86  women in Turkish political

thought: between

 tradition and modernity

Simten Cos¸ar

abstract
This article aims at revealing the patriarchal pattern that has dominated Turkish
political thought in the 20th century. I analyse the construction of woman’s identity in
the writings of three prominent thinkers of the early-republican era (1923–1945);
namely, Ahmet Aǧaoǧlu, Peyami Safa and Zekeriya Sertel. The thinkers are
deliberately chosen since each represents challenging political dispositions vis-à-
vis the others. Ahmet Aǧaoǧlu is a liberal-nationalist, Peyami Safa is a well-known
conservative thinker and Zekeriya Sertel is a leftist. However, despite the differences
between and/or opposing foundations of their approaches all the three thinkers agree
that there is a universally valid woman nature, attested by women’s reproductive
function, and approach the ‘woman issue’ on the basis of this assumption. The
thinkers also argue that participation of women in public sphere inevitably results in
their masculinization. Moreover, they distinguish between femininity and womanhood
and offer their ideal models of womanhood. Although one can trace differences
among the models, all converge on the concept of ‘nation’s motherhood’ as the most
significant feature of ideal womanhood. The main argument of the article is that
women’s subordination in the Turkish context is reinforced by the wide acceptance of
these assumptions, and is further reproduced by the exclusion of the construction of
gender typologies in the studies on Turkish political thought for a considerably long
time.

keywords
modern Turkish political thought; women’s subordination; woman nature; feminist
criticism

feminist review 86 2007 113

(113–131)
c 2007 Feminist Review. 0141-7789/07 $30 www.feminist-review.com
 introduction
The past two decades have witnessed substantial increase in academic
publications on the construction of gender typologies in Turkey. This increase
can be attributed to two related factors. First, in the post-1980 era, a relatively
autonomous feminist movement has emerged, especially from within the leftist
circles of the previous decades. Second, starting with the early 1990s, women’s/
gender studies programmes were established in Turkish universities. However,
except for the feminist literature on Kemalism, the founding ideology of Turkish
Republic, and on the republican model of woman, in-depth feminist analysis of
the construction of gender typologies in the history of Turkish political thought is
still demanding.1 1 For recent works
on Turkish political
thought with a view
This article aims to contribute to a feminist re-reading of Turkish political thought to the woman issue
by deciphering the intellectual aspects of patriarchal political structure. I analyse see Kandiyoti (1991)
and Bora (2005).
the construction of women’s identity in the works of three significant thinkers of
the early-republican era (1923–1945): Ahmet Aǧaoǧlu (1869–1939), Peyami Safa
(1899–1961), and M. Zekeriya Sertel (1890–1980); a liberal nationalist, a
prominent conservative thinker, and a leftist respectively.2 Aǧaoǧlu was one of the 2 On Aǧaoǧlu’s
political thought see
significant members of the Turkist movement in the last decade of the Ottoman Cos¸ar (2002, 2004)
Empire. After the foundation of the Republic (1923) he served in the second and and Shissler (2003).
For Safa’s
third national assemblies, worked as the General Director of Press, taught at conservatism see
Ankara Law Faculty and Istanbul University. In addition to his books, he published İrem (1997) and
Öǧün (1997).
the daily, Akın, and wrote in several other newspaper and journals. He participated
in the formation of liberal Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party, SCF)
(August–November 1930). Aǧaoǧlu’s liberalism was displayed in his opposition to
étatism and single-party rule, which he thought tended to dictatorship. Safa
earned his life from journalism. He worked as a columnist in various dailies and
journals, which at times had opposing ideological identities, such as Cumhuriyet
and Ulus on the one hand, and Resimli Ay and Tan on the other. While the first two
figured as the official publications of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s
Party, CHP), the state party of the period, the third and fourth were published by
the prominent ‘socialist’ intellectuals of the period, like Nazım Hikmet, Sabiha
Sertel and Zekeriya Sertel. Apart from his philosophical works, which extensively
focused on modernity, East and West, Safa also wrote novels and compiled reading
books for primary education. Sertel, too, was involved in Turkist intellectual circles
during the First World War and Independence War (1918–1922). Like Safa, he
earned his life from journalism. He also worked for the state as the General
Director of Press, and compiled reading books for primary education. He is most
known in Turkish politics with the Tan incident (4th December 1945) when the
printing office of his newspaper, Tan, was wrecked by a fascist group, composed
mainly of university students. It was declared that the attack was aimed against
the communist leaning of the Tan circle, and ‘destructive’ criticisms that were
raised against the CHP in the articles published in the newspaper.

114 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

 Aǧaoǧlu’s works are important for understanding the convergences and divergences
between Republican liberalism and Kemalism on the woman issue and for tracing
the roots of the delayed inclusion of women’s rights discourse into Turkish liberal
thought, as late as 1990s. Safa’s effectiveness in Turkish political thought is
marked by his acclaimed prominence as a conservative intellectual whose works
have been widely read. The protagonists of his novels have been taken as role
3 Berktay (1999) models.3 His novels have also served as moral books.4 And Sertel’s thought gains
notes that especially
male university significance when his involvement in Turkish left during its formation period is
students with rural taken into consideration. (Post-1980 autonomous feminist movement has sprung
origins display
remarkable interest from within the socialist movement of the previous decades.)
in Safa’s works.
4 The main theme of The article is composed of four parts. In the first part, I present a review of the
Safa’s novels can dominant paradigm – that is, modernization – that has had significant effects on
also be found in the
scenarios of the women’s socio-political status in Turkey. In so doing, I focus on Kemalism, and
popular movies of Kemalist measures taken for the ‘emancipation’ of women from the ‘clutches of
the late 1970s and
1980s. These movies tradition’. In the second part, I analyse the reflections of the political arguments
were mainly about
the moral of the three thinkers on the formation of the republican women’s identity. In the
devastation that third part, I decipher the thinkers’ conceptualizations of ‘woman’s nature’ and
rural women who
migrated to big ‘ideal woman’. In the concluding part, I discuss the implications of the dominance
cities experienced.
An earlier example is of patriarchal mentality in Turkish political thought for Turkish feminism.
the cinematization
of Safa’s novel,
Sözde Kızlar, in 1967
(directed by Nejat
women and the republican struggle against the
Saydam) under the
same name. The past
inscription in the
beginning and end of In early-republican era, Turkish society and polity underwent a significant
the movie is
significant: ‘We transformation process. This process, carried by the leading (predominantly)
dedicate this movie
to honorable Turkish military cadres of the Independence War, had already started by the encounter of
girls, to mothers and Ottoman Empire with Western modernization in early 19th century. The 19th
fathers who are the
great protagonists century also marked the declining period of the Empire. The Ottoman political
of the struggle for
bringing up good elite tried to reverse the decline process in terms of saving the state with resort
children, and to the to modernization. The main issue that dominated the debates about saving the
members of vice
squad who work for Empire was the compatibility of modernization with Islam. Aside from the
this aim with great attempts of Young Ottomans to synthesize Islam and modernization (Mardin,
sacrifice’.
1962), there emerged two contending strands of thought: Islamism and
Westernism. By the turn of the century, at the heyday of the penetration of
nationalism into Ottoman lands, a third strand of political thought was included
into this scheme: Turkism. After the rather short and futile flirtation with the
formula of Ottomanism – that is, uniting all the millets, which were distinguished
along ethno-religious lines on the basis of loyalty to the Ottoman state – the
ruling cadre opted for Turkish nationalism (Berkes, 1964).
It is no surprise that the woman issue occupied a significant place in these
debates. (As noted by Göle (1996) the conflict between Westernists and Islamists
still continues on the axis of the woman issue in contemporary Turkey). Ottoman

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 115

 reform process that started with Tanzimat (1839–1876) and continued throughout
the century gradually introduced new conceptions and practices, which
(in)directly affected women’s social status. The debates and reforms eventually
opened the way for the rise of women’s voices in the public sphere. Although the
reforms were carried by male rulers and masculine voices dominated the debates,
women began to organize around numerous associations and journals. Apart from
charity work that characterized the activities of most of the women’s
associations in the period, women were also voicing demands for social equality
(Çakır, 1996; Zihnioǧlu, 2003).
These demands were started to be recognized at the turn of the century in a war-
thorn context. Early 20th century marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, first by
the Balkan Wars, then by the First World War and Independence War. As might be
expected, war conditions necessitated women’s active participation in public.
Thus, almost simultaneously with the rise of Turkism as the most plausible
political option among the ruling cadres, women got the right to education,5 and 5 Yaraman (2001)
notes that the first
their access to employment opportunities increased (Yaraman, 2001). Ottoman girls’ school had
women’s movement evolved in accordance with the conditions of the period and been founded in
1778, first girls’
was articulated into Turkish nationalist movement (Kandiyoti, 1991). secondary school
was founded in 1862,
Republican structure was founded on the Ottoman past, which contained all the and girls’ teacher
school in 1869.
contradictions of an empire in decline. As for the woman issue, the However, women got
contradictions can be found in the coexistence of the escalating visibility of the right to higher
education in
women’s movement and the reforms that relatively improved the conditions of 1913–1914.
women on the one hand, and the patriarchal mentality that dominated the
reform process and the articulation of women’s movement into the nationalist
movement, on the other. The contradiction was further evinced by the emphasis
in Republican ruling discourse on total break with the Ottoman past. The change
in the structure of political regime from sultanate to republic, the abolition of
the caliphate, the adoption of the Latin alphabet were all attempts for the
construction of a new regime that were meant to ensure the break. In fact,
Republican setting provided the Turkish modernizing elite with the appropriate
milieu for full implementation of the reforms whose intellectual roots can be
found in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. As noted above, Turkism was
the winner of the contesting traditions of thought that took issue with
modernization, and the prime task in early-republican period turned out to be
nation-state construction. The reformers tended to perceive the Turkish people as
heroic, having the potential to progress and reach at the highest level of
civilization, while at the same time emphasizing their immaturity, and thus the
need to awaken their Republican consciousness. This mentality required a top-
down socio-political transformation that would be planned, regulated and
realized by modernizing elites.
One of the most significant implications of modernizing mentality for women can
be cited as the abolition of shariah laws and the adoption of Swiss Civil Code

116 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

 (1926), which ensured relatively equal rights in marriage, family and inheritance
laws. Besides, through the unification of education (1924), the right to
participate in local elections (1930) and subsequently in general elections
(1934), the women were given the institutional means for public visibility. In
malestream literature, these developments are constantly emphasized as the
major means for ‘women’s emancipation’. However, as Z. Arat argues, the reforms
‘were seen as tools for national development rather than as means that would
enable y [the women] to develop an individual y or y collective
consciousness’ (Arat, 1994: 59; see also Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991;
Kadıoǧlu, 1998; Saktanber, 2002).
The hindrance of the attempts for the formation of independent feminist
organization substantiates this argument. The attempt to form Kadınlar Halk
Fırkası (Women’s People’s Party, KHF) even before the foundation of CHP is an
example. In 1924 the KHF was forced to reorganize into Türk Kadınlar Birliǧi
(Turkish Women’s Association, TKB) (Toprak, 1988). The Association dissolved
itself in 1935 on the grounds that equality between men and women was fully
achieved, and thus nothing was left to struggle for women’s rights in Turkey
(Zihnioǧlu, 2003).
At this point, it is possible to argue that the ruling cadres not only undermined
the attempts for independent feminist organization but also hegemonized
women’s movement. Latife Bekir’s – the incumbent head of TKB – statement can
be read as a symbolic manifestation of this hegemonization: ‘We delightfully
dissolve the Association y We are all members of the party (CHP), charity
organizationsy . We will be active in these organizations’ (Zihnioǧlu, 2003: 258).
The implication was that in terms of republican modernization, women were
thought to have taken their share of modernity. Besides, the expulsion of Nezihe
Muhiddin – the head of the TKB before Latife Bekir – who dared to act
independently from CHP substantiates the consummation of the marriage
between women’s movement and the patriarchal setting of the period (Zihnioǧlu,
2003). Thus, it has been argued that Kemalist reforms neither aimed nor led to
the dissolution of the patriarchal structure that had been infused into the private
and public spheres. Instead, they were instrumental in the transformation of the
mode of patriarchy from sultanic to republican texture (Berktay, 2003).
Kemalism built its hegemony as a nation-state constructing discourse. It offered
a synthesis between nationalism and Westernism that enmeshed women’s
6 Yaraman (2001) movement.6 The synthesis provided women with the means for liberation from
argues that Turkish
women’s movement Ottoman-Islamic tradition while reproducing the patriarchal structure by turning
until post-1980 them into symbols of national identity in the process of the construction of
period has gone
through the first national tradition (Arat, 1994; Abu-Lughod, 1998). The signifier position of the
wave – aiming at women also worked for ensuring the ‘modern’ nature of the republican regime.
equality according
to male norms, and The ‘new woman’ model was idealized not only by the ruling (male) cadre but also
that the second
by the women from within the women’s movement. Briefly, the ‘new woman’ was

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 117

 defined as an ‘enlightened’ mother in the private sphere and a ‘masculinized’ phase (equality with
differences) started
social actor (Kandiyoti, 1995). in the late 1980s and
is still continuing.
It can be argued that in Kemalist discourse the ideal republican woman was
subjected to double subordination. First, her femininity was drawn within the
limits of wifehood and motherhood. Second, she was required to enter the public
sphere devoid of any hint of femininity that would connote a self-chosen sexual
identity. As Kandiyoti (1998: 282) notes, ‘[A] persistent anxiety over sexual
morality lodged itself at the heart of the ‘modern’ woman. With segregation and
the veil removed, women incurred the constant risk of overstepping dangerous
boundaries, which now required diffuse but persistent monitoring’. This
combination involved education in and internalization of the Republican virtue.
This new virtue led to a new style of confining woman’s body whose sexual
identity was re-conceptualized by the modernizing male elite:7 7 I would like to
thank Tuba Kancı for
her comments on the
y especially in our big cities our clothing does not reflect our identity. In our cities our argument that
republican
women appear in two [types] of extreme clothing. They either veil themselves into womanhood
darkness, or wear such indecent dresses, which you cannot see even in the most liberal necessitated a
nonsexual existence.
balls of Europe. The path to be followed is to incorporate the great Turkish woman to our As Kancı argues, the
Republic determined
work life, to share our lives with her, to make her the partner, friend, assistant of man in the form and
science, moral, social and economic lifey . Even the most conservative nation of the contours of woman’s
sexuality, rather
world admires the woman who participates in scientific and artistic movements, social than turning women
into nonsexual and/
movements and who is not veiled, but who dresses in a virtuous way. or asexual entities.
(Atatürk, quoted in İlyasoǧlu, 2000: 71).

betwixt and between nation’s motherhood and

masculinization
The attribution of a signifier position to women in both the attempts to define
Turkish national tradition and to modernize the society was not reserved to the
agenda of ruling Republican cadres. Women and woman’s body were used as
symbols in the opposition to modernization project, to the nature of modernizing
reforms, or to the way reforms were implemented. For example, Aǧaoǧlu opposed
the way reforms were implemented. But he shared the Kemalist imagination of
ideal Turkish women. Safa ultimately opposed the essence of the ongoing
modernization project. One of the most decisive aspects of this opposition was
his essentialist approach to woman. Sertel, on the other hand, opposed both the
policies of Kemalist state and CHP, and offered an alternative scheme of
modernization, which he based on egalitarianism. For Sertel, once egalitarianism
was achieved women’s liberation would automatically be materialized. On the
whole, all the three thinkers took issue with the modernization project and
consistently referred to women as symbols in differentiating between ‘false’ and
‘true’ modernization.

118 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

Aǧaoǧlu conceptualized modernization within the framework of a pro-Enlight-
enment approach (Georgeon, 1996), and in terms of East–West divide. For him,
East had lagged behind the West due to two reasons. The first was the particular
course of development that Islam – as a major Eastern feature – has gone
through. The second was the late emergence or lack of national consciousness in
the East (Aǧaoǧlu, 1923). Aǧaoǧlu’s acquiescence to the Kemalist modernization
project was in line with such a conceptualization. However, he offered a milder
approach to the social role of Islam as compared to the hard-line laicist stance
that came to characterize Kemalism.
In his İslamiyet’te Kadın (Woman in Islam), published when he was engaged in the
Turkist movement, Aǧaoǧlu (1985) traced the roots of the decline of women’s
status in Muslim societies. For him Islam per se was not the main cause behind
the decline. He argued that the Koran embodied the moral rules and principles
that ensured equality between men and women, and improved women’s status in
every aspect, including intellectual enrichment. He put the blame on the rise of
Persian dominance in the Islamic world for hindering this progressive potential
(Aǧaoǧlu, 1985).
By women’s subordination, Aǧaoǧlu meant the restriction of women to the domestic
sphere. Again referring to the Persian model and its negative influence in Muslim
societies, he argued that both the exclusion of women from the social sphere and
the increasing regularity of polygamy have led to ‘ythe annihilation of woman’s
personalityy’ and eventually, to the rise of ‘ythe spirit of decadence’ (Aǧaoǧlu,
1985: 53). This was so, because women, deprived of their previously high
intellectual and social status, were turned into commodities of their husbands, and
were enslaved in domestic life (Aǧaoǧlu, 1985). Finally, he concluded that such a
development harmed the fabric of the family. For Aǧaoǧlu devastation in the family
and in the status of women was the main cause that led to the decline of the East.
Aǧaoǧlu (1939) identified the East with egoism and the West with altruism. This
characterization is based on his conceptualization of the individual. Aǧaoǧlu
conceptualized the individual as a dual self. For him, the individual inherently
possesses two polar features; ‘inner self’ and ‘outer self’. ‘Outer self’ is
indifferent towards the others, egocentric, and lacks the feeling of responsibility
(Aǧaoǧlu, 1933). This part represents the ‘raw rationality’ of the individual
(Aǧaoǧlu, 1936). ‘Inner self’ on the other hand, tends to ‘solidarity’ (Aǧaoǧlu,
1930), is ‘virtuous’, ‘wise’ (Aǧaoǧlu, 1933), and is in the origin of the
voluntaristic acts of the individual (Aǧaoǧlu, 1936). For Aǧaoǧlu, the historical
decadence caused by the route that Islam had taken hindered the rise of ‘inner
self’ vis-à-vis ‘outer self’ in the East. He thought that such a predicament is also
related to the absence of national consciousness, which is taken as a guarantee
for avoiding egoism. Within this framework, Aǧaoǧlu (1930) gave a picture of his
ideal system in his Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde (On the Land of Free People).
Briefly, the Land of Free People is a country ruled by enlightened citizens. The

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 119

 newcomers and the youth are educated in the modus operandi of the system,
which is based on a certain ethical code. The ethical code is expressed in relation
to voluntary surrendering of individuals’ egoistic orientation to the responsibility
felt to the res publica – that is, the nation.
In this system, women have the right to public visibility on the basis of national
duties. Women’s national duties are directly related to motherhood and wifehood
roles, which necessitate a state of consciousness by means of intellectual
development through national education. In this respect, women are expected to
use their intellectual capacities as ‘conscious mother[s] and wives’. Thus, they
should not be confined to the familial sphere; but be active members of the
nation, whose public responsibilities are directly linked to their domestic roles.
These women were thought to be the potential nurturers and educators of the
national leader(s). Their significance for Aǧaoǧlu was based on his contention
that the ‘ynations do not frequently give birth to leadersy’ (Aǧaoǧlu, 1930:
21). Although he noted that there had been such women in both pre-Islamic
Turkish and Muslim societies, he claimed that at the turn of the 20th century it
was necessary to refer to Europe for intellectual enrichment (Aǧaoǧlu, 1985).
Safa, too, was concerned about East–West comparison on the basis of a
particular conceptualization of the ‘modern’. Analysis of Safa’s pattern of
thought reveals shifts in his philosophical and political orientation. As elaborated
by Yılmaz (2003), these shifts did not amount to an inherently contradictory
philosophical and political profile, but they attest the adaptation of conservative
stance to changing dynamics. Despite the shifts the main problematique of
Safa’s works – that is, the East–West dichotomy – and his approach to this
problematique with a nationalistic political perspective remained constant.
In approaching national identity Safa, like Aǧaoǧlu, referred to national
consciousness, emerging in the course of history. Since Safa was content that
such consciousness was not matured in Turkish society he argued for an idealist
state and an appropriate education system that ingrains national attributes in
young generations. However, unlike Aǧaoǧlu, Safa’s nationalistic stance was not
supplemented by a liberal Enlightenment tune; rather it was fed by mysticism. He
defined national identity as ‘yunity of spirit and body in a national
anatomyy’ (Safa, 1961: 190–191).

Human being is a sacred concept, but on the condition that [we do not] separate it from
the idea of nation and race, which makes him a reality. Just as a single human being has an
organic body and a soul, the human community also has a body and a soul. The body of
human community is race, and nation is its soul. Without these, human being looses his
sacredness and becomes an empty concepty
(Safa, 1941a: 224).8 8 In Turkish
pronouns are not
The quotation above also explains Safa’s fervent opposition to liberalism and gendered. However,
considering Safa’s
socialism. For Safa these ideologies were doctrinaire since their assumptions were

120 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

pattern of thought I based on a conceptualization of human being that is impossible to materialize.
used ‘he’ for ‘human
being’ in the He held that the premises of these ideologies were doomed to fail (Safa, 1960:
translation. 186–187). Proposing his traditionalist-conservative alternative as the most
reasonable one, he claimed that traditionalism was the essence of national
consciousness, and underlined the historical success of nationalism vis-à-vis
liberalism and socialism (Safa, 1959).
Woman’s body is one of the most recurrent topics in Safa’s attack especially to
socialists. In this respect, while accusing the (male) ‘leftists’ for aiming at
destroying the family morals by encouraging ‘intellectual prostitutes’ (Safa,
1956: 180) he condemned the communist women and feminists for representing
the ‘daughters of Lilith, who want to turn into men, who have deep voices, big
hands, fat feet, callused skin, whose hairy chin are tightened with the claim to
dominate, and who are chatterbox and quarrelsome’, and praised ‘the daughters
of Eve, who are soft and lithe, sweet and full of the essence of easy adaptation,
ingratiating and cheerfuly’(Safa, 1937: 81). Apart from such derogatory
criticisms, Safa insistently focused on woman’s body and nature in reading
Turkish modernization. In line with his attempts to reach a synthesis between
Eastern values and Western material achievements, and thus to argue for the
proper path to ‘true’ modernization he used woman’s body to explicate social
decadence, resulting from ‘false’ modernization.
Unlike Aǧaoǧlu, for Safa, modernization-as-Westernization could not be a
reference point for gaining national consciousness. He perceived the former as
a major threat to the latter. Safa argued that ‘true’ modernization meant a
balanced integration of science and spirit. He thought that the spirit was rooted
in traditions, and any change that threatened traditions would also pose a risk to
national survival. It is with such an understanding that he disapproved the
technical innovations that eased the burden of housework on women, which for
him ‘y make woman’s labor unnecessaryy [and thus] which represent the
most terrorizing rival of the housewife’ (Safa, 1990: 23, original year of
publication unknown). It turns out that in Safa’s line of thought, woman’s
national responsibility was defined within the contours of domestic sphere.
In total contrast to Safa, Sertel perceived scientific and technological innovation
as a means for women’s liberation (Z. Sertel, 1994: 15). He argued that
housewifery was identical with servanthood, and that scientific progress would
free women from housework and give them the opportunity to step out of
domestic sphere and participate in public life. For Sertel, women’s participation
in public life was a positive development for the nation as a whole. Putting the
blame on Islam and traditional value systems for the subordination of women in
late Ottoman Empire, Sertel claimed that by the replacement of the established
customs by national spirit not only women but also Turkish nation would be
emancipated from backwardness and imperialism (Z. Sertel, 1911, cited in
Y. Sertel, 2002).

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 121

 Similar to Aǧaoǧlu and Safa, it is also possible to trace nationalistic elements in
Sertel’s works. He admitted that he admired the West, which for him symbolized
development in all aspects; scientific, political and economic. At the same time,
he was keen on emphasizing that he refrained from ‘unconditional’ Westernism.
For him, unconditional Westernism ‘y would mean fantasizing’, and an
intellectual surrender to ‘Western imperialism’. Sertel defined his nationalistic
preference in terms of ‘constructive nationalism’, which he explicated as caring
for the future of one’s nation without recourse to essentialist and/or expansionist
ideals (Z. Sertel, 2000: 64; Y. Sertel, 2002: 50).
Sertel’s ‘constructive nationalism’ contained an emphasis on mothering as a
significant component of national development. Thus, despite his views on
housework he could not refrain from the patriarchal mode of thinking in taking
childbearing and childrearing as women’s primary functions. Sertel advocated
that for a nation to progress, the ‘mothers’ should be educated in order to bring
up healthy children (Z. Sertel, 1911). For him, a ‘healthy’ generation meant a
generation, cognizant of its rights and liberties vis-à-vis the government. He
thought that such an upbringing could be achieved by a ‘democratic education’
system that would convey democratic culture to all the people of the land
equally. Only then, he argued, the people would be equipped with the means to
control the government, and if necessary, to overrule it.
Sertel’s emphasis on equality is not restricted to the educational sphere. He
thought that the state should guarantee economic equality, which for him was
the cornerstone of a democratic regime. He asserted that liberalism privileged
the individual at the expense of the masses, while étatism guaranteed equality
for all so long as it did not turn into state capitalism. In this respect, Sertel’s
stance was based on the contention that the true owners of the country were the
poor masses and that the rich had no sense of belonging to a land or of
nationality at all (Y. Sertel, 2002: 121 124).
This blend of nationalism with humanitarian and democratic stance in Sertel’s
thought was shaped within a leftist frame (Z. Sertel, 2000). In parallel, Sertel
argued that women, as part of the human race, should have equal civil, social
and political rights (Z. Sertel, 1911). While maintaining his conviction that
motherhood is indispensable for national development, he nevertheless accepted
the (partial) liberation of women from their domestic responsibilities. For him
women’s liberation was contingent on either the development of market
conditions or state-sponsored childcare system. In this respect, he gave the USA
and the (former) USSR as examples (Z. Sertel, 1993, 1994).
Sertel (1994) emphasized economic independence as the most significant
requisite for women’s liberation. Comparing the daily life and politics in the two
countries, he concluded that in the USSR equality between men and women was
rather overly accomplished, at least at the institutional level. As for the USA, he

122 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

pointed at a different path for women’s liberation, which is again related to
technological progress and economic development. According to Sertel (1994: 79)
‘y in capitalist countries y the transition from autocratic family to
democratic family is ever harder y since the relief of women from the burden of
childcare is left to market forcesy’. Thus, for Sertel, American women were
forced to work outside due to the increasing childcare expenses. Besides, he
employed class analysis by pointing at the differences between middle/upper
middle classes and lower classes. He noted that American middle/upper middle
class women did not feel the necessity to work outside since their husbands could
afford domestic expenses. As chain effect, such a dependent position caused an
indifference towards political and public issues, which according to Sertel further
delayed women’s liberation. Unsurprisingly, Sertel concluded that for the full
accomplishment of equality between men and women the socialist system was
the ideal one.
Thus, the three thinkers Aǧaoǧlu, Safa and Sertel took issue with women’s public
roles. In doing so, they shared the same paradigmatic concern – that is, their
approach to the ‘woman issue’ was framed in terms of the problematique of
modernization. The thinkers mainly diverged with regard to their respective
ideological standpoints. However, they did converge on three points. First, they
perceived women as the assets of national salvation. Second, they reproduced
the subordination of women by readily accepting the premise that women were at
large identified with motherhood and wifehood roles. Third, they defined women’s
emancipation in terms of men’s social, economic and political status. This, in
turn, gave rise to a conviction that women’s participation in the public sphere
eventually led to their masculinization.

transcending woman’s nature: portraits of ideal

woman
Despite their ideological differences Aǧaoǧlu, Safa and Sertel shared the idea
that there is an essential woman nature. As hinted above, motherhood is
conceptualized as one of the main tenets of this nature. They asserted the
necessity of turning this tenet into an asset in building national consciousness,
and for national progress. However, each of them offered different
conceptualizations of woman’s nature and ideal woman.
Aǧaoǧlu’s interpretation of the decline of women’s status in Eastern societies
entails his ideas about woman’s nature. Aǧaoǧlu (1989) emphasized that in the
Koran men and women are treated as equal beings on the basis of humanity and
in terms of equal responsibility before God. However, he noted that equality
did not mean sameness. Citing from the Koran that ‘[W]omen are so weak that
they are unable to grasp the cunningly deceitful acts of Satan, and they are
quickly deceived. For this reason, many of their faults shall be tolerated’

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 123

 (Aǧaoǧlu, 1985: 31), Aǧaoǧlu argued that Islam encouraged men to adopt a
tolerant attitude towards women. Such an assertion certainly signifies an order
of ranking that places men at the higher echelon.
This reading of woman’s nature implies the necessity of a certain form of
cultivation for the emergence of Aǧaoǧlu’s ideal woman. Aǧaoǧlu’s ideal woman
was an intellectually sophisticated member of the nation. She used her
intellectual assets as a ‘conscious mother [and] wife’ in the training of the
children of the nation (Aǧaoǧlu, 1985: 59). Aǧaoǧlu (1985: 41) also gave the
modal example of his ideal woman; Fatma, the daughter of Muhammad, whom
he thought represented the most ideal woman in all periods: ‘y docile, mild,
virtuousy having no difference from the best educated meny’ in terms of ‘y
seriousness, modestyy’ and who can harmonize her duties as housewife with her
social responsibilities.
Compared to Aǧaoǧlu, Safa’s works display a stricter version of biological
determinism. According to Safa, woman’s sexual features form the grounds for
the social, political, economic and intellectual differences between men and
women. He defined woman’s nature with recourse to sexuality: woman ‘is a bird
of sex who has tied one edge of her most holy sentiments to her ovaries and who
cannot distinguish love from nature [read as passion]’ (Safa, 1944: 46). Thus for
Safa, women pose a threat to the society at large. In order to avoid this threat
they should be domesticated in motherhood and wifehood roles. Safa further
tried to substantiate this boundary setting with recourse to the argument that
women are socially and intellectually inferior to men. He pointed at the absence
of success stories of women in fine arts as well as in politics and business life
(Safa, 1941b). More briefly, he was content that woman’s nature is characterized
by weakness, subordinate status, formalism, unconsciousness, submissiveness,
lack of analytical and intellectual capacities, lack of imagination, and defined
woman as ‘ythe oversized child’ (Safa, 1933: 30) vis-à-vis the strong, superior,
analytical, and intellectually capacitated and mature man. It can be argued
that Safa’s thoughts on woman’s nature formed an important base for his
opposition to Kemalist modernizing reforms. For example, his argument that
women were incapable of grasping such courses as mathematics, physics, and
that gender equality in education was a futile task hints at his rejection of
unification in education. Instead, he proposed a gendered education system in
which women are trained in ‘ythe true meaning and pleasures of the house’
(Safa, 1990: 23).
Safa argued that Kemalist modernization masculinized women by stripping them
off their natural features. However, his portrayal of the ideal woman did not
endorse the natural features of women. On the contrary, except for childbearing
and childrearing functions, his model of ideal woman was based on the negation
of the features that he thought were embedded in woman’s nature. This model
required that women should be cultivated in such a way that they could avoid the

124 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

traps of modernization. In his various novels and essays on women, he offered
judgements of vice and virtue via the changes that woman’s body and physical
appearance have undergone in the modernization process. In parallel, he
criticized the changes in bodily appearances of (modernized) women brought
about by Kemalist reforms. For him these women were vivid examples of moral
decadence. He characterized them with reference to extremity: extremity in
make-up, extremity in dressing, extremity in their demands for equality with
men, extremity in love (Safa, 1935: 18):

Since the beginning of this century the wishes and desires of woman have increased y she
wants everything from us. Everything: luxurious automobile on the one hand, enfranchise on
the other; half-naked ball dress on the one hand, virtue on the other, pearled necklace and
equal wage with men, make up and sincerity, unreservedness and family care; war against
us, war for themselvesy’ .
(Safa, 1935: 17) (Emphasis added)

He thought that those demands were beyond the capacity and grasp of woman.
Safa proposed the label ‘daylight woman’ for those women whose demands
exceed their natural capacities. Daylight woman is almost an ‘extraordinar-
y.creature’, who ‘possesses all the inquisitiveness and concerns of men, and who
takes pleasure in dwelling on any matter related to human fatey’ (Safa, 1951:
21). In brief, she resembles man and has a tendency to masculinize.

Daylight woman is one among the three categories in Safa’s typology of woman.
Safa classified women on the basis of dichotomies – artificiality/authenticity,
body/spirit, individualism/personalism, materialism/moralism, unconsciousness/
(national) consciousness. These dichotomies are also vividly illustrated by the
female characters in his novels. For Safa those women who fall into the traps of
modernization acquire the undesired characteristics represented in the first
terms of the dichotomies. Those who avoid the traps do so by protecting their
traditional identities and national consciousness. Safa (1951: 21), classified the
latter type under the category of the ‘moonlight woman’ which for him
represented the ideal woman. Briefly, this type of woman has accomplished the
status of the person, who is cognizant of her past, and who lives the present with
such a cognizance. In Safa’s terms she is ‘the woman of meaning [and deserves]
to be fallen in love with’ (1951: 21–22). In his novels, Safa pictured this ideal
woman, as a ‘docile person who has concerns with the problems of [her] country’.
She is docile in love, in public standing, in speech and in physical appearance.
Moreover, she is also cognizant of her place in the society – domestic sphere that
Safa (1942: 27) equated with the family as the reflection of state at micro level.
She is also well versed in her essential role, as the mother and wife. The third
category, which Safa characterized with being a female rather than a woman,
summarizes his understanding of woman’s nature. For Safa (1951), this woman is
not a social being; rather she is a slave of her passions.

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 125

 Sertel never gave an explicit account of woman’s nature. However, reading
between the lines of his works, and especially his comparison between Soviet
woman and European woman it is possible to trace his thoughts on this issue. He
described European women with ‘coquettish behavior’, ‘interest in make up’,
‘concern with bodily beauty’, which he termed as ‘femininity’. Sertel (1993: 211)
believed that such women ‘used their femininity in order to attract men’. For him,
femininity is not identical to womanhood. He argued that Soviet women, who
were ‘more masculinized’ than their European counterparts – as a result of
economic independence – did not ‘forget their womanhood’. This meant that they
were not indifferent to sexual intercourse with men. Their difference from their
more ‘feminine’ European counterparts was manifest in the style of their
interaction with men: Soviet women were ‘lax [and] soft in sex. [They were]
easy-going’. Sertel (1993: 211) asserted that such a style was ‘an expression of
the feeling of independence’.
This portrait of the ‘feminine’ and ‘womanhood’ denotes Sertel’s imagination of
the public sphere as essentially a male sphere. In his works it is not possible to
observe any attempt to transform the masculinity of the public sphere. Femininity
and womanhood were conceptualized as non-public categories, while masculi-
nization of women in the public sphere was perceived to mark women’s liberation.
Besides, his emphasis on technological innovation and not on equal responsibility
in the domestic sphere, for freeing women from housework reveals the gendered
division between private (feminine) and public (masculine) spheres in his
thought.
Sertel was also keen to point at the drawbacks that masculinized women would
face in an unfinished social transformation. Again referring to the Soviet regime,
he gave accounts of the daily practices of Central Asian women, and concluded
that economic independence was necessary but not sufficient for women’s
emancipation. In his stay in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, Sertel witnessed
the continuing subordination of Central Asian working women in the private
sphere. He argued that in Central Asia, Islamic value system challenged the
infrastructural transformations that took place after the Soviet revolution. For
him this led to a bifurcated, and thus, even harder life for Muslim women.
According to Sertel, in these communities, while women made use of
constitutional equality in economic, political and social spheres, they were
deprived of equality at home. In his words, this meant ‘yemancipation from
servitude, but not from exploitation’ (Sertel, 1993: 214). As a solution he
advocated the eradication of Islamic tradition.
All in all, the three thinkers argued that women would or should strip off their
femininity and/or womanhood in case they enter the public sphere. In Aǧaoǧlu’s
works, the exclusion of ‘femininity’ from the public sphere was based on the
glorification of the asexual national woman. Safa took a seemingly contrasting
stance by forecasting masculinization as the detrimental fate of women who

126 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

became too visible in public, which for him was a morally devastating
development. Finally, Sertel affirmed women’s public participation at the expense
of ‘femininity’ and ‘womanhood’. As Aǧaoǧlu and Safa, Sertel, too, by defining
femininity and womanhood as a matter of private sphere offered an essentialist
view of woman’s nature, determined and/or shaped by biological/physical
factors. All the three thinkers emphasized women’s specific roles in the domestic
sphere, which they linked to their procreative capacities. They perceived the
public sphere as a male sphere, and thus took masculinity as the main reference
point in levelling the familial duties of women with their public visibility.
Although Sertel’s thought contained an emphasis on women’s emancipation from
tradition, and the seeds for the opening of leftist discourse in terms of feminist
concerns, it is imbued with patriarchal limitations since he did not question the
masculine character of the public sphere, and excluded femininity and
womanhood from the public sphere.

conclusion
The last period of Ottoman Empire witnessed the rise of a women’s movement,
which demanded legal amendments for women’s visibility in social and political
spheres. The demands of women were articulated into the male-dominated
discourse in a war-torn context, and after the foundation of Turkish Republic,
republican cadres took hold of ‘women’s emancipation’ within the framework of
nation-state building. In the state-dominant polity of early-republican era,
relatively independent women’s associations were perceived to be unnecessary.
Instead, the woman issue was considered within the context of alternative, at
times contesting ideologies. Feminist concerns hardly infiltrated into these
ideologies.
The course of women’s subordination in republican Turkey has been most affected
by the modernizing paradigm, symbolized in Kemalism. While Kemalist policies
provided an opening for women in terms of legal and political equality, they
nevertheless restricted women’s liberation within the contours of the republican
regime. In this respect, the woman issue was perceived to be a matter of
traditionality–modernity dichotomy. Those political actors and thinkers who took
issue with Kemalist modernization project approached the woman issue in the
same frame, and as a problem that could be resolved by a certain ideological
recipe other than feminism. This state of affairs inevitably undermined the rise of
the voice of women for women.
The shortcomings of these approaches did not result from the fact that all the
thinkers concerned were misogynous, but that the political thought was
embedded in a patriarchal framework. This framework was reflected in the
idealization of womanhood in terms of wifehood and (national) motherhood as

Simten Cos¸ar feminist review 86 2007 127

 opposed to femininity. This dualistic construction of woman’s self also hints at
the common grounds on which the model of ideal woman was defined within the
frame of contesting ideologies: the women were conceived primarily in relation to
their procreative functions in the family, and for the nation. Thus, although, Safa
and Sertel represented polar opposites in terms of their political preferences
neither refrained from emphasizing the childbearing and childrearing capacities
of women. Here, I shall note that this commonality does not place Safa and
Sertel on equal grounds regarding the possible extensions that their works convey
for women’s liberation in the Turkish context. While it would be futile to try to
derive a constructive reference point from Safa’s outwardly misogynous works, a
careful re-reading of Sertel’s works – keeping in mind the patriarchal limitations
– might provide an opening for feminists in struggling patriarchy. In fact, such an
opening has been started in post-1980 Turkey, primarily by the feminists from
socialist circles of the previous decade – although not with direct recourse to
Sertel’s works. A careful re-reading of Aǧaoǧlu’s works on the other hand, reveals
the relevance of his thought to contemporary ‘liberal feminists’ and ‘nationalist
women’s rights defenders’.
The dominance of masculinist intellectual milieu in the Turkish context continued
throughout the republican history. This continuity has maintained the
reproduction of patriarchy in Turkish political thought: most of the studies on
the works of prominent political thinkers have been conducted without due regard
to gender relations and patriarchy. In those rare cases where women and/or
family have been integrated into the scope of analysis, this was done without
questioning the ‘gendered expression of dualism’ (Berktay, 1999: 270) that has
put its stamp not only on Turkish political thought, but on political thought in
general.
This certainly affected and reflected the way the woman issue has been handled,
either by men or by women. Since knowledge about women are organized and
produced without questioning the patriarchal mode of thinking it was the male
who continued to be taken as ‘the norm and female [as] the submissive (or
aggressive) exception’ (Hartman, 1991: 18). Thus, the differences attributed to
women were to be reserved to the private sphere, or considered to be facts
attesting to the need for relegating women to the private sphere. This has led to
a delay in the rise of an autonomous feminist movement until the 1980s. Today, it
is yet to consolidate.
It can be argued that the reproduction of the division between Kemalist versus
Islamist political identities within contemporary Turkish women’s movement is
one of the significant factors that delay the consolidation. Today, it is apt to
point out the increasing risk of the colonization of the woman issue by the
headscarf issue. This leads to the crystallization of the division between Islamist
and/or Muslim ‘feminists’9 and Kemalist feminists. Besides, although much has 9 Here, I use
‘feminist’ in
been written on the patriarchal limitations of Kemalism and Islamism, the same

128 feminist review 86 2007 women in Turkish political thought

quotation marks cannot be said for various other strands in Turkish political thought. I argue that
since not all the
activists in Islamist a feminist re-reading of different strands in Turkish political thought would
and/or Muslim contribute to Turkish women’s movement by revealing their (patriarchal) origins.
women’s movement
accept the name Feminism has not yet hegemonized the contemporary women’s movement and this
feminist. task necessitates the elaboration of the patriarchal traps that await women
activists with different political affiliations.

acknowledgements
I thank Metin Yeǧenoǧlu for his comments on the earlier versions of this article
and Elçin Gen for her meticulous editing. I am also grateful to the two anonymons
reviewers and the editor for their invaluable suggestions. I take full responsibility
for the article.

author biography
Simten Cos¸ar teaches in the Department of Political Science and International
Relations, at Bas¸kent University, Turkey. She has conducted research on liberal
theory in general and Turkish liberal thought in particular. She has publications
on Turkish political history and Turkish liberal thought, relations between neo-
liberal politics and democracy in post-1980 Turkey in particular. Currently, she is
researching feminist politics in Turkey and the construction of gender typologies
in Turkish political thought.

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