REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
That is, the
JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name
from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition
where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both male
and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the
Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation
of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in
her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme
Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the available
evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as
to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s
body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen), which is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect
to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out.
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons and the consequences that will follow.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws
of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of
the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
GMA NETWORK v. MOVIE, GR NO. 148579,
2007-02-05
Facts:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages
the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On
January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order
of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami:
The Making" without first securing a permit from it as
provided in Section 7... of PD 1986.
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum
Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998[4] which
provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program
without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension
order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that
Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by
going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000.
It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted"
by the MTRCB... thereby, in effect, denying both the
motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed
June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000
suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in
toto.
Issues:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to
review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its
broadcast by television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was
enforceable and binding on petitioner.
Ruling:
First, Section 3 of PD 1986[5] empowers the MTRCB
to screen, review and examine all motion pictures,
television programs including publicity materials.
This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules
and Regulations, particularly Section 7... thereof,
which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR
REVIEW. -- No motion picture, television program or
related publicity material shall be imported, exported,
produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited
or broadcasted by television without prior permit
issued by the
BOARD after review of the motion picture, television
program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB's power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7,[6]
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited
by the Philippine Government and/or departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a
publicity for the movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this
finding, we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making," did
not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore
within the power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami:
The Making" was a public affairs program.[7] Even if
that were so, our resolution of this issue would not
change. This Court has already ruled that a public
affairs program -- described as a... variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange
of opinions -- is within the MTRCB's power of
review.[8]
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the
subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which
was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding
on petitioner.
The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section
3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with
the
Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law
Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Administrative issuances which are not published or
filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be
enforced.
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for
the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for
exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit,
has not been registered with the ONAR as of January
27, 2000.[10] Hence, the same is yet to be... effective.
Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said
circular and should not have been meted the sanction
provided thereunder.
Knights of Rizal Vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., DMCI
Project Developers, Inc., City of Manila, National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, National
Museum, and National Historical Commission of
the Philippines
G.R. No. 213948
April 25, 2017
FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the
City of Manila. The said lot was earmarked for the
construction of Torre de Manila Condominium
project. After having acquired all the necessary
permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to
commence the intended project. However, the City of
Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily
suspend the Building Permit until such time that issues
had been cleared. Consultations after consultations
had he been initiated both by the City of Manila and
DMCI-PDI. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council
of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and
confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and
approvals issued by the City for Torre de Manila.
Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for
injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of the project. The
KOR argued that the building, if completed, would be
a sore to the view of the monument, an endangerment
to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a construction
borne out of bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should issue a writ of
mandamus against the City Officials to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila.
RULING:
No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting
the construction of the project. It was not even
considered as contrary to morals, customs and public
order. The project was way well from the Park where
the monument was located. The SC ruled further that
a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It
is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when
there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or
the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act,
and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right
to the performance of such act.” In the case at bar,
such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it found in
the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the
construction of such building outside the Rizal Park
was prohibited if the building was within the
background sightline or vision of the Rizal
Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit
and, thus dismissed.
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations
with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural
entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation
of property without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic
Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly
exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare
Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the
ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial
spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides
application because it exposed the residents to a higher
degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and
that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a
clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It
declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void
and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between
the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial
spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on
the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an
invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban
on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide
application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted
Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers...
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under
Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are
vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation
behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation
that will promote the general welfare, specifically the
health of its constituents. Such authority should not be
construed, however, as a valid license for the City of
Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge
its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates
authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process
Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government and passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In
order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation,
it must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it
must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's
exercise of police power, the property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government.[110] A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to
wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires
that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action.[113] This
means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its
salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically
serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs
means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals
regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-
mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the
topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months.
Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the
ban within the three-month period under pain of
penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation
of business permits would definitely be oppressive as
to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of
maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory;
and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural
landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of
their property that amounts to taking without just
compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have
thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the
beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection
Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures
every person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the State's duly
constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice
under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application
of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by
limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty
of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification.[122] If
the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from another.[123]
In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based
on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the
rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the means and the
purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the
means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is
based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A
reasonable classification includes all persons or things
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial
spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and
degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the
classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial
spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of
pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring
about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged
health risks to the community and to the
environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does
not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers
from being "underinclusive" because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A
classification that is drastically underinclusive with
respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational
means to the legislative end because it poorly serves
the intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated
petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9,
2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
NESTLE v. PUEDAN
NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC., Petitioner VS.
BENNY A. PUEDAN, et. al., Respondent
G.R. No. 220617
January 30, 2017
FACTS:
On July 6, 2012, the respondents filed a
complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal
and demanding for separation pay, nominal damages
and attorney’s fees. The respondents alleged that Ocho
de Setiembre Inc. (ODSI) and Nestle Philippines Inc.
(NPI) hired them to sell various products of NPI in the
assigned covered area. After sometime, the
respondents demanded that they be considered regular
employees of NPI but they were directed to sign
contracts of employment with ODSI instead.
However, the respondents refused to comply with such
directives resulting from their dismissal from their
position. The contention of the respondents is that
ODSI is a labor-only contractor and, thus, they should
be deemed regular employees of NPI and there was no
just or authorized cause for their dismissal. The ODSI
averred that it is a company engaged in the business of
buying, selling, distributing, and marketing of goods
and commodities of every kind and it enters into all
kinds of contracts for the acquisition thereof.
According to ODSI the respondents were hired as its
employees to execute the Distributorship Agreement
with the NPI. Unfortunately, the business relationship
between the NPI and ODSI turned sour and eventually
NPI downsized its marketing and promotional support
from ODSI and termination of the Distributorship
Agreement. Meanwhile, ODSI argues with the
respondents that they were not dismissed but merely
on floating status. However, the NPI did not file any
position paper or appear in the scheduled conferences.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that all the
impleaded respondents therein (i.e. including NPI)
should be held liable for the payment of nominal
damages plus attorney’s fees.
The aggrieved respondents appealed to National
Labor Relation Commission (NLRC) and the NLRC
reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter ruling. The
NLRC ordered ODSI and NPI to pay each of the
respondents and entitled to separation pay and to
nominal damages. The respondents moved for a partial
reconsideration arguing since it was ODSI that closed
down operations and not the NPI, therefore NPI should
reinstate them. However, the NLRC denied the
motion.
Moreover, the NPI was dissatisfied hence filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA) which the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestle Philippines Inc. (NPI) and
Ocho de Setiembre Inc. (ODSI) are deemed jointly and
severely liable for the respondent’s monetary claims.
HELD:
No. The Distributorship Agreement between the
Nestle Philippines inc. (NPI) and Ocho de Setiembre
Inc. (ODSI) is not that of a principal and a contractor,
but that of a seller and a buyer/re-seller. Based on the
stipulated in the Distributorship Agreement NPI
agreed to sell its products to ODSI at discounted
prices. According to NPI the goods it manufactures are
distributed to the market through various distributor
including ODSI, that in turn, re-sell the same to the
designated outlets through its own employees as the
respondents. Therefore, the reselling activities
allegedly performed by the respondents properly
pertain to ODSI only.
In effect, ODSI was not a labor-only contractor
of NPI hence the NPI cannot be deemed the true
employer of the respondents. Therefore, NPI cannot be
held jointly and severely liable to ODSI’s monetary
obligation towards the respondents.
Turks Shawarma Company/Gem Zenarosa Vs.
Feliciano Z. Pajaron and Larry A. Carbonilla
G.R. No. 207156.
January 16, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in
May 2007 as service crew and Larey A. Carbonilla
(Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. Both Pajaron
and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or
authorized cause for their dismissal and petitioners
also failed to comply with the requirements of due
process. On April 15, 2010, they filed their respective
Complaints for constructive and actual illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive
leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both
Complaints were consolidated.
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and
Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned
their work. They likewise failed to substantiate their
claims that they were not paid labor standards benefits.
The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and
Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and
illegally dismissed. Then, petitioners appealed before
the NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full
the required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners' appeal was
dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. They filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
However, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari. It held that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's
decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-
perfection
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's
decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-
perfection.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component
of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements
of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."
It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and
the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Sections 4 and 6 of
Rule VI) that there is legislative and administrative
intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement,
and the Court should give utmost regard to this
intention."21
The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore
mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with
this requirement renders the decision of the Labor
Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure
the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the
monetary award will be given to them upon the
dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further
meant to discourage employers from using the appeal
to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the
employees.
Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its
merits even if we are to allow their appeal to be given
due course. After scrupulously examining the
contracting positions and arguments of the parties, we
find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron
and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by
substantial evidence. All told, we find no error on the
part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal
for no perfection due to noncompliance with the
requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS v.
REPUBLIC, GR No. 213027, 2017-01-18
Facts:
The 1991 Petition sought the recovery of the assets and
properties pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired
them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of,
the improper or illegal use of funds or properties
owned by the government.[12] The properties, subject
of other pending forfeiture cases before the
Sandiganbayan, were excluded; and the properties,
subject of the 1991 Petition, were specifically listed
and accordingly clustered into 18 categories.
Some of the properties listed in the 1991 Petition were
already adjudged as ill-gotten wealth and
consequently forfeited in favor of the government.
The present consolidated petitions emanated from the
same Civil Case No. 0141, when the Republic filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment[19] dated 24
June 2009 with respect to another property listed in the
1991 Petition. By way of that motion, the Republic
asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring
the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang
Collection and specifically mentioned under
paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten; and
to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be
declared forfeited in favor of the Republic.[20] The
latter categorized the pieces of jewelry recovered from
the Marcoses into three collections and singled out the
Malacañang Collection as the object of the motion
Hawaii Collection
Roumeliotes Collection
Based on the 1991 valuation of auction house Christie,
Manson and Woods International, Inc., the
Roumeliotes, Malacañang and Hawaii collections
were worth between US$5,313.575 (low estimate) to
US$7,112,879 (high estimate), at the time of the filing
of the petition. (ANNEX "D")[27] The value of the
Malacañang collection by itself was US$110,055 (low
estimate) to US$153,089 (high estimate).
In support of the motion, the Republic cited the
letter[29] dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by
Imelda Marcos, through counsel, demanding "the
immediate return of all her pieces of jewelry (i) taken
by PCGG from Malacañang Palace and (ii) those
turned over to PCGG by the U.S. Government."[30]
The Republic argued that the letter proved the claim of
the Marcoses that they owned the Malacañang
Collection, including the Hawaii Collection.[31] It
further argued that in the 1991 Petition, they were
deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the
pieces of jewelry... the Republic stated that their
lawful income amounting to USD 304,372.43 was
grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of
jewelry in 1991
On 3 July 2009, the Republic also filed a Request for
Admission[38] addressed to the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, and
Irene Marcos Araneta
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed their
Manifestation and Preliminary Comments[50] dated
21 July 2009
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta then stated
that the Republic's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was filed to justify the possession by the
PCGG of the pieces of jewelry, even if these were not
part of the forfeiture case - Civil Case No. 0141.[60]
They based their allegations on the pronouncements of
the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[61] dated 25
October 1996 and Order[62] dated 19 November 2001
and on the Republic's omission of the collection in the
prayer[63] of the 1991 Petition
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta
subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Expunge[66] dated 25 July 2009. They specifically
stated therein that they were adopting the same
arguments raised in their Comment,[67] as well as in
their Motion for Reconsideration[68] dated 5 May
2009, which was filed after the Sandiganbayan
Decision[69] dated 2 April 2009 granting the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on the Arelma account
Meanwhile, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. filed a
Manifestation[76] that he was adopting the
Manifestation and Motion to Expunge filed by Marcos
and Irene Marcos Araneta
The Republic therefore claimed that by operation of
law, the failure of the Marcoses to respond resulted in
their admission of the matters contained in the
request.[81]
In a Resolution[96] dated 2 August 2010, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Marcoses' Manifestation
and Preliminary Comments and Manifestation and
Motion to Expunge. It ruled that (1) the proceedings in
this case had not been terminated;[97] (2) in filing
their objection, respondents were not deemed to have
admitted the matters in the Request for
Admission;[98] and (3) the Republic's Request for
Admission was not inconsistent with the Motion for
Summary Judgment.[99] The Sandiganbayan further
directed the Marcoses to file and serve within 15 days
their sworn answer to the Request for Admission,[100]
but they failed to comply with the directive.[101]
Sandiganbayan issued a Partial Summary
Judgment[103] dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1)
the Malacañang Collection was part and subject of the
forfeiture petition;[104] (2) the Motion for Summary
Judgment was proper;[105] and (3) the forfeiture of
the Malacañang Collection was justified pursuant to
R.A. 1379.[106]
Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the Estate
of Marcos on 29 January 2014[107] and by Imelda
Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta on 30 January 2014.
In a Resolution[113] dated 11 June 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for
Reconsideration for being mere rehashes of the
arguments of the Marcoses in their Comments and
Opposition to the Republic's Motion for Summary
Judgment.[114]
Meanwhile, the Estate of Marcos filed a Motion for
Extension of Time on 09 July 2014 and a
Manifestation on 8 August 2014, saying that its other
executor in solidum was no longer filing a separate
petition for review, but was adopting that which was
filed by Imelda Marco
This Court issued a Resolution[118] on 17 November
2014 in G.R. No. 213027 granting the Motion for
Extension and noting the Manifestation of the Estate
of Marcos that the latter was adopting the petition for
review filed by Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos
Araneta in G.R. No. 213253. This Court also issued a
Resolution[119] on 17 November 2014 in G.R. No.
213253 noting the Manifestation of Imelda Marcos
and Irene Marcos Araneta's counsels, who were
seeking the grant of their Motion for an
Extension.[120] This Court thereafter consolidated the
petitions.[121]
Issues:
whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
properties; (2) whether the Malacañang Collection can
be the subject of the forfeiture case; (3) whether
forfeiture is justitied under R.A. 1379; (4) whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment was not inconsistent with
the Request for Admission; and (5) whether the
Sandiganbayan conectly declared that the forfeiture
was not a deprivation of petitioners' right to due
process of law.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan conectly acquired jurisdiction
over the case... in the absence of any compelling legal
reason, there is no basis to overturn, or carve an
exception to, existing jurisprudence on the matters
raised in the present case.
Principles:
Rules of Court simply provides as follows:Section 1.
In general. - Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. If a defense relied on is based on law,
the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability
to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.[128]
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a
cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the
truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer? To be taken
into account are only the material allegations in the
complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or
other matters aliunde are not considered. The court
may consider - in addition to the complaint - the
appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of
the plaintiff, or admissions in the records
Section 2 of R.A. 1379 provides that "[w]henever any
public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of propmtion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie
to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard,
the Sandiganbayan had taken judicial notice of the
legitimate income of the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-
1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43... the
Answer to the 1991 Petition the denial of the Marcoses
cannot be considered a specific denial because similar
to their denial in the Arelma case, in which insisted
that they were not privy to the transactions, the
Marcoses gave "the same stock answer to the effect
that [they] did not engage in any illegal activities, and
that all their properties were lawfully acquired."[143]
That they were not privy to the actual data in the
possession of the PCGG and the Solicitor General is
simply a line of defense which necessarily results in
their failure to allege the lawfulness of the mode of
acquiring the property subject of forfeiture,
considering the amount of their lawful income.
a request for admission may even complement a
summary judgment in that the request for admission
may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment"
ARMANDO LAGON v. DENNIS A. VELASCO, GR
No. 208424, 2018-02-14
Facts:
Sometime in December 2000, Lagon obtained a cash
loan from private respondent Gabriel Dizon (Dizon),
in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
300,000.00). In payment thereof, Lagon issued
PCIBank Check No. 0064914, postdated January 12,
2001, in an equal amount. However, when Dizon
presented the check for payment, it was dishonored for
being Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.[3]
Consequently, Dizon sent a Letter dated May 6, 2011
to Lagon, demanding the payment Php 300,000.00.
However, Lagon refused to pay.[4]
On June 6, 2011, Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of
Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees against
Lagon.[5]
On October 8, 2011, Lagon filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of prescription.
In response, Dizon filed an Opposition with Motion to
Amend Complaint.[6] In his Amended Complaint,
Dizon averred that he sent two demand letters, one
dated March 23, 2010 and another dated May 6, 2011.
Both letters were sent through JRS Express.[7]
On February 29, 2012, Lagon filed his Answer
asserting that he has paid the loan.[8]
Meanwhile, during the preliminary conference, the
parties were directed to file their respective pre-trial
briefs within five (5) days from receipt of the trial
court's order.
Thereafter, on August 9, 2012, Judge Velasco issued a
Pre-Trial Conference Order.[9]... t the initial trial on
June 6, 2013, neither of the parties submitted their
judicial affidavits or those of their witnesses. Hence,
Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order[10] requiring
the parties to submit their respective judicial affidavits
five (5) days before the trial.
Lagon received a copy of the same Order on June 26,
2013.[13]
On June 27, 2013, Lagon filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.[14] In his Motion, Lagon requested
that he be allowed to submit the judicial affidavit of
his witnesses after the plaintiff shall have adduced his
evidence. Lagon claimed that Section 2 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule, which mandates the submission by
both parties of their judicial affidavits before the pre-
trial conference is violative of his right to due process,
hence unconstitutional.[15]
On July 10, 2013, Judge Velasco issued the assailed
Order[16] denying Lagon's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.[17] Judge Velasco opined that "the
requirement of the submission of judicial affidavits of
witnesses, not later than 5 days before the pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing,
under Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule is not
violative of Lagon's right to due process.[18]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Lagon sought direct
recourse to this Court by filing the instant Petition for
Certiorari[19] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Issues:
whether or not Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule,
which requires a defendant to adduce his testimony
and that of his witnesses by judicial affidavits, and
submit his documentary evidence before the pre-trial
or preliminary conference, offends his right to due
process of law.
Ruling:
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
in all proceedings before the aforementioned tribunals,
the parties are required to file the Judicial Affidavits
of their witnesses, in lieu of their direct testimonies.
Specifically, Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule
ordains that: Section 2. Submission of Judicial
Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. -
(a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on
the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier
service, not later than five days before pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with
respect to motions and incidents, the following: The
judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take
the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any,
which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and
marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of
the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2,
3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of
secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.
Despite the noble purpose of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule, Lagon comes to this Court bewailing the same
procedural regulation as violative of his right to due
process of law, in that it "forces" him to present
evidence even before the plaintiff has rested his case,
apparently in violation of the rule on demurrer to
evidence.
All told, the Court has always emphasized that
"procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival
claims and in the administration of justice."[41] It
cannot be overemphasized that when the rules are
clear, magistrates are mandated to apply them.
BORLONGAN V. BANCO DE ORO, G.R. NOS.
217617 & 218540 (RESOLUTION), [APRIL 5,
2017]
FACTS: Sometime in 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr.
(Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real
property located at No. 111, Sampaguita St., Valle
Verde II, Pasig City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). In 2012,
they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to
obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a
prospective sale of the subject property. To their
surprise, the title contained an annotation that the
property covered thereby was the subject of an
execution sale in Civil Case (CC) No. 03-0713
pending before Branch 134 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City (Makati RTC).
Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records
of CC No. 03-0713 and found out that respondent
Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank,
filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations
obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were
several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly
signed four (4) security agreements totaling
P13,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho
Corporation.
It appears from the records of CC No. 03-0713 that on
July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order
directing the service of summons to all the defendants
at the business address of Tancho Corporation
provided by BDO: Fumakilla Compound, Amang
Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City
(Fumakilla Compound).
Parenthetically, the records of CC No. 03-0713 show
that respondent BDO already foreclosed the Fumakilla
Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following
Tancho Corporation’s failure to pay its obligation, and
BDO already consolidated its ownership of the
property on November 16, 2001.
Understandably, on July 31, 2003, the process server
filed an Officer’s Return stating that summons
remained unserved as the “defendants are no longer
holding office at [Fumakilla Compound].”
On October 27, 2003, after the single attempt at
personal service on Carmelita and her co-defendants,
BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by
publication. On October 28, 2003, the RTC granted the
motion.
On August 10, 2004, BDO filed an ex-parte Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the
defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing
on the motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of
the subject property. The Makati RTC thereafter
granted BDO’s motion and a Writ of Attachment was
issued against the defendants in CC No. 03-0713,
effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of
BDO.
On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion
praying, among others, that the summons and the
complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject
property. The Makati RTC granted the motion. On
February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return stating that
no actual personal service was made as Carmelita “is
no longer residing at the given address and the said
address is for ‘rent,’ as per information gathered from
the security guard on duty.”
On May 30, 2006, however, BDO filed a manifestation
stating that it had complied with the October 28, 2003
Order of the Makati RTC having caused the
publication of the alias summons and the complaint
in People’s Taliba on May 15, 2006.
Thereafter, upon BDO’s motion, the Makati RTC
declared the defendants in CC No. 03-0713, including
Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to
present its evidence ex-parte.
ISSUE:
A. WON THE SERVICE OF SUMMON THROUGH
PUBLICATION IS PROPER.
B. WON THE DENIAL OF ISSUANCE OF
TRO/WPI IS PROPER.
C. WON THE FILING OF INDEPENDENT
ACTION IS PROPER.
HELD:
A. NO. As a rule, summons should be personally
served on a defendant. When summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time,
substituted service may be resorted to. Service of
summons by publication can be resorted to only if the
defendant’s “whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve
the summons on the defendants, including petitioner
Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound, i.e., at the
property already foreclosed, acquired, and possessed
by the respondent bank as early as August 2001.
Immediately after this single attempt at personal
service in July 2003, the respondent bank moved in
October 2003 for leave to serve the summons by
publication (and not even substituted service), which
motion the RTC granted.
Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the
petitioner and properly serve her the summons before
the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it
impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts.
It should be noted that the principal obligor in CC No.
03-0713 was Tancho Corporation and petitioner
Carmelita was impleaded only because she supposedly
signed a surety agreement as a director. As a juridical
person, Tancho Corporation is required to file
mandatory corporate papers with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), such as its General
Information Sheet (GIS). In 1997 and 2000, the GIS
filed by Tancho Corporation with the SEC provided
the names of its directors and their addresses. One of
these directors included petitioner Carmelita with her
address listed at 41 Chicago St., Quezon City. The GIS
of Tancho Corporation was readily available to the
public including the RTC’s process server and
respondent bank.
Patently, it cannot be plausibly argued that it was
impossible to find the petitioner and personally serve
her with summons. In like manner, it can hardly be
stated that the process server regularly performed his
duty.
B. NO. Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for
Annulment before the appellate court is the declaration
of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC and its
Decision dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely
confined to the prevention of the issuance of the writ
of possession and the consolidation of the ownership
of the subject property in BDO’s name — the concerns
of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI.
Indeed, the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve the status
quo ante, and not to pre-empt the appellate court’s
decision on the merits of her petition for annulment.
Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA to
deny her of this provisional remedy.
The appellate court’s error is readily apparent given
the stark existence of the grounds for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected. This right is
not just her proprietary rights over the subject property
but her constitutionally protected right to due process
before she can be deprived of her property. No less
than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution mandates that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
In its classic formulation, due process means that any
person with interest to the thing in litigation must be
notified and given an opportunity to defendthat
interest. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence the defendant may have in support of her
defense, she must be properly served the summons of
the court. In other words, the service of summons is a
vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it
would seem that the Constitutional right of the
petitioner to be properly served the summons and be
notified has been disregarded by the officers of the
trial court.
At this very juncture, the existence of the second
ground for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI is self-
evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
respondent bank from continuing in the possession and
consolidating the ownership of the subject property,
petitioner’s right to be afforded due process will
unceasingly be violated.
It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of
constitutional rights is by itself a grave and irreparable
injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.
Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted
intrepidly and issued the TRO and/or WPI posthaste to
protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is
duty-bound to do.
C. YES. The availability of the remedy provided
under the foregoing provision requires only that that
the claim is a third-party or a “stranger” to the case.
The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a
party to the suit but whose conjugal property was
executed on account of the other spouse’s debt, a
“stranger” to the suit? In Buado v. Court of Appeals,
this Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve
the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt
had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a
stranger to the suit who can file an independent
separate action, distinct from the action in which the
writ was issued.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal
property was attached on the basis of a surety
agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in
behalf of Tancho Corporation. In our 2004 Decision
in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated
that there is no presumption that the conjugal
partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a
contract of suretY.
Besides, BDO’s reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of
Appeals (2003) is improper. In the present case, Eliseo
and his wife discovered the attachment of their
conjugal property only after the finality of the decision
by the RTC Makati. There was, therefore, no
opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case before
the RTC Makati which attached the conjugal property,
as a motion to intervene can only be filed “at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court.” This
spells the whale of difference between the case at bar
and the earlier Spouses Ching. Unlike in the present
case, the debtor in the case cited by BDO was properly
informed of the collection suit and his spouse had the
opportunity to question the attachment of their
conjugal property before the court that issued the levy
on attachment, but simply refused to do so. Thus, to
now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the
attachment made by the RTC Makati in a separate and
independent action will be to, again, refuse him the
due process of law before their property is taken. As
this Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce
Constitutional rights, this we cannot allow.
Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines,
Inc. (ALFI) et.al. vs. Hon. Garin (G.R. Nos. 217872
and 221866, 26 April 2017)
Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and
Drugs Administration (FDA) on re-certifying the
contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon
NXT; the basis of their opposition hinges on the fact
that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to
them, they should have been given notice of the
certification proceedings, and a chance to present
evidence that indeed such drugs are abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that
petitioners are not entitled to notice and hearing
because the said proceedings are done in the exercise
of its regulatory power, not quasi-judicial power; also,
they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is
incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due to
the same reason.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not said controversy is outside the
scope of Judicial Review;
(b) Whether or not petitioners were deprived of
substantial and procedural due process of law;
Held/Doctrines:
It is quite fascinating that the Supreme Court again
reminded us the two fundamental powers of an
administrative body, in the words of the Honorable
Court:
“The powers of an administrative body are classified
into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative
power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate
legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated
by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to
adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of law and implement legislative policy. A
legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. The
exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-
legislative power through the promulgation of
regulations of general application does not, as a rule,
require notice and hearing. The only exception being
where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates
that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation.
Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as
the power of the administrative agency to determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion
in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties,
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires
the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction
which must be acquired by the administrative body
and two, the observance of the requirements of due
process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.”
To answer (a) above, the Supreme Court has this to
say, viz:
“On the argument that the certification proceedings
were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its
“regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial
review, the Court holds that it has the power to review
all acts and decisions where there is a commission of
grave abuse of discretion. No less than the
Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its
duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Such is committed when there is a
violation of the constitutional mandate that “no person
is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law.” The Court’s power cannot be
curtailed by the FDA’s invocation of its regulatory
power.”
With regard to (b), the Supreme Court ruled that
petitioners were deprived of their Right to Due
Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of
the instant agency reveals the need of an issuance of
notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the
contraceptive products for public
comments. These, respondents failed to do.
This was thoroughly explained by the Court, to wit:
“Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and
procedural. In order that a particular act may not be
impugned as violative of the due process clause, there
must be compliance with both the substantive and
procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property.
Procedural due process, on the other hand, means
compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the
part of those who are called upon to administer it. xxx
xxx To conclude that product registration,
recertification, procurement, and distribution of the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the
FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power need not
comply with the requirements of due process would
render the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs and
the posting of a list of contraceptives for public
comment a meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs
and the public in general will be deprived of any
significant participation if what they will submit will
not be considered.
Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-
IRR), relied upon by the respondents in support of
their claims, expressly allows the consideration of
conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by the
petitioners in support of their opposition to the
approval of certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In
fact, the said provision mandated that the FDA utilize
the “best evidence available” to ensure that no
abortifacient is approved as family planning drug or
device. It bears mentioning that the same provision
even allows an independent evidence review group
(ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the
certification of a contraceptive drug or device is duly
considered.”
GOV’T OF HONGKONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON. OLALIA
Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure - is the surety for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified.
Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
Extradition:
FACTS:
Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of
offences of “accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7
counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the
common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong
Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the
provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ
forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the
same day, NBI agents arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition
by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and
sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the
RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC
denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine
 Law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
responded is a “flight risk”.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition
cases.
HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in
the extradition cases, since it is available only in
criminal proceedings.
However the Supreme Court, recognised the following
trends in International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in
publican international law who, in the 20th century
attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in
international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is
the primacy placed on the sanctity of human rights.
Enshrined the Constitution “The state values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.” The Philippines
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceeding before the a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified.
Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for
in the US Vs Purganan provide the following.
1. The exercise of the State’s police power to deprive a
person of his liberty is not limited to criminal
proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding
would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential history.
Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved
in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with criminal investigation directed
against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal and criminal law of the requesting
state or government. Thus characterized as the right of
the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
obligation of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.
The extradited may be subject to detention as may be
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time in the detention should be reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent,
Muñoz has been detained for 2 years without being
convicted in Hongkong.
The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the
individual his right to liberty and due process and
should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right
to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant
is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be
“CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not
able to show and clear and convincing evidence that
he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the
court for the determination and otherwise, should
order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate
detention.