1. What is the doctrine in the case of SPARK V. QC (G.R. NO. 225442. AUGUST 08, 2017)? Explain fully. ( 10 pts.

DOCTRINE:
A Local Government Unit, through a City Ordinance can impose curfews for minors, provided that the said
ordinance is based on, and within the bounds of an existing statute/law. The local government unit’s power to
prescribe curfew hours is based on Article 139 of PD 603, which provides in part that City or municipal councils may
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
The Court discussed that while the State recognizes that parents have the duty to prepare the child in the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship and that the parents' superior right
over the State in the upbringing of their children it should be stressed that when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate
interests. Thus, in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order,
or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children.

2. Discuss the Power of Eminent Domain of Local Government Units. Cite legal basis. ( 10 pts.)

By virtue of the Local Government Code, or Republic Act 7160, specifically Section 19, Congress conferred upon
Local Government Units the power of Eminent Domain.

In the case of Beluso v. Municipality of Panay, G.R. 153974, the Supreme Court laid down the following requisites
for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a Local Government Unit:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.

Further, the Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known
as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely
expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.

3. Diget the case of Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087. (10 pts..)

4. Discuss the doctrine of relative unconstitutionality. ( 10 pts.)

In the case of CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, (G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004), The Supreme Court had the opportunity to
discuss the Doctrine of Relative Uncostitutionality. The Court discussed in the following wise:

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.
 5. Digest the case of BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CAYETANO PACANA III, NOE U. DACER, JOHNNY B.
RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN, PORFERIA M. VALMORES, MENELEO G.
LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA, FRANCISCO D. MANGA, NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN,
RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M. NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, Respondents, G.R. No. 171673 : May 30, 2011. (10 pts.)

6. What is the legal doctrine of the case Kulayan v. Tan G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012? ( 10 pts.)

In the case of Kulayan v. Tan G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, where a Provincial Governor, a Local Chief Executive, exercised the
calling-out powers, the Supreme Court held that provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be
discussed subsequently. This is without prejudice to the local chief executive’s authority over police units in their jurisdiction as
provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations

7. Digest the case of MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013. ( 10 pts.)
8. Digest the case of AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMELEC, GR No. 203974, Apr 22, 2014.( 10 pts.)
9. Digest the case of SEMA versus COMELEC, [G.R. No. 134163-64. December 13, 2000. ( 10 pts.)

10.What are the instances wherein the consecutive terms are considered as having been involuntarily interrupted or broken. Discuss. (
10 pts.)

Consecutive terms are considered as having been involuntarily interrupted or broken in the following instances:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term
as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit. If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption.

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen.

3. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term
of office had the protest been dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the
3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL
BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS
CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert
Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance
as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their
children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in
Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as
part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing
Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June
6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00
P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-
2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00
A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City
Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims
to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners
assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear
provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the
imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not
cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew
hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as
amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They
contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose
them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less
restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a
penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual
controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable." 25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may
be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[
m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power
and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking
the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in
the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of the
foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not
made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive
enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct
resort to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first
two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication,
it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the
parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether
the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until
the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative
or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the
right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue
and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,
he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to
freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the
purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's
right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of
the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger
of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any
direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children
as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been
infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his
primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly
infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming
that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected
by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the
requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It
may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is
this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to
travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including,
among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle
petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves
the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit
that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any
provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public
of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases"
and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was
so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for
adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the
due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of
suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only
point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because
agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis,
and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather,
lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal
provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true
that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed
measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all
ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation
of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with
law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be
read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may
therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification
establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment
of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers
disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine
whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of
their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given
the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty
aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example
is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference
to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is
that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to
the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is
therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's
role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes
a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-
being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by
criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to
the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect
of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to
apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently,
this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the
perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal
curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty
to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if
there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any
transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to
a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases," 81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process
rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free
speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of
locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where
they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly
rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to move about, such
movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is
equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive
to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental rights.
Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987
Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably
serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and
their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA
9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by
local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce
the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to
restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of
adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their
affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect
to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the
State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general
interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights.
These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner;
and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most
appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising
from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed
to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers
for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out
on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict
scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the
fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute
whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but
that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx.
Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights
of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in
the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state
interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree
of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-
vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the
means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's
welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the
State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm,
and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses"
of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development,
which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of
notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups
without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the
evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night time by setting
disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their
development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing
number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure
that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the
curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the
US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of
children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing
juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records from
Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national
crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less
wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early
age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected
officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities
for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence
and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their
respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in· the
Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom
to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must
be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in
unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve
watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking
their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30
(which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages
with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise
of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the
above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents,
family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication
facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in
the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those
who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the
curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over
them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and
All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk
of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a
greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is
apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or
nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears
stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits
minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario
depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively
curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to
voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no
reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the
State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal
activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional
rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities
of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such
minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same
place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es
in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These
items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items
given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in
the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting
attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to
move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth,
only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a
time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate
activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception
found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment
should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not
superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their
children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who
are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences
of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is
not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon
City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are
in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting,
adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as
applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in
relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any
penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render
social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine
imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based
on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in
case of a third and subsequent violation; and
 3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service;
(b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not
limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or
to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the
parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of
adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on
minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for
violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction
- such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are
without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service
programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the
moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give
them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a
formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or
friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild
rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning." 165 Notably,
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare
that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on
the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of
lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; 168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public
and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more
than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or
sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence,
prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative
laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children
for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for
curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-
A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on
the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the
State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only
the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has
also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is
declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on
minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the
law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City
of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government
of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners1 pray for the reversal of the Order dated July 28, 1998 issued by Branch
155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED and an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION is
hereby issued declaring that the plaintiff, City of Mandaluyong, has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together
with existing improvements thereon more specifically covered by Transfer Certificate Of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of
 Deeds for Metro Manila District II for the public use or purpose as stated in the Complaint, upon payment of just
compensation.

Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the parties are hereby directed to submit to the Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to be appointed as
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.2

It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-
19943 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at
Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more particularly described under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was
the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to
sell.4 Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint5 for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875.

Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss6 the complaint based on the following grounds — (1) the power of eminent domain is not being
exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of
Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget
and appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of
Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On
October 24, 1995, the trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.7

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong
to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the
subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed
possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995.8 On July 28, 1998, the
court granted the assailed order of expropriation.

Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as
required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,9 and not by means of a mere resolution. 10 Respondent contends, however, that it
validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court, was explained, thus: 11

. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a "resolution" empowering the City
Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the court has already determine[d] with certainty the
amount of just compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian
Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. 12

Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriation proceedings and that
an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation, explaining that the resolution
mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation
case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code. 13

The petition is imbued with merit.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public
welfare. 14 It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. 15 Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. 16 The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of
property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be
without limit. 17 Thus, our own Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." 18 Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses 19 act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power.

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right
necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, 20 the
need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila we said: 21

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right
to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation.
(Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Gal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of
governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse.
. . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated
to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. 22

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property.

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the
power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. 23 In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious
attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is
directly exercised by the national legislature. 24

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the local government unit
concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted. 25
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a
resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an
ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v.
V.M. Realty Corporation 26 regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that 1998 case we held that:

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the
amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a
complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the
action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 27

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in
favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the
court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has
properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon the possession of the real
property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. 28 Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body
authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint
with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.

Neither is respondent's position improved by its reliance upon Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR which provides that:

If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.

The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more apparent than real, in Municipality of
Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 29 which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule
which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a
mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in
the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent
domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we cannot grant judicial sanction to a
local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary
ordinance and thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with all other legal requirements.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No.
875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO PACANA III, NOE U. DACER, JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN,
PORFERIA M. VALMORES, MENELEO G. LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA, FRANCISCO D. MANGA, NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B.
GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN, RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M. NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 dated April 15, 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and its Resolution2 dated January 27, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Respondents in the case at bar, Cayetano Pacana III, Noe U. Dacer, Johnny B. Racaza, Leonardo S. Orevillo, Araceli T. Libre, Genovevo E.
Romitman, Porferia M. Valmores, Meneleo G. Lactuan, Dionisio G. Bangga, Francisco D. Manga, Nestor A. Amplayo, Leilani B. Gasataya,
Loreta G. Lactuan, Ricardo B. Pido, Resigolo M. Nacua and Anacleto C. Remedio (collectively, the DXWG personnel), are supervisory and
rank and file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City radio station which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), a
corporation managed by Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC).

On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed with the Sub-regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Iligan City a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits, and attorney’s fees against IBC
and BBC.

On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Abdullah L. Alug rendered his Decision3 awarding the DXWG personnel a total of ₱12,002,157.28 as
unpaid CBA benefits consisting of unpaid wages and increases, 13th month pay, longevity pay, sick leave cash conversion, rice and sugar
subsidy, retirement pay, loyalty reward and separation pay.4 The Labor Arbiter denied the other claims of the DXWG personnel for
Christmas bonus, educational assistance, medical check-up and optical expenses. Both sets of parties appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

On May 15, 1997, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,5 was jointly filed by IBC and the DXWG personnel based on the
latter’s admission that IBC is not their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan City. On April 21, 1997, the NLRC granted the Motion
and dismissed the case with respect to IBC.6

BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that (1) neither BBC nor its duly authorized representatives or officers were served with
summons and/or a copy of the complaint when the case was pending before the Labor Arbiter or a copy of the Decision therein; (2) since
the liability of IBC and BBC is solidary, the release and quitclaim issued by the DXWG personnel in favor of IBC totally extinguished BBC’s
liability; (3) it was IBC that effected the termination of the DXWG personnel’s employment; (4) the DXWG personnel are members of the
IBC union and are not employees of BBC; and (5) the sequestered properties of BBC cannot be levied upon.

On December 12, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution vacating the Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug and remanding the case to the
arbitration branch of origin on the ground that while the complaint was filed against both IBC and BBC, only IBC was served with
summons, ordered to submit a position paper, and furnished a copy of the assailed decision.7

On October 15, 1998, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan rendered a Decision adjudging BBC to be liable for the same amount
discussed in the vacated Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation to pay
complainants the following:

1. Cayetano Pacana III ₱ 1,730,535.75

2. Noe U. Dacer 886,776.43

3. Johnny B. Racaza 1,271,739.34

4. Leonardo S. Orevillo 1,097,752.70

5. Araceli T. Libre 543,467.22

6. Genovevo E. Romitman 716,455.72

7. Porferia M. Valmores 562,564.78

8. Meneleo G. Lactuan 678,995.91

9. Dionisio G. Bangga 580,873.78

10. Francisco D. Manga 29,286.65

11. Nestor A. Amplayo 583,798.51

12. Leilani B. Gasataya 42,669.75

13. Loreta G. Lactuan 757,252.52

14. Ricardo B. Pido 756,835.64

15. Resigolo M. Nacua 887,344.75

16. Anacleto C. Remedio 887,345.39

GRAND TOTAL ₱ 12,002,157.28

Respondent is likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney’s fee.8

Both BBC and respondents appealed to the NLRC anew. The appeal was docketed as NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In their appeal, the
DXWG personnel reasserted their claim for the remaining CBA benefits not awarded to them, and alleged error in the reckoning date of
the computation of the monetary award. BBC, in its own Memorandum of Appeal, challenged the monetary award itself, claiming that
such benefits were only due to IBC, not BBC, employees.9 In the same Memorandum of Appeal, BBC incorporated a Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award (of the Labor Arbiter),10 in order that the appeal bond may be reduced.

On September 16, 1999, the NLRC issued an Order11 denying the Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award. According to
the NLRC, such recomputation would result in the premature resolution of the issue raised on appeal. The NLRC ordered BBC to post the
required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the appeal for
non-perfection.12 Instead of complying with the Order to post the required bond, BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 alleging this
time that since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond.

On November 22, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision14 in NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In said Decision, the NLRC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of BBC on its September 16, 1999 Order and accordingly dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The NLRC
likewise dismissed the appeal of the DXWG personnel for lack of merit in the same Decision.

BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision. On January 13, 2000, the NLRC issued a Resolution15 denying the Motion.

BBC filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the above dispositions by the
NLRC. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57847.

On April 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying BBC’s Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals held
that BBC, though owned by the government, is a corporation with a personality distinct from the Republic or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, and therefore do not partake in the latter’s exemption from the posting of appeal bonds. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents, We DENY the petition. The challenged decision of
public respondent dated November 22, 1999, as well as its subsequent resolution dated January 13, 2000, in NLRC Case No. M-004419-
98 are hereby AFFIRMED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 15, 1998 in RAB Case No. 12-09-00309-95 is hereby declared
FINAL AND EXECUTORY.16

On January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition
for Review.

As stated above, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals dealt with only one issue – whether BBC is exempt from posting an appeal
bond. To recall, the NLRC issued an Order denying BBC’s Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award and ordered BBC to post
the required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the appeal
for non-perfection.17 However, instead of heeding the warning, BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that it need not post an
appeal bond since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

There is no dispute as regards the history of the ownership of BBC and IBC. Both BBC and IBC, together with Radio Philippines Network
(RPN-9), were formerly owned by Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto). In the aftermath of the 1986 people power revolution, the three
companies, collectively denominated as Broadcast City, were sequestered and placed under the control and management of the Board
of Administrators (BOA).18 The BOA was tasked to operate and manage its business and affairs subject to the control and supervision of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).19 In December 1986, Benedicto and PCGG allegedly executed a Management
Agreement whereby the Boards of Directors of BBC, IBC and RPN-9 were agreed to be reconstituted. Under the agreement, 2/3 of the
membership of the Boards of Directors will be PCGG nominees, and 1/3 will be Benedicto nominees. A reorganized Board of Directors
was thus elected for each of the three corporations. The BOA, however, refused to relinquish its function, paving for the filing by
Benedicto of a Petition for Prohibition with this Court in 1989, which was docketed as G.R. No. 87710.

In the meantime, it was in 1987 when the Republic, represented by the PCGG, filed the case for recovery/reconveyance/reversion and
damages against Benedicto. Following our ruling in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO) v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government,20 the institution of this suit necessarily placed BBC, IBC and RPN-9 under custodia legis of the Sandiganbayan.

On November 3, 1990, Benedicto and the Republic executed a Compromise Agreement whereby Benedicto, in exchange for immunity
from civil and criminal actions, "ceded to the government certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of the agreement and assigned or
transferred whatever rights he may have, if any, to the government over all corporate assets listed in Annex B of the agreement."21 BBC
is one of the properties listed in Annex B.22 Annex A, on the other hand, includes the following entry:

CESSION TO THE GOVERNMENT:

I. PHILIPPINE ASSETS:

xxxx

7. Inter-Continental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), 100% of total assets estimated at P450 million, consisting of 41,000 sq.mtrs. of land,
more or less, located at Broadcast City Quezon City, other land and buildings in various Provinces, and operates the following TV stations:

a. TV 13 (Manila)

b. DY/TV 13 (Cebu)

c. DX/TV 13 (Davao)

d. DYOB/TV 12 (Iloilo)

e. DWLW/TV 13 (Laoag)

as well as the following Radio Stations

 a. DZMZ-FM Manila

b. DYBQ Iloilo

c. DYOO Roxas

d. DYRG Kalibo

e. DWLW Laoag

f. DWGW Legaspi

g. DWDW Dagupan

h. DWNW Naga

i. DXWG Iligan . . . . . . . . . . ₱352,455,286.0023 (Emphasis supplied.)

Then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to invalidate the Compromise Agreement,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 96087. The Petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 87710.

On March 31, 1992, this Court, in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC,24 promulgated its
Decision on the consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 87710 and G.R. No. 96087. Holding that the authority of the BOA had become functus
oficio, we granted the Petition in G.R. No. 87710, ordering the BOA to "cease and desist from further exercising management, operation
and control of Broadcast City and is hereby directed to surrender the management, operation and control of Broadcast City to the
reorganized Board of Directors of each of the Broadcast City television stations." 25 We denied the Petition in G.R. No. 96087 for being
premature, since the approval of the Compromise Agreement was still pending in the Sandiganbayan.26

The Sandiganbayan subsequently approved the Compromise Agreement on October 31, 1992, and the approval was affirmed by this
Court on September 10, 1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.27 Thus, both BBC and IBC were government-owned and controlled during
the time the DXWG personnel filed their original complaint on August 29, 1995.

In the present Petition, BBC reiterates its argument that since it is now wholly and solely owned by the government, the posting of the
appeal bond was unnecessary on account of the fact that it is presumed that the government is always solvent.28 Citing the 1975 case of
Republic (Bureau of Forestry) v. Court of Appeals,29 BBC adds before us that it is not even necessary for BBC to raise its exempt status as
the NLRC should have taken cognizance of the same.30

When the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of BBC’s appeal for failure of the latter to post an appeal bond, it relied to
the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Presiding Judge, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal.31 The appellate court, noting that BBC’s
primary purpose as stated in its Articles of Incorporation is to engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, held that BBC did
not meet the criteria enunciated in Republic v. Presiding Judge for exemption from the appeal bond.32

We pertinently held in Republic v. Presiding Judge:

The sole issue implicit in this petition is whether or not the RCA is exempt from paying the legal fees and from posting an appeal bond.

We find merit in the petition.

To begin with, We have to determine whether the RCA is a governmental agency of the Republic of the Philippines without a separate,
distinct and independent legal personality from the latter. We maintain the affirmative. The legal character of the RCA as a governmental
agency had already been passed upon in the case of Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein this Court held:

"Congress, by said Republic Act 3452 approved on June 14, 1962, created RCA, in pursuance of its declared policy, viz:
‘SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government that in order to stabilize the price of palay, rice and corn, it shall
engage in the 'purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines
who wish to dispose of their produce at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment and
whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, shall sell and dispose of these commodities
to the consumers at areas of consumption at a price that is within their reach.’

"RCA is, therefore, a government machinery to carry out a declared government policy just noted, and not for profit.

"And more. By law, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriations yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. So
says Section 14 of Republic Act 3452:

‘SECTION 14. The sum of one hundred million pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the capitalization of the Administration: Provided, That the annual operational expenses of the Administration shall not
exceed three million pesos of the said amount: Provided further, That the budget of the Rice and Corn Administration for the fiscal year
nineteen hundred and sixty-three to nineteen hundred and sixty-four and the years thereafter shall be included in the General
appropriations submitted to Congress.’

"RCA is not possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly
under the Office of the President of the Philippines."

Respondent, however, contends that the RCA has been created to succeed to the corporate assets, liabilities, functions and powers of
the abolished National Rice & Corn Corporation which is a government-owned and controlled corporation separate and distinct from the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. He further contends that the RCA, being a duly capitalized entity doing mercantile activity
engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn cannot be the same as the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity
separate and distinct from the Republic of the Philippines. These contentions are patently erroneous.

xxxx

The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn is only incident to its primary governmental function
which is to carry out its declared policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to make it well within the
reach of average consumers, an object obviously identified with the primary function of government to serve the well-being of the
people.

As a governmental agency under the Office of the President the RCA is thus exempt from the payment of legal fees as well as the posting
of an appeal bond. Under the decisional laws which form part of the legal system of the Philippines the Republic of the Philippines is
exempt from the requirement of filing an appeal bond on taking an appeal from an adverse judgment, since there could be no doubt, as
to the solvency of the Government. This well-settled doctrine of the Government's exemption from the requirement of posting an
appeal bond was first enunciated as early as March 7, 1916 in Government of the Philippine Island vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo and has since been so consistently enforced that it has become practically a matter of public knowledge and certainly a matter of
judicial notice on the part of the courts of the land.33

In the subsequent case of Badillo v. Tayag,34 we further discussed that:

Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. As a general rule,
however, such corporations -- with or without independent charters -- are required to pay legal fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

"SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees
provided in this rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are
not exempt from paying such fees."

On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges, because it performs governmental
functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and
controlled corporation, is exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental functions.

We agree. x x x.35
We can infer from the foregoing jurisprudential precedents that, as a general rule, the government and all the attached agencies with no
legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted. This distinction is brought about by the very reason of the appeal bond itself: to
protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is not
required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always solvent.36 This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule,
apply to GOCCs for the reason that the latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC’s majority stockholder,
the State, will always be presumed solvent, the presumption does not necessarily extend to the GOCC itself. However, when a GOCC
becomes a "government machinery to carry out a declared government policy,"37 it becomes similarly situated as its majority
stockholder as there is the assurance that the government will necessarily fund its primary functions. Thus, a GOCC that is sued in
relation to its governmental functions may be, under appropriate circumstances, exempted from the payment of appeal fees.

In the case at bar, BBC was organized as a private corporation, sequestered in the 1980’s and the ownership of which was subsequently
transferred to the government in a compromise agreement. Further, it is stated in its Amended Articles of Incorporation that BBC has
the following primary function:

To engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, and for this purpose, to establish, operate and maintain such stations, both
terrestrial and satellite or interplanetary, as may be necessary for broadcasting on a network wide or international basis. 38

It is therefore crystal clear that BBC’s function is purely commercial or proprietary and not governmental. As such, BBC cannot be
deemed entitled to an exemption from the posting of an appeal bond.

Consequently, the NLRC did not commit an error, and much less grave abuse of discretion, in dismissing the appeal of BBC on account of
non-perfection of the same. In doing so, the NLRC was merely applying Article 223 of the Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any
or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;

(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. (Italization supplied.)

The posting of the appeal bond within the period provided by law is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional. The failure on the part of
BBC to perfect the appeal thus had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.39

Neither was there an interruption of the period to perfect the appeal when BBC filed (1) its Motion for the Recomputation of the
Monetary Award in order to reduce the appeal bond, and (2) its Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the same. In Lamzon v.
National Labor Relations Commission,40 where the petitioner argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing her appeal
on the ground of non-perfection despite the fact that she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File an Appeal Bond, we held:

The pertinent provision of Rule VI, NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides as follows:

xxxx

Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officer
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award,
exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it
shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.

The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing, however, of
the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.1awphil

Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed."

As correctly observed by the NLRC, petitioner is presumptuous in assuming that the 10-day period for perfecting an appeal, during which
she was to post her appeal bond, could be easily extended by the mere filing of an appropriate motion for extension to file the bond and
even without the said motion being granted. It bears emphasizing that an appeal is only a statutory privilege and it may only be exercised
in the manner provided by law. Nevertheless, in certain cases, we had occasion to declare that while the rule treats the filing of a cash or
surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from, as a jurisdictional requirement to perfect
an appeal, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards is sometimes given a liberal interpretation in line with the
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. However, we find no cogent reason to apply this same liberal interpretation in
this case. Considering that the motion for extension to file appeal bond remained unacted upon, petitioner, pursuant to the NLRC rules,
should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten (10) day reglementary period following receipt of the order, resolution or
decision of the NLRC to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. Besides, the rule mandates that no motion or request
for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. The motion filed by petitioner in this case is tantamount
to an extension of the period for perfecting an appeal. As payment of the appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and
not a mere technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged NLRC Resolution of October 26, 1993 and Order dated January 11,
1994 in accordance with law. The appeal filed by petitioner was not perfected within the reglementary period because the appeal bond
was filed out of time. Consequently, the decision sought to be reconsidered became final and executory. Unless there is a clear and
patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the NLRC's denial of the appeal and the motion for
reconsideration may not be disturbed.41 (Underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, BBC already took a risk when it filed its Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award without posting the
bond itself. The Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award filed by BBC, like the Motion for Extension to File the Appeal
Bond in Lamzon, was itself tantamount to a motion for extension to perfect the appeal, which is prohibited by the rules. The NLRC
already exhibited leniency when, instead of dismissing the appeal outright, it merely ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10
days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. When BBC
further demonstrated its unwillingness by completely ignoring this warning and by filing a Motion for Reconsideration on an entirely new
ground, the NLRC cannot be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion by making good its warning to dismiss the appeal.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it upheld the NLRC’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 2005 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57847, and its Resolution dated January 27, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM
KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police,
respectively, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian
national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed
men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as
Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu
Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local
group known as the Local Crisis Committee.3 The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the
leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by
respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent Police
Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).4

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who
were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.5 The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of
Understanding"6 entered into

between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum
alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in
order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved."7

This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of each of the party signatories, as
follows:

Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:

1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation of the CEF;

2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall participate in the operations and to
propose them for the approval of the parties to this agreement;

3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the CEF without the knowledge and
approval by both parties.

Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):

1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and law enforcement;

2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of their assigned task(s);

3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of operation(s);

4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the course of operation(s)/movements
of the CEF.8

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, announced to the media that
government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3)
hostages.9 However, the ASG made

contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area.10 The government troops yielded
and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces pulled back from the
terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further
demanded the evacuation of the military camps and bases in the different barangays in Jolo.11 The authorities were given no later than
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor
the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation
states:

NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH
THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper authorities;

3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters; and

4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety.

DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS

31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.14

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.15 Upon arriving at the
police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives.
Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi,
Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and
jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested.16 The affidavit17 of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG
supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was
released by the ASG.

On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the Implementation of
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."18 These Guidelines suspended all Permits to
Carry

Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from the gun ban only
by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also allowed general
searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli,
residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,19 claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the
1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.20 Additionally, petitioners claim that the
Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances
of PTCFORs to his own private army.

In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they filed the instant
petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed
concurrent jurisdiction with the

Supreme Court under Rule 65.21 This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan. Respondents Gen. Juancho Saban, Col.
Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective Comments.1âwphi1
On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to
Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during
calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence,
rebellion or sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as
evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its regular session.23

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes
the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically
the conduct of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial governor is
similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the said provisions.

We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by this Court in
the present case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco.24 Simply
put, the

doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of
these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and
important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court is a court of last resort and must
so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with
deciding cases in the first instance.25

The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,26 the Court stated:

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of
courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual
issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this
case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the
original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the
instant case.27

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses original
jurisdiction.28 More crucially, this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus impressed with
transcendental public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be remiss in its constitutional
duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of judicial hierarchy.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,29 the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that concern restrictive
custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians ‘in police power’ cases due to
the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."30 Otherwise, the importance of the high tribunal as the
court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are
inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited
transcendental public importance as an exception, stating:

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor
ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na
nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual
incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of
disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive
custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is
capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and guidance of all
concerned.31 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,32 it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is
the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to
the President and no one else.33 As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without
the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other.34

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article
VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very
nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other
hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the
Constitution:

Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.35

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call.36

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. 37 By
constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the
President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by
any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.38

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when
read with Article VII,

Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed
forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.40 As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval
and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.41

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,42 the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to
the President as commander-in-chief:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself.
The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.43 (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.44

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he
can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject
to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he
exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be
reviewed by anybody.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by this Court.

x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.45 (Emphasis Supplied)

In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,46 the Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the President, precisely
because they are of exceptional import:

These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which
arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of
the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.
The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.47

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s police forces,
under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." During the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the word "control," employing the
same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the presidential form of government.48

Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."49

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police,50 and may exercise control only
in day-to-day operations, viz:

Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law full control of the police by the local chief
executive and local executives, the mayors. By our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and
abuses. If the national government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500 legally, technically separate police forces, plus
61 city police forces, fragmented police system, we will have a lot of difficulty in presenting a modern professional police force. So that a
certain amount of supervision and control will have to be exercised by the national government.

For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police problems, such as riots, conflagrations
or organized crime, the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local executives. Under that situation, if they
come in under such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day business of police investigation of crime,
crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged in the mayors, and if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day
business of police service, what the national government would control would be the administrative aspect.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the ordinary
policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives?

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the National Police Commission?

Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments.51 (Emphases supplied)
Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the police,
through the National Police Commission:

Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.

Mr. Natividad: He is the President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of all
the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The

President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which does the police fall,
under control or under supervision?

Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President.52

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief
executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police
units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as
contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM,
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by
the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the
issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the
ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers the entire country, and does not
include emergency situations in local government units.54 This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations
involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses
the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission:

Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of "invasion or rebellion." Mr. Sumulong
stated that the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the President may call out and
make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion or rebellion without declaring martial
law. He observed that by deleting "invasion or rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial
law before he can make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.

Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some lawless violence in a
small portion of the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can be called to prevent or suppress these
incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also exercise such powers should the situation
worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion" to be eliminated on line 14 are covered by the following sentence which provides for "invasion
or rebellion." He maintained that the proposed amendment does not mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on
the armed forces to prevent or suppress the same.55 (Emphasis supplied)

III. Section 465 of the Local

Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09

Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to justify the
exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local
Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local Government
Code nor in any law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be based.

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
supporters,"57 as being violative of the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly
assert that this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are proscribed, for being
violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.58

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President, because as the
Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."59

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said
Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16, which states:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government, and in this
connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and
calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the appropriate corporate powers
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the province
and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:
 xxx xxx xxx

(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to
apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the
disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphases supplied)

Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and
disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and
implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a
calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its
departments belong.

Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies,
foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory.60

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or
apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies.

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially
not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature.1âwphi1 The Code is
concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents,61 and should not be
unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.

In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a step towards the autonomy of local
government units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose success heavily relies on the power of taxation of the LGUs. The
underpinnings of the Code can be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed LGUs to create their own sources
of revenue.62 During the interpellation made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter emphasized that "Decentralization is an
administrative concept and the process of shifting and delegating power from a central point to subordinate levels to promote
independence, responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does not involve any transfer of final authority from the national to field
levels, nor diminution of central office powers and responsibilities. Certain government agencies, including the police force, are exempted
from the decentralization process because their functions are not inherent in local government units."63

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF

Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article
XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:

Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including
Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or,
where appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government."

Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed
groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed
citizens’ groups, as shown in the following proceedings:

MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force operating under the cloak, under the mantle of
legality is creating a lot of problems precisely by being able to operate as an independent private army for many regional warlords. And
at the same time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the discussions and objections to the paramilitary units and the
armed groups.

MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other armed torces not recognized by
constituted authority which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses committed by the
CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not know whether a particular CHDF is approved
or authorized by competent authority. If it is not authorized, then the CHDF will have to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other
provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of
National Defense, if they are recognized and authorized, then they will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical answer to any
specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are armed forces which are not authorized, then they should be
dismantled. 64 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) in the present
case, is also invalid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings m
implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012
Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012
Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible,
under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007,
or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo,
herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes,
docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

SO ORDERED.9

In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms,
to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC
noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually
served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year
and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.

Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11

Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the
unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within
the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.

In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012.
The fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary
interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to
have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective
official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.

Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
 Intervening Events

In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for reconsideration,
the following events transpired:

1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution final and executory. The following
day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of Judgment.14

2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes.

3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier, issued an Order17 directing the
bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.

On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and were duly
received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.

4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s
Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.

5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on
the same day via substituted service.

6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.

7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor
Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.

8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated
June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M.
Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office the day before—assumed the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24

9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and Manifestation with Leave to
Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of
the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55.

10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo
Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already
assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.

11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status
Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28

It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be
sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost
on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO either
before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the
confluence of events following the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it were
to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have
been trivialized.

On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by public respondent COMELEC’s
Consolidated Comment.29

The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:

6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared
the arguments in Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the
promulgation of the Resolution.

6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared
that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one
month of the second term as a result of an election protest.30

First Issue:

Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration

The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations
of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.

Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.

A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the
arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole
issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already
been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the
conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo
assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with
preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief
that his situation cannot be equated with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before
that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term.

Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.

Core Issue:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his
being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.

On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was
veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

 xxxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall
revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the
incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however,
the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of
service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and
that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third
consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually
occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a
"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local
official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption
as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying
interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was
punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed,
fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by
operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as
having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court
delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an
elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following contingencies,
i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.37

In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then
elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for
violation of the three-term limit rule.

Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office
of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that
office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term,
Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon
filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term
limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of
service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as
vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

(2) Recall Election

With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections40 (2002) and the
aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.

In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During
the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was
conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in
2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three
term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as
mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.

A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared
Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of
Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won.
However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s
unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:

x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,
Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence, any
subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered x x x."42

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity
of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the
corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the
2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the
basis of the following ratiocination:

This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city
mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

(Emphasis supplied.)

(4) Period of Preventive Suspension

In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is under preventive
suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption
that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because
the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and
the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)

(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The
Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.

In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-
1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and
then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent
assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same
post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms."49

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated
that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term,
a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v.
Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant.

In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and
2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the
postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001, when
Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed
for violation of the three-term limit rule.

Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he
was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that
his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed
and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the
COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value"
promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:

Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be
taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would –
under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election
was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as
mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms:
1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo
warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor
for three consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against him, for,
although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the
duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.

The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with
Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-
year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:

Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until
June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by
petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.

xxxx

Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995.
In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. 55 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in
Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto
officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.

In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a
disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010.
Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term
limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the
2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption
by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption,
viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules
on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated
as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in
the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could
be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt
the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this
period (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses
in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for
a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term
for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term
from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

The Case of Abundo

Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus,
barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:

1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does not
interrupt the continuity of service of a term;

2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the
constitutional three-term limitation;

3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and
not on the unified logic in the disquisition;

4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.59

5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since what he
considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and
 6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the
protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The
COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and
he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.

We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera
and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension
being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the
election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their
respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines established from
the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected
officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to "enhance the people’s freedom of choice."61 In the words of
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-
term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly
elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected
mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has
been elected is satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is
juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue
is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting
in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor,
Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year
and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to
serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly elected
official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected
officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly
claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve
the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to
assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office
and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the
May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that
Abundo actually served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered
an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of
service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or
prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the
elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce
is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or
abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies
that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed
Resolution states:

In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the
office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was
validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily
discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title
to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)

The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in a given term is
immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:

As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of
the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers
of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of
the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73

In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he
was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot
simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions
as mayor during the pendency of the election protest.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term,
Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest,
Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying
the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which
his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his
protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not
erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right
to said position.

Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr.,
the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.74

We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that
Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening
period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective
office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly
lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election
protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election
protest was finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the
office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s
case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed
winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly
were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as
involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor.
If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election
protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after
the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular
local government unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election
protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.

Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service
because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such
powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.

As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while
Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the
mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the
injustices it may bring.

In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was
belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court
ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it
anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office
but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.

Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people
of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that
We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself."77 For
democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in
the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O.
Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert
to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204371

J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No.
203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-07971 and Minute Resolution No. 12-09252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16,
2012, respectively, both promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for Mandamus, docketed
G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to implement the same.

The Facts

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare
the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to
the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC
subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991."

Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan
City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said
plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto
Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to
be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.

In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the
proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that
Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion
in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for
the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights
and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified
voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner
Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material
change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition
on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific
provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private
respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant
to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.

Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012,3 the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of
5-24 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:

The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor, after due
deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and

2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-urbanized
city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said plebiscite.

Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on substantially the same arguments
earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, maintained in its Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and
that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would
merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of
an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire
province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.

Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of activities and
periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the
plebiscite on December 1, 2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be
declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite,
and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing the questioned resolution. On
October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.

On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the preparations for the event in view of
the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national,
local and ARMM regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.

After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to schedule the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista
argued that since the TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite has become
mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement
that it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date of the President’s declaration.

In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that mandamus will not issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of
petitioner Bautista’s entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus Election Code to
justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014.
However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for
Cabanatuan City’s conversion. Given the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated
on March 18, 2014.

The Issue

The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva
Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city into an HUC.

Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus moot and academic for ultimately, the
public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The only variation will be as regards its participants.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution

Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will
participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:

Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the
entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City.

On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to
take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within
thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)

Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted,
excluding in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.

Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that we ascertain first the relationship
between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.

First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the general rule barring
delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution, namely:

(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government" under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; and

(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy" in times of war and other national emergency under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is
pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature.5 The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the
delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation,
division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays
pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:

Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay
located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC provisions detailing the requirements
for the creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the
Constitution has also been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected." (emphasis supplied)

With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.

Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted earlier, which states:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within
thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec.
45210 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a
component city as highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec.
452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.

In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of conversions once the requirements are
met. No further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through
ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the
LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, considering that
the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation, division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries"
encompassed by the said constitutional provision.

This proposition is bereft of merit.

First, the Court’s pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy. While Miranda involves the
downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent component city into a component city, its application to the case at bar is
nonetheless material in ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the downgrading of
an independent component city into a component city comes within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases of conversion were discussed
thusly:

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for
it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the
welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking
mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government
units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru people’s representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.12

It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the
plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were
found to result in material changes in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching
ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally
apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 852813 was declared unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago
City in Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the
conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.

As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration
of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the
metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between
political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration
must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision.

Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGC’s Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:

Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City. –

xxxx

(c) Effect of Conversion – The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province
where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)

Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned
from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan
City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in
effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by
the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s
severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently
satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."

Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion in the same way that creations,
divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not
mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec.
10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.

Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted with the other relevant provisions
in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites.
The title of the provision itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly
Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the
declaration after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite. The
conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus, the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails
over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act beyond the Constitution’s
mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a
nullity. As elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern." Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or
executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x x

Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.15 In a long line of cases,
the cardinal principle of construction established is that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather
than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if
the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation which will
avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used.17

Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will
avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city
is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units
directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed
to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453
with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul
of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to
vote.

Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-
Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered voters in said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are
entitled to vote in said plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will vote in a
plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the question. As
such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that
conversion of said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact
doctrine―that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”18

The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly

affected by Cabanatuan City’s conversion

After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to
elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.

a. "Political units directly affected" defined

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or
not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and
Padilla v. COMELEC20 are worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs
whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.

The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected
entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.21

xxxx

To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent
province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an
existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of
the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they
are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite
contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)

Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (emphasis added)

Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As
held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected" is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission:23

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the
formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the
implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the
floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must
involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
(emphasis added)

The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155––the predecessor of the LGC––thus:

Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has municipalities and there is a merger of two
municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the plebiscite will be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the
eight other municipalities?

Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we probably have to involve the entire
province.

Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being merged, but the entire province will
now have to undergo.

Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.

Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There are two barangays being merged,
say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of two of its barangay.

Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would the rest of the municipality not
participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to one municipality?

Senator Guingona. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.

Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.

Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a province with 10 municipalities – the
entire province – will the other municipalities although not affected also have to participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be
altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman mentioned.24

In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not only changes in economic but also
political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the
requirement that the plebiscite be participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.

b. Impact on Economic Rights

To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from an independent component city to a
component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar
fashion, herein petitioner Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City’s conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija to justify the
province’s participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.

Often raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The law states:

Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be
collected in the following manner:

(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);

(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);

(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and

(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)

Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:

(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);

(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and

(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)

In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory of substantial alteration of
boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of
Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s
population. Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija will
indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values. As assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) for Region III:25

Basis for IRA Province of Cabanatuan Province of

Computation Nueva Ecija City Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City
No. of Population 1,843,853 259,267 259,267
CY 2007 Census
Land Area 5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58
(sq. km.)

IRA Share of Actual IRA Estimated IRA Reduction

Nueva Ecija Share share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Based on ₱800,772,618.45 ₱688,174,751.66 ₱112,597,866.79
Population
Based on Land ₱263,470,472.62 ₱250,517,594.56 P 12,952,878.06
Area
Total ₱125,550,744.85

Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains
autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province
is not only direct but also adverse, deserves merit.

Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded. This is based on
Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:

SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which
the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized
and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (emphasis
added)

Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and
collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources,26 professional taxes,27 and amusement taxes28 over the
component city. While, it may be argued that this is not a derogation of the province’s taxing power because it is in no way deprived of
its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the province’s taxing jurisdiction, and
corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction
and shares poses a material and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting its participation in the plebiscite.

To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC is in order, viz:

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.

(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.

Section 461. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat to the latter’s economic viability.
Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the
creation of a province. The ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of
services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the
decline in the province’s economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan
attains independence.

c. Impact on Political Rights

Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will also be affected by
Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked
upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the Constitution read:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the
right to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to
provincial oversight because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
require greater autonomy.29 The provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of
Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and
to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay
officials of the city will also be modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and
be voted upon as provincial officials.33

In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial
jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for
the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects queued by
the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing
functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1âwphi1

In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly
stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the
qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.

Respondents’ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a dangerous precedent leading to
the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain
the city’s dependence is speculative at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the conversion is a
valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of
the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a
matter that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to
only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists
to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared
NULL and VOID. Public respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally, COMELEC is
hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in
by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed
as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134163-64 December 13, 2000

MUSLIMIN SEMA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODEL MAÑARA, respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 141249-50 December 13, 2000

RODEL MAÑARA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN SEMA, respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 141534-35 December 13, 2000

RODEL MAÑARA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN SEMA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Muslimin Sema*and Rodel Mañara were two (2) of the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of Cotabato City during the May 11, 1998
elections.

During the canvassing of the election returns from the three hundred sixty-two (362) precincts of Cotabato City by the City Board of
Canvassers (CBC), numerous petitions for exclusion of election returns were filed. For his part, Sema objected to thirty (30) election
returns from the following precincts, namely: Precinct Nos. 295A/A1, 274A/275A, 46A2, 262A/263A, 218A/219A, 178A, 255A/256A,
158A/158A1, 214A/214A1, 104A/104A1, 154A/154A1, 92A, 212A/212A1, 109A/109A1, 184A1; 175A1, 168A/168A1, 233A/233A1,
209A/209A1, 121A1, 275A, 198A/198A1, 237A/237A1, 176A, 213A1/213A2, 241A, 167A, 180A, 103A, 264A/265A/266A and thereafter,
filed a petition for exclusion of such returns with the CBC on the ground that the same contained material defects, were allegedly
tampered with or falsified, prepared under duress, threat, coercion, and intimidation, or substituted with fraudulent ones. If the 30
election returns were to be excluded, Sema and Mañara would obtain 13,338 and 12,484 votes, respectively. Including the 30 election
returns, the votes of Sema and Mañara would be 13,713 and 15,442, respectively.

On May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order dismissing one hundred-sixteen (116) petitions for exclusion of election returns including the
petitions for exclusion filed by Sema with respect to thirteen (13) of the thirty (30) contested returns he filed.
On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order dismissing fifty-five (55) petitions for exclusion of election returns including Sema’s
petitions for exclusion with respect to fifteen (15) of the remaining seventeen (17) contested returns. In effect then, only two (2) election
returns remained contested.

No appeal was taken from these orders.

Nonetheless, on May 30, 1998, the CBC issued another order dated May 29, 1998, this time granting Sema’s petition for exclusion of the
thirty (30) election returns. A copy of this order was actually served upon Mañara in the morning of May 31, 1998. On May 30, 1998,
counsel for Mañara, already aware of the existence of the May 29, 1998 order, questioned the illegal proceedings of the CBC saying that
it had previously ruled upon the inclusion of twenty-eight (28) of said thirty (30) contested returns. In addition, Mañara questioned the
composition of the CBC, the legality of its proceedings and the capacity of the board to act fairly and judiciously. The latter did not rule
on his objection.

Upon the resumption of the canvassing in the evening of May 31, 1998, counsel for Mañara again called the CBC’s attention to the fact
that it had already ruled upon and dismissed the petition for exclusion of Sema in its Orders dated May 22, and 23, 1998, and which
orders had already become final and executory because no appeal was taken therefrom. But the CBC ignored the manifestation,
explaining that the previous orders did not include Sema’s objections. Consequently, Mañara’s counsel manifested his intent to appeal
from the May 29, 1998 order of the CBC.

On May 31, 1998, Sema and the other winning candidates for the City of Cotabato were proclaimed by the CBC. Notably, said
proclamation was based on the canvass of only three hundred thirty-two (332) election returns, thirty (30) returns having been excluded
from the total of three hundred sixty-two (362) returns pursuant to the CBC’s Order of May 29, 1998.

On June 2, 1998, Mañara filed his written notice of appeal with the CBC.

On June 5, 1998, Mañara filed his appeal with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as SPC No. 98-240, questioning the
exclusion of the thirty (30) election returns in the canvass and the proceeding of the CBC in promulgating the May 29, 1998 order which
he claimed to be illegal. The appeal was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the CBC exceeded its authority in its ruling of May 29,
1998 excluding from the canvass the 30 election returns, considering that the CBC had already dismissed the petition for exclusion in its
orders dated May 22 and 23, 1998; (2) the CBC was illegally constituted when it issued its ruling of May 29, 1998 because it was presided
by Casan Macadatu, who had already been replaced by Atty. Lintang Bidol effective May 25, 1998; and (3) the CBC’s proclamation of
Sema as Mayor of the City of Cotabato was invalid as it was only on May 31, 1998 that the CBC completed the canvassing of 362 election
returns and it was in the morning of the same day when the Board was not in session that Mañara was furnished with a copy of the
CBC’s questioned ruling of May 29, 1998; such being the case, it was only at nightfall of May 31, 1998 when the Board held session that
Mañara was able to manifest his intent to appeal from the said ruling.

On June 9, 1998, Mañara filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Sema which was docketed as SPC No.
98-262.

Initially, the hearing of Mañara’s appeal and petition for annulment of proclamation was set on June 19, 1998 before the COMELEC en
banc. However, the hearing was cancelled and the two (2) cases were referred to the First Division of the COMELEC instead.

Said cases were then heard on June 27, 1998 by the First Division of the COMELEC afterwhich they were submitted for resolution.

On June 29, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an order which reads as follows:

Without prejudice to the issuance at a later time of a formal Resolution in these cases, but based on the pleadings, the evidence
adduced by the parties during the hearing on June 27, 1998, and the facts established therein, the effects and consequences of the
proclamation for the position of City Mayor per Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation dated May 31, 1998 issued by the City
Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City is HEREBY SUSPENDED.

Respondent Muslimin Sema is directed to cease and desist from taking his oath of office as City Mayor and/or from discharging the
functions of said office.

The Clerk of the Commission is directed to furnish a copy of this order to the Hon. Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, and Land Bank of the Philippines, thru its branch at Cotabato City.
The Regional Election Director, Atty. Hector Masna shall serve immediately to the parties a copy of this Order.1

Despite the above order of the COMELEC, Sema assumed the office of the city mayor of Cotabato and commenced to discharge the
functions of said office.

On July 3, 1998, Sema filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court to annul the order of the COMELEC dated June 29,
1998 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction directing the COMELEC to desist
from enforcing the questioned order. The case was docketed as G.R. Nos. 134163-64. As grounds therefor, Sema alleged that:

The pendency of the appeal which was apparently filed out of time and the petition for annulment of proclamation is not a sufficient
basis to enjoin petitioner from discharging the functions of the contested office especially where, as here, he had already taken his oath
of office and assumed the same in accordance with law.

The evidence submitted by the private respondent before the Comelec proved beyond doubt that his appeal (SPC No. 98-240) was filed
out of time and that he failed to comply with the requirements of a pre-proclamation controversy.2

On July 14, 1998, this Court issued a resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of
the order of the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 in SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262.3

On August 17, 1999, this Court directed the COMELEC to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
resolution and to make a report of the same to the Court within five (5) days from its promulgation.4

On September 17, 1999, the COMELEC filed a manifestation and motion for extension of time to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262
stating that the Commissioner to whom the cases were raffled to and assigned for writing of the Commission’s opinion was out of the
country and would be back on October 8, 1999. Consequently, it asked for a period of thirty (30) days from October 8, 1999 or until
November 7, 1999 to resolve the said cases.5

On October 19, 1999, the Court noted the manifestation and granted the motion for extension of time to resolve the said cases.6

On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC submitted its compliance7 to the Court’s Resolution of August 17, 1999 and attached therewith a
copy of the resolution of the First Division of the COMELEC dated October 18, 19998 denying due course to SPC No. 98-240 for having
been filed out of time, dismissing SPC No. 98-262 for lack of merit and affirming the proclamation of Sema as mayor of Cotabato City.

On November 5, 1999, Mañara filed his comment on the COMELEC’s compliance stating, among other things, that the same is
premature since it is only a resolution of the First Division and not a final resolution of the Commission en banc.9

Consequently, on December 7, 1999 this Court issued a resolution directing the COMELEC en banc to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-
262 with finality within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution and to forthwith make a report thereon
to the Court within five (5) days from the promulgation of the resolution.

On January 19, 2000, respondent COMELEC submitted its compliance and reported that it issued a resolution10 on January 2, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Mañara.11

On January 24, 2000, Sema filed a manifestation with motion to consider G.R. Nos. 134163-64 closed and terminated.

On January 27, 2000, Mañara filed a counter-manifestation with motion to resolve the petition in G.R. Nos. 134163-64 on the merits.

On February 14, 2000, Sema filed a motion for leave of court to file an incorporated reply to Mañara’s counter-manifestation.

All motions were noted by this Court.

Previously, or on January 13, 2000, Mañara filed a petition for certiorari captioned "petition ex abundanti cautela", docketed as G.R. Nos.
141249-50, questioning the COMELEC Resolutions dated October 18, 1999 and January 2, 2000. He prayed that the proclamation of
Sema as mayor of Cotabato City be annulled and that the COMELEC be ordered to canvass the thirty (30) election returns excluded by
the CBC. This petition, however, was dismissed by the Court on January 25, 2000 for lack of a verified statement on material dates. An
addendum to said petition was noted without action by the Court on February 8, 1999.12
On February 7, 2000, Mañara seasonably13 filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141534-35.14 Aside from questioning the
non-observance of the COMELEC of its own Rules of Procedure, the petition challenges the illegal proclamation of Sema which
proceeded from the illegal proceedings of the CBC in excluding thirty (30) election returns in the canvassing of votes for mayor in the City
of Cotabato when it had earlier ruled for the inclusion of twenty-eight (28) of said returns. It ascribes to the COMELEC the following
errors, viz:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING ONE AND THE SAME
COMMISSIONER AS PONENTE FOR BOTH THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTIONS;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING A COMMISSIONER OF THE
SECOND DIVISION TO SIGN AS MEMBER OF THE FIRST DIVISION ON THE CHALLENGED SPLIT RESOLUTION, ANNEX "A" HEREOF,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST DIVISION;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT PRIORLY RESOLVING THE CRISES IN QUORUM OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC SO AS TO ACCORD
TO PETITIONER THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN BY-PASSING IN ITS CHALLENGED SPLIT RESOLUTION THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS SPC NO.
98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISTORTING THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE, WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT, IN ITS RESOLUTION
OF AUGUST 17, 1999, HAS ALREADY ASCERTAINED;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE BOARD IN ITS
ILLEGAL PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MUSLIMEN SEMA AS THE ELECTED MAYOR OF COTABATO CITY WHICH PETITIONER
IN SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262 CHALLENGED AND QUESTIONED FOR BEING NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262, ON THE
TECHNICALITY GROUND THAT THE SAME WERE ALLEGEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND CONTRARY
TO THE SETTLED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.15

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998 granting Sema’s 28
petitions for exclusion of the 30 contested election returns is null and void for having been issued after its earlier ruling
embodied in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the exclusion of the same returns had already become final.
 It may be recalled that on May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order dismissing 13 of the 30 petitions for exclusion filed by Sema.
On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order dismissing 15 of the remaining 17 petitions for exclusion he filed. He did not
appeal from these orders within the reglementary period, consequently, the same already became final. However, the CBC
issued another order on May 29, 1998, this time granting Sema’s petitions for exclusion of 30 election returns, among which
were the 28 election returns already ordered included for canvass.

It was blatantly absurd for the CBC to rationalize that the May 22 and 23, 1998 orders dismissing the petitions for exclusions
refer only to candidates Guiani’s and Leyretana’s petitions and not Sema’s. The wordings of the May 23, 1998 order is plain
and unequivocal. It says: "all petitions/cases against the hereunder contested precincts are hereby being DISMISSED for lack of
merit xxx." If all petitions/cases were dismissed, then, these necessarily included Sema’s petition. Furthermore, there was
nothing in the aforementioned orders which would indicate that the CBC reserved its right to rule on Sema’s petition at a later
time. Neither do the minutes of the board even intimate such a reservation.

II

Even assuming arguendo that the orders of the CBC of May 22 and 23, 1998 had not become final and executory, we are not
persuaded by the COMELEC’s pronouncement that Mañara belatedly filed his appeal from the May 29, 1998 ruling of the CBC
on June 5, 1998. According to the COMELEC's First Division in its Resolution dated October 18, 1999:

Records show that the ruling which aggrieved appellant was issued on or about 4:00 p.m.1âwphi1 of May 30, 1998. Following the
instructions of the provisions above-cited, Mañara had, until 4:00 p.m. of June 1, 1998 to file his notice of appeal with the Board. As it
was, he filed said notice only on June 2, 1998. In this regard alone, appellant had already committed a procedural lapse. He aggravated
his errors when he filed his appeal before the Commission on June 5, 1998, a full day beyond the 5-day reglementary period. The law, we
have to stress, specifically ruled out any extension of the five-day period. It is most unfortunate that in committing not only one but two
fatal lapses, appellant disregarded a procedure which according to COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 "is mandatory and shall be strictly
observed by the Board of Canvassers". It cost him his appeal because the same had, for all intents and purposes prescribed. The May 30,
1998 ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City, not having been seasonably questioned can no longer be disturbed.16

It would appear that the May 29, 1998 ruling of the CBC was received by Mañara only on May 31, 1998 which was the same date the
CBC declared that it had completed the canvassing of 362 returns. It was also in the evening of May 31, 1998 while the CBC was in
session that Mañara manifested his intent to appeal from said ruling. The appeal was therefore filed with the COMELEC on June 5, 1998
within the period prescribed in Section 20 (e) and (f) of R.A. No. 7166.17

Further assuming that the reckoning date for appeal was May 30, 1998 and not May 31, 1998, it bears stressing that the petition brought
by Mañara to the COMELEC on June 5, 1998, docketed as SPC No. 98-240, in effect challenged the composition of the CBC and the
legality of its proceedings. If such be the situation, the proceedings would be governed by Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 8, Rule
27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 reads:

SEC. 19. Contested Composition or Proceedings of the Board; Period to Appeal; Decision by the Commission.—Parties adversely affected
by a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the
Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall summarily decide the case within five (5) days from the
filing thereof.

Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 8. Procedure Before the Board of Canvassers When Composition or Proceedings of Board are Contested.— (a) When the composition
or proceeding of the board of canvassers are contested, the board of canvassers shall, within twenty-four (24) hours, make a ruling
thereon with notice to the contestant who, if adversely affected, may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days after
the ruling with proper notice to the board of canvassers. The Commission en banc shall summarily decide the case within five (5) days
from the filing thereof.

(b) Upon receipt of such appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the case for hearing, with due notice to the parties,
by the Commission en banc.

(c) During the pendency of the appeal, the board of canvassers shall immediately suspend the canvass until the Commission orders the
continuation or resumption thereof.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the party adversely affected by a ruling of the board must take an appeal within three (3) days from
the date of the ruling. In this case, the facts would suggest that the CBC adjourned its proceedings on May 30 and 31, 1998 without
making any ruling on Mañara’s objections to the CBC’s proceedings. When Mañara filed his appeal in SPC No. 98-240 on June 5, 1998, it
cannot be correctly argued that the 3-day period set by law for its submission had expired because the CBC never ruled on his objections
to the board’s proceedings. The failure or refusal of the CBC to rule on Mañara’s objections should not prevent his right to elevate the
matter to the COMELEC for proper review.18 On this score, we find persuasive and logical the dissent of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores to the First Division’s ruling, thus:

Mañara filed the present Appeal on 5 June 1998.1âwphi1 Whether it is within the three day period to file, nobody knows, because the
Board never issued any ruling from 30 May 1998 when the proceedings of the board was challenged up to the time it adjourned on 31
May 1998. It never made a ruling at all even after that. The board’s adjournment without making any written and express ruling thereon
means that the Board has not complied with its duty to rule thereon. The absence of any ruling makes it impossible for Mañara to file his
appeal within the prescribed period because there was no ruling to appeal from in the first place. The absence of compliance of the duty
by the board makes it legally unjustifiable for this Commission to dismiss the present appeal because the three-day period within which
to appeal must be counted from the time the ruling was made which in the case at bar is absent.

Mañara has every right to expect a ruling from the Board on its objection over the latter’s proceedings. Up to this time, however, the
Board has not complied with its statutory responsibility to come up with a ruling thereon. The failure of the Board to discharge this
obligation should not in any way prejudice Mañara’s right to elevate the matter to this Commission on appeal. Otherwise, all that a
partial board can do to favor a party is to refuse to make a ruling on the latter’s opponent’s objections effectively preventing its review
by this Commission. (Abella vs. Larrazabal 180 SCRA 509). It is in this light that the instant appeal must be considered seasonably filed.
This Commission must assume jurisdiction, entertain the allegations raised and resolve the issues involved in SPC No. 98-240.19

It is clear that the CBC acted without authority when it issued its May 29, 1998 ruling. Consequently, the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it rendered the questioned resolution of October 18, 1999 denying due
course to SPC No. 98-240 for allegedly having been filed out of time and affirming the proclamation of Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City;
and the resolution of January 2, 2000 denying Mañara’s motion for reconsideration of the October 18, 1999 resolution.

Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and void as it was based on an incomplete canvass. An incomplete canvass is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.20 A proclamation made where the contested returns set aside will affect the result of the
election and the board of canvassers proceeded to proclaim without the authority from the COMELEC is null and void.21

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141534-35 is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated October 18, 1999 and January 2, 2000 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The COMELEC is ORDERED to direct the City
Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City to reconvene within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision for the purpose of completing the
canvass of votes and proclaiming the winner. The petition for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 134163-64 is deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED. The status quo order dated July 14, 1998 is hereby ordered LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.