1.
Kho Ah Pao vs Ting ON a petition for review they now question the assessment of credibility of the
The controversy involves two feuding families of the same clan battling over a piece
of property registered in the name of respondents. Petitioners claim that the property
was bought by their patriarch, the late Teng Ching Lay, who allegedly entrusted the
same to his son from a previous marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein
respondents.
Spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold the property to Arsenio Ting.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63991 was subsequently issued in the name of
Arsenio Ting on June 14, 1961.
Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the
sale, Arsenio was a practicing lawyer and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire
and own real property in the Philippines. Arsenio was likewise the manager and
controlling stockholder of Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng Ching Lay, on the
other hand, was a Chinese citizen, and although his name did not appear in the
corporate records of Triumph Timber, Inc., he was the one making business decisions
for the company. He became a naturalized Filipino citizen on January 18, 1966.
Arsenio married Germana Chua. Germana bore three sons, respondents herein,
namely, Laurence, Anthony and Edmund, all surnamed Ting.
Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching Lay, and leaving as
compulsory heirs, the surviving spouse, Germana, and respondents who were all
minors at that time.
According to petitioners, Teng Ching Lay purchased the property from the spouses
Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay but it was made to appear in the contract of sale
that Arsenio was the vendee because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens
owning land in the Philippines. They claim that they became aware of the TCT in the
name of respondents only when the latter instituted an ejectment suit against them,
and notwithstanding the efforts on their part to settle the dispute, respondents
refused to recognize their ownership of the property.
witness.
The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of this Court in a
Petition for Review because only questions purely of law may be raised in such a
petition. One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case
is whether the Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review
or evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed,
and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether or not the
conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
In the present case, however, the circumstances surrounding the ownership of the
property that is central to the parties' disagreement are put at issue. A resolution of
this point will require a re-evaluation of the evidence on record. In an appeal via
certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA,13 and petitioners
have not shown that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.
The Court has held that it will not interfere with the trial court's assessment regarding
the credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that it overlooked, misapplied or
misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and substance or that it gravely
abused its discretion. Here, both the RTC and the CA were not convinced of the
truthfulness of Sembrano's bare testimony. He did not present any documentary
proof to support his statements, particularly with regard to the P200,000 check that
he supposedly gave to Arsenio for the payment of the property in question.
At any event, the issues propounded by petitioners have been discussed lengthily and
ruled upon by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions. Hence, the Court does
not deem it necessary to further delve into these matters.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed
by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court.21
This Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew the evidence
already passed upon by the CA.22 Absent any showing that some facts of certain
weight and substance were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the
outcome of the case, the Court, as in this case, will uphold the findings of the RTC and
the CA.
2. People Vs Dasig
Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. In an
investigation it was then found out that one of the guns used in the crime was
registered to Mallillin who was previously a school teacher and who was also present
during the crime. He testified that he was there during the incident but did not
participate in the actual crime and was just forced to join the band. He then became
a state witness. Defendants-appellants contends is that inasmuch as Mallillin was an
accomplice in the crime and his testimony contains flaws in many particulars, the
maxim Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus should be applied to the whole of his
testimony, and the judgment of conviction would then have no leg to stand on.
It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus) invoked is not a
mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible one, which allows the jury or
the court to draw the inference or not to draw it as circumstances may best warrant.
(70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable allegation of Mallillin, that he was forced into joining
the band against his will, arises from the natural desire of an accomplice to shift the
blame to his co-conspirators and exculpate himself; while his assertion that the gun
Gabuni carried was his service pistol maybe an innocent mistake on Mallillin's part.
His claim that it was Bumanglag who indicated where access to the victim's house
may be had may also be untrue, because Mallillin had been said to have been in the
house. Do these flaws and defects render his testimony wholly inadmissible under the
rule invoked?
Requirements for the application of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as to a
material point, and that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify
With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the maxim should not
apply in the case at bar, for three reasons. First, there is sufficient corroboration on
many grounds of the testimony such as the instruments used in the commission of
the crime and that he was present on the occasion of the robbery. Second, the
mistakes are not on the very material points. Third, the errors do not arise from an
apparent desire to pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of
the witness to exculpate himself though not completely.
3. People vs Lucena
This is an appeal in a decision finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez
alias “Machete” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape.
While the victim, who was then 17 years old, was walking and chatting with her
friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay
tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were
being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. The
victims companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.
She was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she
might spend the night in jail, She pleaded with them and protested that she did not
commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends but it was of no avail.
The victim was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the
San Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and
went inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle
to guard the victim. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the
barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one
to bring the victim back to her house.
But, instead of escorting her back to her house, the appellant brought her to a Bridge
in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened her that
he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant
ordered her to alight from the tricycle. Then after sexual intercourse happed with the
victims objection.
The appellant admitted that he knew the victim as the one who lodged a complaint
against him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied
the following: (1) that he raped the victim; (2) that he was one of those barangay
tanods who apprehended her for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay;
and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead,
the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home
already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he
did not commit any crime
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was
committed without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse
between him and the victim was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity. Simply put, the
positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While
denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect
cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim, as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the
barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went
home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating
testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00
midnight, almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after
two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant’s presence at the scene of
the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill–motive on the part of
the victim to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of her accusation
since no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring
humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors,
shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by
her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her. He was sentenced guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ADRIANO CAÑETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY, defendants-appellants.
Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First Instance of
Palawan the two (2) accused, Adriano Cañete and Jose Bilog now appeals for the
decision.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Accused and the victim were brothers. They were owners of adjoining ricelands. They
were not in good terms and always quarrelled because Jose resented the fact that
Douglas has received a bigger share of the lands inherited from their parents. To the
point that the accused got his father's shotgun and attacked Douglas at the bridge
leading their house. But was stopped by someone. Jose offered a certain prisoner
farm worker to kill his brother for 300 pesos but the later refused. The witness then
after saw the victim together with the accused drinking inside a hut. When those
around the table were already drunk, Jose (Boy) Bilog stood up and drew from his
waist a "laring," a bladed instrument about 1-1/2 feet long. Suddenly, Jose stabbed
Douglas at the front part of his body . Cañete got hold of the knife and stabbed
Douglas on the stomach . Douglas stood up and fought his assailants with karate
blows. The two persons helped Jose and Cañete by hitting Douglas with a piece of
wood. The victim was then dumped in a nearby canal. Cañete got the 'laring' and
proceeded to the Colony's brigade with it. Canete confessed extra judicially. But the
appealed assailing that his extra judicial confession should be rejected that the case
was merely concocted, incredible and in conflict with the People's evidence; that the
crime was committed in conspiracy with the attendance of evident premeditation,
price, treachery and in not finding that Cañete should have been found guilty only of
physical injuries or at most homicide.
On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower court erred (1) in giving
credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Antonio Cabig, notwithstanding that
said witness is "known to be a confirmed degenerate and an admitted perjurer"; (2)
in disregarding his defense of alibi; and (3) in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Appellant Cañete subjects that the extra-judicial admission, Exhibit "C", should have
been disregarded, not due to violence in the taking thereof, but on the ground that
the same had been successfully explained by him; that the contents thereof were
merely concocted and this is supported by the evidence of the prosecution; that aside
from the irreconciliable conflict between what' is contained in his extra-judicial
confession and what prosecution witness Antonio Cabig testified in court, said extra-
judicial confession contains statements which are strikingly incredible; and that the
credibility of prosecution witness Cabig as to the participation of appellant Cañete in
the killing of Douglas Bilog is doubtful.
The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial court is entitled to
great weight that Cañete's retraction was merely a last minute effort at exculpation,
considering that his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in April 1972, was
freely and voluntarily given. The fact is, there was no evidence presented that said
confession was obtained as a result of violence, torture, intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency, nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to
concoct facts narrated in said confession.
Likewise, appellant Jose Bilog's alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification of
Cabig. He points out that on the day of the incident, April 19, 1972, he was in his house
doing household chores as his wife was in Puerto Princess doing some marketing. On
this score, the lower court rightfully observed:
Jose Bilog's alibi has no merit. His house is but three kilometers away from the place
of the incident and he was seen by the widow of the deceased leaving his house on a
bicycle about 4:00 o'clock that afternoon. At 5:00 o'clock, he was met by Angel
Rebong at the highway while riding his bicycle and at 6:00 o'clock late in the
afternoon, Antonio Cabig saw him drinking liquor with the deceased in his hut in the
banana plantation (pp. 154-155, Rec.).
The defense of alibi cannot be believed where the distance between two barrios is
only eight kilometers and can be traversed by walking one and one-half hour (People
vs. Manangan, L-32733, Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 31). (pp. 9-10, Appellee's Brief).
Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting alibi because it is
easily concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one author said about alibi as a
defense: "it is a reason with a bad reputation."
Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose Bilog tried to shift
the blame at Cañete, Cañete too wanted the Court to believe that it was Jose Bilog
who did the heinous act. Repudiating his confession, Cañete tried to convince the
Court that he was simply offered P1,000.00 in consideration of his admission of the
crime. On cross- examination, however, Cañete slipped and admitted that the
P1,000.00 consideration was offered for him to execute the killing. It is therefore
evident that Cañete's testimony disowning the crime is but a last minute attempt at
exculpation."
The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because the attack was
unexpected and sudden, and the victim had no chance to defend himself. Likewise,
the aggravating circumstance of price was present in the commission of the crime and
this affects not only the person who received the money or the reward but also the
person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of necessary
votes, the sentence is modified in that both appellants shall each suffer Reclusion
Perpetua only, and shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Douglas Bilog in
the sum of P30,000.00. Costs against both appellants. SO ORDERED.
 5. People vs payot
On automatic review is the Decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan
del Norte convicting appellant Bienvenido Salabao Payot, Jr. (Payot) for the crime of
rape.
Payot was charged with rape in an Information dated 14 December 1999, to wit:
That on or about the 17th day of July,[sic] 1999, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more
or less at Barangay Jaliobong, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation
did then and there[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant, [AAA], a woman[,] 16 years of age. AAA testified that Payot is her
elder sister's husband and that since she was 8 years old, she had been living with him
together with her elder sister,[6] her younger brother and Payot's two children.
AAA narrated that on 17 July 1999, after having taken their lunch together, her sister
and brother went up to the mountain to harvest bananas while the two children went
to sleep in one room and she in another. AAA was awakened by the pressing weight
of Payot over her body, and she realized that her skirt had already been pulled up and
her panties rolled down to her knees. Payot, wearing only a vest and without his
underwear on, held down AAA's waist with his hands, inserted his penis into AAA's
vagina and made push-and-pull movements. Payot also kissed her on the neck. AAA
could not shout for help and was unable to break free as Payot was then holding a
bolo with his left hand. AAA felt pain in her vagina, and later on sensed a milky
substance come out of Payot's penis as if the latter had urinated inside her. AAA cried
afterward. AAA also testified that the nearest house was about 75 meters away.[7]
Payot denied the charges against him and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
that at noon time of 17 July 1999, he had lunch with his family, AAA and her brother
at his residence. At around 12:30 p.m., he asked permission from his wife to go to the
barrio but before leaving, he instructed his wife to harvest some bananas. He left and
headed for the house of Caridad Damian (Caridad), which is approximately ten (10)
minutes away by foot, where he watched the television until 2:00 p.m. He then went
to the house of Rudy Mosende for a drink of tuba and stayed there until 3:00 p.m.
after which, he proceeded to go home.
Payot also testified that he could not have held a bolo with his his left hand, contrary
to AAA's testimony, because he had always used his right hand for writing and for
carrying weapons. He likewise stated that he had more than once caught AAA in their
house kissing her lesbian ("tomboy") friend in June 1999 for which he scolded the
duo. He claimed that AAA resented this and the latter's lesbian friend allegedly
angrily warned him to be careful as someday he would regret doing what he had
done. Payot moreover averred that there had been instances in the past when AAA's
lesbian friend slept over in their house, but after several reprimands AAA no longer
slept at their house and slept instead at her lesbian friend's house.
Sandulan testified that at around 12:30 p.m. on 17 July 1999, he was heading for
Payot's house to remind the latter about their bible-sharing activity for the evening;
he met Payot on his way but since the latter was then on his way to the barrio, he
(Sandulan) suggested that they go to the barrio together. They parted ways at
Caridad's house where Payot had planned on watching the television. Sandulan then
proceeded to Rudy Mosende's house, right across Caridad's house, also to remind
Mosende of the activity that evening which was going to be held at Payot's house.
While there, Mosende offered him a glass of tuba. During his stay at Mosende's
house, Sandulan allegedly could tell that Payot likewise remained at Caridad's house.
Sandulan left for home at 1:45 p.m. and on his way, saw Payot coming from Caridad's
house and taking the direction to Mosende's
Aside from insinuating that a lesbian caused complaining witness's lacerations,
accused also interposed the defense of alibi by alleging that at the time of the
commission of the crime, he was at the house of Caridad Damian viewing T.V. But
trite as it is, the Court has to impress upon the accused once again the doctrine that
alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. The shopworn rule is that for alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to show that accused was at some place else at the time of the commission
of the crime, it must also be proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime of its commission
and commit the crime.
As shown by the defense, the house of Caridad Damian is only about 300 meters from
the house of accused where the crime was committed. Thus, it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti at the time the crime was committed and
commit the crime.
The defense also wanted to impress upon the Court that the offense could not have
been committed inside accused's house because at that time, his wife, children and
private complainant's younger brother were present then. Although the victim
testified that only the children of the accused were still in the house at the time and
that they were sleeping in the other room, as accused's wife and her younger brother,
Anselmo Enoy, were out in the mountain harvesting bananas, it is not impossible for
accused to have committed the offense.
Payot's contentions are bereft of merit.
First, it should be reiterated that in a rape case, what is most important is the credible
testimony of the victim. A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely
corroborative and are not indispensable to a prosecution for rape. The court may
convict the accused based solely on the victim's credible, natural and convincing
testimony.[29] In this case, both the courts are in agreement that AAA was candid,
natural, forthright and unwavering in her testimony that Payot raped her. AAA's
credibility is strengthened by the absence of evidence showing that she had any ill
motive in testifying against Payot.
Second, Dr. Referente's report and testimony revealed that she found two old, healed
hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions. It should be noted that the
examination was made in September 1999, a couple of months after the rape incident
occurred in July 1999. The presence of such healed lacerations is consistent with and
corroborative of AAA's testimony that she had indeed been raped by Payot months
before the date of the examination. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh,
are the best evidence of forcible defloration. And when the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis
to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisite of carnal knowledge has been
established.
Third, AAA categorically said that Payot inserted his penis into her vagina. This
assertion is supported by Dr. Referente's testimony
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, Payot merely interposed the
defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that on the occasion of the rape, he was
somewhere else and could not have been at the scene of the crime.
Having been positively and unmistakably identified by AAA as her rapist, Payot's weak
defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper. The settled jurisprudence is that
categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying thereon, prevails over the defenses of denial and
alibi which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, as in the case at bar,
constitute self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Alibi, like denial, is also inherently weak and easily fabricated. For this defense to
justify an acquittal, the following must be established: the presence of the appellant
in another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. These requisites have not been
met. Payot claims that he was at a friend's house on the occasion of the rape.
Considering, however, that his friend's house is a mere ten-minute walk or about a
hundred meters away from his own house where the rape was committed, it would
have still been physically possible for him to be present at the scene of the crime at
the time of its consummation.
Anent the contention that AAA was telling a lie when she said that Payot used his left
hand to hold the bolo, the Court agrees with the appellate court that this deserves
scant consideration. The fact that Payot is right-handed does not absolutely cancel
the possibility that at the time of the incident, he used his left hand to wield the
weapon. In any event, this inconsistency, if it is at all, does not diminish the reliability
and dependability of AAA's testimony.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
versus
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG,
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
"WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM",
PONENTE: HILARIO DAVIDE, Jr.
FACTS
On the night of July 16, 1997, Larrañaga and seven others kidnapped the Chiong
sisters near the west wing entrance of Ayala Center Cebu, the two [women] were
raped but only Marijoy's body was found while the other sister's body, was never
found.
The accused [appellants] were charged and later on convicted of the crimes of of (a)
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention [Larrañaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; and (James Andrew) Uy] ; and (b) simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention [Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; (James Andrew)
Uy; and (James Anthony) Uy]
The case was centered on the testimony of a co-defendant, David Valiente Rusia who
only appeared 10 months after the incident. In exchange for immunity, he [Rusia]
testified against his codefendants, he claimed that he was with Larrañaga in Ayala
Center, Cebú early in the evening of July 16.
Larrañaga raised in his defense that he was in Quezon City and not in Cebu at the time
when the crime is said to have taken place, some thirty five witnesses, including his
friends and teachers, testified under oath to prove this, however, all were rejected by
the court; he further contended that the body found in the ravine was not Marijoy's
but somebody else's. While, Aznar, Adlawan, Balansag and Caño, on the other hand,
questioned Rusia’s testimony for being incredible, inconsistent, and unworthy of
belief.
ISSUES
Is the defense of alibi admissible?
RULING
1. The trial court took into consideration not only Rusia's testimonies but also the
physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses for being
strikingly compatible. Physical evidence being one of the highest degrees of proof is
give more weight than all witnesses put together. Even assuming that his testimony
standing alone might indeed be unworthy in view of his character, it is not so when
corroborated with other evidence.
2. It is a well settled rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak for being a
negative evidence and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. Moreover, alibi
becomes LESS credible when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the
accused. In the case at bar, the accused failed to meet the requirements of alibi.
Larrañaga failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at Ayala Center Cebu during the abduction. His claimed of
being in Quezon City at that time, failed to satisfy the required proof of physical
impossibility. It was shown that it takes only an hour to travel by plane from Manila
to Cebu and that there were four airlines flying the route. Indeed, Larrañaga’s
presence in Cebu City on the night of July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a
possibility but a reality.
 7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG,
Appellants.
Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven,
were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that
it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its
informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995
the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et
al.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the
ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as
well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding
it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-
examinations.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged . On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
Held:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel
preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second
immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented
alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence
that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy
of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of
departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it
on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to other accussed. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony
will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without
it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RONALD M. DEL ROSARIO @ "AGING", Accused-Appellant.
This is a case for review for a decision wherein accused-appellant Ronald M. del
Rosario (Del Rosario), also known as Aging, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
That on or about the 26th day of April, 2003, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorize[d] by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell,
deliver, give away to another, distribute or transport 0.03 gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.
[Del Rosario] interposed the defense of denial. He testified that he was in his house
with his wife and his 10-month old child watching television when the three police
officers, in civilian clothes, kicked the door open and forcibly entered his house,
searched the same, and when they found nothing, handcuffed him for a purportedly
fabricated charge of selling shabu. [Del Rosario] further narrated that his father,
Rolando Del Rosario, summoned the officials of the Barangay and came to his rescue
but he was still taken by the police officers. [Del Rosario] added that it was only in
front of the Barangay officials that the police officers introduced themselves as such.
At the DEU Office, PO2 Dolleton allegedly asked for money from [Del Rosario] and for
a night with [Del Rosario]’s wife in exchange for his release, but [Del Rosario] allegedly
refused to give in to the police officer’s demands.
The defense presented another witness in the person of Saulito Granada, who
testified that, from a distance of six (6) meters, he saw three (3) persons in civilian
clothes carrying firearms inside the house of [Del Rosario]. These three persons
allegedly kicked the door of [Del Rosario]’s house, ransacked the house, and arrested
[Del Rosario] who was, at that time, wearing only his brief. Granada narrated that [Del
Rosario]’s father and the Barangay officials arrived. The police officers allegedly did
not introduce themselves and it waAfter a thorough deliberation, this Court resolves
to acquit Del Rosario for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Del Rosario posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as he was
convicted because of the weakness of his defense, rather than the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. He highlighted the inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies, which are material to the establishment of the identity of the
dangerous drug allegedly confiscated from him. Del Rosario also points out the non-
compliance by the police officers with the guidelines in the chain of custody of seized
drugs.25
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the plastic
sachet of shabu presented in court was the same one confiscated from Del Rosario.s
the Barangay officials who identified them and mentioned their names.15
The prosecution was not able to salvage the above inconsistencies with a logical and
rational explanation. Moreover, it offered no explanation as to how PO3 Besmonte
was able to identify the plastic sachet presented in court as the one he seized from
Del Rosario, considering that it contained a marking different from the one he just
said he made. PO3 Besmonte’s testimony on the matter ended with the statement
that the Investigator would be the best person to explain the different marking on the
plastic sachet;40 however, it must be remembered that the Investigator’s testimony
was already dispensed with early in the trial.
The Court of Appeals’ explanation as to why the marking on the plastic sachet
presented in court was different from the marking supposedly made by the one who
actually seized such plastic sachet has no basis at all from the facts as borne by the
records submitted to this Court. Therefore, this Court cannot subscribe to the Court
of Appeals’ pronouncement that there is no reason to doubt the identity of the
subject dangerous drug in this case.
While it is true that Del Rosario’s defense of denial is an inherently weak one, it bears
stressing that his conviction should be based not on such weak defense, but on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
9. FLORES V. PEOPLE
(Criminal Law: Self-defense)
692 SCRA 127, February 27, 2013
FACTS
Jesus Avenido was shot in his residence by Simon Flores, Barangay Captain of San
Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, with an M-16 armalite rifle. According to the prosecution,
Flores suddenly shot Avenido while they were talking, and that he continued shooting
even as Avenido was laying flat on the ground. On the other hand, Flores claims self-
defense. He reasoned that he went to Avenido’s home to ask Avenido and his guests
to cease firing their guns and to save these for the next day’s Fiesta. Also, Flores
claimed that Avenido appeared drunk when he was approached by him, then he was
suddenly fired at by Avenido, prompting him to fire back. Flores claimed that he was
hit twice with a magnum handgun by Avenido.
Avenido suffered 4 gunshot wounds in the different parts of the body: the left
shoulder, abdomen, left buttocks, and right flank. Flores was found guilty of homicide
by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether the elements of self-defense are present in the case.
RULING
No, the elements of self-defense are not present in the case. To successfully claim
self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements
of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in
defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the
following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
First, the accused claims that Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum
handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at
such close range, and without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible
that the bullet did not exit through the accused’s shoulder.
Second, Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not
mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder.
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on
his right shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or
any medical records from the hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have
most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during the preliminary
investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter
lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical
record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the incident.x
Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a
hard object, such as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain
is visibly concentrated only on the area around the hole forming a circular shape. The
blood on the shirt was not even definitively shown to be human blood.
Fifth, Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00
midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the
incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves noted that the victim
Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused. Moreover, the victim
was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a
policeman. In addition, the latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the
incident happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim
could miss when he allegedly shot the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really
had a gun and intended to harm the accused. They found it less acceptable to believe
how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun
from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such
ease, the armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no
experience handling, while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with
the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted)
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores’ credibility and reliability, his story
being contrary to ordinary human experience. “Settled is the rule that testimonial
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or
credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with
common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the affirmed the decision of Sandigan Bayan.
10. G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012
People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo
Facts: Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La
Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood
called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the
head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him,
causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical
clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident,
he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick
and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach. Although he had then
talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him
with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs. He
had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit
the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground.
He had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC.
Issue: Standard of proof required in order for self defense to be appreciated
Held: In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there
is nothing to repel.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder
or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed
the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the
author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held
criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence,
because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view
of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond Whether or not error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. Appeals, that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of RA
9165.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one,
Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act Ruling:
of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt
proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack
not only the commission but likewise to establish, with the same, the quantum of
and kicks.
proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefore.
11. People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. 172116, October 30, 2006)
This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution
Facts: throughout the trial. However when prosecution has succeeded in discharging the
burden of proof by presenting the evidence sufficient to convince the court of the
PO1 Rana of Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group (DDEG) was informed that
truth of the allegation in the information or has established a prima facie case against
Villanueva herein appellant was selling shabu. PO1 immediately composed a team to
the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon
entrap appellant wherein PO1 Rana acted as the poseur buyer. After the entrapment
him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify if not to overthrow, that prima
the confiscated substance was submitted to the Northern Police District for
facie case.
examination which gave a positive result.
In this case, the Prosecution submitted three strong positive and substantial
Appellant denied the accusation and testified that was at home when suddenly the
evidence:
Policemen knocked and looked for a certain person named Roger. When he identified
himself as Roger, he was immediately handcuffed and brought to the headquarters 1.The Prosecution established with moral certainty the presence of all elements
without explanation and it was only later on that he discovered that he was being necessary for the prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs;
charged for selling shabu.
2.PO1 Rana identifies Villanueva as the person who sold to him a plastic sachet
After hearing, the trial court finds Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug containing the crystalline substance;
pushing punishable under RA 9165. Court Appeals affirmed decision. Hence this
3.Regulated Drug of Shabu contained in the plastic sachet which Villanueva handed
petition.
over PO1 Rana, was duly proven before the Trial Court.
Appellant insist that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
Against such three evidence, Appellant could only say that no entrapment was
alone could not sustain conviction, and that self serving and uncorroborated
conducted and insisted that he was just framed up.
testimony of PO1 Rana could not prevail over his constitutionally granted
presumption of innocence. Wherefore, Decision of RTC and CA was affirmed.
Issue: 12. GR No. 180157
EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC.Petitioner
Versus
JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO, Respondent
February 8, 2012
Facts:
CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed ECI’s complaint. The
respondent answer was infirm, still the respondent raised the issue of the
genuineness and due execution of ECI-s documents during the trial by presenting
evidence that the respondent never signed any of them. ECI failed to make a timely
objection to its admission, such evidence cured. The vagueness in her answer.
CA ruled that respondent sufficiently proved by evidence that her signature had
been forged.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that although respondent failed to make an
effective specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she
overcame the omission by presenting parole evidence to which ECT failed to object.
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Respondent presented clear and
convincing evidence that her signatures on the actionable documents had been
forged.
Held:
The court finds no reason to take excemption from the CA’s finding.
The court dismiss the petition and Affirm the order of the Court of Appeals, directed
the dismissal of the complaint against respondent.
13. Alferor vs Halasan
Facts:
The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a
Complaint for Partition. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose
Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that she has legal interest
in the matter of litigation for partition, she being the surviving spouse and primary
compulsory heir of Jose. Josefina attached to said motion her Complaint-in-
Intervention wherein she alleged that the second marriage to Teresita was void ab
initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage.
Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s
children. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract which
indicated that she and Jose were married.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina
presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-Intervention filed by the heirs
of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew of the previous marriage of
the late Jose with that Josefina. However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified that she and Jose were married. While she did not know Josefina
personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and
that the two did not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left
Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because
there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years.
Judge denied the motion and dismissed intervenor’s complaint, ruling that
respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the
intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no
witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. Teresita
and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the
late Jose, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, among others.
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. CA reversed the ruling
of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in
writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof.
Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was
married to the decedent.
Issues:
1. Was there need to prove the existence of Josefina's marriage to Jose?
2. Should Josefina be allowed to intervene in the action for partition?
Held:
1. No. The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention
filed in the RTC. Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband
had been previously married to another. This admission constitutes a “deliberate,
clear and unequivocal” statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who judicially
admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.
2. Yes. Intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against
the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that
respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the
partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
(Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006)
Rino vs. ECC and SSS
Facts: Virgilio T. Riño, Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port
Services, Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Riño collapsed
while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) but he died three days later. His spouse, filed a claim for death benefits
before the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim. On
appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the findings of the
SSS which ruled that petitioner failed to present relevant evidence to establish the
causal connection between the deceased’s ailment and his work as stevedore.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the ECC, hence, this petition for review.
Issue: won petitioner’s claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall
prosper under the increased risk theory.
Held: No. The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death were not listed
as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial
evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband’s
employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure
or chronic glomerulonephritis. This the petitioner failed to do. The petition was
denied and the assailed decision and resolution were affirmed.

As the Court ruled in Sante v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, “. . . a claimant

must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either
that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such
working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind
and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man
(not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can
obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however,
be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-
causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely
apparent.” At most, petitioner merely claims that: “. . . The nature of his work
required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the same time giving full
attention in supervising his men as the group’s leadman assigned at Del Pan Area. It
is worth mentioning that in the place where the deceased was assigned, there were
no available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the ‘call of nature.’ In effect,
delayed urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his
group, his continuing physical presence at the work’s premises was indispensable. . .