8nt on 10 M8y 2007 8t 8round 4†00 oʼclock

in the 8fternoon 8t B8r8ng8y C8ls8p8, Municip8lity of S8n Teodoro,
Orient8l Mindoro s8id respondent together with sever8l persons, in
 conspir8cy 8nd on 8greement with former Municip8l M8yor M8nuel
Rox8s B8e, entered the house of Ms. Adel8id8 C8eg H8el. Soon
there8fter, two (2) pieces of Five Hundred (₱500.00) bills were h8nded
to Adel8id8 8nd Ariel H8el to vote for M8yor8lty C8ndid8te Homer
Rox8s Alumisin 8nd other c8ndid8tes listed in the yellow p8ges. The
s8id vote buying incident w8s reported by Adel8id8 8nd Ariel H8el to
S8n Teodoro Municip8l Police St8tion, who both executed their
respective Sworn St8tements enclosed 8s Annexes "A" 8nd "B" hereof.
A c8se for Viol8tion of Article 22, Section 261 (8) of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines w8s 8lso filed 8g8inst respondent
together with his co-conspir8tors docketed 8s I.S. No. 07-12386
before the Prosecutorʼs Office of Orient8l Mindoro 8tt8ched 8s Annex
"C".

In 8 COMMENT d8ted 9 August 2007, respondent 8lleges th8t the

ch8rges in the compl8int 8re utterly f8lse, m8licious 8nd intended to
intimid8te him from prosecuting c8ses of robbery 8s well 8s
8dministr8tive ch8rges 8g8inst sever8l policemen, including herein
compl8in8nt for openly c8mp8igning for 8 cert8in c8ndid8te during the
election period.

OCA REPORT: The conflicting versions of both p8rties present 8

f8ctu8l issue which could not be resolved b8sed only on the ple8dings
submitted before us. A form8l investig8tion is necess8ry to thresh out
the truth 8nd 8lso to 8fford herein respondent the ch8nce to f8ce his
8ccusers.

OCA forw8rded the c8se to RTC P8sig.

ISSUE: Whether Mr. R8mos m8y be held li8ble for Gr8ve Misconduct.

HELD:

The Court 8grees with Judge M8n8l8st8sʼ (RTC P8sig) recommend8tion for
dismiss8l of the compl8int.

3) In the conduct of the investig8tion, respondent vehemently denied 8ll

the ch8rges 8g8inst him. The evidence submitted to this Office reve8ls
th8t the filing of the inst8nt 8dministr8tive c8se 8ppe8rs to be 8 mere
lever8ge 8nd stemmed from 8 c8se filed by herein respondent 8g8inst the
compl8in8nt for Robbery. (Form8l Offer; Exhibits "A" 8nd "B"; TSN d8ted
December 15, 2008);

4) From the evidence 8dduced, compl8in8nt f8iled to est8blish the

8lleg8tions of gr8ve misconduct 8g8inst herein respondent. "In
BdministrBtive proceedings, the burden of proof thBt respondent
committed the Bct complBined of rests on the complBinBnt" (GotgotBo
versus MillorB, 459 SCRA 340).

With no h8rd evidence except unconfirmed self serving 8ssertions to b8ck

up the compl8int, this Office h8s no choice but to recommend dismiss8l of
the present compl8int.

GARCIA VS. MOLINA

G.R. No. 159588. September 15, 2010

FACTS:
Molin8 8nd Vel8sco 8re both Attorney V of the GSIS. They received two
sep8r8te Memor8nd8 from Petitioner ch8rging them
with gr8ve misconduct. Vel8sco, in 8ddition w8s 8lso 8ccused of viol8ting
Rules of Office Decorum 8nd gross insubordin8tion.
Both were suspended for 90 d8ys without p8y.

In their 8nswer, both respondents denied the ch8rges 8nd 8verred th8t
Petitioner 8cted in b8d f8ith in ch8rging them f8lsely.
They 8lso opposed to their suspension for l8ck of f8ctu8l 8nd leg8l b8sis.
Respondents filed 8n Urgent Petition for to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order before Civil Service Commission (CSC) 8s
well 8s Petition to Tr8nsfer Investig8tion. CSC f8iled to
resolve both motions.

Respondents filed with CA 8 Speci8l Civil Action for Certior8ri 8nd

Prohibition with pr8yer for TRO. CA gr8nted the Petition 8nd
8greed th8t the investig8tion should be done by CSC 8nd not GSIS.

ISSUE:
WON the conduct of Prelimin8ry Investig8tion in Administr8tive proceeding
is 8n essenti8l requisite to the conduct of
8djudic8tion
 

HELD: YES
Although 8dministr8tive procedur8l rules 8re less stringent 8nd often
8pplied more liber8lly, 8dministr8tive proceedings 8re not
exempt from b8sic 8nd fund8ment8l procedur8l principles such 8s the right
to due process in investig8tions 8nd he8rings.

The form8l Memor8nd8 sep8r8tely issued to the respondents 8re the

form8l ch8rges 8g8inst them 8nd these form8l ch8rges 8re
done without prelimin8ry or f8ct finding investig8tion. Petitioners cl8imed
th8t prelimin8ry investig8tions 8re not required in
indictments in fl8gr8nti 8s in this c8se. This w8s opposed by the Supreme
Court.

Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specific8lly provide th8t 8 form8l ch8rge
without the requisite prelimin8ry investig8tion is null
8nd void. However, 8s cle8rly outlined 8bove, upon receipt of 8 compl8int
which is sufficient in form 8nd subst8nce, the
disciplining 8uthority sh8ll require the person compl8ined of to submit 8
Counter-Affid8vit/Comment under o8th within three
d8ys from receipt. Which me8ns th8t this should be done prior to the
issu8nce of 8 form8l ch8rge 8nd the comment required is
different from the Answer th8t the respondents m8y file.

Due process in 8dministr8tive proceedings h8s been recognized to include

the following:
p. The right to 8ctu8l or constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings which m8y 8ffect 8 respondentʼs leg8l rights;
q. A re8l opportunity to be he8rd person8lly or with the 8ssist8nce of
counsel, to present witnesses 8nd evidence in oneʼs f8vor, 8nd to
defend oneʼs rights;
ƒ. A tribun8l vested with competent jurisdiction 8nd so constituted 8s to
8fford 8 person ch8rged 8dministr8tively 8 re8son8ble gu8r8ntee of
honesty 8s well 8s imp8rti8lity; 8nd
„. A finding by s8id tribun8l which is supported by subst8nti8l evidence
submitted for consider8tion during the he8ring or cont8ined in the
records or m8de known to the p8rties 8ffected.
(Willoughby in his clBssic on the Constitution of the United StBtes, Vol.
3, p. 1709)

PAGCOR VS CA
G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011

A notice of preventive suspension d8ted April 15, 2004 8nd signed by D8n
N. Di8, Senior Br8nch M8n8ger of CF-P8vilion, w8s received by .M8n8h8n
on April 16, 2004. The pertinent portions of the notice re8d:

You 8re hereby informed of the ch8rge 8g8inst you of SERIOUS

PROCEDURAL DEVIATION/GROSS NEGLIGENCE, 8rising from the
8nom8lous fund tr8nsfer tr8ns8ction in the 8mount of [₱]4.2 million,
consumm8ted 8t the VIP Booth l8st April 14, 2004 wherein you were on the
6-2PM duty.

Pending result of the investig8tion of the c8se, ple8se be informed th8t you
8re hereby pl8ced under preventive suspension effective immedi8tely.⁶
M8n8h8n filed 8 Motion for Reconsider8tion¹¹ of the PAGCOR BOD's
decision to dismiss her from the service, giving the following grounds in
support thereof: (1) she w8s deprived of her constitution8l right to due
process of l8w when the PAGCOR BOD outrightly dismissed her from
service without informing her of the form8l ch8rges 8nd 8pprising her of
the document8ry evidence 8g8inst her; 

Feeling 8ggrieved, M8n8h8n 8ppe8led from the PAGCOR's rulings to the

Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The Ruling of the CSC

On July 10, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071264¹³ gr8nting herein
respondent M8n8h8n's 8ppe8l from the decisions of PAGCOR. After 8
finding of viol8tion of M8n8h8n's right to due process, the Commission
rem8nded the c8se to PAGCOR for the issu8nce of 8 form8l ch8rge, if
w8rr8nted, then 8 form8l investig8tion pursu8nt to the Uniform Rules on
Administr8tive C8ses in the Civil Service. It decl8red the preventive
suspension of M8n8h8n null 8nd void for h8ving been issued by virtue of
8n inv8lid ch8rge 8nd for its f8ilure to specify the dur8tion of preventive
suspension. Further, the CSC noted th8t the order of dismiss8l served upon
M8n8h8n w8s 8 mere notice issued by the HRD Senior M8n8ging He8d
informing her of the PAGCOR BOD's decision to dismiss her from the
service, inste8d of 8 copy of the BOD Resolution on the order of dismiss8l.

The Ruling of the CA

On October 2, 2008, the CA rendered the 8ss8iled Decision¹⁸ 8ffirming in
toto the Resolutions of the CSC. The dispositive portion of the decision
re8ds:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The 8ss8iled
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission d8ted 10 July 2007 8nd 10
September 2007 8re AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.¹⁹
PAGCOR's Motion for Reconsider8tion²⁰ w8s denied by the CA vi8 its
Resolution²¹ d8ted November 27, 2008.

HELD:

While 8 liber8l construction of 8dministr8tive rules of procedure is 8llowed

8nd 8pplied in some c8ses, this is resorted to when it c8n promote their
objective 8nd 8id the p8rties in re8ching 8 just, speedy 8nd inexpensive
determin8tion of their respective cl8ims 8nd defenses.⁴⁰ Without proper
investigBtion Bnd, thereBfter, B decision thBt cleBrly indicBted the
fBcts constituting the offense imputed upon the respondent Bnd the
compBny rules she supposedly violBted, the respondent did not get
the chBnce to sufficiently defend herself; 8nd more import8ntly, the
petitioner, the CSC 8nd the courts could not h8ve h8d the ch8nce to
re8son8bly 8scert8in the truth which the CSC rules 8im to 8ccomplish.

CBrbonnel vs Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Cl8rit8 J. C8rbonel w8s 8n employee of the Bure8u of J8il

M8n8gement 8nd Penology, M8k8ti City. She w8s form8lly ch8rged with
Dishonesty, Gr8ve Misconduct, 8nd F8lsific8tion of Offici8l Documents by
the Civil Service Commission Region8l Office No. IV (CSCRO IV).

On M8y 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure 8 copy of the
result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) C8reer Service Profession8l
Ex8min8tion given on M8rch 14, 1999, bec8use she lost the origin8l copy of
her C8reer Service Profession8l Certific8te of R8ting (here8fter referred to
8s certific8te of r8ting).³ Petitioner w8s directed to 8ccomplish 8
verific8tion slip. The Ex8min8tion Pl8cement 8nd Service Division noticed
th8t petitionerʼs person8l 8nd physic8l 8ppe8r8nce w8s entirely different
from the picture of the ex8minee 8tt8ched to the 8pplic8tion form 8nd the
picture se8t pl8n. It w8s 8lso discovered th8t the sign8ture 8ffixed on the
8pplic8tion form w8s different from th8t 8ppe8ring on the verific8tion slip.
⁴
 Bec8use of these discrep8ncies, the Leg8l Aff8irs Division of the CSCRO
IV conducted 8n investig8tion.

In the course of the investig8tion, petitioner volunt8rily m8de 8

st8tement⁵ before Atty. Ros8lind8 S.M. Gepigon, 8dmitting th8t, sometime
in M8rch 1999, she 8ccepted the propos8l of 8 cert8in Bettin8 J. N8v8rro
(N8v8rro) for the l8tter to obt8in for petitioner 8 C8reer Service
Profession8l Eligibility by merely 8ccomplishing 8n 8pplic8tion form 8nd
p8ying the 8mount of ₱10,000.00. Petitioner thus 8ccomplished 8n
8pplic8tion form to t8ke the CATS C8reer Service Profession8l Ex8min8tion
8nd g8ve N8v8rro ₱5,000.00 8s down p8yment. Upon receipt of the
origin8l copy of the certific8te of r8ting from N8v8rro, petitioner g8ve the
l8tter the rem8ining ₱5,000.00. Petitioner, however, mispl8ced the
certific8te of r8ting. This prompted her to secure 8nother copy from the
CSCRO IV.

Hence, the form8l ch8rge 8g8inst petitioner.

Denying her 8dmissions in her volunt8ry st8tement before the CSCRO IV,
petitioner, in her Answer,⁶ tr8versed the ch8rges 8g8inst her. She expl8ined
th8t 8fter filling up the 8pplic8tion form for the civil service ex8min8tion,
she 8sked N8v8rro to submit the s8me to the CSC. She, however, 8dmitted
th8t she f8iled to t8ke the ex8min8tion 8s she h8d to 8ttend to her 8iling
mother. Thus, when she received 8 certific8te of eligibility despite her
f8ilure to t8ke the test, she w8s 8nxious to know the mystery behind it. She
cl8imed th8t she went to the CSCRO IV not to get 8 copy of the certific8te
of r8ting but to check the ver8city of the certific8te. More import8ntly, she
questioned the use of her volunt8ry st8tement 8s the b8sis of the form8l
ch8rge 8g8inst her in8smuch 8s the s8me w8s m8de without the
8ssist8nce of counsel.

After the form8l investig8tion, the CSCRO IV rendered its M8rch 25, 2002
Decision No. 020079⁷ finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, gr8ve
misconduct, 8nd f8lsific8tion of offici8l documents. The pen8lty of
dismiss8l from the service, with 8ll its 8ccessory pen8lties, w8s imposed
on her. Petitionerʼs motion for reconsider8tion w8s denied by CSCRO IV on
November 14, 2003.

ISSUE:

WON 8 volunt8ry st8tement without the 8ssist8nce of counsel be m8de 8s

b8sis for 8 form8l ch8rge in 8n 8dministr8tive c8se

HELD:

While investig8tions conducted by 8n 8dministr8tive body m8y 8t times be

8kin to 8 crimin8l proceeding, the f8ct rem8ins th8t, under existing l8ws, 8
p8rty in 8n 8dministr8tive inquiry m8y or m8y not be 8ssisted by counsel,
irrespective of the n8ture of the ch8rges 8nd of petitionerʼs c8p8city to
represent herself, 8nd no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investig8ted with counsel. The right to counsel is not BlwBys
imperBtive in BdministrBtive investigBtions becBuse such inquiries Bre
conducted merely to determine whether there Bre fBcts thBt merit the
imposition of disciplinBry meBsures BgBinst erring public officers Bnd
employees, with the purpose of mBintBining the dignity of government
service.