2002european Tolerance PDF

EUROPEAN DIFFERENTIATIONS OF SOCIAL TOLERANCE
Dumitru Sandu
University of Bucharest
The study presents the configuration of the tolerance at the level of Europe at the end
of twentieth century. The attitudes of non-discrimination and contextual understanding
of reality are the basic dimensions of the concept .They are operationalized by data of
World Value Survey, 1990-1997 for 25 countries. Results of cluster analysis indicate
that there are three Europes from the point of view of tolerance: post-communist,
catholic and protestant ones. Country context, status context and personal values are
the main predictors of tolerance indicators. Religion- tolerance relation is considered
in a detailed manner.
How are the tolerance / intolerance behaviours distributed in Europe after the fall of the
Berlin Wall? Which is the force lines structuring the social field of tolerance at continental level?
Are these mainly economic, political, religious or social in nature? Is the country still a relevant
analysis unit for tolerance if individual status variables are controlled (maintained constant)?
How about the political experiments, such as communism, have they left a significant mark
on the tolerance/intolerance behaviours?
This is the group of questions I will focus on in this paper. I will seek justification for my
findings and conclusions in the answers given by tens of thousands of persons in Europe to the
survey questions in the “World Value Survey” (WVS) between 1990 and 1997.
The perspective is that of “social” tolerance1, of the phenomenon seen from the perspective
of persons and social segments and not that of institutions that could reduce or induce tolerance/
1
Discrimination and tolerance can also be seen from an institutional and legislative point of view, that of the formal
mechanisms that increase or decrease the chances of discrimination. „Social” in the expression „social tolerance” does
not refer to a given area, but rather to a perspective that can be put in contrast with the institutional one. For religious,
gender, ethnic, age discrimination, we can apply with equal justification and usefulness both perspective - social and
institutional.
Sociologie Românească / Romanian Sociology

Annual English Electronic Edition
Issue 4 (2002), pp. 1-39
Original (Romanian) version:

Dumitru Sandu: Diferenţieri europene ale toleranţei sociale
Sociologie Românească, 2002, 1-2, 1-37.
English translation by DELCOM Group & Sociologie Românească,

with the financial support of the Open Society Institute - the Open Access Journals Program.
Sociologie Românească is published by the Romanian Association of Sociology. The issues from the new series
(starting 1999) are available on the journal website: www.sociologieromaneasca.ro, as well as the English
translations from the Annual English Electronic Edition.
2 Dumitru Sandu
discrimination.
The issue of tolerance is a fundamental one for changing societies, for the moments of
religious (Colas, 1998), political or economic reform, for the shocks brought by globalization. The
change from an essay approach to a scientific one on the matter is largely associated with the
extension of the debates on social capital, on the relation between trust and tolerance (Putnam,
2000).
However, before discussing the figures, a conceptual exploration is in order. What is
tolerance?
The Defining Values of Tolerance
“Although I don’t agree with you or do not like what you do, I accept you. We could be
colleagues or neighbours, or even relatives”. This is an elementary fact of tolerance, or, more
precisely, a declaration of tolerance. It can actually be grounds for action or just a simple
convenient declaration, a linguistic reaction of social desirability for someone that is supposed to
support such a point of view. The disagreement may involve different issues, from religion, politics,
economics, to marital choice, sexual behaviour or drug consumption.
Tolerance is not only accepting coexistence or common action with persons very different
from you, but also understanding for those acting differently than you, based on different beliefs or
lifestyles.
In a situation of disagreement or difference of opinion, reactions can be rated on a scale
from “tendency to suppress the different behaviour” to “supporting the person in disagreement in
spite of the disagreement”. The first case is maximum, extremist intolerance, while the second
involves a situation of maximum tolerance, associated with generosity. There are, of course, many
intermediate options between the two extremes:
“Generous” tolerance, of the “I help you even though I do not agree with you” type is a
relatively rare phenomenon in society, mostly associated with the Kantian ideal of ethics. The most
common form of tolerance is based on relativism: “we have different beliefs, but we are both
entitled to our own belief”. “Indifference” as an intermediate position between tolerance and
intolerance has a rather ambiguous status. It can be a form of tolerance, through the idea of keeping
the distance from the practical implications of differences. However, it could also be subtler form of
promoting intolerance, in cases of “symbolic”, “aversive” or “regressive” racism (Bourhis, Gagnon,
Moise, 1997:152-154). Ignoring disapproved consequences is, in turn, a kind of no man’s land
between tolerance and intolerance.
Sociologie Românească / Romanian Sociology - Annual English Electronic Edition - Issue 4 (2002)
European differentiations of social tolerance 3
The space of tolerance and intolerance behaviours is structured not only according to the
type of reaction to difference or the negatively valued object, but also according to the nature of
perception of the differences (Figure 1). Perceiving the differences as essential is likely to favour
extreme forms of intolerance or lead to the adoption of active, strongly structured forms of
tolerance. Moderated tolerance is probably associated with the perception of differences as
secondary or minimal, and with passive acceptance forms.
Table 1. The tolerance-intolerance polarity

“either believe “we do not “ignorance on “I don’t care “I don’t agree “I help you, even
what I believe or agree and must the what you think with you, but though I don’t
go away” live in different disapproved or do although we are both agree with you”
worlds” consequences”2 I know we are entitled to our
different” beliefs”
(uncertainty
TOLERANCE
between
EXTREMIST-TYPE ISOLATION THROUGH RELATIVISTIC “GENEROUS”
INTOLERANCE INTOLERANCE tolerance and INDIFFERENCE TOLERANCE TOLERANCE
intolerance)
Figure 1. The attribute matrix of the tolerance-intolerance behaviours

extreme "generous"
Differences perceived as
major intolerance tolerance

(extremism
) intense
being
tolerance by
moderate moderate accepting
minor
intolerance tolerance major
differences
Type of attitude extreme moderate moderate maximal
towards the rejection acceptance
negatively valued
reference
In most approaches, “tolerance” is understood as “refusal, when there is a power to refuse,

to forbid or seriously interfere with series of conducts deemed criticisable” (Horton, 1996:28) or as
a “deliberate option of someone having the necessary power and knowledge not to forbid, prevent
or hamper behaviours he or she disapproves of” (Horton, 2000: 746-747). The power to impose
prejudice, to act in a discriminatory manner, is the one that gives the intensity of intolerance.
Measuring intolerance in modern societies poses a series of challenges, given that prejudice
and discrimination are increasingly well masked (Bourhis, Gagnon, Moise: 1997:152-154). A
2
„one cannot classify as tolerance the non-interference resulting from the simple ignorance regarding the occurrence of
the disapproved behaviour” (Horton, 2000:747)
Sociologie Românească / Romanian Sociology - Annual English Electronic Edition – Issue 4 (2002)
4 Dumitru Sandu
combined approach of tolerance and trust could be one of the solutions to facilitate a better
understanding of both phenomena. Currently, different solutions are used, ranging from treating the
issues separately – with trust as a component of social capital and tolerance as a correlated
phenomenon, residing outside the sphere of social capital (Putnam, 2000) – to including them in the
sphere of the same concept of social capital (Sandu, 1999:71). Trust is a positive expectation related
to certain social actors or social relations.
It represents a particular form of social capital, a concept that “focuses on the positive
consequences of sociability” (Portes, 1998:2) or, in other words, concerns “productive sociability”
(Sandu, 1999). Trust may refer to the “generalized other”, formal associations, friendship or interest
groups, institutions, etc. To the extent that the reference consists of marginal or negatively-valued
groups/ roles, in the context of a given society, and the expectation for the ego is minimally positive
– there will be no conflicts with the usually incriminated group, the social tissue will not will not be
negatively affected by accepted the rejected group, etc. – tolerance may be considered a form of
trust. Similarly, intolerance is a negative expectation towards a social group or role. From this
perspective, is appears as distrust manifested as a refusal to accept a different type of behaviour or
different values than one’s own. Accepting negatively-valued behaviours or persons is done on very
different reasons. It can be a result of usefulness reasoning (“it is useful to accept what I don’t
like”), neutrality (“it is good not to judge the others all the time”) or respect (“all people are
autonomous beings that must be respected”) (Horton 2000: 748).
Considering tolerance a particular form of trust is valid especially when the tolerance
criterion is respect.
This study, according to a previously mentioned theoretical choice, will focus on describing
the macroregional tolerance patterns in Europe after 2000, and on their integration with the specific
socio-cultural contexts. Accordingly, tolerance will not appear as a consequence of trust, as it does
in some recent studies (Persell, Green, Gurevich, 2001), but rather as a correlated variable, under
the same concept of social capital. The solution avoids an artificial answer to the question – which
one is the anterior factor in the causal relation, trust or tolerance? Both values and conscience
phenomena are results of socialization and most probably “go hand in hand”.
Measuring and Data
The data used for the analysis3 come from surveys made through the World Value Survey,
second (1990-1993) and third (1995-1997) wave and concerns a group of 25 European countries.
Ten of these are countries from the former communist block4. Selecting data from different waves
of the survey was prompted by the fact that not all countries compared here were involved in the
third wave. For the UK I worked with data from the second wave because the data in the third
wave, although available in the file I had access to, was not fully comparable with the other
countries, for the set of questions of interest. For Romania, I have used with priority the set of data
produced by ICCV in 1993. I only used the set made in 1997 by the University of Bucharest – Chair
of Sociology and ICCV, only for comparison reasons, to show the dynamics of the analyzed
phenomena in the absence of some variables needed to make a trans-cultural analysis in the
Romanian questionnaire of 19975. (Unless the text mentions otherwise, the dataset used for
Romania is the one from 1993).
The total number of persons interviewed in the 25 countries is 29,533. If we use a weighting
variable to correct structure deficiencies for each country, the number of cases appears as equal to
27,136.
In order to use a single sample for the entire Europe, including the 25 samples, I multiplied
the original weighting variable (v236 from the official WVS code list for common bases in the 1st,
2nd and 3rd wave) by the ratio between the percentage of the country’s population in the total
population of the 25 countries and the percentage of the country sample in the total interviewed
persons of the 25 countries.
By this latter weighting, the volume of the European sample reaches 27,166.
Tolerance is defined in the following as a model of social interaction based on valuing the
relativity and equal rights of human achievement. The belief that there are no standards of absolute
“good” and “bad”, regardless of context, that negotiation or compromise are preferable to
fanaticism and violence, is an expression of valuing relativity in human interaction. Relativity is not
meant as a lack of reference points, as total anarchy, but rather as a dependence of social values on
3
Access to the dataset was provided by UK Data Archive, for the project 8926 „CompSCS Comparative approach of
social capital structures”, through Nuffield College, Oxford University.
4
Of the former Soviet countries, I only retained for analysis Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which are largely
comparable with the former communist countries of Central Europe, at least by the processes of Euro-Atlantic
integration in which they are involved.
5
A second set of Romanian data for the second wave of WVS was produced by CIS. I preferred the UB-ICCV version
because I was able to exert precise control (as coordinator, together with Lucian Pop) over the methodology for
designing and making the sample
6 Dumitru Sandu
the context, as a pluralism of values6. This is “tolerance as contextual understanding”. Such an

understanding of social life represents a generalized model of seeing the social world not through
absolute standards, but rather through conditional assessments, by an empathic effort to understand
the other even if you are in disagreement. The second core value of tolerance is “equality of
assertion/manifestation rights” for human groups, regardless of them being majority or
marginal/minority. This is a meaning of tolerance descending from the illuminist 18th century: “the
notion that all human beings are essentially the same, regardless of their moral or religious
convictions and that the set of faith of other races or civilization is not inherently inferior to the one
specific to European Christianity” (Hamilton, 1996:23). Tolerance comes as a strong idea in the
triad of values “liberty, equality, fraternity” promoted by the French Revolution. The equivalence
between the principle of fraternity and the concept of social capital has already been made (Putnam,
2000:351). However, I believe that the principle of tolerance does not originate in just one of the
principles, but rather in all three of them: accepting another, different from myself, or that person’s
actions which I perceive as having a negative significance, is possible because that person is free, as
I am, and we are both equally entitled in our beliefs and, ultimately, we must show solidarity in
what unites us, beyond differences. However, as I mentioned above, the motivation of tolerance
can be very different – usefulness, neutrality or respect7.
Refusal to discriminate in the labour market or in neighbourhood or work interaction is a

form of this valuing. Consequently, I will make a distinction between tolerance as “contextual
understanding”, as a largely attitudinal dimension, and tolerance as discrimination. Discrimination
involves an intervention based on force or power, meant to deprive another person or group of a
right or reward, invoking non-specific criteria, from outside the nature of the activity impacted by
the act of discrimination.
The equality of individuals, of their fundamental rights, and relativism are two strongly
interconnected dimensions. Relativistic culture developed in close association with the promotion
of egalitarian democratic ideologies, and individualism (Box 1).
6
Karl Popper (1998:204-205) expresses his preference for „critical relativism” instead of a relativisms „that arises from
lax tolerance” and „leads to a dominance of violence”. „Critical pluralism is the position by which, for the interest of
finding the truth, any theory - the more theories the better - must be accepted in the competition between theories”. The
social relativism considered by this study includes the idea of plurality of points of view and of competition based on
argument, non-violent, between these points of view. However, I used the term relativism given especially the
compromise or negotiation component, which is essential for social tolerance. Context dependence and the need to
negotiate could be better suggested by “social relativism” than by “pluralism”. Ultimately, it is not the terms that
matter, but their precise definition.
7
The acceptance of negative differences in the proximity is not tolerance if the reason of this acceptance is lack of
power to interfere with what one does not like.
Box 1. Sources of tolerance as relativism

Raymond Boudon (1999:293-312) adopts the Tocqueville’s theory regarding the implacable road of
egalitarianism as a major source of modern relativistic culture: “modern societies or, as Tocqueville calls
them, <democratic societies>, are replaced by what he calls <a general and dominant passion>, which
we would rather call a <fundamental value, that of equality>. One must see the installation of this value
as a gift of Providence, says Tocqueville. To translate: this installation is irreversible. That value
indicates that all cultures are treated as equals. As individuals have varying opinions on different
matters, and as groups and cultures uphold different values, one can only be faithful to the principle of
equality by admitting that there is no truth, no objectivity, except in values that are different from
equality. These other value must then be considered simple points of view. Otherwise, one would have
to admit that some people’s values are superior to others’. This would contradict the principle of
equality.” (300-301). In short, the conception of relativism as a derivative from the dominance of the
value of equality in social life is called by Boudon the “Tocqueville effect”.
Tocqueville relates this moral innovation of relativism, based on egalitarianism, with the triumph of
human dignity, of the human individual, beyond the particulars of a “person”. “Thus, equality has
become a fundamental value, <a general and dominant passion>, simply because it affirms, in a codified
manner specific to religious thinking, the dignity of man as a human, regardless of individual
competencies, characteristics and achievements. After Tocqueville, Simmel will support a similar thesis:
modern egalitarianism owes its modern success to what he calls human dignity as a human” (303-304).
A series of social-historical and political processes have contributed to the ascent of relativistic
culture, sustains Boudon. The social movement called “political correctness” is a recent form of
supporting egalitarianism in the context of democracy. It expresses “in an extreme manner the claim for
extreme dignity of all individuals, all groups, cultures and sub-cultures. It also shows very well that the
value of equal dignity for all tends to absorb the other values. The supporters of <political correctness>
particularly insist on upholding this value, but it is the only one for which they propose public control.
For the rest, they consider that the choice of values lies in the private sphere” (307).
The ideology or cult of “communitarism”, developing today, according to Boudon, falls under the
same culture of relativism: “In fact, <communitarism> is founded on a solipsistic concept of group,
which, in turn is legitimized by the relativistic principle that <everyone has their truth> and each group
has its own truth and values” (308).
The easy development of religious cults is considered by Boudon to be another expression of
egalitarian relativism.
There are however, says the French sociologist, processes, factors reacting to the general movement
towards relativism “first of all skepticism and relativism cannot be taken to the extreme without making
any social life impossible. Any society must know a consensus on a minimum set of values.” (305). The
horrors of World War II generated the democratic consensus that followed, and the tensions associated
with the Cold War lead to a focus on the American model of values.
The constitutive elements of tolerance/intolerance can be identified in good actionalist logic.

What we usually define as tolerance phenomena cover the range between defining the situation,
choosing the goals and the means of action, and the actual performance of the action. Contextual,
relativistic understanding is the tolerant way that characterizes how the situation is defined when
facing the diversity of persons and cultural models. Depending on how the situation is defined –
relatively or absolutely, with or without understanding and empathy – means of action are chosen
from negotiating, ignoring, or violent intervention. Fanaticism or dogmatism is the standard way of
absolute definition of the situation, of one-dimensional approach to reality, usually converted into
violent actions. The types of discrimination depend on the nature of the rights being broken
(political, economic, religious, etc.) or the nature of the criteria misused to limit the rights (ethnic,
8 Dumitru Sandu
gender, racial, age discrimination, etc.). The anatomy of tolerance includes the “tolerant”, the
“object of tolerance” and the “tolerated”. What I tolerate has a negative value for the “tolerant”8.
Box 2. Marginality
„The term „marginality” has its origin in a metaphor related to the notion of space. During the Middle
Ages, the phenomenon of marginality was closely related to this notion. Space is perceived as a dichotomy:
there is an “inside” and an “outside”, “centre” and “periphery”; only the first element (already representing
a value judgment) meets the positive characteristics, in the differences between the various ways of living,
defined starting from the “space” principle; the “centre” means an organized social life, community life
based on family and group solidarity; the “periphery” means the outcasts, the criminals, the protesters, the
heretics and the deviants. This dichotomy is present at a much wider scale: that of the Christian Ecumene,
which excludes the monsters, savages, pagans, people of other religion. At this quasi-universal scale, the
image of those who are “different” remains in the medieval conscience (and the period’s literature is best
proof for this), but marginalization is mainly a consequence of behaviours that do not conform with the
rules of organization for the day-to-day life and the customs of a community (breaches of ethical and legal
norms, non-compliance with allowed behaviour models and value systems). To be “at the periphery of
society meant exactly to be cast out of the community space (examples: the outcast from the towns and
villages, the “infamy areas” and the ghetto-neighbourhoods in the towns). However, in spite of this
dichotomy the existed in the mind of people, we could not say that links were actually broken: the line
between those who obeyed the rules of community life and those who broke them was often flexible and
fluctuating.” (Geremek, 1996: 324)
The acceptance of what is different or negatively value is done under a fourth element, the
factor justifying tolerance: I accept what I do not like in the name of a higher value or norm in my
hierarchy of values or that of the community to which I belong.
The fear of meeting the disapproval of the community can thus lead to conformity to the
community norm of accepting diversity/differences. Similarly, intolerance can also represent a form
of conformity to the community norm of not accepting the “stranger” or the “marginal” (Geremek,
1996).
The mechanisms of marginalization that operated during the Middle Ages, make all these
components of social exclusion based on community norms very clear (Box 2).
Figure 1 and Table 2 show the operational measures of tolerance used in this study,
according to previous conceptualization. The conceptual distinction between intolerance to groups
or deviant behaviour roles, and intolerance to minority status groups is fully supported by the
8
“It is useful in this regard to mark two general features of liberal toleration. First, the object of toleration has negative
value to the tolerator: one tolerates what one dislikes or disapproves of. What I tolerate, I need not mind-indeed I might
want-that it cease to be. Second toleration is not in itself chosen as a good; one comes to it as the result of balancing
competing considerations. One accedes to the continued existence of something one objects to either because its
continued existence contributes to something else one values or because the costs of interfering with it are too high.
Someone who exemplifies the virtue of toleration thus need not approve of, be interested in, or be willing to have much
to do with the objects of her toleration. It is a laissez-faire virtue.” (Herman, 1996:61)
empirical data: the defining variables for drug users, persons with AIDS, alcoholics, emotionally
unstable persons or criminals have maximum saturation for the first factor (own value 39%);
intolerance to racial, ethnic or immigration groups appears in the second independent factor (own
value 15%).
Figure 2. Dimensions and indicators for measuring social tolerance/intolerance

intolerance towards deviant
groups INTOdev
valuing equal opportunities ethnic or residential

(„tolerance as non- intolerance INTOstat
discrimination”)
non-discrimination in the
Tolerance/ labour market NONDIS
intolerance as
a social
interaction valuing non-violent means violence as political action *
model based for solving conflicts
on compromise in political
action COMPRO
support for social relativism

NONSTAND
valuing social relativity
(tolerance as „contextual
understanding”)
justification of deviant
behaviour JUSTdev
(*Variable not included in the cluster analysis, given the low number of countries where it was surveyed)
The separation between the two categories of variables, when the analysis is done for each
country individually, is found in 23 of the 25 selected countries. The exceptions are the surveys in
Estonia and Eastern Germany.
These are the only cases where we can find factors related to intolerance towards
ethnic/immigrant groups, sexual minorities (homosexuals) and towards persons that use drugs or
alcohol9.
9
For countries with a two-factor grouping of indicators, the order of factors (given by their own value) varies. All
these variations in factor weight or even a number of factors are sign for different social configurations of tolerance
from one country to the other.
10 Dumitru Sandu
Table 2. Variables used in the analysis

Variable Description
intolerance towards Index counting the categories of persons that the respondent wouldn’t want as neighbours, from
deviant groups criminals, alcoholics, persons with AIDS, drug users and emotionally unstable persons.
INTOdev
justification of deviant Simple average of three variables measuring the disagreement/agreement reaction, on an 11-
behaviour JUSTdev point scale (-1, -0.80, -0.60 …. 0 … 0.80, 1) with the statements that homosexuality, prostitution
and divorce “are never justifiable” (-1) to “are always justifiable” (1).
ethnic or residential Index counting the categories of persons that the respondent would not want as neighbours from
intolerance INTOstat among persons of another race and muslims (or equivalent)
non-discrimination in Simple average of scores measuring (on a scale of -1, 0 to 1) agreement with statements
the labour market regarding refusal to discriminate between men and women, senior citizens and the rest of the
NONdis population, and natives versus immigrants
support for relativism Three-point scale (V178), recoding the options of agreement with the statements: “there are
in values NONstand absolutely clear rules on what is good and what is bad, rules that apply to anyone, anywhere” (-
1); “there can be no clear rules for what is good and what is bad. What is good and what is bad
depends entirely on the context” (0); disagreement with both extreme phrasings above was rated
with 1. The decision was made after intersecting the newly-scaled variable with other clear
measures of tolerance.10
Accepting liberty The subjects were asked about their agreement with: a) the option of some women to raise their
GENlib child as a single parent, because they do not wish to be married; b) the statement “individuals
should have the opportunity to fully enjoy sexual freedom, without restrictions”. The counting
index built will have value 2 for agreement with both statements, 1 if only one of the statements
is accepted, and 0 if both are rejected.
Discrimination index Factor score defined mainly by INTOstat, INTOdev and NONDISC (Table 3)
DISCRIM
Relativistic orientation Factor score defined mainly by NONSTAND, GENlib, JUSTdev (Table 3).
INTELEG
Orientation towards Five-point scale, indicating the importance degree held by friends in the respondent’s life (1 very
friendship FRIEND important, 0.5 important, -0.5 not quite important, -1 totally unimportant; 0 was used to code
non-answers)
General trust Agreement with the statement “most people can be trusted” (1) versus “it is good to be careful in
TGENERAL the relations with other people” (-1). Non-answer were rated with 0.
Association Number of associations in which the person is a member. The index takes values of 0 to 9. In the
membership version of the questionnaire applied in Romania (1993) “charity organizations” do not appear,
ASSOCIAT but “family agricultural associations” appear compared to other European countries.
Religiousness Counting index for: consider religion as important or very important (1 or 2 at V9), consider
RELIGAT themselves to be religious persons (1 at V182), believe in God (V183), believe in life after death
(V184), believe in soul (V185), in Devil (V186), in Hell (V187), in Heaven (V188), in sin
(V189) and find spiritual strength in religion (1 at V191). The index ranges between 0 and 10.
Individualist Average of three 11-point scales (recoded to range between -1, -0.80, -0.60…..0… 0.80, 1),
orientation INDIVID indicating support for private property versus state property (V126), individual responsibility
versus state-control (V127) and preference for competition-based strategies versus those that
avoid competition (V128). By construction, the index also signifies a liberal orientation.
Attitude favourable to Average of two 11-point scales (recoded to range between -1, -0.80, -0.60…..0… 0.80, 1),
change CHANGE indicating that it is preferable “to act with courage” versus “with caution” (V131) and that “new
ideas are better” opposed to those who believe that “ideas that have stood the test of time are
generally better” (V132).
10
Two of the countries selected for the analysis - the Czech Republic and Slovakia - did not apply that question. In
order to keep them in the working set, I used the following method to assign values: I calculated a factorial score for the
whole of the European sample with the variables INTOdev, INTOstat, JUSTdev, NONDIS and COMPRO; I
determined the regression coefficients of the variable NONstand on the new factorial score; using these coefficients and
the factorial score I estimated the expected values of the variable NONstand for the interviewed subjects in the two
countries. I used a similar method to build the NONstand variable for the dataset produced in the Romanian survey of
1997 (the version of the University of Bucharest-ICCV).
Furthermore, the hypothesis of a differentiation between tolerance focusing on value

relativity and tolerance associated mainly with equality as a value is supported by empirical
evidence (Table 3).
Table 3. Factor analysis of the variables used to measure tolerance

Factors and saturations Communalities
Discrimination Relativistic
orientation
DISCRIM INTELEG
ethnic or residential intolerance INTOstat 0.79 0.07 0.62
intolerance towards deviant groups INTOdev 0.78 -0.16 0.64
non-discrimination in the labour market
NONDISC -0.62 0.21 0.42
support for value relativism NONstand 0.06 0.71 0.50
Accepting the freedom to GENlib -0.14 0.66 0.45
justification of deviant behaviour JUSTdev -0.41 0.62 0.55
Own values of factors 35.700 17.400
Factor extraction by PCA and rotation through VARIMAX. KMO=0.71. N=24764
The two dimensions of tolerance - non-discrimination and relativistic orientation - are

positively associated. This indicates the existence of a single latent dimension of tolerance11.
However, the phenomenon has two specific forms of manifestation, and there are
inconsistencies between the non-discrimination behaviours and relativistic understanding of
situations. Persons that may seem understanding and tolerant at discourse level can show, in
concrete cases, discriminating behaviours.
The tendency is however for non-discrimination and contextual understanding to go hand in
hand. On the whole, the most relevant indicators for tolerance are those related to status intolerance
and intolerance towards deviant or presumed deviant behaviours.
Finally, for the discussed relation between tolerance and social capital, it is generally
noteworthy that generalized trust is especially associated with non-discrimination, which is the
main dimension of tolerance. The propensity towards sociable behaviours appears (Table 4) as a
specific dimension of social capital, defined by non-discrimination, generalized trust, association,
and valuing friendship. Persons that are members of several associations and value friendship are at
11
If, after extracting the factors with PCA we rotated with OBLIMIN, factor configuration would appear to be similar
with that of Table 3, with the difference that the first factor is defined as non-discrimination. The correlation between
non-discrimination and relativistic orientation is positive, 0.25.
12 Dumitru Sandu
the same time characterized by a non-discriminating orientation and the tendency to trust their
fellow people. Without being decisive proof, the empirical analysis does not disprove the
hypothesis of tolerance as a defining indicator of social capital. Less resolute assertions are
suggested, considering non-discrimination a relevant measure especially for positive sociability at
behavioural level. Social relativism appears as a separate dimension of social capital, which is
significant for the attitude facet of productive sociability.
Table 4. Factor analysis of tolerance, generalized trust and association

Factors and saturations
behavioural ideal productive Commonalities
productive sociability sociability
Discrimination DISCRIM -.694 .155 .505
Generalized trust TGENERAL .642 .001 .412
Involvement in associations ASSOCIAT .572 .075 .333
Orientation towards friendship FRIENDS .535 .228 .338
Contextual tolerance INTELEG .025 .967 .936
Own values of factors 30.41 20.01
Factor extraction by PCA and rotation through VARIMAX. KMO=0.63. N=24231
Regional Tolerance/Intolerance Structures
Grouping the 25 European countries according to the degree of similarity in their tolerance
profile showed the existence of a large number of patterns.
One of the more structured groups consists, in its majority, of Catholic countries - Italy,
Austria, Portugal, Ireland, France and Belgium. The only non-Catholic country in the group is the
United Kingdom. It appears in this group because of its strong similarity in patterns to the Republic
of Ireland. Common language and historic interaction seem to be, in this case, more important than
religious differences in generating tolerance patterns. The group of catholic countries includes
distinct sub-groups, consisting of France and Belgium on the one hand and Italy, Austria and
Portugal on the other hand.
Protestant countries also constitute a specific macro-group, comprising two sub-groups:
Germany (former Western and former Eastern), the Netherlands, and Switzerland on the one hand
and Norway, Sweden, and Denmark on the other hand. The presence of Spain with the protestant
group is hard to explain; it is either the result of an exceptional situation or an effect of poor
measurement of the phenomenon.
The former communist countries appear in three groups: the Baltic countries, Hungary,
Poland and Romania, and the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Slovenia, the only one from
the former Yugoslavia, is more similar in profile with the Baltic States.
Figure 3. Dendogram of distances between tolerance profiles of 25 European countries
0 5 10 15 20 25
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
Letonia òûòòòø
Estonia ò÷ ùòòòòòø
Slovenia òòòûò÷ ó
Lituania òòò÷ ùòòòø
Ungaria òòòûòø ó ó
Romania òòò÷ ùòòòòò÷ ó
Polonia òòòòò÷ ó
Portugalia òø ùòòòòòòòòòòòø
Austria òôòòòø ó ó
Italia ò÷ ó ó ó
Franta òûòø ó ó ó
Marea Britanie ò÷ ùòôòòòòòòòòò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø
Belgia òòò÷ ó ó ó
Irlanda òòòòò÷ ó ó
Rep.Ceha òûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø ó ó
Slovacia ò÷ ùòòòòòòòòò÷ ó
Bulgaria òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ ó
Germania (ex.RFG) òûòø ó

Olanda ò÷ ùòòòòòòòø ó
Elvetia òòòú ó ó
German (ex.Demo) òòò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø ó
Norvegia òòòûòòòø ó ó ó
Suedia òòò÷ ùòòò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Danemarca òòòòòòò÷ ó
Spania òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷
Cluster by method of the furthest neighbour, measuring profile differences by squared Euclidian distances. Profiles are
given by country averages of the indices INTOstat, INTOdev, NONDISC, RELATIV, GENlib and JUSTdev,
standardized with the score z. and the data for Romania is from the 1993 dataset. If we use the data from the Romanian
survey of 1997, the configuration of the dendogram remains the same, with only one change: the Romanian profile
shows the most similarity to that of Poland and that of Hungary.
The fact that neighbouring countries, with similarities of religion and language tend to
appear in the same groups has a double significance, methodologically and in content.
Methodologically, it appears that the indicators used for measuring are valid and the aggregation
method is adequate for the data. As for the content, it is noteworthy that similarities in religion,
common language and territorial proximity are factors that favour common orientations in the
structure of social capital and tolerance in particular. The Baltic countries, the Scandinavian
countries, the two Germanys, Czech Republic and Slovakia are the best examples for this.
Maximum tolerance values tend to be concentrated mostly in protestant countries, especially
in Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands (Table A.1.). The predisposition for compromise and
14 Dumitru Sandu
negotiation appears especially in Sweden and Germany. Catholic countries are closer to the average
tolerance indices.
Generally, intolerance seems to be greatest in the former communist countries, with the
exception of Slovenia (the most developed of them economically)
Intolerance towards groups having a deviant/presumed deviant status seems to be at a high
level in former communist countries, with the exception of Bulgaria. Maximum intolerance to
minority groups and immigrants shows maximum values for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Romania.
For the former communist countries as a whole, the most intense discriminating attitudes
appear in the case of Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Absolutist intolerance,
as a refusal of contextual/relativistic social judgments appears with maximum level indices in
Bulgaria and Poland.
In the European countries that have not experienced communism, maximum intolerance
values are relatively isolated (from the perspective of the six main indicators used for the analysis –
Table A.2.). In that series, maximum intolerance, albeit under the European average, is found in
Ireland, Belgium and the U.K.
Spain’s profile is distinguished by a great level of tolerance towards family and sex life.
Catholic countries strongly reject the model of a woman accepting to have a child while not
wanting to get married. The percentage of the sample accepting such behaviour varies between 23%
for Ireland and 40% for Italy and Portugal. Spain shows an unusually high tolerance, with a
percentage of 75%. This value is not conjectural, as it appears with a similarly high level (65%) in
the previous (second) wave of the survey (Inglehart et al, 1998)
Europe’s tolerance configuration at the end of the millennium has been a dynamic one, with
strong restructuring going on, especially for the former communist countries, where changes have
had the most extent politically, socially and economically.
Not accepting an immigrant (from abroad) as a neighbour is a sign of social intolerance.
Surprisingly enough, the highest percentages of discontent with immigrants appear in the former
communist countries, with a relatively low number of immigrants (Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Lithuania, Romania and Hungary). Most probably, this indicates a high level of traditionalism in
these societies and a relatively low democratic experience, and not a deficiency in the measuring
procedure.
The category of population towards which the highest percentage of rejection as a neighbour
is expressed is that of drug users. In the Baltic countries, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia,
this rejection reaches maximum levels, 80% or over 80% of the respondents. However, even
minimum percentages are very high (44% in France, 48% in Western Germany, 49% in
Switzerland).
Maximum social distance towards alcoholics is expressed in Poland (79%), Romania (79%),
Slovenia (79%), Austria (60%) and France (50%). A small group of countries has maximum
rejection towards extremists - Western Germany (70%), Eastern Germany (71%) and Switzerland
(61%). Bulgaria is the only country with a very strong rejection of criminals.
It is hard to tell where the social definitions of the categories that face the strongest rejection
come from in different country groups. It is very likely that in the subtle equation of labelling and
rejection, an important role is played by the intensity of the incriminated phenomenon, its newness
and the historical experiences of the reference country. Drug consumption is probably a social
innovation for many of the former communist countries, and consequently is more visible socially.
The rejection of extremism in Germany may be related to the intensity of this country’s extremist
groups, to the firmness of laws against extremism, and also to the country’s historical experience
and the high sensitivity of population to the risk of such phenomena. The rise of alcoholism after
1989 in countries such as Romania, Poland and Slovenia could be the cause of the opinions
expressed by the persons interviewed in these countries.
Racial intolerance, expressed by the refusal to have neighbours of another race seems to be
greatest in the former communist countries of Central Europe and in Romania (Slovakia 36%,
Czech Republic 29%, Romania 28%, Hungary 23% and Poland 20%)12. The presence and mobility
of Rroma in the region or the thawing of old feuds in the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire could
explain such a reading.
Level variations are considerable from one wave to the other, for many of the analysed
countries. Slovenia, for instance, had one of the highest rates of ethnic and residential intolerance in
the second wave. It was the moment when it had broken off from the Yugoslav Federation. Later,
after 1995, its discrimination score dropped almost to one half. A similar process happened in the
reduction of discriminating tendencies in Bulgaria. In fact, most former communist countries
showed a decline in discriminating orientations between the second and third wave of the survey
(Table A.3.).
Significant drops in discriminating tendencies are also found in Western countries, such as
the UK, Germany, Sweden and Spain. A certain increase in intolerance between 1990 and 1998 was
seen in countries like Denmark, Ireland and Norway. The European image is marked not only by
12
Compare with the extremely low values of racial intolerance for countries like Germany - 2%, Sweden - 3%, Ireland
- 6%, Netherlands - 6%, etc.
16 Dumitru Sandu
changes, but also by stability nuclei. Sweden, for instance, is an example of country with a
constantly high level of tolerance in the labour market. The Scandinavian area also shows a high
stability in Denmark’s position as a pole of tolerant interpretation of value sets.
In the area of tolerance towards sexual/family behaviours, I have already mentioned Spain’s
high-level stability.
Sources of Tolerance/Intolerance
Country profile, status profile and personal beliefs or feelings are the main categories of
factors that are expected to influence tolerance. What matters most, social, economic and cultural
characteristics of the country where you live, or education, age, occupation, religious adherence, or
the degree of individual modernity, religiousness, satisfaction with the income, identification with
one’s location? Tolerance being a value, we would expect value contamination phenomena to play
an essential part. It remains to be seen whether the empirical evidence supports such an expectation,
and whether all the aspects of tolerance are subject to the same causal regularities.
Furthermore, as tolerance is a part of a culture of openness, personal and status variables
should matter more than country variables in determining the orientations related to discrimination
and relativism as a vision of the world.
Each of the three categories of factors adds its significant contribution to the explanation of
tolerance phenomena.
The “discussion” with the data shows however that for different aspects of tolerance,
explanatory contributions are different. The cultural profile of the individual is the weakest
predictor of tolerance, regardless of the form in which it is measured13. This observation contradicts
the expectation that was stated above. The explanation of this inconsistency could be related to the
low level of effectiveness of the cultural profile. It is very likely that besides individual modernity,
religiousness and local orientation there are other relevant variables for the cultural orientation of
the person. Given a relatively poor measurement of the subjective and cultural dimensions, it is
probable that the package of status variables largely includes the effects of subjective and cultural
components.
Discrimination and the relativistic-pluralist vision of the world have different causal
profiles. The assertion of discriminating behaviours is mostly subject to country conditions, national
society development levels, urbanization patterns, but also the ideological/religious configuration of
13
All evaluations of the contribution of the three categories of explanatory variables are done depending the R2 change
the country. However, the vision of the dominant models of desirable social interaction - marked
more or less by relativism or pluralism - is determined by the status profile.
In other words, people tend to discriminate more or less depending on the cultural models of
the country in which they live, in turn deriving from conditioning by religious, urban, economic
development degree, recent political experience, etc. By contrast, their vision regarding the
fundamental models of social interaction depends mainly on the personal position in the social
space, and not by the country profile.
Country and Community Profile
The degree of behavioural tolerance, measured by non-discrimination, is greater in countries

that are more developed economically, controlling the other characteristics of the country profile.
The economic situation of the country matters more for tolerance behaviours than for
attitudes. We cannot rule out the possibility of the regularity appearing due to a poorer measuring of
the evaluating and discourse dimension of tolerance. Although worth remembering, the hypothesis
is not very probable. If the relativism in values was the result of poor measurement, it would be
hard to explain the relatively high number of significant and socially meaningful associations
between that variable and status or cultural predictors.
Discrimination and exclusivist/ monocentric orientations are more frequent in the former
communist countries, and less intense in the preponderantly protestant countries14.
Modern environments, with a high percentage of urban population, a high degree of
population concentration in large cities, and with low fertility rates, are characterized by the
rejection of discrimination and supporting pluralist/ relativistic life philosophies. Small rural
settlements, with high levels of fertility and implicitly traditionalism, are characterized by strong
orientation towards discrimination and exclusivism.
The intensity of economic change such as the growth of the gross domestic product does not
seem to have a clear and stable influence. Intolerance seems to be alleviated in countries that have
had substantial economic growth between 1990 and 1999 (Table 5). Even if it is not very clear or
very stable, such a tendency is noteworthy because it shows the fragility (Tarrow, 1996) of the
coefficients shown in Table 5, Table 6.

14
The relation between tolerant-type understanding and belonging to the former group of communist countries is
relatively unstable. Within model I, only with the set of variables referring to the country and community profile, that
relation appears to be positive, indicating greater openness towards relativism in the former communist countries, if the
other features of the country profile are kept under control. If we introduce the status variables into the model, the
meaning of the relation changes, and tolerant-relativistic type understanding appears as being lower in the former
communist countries.
18 Dumitru Sandu
fatalist theories of social capital (Putnam, 2001; Fukuyama, 1995)

The separation between “high social capital societies”, such as Japan or Germany, and
“family-type societies”, with a low level of social capital, such as France, Italy, China or South
Korea (Fukuyama, 1995:12) seems to be questionable when we look more closely at the European
image. Of course, the social capital to which Fukuyama refers is mainly the one given by trust.
Regardless of how it is conceptualized, tolerance is significantly associated with trust15. High levels
of intolerance correspond to high values of trust. Tolerance, as a variable associated with trust, is
strongly dependent on economic, social and cultural variables at country level, on indicators of
economic dynamics. The picture that results from the analysis of the 25 European countries
indicates a structuring of social capital along much finer lines than the ones given by the
state/family polarity.
Surprisingly, tolerant understanding seems to become eroded under conditions of economic
growth (Table 6). Typical cases of economic growth accompanied by low values of relativistic and
pluralist visions are Ireland, Norway, Poland and Austria. At the opposite pole we noted Latvia and
Estonia, marked by economic decline, but with levels of evaluative tolerance close to the European
average. It is hard to explain this negative relation between economic growth and discourse
tolerance, at the level of pluralist/ relativistic evaluations. How can one interpret the observation
that the economic development of a country reduces intolerance but increases the frequency of
persons who have a non-relativistic, dogmatic approach of the world?
As this observation does not seem to result from deficiencies in the measurement and as the
available data does not allow any clarification, we note is as waiting for an answer.
The demographic size of the residence country does not significantly influence cultural
openness and tolerance.
The status profile. Diffuse social philosophy on social openness and implicitly on tolerance,
is controlled mostly by status. What the person is, their position in the demographic, professional,
material and cultural space, matters very much.
A certain “tyranny” of age is noted in the area of the social understanding of social
interaction. Elderly persons are more inclined to reject relativism and social pluralism (of course
subject to caeteris paribus).
In attitudes and behaviours, tolerance is higher for young people with a high level of
education and professional skills, employed in non-agricultural sectors, of orthodox religion.
15
Generalized trust (TGENERAL) is significantly correlated, at a level of p=0.01, using individuals as an analysis unit,
with the two types of tolerance r TGENERAL DISCRIM= -0.22, r TGENERAL INTELEG=0.04.
Table 5. Predictors of discriminating attitudes at individual level

Model I Model II Model III
with predictors from with predictors from with predictors from
country profile country profile and status country profile. status and
Predictors cultural
b beta p b beta p b beta p
Constant 1.54 0.00 1.02 0.00 0.92 0.00
Country urbanization degree 1999 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.00
Size of settlement (8-degree
-0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.00
scale)
growth of gross domestic product
0.00 0.00 0.68 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01
in 1999 compared to 1990 (ln)
net national product per capita
-0.30 -0.14 0.00 -0.32 -0.15 0.00 -0.28 -0.13 0.00
(logarithmic value)
former communist country (1 yes.
0.34 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.16 0.00 0.39 0.18 0.00
0 no)
Country population 1996 (ln) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.48
Total fertility rate 1998 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.00
lives in a prevailingly protestant
-0.20 -0.10 0.00 -0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 -0.06 0.00
country (1 yes. 0 no)
male (1 yes. 0 no) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00
age 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.00
age of completion of continuing
0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00
education studies
self assessed income (direct scale.
0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00
10 degrees)
farmer (1 yes. 0 no) 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00
unskilled or semi-skilled manual
0.22 0.08 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00
worker (1 yes. 0 no)
catholic (1 yes. 0 no) 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01
protestant (1 da. 0 nu) 0.00 0.00 0.96 -0.01 0.00 0.76
orthodox (1 yes. 0 no) -0.18 -0.03 0.00 -0.20 -0.03 0.00
identification with the
0.08 0.04 0.00
settlement (1 yes 0 no)
religiousness RELIGAT 0.00 0.01 0.55
frequency of participation in
0.00 0.00 0.62
religious services
„have you received a religious
education at home?” (1 yes. 0 0.05 0.02 0.00
no)
individualist orientation
-0.10 -0.04 0.00
INDIVID
orientation favourable to change
-0.13 -0.06 0.00
CHANGE
R2 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.00
R2 change 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00
N (number of cases in the
24674 20520 19825
models)
The source of data for quantitative variables at country level: World Development Report 2000/2001. Attacking
Poverty, World Bank 2000, Oxford University Press.
Dependent variable: factorial score of discrimination generated by factorial analysis described in Table 3. The run
was made with the survey values at individual levels after weighting them with a new variable = v236*(percentage of
country population in the total population of the 25 states in 1996/percentage of country sample volume in the total
interviewed persons per total countries analyzed), where v236 - original percentage in the file for the correction of the
sample’s structural deficiencies. This way, the sample was corrected to represent the Europe of the 25 countries
included in the analysis.
20 Dumitru Sandu
Men tend to adopt discriminating attitudes more than women. Their philosophy of social
interaction is, more than for women, based on lack of flexibility and relativity.
Occupational status matters more in determining discrimination behaviours than in
determining contextual, relativistic understanding. Being a farmer or an unskilled worker has a
greater impact on the appearance of discriminating orientations than on structuring non-relativistic,
egocentric visions.16
The self-assessed level of household income has an ambivalent significant with respect to
tolerance. Persons from wealthy households seem to reject ethnic and residential discrimination,
while at the same time having visions on social interaction based more on firmness, lack of
contextual understanding. So, this is an economic factor having, together with economic growth, an
ambivalent meaning in relation with tolerance. Measuring effect or complex causality, through yet
unsolved networks? The available empirical signals are, as for income, insufficient.
Religiousness and individual modernity. Putnam noted that “at least in Italy, the most ardent
believers have the least civic sense” (Putnam, 2001:197). The explanation, he thinks, lies in the fact
that Catholic church is structured vertically and, in general, horizontal networks are more efficient
than the vertical ones in stimulating civic spirit, social capital: “The efficiency of the Italian
government is owed to music bands and sports clubs, not to priests” (Putnam, 2001: 197).
The dataset I am working on allows a detailed exploration of this issue.
The regression models of tables 5 and 6 retain a relatively rich set of predictors associated
with religious life: type of religion (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other), location in a prevailingly
Protestant country, religious socialization (“have you received a religious education at home?”), the
frequency of participation in religious services, the religiousness degree, the reliance on religious
beliefs about God, hell, heaven, afterlife, etc. Thus we take into account religious status, behaviour
and attitude aspects. Of the 23 predictors contained in tables 4 and 5, almost a third (seven) refer to
the person’s religious life or situation.
Discriminating behaviours appear more frequently in non-Protestant countries. At an
individual, religious status level, we should note that behavioural intolerance appears more
frequently for Catholics and less so for Orthodoxes (Table 5). As for the attitudes, contextual-type
visions, with wide understanding for diversity appear more frequently for Protestants and
Orthodoxes.
16
Statement based on comparing the non-standardized b coefficients in the two models of multiple regression of tables
4 and 5.
Table 6. Predictors of social relativism at individual level

Model I Model II Model III
with predictors from with predictors from with predictors from country
Predictors country profile country profile and status profile. status and cultural
b beta p b beta p b beta p
Constant -0.90 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.83 0.00
Country urbanization degree 1999 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Size of settlement (8-degree scale) 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00
gross domestic product growth in
1999 compared with 1990 (ln) -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.00
net national product per capita
(logarithmic value) 0.34 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.25
former communist country (1 yes,
0 no) 0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.70 -0.17 -0.08 0.00
Country population 1996 (ln) -0.01 -0.01 0.22 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.93
Total fertility rate 1998 -0.55 -0.13 0.00 -0.58 -0.13 0.00 -0.64 -0.15 0.00
lives in a prevailingly protestant
country (1 yes, 0 no) 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.00
male (1 yes, 0 no) 0.00 0.00 0.84 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
age -0.02 -0.27 0.00 -0.01 -0.21 0.00
age of completion of continuing
education studies 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
self-assessed income (direct scale,
10 degrees) 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00
farmer (1 yes, 0 no) -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.61
unskilled or semi-skilled manual
worker (1 yes, 0 no) -0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.00
catholic (1 yes, 0 no) -0.27 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.16
protestant (1 yes, 0 no) -0.21 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
orthodox (1 yes, 0 no) -0.56 -0.09 0.00 -0.26 -0.04 0.00
identification with the settlement
(1 yes, 0 no) -0.03 -0.02 0.01
religiousness RELIGAT -0.05 -0.15 0.00
frequency of participation in
religious services 0.08 0.16 0.00
education at home?” (1 yes, 0 no) 0.03 0.01 0.07
individualist orientation INDIVID 0.00 0.00 0.92
favourable orientation to change
CHANGE 0.23 0.10 0.00
2
R 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.24 0.00
R2 change 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.00
N(number of cases in models for
R2) 24674 20520 19825
The data source for quantitative variables at country level: World Development Report 2000/2001. Attacking Poverty,
World Bank 2000, Oxford University Press.
Dependent variable: factor score of relativistic orientation, index generated by factor analysis as described in Table 3.
Religious practice, the frequency of participation in religious services does not seem to be
relevant for discrimination, but it contributes to the cultivation of tolerant views of social
interaction. Intense religious socialization in childhood increases propensity towards ethnic and
residential discrimination, but it does not significantly influence the pluralist-relativistic attitudes.
22 Dumitru Sandu
Religiousness itself, as a set of beliefs supporting the fundamental issues of Christianity, does not
appear as an effective predictor of discrimination. However, in the area of the views of social
interaction, increased religiousness becomes associated with low levels of social relativism.
Individual modernity, measured by valuing change, has a clearly positive impact on
tolerance, regardless of its form. People who believe that “new ideas are better” and “it is good to
act boldly” are at the same time the ones that show higher levels of behavioural and verbal-attitude
tolerance. Individualism, in turn, reduces propensity towards discrimination, but it does not appear
relevant for the contextual and flexible understanding of social interaction. If localist orientations
(persons feel more attached to their settlement than to larger territorial units) are considered an
indicator of traditionalism, we can easily notice the reverse of the above-mentioned regularities:
persons with a traditionalist value profile are more intolerant, more oriented towards discrimination
and towards rejecting the values of relativism and social pluralism. When explanatory models are
strongly specified, the variables related to the religious life have a significantly reduced impact on
social tolerance: religiousness and participation in religious services no longer count as predictors
of discriminating behaviours; intense religious socialization during childhood appears, surprisingly,
as a favouring factor for the adoption of discriminating behaviours. It is very likely that this is not
caused by the religious values themselves, as promoted through socialization, but rather by certain
mechanisms of consolidation of traditionalist attitudes, which are less permissive towards diversity
and social risk. This interpretation is based on the observation that, in fact, religiousness as a set of
religious beliefs has no significant impact on the adoption of discriminating behaviours. Of the
multiple aspects of individual religious life, adult socialization within the church, by participation in
religious services, seems to be the most important aspect having a positive impact on
evaluative/attitude tolerance. At the same time, it is notable that this type of socialization is not a
strong and relevant enough as a factor in determining increased propensity for the reduction of
discriminating behaviours.
On the whole, religious variables have a considerably larger impact on the attitude of social
relativism than on the adoption of discriminating behaviours17
Discrimination or Discriminations?
Previous analyses have used the hypothesis that there is a latent dimension related to
17
R2 change is 0.06 if the block of the seven variables associated with religion is added to the 16 in the multiple
regression model of social relativism. The same procedure applied to discrimination as a dependent variable indicates a
contribution of the variable set associated with religion by only 0.01.
intolerance, manifested by two sub-dimensions - discrimination and relativistic orientation. The

data seems to support this hypothesis. As the models I have worked with use indices that sometimes
have a high degree of aggregation, which can lead to interpretation errors, it is prudent to deepen
the analysis by relating to indices with a low degree of aggregation. To this end, I will try to answer
the question whether there is one attitude of discrimination/xenophobia or there are several
attitudes18. A first level of empirical evidence indicates the existence of a latent variable measuring
discrimination towards foreigners (INTOstat) , discrimination in the labour market (NONdis) and
discrimination towards persons considered deviant (INTOdev). All these three variables appear
together within the same factor, thus referring to the same latent variable (Table 3). Later, the entire
analysis was based on the hypothesis that there is a latent dimension of intolerance, called
discrimination. However, what if xenophobia does not always “go hand in hand” with “intolerance
towards deviant behaviours”? What if there are ambivalent causalities - for instance favouring
xenophobia but reducing intolerance towards deviant behaviour? Ambivalence reigns supreme in
the social world. There are frequent cases when the same factor has different causal reflections on
different sub-fields of the same field. A well-known debate in psychology is the one related to
intelligence as a single and general factor versus intelligence as a set of specific factors.
Our subject matter is fully comparable to the one discussed by psychology. A comparison
(Figure 1) of the causal profile of xenophobia with that of intolerance to deviant behaviours
supports the legitimacy of the questions posed above.
Of the total of 21 predictors considered for the explanation of the two particular aspects of
intolerance, 12 act the same and 5 in opposite directions (favour one type of intolerance while
disfavouring the other). Finally, 4 predictors are significant only for one of the two aspects of
intolerance (gender, religiousness, total fertility rate and size of settlement).
Both xenophobia and intolerance to deviant behaviours tend to be higher for farmers and
unskilled workers, older, strongly attached to their settlement, from the former communist
countries. A decreased chance of intolerance towards foreigners and marginal-deviant persons is
encountered for persons of Orthodox religion, modern orientation, relatively well off, from
European countries with a high degree of urbanization and economic development.
18
The idea to detail this aspect of this analysis on tolerance as a single or multiple phenomenon was suggested to me by
professor Septimiu Chelcea.
24 Dumitru Sandu
Figura 4. Factors contributing to increase (+) or to decrease (-) xenophobia and intolerance to
(supposed to be) deviant behaviors
former communist country (1 yes, 0 no)
INTOLERANCE TO (PRESUMEDLY) DEVIANT BEHAVIOURS

age
farmer (1 yes, 0 no)
unskilled or semi-skilled manual (1 yes, 0 no)
+
+ identification with the settlement (1 yes 0 no)
total fertility rate 1998

XENOPHOBIA (INTOstat)
male (1 yes, 0 no)

frequency of participation in religious services -
(INTOdev)
age of completion of continuing education studies
catholic (1 yes, 0 no)
GDP growth 1999 compared to 1990
lives in a prevailingly Protestant country (1 yes, 0 no) +
religiousness RELIGAT
size of settlement (8-degree scale)
country population 1996
- country urbanization degree 1999
net domestic product per capita (logarithmic value)
self-assessed income
Orthodox (1 yes, 0 no) -
individualist orientation INDIVID
favourable orientation towards CHANGE
The figure display in a simplified way two multiple regression models with xenophobia (INTOdev), respectively,
intolerance to (supposed to be) deviant behaviors as dependent variables. The predictors under the same accolade have
regression coefficient significantly different from 0 for p=0,05.
Causal ambivalence can be identified in relation with education, religious preferences and
the economic dynamics of the country. Persons with a high education degree, for instance, show
increased tolerance towards deviant behaviours or at least greater than the persons with less
education, but seem to have a higher degree of xenophobia. Frequent participation in religious
services reduces the chance of intolerance towards deviant behaviours, but increases the chance for
xenophobia. At national level, positive economic dynamics favour a reduction in xenophobia, but
increase the chance of rejecting behaviours perceived as deviant. To live in a prevailingly Protestant
country is also an ambivalent condition: on the one hand, it involves a reduced probability of
xenophobia, but, on the other hand, it favours intolerance towards behaviours perceived as deviant.
Such ambivalence is particularly strong in Germany (former “Federal”) and Sweden.
Three of the European countries included in this analysis - the United Kingdom, Germany
(former FRG) and Sweden - were included in another study on xenophobia, using different data
(Hjerm, 1998)19. The index used by Hjerm to measure xenophobia is obtained by aggregating four
indicators measuring the attitude towards immigrants. The xenophobia index I use (INTOsta) is
more comprehensive, including three indicators regarding the discrimination of immigrants, persons
of another race and a specific ethnic minority group (Muslims). Even with these significant
differences in construction, a few comparative commentaries are worth developing. In both
analyses, the UK appears with the highest degree of xenophobia. The data used by Hjerm allow
significant qualitative differentiations. The three countries illustrate three models of different
national identity (Castles, Miller, 1993): The UK, with the imperial model, providing special rights
to immigrants from the former colonies, Germany with the ethnic model, where citizenship is based
on descendence or is obtained after a long time, and Sweden with a multicultural or “semi-
multicultural” model (Hjerm, 1998: 337), more permissive to immigrants. It is very likely that such
particularities in the national model could have an influence on the attitudes of tolerance, and
especially on xenophobia. The data I used, comprising a large number of European countries, did
not allow me to go into such details; however, these factors are important in the structure of
national and tolerance attitudes. For the three states for which we have available data, partial
intolerance indices are consistent with the perspective of Castles’ typology. In all three
measurements, UK appears with the highest intolerance degree. For 4 of the 5 indicators of Table 7,
the minimum value of xenophobia appears in Germany’s case.
In Hjerm’s study, it was possible to obtain a multiple measurement for the feeling of
national pride, starting with a set of 10 variables. The empirical grouping indicates the existence of
two relatively independent dimensions of that feeling, the cultural and historic dimension and the
civic dimension. The distinction largely overlaps with that made by Smith (1991) between ethnic
and civic nationalism. Xenophobia appears as being positively associated only with the
cultural/national dimension (Hjerm, 1993: 344). UK’s greater degree of xenophobia and Germany’s
minimum appear to be associated with the values of national pride, especially in its cultural/historic
aspect, and not political/civic.
In the analysis with WVS data, national pride is rudimentarily measured, with only one
question, mainly focused on the national/historic aspect. Being a weak measure, I have not used it
to understand the tolerance/intolerance structures.
19
Hjerm (1998) compared four countries – Germany, Sweden, UK and Australia, using data from the International
Social Survey Programme ISSP, 1995 wave, for “national identity”.
26 Dumitru Sandu
Table 7. Indicators for xenophobia and national pride in Germany, UK and Sweden
Germany
Sweden UK
(former FRG)
1.Xenophobia index focused on immigrant perception * 7.9 7.6 8.1
2. National/cultural index of national pride * 7.9 9.1 10.8
3. Xenophobia index with measurements referring to
immigrants, persons of different races and an ethnic 0.16 0.21 0.37
minority INTOsta**
4. Index of discrimination towards persons perceived as deviant
1.44 1.88 2.34
INTOdev**
5. Percentage of persons declaring that they are very proud to
11 45 54
belong to their nationality **
Source: * Hjerm,1998:341, using ISSP data; ** World Value Survey. Hjerm distinguishes between two components of
national pride - one is political and economic (for democracy, economic power, social security, equal treatment of
social groups) and another is cultural and historic (associated with history, scientific, cultural and sports achievements).
Ordering by indices 3,4,5 with WVS data is consistent with ordering by index 2, based on ISSP data. The indices
cannot be compared between them given the different manner of construction and the different measuring units.
Tolerance in the three Europes
The causal configuration described above suggests a considerable variation of causal

patterns of tolerance depending on the religious and political experiences at a macro-regional level.
The distinction between the (prevailingly) Catholic countries, (prevailingly) Protestant countries
and former communist ones is one that has appeared rather frequently in the interpretation of data.
It appears that an exploration of data along such an outline of religious and political culture is worth
embarking on. This is what I will do next. Given the strong differences of political and religious
experience, it is to be expected that causal patterns would differ considerably among the three
country groups. Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the multi-variable analysis based on the
methodological hypothesis of the three Europes.
For the whole of the countries, the most significant contribution in explaining the individual
variation of discriminating orientations is given by the variables relating to the country profile. In
the new analysis situation, where certain variables relating to the country profile no longer appear
in the series of predictors due to the segmentation of data (“former communist country” and
“prevailingly Protestant country” disappear), the causal configuration changes. For Catholic and
Protestant countries (Table 8), the most important predictors of discrimination involve the status
variables (gender, age, education, self-assessed income, agricultural occupation and skill degree)
Table 8. Contribution of four categories of variables in explaining discriminating attitudes by

types of countries
Categories of predictors* referring to Catholic countries Protestant countries former communist countries
country profile 3.2 4.9 12.4
status profile 5.8 7.4 3.2
religious profile 0.9 0.3 0.6
individual modernity 0.5 1.0 1.4
The figures in the table indicate the values of the R2 change coefficients, multiplied by 100 for each set of variables
specified in turn, for each category of countries.
*To group the predictors in the four categories, see the groups marked with bold characters in Table 9.
In contrast, for the former communist countries, country profile remains as the most
important category of predictors. The ecologic dependence of tolerance is higher in these countries
that have a lower degree of economic development and a still fresh memory of the communist
experience.
Like the analysis for all the 24 countries, in the macro-regional approach age remains the
most important predictor of behavioural intolerance from all the status variables. It counts more
than the level of education. Regardless of the type of country, the highest level of behavioural
intolerance seems to appear at older persons, with a low education level, low income and
occupation mainly in manual professions, unskilled or semi-skilled.
For the total of the European sample, I noted a higher tendency to discriminate in men than
in women. The segmentation of the sample gives a more precise image. Propensity towards
discrimination remains higher in men than in women, but only for Catholic and Protestant
countries. For the former communist countries, gender difference is no longer an effective predictor
of discriminating orientation.
Have the differences in socialization between boys and girls been greater in the West than in
the East in the period before 1989? It is hard to tell. The problem remains open to discussion.
At the level of the predictors associated with the country profile there are however several
particularities of causal profile. On the whole of the European sample, the high urbanization degree
of the country appeared as a factor against discrimination. States with less urban population had
lower indices of ethnic and residential intolerance towards immigrants. In the new analysis
situation, the regularity remains only for Catholic and former communist countries. For Protestant
countries, the relation appears reversed: the higher the country’s urban population, the higher the
percentage of persons manifesting intolerance, propensity towards discrimination. Are people from
cities in the Protestant countries more inclined to discriminate than their counterparts in the
Catholic and former communist countries?
28 Dumitru Sandu
Table 9. Predictors of discriminating attitude at individual level, for the three categories of
countries
Prevailingly Catholic Prevailingly Protestant Former communist

Predictors countries countries countries
B Beta p B Beta p B Beta p
-
Constant 1.09 0.00 0.00 1.88 0.01
13.84
Country urbanization degree
-0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.00 -0.03 -0.30 0.00
1999
Locality size (8-points scale) -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.00
country profile
GDP growth in 1999

-0.17 -0.20 0.00 -0.31 -0.28 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.14
compared to 1990 (ln)
Net domestic product per
0.18 0.03 0.07 2.35 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.15
capita (logarithmic value)
Country population 1996 (ln) -0.27 -0.21 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.09
Total fertility rate 1998 0.15 0.04 0.01 2.08 0.38 0.00 0.71 0.09 0.04
Male (1 yes, 0 no) 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.75
Age 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.00
Age of completion of
status profile
0.00 -0.01 0.62 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.03

continuing education studies
Self-assessed income (direct
-0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00
scale, 10 degrees)
Farmer (1 yes, 0 no) 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.72
Unskilled or semi-skilled
0.18 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00
manual worker (1 yes, 0 no)
Catholic (1 yes, 0 no) 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.06 0.01
Protestant (1 yes, 0 no) 0.01 0.00 0.96 0.08 0.05 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.01
religious profile
Orthodox (1 yes, 0 no) 0.12 0.01 0.54 -0.04 -0.01 0.46 -0.33 -0.07 0.00
Religiousness RELIGAT 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.22 -0.03 -0.07 0.00
Frequency of participation in
0.00 0.01 0.72 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.10
religious services
education at home?” (1 yes, 0 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.72 0.05 0.02 0.14
no)
identification with the locality
0.09 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.10
(1 yes 0 no)
modernity
individualist orientation
-0,07 -0,03 0,01 0,05 0,02 0,07 -0,27 -0,12 0,00
INDIVID
favourable orientation
-0,10 -0,05 0,00 -0,16 -0,07 0,00 -0,06 -0,03 0,02
towards change CHANGE
R2 0,10 0,14 0,18
N 6740 7566 5518
The data source for the quantitative variables at country level: World Development Report 2000/2001. Attacking
Poverty, World Bank 2000, Oxford University Press .
Dependent variable: factorial score of discrimination, generated by the factorial analysis described in Table 3.
Prevailingly Catholic countries included in the analysis (7): France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria.
Prevailingly Protestant countries included in the analysis: UK, Germany (former Federal), Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland (7).
Former communist countries included in the analysis (10): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany (former Democratic). Slovenia is absent from the 25 countries, as it did
not have available data on self-assessed income. Samples are weighted according to the procedure described under
table 4.
The data I used seems to support this hypothesis. It is very likely that behind these relations
lie more complicated configurations related to the urbanization and immigration patterns specific to
the three categories of countries. The above observation is yet another signal for the usefulness of
clarifying the aspects by detailed analysis. The causal profile of Protestant countries is a very
particular one. The general development level, measured by the net domestic product per capita no
longer acts in the causal relation as it did for the whole of Europe. At the level of the European
sample I noted a significant negative relation between the economic indicator and the propensity
towards discrimination.
With the data segmented by macro-regions, the causal configuration changes again: for
former communist and Catholic countries, the level of economic development no longer appears as
an effective predictor of tolerance; surprisingly, Protestant countries with a high level of economic
development are, at the same time, countries with a high percentage of persons orientated towards
discrimination. Typical examples are the UK, Switzerland and Norway.
The growth of the gross domestic product maintains the same meaning at macro-regional
level, that of a discouraging factor for discrimination, as it did in the analysis for the whole of the
European sample. Similarly, high levels of fertility appear, for all three categories of countries, as
an indicator of traditionalism, supporting discriminating attitudes.
Religious profile tends to hold the maximum of significance in Catholic countries and a
minimum in case of Protestant countries. For Catholic countries, in relation with religious status,
Catholics and those who have strongly socialized religiously in their childhood manifest maximum
propensity towards intolerance. In Protestant countries, discriminating attitudes are stronger not in
Catholics, but in Protestants who frequently attend religious service. The significance of religious
life for tolerance is completely different in the former communist countries. Individual variations of
religious socialization and practice have no significant echoes on behavioural tolerance at the level
of the population samples from the former communist countries. This is the only category of
countries where high religiousness and a strong set of religious beliefs contribute directly to a
reduction in behavioural intolerance.
This observation holds a particular relevance. Firstly, it underscores the fact that there are
situations where a high level of religiousness could signify something else than a high degree of
traditionalism. Secondly, it allows us to formulate the hypothesis that variations in religious beliefs
among the people in the former communist countries have a greater impact on tolerance than
similar variations in the Western European societies. The assertion of a religious identity in the East
- regardless of whether it is a Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox one - is associated with high level of
social tolerance. Religious identity and belief work completely differently in the former communist
30 Dumitru Sandu
countries than in Western Europe. In the context of the liberalization that occurred by the
revolutions of 1989, religiousness is a cultural phenomenon with multiple positive effects on the
sociability of East-Europeans, for the recovery of the social tissue affected by communism. The
relatively major contribution of individual modernity (Inkeles, 1996) in explaining tolerance is
found in the former communist countries. Individualist orientation is a factor against intolerance,
and it is much stronger in the post-communist area than in the rest of Europe.
Behavioural tolerance prediction models at country level are largely consistent with the
general model of the overall European sample.
The consistency between national- and European-level relationships is an argument in
favour of the legitimacy of aggregating country samples. Of course there are exceptions: in
Slovakia, orientation towards discrimination is, contrarily to the general European trend, greater in
women than in men and in skilled persons in non-agricultural sectors; Bulgaria is the only one of
the 24 countries that does not show a significant relation between tolerance and age; for Slovakia
and Hungary, farmers seem to be more tolerant than non-farmers; in Bulgaria and Portugal,
localism as an identity orientation is not opposed to tolerance, as it is in many other countries, but
rather supports it. Estonia is the only country where individual modernity, measured by openness to
change, seems to stimulate behavioural intolerance. Such deviations from the European model
could be the result of very particular local configurations or could indicate measurement flaws. It is
even harder to decide which is the case when deviations like the above appear mostly in transition
societies, marked both by instability and by less experience with measuring data by surveys.
Conclusions
On the whole, we can speak of a causal configuration of tolerance in the Europe of the
period 1990-1998, characterized by a set of regularities that relate multiple factors. The roots of
social tolerance as a form of productive sociability are so strong, with so great ramifications that
they fully justify considering it a “total social phenomenon”, as conceptualized by Marcel Mauss
(1993):
1. the basic matrix that makes the difference between tolerance/ intolerance models is the one
associated with the dimensions “discrimination and social relativism” and the distinction
between Catholic, Protestant and former communist countries (regardless of their religious
profile):
1.1. the axes of thematic structuring of tolerance at European level, depending on the starting
theoretic model (Figure 2) and available data (Table 3) are discrimination and social
relativism;
1.2. one of the more strongly structured groups (Figure 3) is that consisting in its majority of
Catholic countries - Italy, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, France and Belgium. The group of
Catholic countries has distinct sub-groups, comprising France and Belgium, and Italy,
Austria and Portugal;
1.3. Protestant countries also appear as a specific macro-group, comprising two sub-groups:
Germany (ex Federal), Germany (ex Democratic), Netherlands, and Switzerland, and
Norway, Sweden and Denmark
1.4. former communist countries appear in three distinct groups: the Baltic countries, Hungary,
Poland and Romania, and the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Slovenia, the only
country from the former Yugoslav country, has a profile closer to the Baltic countries;
1.5. the maximum tolerance, under the behaviour and attitude aspects, is found in the mainly
Protestant countries, and the minimum one in the former communist countries;
2. different facets of tolerance are controlled by different categories of factors:
2.1. the variation of discriminating orientations at individual level is mainly influenced by the
country profile, given by economic development, urbanization pattern and traditionalism,
identifiable in the demographic reproduction behaviours;
2.2. tolerance, especially at behaviour level, manifested by the rejection of discrimination, is

favoured in environments characterized by a high level of economic development and
social modernization (high urbanization degree, high concentration of population and low
levels of fertility);
2.3. attitude tolerance, associated with social relativism or value pluralism, varies mainly with
the characteristics of the individual status profile;
2.4. actual intolerance behaviour is dictated to a significant extent by the country or local
community model, and tolerance evaluations are mode dependent on the individual/family
status;
3. the economic development level of the country has a rather unstable relation with tolerance
indicators:
3.1. For the whole of the European sample, we observe that discrimination is less in countries
with a high level of domestic product per capita. The same relation no longer appears as
significant if we make comparisons by categories of countries. In catholic countries, and in
countries that have lived for the last fifty years under communism, the relation appears to
32 Dumitru Sandu
be insignificant statistically. Furthermore, as a sign of maximum instability, Protestant

countries show a positive relation between economic development and discrimination. I
would interpret this instability of statistical relationships as a proof of the fact that country
economic development indices have multiple meanings, not only economic ones, and the
regression model I worked with was insufficiently specified to eliminate the non-economic
connotations of macroeconomic indices;
3.2. the economic development level of the country seems to not have a significant relevance
for tolerance at evaluative/discourse level (Table 6);
3.3. another relatively unstable effect is that of economic growth: it seems to reduce propensity
towards discrimination, but the effect is limited to the Western countries and it does not act
significantly among former communist countries (Table 5, Table 9);
3.4. of course, the meaning of the relationship between tolerance and social capital, on the one
hand, and economic development on the other hand remains open to debate.
3.5. In Putnam’s (2001) or Fukuyama’s (1995) conception, “social capital brings development”.
The type of data we are working with does not allow us to validate this, given that this is
essentially synchronic data. The more probable meaning of the relationship we are
discussing is, for this case, the influences from macro to micro, from the country’s
economic development stage and rhythm to opinion and value judgments at individual
level. The social capital and tolerance indices show considerable fluctuations from one
period to the other, for the same country. Economic variables shift much more slowly, so it
is hard to take them as the cause of rapid changes in opinion and social behaviours. Many
of the analyses that focus on the opposite direction of the relationship use poorly specified
models.
4. the status profile influences tolerance mainly through the triplet gender, age, human capital:
4.1. high human capital, associated with education and professional training, favours tolerance;
4.2. elderly males tend to be a more intolerant segment of population than the other categories
of population determined by age and gender..
4.2.1. This observation requires additional data to be integrated into an adequate

explanatory context.
4.2.2. It is even harder to build such a context given that these are not the gross effects of
the status of being an elderly male, but a kind of “net” effects, after other
characteristics such as education, activity field, residential area, individual modernity
degree, etc. are eliminated or controlled.
4.2.3. Given the high specification degree of the explanatory model used to analyse the
data, I am inclined to believe that this is mainly about a certain gender-age culture
having a strong impact on tolerance, independently of other personal, community or
country status variables. A culture where firmness and violence are associated with
being a man and with the respectability given by age, then with being a woman and
being young.
4.2.4. Anyway, the data conveys a very clear message - in 23 of the 24 societies I have
analysed, intolerance goes with age. This is a regularity so strong that it can be brought
into discussion as the “tyranny of age over tolerance or the affinity between old age
and intolerance”.
4.3. rich people are more inclined than poor people to reject discrimination on status criteria
(ethnic, age, gender, residence, etc.), but they seem to have more firm judgments,
characterized by dogmatism and a lack of flexibility (Table 5, Table 6). In other words, the
financial status of the household has ambivalent effects on tolerance, reducing the
probability of discrimination but increasing the chance of intolerant value judgments. Of
course, in formal logic this finding would signal an inconsistency in the data. However, in
social logic this is probably not true. Looking for an explanation, we cannot omit the
hypothesis of a certain effect of social desirability under the interview situation, which is
stronger in rich people than in poor people (and perhaps, more so in the West than in the
East). The former know much better that “it is not correct” politically to reject members of
marginal groups as neighbours. Although such an effect is possible, its effect should not be
overestimated. If discrimination measurements were strongly affected by declaration errors
associated with social desirability, we would not be able to find so many statistically
significant and sociologically meaningful links in the regression models we use.
5. the relation between tolerance and religion is a particularly complex one. Manifestations of
tolerance/ intolerance must be put in relation not only with what the interviewed persons
believe, but also with the religious profile of the country, the type of religious socialization they
were subjected to in their childhood, and their religious preference and practice.
5.1. different components of a person’s religious situation associate differently with each of the
components of tolerance. This way we cannot speak of a single-dimensional relation
between religion and tolerance. Religion has facets and layers that connect differently with
the different aspects of tolerance.
5.2. even if we control the individual characteristics of the religious profile, the country’s
religious environment continues to impact tolerance behaviours and judgments. Living in a
prevailingly Protestant country favours a social interaction based more on tolerance
(subject, of course, to caeteris paribus, which is implicit in all the statements of this kind).
34 Dumitru Sandu
5.3. belonging to the dominant religion seems to strengthen the propensity towards ethnic or
residential discrimination in the labour market: Catholics in the Catholic countries and
Protestants in the Protestant countries tend to be more intolerant (Table 9);
5.4. religious socialization, if considered at the level of the entire Europe, seems to support
behavioural intolerance (Table 5), but not the discourse/evaluation one (Table 6). The
strongest relation of religious socialization supporting behavioural intolerance is found in
Italy, Switzerland and the Baltic countries (Table 10). These are countries with very
different cultural/religious profiles. Why mainly in these national contexts?
5.5. participation in religious service as a kind of continuing socialization at adult level is in fact
a favouring factor for tolerance, for a vision of social interaction based on relativism and
plurality (Table 6).
5.6. the relation between the same type of socialization and the adoption of discriminating
behaviour is more context-dependent, with limited validity, than the relation with the
evaluation/discourse tolerance. Going to the church or to a prayer house often does not
seem to have a significant impact on discriminating orientations in Catholic or former
communist countries. However, if we consider that relation only for Protestant countries,
we will be surprised to find that behavioural intolerance is supported by a high frequency of
participation in the religious service.
5.7. religiousness, as a matrix of religious beliefs, has a rather localist than universalist relation
with tolerance. In large, continental areas, after controlling all the relevant dimensions of
status, economic development and individual modernity, it does not show as a relevant
factor for behavioural intolerance (Table 5). However, in the particular cases of Germany
(former Federal), Italy and Slovakia, we notice that religiousness and discrimination are
positively associated (Table 10). The same three countries show a positive relation between
the intensity of religious practice and potential support for discrimination.
5.8. the link between religiousness and the evaluation/discourse aspect of tolerance seems to be
stronger than that with the behavioural facet of the phenomenon in cause. Persons with
strong religious beliefs tend to be firmer, and to adopt evaluations of low relativism, with
little reference to the context (Table 6).
5.9. The person’s religious profile has a largely different significance in Eastern than in Western
Europe. The population of the former communist countries seems to live the religious
experience to a great extent as a favouring factor for behavioural tolerance. Here, a strong
level of religiousness is associated with low orientation towards discrimination (Table 9).
The relation is particularly strong in the case of Lithuania, Latvia and Romania (Table 10).
The novelty of the freedoms obtained after 1989 could be the main factor contributing to
such a link.
6. individual modernity connects to tolerance phenomena with a differentiated impact, depending

on how it is measured:
6.1. persons who are able to face the risks of change also know how to face the risks of human
diversity, in values and behaviour. Those who are oriented in individual modernity towards
accepting the new and the change are at the same time more tolerant in rejecting
discrimination and in making judgments that take context and plurality into account. The
relation is stronger and it appears in Catholic, Protestant and post-communist countries
(Table 9). The country-level analysis shows a single exception, in the case of Estonia
(Table 10) – discrimination orientation is higher for persons who are open to change. As
this is a unique situation among the 24 countries subjected to the multi-variable analysis, I
tend to attribute this deviation, naturally assuming the risk of error, to measuring errors in
data collection.
6.2. individualist orientations seem to reduce the probability of discriminating behaviours. The
relation is well structured in especially in Catholic and post-communist countries. There are
a few exceptions from the rule, though. In Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands, high individualism is associated with consistent orientations of social
discrimination (Table 10).
6.3. traditionalism, approximated by strong local identity, tends to support intolerance

complexes.
7. discrimination as a particular form of intolerance seems to be a unitary dimension, but it does

show significant variations in its causal profile, depending to the discrimination type.
Xenophobia and discrimination against persons with behaviours perceived as deviant have
common and specific conditioning:
7.1. both xenophobia and intolerance to deviant behaviours tend to have higher values for
farmers, unskilled workers, elderly persons, attached to their settlement, from the former
communist countries. A lower chance of intolerance towards marginal/deviant persons is
found in persons of Orthodox religion, modern orientation, relatively wealthy, from
European countries with a high urbanization and economic development degree.
7.2. A causal ambivalence in the relation with discrimination can be identified with respect to
education, religious preference and the economic dynamics of the country. Highly educated
persons, for instance, show high tolerance to deviant behaviour, or at least higher than less
educated persons, but they seem to have a high level of xenophobia.
36 Dumitru Sandu
Table A 1. Tolerance/intolerance profile at the level of 25 European countries

Intolerance Ethnic or residential Non-discrimination Justification of Support for Accepting Synthetic dimensions
towards deviant intolerance in the labour deviant behaviours relativity of values gender freedom Discrimination Relativistic
groups INTOdev INTOstat market NONDIS JUSTdev NONSTAND GENlib orientation
Slovenia* 61 54 36 50 50 66 61 60
Lithuania* 73 57 37 33 43 66 69 47
Latvia* 68 49 58 47 49 63 57 56
Estonia* 67 50 51 42 50 59 59 50
Hungary 67 57 47 38 66 43 64 51
Poland * 67 59 32 35 40 33 65 29
Romania 69 73 39 30 56 43 73 43
Italia 48 45 44 44 36 58 49 42
Portugal 54 47 42 35 50 48 54 39
Austria 45 46 44 41 54 54 50 48
France 35 45 53 47 57 51 41 51
UK 43 44 60 44 45 50 42 42
Belgium 39 58 49 45 42 45 47 41
Ireland 45 37 53 34 37 34 43 22
Czech Republic 61 81 31 63 44 31 69 52
Bulgaria* 53 50 38 46 12 44 51 26
Slovakia 67 89 28 47 40 27 75 41
Germany (ex.FRG)* 31 32 63 78 69 58 31 74
Netherlands 39 37 71 76 61 55 33 71
Switzerland* 34 43 51 70 51 51 38 60
Germany (ex.DRG)* 36 39 51 66 73 61 40 73
Denmark * 32 42 72 53 78 57 35 67
Norway* 40 44 69 55 53 30 36 42
Sweden* 37 35 84 72 59 35 27 56
Spain* 39 38 47 60 35 87 41 65
The figures in this table represent standardized values, with the Hull score = 50+14*z. Maximum intolerance values were marked with bold characters, and maximum tolerance with
italics. *Data collected in the third wave (1995-1997). For the rest of the countries the data is taken from the second wave (1990-1993) of WVS.
Table A 2. Tolerance/intolerance and socio-economic development indices, by countries

Index of Index of Urbanization GDP per GDP Total
intolerance as tolerance as degree 1999 capita 1999 growth fertility
discrimination* social % (thousand US 1990-1999 rate 1998
relativism* dollars, PPP) %
Sweden 27 56 83 21 1.50 1.51
Germany
(ex.FRG) 31 74 87 22 1.50 1.41
Netherlands 33 71 89 24 2.70 1.56
Denmark 35 67 85 24 2.80 1.72
Norway 36 42 75 27 3.70 1.81
Switzerland 38 60 68 28 0.50 1.46
Germany
ex.Dem. 40 73 87 22 1.50 1.06
Spain 41 65 77 17 2.20 1.14
France 41 51 75 22 1.70 1.75
UK 42 42 89 21 2.20 1.70
Ireland 43 22 59 19 7.90 1.93
Belgium 47 41 97 24 1.70 1.59
Italy 49 42 67 21 1.20 1.19
Austria 50 48 65 24 3.80 1.34
Bulgaria 51 26 69 5 -2.70 1.11
Portugal 54 39 63 15 2.50 1.46
Latvia 57 56 69 6 -4.80 1.09
Estonia 59 50 69 8 -1.30 1.21
Slovenia 61 60 50 16 2.40 1.23
Hungary 64 51 64 11 1.00 1.33
Poland 65 29 65 8 4.70 1.43
Czech Republic 69 52 75 12 0.90 1.16
Lithuania 69 47 68 6 -3.90 1.36
Romania 73 43 56 6 -1.20 1.32
Slovakia 75 41 57 10 1.90 1.38
Data source for quantitative variables at country level: World Development Report 2000/2001. Attacking Poverty,
World Bank 2000, Oxford University Press .
*Factor scores were converted into HULL scores =50+14*factor score.
Tolerance indices were calculated as shown in Table 2.
38 Dumitru Sandu
Table A 3. Values of tolerance indicators by countries and survey waves

Ethnic or Intolerance Non- Justification Support for the Accepting
residential towards deviant discrimination in of deviant relativity of gender
Survey intolerance groups the labour market behaviours values freedom
wave INTOstat INTOdev NONDIS JUSTdev NONSTAND GENlib
France 1 0.11 0.64 . -0.37 0.48 0.89
2 0.40 1.69 -0.04 -0.29 0.44 0.67
UK 1 0.22 1.19 . -0.39 0.36 0.51
2 0.37 2.34 0.10 -0.35 0.25 0.65
3 0.11 1.03 . -0.02 . 0.00
Germany 1 0.33 1.27 . -0.36 0.37 0.43
2 0.46 2.45 -0.04 -0.19 0.38 0.56
3 0.16 1.44 0.16 0.27 0.62 0.78
Italy 1 0.10 1.12 . -0.51 0.28 0.62
2 0.40 2.72 -0.23 -0.35 0.13 0.79
Netherlands 1 0.23 0.84 . -0.02 0.43 0.59
2 0.24 1.98 0.33 0.22 0.50 0.74
Belgium 1 0.25 0.75 . -0.48 0.15 0.54
2 0.64 1.99 -0.13 -0.33 0.22 0.57
Switzerland 2 0.04 0.65 . -0.30 0.47 0.78
3 0.37 1.65 -0.09 0.11 0.35 0.68
Denmark 1 0.13 0.52 . 0.10 0.79 0.83
2 0.34 1.47 0.34 -0.19 0.76 0.76
Norway 1 0.19 0.87 . -0.47 0.34 0.42
2 0.49 1.91 0.26 -0.38 0.34 0.36
3 0.37 2.07 0.27 -0.14 0.38 0.34
Sweden 1 0.10 0.82 . -0.25 0.56 0.54
2 0.32 1.97 0.61 -0.27 0.57 0.43
3 0.21 1.88 0.59 0.15 0.47 0.41
Spain 1 0.11 0.94 . -0.49 0.42 0.63
2 0.32 2.23 -0.19 -0.30 0.32 1.11
3 0.27 1.99 -0.18 -0.05 0.11 1.26
Ireland 1 0.10 0.94 . -0.50 0.35 0.49
2 0.24 2.48 -0.05 -0.52 0.14 0.40
Hungary 1 0.00 2.18 . -0.68 0.73 0.37
2 0.63 4.07 -0.18 -0.45 0.58 0.54
Poland 2 0.00 0.00 -0.49 -0.67 0.29 0.37
3 0.67 4.07 -0.47 -0.51 0.19 0.38
Germany 2 0.51 2.39 -0.16 -0.36 0.49 0.79
3 0.29 1.77 -0.10 0.05 0.68 0.84
Slovenia 2 1.17 2.48 -0.20 -0.29 0.42 0.94
3 0.58 3.69 -0.39 -0.24 0.33 0.92
Bulgaria 2 1.14 3.95 -0.43 -0.59 -0.01 0.73
3 0.50 3.03 -0.35 -0.31 -0.24 0.55
Romania 2 0.92 4.27 -0.34 -0.61 0.42 0.53
3 0.81 3.79 -0.14 -0.80 0.35 0.40
Lithuania 2 0.69 4.62 -0.67 -0.69 0.50 0.77
3 0.63 4.55 -0.38 -0.55 0.24 0.91
Latvia 2 0.70 4.33 -0.43 -0.49 0.33 0.39
3 0.48 4.15 0.06 -0.30 0.32 0.87
Estonia 2 0.57 4.12 -0.55 -0.49 0.48 0.54
3 0.50 4.14 -0.08 -0.39 0.33 0.80
Indices were calculated as shown in Table 2
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EUROPEAN DIFFERENTIATIONS OF SOCIAL TOLERANCE

Sociologie Românească / Romanian Sociology

Original (Romanian) version:

English translation by DELCOM Group & Sociologie Românească,

The Defining Values of Tolerance

Table 1. The tolerance-intolerance polarity

Figure 1. The attribute matrix of the tolerance-intolerance behaviours

major intolerance tolerance

In most approaches, “tolerance” is understood as “refusal, when there is a power to refuse,

Measuring and Data

the context, as a pluralism of values6. This is “tolerance as contextual understanding”. Such an

Refusal to discriminate in the labour market or in neighbourhood or work interaction is a

Box 1. Sources of tolerance as relativism

The constitutive elements of tolerance/intolerance can be identified in good actionalist logic.

Figure 2. Dimensions and indicators for measuring social tolerance/intolerance

valuing equal opportunities ethnic or residential

support for social relativism

Table 2. Variables used in the analysis

Furthermore, the hypothesis of a differentiation between tolerance focusing on value

Table 3. Factor analysis of the variables used to measure tolerance

The two dimensions of tolerance - non-discrimination and relativistic orientation - are

Table 4. Factor analysis of tolerance, generalized trust and association

Regional Tolerance/Intolerance Structures

Figure 3. Dendogram of distances between tolerance profiles of 25 European countries

Germania (ex.RFG) òûòø ó

Country and Community Profile

The degree of behavioural tolerance, measured by non-discrimination, is greater in countries

coefficients shown in Table 5, Table 6.

fatalist theories of social capital (Putnam, 2001; Fukuyama, 1995)

Table 5. Predictors of discriminating attitudes at individual level

Table 6. Predictors of social relativism at individual level

intolerance, manifested by two sub-dimensions - discrimination and relativistic orientation. The

INTOLERANCE TO (PRESUMEDLY) DEVIANT BEHAVIOURS

total fertility rate 1998

male (1 yes, 0 no)

Tolerance in the three Europes

The causal configuration described above suggests a considerable variation of causal

Table 8. Contribution of four categories of variables in explaining discriminating attitudes by

Prevailingly Catholic Prevailingly Protestant Former communist

GDP growth in 1999

0.00 -0.01 0.62 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.03

2. different facets of tolerance are controlled by different categories of factors:

2.2. tolerance, especially at behaviour level, manifested by the rejection of discrimination, is

be insignificant statistically. Furthermore, as a sign of maximum instability, Protestant

4.2.1. This observation requires additional data to be integrated into an adequate

6. individual modernity connects to tolerance phenomena with a differentiated impact, depending

6.3. traditionalism, approximated by strong local identity, tends to support intolerance

7. discrimination as a particular form of intolerance seems to be a unitary dimension, but it does

Table A 1. Tolerance/intolerance profile at the level of 25 European countries

Table A 2. Tolerance/intolerance and socio-economic development indices, by countries

Table A 3. Values of tolerance indicators by countries and survey waves

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