ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

November 8, 2019 F: The Congress has the power to create administrative bodies. Moreover, the
I. General Principles power to reorganize and to abolish such administrative bodies belongs to
a. Administrative Agencies them. The power to create agencies necessarily involves the power to
i. Nature reorganize it.
ii. Creation
iii. Establishment What if the law has delegated the creation of an office to the President, who
iv. Abolition shall now have the power to abolish the office – the Congress or the President?
b. Powers of Administrative Agencies It is the President because it is the president who has the power to create. The
i. Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers power to abolish the office belongs to the body that created it.
ii. Quasi-judicial power
Government Agency vs Government Instrumentality
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Agency

- It is a branch of public law that deals with activities of the
administrative agencies in the exercise of its quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial functions.
- It is a branch of public law fixing the organization and determines the
competence of administrative authorities, and indicates the individual
remedies for the violation of the rights.
- These are offices which are passed to exercise some government functions.
- Any of the various units of the government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporations or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Ex. Local Government

Instrumentality
Administrative Agency
- A government office which is created to specifically carry out a mandate
- It is an organ of government, other than a court and the legislature, of an office.
which affects the rights of private parties either through adjudication
or rule making. - It refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
Manner of Creation endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. It includes
1. Constitutional provision regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
2. Authority of Law controlled corporations.
3. Legislative Enactment
Ex. BIR – to collect taxes
Reasons for the creation of administrative agencies:
Powers of Administrative Agencies
1. Help unclog court dockets
2. Meet the growing complexities of modern society 1. Quasi-legislative Power
3. Help in the regulation of ramified activities of a developing country. 2. Quasi-judicial Power

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 1 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Quasi-Legislative Power December 13, 2019

- It only makes laws in order to implement or to give a detail process for Principle of finality of administrative action or Doctrine of finality of Judgment
the purpose of carrying out a legislative enactment.
- The authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a Mendiola vs CSC GR no. 100671
policy set out in the law itself.
Issue:

LEGISLATIVE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is correct in granting the Bureau’s
motion for reconsideration.
Determine what the Determine how the law
law shall be shall be enforced Held:

Cannot be delegated Can be delegated No.A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be
amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.
Likewise, an executory and final decision cannot be lawfully altered or
Source of the power to promulgate administrative rules and regulations: modified even by the court which rendered the same, especially where the
alteration or modification is material or substantial. In such a situation, the trial
 Derived from the legislature, by virtue of a valid delegation, either court loses jurisdiction over the case except for execution of the final
expressed or implied. judgment. Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including
the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
1. Express provision of the law, and/or;
2. Doctrine of Necessary implication Principle:

Quasi-Judicial Power "The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental

- To make determination of facts in the performance of their official
duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found.
Limitations of Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Power:
1. A power which has been delegated cannot be further be delegated;
2. Cannot make rules or regulations which are inconsistent with the
provision of the Constitution or statute;
3. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
considerations of public policy and sound practice . . ."
Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power
and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it,
much less revoke it. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at
some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final judgments will
result in endless litigation."
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy

Teotico vs Agda, Sr. G.R. No. 87437 May 29, 1991

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in granting the TRO

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 2 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Held:
No. Not having yet fully exhausted the existing adequate administrative
remedy which he already took advantage of, Agda cannot be permitted to
abandon it at his chosen time and leisure and invoke the jurisdiction of regular
courts. As aptly summarized: "Within the administrative forum the law may
provide for review of decisions by higher authorities. Before a party can be
allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded him. There are
both legal and practical reasons for this. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes,
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review,
and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the
errors committed in the administrative forum."
Principle:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well entrenched in this
jurisdiction and a host of cases has buttressed its stability. There are, of course,
recognized exceptions thereto, but, unfortunately, private respondent cannot
seek safe refuge under their protective mantle, for in respect to the remedy
provided for in Section 24(c) of P.D. No. 807, which is also the remedy
provided for in Section 24(f), availment thereof is indispensable for the viability
of any judicial action.
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs Judge Abad
G.R. No. 85502. February 24, 1992
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent should first exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court
Held:
Yes.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Firme (Might be asked in the exam): General rule: All the remedies that are still
available within the agency must be exhausted before going to the court.
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent
court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, (14
SCRA 269) where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an
exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, (63 SCRA 193) where the doctrine was waived because of "the
strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible. There
are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and
judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are:1) when the question raised is purely
legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the
controversy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
Supreme Court held that even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not
expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the
doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the
explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function
"to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of
the country’s forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the
"management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,"
Principle:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of
justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke
it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss
Page 3 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation
of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-
interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the
competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their
resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no
less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement
of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Ret.) vs. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga,
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and
for conduct of unbecoming of a judge.
Held:
Yes. violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesand
violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The
DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The
complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task Force Sagip
Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have
alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products,
that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the
replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
The DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by
the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Principle:
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Carpio vs Executive Secretary
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Held:
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of
control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to
be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
Principle:
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise
his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate
some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
“all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
Page 4 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious if a person is given an opportunity to file his answer, and deny allegation
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed against him that is enough.
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
Saunar vs Executive Secretary
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are Issue:
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not
Due process in administrative proceedings denied due process and that respondents did not violate petitioner's right to
security of tenure as guaranteed in the constitution
Vivo vs PAGCOR
Held:
Issue:
Yes. In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for
administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the decision
Whether or not PAGCOR violated Vivo’s Due process
rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court
reminded that administrative bodies have the active duty to use the
Held:
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping
No. The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the
with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general
very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be
rule rather than the exception.
heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
Might be asked in the exam:
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, the
in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
Court eruditely expounded on the concept of due process in administrative
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
proceedings, to wit:
Principle:
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can,
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of
of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
in support thereof.
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
Firme:
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
When will you consider that administrative proceeding is compiled?

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 5 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible
for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Proceedings
B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and LEANDRO M. CASTRO
Issue:
The workmen’s compensation commission erred in affirming the disputed
award which may be attacked at any time directly or collaterally in spite of
the fact that the said award was void ab initio as alleged above.
Held:
Yes. However, in the instant petition, the former judgment is based on a
prohibited or null and void contract. Therefore, there is no valid judgment
which can be predicated on res judicata. While it may be true that
respondent claimant Leandro M. Castro received the sum of P1,377.00 from
petitioner which the former acknowledged as full payment of his Workmen’s
Compensation, on a Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Releases,
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
nonetheless, such is not his full compensation under the law and the aforesaid
document is null and void under Section 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.
Principle:
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) it must be rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.
T.H. VALDERAMA & SONS, INC. and/or ROBERTO TINSAY vs. HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, DANNY GONZAGA and 276 OTHER WORKERS
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were denied their right to procedural due process.
Held:
No. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the record discloses that they were not
denied their right to due process. They had several opportunities to present
their side of the controversy but were negligent in defending their cause.
As borne by the record, after the narrative report was forwarded by the Labor
Standards Enforcement Unit to the Office of the Regional Director, a hearing
was scheduled on February 8, 1985 for petitioners to dispute the report thus
submitted. However on the scheduled hearing, petitioners failed to appear.
Likewise, in the summary investigation that was scheduled on May 20, 1986 for
the purpose of hearing the parties relative to the amount of petitioner
company’s liability as recomputed, Petitioners, again, did not appear despite
due notice.
IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC., , v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,.
Page 6 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Issue:
Whether or not there is res judicata requisite no.2 it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
Held:
Yes. While decisions of the B.T.A. were administrative in character, those that
were not brought before the court of First Instance, following U.S.T. v. B.T.A., 93
Phil., 316, or before the Court of Tax Appeals, pursuant to Section 11, R.A. 1125,
were considered as having been judicially confirmed by virtue of R.A. 1125.
The decisions covered by the pronouncement assumed the character of
decisions of regular courts. And the same should be considered final and
executory and enforceable by execution, just like any other decision of a
court of justice.
Principle:
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply exclusively to courts but may be
extended to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION,, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CRISANTO G. DE
GUZMAN,
Issues:
Whether or not De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies available to him.
Whether or not there is a Res Judicata
Held:
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Yes. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the
courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an
opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct
any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity
and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
No.In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action,
the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii)
identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is
rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.
In this case, there was no “judgment on the merits” in contemplation of the
above–stated definition. The dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in
the Memorandumdated May 15, 1990 of Asec. Jardiniano was a result of a
fact–finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether a prima
facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses should be
filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were
determined therein with finality.
Judicial Review In Administrative Proceedings
Page 7 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case.
Held:
No. The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the
Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing
that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, SC hold
that the present petition should have been filed with this Court.
Ramos vs Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Issue:
Whether or not he lower court erred in holding that the decision of respondent-
appellee secretary of agriculture and natural resources sought to be judicially
reviewed and annulled was rendered by said official in accordance with law
and sound discretion.
Held:
The invariable rule laid down by this Court in reviewing administrative decisions
of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact made
therein must be respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. that it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of the evidence. that the administrative decision in
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
Principle:
These principles negate the power of a reviewing court to re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted
therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that
was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. Common sense
dictates that the question whether the administrative agency abused its
discretion in weighing the evidence should be resolved solely on the basis of
the proof that the administrative authorities had before them and no other.
Guagua national Colleges vs CA
Issue:
Whether or not the correct period to appeal the decision of voluntary
arbitration.
Held:
The Court has variantly applied either the 15-day or the 10- day period as the
time within which to appeal the decisions or awards of the Voluntary
Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.
The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision shall be
appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the
award or decision to file motion for reconsideration and from the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, you are given 15 days to file it to the CA via rule
43.
“Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with
the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day
period since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking
an appeal.Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the
Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals
Page 8 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Public employment is governed by a contract while Public office is
Code.” incidental to the sovereign function. It is important to distinguish because
not all who are working in the government are public officers.
Administrative Agencies Created by the Constitution
Basis Public Office Public Contract
 COMELEC
Originates from the will of
 CSC
the contracting parties,
 COA As to creation Incident of sovereignty
subject to the limitations
 BSP
imposed by law.

Administrative Agencies Created by the Constitution vs Administrative

Agencies Created by Statutes Has for its object the
carrying out of sovereign
Imposes obligations only
As to persons as well as governmental
upon persons who
affected functions affecting even
entered the same.
December 20, 2019 persons not bound by
contract.

I. General Principles and Concept of the Public Office

a. Definition Is almost always limited in
Embraces idea of tenure, its duration and specific in
b. Elements
duration and continuity, its objects. Its terms define
c. Creation
As to subject matter and duties connected and limit the rights and
d. Characteristics and scope therewith are generally obligations of the parties,
e. Classification continuing and and neither may depart
permanent. there from without the
A. Definition consent of the other.

Public Office is the right and duty created and conferred by law by which
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is vested with portion of the sovereign What is sovereign function?
functions of the government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The officer exercises discretion in the performance of a government
function.
It is created to give effect to the functions of the government to which it is
instituted. How is government function given?

F: How will you distinguish public employment from public office? 1. Constitutional provision
2. Authority of Law
3. Legislative Enactment

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 9 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Public Officer – Any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of Modifications or abolition of public office
public functions in the government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in 1. Office created by the congress
a. The power to create an office generally includes the power
said Government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent
to modify or abolish it.
or subordinate official, of any rank or class. b. The power is inherently legislative.
c. Power to fix the number of positions and the salaries or
 It is necessary that his power must be from some source. There is no emoluments of the holders thereof and to provide funds for
public officer if there is no office. Hence, an office must be created. the offices created.

B. Elements 2. Offices created by the constitution

a. Constitutional offices may be modified or abolished by the
1. Created by Constitution or by law or by some body or agency to people through a constitutional provision.
which the power to create the office has been delegated;
D. Characteristics

2. Invested with authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign

1. It is a public trust.
power of the State;
2. It is not a property.
3. It is personal to the public officer.
3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be
4. It is not a vested right.
defined directly or impliedly by the Legislature or through legislative
5. It is not a natural right.
authority;

It is a public trust – “Public office is a public trust”; the officer holds the
F: As you would see, police power belongs to the legislative. And the
office in trust for the benefit of the people to whom such officers are
legislative can delegate it to the public officers.
required to be accountable at all times; officers regards as public
servants; officers are subject to highest standards of accountability
4. Duties are performed independently without control unless those of a
and service.
subordinate;

It is not a property – It cannot be the subject of a contract because it

5. Continuing and permanent.
is outside the commerce of man;

C. Creation
It is personal to the public officer – It is not a property transmissible to
1. Generally
the heirs of the public officer upon the latter’s death.
a. By the Constitution, Statute or Tribunal Body
b. By the Congress
It is not a vested right – The right to a public office is a protected right.
i. Exigencies of government it is necessary to create
The right to a public office is protected by the constitutional provision
and define duties.
ii. An office created by the legislature is wholly within on security of tenure. It cannot be taken from its incumbent without
the power of the body. Can fit and abolish the office. due process.
c. By the President
i. Bureaus, agencies or offices in executive department

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 10 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent

Civil Service Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except Case: National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC and
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards Violeta Garcia, 211 SCRA 145
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary. (Case: National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Facts:
Administration vs CSC, 211 SCRA 145)
A Bochelor of Lows graduate and a fstade civ service elgible. Violeta Garcia,
herein pettioner, was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
It is not a natural right – The right to hold public office exists only permanent status.
because and by virtue of some law expressly creating and conferring
it. Pursuant to PD 1529, her position was reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds
IlI under permanent status.
E. Classification
Thereatter, she was designated as the Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
1. As to nature of functions: (Co-M) Mexcouaxan, Bulacan.
a. Civil office — It covers any kind of a public office, whether
executive, legislative, or judicial. By Virtue of EO 649. took effect on February 9, 1981, Garcia was issued an
b. Military office appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds IL under temporary status. or not
being a member of the Philippine Bar.
2. As to creation: (CS)
a. Constitutional office
b. Statutory office She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied.

3. As to the department of government to which it belongs: (L-E-J) While sald case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as
a. Legislative office renewed in 1985.
b. Executive office
c. Judicial office
The Civil Service Commission, in its resolution, directed that private respondent
4. As to branch of government served: (NAT-LOC) Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Regster of Deeds il or Its
a. National office equivalent in the NALTDRA. I held that "under the vestedright theory the new
b. Local office requirement of BAR membership to quality for permanent appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds Il or higher as mandated under said Executive
5. As to whether exercise of discretion is required: (QJO- MinOff) Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the
a. Quasi-judicial office “Discretionary” - Certiorari filing up of February 1981, the date sald Executive Order took effect. A fortiort
b. Ministerial office – Mandamus case
since private respondent Garcia had been hoiding the position of Deputy
6. As to compensation: Regster of Deeds Il trom 1977 to September 1984, she should not be atfected
a. Lucrative office, office of profit, or office coupled with an by the operation on February 1. 1981 of Executive Order No. 649.
interest. It includes any office to which salary, compensation
or fees are attached. Issue: Whether or not membership In the bar, which is the qualiication
b. Honorary office, no compensation requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 11 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 447 (Reorganizing the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Into the National Land Tiles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA) should be required of and / or applied
only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the
LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.
due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order.
Her MR was denied on similar ground.
When can Garcia be reinstated? Garcia can be reinstated if the abolition is
done in bad faith. However, in the case at bar, the abolition of office is done in
good faith and it suffers no infirmity.

Held: Executive Order was enacted to improve the services and better systematize
the operation of the LRC. The requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
Yes. Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land positions was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new
Registration Commission (LRCI Into the National Land Titles and Deeds development of the times.
Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now
defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of II. Requirements of Public Office
the NALTDRA. a. Appointment vs Election
b. Vacancies
A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the c. De Facto vs De Jure
reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) Into the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that sald
lawin express tems provided for the abolition of existing positions.
A.need of any A. Requirements of Public Office
Interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an B. Implementing
order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed Public offices are filled up either by:
non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Aboltion of a postion
does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the 1. Appointment; or
post subsists and that one is merely separated theretrom. 2. Election

Election is designation by popular vote (people’s right to Suffrage).

After abolition, there is in law no oc cupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to
speak of. It is in this standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
Appointment is the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body
security of tenure does not arise.
to whom that power has been delegated, the individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office. It refers to the nomination or
On the vested right theory advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission.
designation of an individual to an office.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special The appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as properly
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any belonging to the executive department.
vested right in an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are
obtaining in this case. F: what is the limitation of the appointing authority?

F: Is the termination reviewable? Yes. The MSPB dropped the appeal of 1. The need to secure the concurrence of the Commission of
petitioner Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her services was Appointments.

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 12 of 22

ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Commission of Appointments
The CA is a constitutional body under the 1987 Constitution. It is an
independent body separate and distinct from the Legislature,
although its membership is confined to members of Congress. *
The CA does not curtail the Presidents appointing authority but serves
as a check against its abuse. It assures that the President has
exercised the power to appoint wisely, by appointing only those who
are fit and qualified. To this end, the Rules of the Commission's
Statement of Policy provides that, 'The Commission on Appointments
hereby declares as its policy that the powers vested in it by the
Constitution shall be discharged with only one impelling motive, which
is the efficient and harmonious functioning of the government.
'Cognizant of the fact that the power of appointment is vested in the
President of the Philippines, and that the President, in the exercise of
that power, had carefully considered the fitness and qualifications of
nominees or appointees, the Commission on Appointments shall
accord the nomination or appointment weight and respect, to the
end that all doubts should be resolved in favor of approval or
confirmation.
'On the other hand, the Commission, being part of our republican
system of checks and balances, shall act as a restraint against abuse
of the appointing authority, to the end that the power of disapproval
should be exercised to protect and enhance the public interest.'
Whose appointments must be confirmed?
Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 16
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint:
a. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain;
b. And other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
constitution;
c. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by the law; and
d. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
e. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress."
2. Section 14. Appointments extended by an acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within
ninety days from his assumption or re-assumption of office. (Article VII)
3. Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancy therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. (Article VII)
4. The President can only appoint members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts from among the list of at least three members
for each position prepared and recommended by the Judicial and
Bar Council (Section 9, Article VII, Constitution).
5. The President cannot appoint officials and employees of the Judiciary,
as the power to appoint them belongs to the Supreme Court in
accordance with the civil service law (Section 5(6) Article VIII,
Constitution). Neither can he appoint officials and employees of the
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections and Commission
on Audit, as the power to appoint them belongs to these respective
commissions in accordance with the civil service law (Section 4,
Article IX-A, Constitution).
6. The President cannot appoint any person who lost in any election
within one year after such election to any office in the government or
any government-owned or -controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries (Section 6, Article IX(B), Constitution).
Page 13 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

7. The President can only appoint the Ombudsman and deputies

persons from among the list of at least six nominees prepared and  Constructive Vacancy – Vacancy is created when an officer has
recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council (Section 9, Article XI, been removed in the office and another person has occupied it. (Not
Constitution). actual vacancy)
Ex. De facto officer
8. An elective official may be appointed by the President to another
position, but he has to vacate his elective post. He cannot be C. De facto vs De Jure
appointed to another position and, at the same time, maintain his
elective position. On the other hand, an appointive official may be De Facto Officer
appointed or designated by the President to another appointive
position, thus occupying two or more appointive positions, if a specific A de facto officer is one who assumed office under the color of a known
law so allows or where his primary functions so require in an ex officio appointment or election but which appointment or election is void for reasons
capacity (Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 268[1993]). that the officer was not eligible, or that there was want of power in the electing
body, or that there was some other defect or irregularity in its exercise, wherein
9. Except as may be expressly provided by the Constitution, (i.e., the such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public.
Vice President may be appointed Cabinet member) Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution prohibits the President from appointing a De Jure Officer
Cabinet member, any of his deputies or assistants to another
position(s). However, such constitutional provision does not prohibit A de jure officer is one who is in all respects legally appointed or elected and
these executive officials from holding additional positions in ex-officio qualified to exercise the office.
capacities and as required by their primary functions but without
additional compensation or per diems in whatever form (De la De Facto De Jure
Cruz v. COA, GR 138489, November 29, 2001).
Has possession and
10. The President, during his tenure, cannot appoint his or her spouse and performs the duties under
Has lawful title to the
a colorable title without
relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree. office.
being technically qualified
in all points of law to act.
B. Vacancy

Holding of office rests on Holding of office rests on

There is vacancy if there is no person lawfully authorize to assume the office reputation. right.
and exercise the functions relating to it.

Officer may be ousted in a Officer cannot be

 Accidental Vacancy – Vacancy is created other than by expiration
direct proceeding against removed through a direct
of term. him. proceeding.
Ex. Termination, death

 Absolute Vacancy – Vacancy is created by the expiration of term. Elements of De Facto Officer:

 Original Vacancy – Vacancy is created by virtue of some law. (1) There must be an office de jure;
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 14 of 22
 ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
(2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public, and;
(3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
“Color of right or general acquiescence by the public”
There is semblance of legality (but not legal per se) and that it is known and
accepted by the public.
What are the effects of the acts of de facto public officer?
1. The lawful acts, so far as the rights of third persons are concerned are, if
done within the scope and by apparent authority of the office, are
considered valid and binding.
2. The de facto officer cannot benefit from his own status because public
policy demands that unlawful assumption of public office be discouraged.
3. The de facto officer is subject to the same liabilities imposed on the de jure
officer in the discharge of official duties, in addition to whatever special
damages may due from him because of the assumption of office.
4. The acts of the de facto public officer, insofar as they affect the public are
valid, binding and with full legal effect.
Case: Ramon Binamira vs Peter Garrucho, Jr., 188 SCRA 154, GR No. 92008,
July 30, 1990
Facts:
Ramon Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philppine Tourism
Authority. He ciaims to have been removed without just cause in violation of
his security of tenure.
Binamira's. claim was based on a memorandum addressed to him by Jose
Antonio Gonzales, then Minister of Tourism, which states that he was
appointed as a General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority on April
7, 1986 and an approval of the President of his position as Vice -Chairman of
the board of directors.
Thereatter, President Corazon Aquino wrote a memorandum to the Secretary
of Tourism, Peter Garrucho, that the present General Manager of the
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Philippine Tourtsm Authority was designated not by the President, as required
by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, Such
designation is invalid. And effectively appoint Garrucho as a temporary
General Manager.
Garrucho, having taken over as General Manager of the PIA in accordance
with fnis memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against the question his
title.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of Binamka as General Manager of the
Philippine Tourtsm Authority constitutes an appointment.
Held:
No. Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which was created by the Philippine Tourism
Authority. provides as folows: SECTION 23-A, General Manager-Appointment
and Tenure. - The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines and shall serve for a term of sx (6) years unless sooner removed for
That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as shall have been
appointed and quaified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the
Philppines but only designated by the Minister of Tourtsm. There is a ciear
distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has
faled to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office.When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the
Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal ofthe Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.
Page 15 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Acts of Department Heads performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business to be considered valid as acts of the President of the Philippines
must not be disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive. —The
doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business." which was true of the designation made by Minister
Gonzales in favor ofthe petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be
considered valid only if not "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive," as also happened in the case at bar.
F: Public office has no security of tenure. The only office that is entitled to
security of tenure is Constitutional office unless otherwise impeached.
Case: Teresita Quintos-Deles, Gloria Aragon (m.d.), Lourdes Mastura, Trinidad
Gomez, Adul De Leon, Josefina Azarcon-Dela Cruz, Trinidad Domingo, Maria
Mayet Ledano, Lolit Antonio, et al., vs. The Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, and offices (CA), Commission on Appointments, The Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, The Chief Accountant of the House of
Representatives, GR No. 83216 September 4, 1989
Facts:
On April 6, 1988, Teresita Quinto-Delesand other threewere appointed Sectoral
Representative by the Presidentof the Philippinespursuant to Article VII, Section
16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives- appointees
were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of
Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the
Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their
oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. This
opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking
of the four sectoral representatives.
Petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker RamonV. Mitra,
Jr. appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that
since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives* already
sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be
discriminatory."
Speaker Mitra in a letter, informed petitioner that since "President Corazon C.
Aquino has submitted your appointment to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation in a letter dated April 11, 1988, . . . the Commission on
Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter."
The Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the
Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the
Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representative to the House of Representatives to ne confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment.
Held:
Yes.
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
Page 16 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices
mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as follows:
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
xxx xxx xxx
The purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is that, except as to those officers whose appointments require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the
first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of
the foreseeable effects thereof.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority
for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The
records show that petitioner's appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while
Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the
reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment
extended to her.
Case: Central Bank Of The Philippines And Angela P. Jordan vs Civil Service
Commission And Basilao E. Borja, GR No. 80455-56 April 10, 1989
Facts:
Dr. Angela P. Jordan, herein petitioner, was certified on October 3, 1984, for
promotion to the position of Assistant Bank Physician. The Promotions Board of
the Central Bank submitted the proposal to the Office of the Governor of the
Central Bank.
On the other hand, it appears that as early as July, 1984, respondent Borja
filed an application for the position of Medical Director in the Central Bank. His
papers were acted upon by the Promotions Board and he was considered for
the position of Physician.
The promotion of Dr. Jordan to Assistant Bank Physician was approved by the
Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and was issued an appointment
as Assistant Bank Physician to take effect January 2, 1985.
On February 15, 1985, private respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment
claiming that he was the next-in-rank employee and that he was more
qualified than she. On May 16, 1985, the Bank dismissed the protest on the
grounds that the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period; that
protestant is not thenext in-rank employee as regards the contested position
and, as such, he wasno legal personality to file the protest; and, that the
Page 17 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
protestee aside from being the next-in-rank employee, met the requirements
for promotion.
Private respondent appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB for short). They
initially found the appeal meritorious, however, the Bank, in an undated
petition for reconsideration, prayed that the MSB decision be set aside and
that the Bank's decision upholding the appointment of Dr. Jordan be left
undisturbed. On January 28, 1987, reverse and set aside its decision of
October 28, 1986 and confirmed the approval of the appointment of Dr.
Jordan to the contested position.
On March 5, 1987, private respondent appealed to the Civil Service
Commission on the grounds that he was denied due process of law inasmuch
as he was not furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Bank, and that the decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 is contrary to
the merit and fitness principles enshrined in the Civil Service Law and the
Constitution.
On May 26, 1987, the Commission issued Resolution No. 87156 setting aside the
decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 and directing the appointment of
private respondent to the contested position.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may disapprove an
appointment and require the appointment of another person whom it believe
is more qualified for the position.
Held:
No. It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample
discretionin the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant
positions. Thisis a management prerogative which is generally unhampered by
judicial intervention.
There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the
power of appointment under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as
amended, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act. At issue in this petition is
the extent of the power of the Civil Service Commission to approve or
disapprove a particular appointment.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has the
final authority on appointments. But the situation has changed under the new
law, Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree,
wherein the Commission is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the
appointing official on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended. The
authority of the Commission is limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil
Service.
In the case at bar, the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were never disputed. The
fact that she was qualified was attested to by the Promotions Board.
Case: Marcial Costin, Estanislao Lajer, Lionel Kanen as Chief Of Police;
Francisco Tisado, Octavio Traya As Municipal Mayor; Domingo Ipong As
Municipal Treasurer; and The Municipal Council Of Abuyog, Leyte, vs
Honorable Lope C. Quimbo, Judge Of The Court Of First Instance Of Leyte, And
Higinio Verra, GR. No. L-32271 January 27, 1983
Facts:
On October 15, 1958, petitioner Estanislao Lajer was extended a
promotionalappointment as sergeant of police.
On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded
Lajer another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last
appointment was not attested and approved as required by law.
On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other
members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor
extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of
Police of Abuyog.
On January 19, 1960, Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed an
action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the municipal mayor,
municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their
separation from the service.
Page 18 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was again a change in
the municipal administration of as a result of the 1963 local elections. The
newly elected municipal mayor dismissed respondent Verra from office on
January 16, 1964. Verra was replaced by Victoriano Silleza officer-in-charge,
on January 17, 1964 until October, 1964 when petitioner Marcial Costin was
appointed chief of police.
On December 29, 1964, respondent Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo
warranto with mandamus against Marcial Costin the municipal mayor, and
the municipal treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that
he could not be dismissed as chief of police because he was a civil service
eligible and in possession of an appointment to the position of chief of police
of Abuyog, Leyte duly attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service Commission.
As a result of the appellate decision, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated
Lajer as chief of police on April 1, 1966.
On December 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case
No. 3606, declaring that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary to be
paid to him for the Whole period of his illegal separation to the date of his
reinstatement.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Verra appointment in the position of
Chief of Police was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal.
Held:
No. When respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14,
1960, Lajer had just been dismissed from office with several other members of
thepolice force. The validity of Verras appointment, therefore, hinges on the
legality of Lajers removal.
It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how
qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an
office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant
position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
validly terminated. In the case at bar, since petitioner Lajer was not validly
terminated from public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered reinstated
through a writ of mandamus, by no less than the Court of Appeals, it follows
that there was no vacancy in the office of chief of police on January 14, 1960
and there was no office to which respondent Higinio Verra could have been
appointed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals superseded any decision that the Court
of First Instance or the Civil Service Commissioner could have rendered on the
same issue and the same facts. The certification by the Commissioner of Civil
Service that Mr. Verra possessed the qualifications and the eligibility, doubtful
though the latter may be, for the position of chief of police could not have
made the proceedings in court moot and academic much less rendered
inutile the 1966 decision of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for a writ
of mandamus in Lajer’s favor.
F: The Civil Service Commission can only disapprove the appointment by the
appointing authority if the appointee is ineligible. The Central Bank has been
given ample discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons.
Case: Reynaldo Tuanda, Mayor Of The Municipality Of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental, Herminigildo Faburada, (Former Vice-Mayor), Santos Villanueva,
Incumbent Member Of The Sangguniang Bayan, Manuel Lim, Nicanor Agosto,
Erenieta Mendoza, Maximino Viernes, Hacubina Serillo, Iluminado Estrellanes,
and former members Of The Sangguniang Bayan Of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, (Third Division), Bartolome
Binaohan And Delia Estrellanes, Respondents. GR No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Facts:
Then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government
designated private respondents Delia Estrellanes as industrial labor sectoral
representative and Bartolome Binaohan as agricultural labor sectoral
representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros
Oriental. They took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February
1989, respectively.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the
President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a
Page 19 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
letter denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize
private respondents as sectoral representatives.
Private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Negros
Oriental as aSpecial Civil Action for recognition as members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, but was dismissed.
Thereafter,petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio
the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the
private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in
violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government) may appoint members of the local
legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors,
there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the
said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant
representation after consultation with associations and persons belonging to
the sector concerned.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior
determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help
but declare the designations of private defendants as sectoral representatives
null and void.
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension,
however,Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for
suspension of proceedings.Stating:
Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide
that the said appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
the privatecomplainants are entitled to their salaries and compensation for
service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial
declaration of nullity, the privatecomplainants are considered at least de
facto public officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid
appointments issued by competent authorities.
Issue: Whether or not may be considered de facto public officers entitled to
compensation for services actually rendered in the event that their
designations are finally declared invalid.
Held:
No. Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per
diems and other benefits.
The conditions and elements of de facto officer are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are
present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no actual physical
possession of the office in good faith.
Case: Aurelio Menzon vs Leopoldo Petilla and Florencio Luna, 197 SCRA 251,
GR No. 90762, May 20, 1991
Facts:
On February 16, 1988, Leopoldo Petila, Vice Governor of Leyte was
designated by the Secretary of Local Governmnet Luis Santos as acting
Governor due to the pendency of the electoral conversy of governship.
Santos also designates the petitioner, Aurelio Menzon as Vice Governer of the
same province. (March 25, 1988)
On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente Quintero inquired from
the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto Rubullar,
Page 20 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS
Jr. as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-
Governer of Leyte.
Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar, Jr. stated on his reply that since B.P. 337 has
no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case
of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary
Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice- Governor who is temporarily
performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the
functions of both offices.
On July 7, 1989, a special session was held and a resolution was issued
invalidating the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Resolution: the circumstances obtaining at present in the Office of the
Vice-Governor is that there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in
said office. The Honorable Leopoldo E. Petilla assumed the Office of
the Vice-Governor after he took his oath of office to said position.
Petitioner, through his counsel, sought clarification from Rubillar. Rubillar
replied and explained that the fact he (Menzon) was temporarily designated
to perform the functions of the vice-governor could not be considered that he
succeeds to such office for it is basic that the designation is merely an
imposition of additional duties to be performed by the designee in the
addition to the official functions attached to his office.
In view of the clarifacatory letter, the Regional Director of the Local
Government, Resurrecion Salvatierra wrote a letter to the Acting-Governor,
Petila, requesting the latter to correct the resolution and to pay the Acting
Vice-Governor his salary if deprived of such.
The Acting Governor refused to modify the resolution to give the petitioner’s
salary. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
He sought to nullify the resolution and the payment of his salaries.
During the pendency of the petition, the Provincial Treasurer, Florencio Luna,
allowed payment to the petitioner of his salary.
On August 28, 1990, the court dismissed the petition of Menzon.
CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Adelina Larazabal, the newly proclaimed Governor, direct the petitioner to
pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation
which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
On September 21, 1990, Menzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying
that he be entitled to the emoluments for the services rendered as designated
acting Vice-Governor because of the principles of good faith, simple justice
and equity.
Issue: Whether or not the temporary appointment of Menzon as the acting
Vice-Governor is valid and if he is entitled to emoluments.
Held:
Yes, the appointment has the color of validity.
The law on Public Officer is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy
whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. Applying
the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of
the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor
Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the
office to which he was elected was left barren (unproductive) of a legally
qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
It was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted
in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary
of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need
to fill up the position during the period it was vacant.
In view of the foregoing, In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be
paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The
petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. Upon the principle of
public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the
salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-
Governor of the province of Leyte.
F: There is no proof to show that Petilla is performing the duties of both offices.
Can a de facto receive salary? Yes.
Page 21 of 22
ADMINISTRATION LAW PRELIMS - MIDTERMS USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Case: Melanio Sampayan, et. al. Diego Turia, Jr. and Leonardo Tiozon vs Raul Moreover, the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Daza, 213 SCRA 807 GR No. 103903, September 11, 1992 Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent
since his term has already expired.
Facts:
Furthermore, as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to
Melanio Sampayan, Diego Turia and Leonardo Tiozon, herein petitioners, are reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid
residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar. On October as those of a dejure officer. And as a de facto officer, he is entitled to
18, 1992, they filed a petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent emoluments for actual services rendered.
Raul Daza, who is the incumbent Congressman of the same district, from
continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is
a greencard holder and lawful permanent resident of the United States. They
also alleged Daza has violated Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 18, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution because he has not, by any act
of declaration, renounced his status of a permanent resident.

Congressman Daza denied on his comment that although he was accorded

a permanent residency status, he had long waived his status when he
returned to the Philippines.

On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before that on April 2, 1992, they filed
a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Daza from running in the recent
May elections on the basis of Section 68 of Omnibus Election Code and that
the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
Daza from June 1987 to June 1992. Daza countered that the petition should
be dismiss because the case has become moot when Daza was granted a US
non-immigrant visa.

Issue: Whether or not Congressman Daza should be disqualified as a member

of the House of Representatives for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled in negative because the prohibition case should
be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the reason
that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of
his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.

CANO – FILIPINAS – URSUA – GITAN Page 22 of 22