accepted principles of international law.
Such rules and principles form part of the law
KURODA v JALANDONI
FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, was a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines. He was
charged before a Military Commission with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial
Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war.
He came before the Court, seeking to establish the illegality of EO 68, on the ground
that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to
say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Thus, he
argues that in view of the fact that the Military Commission has been empanelled by
virtue of an unconstitutional law, it has no jurisdiction to try him. He also argues that
the participation in the prosecution against him before the Military Commission in
behalf of the USA of attorneys Hussey and Robert Poy, who are not attorneys
authorized by the SC to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality
as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are violation of our
Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
EO 68 established a National War Crimes Office prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals.
ISSUE: Whether EO 68 is illegal for being violative of the Constitution
HELD: NO. The Court held that EO is valid and constitutional. Art. 2 of the Constitution
provides in Sec. 3 that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the laws of
the land. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of
the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the UN, all those
person, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging war
of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable. Consequently, the President of the Philippines, in the
promulgation and enforcement of EO 68, has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law, which are part of the Constitution. It was an
exercise of the President of his power as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces,
who is fully empowered to consummate the unfinished aspect of war, namely the trial
and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of EO 68.
Although the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention and only signed
the Geneva Convention in 1947, it cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of
the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying
them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and
is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued
in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, the crimes charged against Kuroda were committed when the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of the US. Thus, the Philippines is equally bound with the US
and Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. As to the participation of the American lawyers in the prosecution of his case,
the Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not
by the Rules of Court, which govern ordinary civil court. There is nothing in EO 68 that
requires that counsel appearing before such must be lawyers qualified to practice law in
the Philippines. the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our
nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted
the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our
nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
VICTOR BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS
FACTS: Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai,
China, of Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein
ever since, if the period of his detention be included. On June 24, 1946, by order of the
Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the petitioner was arrested for
investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for deportation was issued by the
Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an undesirable alien, a
vagrant and habitual drunkard. Petitioner was deported to China but he was not
provided with an entry visa because he was not a a national of China. He was therefore
brought back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. On
December 8, 1947, was granted provisional release by the President through Secretary
of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that period, the
Immigration department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the purpose of
placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued against
him. However, said deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused
to take him on board without permission from the Russian government. As such,
petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that while in
detention, they have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners
subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to
the place where they may be sent. Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to
which the court denied as mainly on the ground that such detention was merely
temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the decision was promulgated, but still
the Government had not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the
country. Hence this second petition for writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending
deportation
HELD: NO. Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein
(Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against
whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not
indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty, without
due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not
limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens,
regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its
immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport
him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no allegation that the
petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference
from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in
this country under legal permit. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and
all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was
there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights"
(Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other
status (Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.
BORIS MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
90 Phil. 70 (1979) Court of the Philippines
Facts: The case is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner Boris Mejoff,
the first having been denied in a decision of this Court of July 30, 1949.
Herein petitioner is an alien of Russian decent who was brought from Shanghai by the
Japanese forces. Upon liberation, he was arrested as Japanese spy by U.S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps and was handed to the Commonwealth Government for
disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People
Court ordered his release but the Deportation Board taking his case up declared the
petitioner as an illegal alien for lack of necessary documents presented upon entering
the Philippines. The immigration officials then ordered that the petitioner be deported
on the first available transportation to Russia but failed to do so in several times. While
the arrangements for his departure are being made and for the best interest of the
country, petitioner Mejoff was detained at the Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. Over two
years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government
has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country.
Issue: Whether or not prolonged detention of the petitioner is warranted by law and the
Constitution.
Held: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and commanded the respondents to
release the former from custody subject to terms and conditions. The petitioner’s
unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the
only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual,
present, or uncontrollable. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if
turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being
to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in a reasonable amount with
sufficient sureties. Hence, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not be indefinitely be
kept in detention. He has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to human beings, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a
member.
FACTS:
 Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from
Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in these Islands. (The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not
unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto
government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)
 He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there was an order for his release.
 But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that
Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be
deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at
Muntinlupa on October, 1948.
 He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a
detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
 Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated,
the Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out
of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to
the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or
country would take the petitioner.
 This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus

ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer
than a reasonable time
HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed
adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready
to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness
shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in
case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of
P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration
is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
 Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if
they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
 The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and
except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless
of nationality.
 Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting
on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It
was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in
degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
 petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that
is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable
 Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses
is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and
injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique
to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted.
 If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying
principle is of universal application.
 As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner,
but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
HAW PIA v CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
FACTS
Haw Pia had previously contracted a loan from China Banking Corporation in the
amount of P5,103.35, which, according to Haw Pia, had been completely paid, on
different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which was
appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp. With
this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to compel the bank to
execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan
and to deliver its title.
However, upon service of summons, China Banking Corp. demanded from Haw Pia for
the payment of the sum of its indebtedness with interests, which also constituted its
counter claim in its answer.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of China Banking Corp. on the basis that there was no
evidence to show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp. to accept
Haw Pia's payment and that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading
army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of China
Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished his
indebtedness to China Banking Corp.
ISSUE
Whether the Japanese Military Administration had authority to order the liquidation of
the business of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator
authorized as such to accept payment
HELD
YES. Under international law, the Japanese Military authorities had power to order the
liquidation of China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize Bank of Taiwan as
liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not
confiscation of the properties of China Banking Corp., but a mere sequestration of its
assets which required its liquidation.
The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized
expressly, not only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military Government and Civil
Affairs, but also similar manuals of other countries, without violating Art. 46 or other
articles of the Hague Regulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of
private property.
The purpose of such sequestration, as expounded in the Annual Report of the Office of
the Alien Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be used to further the interest
of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. All enemy- controlled assets can be used
to finance propaganda, espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in countries
friendly to their cause.
It is presumed that Japan, in sequestering and liquidating China Banking Corp., must
have acted in accordance, either with her own Manual of the Army and Navy and Civil
Affairs OR with her Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it being permitted to
the Allied Nations, specially the US and England, to sequestrate, impound, and block
enemy properties found within their own
domain or in enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed forces, and it not
being contrary to Hague Regulations or international law, Japan had also the right to do
the same in the Philippines by virtue of the international law principle that "what is
permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other."
Taking these into consideration, it appears that Japan did not intend to confiscate or
appropriate the assets of said banks or the debts due them from their debtors.
The fact that the Japanese Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks the
balance of the money collected by the Bank of Taiwan from the debtors of the said
banks, did not and could not change the sequestration by them of the bank's assets
during the war, into an outright confiscation thereof. It was physically impossible for
the Japanese Military authorities to do so because they were forcibly driven out of the
Philippines, following the readjustment of rights of private property on land seized by
the enemy provided by the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties entered into at
the close of WWI. The general principles underlying such arrangements are that the
owners of properties seized are entitled to receive compensation for the loss or damage
inflicted on their property by the emergency war measures taken by the enemy. Since
Japan war notes were issued as legal tender, Japan was bound to indemnify the
aggrieved banks for the loss or damage on their property, in terms of Phil. Pesos of US
$.
Since the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets of
China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator, it follows that
payments of Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his obligations to China Banking
Corp.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto, Dr.
Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario
Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr. Nemesio Gako
Facts:
- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art.
24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality
and should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR
imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents
from implementing the assailed RIRR.
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various
international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said
international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be
implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent international agreements
entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus be implemented
through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international agreements?
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case ma’am asks) are at the
bottom of the digest.
Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is
based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions
however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Ratio:
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of the land?
- The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:
(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child
(2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to prevent
child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing of breastmilk
substitutes
- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instruments which
have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes
- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law in 2 ways:
 (1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
 Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec
21 – wherein “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred
by at least 2/3 of Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t been concurred
in by the required 2/3 vote.
 HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation that is TMC.
 Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but it’s TMC.
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not
adopt the latter’s provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of
products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that
advertising promotion or other marketing materials may be allowed if
such materials are approved by a committee.
(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land
 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as
binding as a result of two elements:
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity.
 Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds
of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally
 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law
has two factors:
1.) Material factor – how states behave
 The consistency and the generality of the practice
2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the way they do
 Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave
they do. Is it ouor of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type
of behavior is obligatory)
 When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international law
which is then incorporated into our domestic system
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation, have they attained
the status of customary law and hence part of our law of the land?
- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies of the
UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO,
the former also has the power to “adopt regulations concerning advertising and labeling of
pharmaceutical and similar products” and “to make recommendations to members on any
matter within the Organization’s competence”
- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its
members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they
constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest
body in the field of health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA resolutions urging states
to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative enactment, the
subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, which
influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of norm creation, in
order to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it must be
established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered obligatory (opinio
juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to
establish that provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that
may be deemed part of law of the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into domestic law. They
cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted
by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest of its
members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of
its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to represent its members
because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang
Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the association is formed
“to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health
care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical
professions and the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of
representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care industry.
Petitioner is duly authorized to bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts
any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered
as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the
case.
 W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the Revised Administrative W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process clause of the Constitution
Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the (Article III Section 1)?
discussion above) - Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
national health policy and can issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of promote the general welfare… free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective
established health policies. regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and young child feeding, such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
does not declare that as part of its policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk - Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body;
substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and children; Section 32 – giving of assistance,
- Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent WHA Resolutions, can support and logistics or training; Section 52 – giving of donations
be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR. - In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned sections hamper the
trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to establish that these activities are essential
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not all of them and indispensable to their trade.
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2] imposing exclusive
breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute ban on advertising and Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-
promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling requirements; [5] 0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest
prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned.
and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education Although the DOH
has the power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis
breastmilk substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no power to impose an
absolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilk substitutes.
Several provisions of the Milk Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is
not absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code because such
provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion and marketing of
breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of
the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or
sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions are in accordance
with the Milk Code.

W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.

- Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide labeling requirements for
breastmilk substitutes  found to be in consonance with the Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing related provisions in the
Milk Code.

W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?

- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and regulations, not laws. The
provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power. However, such power
is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the granting
statute and the Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. The power, which includes amending, revising, altering or
repealing, is granted to allow for flexibility in the implementation of the laws.