PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, On 15 April 2004, Trestiza was acquitted of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
04, Trestiza was acquitted of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 02-3394.7 The Affidavit of
vs.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, P/S INSP. LORIEMAN* L. MANRIQUE, and RODIE J. PINEDA @
"Buboy," Accused.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 193833 is an appeal1 from the Decision2 promulgated on 30 June 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 11 June 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC. No.
03119. The appellate court affirmed the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision4 of Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393 for Kidnapping (for Ransom), 03-766 for Robbery,
and 04-1311 also for Robbery.
The trial court found appellant PO1 Froilan L. Trestiza (Trestiza) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
by direct participation of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages to Irma Navarro (Navarro) and Lawrence Yu (Yu). P/Insp. Lorieman
L. Manrique (Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) were likewise found guilty of the same crime by
the trial court, and adjudged the same sentence as Trestiza. The trial court acquitted Trestiza, Manrique and
Pineda in Criminal Case Nos. 03-766 and 04-1311.
The Facts
The following charges were brought against Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda on 20 November 2002:
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping
That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp.
Loriemar L. Manrique, both active members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a
private individual[,] all of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with one PO2 [Reynel] Jose, a member of the Philippine National Police, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of
their liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the purpose of extorting money for their safety
and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as ransom money
from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
That on or about the 16th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) Pistol Glock 21 bearing SN 035481 with
thirteen (13) rounds of live ammunitions and without the corresponding license or permit thereof, which he
carried outside of his residence.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Arrest stated that the serial number of the firearm seized was 035481, while the firearm itself had a serial
number of BRG-768. The trial court rejected the explanation that the difference between the serial numbers
was a mere typographical error.
An order8 of the trial court dated 16 April 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393, 02-3394, 03-766 and 04-1311
recounted the circumstances involved in the filing of the charges against Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda.
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping against accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson (PO1 Trestiza),
PS/Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique (PS/Insp. Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) and Criminal Case
No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions against accused PO1 Trestiza alone were
filed before this Court on 20 November 2002. Surprisingly, however, SPO2 [Reynel] Jose was not included as
an accused in the Kidnapping case although in the original Information, Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
mentions him as someone who mutually helped all the other accused in the willful, unlawful, felonious
kidnapping of private complainants Lawrence Yu y Lim (Yu) and Ma. Irma Navarro (Navarro). A Motion for
Reinvestigation dated 21 November 2002 was then filed by "all" three accused while a separate Motion for
Reinvestigation and/or Preliminary Investigation dated 22 November was filed by accused PS/Insp. Manrique.
Then Acting Presiding Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos issued the Order dated 26 November 2002 granting
the Motions filed by all accused. In the said Order, he directed the Public Prosecutor to conduct a Preliminary
Investigation of the cases filed and to furnish the Court with his Report within sixty (60) days from said date.
On 21 February 2003, Public Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos filed a Motion to Withdraw Information of
Kidnapping with Ransom and to Admit Information for Robbery with attached Resolution dated 03 January
2008. He pointed out therein that after he conducted a preliminary investigation, he found no probable cause
exists to warrant the indictment of the accused for the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom. He added that they
should be charged instead for the crimes of Robbery and Grave Threats. The Court set the hearing of this
Motion to 06 March 2003.
On 03 March 2003, private complainants appearing through Private Prosecutor Teresita G. Oledan filed an
"Urgent Motion to Hold Withdrawal of Information for Kidnapping Charge with Entry of Appearance as Private
Prosecutor." They alleged in said Motion that they were not furnished clear and certified true copies of the
Resolution dated 03 January 2003 to enable them to file their Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Withdraw.
On 05 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Makati Branch 135 sent a letter dated 26 February 2003
addressed to the Branch Clerk of this Court ostensibly transmitting the Release Order of PO1 Trestiza dated
22 February 2003 together with other pertinent documents in connection with Criminal Case No. 02-3394,
which was duly approved by the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge of said Court.1âwphi1
The Order of Release dated 22 February 2003 signed by Judge Ibay directed the Jail Warden of Makati Police
Station, Makati City to discharge from his custody the person of said accused as the latter was able to file the
corresponding bail bond in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (PHP200,000.00) thru the Plaridel
Surety and Insurance Company provided "there exists no order in any other case to the effect that he
shall remain confined under your custody." He set the arraignment of the accused on 14 March 2003 at
8:30 o’clock in the morning.
Before the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Withdraw at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 06 March 2003, the
Private Prosecutor filed her Opposition thereto at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of said date. She alleged
therein that while the Motion to Withdraw filed by Public Prosecutor Marcos prays for the withdrawal of the
Information for Kidnapping with Ransom and the substitution thereof with an Information for Robbery, the latter
Information was filed immediately with the Criminal Cases Unit of the Office of the Clerk of Court on the same
date that the Motion to Withdraw was filed with this Court on 21 February 2003. Subsequently, said
"Information for Robbery" was raffled to RTC Branch 57 on 03 March 2003 yet there was a scheduled hearing
of the Motion to Withdraw on 06 March 2003. She added that the complainants were in a quandary why the
alleged "substituted" Information for Robbery was raffled to another Court and docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-766, when this Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the original cases filed. The same case was
thereafter consolidated with this Court on 26 March 2003 as per Order dated 24 March 2003 rendered by the
1
Honorable Reinato G. Quilala, Presiding Judge thereat. Accused PS/Insp. Manrique, PO1 Trestiza, and
Pineda posted bail in this case, which was duly approved by Judge Ibay, while accused SPO2 Jose’s bail was
approved by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 133.
At the hearing to the Motion to Withdraw, then Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos gave counsel for the
accused time within which to file his comment/objection to the Urgent Motion to Hold Withdrawal of Information
for Kidnapping filed by the private complainants, furnishing the Private Prosecutor a copy thereof, who was
given the same number of days to file her Reply, if necessary. The Court likewise ordered the "re-commitment"
of all three (3) accused, who were then present at that hearing, to the custody of the Makati City Jail despite
the fact that they have already posted bail, considering that the Motion to Withdraw was still pending
resolution.
Counsel for the accused filed his Comment to the Opposition dated 10 March 2003 alleging that the same did
not bear the conformity of the Public Prosecutor who has direct control and supervision over the Private
Prosecutor as provided for under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Said Comment, to his mind, is thus a mere
scrap of paper which did not deserve any consideration by the Court.
On 13 March 2003, the Court was furnished by the private complainants a copy of their "Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 03, 2003 but Released on February 20, 2003" which they
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
xxx
On 29 May 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion for
Withdrawal of Original Information claiming that said Original Informations have subsequently been amended
by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and just "needs the court/judge[‘s] approval of the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint and for Admission of the Amended Information." Moreover, they averred that the City Prosecutor’s
Office has approved the findings of the reinvestigating Assistant City Prosecutor on the downgrading of the
original complaint. Both accused prayed that said motion be heard on 28 May 2003.
On 9 June 2003, the Private Prosecutor filed an Ex-Parte Opposition to Accused’s Motion for Withdrawal of
Original Information with Motion for Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against accused SPO2 Jose. She
alleged therein that "it is true that one of the accused’s right is the right to speedy trial. However, where, as in
this case, the stench of "something fishy" already was evident when suddenly the robbery case as amended
by Prosecutor Marcos and more recently "affirmed" by Prosecutor Sibucao, there should be further in-depth
investigation as the circumstances on how the three accused were able to post bail without the knowledge and
approval of this Honorable Court, which had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. In fact, a Petition for
Review from the Resolution of Prosecutor Sibucao denying the Private Complainants’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the 03 January 2003 Resolution of Prosecutor Marcos duly approved by the City
Prosecutor has been seasonably filed." She further alleged that, the Urgent Motion allegedly filed by accused
PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique does not include accused SPO2 Jose, also a member of the Police
Force. However, the records show that the latter also "post bail" for the Robbery case and was in fact "outside"
the Chamber of this Honorable Court when the hearing was being conducted. "However, when she went out to
look for him, SPO2 Jose was able to do a ‘Houdini’ and disappeared from view." Private Prosecutor Oledan
prayed for the deferment of the proceedings herein until the final resolution of the Petition for Review.
Referring back to the Urgent Motion to Resolve by accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique, considering
that the latter prayed for it to be heard on 28 May 2003, but filed said Motion the following day only, the same
was then set for hearing on 10 June 2003. On the same date, the Private Prosecutor furnished the Court a
copy of their Petition for Review which they filed with the Department of Justice. In the meantime, the Branch
Clerk of this Court issued a Certification to the effect that Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos was on official
leave until 15 July 2003 and that there is an Urgent Motion to be resolved. Pairing Judge Manuel D. Victorio,
acting on the Urgent Motion, issued the Order of even date directing the City Prosecution Office to submit to
the Court the complete records of its Preliminary Investigation within five (5) days from notice, thereafter the
same shall be considered for resolution.
On 23 June 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution of the Pending Motion
to Resolve, reiterating the grounds stated in his previous Motion.
Before the issue could be resolved by the Pairing Judge, however, the Honorable Estela Perlas Bernabe, took
over this Court as Assisting Presiding Judge, after the Honorable Salvador S. Abad Santos requested the
Supreme Court to be relieved of his assignment herein. Judge Bernabe issued the Order dated 27 June 2003
holding in abeyance the Resolution of the Prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information for a period of sixty
(60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review by private complainants with the Reviewing Office. On 08
July 2003, she denied the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearms
filed against accused PO1 Trestiza on the grounds that the allegations raised by said accused are defenses
proper for determination in a full-blown trial and set the pre-trial of the same to 24 July 2003. Trial on the
merits for this particular Criminal Case ensued until the Prosecution rested its case and said accused filed his
Demurrer to Evidence on 05 March 2004.
In the meantime, without any word yet as to the outcome of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ relative
to Criminal Case No. 02-3393, Judge Bernabe issued the Order dated 28 August 2003, directing the City
Prosecution Office to conduct a re-assessment and re-evaluation of the evidence presented and to submit its
report and recommendation within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of said Order. The Resolution of the
subject Motion was again held in abeyance.
On 02 March 2004, the Prosecution filed a "Motion to Resolve (Motion to Withdraw Information of Kidnapping)
with attached Order dated 19 February 2004. It alleged therein that it conducted a thorough re-assessment
and re-evaluation of the evidence obtaining in this case in compliance with the Order of this Court dated 28
August 2003 and maintains that the correct and appropriate charges to be filed against accused should be for
ROBBERY and GRAVE THREATS but for two (2) counts each, and NOT for KIDNAPPING as initially filed.
Thus, it prayed for this Court to be allowed to withdraw the present Information for Kidnapping "considering
that the appropriate charges of two (2) counts of Robbery and two (2) counts of Grave Threats in lieu of the
charge of KIDNAPPING have already been filed with the proper Courts."
To justify the Prosecution’s withdrawal of the Information for KIDNAPPING, Public Prosecutor Edgardo G.
Hirang states, in the Order attached to the said Motion, that, to wit:
"A careful re-evaluation of the pieces of evidence adduced by both parties shows that the offense of
Kidnapping shall not prosper against all the accused. As correctly stated in the Resolution issued on February
20, 2003, one of the essential elements for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized under
[Article] 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is that [the] offender must be a private individual which
does not obtain in the case at bar as respondents Trestiza, Manrique, and Jose are public officers being police
officers who at the time the complainants were allegedly divested of their cash money and personal
belongings by herein respondents, were conducting a police operation to enforce the provision of the
Dangerous Drug Law (R.A. 9165).
All accused were in the place of the incident to conduct such operation is shown not only by the existence of
coordination between them and the police authorities but also by the declaration of the complainants that they
were able to verify the plate number of the vehicle of the accused from the Makati Police Station.
Hence, they should be charged with the offense of Robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code and Grave Threats as recommended by this Office in its Resolution issued on February 20, 2003.
Considering that there are two (2) complainants, the respondents should be charged with two (2) counts of
Robbery and Grave Threats."
The Prosecution filed on the same date a Motion to Amend Information and to Admit Attached Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 02-766 alleging that the Criminal Information therein for Robbery should only
be limited to private complainant Yu’s complaint and not to Navarro’s. Counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose Ma.
Q. Austria, filed an Urgent Motion to calendar the hearing of the Motion to Amend Information and to Admit
Amended Information which the Court granted in its Order dated 25 March 2004.
2
In the meantime, Criminal Case No. 04-1311 for Robbery which was filed on the strength of the Complaint of
Navarro was consolidated with similar cases pending before this Court, upon the Order dated 12 March 2004
by the Honorable Ma. Cristina J. Cornejo, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 147.
After study, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping under Criminal Case No. 02-3393;
2. To [sic] GRANT the Motion to Amend Information for Robbery; [and]
3. To [sic] Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against SPO2 Jose in Criminal
Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information relative thereto shall have been duly amended by the
Prosecution.
In its Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping, the Public Prosecutor argues in essence that the crime of
Kidnapping could not be possibly committed by the accused as they, except for one, are police officers, who at
the time the complainants were divested of cash and other personal belongings were conducting a police
operation to enforce the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This to the mind of the movant runs counter
to the provisions of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,
or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The Court finds this unmeritorious. Even a public officer can commit the said crime within the context of the
aforesaid legal provision. This is settled in our jurisprudence in the case of People vs. ALIPIO SANTIANO,
JOSE SANDIGAN, et al. (GR No. 123979[,] December 3, 1998) which provides in part:
"The fact alone that appellant Pillneta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant Sandigan a
member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in
abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of official functions nor in the
pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that
they have acted in concert with their co-appellant Santiano and Chanco."
Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B. Regalado elucidates on this point clearly:
"This article provides that the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are committed by private
individuals obviously because if the offender is a public officer the crime is arbitrary detention under Art. 124,
but passing sub silentio on the matter of kidnapping. It should be understood however, that the public officer
who unlawfully detains another and is punishable by Art. 124 is one who has the duty to apprehend a person
with a correlative power to detain him. If he is only an employee with clerical or postal functions, although the
Code considers him as a public officer, his detention of the victim is illegal detention under this article since he
is acting in a private, and not an official, capacity. If a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when legally
authorized as part of police operations, he cannot also be said to be acting in an official capacity, hence he is
to be treated as a private individual liable under this article. (underscoring ours)
From the purpose and the formulation of R.A. 18 and R.A. 1084, it can be deduced that the legislative
intendment was to put all forms of kidnapping under Art. 267 when Congress amended it together with Art.
270. There appears to have been some oversight, however, in the related articles and these will be discussed
at the proper juncture." (Florenz B. Regalado, Pages 488 and 489, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition,
March 2000)
As to whether or not the accused were indeed engaged in the performance of a legitimate police operation at
the time the private complainants were allegedly deprived of their liberty and personal belongings is a matter
which at this stage can only be considered as a defense that calls for further factual support in the course of
judicial proceedings. Was there a Mission Order? Are there documents to show that police-to-police
coordinations were indeed made? Are there corroborations to these claims whether documentary or
testimonial? The need for further evidence supportive of this claim gains significance in the light of the
emphatic assertions to the contrary by the private complainants and their witnesses.
As there appears to be probable cause for the inclusion of accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case No. 02-3393
for Kidnapping considering that the latter was specifically mentioned in the body of the Information as
someone who conspired, confederated and mutually helped the other accused in this case, the Court resolves
to await for the Prosecution to amend the same before issuing a Warrant of Arrest against said accused.
Lastly, the Court finds the sought amendment of the Information for Robbery to be well-taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping [under Criminal Case No. 02-3393];
2. GRANT the Motion to Amend Information for Robbery;
3. Hold in abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal
Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information relative thereto shall have been duly amended by the
Prosecution.
Set these cases for arraignment on 27 April 2004 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.1âwphi1 The Amended
Information for Robbery duly attached in the Motion is hereby ADMITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria (Atty. Austria) withdrew as counsel for Manrique and Pineda. Atty. Austria also
manifested that he would file an Omnibus Motion relative to the 16 April 2004 Order of the trial court. The
arraignment was reset to 25 May 2004,9 which was further reset to 28 June 2004,10 19 July 2004,11 23 August
2004,12 and finally on 31 August 2004.13
Atty. Austria filed his Omnibus Motion for Trestiza: motion for reconsideration of the 16 April 2004 Order,
motion to quash the informations, and motion to allow Trestiza to post bail.14 Complainants opposed the
Omnibus Motion.15 The corresponding reply16 and rejoinder17 were also filed. In its 19 August 2004
Order,18 the trial court denied the Omnibus Motion. It ruled that the trial court has the authority to deny a
Motion to Withdraw Information relative to a criminal case filed before it. Moreover, the quashal of the
informations against the accused goes into the determination of the nature of the arrest, which, in turn, goes
into the merits of the case. Finally, the charge of kidnapping is a non-bailable offense.
When the case was called for arraignment, Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda all pleaded not guilty to the
following charges:
Criminal Case No. 02-3393:
3
That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines a place within
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp. the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
Loriemar L. Manrique, both active members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means of force and violence or
private individual[,] all of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob and divest Irma Maria A. Navarro of the
another with one PO2 Reynel Jose, a member of the Philippine National Police, did then and there willfully, following items to wit:
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of
their liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the purpose of extorting money for their safety
and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as ransom money a. One (1) Chariol (sic) watch
from them.
b. One (1) Gold ring
CONTRARY TO LAW.
c. One (1) Chariol (sic) bracelet
Criminal Case No. 03-766:
d. One (1) pair diamond earring (sic)
That on or about the 7th day of November 2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S
e. One (1) gold necklace
Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, PO2 Reynel Jose, all active members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie
Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to gain by means of force and violence or intimidation, did then and f. One (1) cellphone 7650 Nokia
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob and divest Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma Navarro of the
following items to wit:
g. One (1) cellphone 8855 Nokia

a. One (1) piece of necklace (gold) with pendant amounting to ₱50,000.00;

h. Cash money amounting to ₱120,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.
b. Two (2) pieces bracelet (gold) worth more or less ₱70,000.00;

CONTRARY TO LAW.19
c. One (1) Rolex watch worth ₱270,000.00;

The trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on 14 September 2004,20 which was reset to 20 September
d. One (1) men’s ring worth ₱15,000.00; 2004.21 The parties stipulated on the following:

e. Two (2) cellphone[s] described as Nokia 9210 & 3310; 1. That on November 7, 2002, the three (3) accused, Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda were using an
Adventure van with plate no. XAU-298;
f. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] watch worth ₱150,000.00;
2. That Loriemar Manrique was the team leader of the group comprising [sic] of Rodie Pineda and
Reynel Jose on November 7, 2002;
g. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] bracelet worth ₱75,000.00;

3. That the incident started at the Hotel Intercon located in Makati City;
h. One (1) solo diamond studded [sic] (3K) worth ₱500,000.00;

4. That Loriemar Manrique is a member of the PNP Drug Enforcement Agency;

i. One (1) women’s ring gold worth ₱12,000.00;

5. That accused Froilan Trestiza was the driver of the Adventure van bearing plate no. XAU-298 on
j. One (1) necklace gold [sic] worth ₱20,000.00;
November 17, 2002;

k. One (1) [sic] cellphone[s] described as Nokia 7650 & 8855; and,
6. That after the operation was conducted, there was never any occasion that the accused Froilan
Trestiza communicated with any of the complainants;
l. Cash money amounting to more or less ₱300,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of the said complainants.
7. None of the items allegedly lost by the complainants were recovered from accused Froilan
Trestiza.22
CONTRARY TO LAW."
The trial court summarized the testimonies during trial as follows:
Criminal Case No. 04-1311:

4
The prosecution sought to establish its case by presenting the following witnesses: Ma. Irma A. Navarro,
Lawrence Yu y Lim, PO2 Rodolfo Santiago, PO3 Rosauro P. Almonte, John Paul Joseph P. Suguitan, Angelo
Gonzales, PO3 Edward C. Ramos, Schneider R. Vivas, PSInsp. Salvador V. Caro, and Chief Insp. Roseller
Fabian.
The Prosecution’s main evidence relies heavily upon the accounts of Irma and Lawrence who testified
respectively as follows:
On November 7, 2002 at about one o’clock in the morning, Irma and her boyfriend Lawrence, both twenty-two
(22) years old at the time of the incident, were at the "Where Else Disco" in Makati attending a party. They
stayed thereat for around thirty (30) minutes only. Irma however, went out ahead of Lawrence. When she was
about to proceed to where Lawrence’s Honda ESI car was parked, she noticed that the said car was blocked
by another vehicle which was a Mitsubishi Adventure van. Three (3) armed men later on emerged from the
said van. As she was about to open the door of the Honda ESI, somebody hit her in [sic] the nape. When she
turned her back, she saw the three (3) men in the company of Rodie Pineda alias "Buboy" ("Pineda"). She
knew Pineda because the latter was her sister Cynthia’s "kumpare," Pineda being the godfather of Cynthia’s
child. Furthermore, she saw Pineda in their residence the night of November 6, 2002 as he visited his [sic]
sister. She asked Pineda what was happening but the latter replied "pasensya na, mare, trabaho lang" ("Bear
with me, mare, this is just a job").
She was told that the three (3) whose identities she later on learned as Capt. Lorieman Manrique, PO2 Reynel
Jose and PO1 Froilan Trestiza, were policemen. She asked why she was being accosted but she was
handcuffed by Manrique. She was ushered inside the Honda ESI. Pineda asked her where Lawrence was but
she was left inside the car with Jose while Pineda, Trestiza and Manrique on the other hand went away
apparently to look for Lawrence. Pineda and Manrique later on went back inside the Honda ESI. They drove
later with Jose behind the wheels [sic] while Pineda occupied the passenger seat. They followed the
Mitsubishi Adventure van which was then driven by Trestiza. Unknown to Irma, Lawrence was already inside
the van at the time. They just drove and drove around ("umiikot"), passing through small alleys as they
avoided major routes. She was asked later by Pineda to remove her jewelry. She was able to remove only her
earrings as she was in handcuffs. Pineda himself removed her Philip Chariolle [sic] watch and bracelet. Her
necklace and ring followed. All these were later on turned over by Pineda to Manrique. Her bag where her
wallet containing the amount of ₱120,000.00 was likewise taken.
Her two (2) cellphones, a 7650 and an 8855, were likewise taken by Pineda. They stopped several times at
the side streets and the accused would talk to each other. Pineda would stay with her inside the vehicle while
Jose would go out and talk to the occupants of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Later on, she and Lawrence were
brought together inside the Mitsubishi Adventure van. It was there that they were told that they will not be
released if they will not be able to produce one million pesos. These were all uttered by Jose and Manrique. It
was somewhere in Blumentritt, San Juan where all the accused stopped for the last time. She was crying all
the while.
She later on felt the call of nature, prompting her to ask permission if she could possibly relieve herself. She
was accompanied by Pineda to a nearby Shell gas station in San Juan. When they returned to where they
stopped, she was asked as to whom she could possibly call so that the money that the accused were asking
will be produced. The accused later on asked Lawrence to make a call using his cellphone with speaker
phone. Lawrence was able to get in touch with his friends John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales. The
latter was told that Lawrence figured in an accident and that he needs money badly. Lawrence and his friends
agreed that the money the two will produce will be brought to the Caltex gas station along Ortigas corner
Wilson Street in Greenhills. They proceeded to the said place later where they waited for the friends of
Lawrence. She was told later by Manrique that she better pray that the transaction pushes through. Manrique
further warned her against reporting the incident to anyone lest her whole family will be held liable. She was
even shown by the accused the picture of her child. She was cursed by Jose. Trestiza on the other hand told
her that Lawrence’s transaction should better push through.
The two, John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales, later on arrived at the gas station. Lawrence took from
them what appears to be a package and handed the same to Pineda. Manrique thereafter called Pineda
asking "positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied "yes." The amount raised by the friends of Lawrence was one
hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php 180,000.00). They (Irma and Lawrence) were later brought to the Star
Mall along Edsa. Their captors warned them not to report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face
dire consequences. The items taken from Irma like the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were placed by the
men inside the console box of the Mitsubishi Adventure. When they reached Star Mall, the men talked to them
for thirty minutes. Again, they were warned about the consequences of their reporting the incident to the
police. Irma was told that the men knew her address, the members of her family and that they have the picture
of her child. She was likewise warned not to report the matter to her father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor
and a policeman, otherwise her daughter with Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the consequences ("anak ko
ang mananagot"). They were released after thirty (30) minutes. Lawrence had to plead for their gasoline from
the accused and he was given Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother about the incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence however made a
report to the Makati police station in the evening of 7 November 2002 where he was shown a "coordination
sheet" pertaining to the plate number of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda in the meanwhile kept on
calling them (Irma and Lawrence) demanding for their "balance" of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
Irma’s mother however soon learned of the incident because of a newspaper item. Her father likewise learned
of the incident and lost no time in contacting authorities from the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence) were later
investigated by the CIDG people to whom they gave their sworn statements on November 14, 2002. As Buboy
Pineda continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that date.
Boodles of money were dusted with ultra-violet powder. On the same date, Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for
purposes of meeting him that night in order to get the remaining money. The entrapment operation which was
conducted along the New World Hotel, and participated in by PO2 Almonte, was successful as Buboy Pineda
was arrested. Recovered from the possession of Pineda were a gold necklace without a pendant; a Nokia
cellphone model 7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate number PNG 214 color red and one (1) ignition key. The
necessary acknowledgment receipt was duly signed by the said accused. A pawnshop ticket was likewise
recovered from his possession.
Lawrence on the other hand narrated that during that fateful day of 7 November 2002 at around 1:30 o’clock in
the morning, as he was stepping out from the Where Else Disco, he was suddenly "sandwhiched" [sic] by two
(2) persons, Manrique and Trestiza. Pineda whom he likewise knew, held a gun and pointed the same to him.
He was later on "lifted" through his belt and loaded to a yellow Mitsubishi Adventure. He was made to occupy
the passenger seat at the back while Trestiza drove the said vehicle. Manrique occupied the seat beside
Trestiza. He asked the accused who they were and he was told that they were policemen. At the time, Trestiza
was wearing an outfit which was "hip hop" while Manrique was wearing a polo which was "button down." He
was cursed and told to shut up. He was asked to bow down his head as they drove along. He remembers that
the accused dug into his pockets and his valuables consisting of cellphones, a 9210 and a 3310 models [sic]
respectively, including his wallet, cigarettes, watch bracelet, ring, necklace and a pair of earrings, were taken
from him. He later on saw his Honda ESI car. He noticed that the Mitsubishi Adventure they riding was
following the said Honda ESI. Manrique later asked him how much money did he have. When replied that his
money was inside his car, Manrique allegedly retorted "imposible." They later on stopped in Mandaluyong
near an open canal. He was asked again by Manrique about his money. At that point, another man whose
name he later on learned was SPO2 Reynel Jose, boarded also the Mitsubishi Adventure. Jose asked him
about his money. When he replied that his money was inside his car, Jose got mad and boxed him on his
face. They later on resumed driving around. When they stopped again, Jose asked him whether he has
thought of the money. When he again replied that the money was inside his car, he was boxed repeatedly by
Jose. Manrique and Trestiza were seated in the front seats but did not do anything.
They resumed driving again. Jose asked him again about the money. When he gave the same response, Jose
put a plastic material over his head which made him unable to breath [sic]. Jose strangled him, prompting him
to shout later "okay na, okay na. Sige na, sige na magbibigay na ako" ("Okay, okay. I will give."). Jose stopped
strangling him and immediately removed the plastic material over his head. Jose remarked that had he
cooperated earlier, he would not have been hurt. Trestiza and Manrique told him that he should not have kept
the matter long. Later on, the four (4) men had a brief huddle. He was later on approached by them saying
"okay na ha, isang milyon na" ("Okey ha, it’s one million). He could not recall however who in particular made
the remark. He was later on instructed by Manrique to call certain persons with the information that he figured
in [an] accident. He was made to use his 9210 model phone as the same had a "speaker" thus enabling the
accused to listen to the conversation. He tried to get in touch with his siblings but failed. He was able to
contact later on his friends John Paul Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales who were then in Libis. He told his
friends that he needed money very badly as he had an accident. He instructed his friends to proceed to the
area given by Manrique which was at the Caltex gas station along Ortigas corner Wilson Street in Greenhills.
5
Later on, Irma and Lawrence were allowed to be together inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. It was at that point
where they were told to produce the amount of One Million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) that night so they will be
released. These very words were uttered by Jose and Manrique. Irma later on asked permission to answer the
call of nature and she was accompanied by Pineda to the Shell gas station in San Juan where she relieved
herself. Upon arriving at the said gas station, Lawrence was directed to drive his Honda ESI car. He was in the
company of Pineda while Irma on the other hand was with Manrique, Trestiza and Jose inside the Mitsubishi
Adventure. While Irma was inside the Mitsubishi Adventure, she was told that if the person contacted by
Lawrence will not show up, they will not be released and if Lawrence will escape, she will be finished off.
Manrique thereafter told Irma to better pray that the transaction will push through. She was warned that if she
reports the incident, her family will be harmed. The said accused had her child’s picture at the time. Jose was
cursing her. Trestiza on the other hand was seated at the driver side of the Mitsubishi Adventure van and
remarked that Lawrence’s transaction should push through so that they will be released.
Not long after, Lawrence alighted from his car and stood beside the vehicle. His friends’ vehicle later on
arrived. Lawrence approached the vehicle that has just arrived and took something. Pineda remained seated
in Lawrence’s car while smoking. The door of the said car was open at the time. Lawrence thereafter walked
back to where Pineda was and handed to him a package. It was already around 4: or 4:30 in the morning.
Lawrence’s friends thereafter went away, prompting Pineda to call Manrique. Manrique allegedly asked
"positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied "yes."
The amount raised by the friends of Lawrence was one hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php 180,000.00).
They (Irma and Lawrence) were later brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their captors warned them not to
report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face dire consequences. The items taken from Irma like
the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were placed by the men inside the console box of the Mitsubishi
Adventure. When they reached Star Mall, the men talked to them for thirty minutes. Again, they were warned
about the consequences of their reporting the incident to the police. Irma was told that the men knew her
address, the members of her family and that they have the picture of her child. She was likewise warned not to
report the matter to her father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a policeman, otherwise her daughter with
Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the consequences ("anak ko ang mananagot"). They were released along
Edsa after thirty (30) minutes. Lawrence had to plead for their gasoline from the accused and he was given
Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother about the incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence however made a
report to the Makati police station in the evening of 7 November 2002 where he was shown a "coordination
sheet" pertaining to the plate number of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda in the meanwhile kept on
calling them (Irma and Lawrence) demanding for their "balance" of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
Irma’s mother however soon learned of the incident because of a newspaper item. Her father likewise learned
of the incident and lost no time in contacting authorities from the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence) were later
investigated by the CIDG people to who they gave their sworn statements on November 14, 2002. As Buboy
Pineda continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that date.
Boodles of money were dusted with ultra-violet powder. On the same date, Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for
purposes of meeting him that night in order to get the remaining money. The entrapment operation which was
conducted along the New World Hotel, and participated in by PO2 Almonte, was successful as Buboy Pineda
was arrested. Recovered from the possession of Pineda were a gold necklace without pendant; a Nokia
cellphone model 7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate number PNG 214 color red and one (1) ignition key. The
necessary acknowledgment receipt was duly signed by the said accused. A pawnshop ticket was likewise
recovered from his possession.
Early in the morning of the following day at the CIDG, Lorieman Manrique went to the said office looking for his
co-accused Froilan Trestiza. He (Manrique) was arrested thereat when the private complainants who
happened to be there as they were giving additional statements identified him (Manrique) through a one-way
mirror. Trestiza was likewise arrested later as he was identified by his co-accused Rodie Pineda. During the
arrest, Trestiza was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm for which the corresponding charge
was filed. He (Trestiza) was likewise the subject of the complaint sheet filed by Irma and Lawrence and was
likewise identified by his co-accused Pineda as one of the cohorts in the kidnapping of the former.
The Defense on the other hand presented the following version:
Private complainants Irma Navarro and Lawrence Yu were known to accused Rodie ‘Buboy’ Pineda, a
freelance dance instructor prior to his incarceration, and a godfather to the child of Irma’s sister, since 1997.
The two (Irma and Lawrence) are known to Pineda as suppliers of prohibited drugs, particularly ‘Ecstasy,’
‘blue anchors,’ and ‘yeng-yen.’ The two, Irma and Lawrence have been distributing these drugs to various
customers who [sic] frequented bars and disco pubs. Pineda has been transacting with the two, particularly
Lawrence, for a profit. Realizing later that his involvement with the group of Lawrence has become deeper and
deeper, Pineda thought of causing the arrest of the latter. He (Pineda) soon decided to report the matter to the
police authorities and contacted forthwith his long-time acquaintance, now his co-accused Froilan Trestiza on
November 6, 2002 at 10:30 in the evening. At that time, Trestiza was a policeman under the Special Action
Unit, Group Director’s Office of the National Capital Region. Pineda and Trestiza, who have known each other
for the past ten years, used to be dancers at the Equinox Disco along Pasay Road. Upon learning the
information from Pineda, Trestiza contacted his classmate PO2 Rolando de Guzman of the Philippine Drugs
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who in turn referred Trestiza to Captain Lorieman Manrique who was then the
Deputy Chief of the Special Enforcement Unit of the PDEA, Metro Manila Regional Office. Manrique was
called later by Trestiza through cellphone and they agreed to meet the same night, at around midnight, at the
parking lot of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Manrique prepared a Pre-Operation sheet for a possible
narcotics operation. He likewise gave [the] plate number of the vehicle he was then driving which was a
Mitsubishi Adventure van with plate number HAU-298.
During their ensuing meeting, Manrique was with PO2 Reynel Jose. Pineda and Manrique talked to each
other. Manrique later on briefed Pineda and Jose. Trestiza was about three to five meters away from the three
(3). After the briefing, Manrique asked Trestiza to drive the Mitsubishi Adventure. Manrique told Trestiza that
the buy-bust operation has been pre-coordinated with the Makati police. Manrique later joined Trestiza inside
the Mitsubishi Adventure while Jose and Pineda were outside as though waiting for someone. Irma and
Lawrence later on arrived and they talked to Pineda and Jose. Pineda introduced Jose to Irma and Lawrence
as ‘the buyer.’ Jose was only wearing a t-shirt at the time and it seemed Lawrence and Irma doubted him.
Jose told the two that he has the money with him and he would like to buy drugs. Irma however whispered
something to Lawrence prompting the latter to vascillate [sic]. From where they are seated inside the
Mitsubishi Adventure, Trestiza and Manrique could see what were [sic] going on among Irma, Lawrence, Jose
and Pineda. Later on, Jose approached Trestiza and Manrique and told them that the ‘pre-arranged signal’ is
when he (Jose) scratched his head. According further to Jose, his scratching of his head will mean a signal to
Trestiza to drive towards them the vehicle. As Jose later on scratched his head, Trestiza drove the vehicle
towards the group as instructed. Manrique thereafter alighted and effected the arrest of Irma and Lawrence.
Irma went hysterical and was loaded into the Honda ESI while Lawrence was made to board the Mitsubishi
Adventure. It was at that point when two (2) mobile cars arrived with policemen on board. A commotion
immediately ensued between the police men aboard the mobile cars and Manrique’s men. Firearms were
drawn and poked against each of the men (‘nagkatutukan ng baril’). Jose, however, later on showed what
appeared to be a document to the men aboard the mobile car. One of the men later on made a call through his
radio and then left afterwards.
Manrique later on instructed Trestiza to drive towards Edsa on their way to Camp Crame. Along the way,
Manrique conducted a tactical interrogation against Lawrence and Irma about their drug-related activities.
Upon reaching SM Megamall, however, Manrique told Trestiza to pull over. Manrique talked to Lawrence,
Irma, Jose and Pineda. Trestiza remained inside the van. Trestiza, however, overheard that Lawrence was at
that point was talking about his supplier of ‘ecstasy.’ Thereafter, Manrique briefed anew Pineda and Jose in
the presence of Irma and Lawrence. It was understood among them that Lawrence will wait for his alleged
supplier whose name was allegedly ‘Jojo’ at the Caltex gas station along Wilson Street in Greenhills.
Lawrence told Manrique that this Jojo was really a big-time supplier of ecstasy and cocaine. Upon arriving at
the gas station, the group waited for Lawrence’s supplier for an hour but nobody appeared. Manrique became
impatient and went to where Lawrence was. Manrique later told his men that Lawrence might have alerted his
supplier. He (Manrique) then decided to bring the two (Irma and Lawrence) to Camp Crame. Trestiza,
however, pointed out to Manrique that nothing was taken from the possession of the two. Manrique conferred
anew with Jose. Jose remarked that the items could have been thrown away. It was later on decided that Irma
and Lawrence will just be released. The two were indeed released near the [Manuela] Complex along Edsa.
Trestiza was later on arrested by the CIDG operatives in the early morning of November 16, 2002 at the
parking lot of the Club 5 Disco. A gun was poked at him and he was shoved inside a vehicle. He was boxed
and placed on handcuffs. He was not shown any warrant of arrest. He told the arresting officers that he is also
a policeman. He was brought later to Camp Crame. While at Camp Crame, he was shown to his co-accused
Pineda and the latter was asked "di ba sya yung nag-drive noong may operation laban kina Irma Navarro?"
("Is he not the one who drove during the operation against Irma Navarro?"). He (Trestiza) asked the
6
authorities what were the grounds for detaining him but his queries were not answered. His watch, wallet and
cellphone were taken. Later on the same day, Irma arrived in Camp Crame. The authorities thereat talked to
Irma, afterwhich, a policeman told her "eto yung itinuturo ni Buboy na nag-drive." ("This is the one pointed to
by Buboy as the one who drove"). Several days later, all the accused were presented to the press by the office
of General Matillano. The Philippine Daily Inquirer covered the story and later on came out with an article
entitled "We Were Framed."
The defense likewise presented PO2 Rolando de Guzman who corroborated the claim of Trestiza that he was
called by the latter concerning the information given by Pineda. No further evidence was presented.23
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Joint Decision24 dated 24 July 2007, the trial court found Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
The trial court concentrated its ruling on the credibility of the witnesses. It found the testimonies of the
prosecution credible, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. On
the other hand, the defense’s testimonies taxed the credulity of the trial court. The trial court raised numerous
questions about the defense’s story line:
x x x But this leads the court to wonder: if indeed Pineda was so bothered by his involvement with the group of
Lawrence, why did he spill the beans against Irma and Lawrence only? Did he not state that it was a "group"
that he was transacting with? Who were the other members of this group? What were their activities that were
so dark and clandestine so as to make him suddenly shudder and opt for a change of life? These were not
answered by Pineda’s testimony.
Also, while Manrique presented what appears to be a Pre-Operation Coordination Report, thus creating at first
glance the impression that theirs was a legitimate police operation, this still does not detract from nor diminish
the credibility of the complainants’ claim that they were subsequently abducted and money was demanded in
exchange for their release. For even if the court is to indulge the claim of the defense that the complainants
were indeed drug-pushers and undeserving of this court’s sympathy, the nagging doubt about the existence of
a prepared police operation as what Manrique and his co-accused refer to, persists. For one, the said Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet appears to be unreliable. Aside from the fact that the same was not duly
authenticated, the failure of the defense, particularly accused Manrique, to summon the signatories therein
who may attest to the existence and authenticity of such document was not at all explained. Second, all the
accused narrated about their almost-fatal encounter with another group of policemen while they were allegedly
in the act of conducting the supposed buy-bust operation against the complainants. This event, to the view of
this court, only invites the suspicion that the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet was dubious if not actually
non-existent.
The accused likewise claimed that they released the two later along Edsa as nothing was found on them. The
manner of the release, however, raises several questions: why were the complainants who were earlier
suspected of being drug-pushers not brought to the police precinct? Did not Lawrence volunteer the name of
his alleged supplier earlier during the tactical interrogation? Why were they unloaded just like that along Edsa
at that ungodly hour? Was there an incident report on the matter considering that Manrique was mindful
enough earlier to first secure a Pre-Operation/Coordination sheet?25
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 finding the
accused PO1 FROILAN TRESTIZA Y LACSON, P/INSP LORIEMAN L. MANRIQUE and RODIE PINEDA Y
JIMENEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of KIDNAPPING
for RANSOM, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In addition
thereto, they are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the private complainants the sums of PHP 300,000.00
as actual damages, and PHP 300,000.00 as exemplary damages. All the accused are ACQUITTED in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-766 and 04-1311 both for Robbery respectively.
Send the records of this case to the archives in so far as accused PO2 Reynel Jose, who continues to be at
large, is concerned. Let, however, a Warrant of Arrest be issued against him.
SO ORDERED.26
On the same date as the promulgation of its decision, the trial court issued an Order of Commitment27 of
Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.
On 27 July 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda filed a Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition. Two
witnesses, Camille Anne Ortiz y Alfonso (Ortiz) and Paulo Antonio De Leon y Espiritu (De Leon), allegedly
intimate friends of Navarro and Yu, will testify as to the circumstances which took place in the early morning of
7 November 2002. Their testimonies, if admitted, will allegedly result in the acquittal of Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda. These witnesses are not known to the accused, and they could not have been produced during trial.
Moreover, the accused are of the belief that trial court judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles acted with bias
against them. She allegedly made an off-the-record remark and stated that the prosecution failed to establish
what they sought to prove, but then later on questioned the existence of the defense’s Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet in her decision. Judge Galapate-Laguilles also failed to resolve the Petition for
Bail, and failed to point out discrepancies in the testimonies of the defense’s witnesses, particularly those
regarding the arrests of Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda.
The prosecution opposed the Motion for New Trial and Inhibition.28 De Leon shared a cell with Manrique since
July 2003, while the trial was ongoing, and hence De Leon’s supposed testimony should not be considered
"newly discovered" evidence. On the other hand, Ortiz’s narration of events in her affidavit is full of
inconsistencies. The prosecution likewise questioned the credibility of the witnesses who allegedly heard
Judge Galapate-Laguilles’ off-the-record remark. One was Trestiza’s relative, while the other was a security
escort who was supposed to stay outside the courtroom. Finally, the motion itself was filed late. The
supplement to the motion, to which the affidavits of the additional witnesses were attached, was filed two days
after the finality of the trial court’s decision. Copies of the decision were furnished to both prosecution and
defense on 24 July 2007, which was also the date of promulgation. The Motion for New Trial and Inhibition
was dated 27 July 2007, while the Supplement to the Motion which included the witnesses’ affidavits was
dated 10 August 2007.
The trial court held hearings on the twin motions. On 3 October 2007, the trial court issued an Order29 denying
the Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition. The evidence presented was merely corroborative, and the
prosecution was able to prove its case despite the judge’s alleged off-the-record equivocal remark.
On 19 October 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda filed a notice of appeal.30 The Order denying the Motion
for New Trial and for Inhibition was received on 18 October 2007, while the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition was filed on 27 July 2007 or three days after the promulgation of the Decision on 24 July 2004. The
trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal.31 In their brief filed with the appellate court, Trestiza,
Manrique, and Pineda assigned the following errors:
The trial court erred in convicting accused Trestiza despite the fact that he was not part of the
alleged conspiracy in that it was not stipulated during the pre-trial that he was just the driver and
was not part of the team. Besides, he did not perform any act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of private complainants Lawrence Yu
and Irma Navarro as their demeanor in the witness stand show hesitation indicative of guilt of
fabrication and their testimonies lack spontaneity and were not straightforward.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses John Paul
Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales as they alleged facts and circumstance that are contrary to human
nature and experience.
7
 The trial court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that the complainants were arrested
in a legitimate operation as evidenced by the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet which was
authenticated by accused-appellant Manrique.32
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 June 2008, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
In its recitation of facts, the appellate court quoted from the People’s Brief for the prosecution and from the trial
court for the defense. The appellate court ruled that Trestiza’s contention that he was just the driver of the van
and never communicated with the witnesses deserves scant consideration. Yu identified Trestiza as one of the
two men who sandwiched him as he left Where Else Disco, and insisted that Yu cooperate with Jose when
Jose asked Yu for cash. Trestiza’s acts thus show that he acted in concert with his co-accused in the
commission of the crime. The appellate court relied on the trial court’s assessment of the reliability of the
prosecution’s witnesses, and gave credence to their testimonies. The appellate court declared that all the
elements of kidnapping for ransom are present and thus affirmed the trial court’s decision:
In any event, it was established that all the elements constituting the crime of kidnapping for ransom in the
case at bar are present. The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 7659 are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive
the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is
extorting ransom for the release of the victim (People vs. Raul Cenahonon, 527 SCRA 542). Here, Navarro
and Yu testified how they were abducted at gun point from the parking lot in Makati and confined inside the car
and van respectively; that they were both handcuffed, hence, deprived of their liberty and that appellants made
a demand for them to deliver a certain amount in exchange for their release.
In fine, the Court rules and so holds that appellants’ guilt for the offense of kidnapping for ransom has been
proven beyond moral certainty of doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.33
Trestiza alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 of the appellate court’s decision. In his Motion, Trestiza
claimed that he alone, through counsel, filed an appeal brief. Trestiza further claimed that the stipulations
made during pre-trial established Trestiza’s limited involvement, that is, he was merely a driver of the vehicle
when the alleged crime took place, he never communicated with the complainants, and none of the items
allegedly taken from the complainants were recovered from Trestiza’s possession. The trial court did not
mention nor discuss these stipulations in its decision. Even the trial court’s finding of facts shows Trestiza’s
participation was merely that of an invited driver in a legitimate Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
drug bust operation. Moreover, the testimonies of witnesses of both prosecution and defense establish that
Trestiza was a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) when he allegedly committed the crime. Under
the circumstances, Trestiza claimed he should be held liable only for Arbitrary Detention. Finally, Trestiza’s
identification was not only improper for being suggested, but his warrantless arrest should also be held invalid.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a comment opposing Trestiza’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The stipulations do not discount that Trestiza conspired with his co-appellants Manrique and Pineda in
committing the crime charged. The apprehension and detention of Navarro and Yu were clearly effected for
the purpose of ransom; hence, the proper crime really is Kidnapping with Ransom. Trestiza filed a Reply to the
Comment35 on 20 October 2009.
The appellate court denied Trestiza’s Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 11 November
2009.36 An examination of the appellants’ brief showed that the brief was filed for Trestiza, Manrique and
Pineda. The appellate court found no compelling reason to warrant consideration of its decision.
Trestiza still filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the appellate court’s decision on 10 January 2010. The appellate
court initially denied38 Trestiza’s Notice of Appeal due to late filing, but eventually granted39 Trestiza’s Motion
for Reconsideration40 of the 16 February 2010 resolution denying his Notice of Appeal.
Trestiza filed the present supplemental brief41 before this Court on 15 August 2011. In his brief, Trestiza
emphasized that Yu was apprehended by agents of the PNP and PDEA on 30 June 2011 during a raid of an
illegal drugs laboratory. Yu was charged with the crime of manufacturing, possessing, and selling illegal drugs
under Sections 8, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Issues
Trestiza raised the following arguments against the appellate court’s decision:
I. The supervening event involving the apprehension of Lawrence L. Yu as the head of a big-time
drug syndicate throws his credibility as a witness beneath the abyss of morass and decay that
must be now totally discarded.
II. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-entitled case is consistent with the
innocence of [Trestiza] rendering the evidence presented insufficient and without moral certainty to
support a conviction.
III. At the very least, the "equipoise rule" finds application in the case at bar, taking into
consideration the supervening event that demolished the credibility of the witnesses presented by
the prosecution.
IV. The Constitutional presumption of innocence of [Trestiza] has not been overwhelmed by the
tainted testimony and total lack of credibility of Lawrence L. Yu and, in light of the supervening
event, could not now be overcome by questionable testimonies presented by the prosecution.
V. The conviction of an innocent man is a great injustice that affects the very foundations of
humanity.
VI. It was not sufficiently shown that all the accused in the above-entitled case conspired in
committing the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and the same was not proven by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
VII. [Trestiza] has no malicious or evil intent in acquiescing to drive the vehicle used in the buy-
bust operation.
VIII. [Trestiza] is innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.42
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, we declare that the 30 June 2011 arrest of Yu has no bearing on the present case. The two
cases are independent of each other and should be treated as such. Yu’s innocence or guilt regarding his 30
June 2011 arrest does not affirm or negate the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom against
him.
Warrantless Arrest
These are the circumstances surrounding Trestiza’s arrest: Pineda had been contacting Yu to follow up on the
balance on the ransom. Pineda was then arrested pursuant to an entrapment operation conducted in the early
8
morning of 16 November 2002 at New World Hotel. During the investigation at Camp Crame, Pineda revealed
that Trestiza could be found at Club 5 in Makati. Pineda and Yu accompanied the arresting team to Club 5. Yu
pointed out Trestiza to the arresting team while Trestiza was on his way to his black Hummer.43
Trestiza questioned the legality of his warrantless arrest in an Omnibus Motion 44 filed before his arraignment.
In its Order dated 19 August 2004, the trial court stated that the quashal of the informations on account of
Trestiza’s illegal arrest is not warranted. The determination of the nature of the arrest goes directly into the
merits of the case, and needs a deeper judicial determination. Matters of defense are not grounds for a Motion
to Quash. The trial court, however, did not make any ruling related to Trestiza’s warrantless arrest in its 24
July 2007 Decision.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when warrantless
arrests are lawful.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. ‒ A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.
It is clear that Trestiza’s warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the circumstances mentioned in Section
5, Rule 113. However, Trestiza failed to make a valid objection to his warrantless arrest.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.45 Trestiza, being a policeman himself, could have immediately objected to his warrantless
arrest. However, he merely asked for the grounds for his arrest. He did not even file charges against the
arresting officers. There was also a lengthy amount of time between Trestiza’s arrest on 16 November 2002
and the filing of the Omnibus Motion objecting to Trestiza’s warrantless arrest on 11 May 2004. Although it
may be argued that the objection was raised prior to the entry of Trestiza’s plea of not guilty in the kidnapping
for ransom charge, it must be noted that the circumstances of the present case make us rule otherwise.
Trestiza was charged with two crimes at the time of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom under Criminal Case
No. 02-3393 and illegal possession of firearms under Criminal Case No. 02-3394. Trestiza did not question the
legality of his warrantless arrest nor the acquisition of jurisdiction of the trial court over his person, and fully
participated in the hearing of the illegal possession of firearms case. Thus, Trestiza is deemed to have waived
any objection to his warrantless arrest. Under the circumstances, Trestiza’s Omnibus Motion in the kidnapping
for ransom case is a mere afterthought and cannot be considered as a timely objection.
Assuming arguendo that Trestiza indeed made a timely objection to his warrantless arrest, our jurisprudence
is replete with rulings that support the view that Trestiza’s conviction is proper despite being illegally arrested
without warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled:
[T]he illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all
other facts on record point to their culpability.46
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon
a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.47 The fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes
moot in view of a credible eyewitness account.48
Kidnapping with Ransom
The trial court’s findings of facts, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the
probative weight of the evidence of the parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are
accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct,
demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses as they testify.49 We see no reason to overrule the trial court’s
finding that Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping with ransom.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ‒ Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount of time spent in
determining whether kidnapping for ransom was the proper crime charged against the accused, especially
since Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code specifically
stated that the crime should be committed by a private individual.50 The trial court settled the matter by citing
our ruling in People v. Santiano,51 thus:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant Sandigan a
member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in
abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of official functions nor in the
pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that
they have acted in concert with their co-appellant Santiano and Chanco.
In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defense’s claim of holding a
legitimate police operation. However, the trial court found as unreliable the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet
presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated, and the signatories were not presented to attest
to its existence and authenticity.
9
The second to the last paragraph of Article 267 prescribes the penalty of death when the extortion of ransom ATTY. OLEDAN:
was the purpose of the kidnapping. Yu and Navarro were released only after they were able to give various
personal effects as well as cash amounting to ₱300,000, with the promise to give the balance of ₱1,000,000 at
a later date. Q: (To Witness) Specifically, who among these three (3) "sandwiched" you?

Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the Mitsubishi Adventure van. Yu testified WITNESS:
otherwise.
A: It was PO1 Trestiza and Capt. Manrique.
Direct Examination of Lawrence Lim Yu
xxx
Atty. Oledan:
Q: What happened after you were brought inside the Mitsubishi vehicle?
Q: What happened [after you left Wherelse Disco]?
A: Later on, Officer Trestiza and Capt. Manrique likewise boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure.
Witness:
xxx
A: As soon as I stepped out of the Wherelse Disco, somebody bumped me at my right side. And then later on,
I was "sandwiched" by two (2) persons and when I looked up, I noted the presence of one (1) man
Q: Who was driving the vehicle?
immediately in front of me holding a gun.

A: It was Froilan Trestiza, ma’am.

Q: And these men who "sandwiched" you and the third men [sic] who held the gun in front of you, would you
be able to identify them?
xxx
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: After [Reynel Jose] said [that had Yu cooperated earlier, he would not have been hurt] and the plastic
removed from your head, what did [sic] the two, Trestiza and Manrique, doing?
Q: Are they inside this Courtroom?

A: They told me the same thing. They told me that I should not have kept the matter long.
A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: What happened after that?

Q: Will you please identify them?

A: After that, Reynel Jose alighted again and we drove towards an area, which I know now to be within San
A: The three of them, ma’am.
Juan. Right in front of the Tambunting Pawnshop.

At this juncture, the witness is to pointing to the three (3) men, who are the accused in this case, inside the
Q: What happened at the Tambunting Pawnshop? Did the vehicle stop there?
Courtroom.

A: The two (2) vehicles parked there beside each other.

COURT: (To the Accused) Again, for the record, please stand up, gentlemen.

Q: What happened when you were there at Tambunting Pawnshop?

At this juncture, the three (3) accused stood up.

A: After parking in front of the Tambunting Pawnshop, they boarded Irma and have her sat [sic] beside me.
COURT: (To Witness) Are you sure these were the three (3) men whom you are referring to?
Then after which, the door at my left side was opened.

WITNESS:
Q: What else happened?

A: Yes, ma’am.
A: They told me not to make any move, that I just keep on sitting there. Afterwards, the men huddled with each
other ("nagkumpul-kumpol po sila").
COURT: Make it of record that the witness pointed to accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza, PSINP Loriemar
Manrique and Rodie Pineda.
Q: Where did they huddle?

10
A: They huddled in an area close to me, almost in front of me. A: Not yet, ma’am. Before letting us go, they threatened us. They reminded us that they have our IDs, the
pictures of our children and the members of our family.

Q: Who among the accused huddled together?

Q: What did you do after that?
A: The four (4) of them, ma’am.
A: We just kept on saying yes because we wanted to go home already.
Q: How long did they huddle?
Q: What time was that?

A: For a while only, ma’am, around (10) ten minutes.

A: It was almost daybreak ("mag-uumaga na"). I have no watch already at that time, ma’am.

Q: After ten (10) minutes, what happened?

Q: So, what did you do after that?

A: After ten (10) minutes, Buboy approached me.

A: After that, Froilan Trestiza handed to me my sim card telling me that they will be calling me in my house
concerning my alleged balance.52
Q: What did he say?

A: He told me that they thought my money would be One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00).
xxx
Q: So, after that huddle, after you were told by Buboy that "okay na ‘yong one million" and that was confirmed
by one of the three (3) men who said "isang million na," what happened?
A: I was talking to Buboy at that time and I was telling him, "Why do you have to do this to me? You are the
‘kumpare’ of the elder sister of Irma."
We agree with the appellate court’s assessment that Trestiza’s acts were far from just being a mere driver.
The series of events that transpired before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than shows that
Trestiza acted in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.53
Trestiza’s civil liability is joint and several with Manrique and Pineda. They are liable for the ₱120,000 taken
from Navarro and the ₱180,000 raised by Yu. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,54 Trestiza is also liable for
₱75,000 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime warrants the imposition of death penalty; ₱75,000 as
moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, without need of proof; and
₱30,000 as exemplary damages.

Q: What did Buboy say to that?

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No. 03119
promulgated on 30 June 2009, as well as the Resolution promulgated on 11 June 2010, is AFFIRMED with
A: Buboy retorted, "Pare, pasensya na, pera pera lang ‘yan." MODIFICATION. Froilan L. Trestiza is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 02-
3393 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as the accessory penalties provided
by law. In addition to the restitution of ₱300,000 for the ransom, Trestiza is ordered to pay Lawrence Yu and
Q: After Buboy said that, what happened? Irma Navarro ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages.

A: I told him that he need not do that, because if he needs money, I can always lend him. Costs against Froilan L. Trestiza.

Q: What did Buboy say? SO ORDERED.

A: After saying this to Buboy, he told me to just shut up and then he later on handed over to me a cell phone
and told me to contact a person, who can give me money.

Q: Who handed you your cell phone?

A: It was Froilan Trestiza, ma’am.

BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

xxx RESOLUTION

Q: After that, were you told to go home already? YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

11
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner's conviction by the
Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision. 4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.4

The facts are briefly restated as follows: Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration.5

Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration and the
Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Supplement thereto.
Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres
B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were
sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.6
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound
Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some be better served thereby.
wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner's house in Daram,
where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On Petition for Review , we rendered judgment as follows:
and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of

technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in

conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt

rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months

promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum,

operation.7
is AFFIRMED in toto.

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

Costs de oficio.

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

SO ORDERED.

2. That he detains a person.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner
then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for
Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the following submissions:
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8

1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a
careful review of the evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the
PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES; private offended parties.

2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer
who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being
then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1
Capoquian testified thus:

ATTY. JUMAMIL:
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;

12
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary a Yes Your Honor.

a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a boat being constructed q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the complainants

there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic). here?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

q And you arrived at 5:00 o'clock?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.

a Yes sir. xxx xxx xxx

q And you left at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary AJ PALATTAO:

a Yes sir. q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this

laughter?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 2, is that

correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended
a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner. parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner
prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. JUMAMIL:

a Yes sir.
q It was raining at that time, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

q And of course you also partook of wine?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir it was raining.

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.
q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time that you were in Lucoblucob,

xxx xxx xxx Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AJ NARIO: a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o'clock Mayor Astorga was with you having q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in Lucoblucob?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

13
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that time. q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was there somebody prevented

you to go to another place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

q But it was raining the whole day?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I don't know Your Honor.

a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you to go somewhere
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o'clock in the morning is that
else?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to leave the barangay.
a A little bit hard I don't know when the rain stopped, sir.

q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed to leave that barangay, is
q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o'clock in the morning of September
this Barangay Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

a I don't remember sir.

q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your impression you cannot
xxx xxx xxx
leave the barangay. How about the other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the

place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AJ PALATTAO:

a No Your Honor.
q Were you told not to go away from the place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of those I have enumerated
a No Your Honor.
they cannot, why?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go
a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10
somewhere?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on August 16, 2000 but did not
a They did not say anything sir.
complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters

q Where did you go after that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary and did not touch on the circumstances of the alleged detention.11

On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato
a Just down until it rained. Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in
pertinent part:
14

xxx xxx xxx;
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by the exhaustion of the team
in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also
been confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a heated argument and the
eventual misunderstanding;
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar our respect for him
prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated
whose invitation was misinterpreted by us;
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and the group of Mayor Astorga
during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram, Samar;
9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident to our supervisors who
required us to submit our affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties had already express
apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of
desistance;
xxx xxx xxx.12
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify. This notwithstanding, the
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian's testimony negate the element of detention. More importantly, fear
is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be
tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the
victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not
competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was
thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable
to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to
petitioner's house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not
more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He
could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy
rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over
dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering
that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m.
the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.15 He is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.16
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of
right. For the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for the
prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly
accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused
enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent
man.18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner
Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA PILLUETA and JOSE VICENTE (JOVY)
CHANCO, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Vicente (Jovy) Chance were
indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail,
in an amended Information, docketed Criminal Case No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence submitted by the prosecution, disclosing its version of the case, is narrated by the Solicitor
General in the People's brief.
15
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in partner,
Loida Navidad were arrested by appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and
several other NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of marijuana (p. 32, TSN,
April 20, 1994).
After the arrest, they were brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the compound of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters, Naga City (p. 32, ibid.). Thereat,
they were at first warned by appellant Pillueta not to contact a lawyer (p. 35, ibid.).
Appellant Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only a matter of P10,000.00" (p.
35, ibid.).
When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived accompanied by a lawyer, appellant
Pillueta got angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once, the victim and Navidad were dragged to the
Naga City Jail situated at a distance of six (6) to seven (7) meters from the NARCOM
Office (pp. 10, 38-39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained at the Naga City Jail
(ibid.).
The defense presented its own account of the facts hereunder expounded by it; viz:
Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio Santiano was detained at the Naga City Jail
(pp. 4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the same cell occupied by the victim (p. 6, ibid.).
When appellant Santiano was mauled by the inmates of Cell 3, the victim was one of
those who participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).
After the release of Santiano, he returned to the City Jail in November 1993
accompanied by one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Thereat, the victim was pointed to by
appellant Santiano as the one who mastermind his mauling (ibid.).
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the victim asked
permission from a jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the jail (pp. 7-9, ibid.).
When he left, the victim was wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p. 9, ibid.).
As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants Sandigan
and Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25, 1994). The two (2) appellants held the victim
between them and thereafter hurriedly, proceeded towards the NARCOM Office
situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters away (pp. 7, 38-41, ibid.). Upon
reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
Once the victim was already inside the NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan
proceeded to and took his place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police Station (pp. 8-
12, ibid.). The victim was made to sit and thereafter mauled by appellant Santiano (pp.
8-11, ibid.). Santiano got hold of a handkerchief, rolled it around his fists and continued
to punch the victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes (p. 16, ibid.). As the victim was being
mauled, appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the NARCOM office, her both hands
inside her pockets while looking to her right and left, acting as a lookout (ibid.).
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in front of
the door of the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, TSN, April 25, 1994). Thereafter, he
proceeded inside the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and started the
trimobile (p. 21, ibid.). His co-appellant Santiano and Pillueta followed him. Inside the
trimobile, appellant Pillueta occupied the back seat (p. 21, ibid.). Santiano occupied the
reserved seat in front of the passenger seat which was occupied by the victim (ibid.).
As appellant Chanco was about to start his trimobile, appellant Sandigan, who was at
Plaza Barlin, transferred to and stationed himself at the Century Fox in front of the
GSIS building situated at the corner of General Luna and Arana Streets (p. 23, ibid.).
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church (p. 40, TSN,
April 23, 1994). When it passed the Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way towards
the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was still aboard the trimobile
seated at the passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN, May 24, 1994).
When prosecution witness Rañola heard over the radio that a person was found dead
at the canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a policeman
Prila of the Pili Police Department that the descriptions of the dead person he heard
over the radio fit not only the person he saw being hauled to and thereafter mauled at
the NARCOM Office but likewise the same person who was on board the trimobile
driven by appellant Chanco (p. 13, TSN, May 6, 1994).
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as his
brother Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.1
Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM, Naga City,
Command. Accused-Appellant Jose Sandigan is a regular member of the PNP but, he
was a former organic member of the NARCOM. On the other hand, Accused Alipio
Santiano and Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the active Civilian
Volunteer/Assists of the NARCOM.
That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December 27, 1993, accused-appellant Sandigan
was in front of the Advent theater; that while thereat, he saw accused-appellant
Santiano and he invited the latter for a snack at the Mang Donald's, a burger house,
situated just beside the Advent theater; that after taking their snacks, they decided to
go to the NARCOM office; that while on their way to the NARCOM office, they saw
accused-appellant Chanco emerging from the Nehrus Department Store where the
latter bought something; that this Nehrus Department Store is located in front of the
Naga City Police Head Quarters which is also near the NARCOM office, that the three
of them (Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco) proceeded to the NARCOM office; that
when they arrived, accused-appellant Pillueta, SPO3 Lorna "Onang" Fernandez, Tet
Deniega and the NARCOM, District Commander P/Insp. Del Socorro were at the
NARCOM office while accused-appellant. Chanco's trimobile was parked in front of the
NARCOM office; that while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant Santiano and
Chanco were joking with each other, like kids, such that accused-appellants Santiano
would sling accused-appellant Chanco with his handkerchief; that, as it was
intermittently raining, accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco left the
NARCOM office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the trimobile of accused-appellant Chanco,
while accused-appellant Pillueta together with SPO3 Lorna Fernandez and Tet
Deniega left the NARCOM office at or about 8:00 P.M. and proceeded to the
Sampaguita Music Lounge to watch a lady band performing at the Sampaguita Music
Lounge, leaving behind P/Insp. Nelson Del Socorro at the NARCOM office.
That upon leaving the NARCOM office and while on board the trimobile accused-
appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco were deciding whether to see a movie or
have a round of drink and, after failing to decide whether to see a movie or a round of
drink, accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco conducted accused-appellant
Santiano to the jeepney terminal for Milaor, Camarines Sur and thereupon, accused-
appellant Chanco also conducted accused-appellant Sandigan to the Philtranco
terminal where the latter boarded a bus to Bato, Camarines Sur where he resides.
That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same date, accused-appellant
Santiano was in Milaor, Camarines Sur, a Municipality less than four kilometers away
from Naga City, and fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife (komadrana), from
the latter's residence to conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy (hilot) upon his (Santiano)
pregnant wife; that Ms. Paz and accused-appellant Santiano proceeded to and arrived
16
at the latter's house in Naga City about past 7:00 o'clock in the evening where Ms. Paz
conducted a pre-natal therapy upon appellant Santiano's wife; that Ms. Paz finished the
pre-natal therapy at or about 9:00 o'clock P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of
accused-appellant Santiano and was accompanied for home by latter at or about 10:00
o'clock of the same evening; that from past 7:00 o'clock when Paz and Santiano
arrived at the latter's house until past 10:00 o'clock when they left Santiano's house,
accused-appellant Santiano was all the time present at and never left his house;
NARCOM, Camp Crame, Quezon City, voluntarily surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed
them under the custody of the NARCOM and were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell,
Camp Crame, Quezon City. The records of this case show that no warrant of arrest
was issued against accused-appellant Chanco (Order dated Sept. 5, 1994), however,
he voluntarily surrendered and submitted to the custody of the NARCOM and to the
trial court.2

Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus:
That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta,
upon leaving the NARCOM office, went directly to the Sampaguita Music Lounge and
watched the lady band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a common acquaintance of On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered somewhere
SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, even saw and approached in the vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines, by
them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) at their table inside the Sampaguita Danilo Camba, the Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was later on
Music Lounge; that the three of them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) left the identified by Robert Dy Kow as that one of his brother, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. 3
Sampaguita Music Lounge at or about 2:00 A.M. of December 28, 1993, and
thereupon, they went to their respective homes.
Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings revealed that Dy
Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained the following injuries:
That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the day, the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.
was neither seen by the accused-appellants nor was he in the NARCOM office more
Eye: Contusion, upper lid extending to
specifically and particularly between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the same date; that the late
the outer canthus, right;
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and his (Dy Kow, Jr.) height
and body built is almost the same or similarly the same as that of accused-appellant
Chanco; that she (SPO3 Fernandez) also known William Rañola whom she usually see Ear: lacerated wound ripping off the
drunk/under the influence of liquor; lowest pole of the lobule, right; serrated
border
That in the first week of January, 1994, during the investigation of the case conducted
by the PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, SPO3 Fernandez was asked by major Ernesto Idian, Sub-occipital region: lacerated wound,
chief of PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's whereabouts in the 0.9 cms. in length, centrally located;
night of December 27, 1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez) told Major Idian that
accused-appellant Pillueta was with her (SPO3 Fernandez) at the Sampaguita Music
Lounge; that Major Idian did not ask her (SPO3 Fernandez) to execute an affidavit of Neck: punctured wound, 3-4 mm deep,
what she told him instead, Major Idian requested her not to tell accused-appellant semi-circular with serrated border, base
Pillueta about what he asked her. of neck at the sternomastoid border,
right;

That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco, reported
and submitted themselves to their superior officer, Col. Norberto Manaog, Deputy Chest: Gunshot wound
Director of the NARCOM at Camp Crame, Quezon City, wherein they reported that
they were suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and requested that they
be placed under his custody; that Col. Manaog referred them to the legal officer of the point of entrance: 2nd ICS, sternal
NARCOM, Major Acpal; that after being informed by accused-appellants Pillueta, border, right, 12 mm in diameter
Santiano and Chanco that they did not have any idea of whether a warrant of arrest
was already issued against them, Col. Manaog, in consultation with Major Acpal, told Bullet route: from the point of entrance
them that there is no yet basis for them to be placed under custody, so that, Col. extending backwards to the left, piercing
Manaog instructed them just get in touch with him so that if a warrant of arrest comes
the heart and left lung and lodging on
out, the same could be served upon them; that Col. Manaog directed Major Acpal to
the anterior aspect or surface of the sub
proceed to Pili, Camarines Sur to determine the status of the investigation and to know scapular area, left
whether a warrant of arrest was already issued; that on January 24, 1994, Major Acpal
went to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that a warrant of arrest against accused-
appellants, Sandigan, who was already arrested, Pillueta and Santiano has been Point of exist: None
issued on January 21, 1994; that on January 25, 1994, Major Acpal, being a lawyer
and the Legal officer of the NARCOM filed before the Municipal Trial Court, Pili,
Camarines Sur, a motion to quash the warrant of arrest; that on January 23, 1994 Bullet slug: Recovered
accused-appellant Pillueta informed Col. Manaog that she was hospitalized due to a
car accident and that she may be placed under his custody should a warrant for her
arrest be issued; on January 26, 1994, she was placed under the custody of her CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE
superior, Col. Manaog of the NARCOM. On the other hand, accused-appellants,
Santiano and Chanco were, from time to time, contacting Col. Manaog to determine SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4
whether a warrant of arrest was already issued but, since Col. Manaog was always out
of his office, they were able to contact, via telephone facility, Col. Manaog only on April
16, 1994; and accused-appellants Chanco and Santiano went to the office of

17
Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code; the court adjudged:
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court FINDS FOR THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and finds all of the accused, Jose Sandigan, Armenia, aka
Armie Pillueta, Alipio Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka Jovy, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING as defined and penalized under Art.
267 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences each and all of them to suffer
imprisonment, RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the penalty, and to
indemnify the heirs of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos, and
to pay the costs; they are credited in full for the preventive imprisonment.5
Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
Assailing the decision of the court a quo, appellants would insist that the amended information under which
they were arraigned, tried and convicted, although so captioned as an indictment for the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, was, in reality a mere indictment for murder. According to appellants, the use of the
words "abducted" and "kidnapping" in the amended information was not in itself indicative of the crime of
kidnapping being charged but that, from the averments of the information, it could be apparent that Ramon
John Dy Kow, Jr., was "abducted or kidnapped" not for the purpose of detaining but of liquidating him. Hence,
the defense theorized, the conviction for kidnapping had no legal ground to stand on.
Let it not be said that the contention lacks remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal proposition that can here
hardly be accepted. The amended information reads:
The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur accuses JOSE
SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO, ARMIE PILLUETA and JOVY CHANCO of the crime
of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 267 and Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00
o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Palestina,
Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and
evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abduct, kidnap, and bring into a secluded place
at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, one RAMON JOHN DY KOW,
JR. and while thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the
different parts of his body causing his instantaneous death.
That as a consequence of the death of the victim Ramon John
Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs suffered damages. 6
The information is not so wanting as to render it legally inadequate for the purpose it has been intended by the
prosecution. It should be sufficient for an information to distinctly state the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions complained of as being constitutive of that offense.7 A reading of the amended
information readily reveals that the charge is for "kidnapping with murder, defined and penalized
under Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention) and Article 248 (Murder) of the Revised
Penal Code" Evidently, appellants have been properly apprised of the charges, the information did go
on to state thus —
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00
o'clock in the evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct
kidnap and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur one
RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while thereat attack and shoot with firearm the
said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the different parts
of his body causing his instantaneous death. 8
The accused have gone through trial without any objection thereover. Exceptions relative to
the statement or recital of fact constituting the offense charged ought be presented before
the trial court; if none is taken and the defective or even omitted averments are supplied by
competent proof, it would not be error for an appellate court to reject those exceptions on
appeal.9
The issue is next posed: When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence
fails to support the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately
convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United
States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an
accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established,
despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused guilty of the other charge.
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, 11 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another; or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private
individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating
public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 12
Prosecution witness William Rañola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held and
thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the NARCOM
office the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued to batter him with
18
punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lockout." The appellants then took the
victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Rañola positively identified the fatigue jacket
worn by the victim on the evening of his abduction on 27 December 1993 and when his lifeless body
was found in the morning of 28 December 1993. Don Gumba corroborated Rañola's testimony. Gumba
was positive that he had seen the victim at around eight o'clock in the evening of 27 December 1993
with appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way
towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, where, the following morning the victim was
found dead evidently after succumbing to several gunshot wounds.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have
influenced them to declare falsely against appellants; the Court sees no justification to thereby deny
faith and credit to their testimony. 13 The Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor General in
pointing out that —
1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained
at the Naga City Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee in order to buy viand
outside. It was while he was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted
by appellants Santiano and Sandigan.
2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first
dragged to the NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This circumstance
indicated the intention to deprive him of his liberty for sometime, an essential
element of the crime of kidnapping.
3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as
indicated in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants' claim that none of the
circumstances in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1993 with appellant Chanco on
its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim
was found dead. 14
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM" and appellant Sandigan
a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability for kidnapping. 15 It is
quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of
official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office,
but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their co-appellants Santiano and
Chanco.
The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention of the
victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants themselves, in fact, all
deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus been found to be wanting by the
trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the death of the victim, the Court is
conviced that the court a quo did not err in making them account for kidnapping. The circumstances
heretofore recited indicate the attendance of conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them
each liable for the offense.
The claim of appellants that they cannot be held liable for indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
because the prosecution did not present evidence to prove damages is without merit. The indemnity
awarded by the trial court clearly refers to the civil indemnity for the offense 16 and not for actual
damages sustained.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993
FERNANDO CAYAO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL MUNDO, Respondent.chanrobles
virtual law library
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the Court Administrator
charging respondent Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite with abuse of
authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator directed Judge Enrique M. Almario, Regional
trial Court Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to submit his report and recommendation
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the investigating Judge, it appears that on or about
October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m., while traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite,
complainant, as driver of Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No. DWB 315, overtook a Sto. Niño Liner with Body
No. 5282 driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus driven by complainant almost
collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate No. PJT 752. It turned out later that the
jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was one
of the passengers therein along with his sons Rommel and June and one Edward Rommen. Respondent's son
Rommel was behind the wheel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could properly park his bus, he was picked up by
policemen of the Philippine National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the Indang Public Plaza and was
immediately brought before the sala of respondent judge. There, complainant was confronted by respondent
judge and accused by the latter of nearly causing an accident that morning. Without giving complainant any
opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be punished for the incident. Whereupon,
complainant was compelled by respondent judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of
which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's
license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e.,
confinement for three (3) days, as a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by
respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail.
Though not actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days,
from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day, complainant was
released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's co-driver and
cousin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days was confirmed and
corroborated by the testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite, SP04 Adelaida Nova. The fact of
complainant's release therefrom after three (3) days detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig who
prepared the corresponding document of release. For his defense, respondent judge merely made general
denials.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of authority. To begin with,
respondent's verbal order for the arrest of complainant at the Indang Public Plaza without the requisite
complaint having been filed and the corresponding warrant of arrest having been issued in order that
complainant may be brought to his sala is characteristic of personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of
respondent. Being a judge, respondent above all, should be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]). Instead, respondent judge opted to
avail of his judicial authority in excess of what is allowed by law to gratify his vindictive
purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
19
If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed violations of traffic rules and regulations which Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not detain Fernando Cayao based on the
nearly caused the accident involving their respective vehicles, respondent judge should have caused the filing premises that you said under oath before this Court?chanrobles virtual law library
of the appropriate criminal charges against complainant and left it at that. On the contrary, respondent is not
one to let the law run its own course. This is a classic case where respondent took it upon himself to be the
accuser, prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time to condemn complainant for his alleged A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
wrongdoing without the benefit of due process. Without even an opportunity to air his side, complainant was
unceremoniously made to choose his own penalty. Left with no other choice but to face his predicament and
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own volition outside the police station without your
overpowered by the imposing authority of respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil of the three
authority or permission?chanrobles virtual law library
alternatives given to him. Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other
choices presented to him will illustrate why.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A He can move freely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide. To threaten
complainant with a criminal case for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of respondent's gross ignorance COURT:chanrobles virtual law library
of the law. As a judge, he should know very well that such at charge will not hold water in any court of law
considering that no accident per se ever occurred and hence, no life threatening injury was even sustained. To
a mere bus driver who is not at all familiar with the intricacies of the law, such a threat spelled not only the Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he could have gone eating in restaurant, he
possibility of long-term imprisonment and all the hardship it entails but also the onus and shame that will could have gone to a theatre or in any public place. Is that what you mean?chanrobles virtual law library
forever attach to his name. Surely, to his mind, a threat of prosecution coming from a municipal trial court
judge is alarming enough.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WITNESS:chanrobles virtual law library

The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose from involves his very means of
livelihood - revocation of his driver's license. This is tantamount to economic death penalty and just as A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
repulsive as the first alternative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What did you tell him?chanrobles virtual law
Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted himself to the jail warden of the Indang library
Municipal Jail for detention after executing his "waiver of detention," complainant felt that he had no other
choice but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and arbitrarily imposed upon him by
A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be detained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
law library

While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had intended, however, complainant
Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other places, you will have no objection? You will
was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with
have no interpolation or you would not feel that you have a right to have him under your custody. Is that
incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or correct?
physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent
judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of
complainant without legal grounds (Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Battallones 23 Phil. 46 [1912]). xxx xxx xxx
In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committed a crime in
the presence of respondent judge (Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being the case, the warrantless
arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the testimony of WITNESS:chanrobles virtual law library
the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed deprived of his liberty for three (3) days:
A I will still prevent him.
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
COURT:chanrobles virtual law library
Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to whether his liberty, was actually restricted
Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on that premises? On the ground of that or not:
premises?chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS (jail warden):chanrobles virtual law library
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the municipal jail of the station of Indang,
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the police station. Cavite?chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police station from the time that I was detained.

COURT:chanrobles virtual law library (TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)

20
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is not alone
centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that complainant was
so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own accuser without the benefit of due process.
Complainant was not even accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. When respondent
insisted on punishing hire without a chance to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption of
innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Moreover, complainant was
made to execute a waiver of detention without the assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was
even subscribed by complainant before the very same judge who was his accuser. Certainly, such intentional
and blatant violations of one's constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of the law, and
more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law (De la Paz
vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If judges, who swore to obey and uphold the constitution, would conduct
themselves in the way that respondent did in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of complainant, then
the people, especially those with whom they come in direct contact, would lose all their respect and high
regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which
the judiciary is founded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the
part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so
quickly and severely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without which the government cannot
continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14
[1989]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case at bar exposed his total
disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of the procedure prescribed by law. His act of intentionally
violating the law and disregarding well-known legal procedures can be characterized as gross misconduct, nay
a criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA 277 [1988]). He used and abused his position
of authority in intimidating the complainant as well as the members of the Indang police force into submitting to
his excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to always conduct
himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not only in the performance of his duties but also outside his
sala and as a private individual. (Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75
[1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive actuations, has
committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to continue
as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of Indang, Cavite is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice
to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
GERONIMO DADO,, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997 decision of
the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April 22, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding petitioner Geronimo
Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were
charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of
Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with
firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned
weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial thereafter
followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas5 and Rufo Alga6 are as follows: On
the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle
rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado
and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio
Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles,
positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco
Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and
were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was
half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso,
who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could
beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter,
Petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim
shouted, Tay Dolfo, ako ini, (Tay Dolfo, [this is] me)7 as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be
Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to
intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas saying, Pare, this was not
intentionally done and this was merely an accident.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem examination
conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially and exiting at the
right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
21
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the ischial spine.
Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding tissues along the femoral triangle.
The wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the
urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the
surrounding vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three
(3) pieces of irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the
iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder substance; three,
copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor. Hematoma noted along the penile
area.
No other injuries noted.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted
on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found
three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of the victim at that time of the
shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added
that the wound on the victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not
immediately treated.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered from the
fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxx
1. Evidence marked SB-1 is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was fired
through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed marked SB-1.
x x x .11cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as
exhibit SB-2 and SB-3) recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of SB-1 which is a part of
a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He
claimed that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a big hole
from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his companions, CAFGU members,
Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts,
he thought they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It
was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized
somebody was shot.13cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be from
their enemies came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken making it difficult
for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the source thereof and instead
fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite
the source of the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy.14cräläwvirtualibräry
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and
Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused, SPO4
Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the expenses
incurred for the complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26,
1997.16cräläwvirtualibräry
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
February 11, 1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30, 1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco
Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of
homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso conspired in killing the
deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound inasmuch as conspiracy
makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution failed to
allege the circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: x x x the said accused,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-
mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
x x x Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in
appropriate language.20 The words conspired, confederated, or the phrase acting in concert or in conspiracy,
or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in
charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not
merely inferred from the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge
sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions.21 In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To
ensure that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the essential
elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place
of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.22cräläwvirtualibräry
22
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be considered xxx
against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly proven,
circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense ATTY. PASOK:
itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor
simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.23cräläwvirtualibräry
xxx

In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that of [an]
more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Simultaneity alone
armalite?
would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be
the basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident
occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the A: Copper jacket.
offense.24cräläwvirtualibräry

Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have been
committed by him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an
individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts done by his co- A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly and personally in the commission of
those acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that
directly caused the death of the victim. Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit 2, SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be bullet from a caliber
.45, M-14 or M-16?

The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a 5.56 mm.
bullet which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim must have been A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core
caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than the wound sustained by the evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29
victim on the right outer lateral arm.25 However, this conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no
evidence was presented to substantiate said conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic xxx
Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the
fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked SB-1, is a part of a copper jacket of
a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,26 and not a Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit 3-A, in page 2 under the column, Findings and Conclusions and I
part of a .45 caliber bullet.27 Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads: quote: Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket
marked [as] SB-1. My question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the
Court, you are sure that this Exhibits SB-2 and SB-3 [are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:

A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.

Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked A-1. This refer to the very same
Exhibit A-1?
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: Yes, sir.
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
xxx
COURT:
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet; how did you arrive? Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition, would you say
that the same would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket of a different caliber or ammunition?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the bullet, sir.
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We cannot evidently
conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?

There is no basis.
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found out
that the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56
mm., they have the same lands and grooves. COURT:

Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine? Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?

A: A bullet comparison microscope.28

23
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper jacket, rubber putted Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
and lead (sic).

A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper jacket fired from
Q: How about .45 firearm? armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper jacket and the standard bullet fired from
5.56., they are the same in width.

A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?

Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?

A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and grooves of .45
caliber is very wide.
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.

They are not the same.

COURT:

Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2
and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide.30cräläwvirtualibräry

A: Could be, Your Honor.

The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic fragments
(marked as exhibit SB-2 and SB-3) are indeed parts of the lead core of the SB-1, which is part of a copper
COURT: jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that is, said metallic
fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of
petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on
Cross for the prosecution.
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
FISCAL DE PERALTA: explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
xxx lacking.31cräläwvirtualibräry

Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct? Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are
particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the
Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.

In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right outer lateral
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit 2, particularly SB-1, arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused
you made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45 caliber? by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.

A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that
petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there
is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the
prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi must
be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The
inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.34cräläwvirtualibräry

Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of
Q: But you said it could be a part? illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.35 The elements of this crime are: (1)
that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention
to kill that person.36 Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted
A: It is a part, Your Honor. of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a
person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance
FISCAL DE PERALTA: between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

24
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying circumstances and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 16886, affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
(2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 19 April 1993, the relative early morning calm in General Luna Street, Barangay Bangkal, Makati, was
shattered when a petty argument evolved into a street brawl. After the dust had settled, eighteen (18) -year old
Christopher Arugay ("Arugay") lay dying from multiple stab wounds, while his neighbor, twenty-four (24)-year
old Kingstone1 Li ("Li"), staggered injured, with hack wounds on his head.
Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 148,2 with the crime of Homicide.3 On
5 January 1994, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. His conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in a Decision4 dated 6 September 1996.
The version presented by the prosecution as to the antecedent facts leading to Arugay’s death differs sharply
from the version offered by Li. The accused claims that the dispute stemmed from a spurned offer to drink,
while the prosecution traces the root of the fight to an indecorous bath in public.
The story of the prosecution was told by the witnesses Aubrey dela Camara ("dela Camara") and Ronaldo Tan
("Tan").5
Shortly before his death, Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his
girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Jane’s boyfriend, Tan. At around 1:15 in the early morning, dela Camara and
Tan suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo "Eddie
Boy" Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the Arugays. 6
Enraged, Arugay yelled, "Pare bastos kayo, ba’t kayo nakahubad?" 7
Li shouted back, "Putang Ina!" and threw something at the Arugays’ house. Sangalang also yelled, "Putang
Ina mo, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!"8
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now wearing briefs and carrying a baseball
bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. Tan and dela
Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a
knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.9
Immediately thereafter, dela Camara was confronted by Li’s sister, Kristine, who proceeded to pull her hair
and slap her around. Kristine also wielded a bolo, with which she hacked dela Camara in the arm. Although
preoccupied under the circumstances, dela Camara was able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once, so
she claimed.10
Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was stabbed, with Li and Sangalang chasing him. He saw
nothing further of the incident, according to him.11
In their respective testimonies, dela Camara and Tan are unable to account for the fact that before the fight
ended, Li also lay wounded with multiple hack wounds on his head and body. This fact lies at the crux of the
petitioner’s defense.
On the other hand, Li presents a different version.
Li encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18 April 1993, a few hours before the brawl. Arugay
was carrying a bayong containing various liquors. He invited Li to a drinking session which the latter refused
as he had work the following day.12
Early the next morning, around one o’clock a.m., Li was watching television at his home with his friend Ricky
Amerol when they heard objects being thrown at the house. Peeping through the window, they saw Arugay
and dela Camara in front of the gate throwing stones and bottles at the direction of Li’s house. The stones
broke window jalousies and also struck Amerol. At the same time, Arugay was also hurling invectives at Li.13
Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, "Pare, ano ba problema mo? Wala naman kaming kasalanan sa ’yo."
Arugay and his girlfriend just kept on stoning the house and hurling invectives at petitioner. Arugay kicked the
gate but Li prevented him from opening it. Arugay then ran towards his house across the street.14
Li tried to fix the gate, which had become misaligned and its lock destroyed as a result of the kicking.
Reacting, he saw Arugay coming out of the house armed with two kitchen knives. In response, Li went inside
his house and got a baseball bat. When he returned to the street, Arugay attacked him with a knife. Li
managed to avoid Arugay’s thrusts and hit Arugay with the baseball bat on the right shoulder. Arugay ran back
to his house shouting, "The long one! The long one!" Li also dashed back to his house but before he was able
to enter the door, he saw Arugay carrying a two-foot long bolo, running towards him. On Arugay’s heels were
Ronaldo Tan and Aubrey dela Camara.15
Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo. Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on
his right temple and right wrist. Not content, Arugay hit Li on the right shoulder. Li passed out.16
Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald Tan hit him at the back of his left
ear with a baseball bat. Eventually, Li managed to get back to the house and was brought to the Makati
Medical Center by Amerol and Barangay Tanod Eduardo Reyes.17
On cross-examination, Li admitted that Eduardo Sangalang was also in his house at the time the incident
started. Sangalang was the boyfriend of Li’s half-sister, Cristy.18
25
Dr. Alberto Reyes of the Medico Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the post-
mortem examination on the body of Arugay. He noted the following injuries:
Pallor, lips and nailbeds.
Contusion, arm, right, poster-lateral, 5.0 x 3.0 cm.
Wounds, incised, scalp, parieto-occipital, right, 6.0 cm.; anterior sheet, left side, suprammary 6.0
cm., inframmary 4.0 cm.
Wounds stab:
1. 3.0 cm., long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, oriented, horizontally, with a sharp,
medial and a blunt lateral extremeties, located at the anterior chest wall, left side, 15.0
cm. from the anterior median line, directed upwards, backwards and medially, involving
the skin and soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.
2. 4.0 cm., long, spindle shaped edges irregular, with a sharp inferolateral and blunt
supero-medial extremeties, located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side, 0.5 cm.
from the anterior median line, directed upwards , backwards and medially involving the
skin and soft tissues, laceration of the diaphragm and the right lobe of the liver, with an
approximate depth of 10.0 cm.
3. 1.5 cm. long, spindle shape[d] edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a
sharp lateral and blunt medial extremeties, located at the anterior abdominal wall, left
side, 9.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards and medially
involving the skin and soft tissues, penetrating the transverse colon with an
approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
4. 1.5 cm. long, spindle, edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp
poster-lateral a blunt antero medial extremities located at the anterior chest wall right
side, 21.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed backward, upwards and medially
involving the skin and soft tissues penetrating the 8th intercostals space, into the
diaphragm and right lobe of the liver, with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
Hemoperitoneum – 1,500 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, half-full with rice and brownish fluid.
Cause of death – stab wounds of the chest and abdomen.19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Li guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused KINGSTONE LI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessories of the law.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of the late Christopher Arugay the sum of
₱50,000.00 for and as indemnity for causing the death of said victim.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.20
Li appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.21
Li filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that the RTC erred in holding that he was the instigator of the events
leading to Arugay’s death; in not basing its Decision on the evidence on record; in holding that he was guilty of
homicide by reason of conspiracy; and in not ruling that the evidence of the prosecution does not prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.22
There is a difference in the factual findings of the RTC and those of the Court of Appeals. The variance
warrants the close review of the findings of the two courts. While both courts argue that Li was guilty of
homicide, their respective rationales are different.
Neither court disputes that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the stab wounds he received. The
RTC concluded though that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay:
From all these conflicting versions, this court after piecing out the evidence presented and from
what can be deduced in the circumstances obtaining finds that because of the altercation between
Christopher Arugay and Kingstone Li, Christopher Arugay armed himself with a bolo and
Kingstone Li armed himself with a baseball bat.
From the evidence presented, it became clear to the court that it was Kingstone Li who hit first with
a baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is
near the shoulder. 23
xxx
Now, after Kingstone Li has hit the deceased with a baseball bat, the deceased who is armed with
a bolo, retaliated by hacking Kingstone Li on the head and indeed he was hit on the head and right
wrist causing Kingstone Li to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell (sic) semi-unconscious or
unconscious.
At this point in time, Eduardo Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the deceased
several times at least six times.
This is explained by the findings of Dr. Alberto Reyes that Christopher Arugay sustained an
incise[d] wound on scalp, on the left chest, and four stab wounds that are fatal.
When Christopher Arugay sustained the fatal wounds, two (2) of them piercing his liver xxx24
While the RTC concluded that Li had not stabbed Arugay, it nevertheless held him guilty, predicated on a
finding of conspiracy with Sangalang. This issue shall be explored in greater detail later.
26
In contrast, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay, and rendered
unnecessary a finding of conspiracy to attach guilt to the accused. It held:
The deceased suffered four fatal wounds, then (sic) the accused might have inflicted at least
one fatal stab wound and so with his friend Eddie Boy, who remains at large. Since it has not
been established which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both be held liable
and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy exists.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court’s formulation is wrong as the converse is the correct rule: with the existence of conspiracy,
it is no longer necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow;26 whereas in the
absence of conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts.27 Thus,
it is necessary to determine whether a conspiracy existed between Li and Sangalang, and if there was none,
to ascertain the particular acts performed by Li.
The Court of Appeals also cited the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Tan and dela Camara, to the
effect that they saw Li stab Arugay at the left portion of the body.28 These testimonies are vital as they
constitute the only evidence that Li actually stabbed Arugay. A careful examination of the case however
cautions us from giving full faith and credence to the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution. The RTC
itself cast doubt on the veracity of all the eyewitness testimony, whether for the prosecution or for the
accused. The RTC noted, thus:
At the outset, the court has to state that it has noted that the witnesses for the prosecution and that
of the defense either held back on material facts or have deliberately withheld some facts or added
some matters to the real facts for these are not only gaps but holes in the versions of the
witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. What this court can do is to cull from the evidence
presented what could be the approximate or near the truth. The prosecution did not help this court
any to have a good view of the facts and neither the defense.29
The relationships of the witnesses dela Camara and Tan to Arugay or the latter’s family cannot be easily
discounted. Dela Camara was the boyfriend of Arugay, while Tan was the boyfriend of Arugay’s sister, Baby
Jane. As such, they are not wholly neutral or disinterested witnesses. Both of them actually asserted in open
court that they were not willing to say anything derogatory against Arugay. Tan testified as follows:
Q: Since Jane Arugay is your girlfriend, and Christopher Arugay was your friend, you did not like to
say anything derogatory against Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Neither did you want to say anything also derogatory against the family of Christopher Arugay,
did you?
A: Yes, maam.30
Similarly, dela Camara testified as follows:
Q: As the girlfriend of Christopher Arugay, you did not say anything derogatory [about] the said
Christopher Arugay, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You do not like to besmirch his memory, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So that if Christopher Arugay assaulted Kingstone Li on April 19, 1993, you did not like this, do
you know that, did you Ms. Dela Camara.
A: Yes, maam.31
The revelations serve caution against accepting the testimonies of Tan and dela Camara as gospel truth. They
cast doubt as to whether these witnesses would be capable to attest to an unbiased narration of facts,
especially if by doing so, they would be forced to impute culpability on Arugay, thereby staining the sainted
memory of their deceased friend.
Moreover, the respective testimonies of dela Camara and Tan are inconsistent with each other with respect to
material points. Dela Camara claimed that she and Tan together assisted Arugay after the latter had been
struck down with the baseball bat.32 Yet while Tan admitted that he had pulled Arugay away from the scene of
the melee, he made no mention of the assistance of dela Camara.33 In fact, Tan stated that dela Camara
remained inside the house.34 This assertion contradicts dela Camara’s claim that she was outside the house
during the whole time the incident transpired.35 Nor did Tan advert to the scene painted by dela Camara of
Kristine Li wielding a bolo while pulling on the hair of Arugay’s girlfriend. That is an unusual enough
occurrence that would stick to the mind of anybody who would witness such.
Indeed, the tale weaved by Tan arouses more curiousity upon examination of his sworn statement, executed
the night after the incident. Therein, Tan referred to some existing bad blood between Arugay and Li over a
borrowed tape, a fact which subsequently none of the parties would call attention to.36 Curioser, Tan never
mentioned any baseball bat having been used by Li during the incident. Nor did he mention any participation
of Sangalang in the actual brawl. On the other hand, dela Camara in her own sworn statement, asserted that
both Li and Sangalang had stabbed Arugay and that she herself was hacked on the arm by Kristine Li.37
Both Tan and dela Camara testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of the body as the latter was being
pulled towards his house after having been struck with the baseball bat.38 However, Tan testified that Li came
from behind Arugay to inflict the stab wound,39 while dela Camara stated that Arugay was facing Li when he
was stabbed.40
Most importantly, the testimonies of dela Camara and Tan both contradict the physical evidence. As
consistently held:
Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated
testimony of witnesses. We have held:
…Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where
the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions,
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth…[W]here the physical
evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail.41
It is undisputed that Li had armed himself with a baseball bat as he prepared to face Arugay. It also appears
that the baseball bat remained at the scene of the fight, as the same weapon was used to strike Li on the head
after he lay injured.42 In order to sustain the claim of Tan and dela Camara that Li had stabbed Arugay, we
would have to postulate that Li was armed with both a knife and a baseball bat. This scenario is severely
flawed.
First. Tan and dela Camara would have us believe that Li faced off Arugay with a baseball bat, then after
having struck Arugay, he ran off to his home to get a knife, returned to the melee, then stabbed Arugay.43 This
projected sequence is simply incredulous. Li was already armed with a weapon that could incapacitate or kill.
He had already struck a blow that apparently forced the victim down. There is no logical reason for Li to
suddenly run off to get a knife, considering he already had a weapon capable of inflicting damage and was at
an advantageous position vis-à-vis the prostrate Arugay.
27
There is of course the possibility that Li was already carrying the knife when he emerged with the baseball bat,
but that was not established by the prosecution. Moreover, the scenario of Li brandishing a knife with one
hand and wielding a bat with the other is highly improbable. It would require unusual physical dexterity for a
person to wield both weapons simultaneously and still utilize them with adequate proficiency. Nor is it likely
that Li concealed the knife in his clothing. According to Tan, Li was only wearing briefs when he attacked
Arugay with the baseball bat.44
Second. The pathological findings likewise cast severe doubt on the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay.
The trial court concluded that only one knife was used in killing Arugay, and probably only one wielder thereof.
The RTC decision said:
The court noted also with particular interest the description of the four wounds as found by Dr.
Reyes. The first wound has been described by Dr. Reyes as 3.0 cm. long, spindle[-]shaped edges,
irregular, etc; the No. 2 wound has also been described as 4.0 cm. long, spindle[-] shaped, edges
irregular, etc.; No. 3 wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle-shaped, edges, irregular, etc.; and the fourth
wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle shaped edges irregular;
Thus there are two (2) outstanding characteristics of the four (4) stab wounds sustained by
Christopher Arugay. All of them are spindle[-]shaped and irregular in their edges. This is significant
because it would appear to the court that only one weapon was used because all the
characteristics of the four wounds were the same. Thus, to the mind of the court there is only one
person who inflicted these wounds, not two (2) or three (3). It could be possible that there were two
who inflicted the stab wound[s] if the weapon used was given to another after using the same and
the other one to whom it was transferred used it also. But in this case there is no showing that
such incident did happen.45
It must be qualified that Dr. Reyes, the NBI Medico-Legal, refused to definitively conclude that only one knife
was used in stabbing Arugay though he conceded that such was possible.46 Nevertheless, the fact that Arugay
sustained the same kind of stab wounds tends to support the conclusion that only one knife was used on him.
Third. Dela Camara testified that she saw both Li and Sangalang stab Arugay. Considering that there was only
one knife used, her version would hold water only if we were to assume that the same knife passed from the
hands of Li to Sangalang or that they held identical or similar knives. As the RTC ruled, nothing of the sort was
established. The more logical assumption would be that there was only one stabber using one knife. The
question now arises, was it Li or Sangalang who stabbed Arugay?
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab Arugay once. Assuming this were
true, this blow would not have been the fatal stab wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from further participating
in the rumble and, as subsequently established, inflicting damaging blows on Li. However, the physical
evidence belies any conclusion that Li inflicted any of the several fatal wounds on Arugay.
Dr. Pedro P. Solis, the medico-legal consultant of Makati Medical Center who also happens to be one of the
country’s leading experts in Legal Medicine47, examined Li’s injuries on the same day of the incident, and
subsequently testified on his findings. He concluded that Li suffered three types of wounds on his body. The
first type consisted of abrasions, consistent with forcible contact accompanied by a hard object. The two other
types of injuries were considerably more serious: incised wounds and a contusion. As found by the RTC:
According to (sic) Dr. Pedro Solis, who examined the accused at the Makati Medical Center on the very night
after the incident and (sic) found the following injuries on Kingstone Li, to wit:
1. xxx
2. Wound, incised, 12 cm., scalp, fronto-parietal area, right, 9 cm., right; 9 cm. posterior aspect,
shoulder, right; 1.5 cm., postero-medial aspect, distal third, forearm, right.
3. Contusion, 4 x 5 cm., scalp, parieto-occipital area (post suricular) left.
From the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Pedro Solis, the injuries suffered by Kingstone Li
were defense wounds, and that there were two (2) weapons used in inflicting injuries on Kingstone
Li. One is a sharp edge[d] instrument such as a bolo and the other one is [a] blunt instrument.48
The physical evidence of Li’s injuries are consistent with his version that Arugay had hacked him, and as he
struggled to recover from the blow, he was struck with his own baseball bat by Tan, thus explaining the
contusion on his head. More importantly though, the injuries were serious enough to incapacitate Li at the
scene, calling into question his ability to inflict the fatal blows on Arugay. As Dr. Solis testified:
A: [I] noticed in this particular case that there are incise[d] wound[s] on the right hand and right
shoulder. These are injuries brought about, as I said, brought about by [a] sharp edged instrument.
This I presumed to have been brought about by the inherent self defensive (sic) mechanism of the
victim. In so far as the injury on the head is concerned, it must be a hit, now, I am referring to the
incise wound on the head, incise[d] wound on the head will also cause pressure on the skull
thereby producing some effect on the brain, this has been aggravated by a blunt instrument
applied on the left side of his neck and joining as together the two injuries the incise[d] wounds and
that of contusion which is brought about by blunt instrument it might have cause[d] him some
degree of loss of consciousness.
Q: Would that person have been able to stab somebody one time, two times, three times or four
times after sustaining those injuries?
A: In that condition he has no complete power to perform volitional acts because he must have lost
partially or totally his consciousness primarily the hit on the left side of the head because the brain
is a vital organ and slight jarring will cause los[s] of consciousness and what we call in ordinary
parlance, you saw shooting stars as a consequence.
Q: Aside from los[s] of consciousness, would that person who sustained that injury have been able
to walk without the assistance of anybody?
A: In all [likelihood], he might have lost I said of his volitional movement, he [may be] able to walk
but as I have observe[d] it must be with assistance more particularly in this case whereby the
incise wound on the head is measured 12 cm., the head is a bloody organ in a way that if a person
is erect, blood will flow on that area and it might cause even modification of his visual perception.49
Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, causing a twelve centimeter (12 cm.)-wound, among other wounds. In
such a condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
Moreover, it could not be established that Li was ever armed with a knife. Difficult as it is already to believe
that the wounded Li could have stabbed Arugay several times, the incredulity is compounded by imagining
that Li would have also groped around for a knife, dazed and severely wounded as he was. Simply put, Li
could not have stabbed Arugay. The assertions to the contrary of Tan and dela Camara are inherently flawed.
Fourth. In all, the factual determination made by the RTC is wholly believable up to a point. There were four
participants in the brawl, namely Li, Sangalang, Arugay and Tan. The first blow was struck by Li, who had
armed himself with a baseball bat and used the same to hit Arugay on the left upper arm. This unprovoked
assault by Li establishes at least some degree of criminal culpability on his part. Arugay then armed himself
with a bolo which he used to inflict an incised wound on the head of Li. After Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself
armed with a knife, fatally stabbed Arugay at least four times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat dropped by
the wounded Li and struck Li on the head with the bat. These findings are consistent with the physical
evidence, reliance on which should be given greater primacy over the unreliable eyewitness testimony of Tan
and dela Camara.
Thus, Sangalang alone had stabbed Christopher Arugay. Yet the RTC still found Li guilty on the tenuous
determination that a conspiracy between Li and Sangalang existed. The RTC held:
28
 From the evidence presented, the court believes and it so holds that there was conspiracy.
It must be pointed out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then in the same
house at the same time. Eduardo Sangalang is the boyfriend of the half-sister of Kingtone Li.
The act of Kingstone Li [in] getting a baseball bat and using it as a weapon and the act of
Eduardo Sangalang alias Eddie Boy in arming himself with a sharp pointed weapon and
both going out to meet Christopher Arugay whose only sin is to point to the accused his
scandalous and indecent act in bathing nude not in the bathroom but in a place which is
crowded by people who can see him especially the ladies and is provocative to others are
patent and conclusive presumption of conspiracy for their acts were concerted and so
close to each other that there is no way but to conclude a conspiracy.50 (Emphasis not ours)
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present wherein the criminal acts
arose spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants would have the opportunity to
orchestrate a more deliberate plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of conspiracy,
which after all, can be consummated in a moment’s notice – through a single word of assent to a proposal or
an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of
violence; hence, the demand that it be established by positive evidence. A conviction premised on a finding of
conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption.51
It is worth noting that while conspiracy was alleged in the Information against Li, the prosecution devoted its
efforts to prove that Li had actually inflicted the stab wounds on Sangalang, tagging him as a direct participant
in the crime. Thus, there seems to be no evidence that would directly establish the fact that Li and Sangalang
had come into an agreement to commit a common felony. Any conclusion that there was a conspiracy will
have to be drawn inferentially, as the RTC did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have
acted in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy
since it is by its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence.52 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint
purpose and design.53 Complicity may be determined by concert of action at the moment of consummating the
crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound.54
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before concluding, as the RTC did,
that an implied conspiracy had been established. An implied conspiracy must still be based on facts
established by positive and conclusive evidence.55 Even if conspiracy per se is not criminal, as it rarely is in
this jurisdiction,56 the weight of factual evidence necessary to prove conspiracy is the same as required to
establish criminal liability – proof beyond reasonable doubt.57 Suppositions based on mere presumptions and
not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.58
The RTC’s conclusion that there was a conspiracy was drawn from these circumstances, namely: that Li and
Sangalang were in the same house at the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going out
to meet Arugay. The fact that they were in the same house at the same time is not in itself sufficient to
establish conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends companionship,59 and mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not in itself amount to conspiracy.60
The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emerged from Li’s house, both armed, to face Arugay has
to be weighed against other facts also relied upon by the RTC. As the RTC held, Sangalang stabbed Arugay
only after petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat,
it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based on these
circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li had acted in concert to commit the
offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by
Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous
reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot arise.61
Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase commenced when Li, without
sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the baseball bat. Li’s participation in this phase, albeit as a
solitary actor, was indubitably established. Sangalang’s participation, much less his physical presence during
this phase, was not established at all. In the second phase, Sangalang was the main actor. Li was
incapacitated by then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be ruled out.
After Arugay had been struck down, it appears that there would have been a lapse of at least a few minutes,
affording him time to procure the bolo. The second phase in the brawl then commenced. No further blows
appear to have been inflicted by Li. On the other hand, Li himself became the victim of the hack wounds on
the head inflicted
by Arugay. As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had any
further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, whose previous participation was not conclusively
established, emerged into the fray. Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily, it cannot be assumed that
Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in coordination with each other.
The scenario as established by the RTC still leaves many open-ended questions and admits to a myriad of
possibilities. This very uncertainty indicates that Li’s liability as a conspirator was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. The general principle in criminal law is that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. Consequently, when confronted with variant though equally plausible versions of events, the version
that is in accord with the acquittal or the least liability of the accused should be favored.
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay
with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li
beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the
realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the
required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries, penalized as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
….
2. By aresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused
physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance;62
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty days.63 The felony of slight physical
injuries is necessarily included in the homicide charge. Since the Information against Li states that among the
means employed to commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the lesser offense
of slight physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances established, the
imposition of the penalty in its medium period is warranted.64 Li was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994.
Having long served more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate release unless, of course, he
is being lawfully detained for another cause.
What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any
methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable
vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however
senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps
into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death
of Christopher Arugay was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is
responsible for the death apparently remains at large. Yet absent any clear showing of conspiracy, as in this
case, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of
the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the
29
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto menor in the medium period of ten (10) to twenty
(20) days. Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated well-beyond the period of the penalty herein
imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause petitioner’s IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless
petitioner is being lawfully held for another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt
of this Decision, of the compliance with such order.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal by way of automatic review is the Decision1cra1aw dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00666, affirming the Judgment2cra1aw of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting
appellant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles (appellant) for the crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
with Frustrated Murder, Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft.
The Informations alleged -
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder -
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a female, thereby depriving
her of her liberty, and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited place in Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose,
Batangas and then and there, with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot her in the face with a hand gun, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of MURDER as consequence, but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the able and timely
medical assistance given to said Agnes Guirindola which prevented her death, resulting to her utmost grief,
sorrow, sufferings and sleepless night, compensable in actual, moral and exemplary damages in such
amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3cra1aw
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 for Carnapping -
That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away one Nissan Sentra Model 1993 with Plate No.
TKR-837, then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by her mother Elvira G. Guirindola, to the damage and
prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola and Elvira G. Guirindola in such amount as may be awarded to them under
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4cra1aw
and -
In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for Robbery -
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, while on board the motor vehicle of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a 1993
Nissan Sentra with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the course of its trip, divested and robbed said Agnes
Guirindola of the following cash, check and personal belongings, to wit:chan robles virtual law library
Cash P1,000.00
Check 3,000.00
Pieces of jewelry valued at 34,000.00
and in the course of execution thereof, shoot and fatally wounded Agnes Guirindola with a handgun, which is
clearly unnecessary in the commission of the crime, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola, in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5cra1aw
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:chan robles virtual law library
On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along Panay Avenue,
Quezon City, on board a red 1993 model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate number TKR-837, was suddenly
flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest. The man signaled her to make a U-turn. Agnes
complied and made the U-turn. The man walked in front of her car and proceeded to the right side of the
car.6cra1aw Agnes, later on, identified the man in open court as appellant, Venancio Roxas (Roxas).
Agnes opened the right front window of the car and asked Roxas, who had positioned himself at the front
passenger side, "Ano ang problema?" Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito." Agnes explained to the
man that she usually passed by the same street and it was only that day that she had been caught. Roxas told
her that the street had been made a one-way street because a girl figured in an accident in the same street
two days ago.7cra1aw
Roxas then asked for Agnes' driver's license. After taking the driver's license, Roxas handed her a piece of
paper which she was asked to sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual traffic citation ticket but,
nevertheless, she pretended to sign the same by making a check thereon.8cra1aw
When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas, the latter asked her to open the door of the car so that he
could show her the one-way sign and the other traffic aide at the corner of the street. Agnes let Roxas enter
the car. Roxas then instructed Agnes to drive to the corner of the street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas
pointed to her the one-way sign and looked for the traffic aide he had told Agnes about. The traffic aide was
not there. Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to make a left turn from the corner
of the street and that he will alight somewhere in Mother Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a left turn and
stopped the car. Thinking that Roxas was waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet, pulled a P50.00 bill
and gave it to Roxas. After receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes her driver's license.9cra1aw
30
Upon returning the driver's license to Agnes, Roxas immediately switched off the engine of the car and poked
a gun at her saying "Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified and shocked by Roxas' actions, cried
and pleaded with him to let her go and just take the car. Roxas continued to poke a gun at her, unmindful of
what Agnes was telling him.10cra1aw
After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside the car. Roxas opened the rear door and then someone
boarded the car, occupying the back seat. The second passenger immediately reclined the driver's seat and
pulled Agnes towards the back seat. Agnes identified this man as Roberto Gungon (Gungon). Subsequently,
Roxas took the driver's seat and drove the car while Gungon held Agnes on the shoulder with one hand, and
her leg with the other.11cra1aw
Agnes then heard Gungon say: "Boss, dalhin natin sya sa Philcoa." After crossing Mother Ignacia Street,
Gungon got his beeper and told Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s." Agnes
became more frightened as she understood "s" to mean "salvage," a lingo for summary execution.12cra1aw
Along the way, Roxas stopped the car and went to a sari-sari store. Gungon was left behind, holding Agnes,
and would tighten his grip every time she made a slight move and sometimes would poke a gun at her. Upon
returning to the car, Roxas offered Agnes a bottle of soft drink and Skyflakes biscuit. Agnes refused so Roxas
handed the softdrink to Gungon and told him: "Mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya." Gungon
took the bottle of softdrink and tried to force Agnes to drink the contents thereof. Agnes refused because she
saw tablets floating inside the bottle. Roxas resumed driving, while Gungon held Agnes.13cra1aw
Agnes testified that she planned to escape, but could not make a single move because every time she made a
slight move, Gungon would poke the gun at her. The windows of the car were tinted and remained
closed.14cra1aw
15
Around 5:00 p.m., Agnes noticed that they were already at the South Superhighway. cra1aw
Along the superhighway, Roxas stopped the car in order to urinate. Gungon guarded Agnes by holding her.
When Roxas returned, Gungon alighted to relieve himself too. While Gungon was out of the car, Roxas sat at
the driver's seat facing Agnes and poked his gun at her. Shortly thereafter, Gungon came back to the car and
Roxas resumed driving. When Agnes took the prayer leaflet from her wallet, Gungon looked at her wallet and
saw the picture of her sister. When asked if she was the one in the picture, Agnes told Gungon that it was her
sister. Out of the blue, Gungon also took his wallet and showed Agnes three (3) pictures which, according to
him, were the pictures of his niece, her girlfriend and that of Roxas and a lady with a little child. After showing
the same to Agnes, Gungon returned the said pictures to his wallet.16cra1aw Agnes planned to escape at that
time but the car was running at a speed of 80 to 100 kilometers per hour. Agnes just continued to
pray.17cra1aw
At this point, Gungon again offered the softdrink to Agnes. When she refused, Gungon became mad and
tightened his hold on Agnes, forcing her to drink it. Sensing that Gungon was already furious, Agnes took the
softdrink. After Agnes drank it, Roxas told Gungon, "Ipainom mo pa itong dalawang tablets dahil malaki sya,
mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya." Gungon took the tablets from Roxas and forced Agnes to swallow the
same. Out of fear, Agnes took the tablets, but did not swallow them. She placed the tablets under her tongue.
When Roxas and Gungon were not looking, she took her handkerchief and spat out the tablets into the
handkerchief.18cra1aw
Afterwards, Agnes told Roxas and Gungon that she was hungry and wanted to eat a McDonald's sandwich.
Gungon replied that they were in the province and that there was no McDonald's there. Roxas told Agnes that
they will just drop by a restaurant to buy something to eat. Roxas then stopped by a bakery and alighted from
the car, while Gungon held Agnes. It was at this point that Agnes noticed the signboard of the bakery which
read something like Sto. Tomas or San Jose, Batangas. After a while, Roxas came back with a "taisan" cake
and offered it to Agnes which she refused. At that instance, Agnes felt dizzy and fell asleep.19cra1aw
When Agnes woke up, she found herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. The car
was at a standstill. She noticed from the car's clock on the dashboard that it was about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. She
also found out that her jewelries consisting of bracelets, pair of earrings, necklace and a watch worth
around P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, as well as her pair of shoes, were already gone. When she asked Gungon
about them, the latter told her that they were just keeping the same for her. Agnes also lost her wallet
containing a check in the amount of P3,000.00 and cash in the amount of P1,000.00.20cra1aw
Agnes also noticed that there was already a third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas who was still
driving. She then asked them if she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas if Agnes would be allowed to
relieve herself to which Roxas answered in the affirmative. Agnes fixed her hair and then asked Gungon for
her shoes. Gungon put the shoes on her feet. Roxas alighted from the car and opened the rear door. Gungon
alighted first from the car followed by Agnes. Gungon then led Agnes to a nearby grassy area and told her, "O,
dyan ka na lang umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she was about to get up and return to the car, she
saw white sparks at her right side and then she fell down. When she opened her eyes, she saw Roxas walking
back towards the car with a gun in his hand. She did not see Gungon at that particular time. Then she lost
consciousness.21cra1aw
When Agnes regained consciousness, she was all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man, as well as the
car, were no longer there. It was very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that led her to a small house. Upon
reaching the house, she opened the door and saw two (2) children and a teenager singing. She asked for their
help but upon seeing her, they ran away. She then saw a lady standing at the stairs of the house carrying a
baby. Agnes asked for her help but the lady went upstairs and locked herself inside the room. Agnes followed
her and knocked at the door of the room asking for help, but still the lady did not come out of the room. She
then went downstairs and lied down on the sofa. Only then did she notice that blood was profusely oozing
from her face and there were "holes" in the left side of her neck and her right cheek.22cra1aw
After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan sa loob ng
bahay, tulungan natin siya!" Agnes was then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and brought to the Batangas
Regional Hospital, where she was treated for her wounds and given first aid.23cra1aw Agnes sustained the
following injuries:chan robles virtual law library
Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX Sudmandibular area (L); Fx, zygomatic arch & condylar area,
(R) Sec to GSW; Submandibular Gland involvement with sinus tract. (Exhibit "A," Medical Certificate dated
February 1, 1994 signed by attending physician Dr. Lauro R. San Jose, Captain MC, Neurosurgery 4-A, p.
177, Volume III, Record)
The following day, about 3:00 a.m. of January 13, 1994, the parents of Agnes and the rest of the family arrived
at the hospital. Her parents immediately arranged for her transfer to the V. Luna General Hospital (now AFP
Medical Center) in Quezon City, where she was treated further, operated on and confined for forty-three (43)
days.24cra1aw Agnes incurred actual damages amounting to P36,161.83 for her hospitalization, surgical
operation and medical treatment, and suffered moral damages the amount of which she cannot readily
quantify, as a result of the ordeal she underwent on that fateful day of January 12, 1994.25cra1aw
Upon transfer of Agnes to the V. Luna General Hospital, her parents immediately reported the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, which promptly conducted an investigation. On January 17,
1994, some NBI agents visited her for the taking of the cartographic sketches of Roxas and Gungon. On
January 19, 1994, another group of NBI agents went to the hospital and showed her 3 to 4 pictures of Gungon
who was subsequently arrested in Davao City. On February 1, 1994, Agnes positively identified Gungon at the
NBI in a police lineup consisting of 5 to 6 men. Likewise, Agnes was able to identify certain personal effects
recovered from Gungon such as her rosary beads,26cra1aw jewelry purse,27cra1aw key chain with a key to the
lock of her Nissan Sentra car,28cra1aw and the check taken from her, which were all presented in evidence in
the trial of Gungon as well as in the trial of the instant case against Roxas.29cra1aw
In the meantime, the NBI conducted a manhunt for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was arrested by
elements of the NBI inside the municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he was working under the Office of
the Mayor using the aliases "Joe Villamor" and "Marianito Villamor."
Agnes further testified that the name of appellant Venancio Roxas was supplied by the NBI, but she was very
sure that he was the person who fatally shot her. She positively identified Roxas on January 12, 1994 during a
31
police line-up at the NBI as the perpetrator other than Gungon, of the crimes charged. She told the NBI agents
that the person in the picture was the one who had flagged her down and shot her on January 12, 1994.
For the defense, appellant denied committing the crimes charged against him. He claimed that it was
impossible for him to be at the place of incident on January 12, 1994. He narrated that on that same day, at
around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., he and a certain Tranquilino Mangiliman and two others were installing an antenna
on the roof of his house. He added that he never left his house that evening. Both Mangiliman and his wife,
Hermogena Roxas, testified that on January 12, 1004, Roxas was in his house at Feria Compound,
Commonwealth Town Homes, Quezon City.
Subsequently, in a Decision30cra1aw dated September 5, 2002, the court a quo, found Roxas guilty of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with frustrated murder, carnapping and theft, the dispositive portion
of which reads:chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases finding accused Venancio Roxas y Arguelles
guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder, and
sentences him to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for Carnapping, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from 18 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum;
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for the crime of Theft, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8
months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for the additional P10,000.00 in excess
of P20,000.00 value of the property taken or a total of 9 years, 8 months and 1 day, as maximum.
The accused shall be credited in full of his preventive imprisonment.
Accused Roxas is also liable to pay the offended party Agnes Guirindola, moral and exemplary damages in
the amount of P1,000,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively, actual damages in the amount of P36,161.83,
representing her hospitalization and related expenses, and P38,000.00 representing the value of the articles
taken from her. Accused Roxas is likewise ordered to pay Mrs. Elvira Guirindola the amount
of P250,257.90.00, representing the cost of repair of the subject vehicle.
SO ORDERED.
August 29, 2002, Quezon City.31cra1aw
Roxas moved for a reconsideration of the September 5, 2002 decision of the court a quo. Likewise, noting the
well-attended promulgation of the court a quo's decision, Roxas also moved for the inhibition of the Honorable
Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. He argued that the presence of then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez
showed the court's predisposition to convict him of the offenses charged. Roxas contended that he was
robbed of his right to due process because the Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. had lost the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge required of him in trying and resolving cases.
In an Order32cra1aw dated October 8, 2002, the RTC denied appellant's motions for inhibition and
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, appellant's co-accused Roberto Gungon y Santiago was found guilty of the same charges in a
Decision33cra1aw dated March 19, 1998. Roxas was at-large during the trial and was arrested only after the
RTC rendered the judgment of conviction against Gungon. Thus, the cases, as far as they concerned Roxas,
was archived until he was eventually arrested on September 11, 1995.
The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our
ruling in People v. Mateo,34cra1aw however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review.
In its Decision35cra1aw dated January 13, 2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the court a
quo.
Thus, this appeal, raising the following arguments:chan robles virtual law library
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RENDERING IN THE ABOVE-TITLED CASE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT A QUO HAS LOST THE COLD NEUTRALITY
OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO DUE
PROCESS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE OFFENSES OF (1) KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH FRUSTRATED
MURDER, (2) CARNAPPING, AND (3) THEFT.
Roxas challenged the RTC judge's neutrality as he invoked that he was deprived of his right to due process
because of the "unexplained presence" of the former Secretary of the Department of Justice, Hernando Perez,
in court. He contended that the RTC was already predisposed to convict him even before trial.
We are unconvinced.
The Court finds no basis for appellant's allegation that he was deprived of due process of law and that the trial
conducted was far from impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record.
The fact that the trial judge opted to believe the prosecution's evidence rather than that of the defense is not a
sign of bias.36cra1aw
Even if the RTC had allowed the presence of then Secretary Hernando Perez and the media, there is no
sufficient basis to show that their presence or pervasive publicity unduly influenced the court's judgment.
Before we could conclude that appellant was prejudiced by the presence of the media and Secretary Perez,
he must first show substantial proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a showing that adverse
publicity indeed influenced the court's decision.37cra1aw We found none, in this case.
Appellant further argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged against him.
Time and again, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would have affected the result of the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide
the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and
manner of testifying.38cra1aw
We have painstakingly examined the records of the case, particularly the testimonies for the prosecution and
the defense. However, after much examination, we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to depart
from the findings of the trial court.
32
Agnes not only positively identified her abductors, she also graphically narrated what happened on January A - He told Gungon that he'll take a leak (sic) first before Gungon so Roxas alighted from the car and took a
12, 1994. Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in the instant case from the moment Agnes was leak (sic), sir.
taken from Panay Avenue to a remote place in Batangas. Agnes testified, thus:chan robles virtual law library

Q - How about Gungon, where was he?

Q - After Roberto Gungon pulled you towards the back seat, what happened?

A - He was seated beside me, he was still holding me, sir.

A - Venancio Roxas took the driver seat and started the car, sir. I mean, he took the driver seat and started the
car.
Q - After Roxas finished leaking (sic), do you know what did he do (sic), if any?

Q - What was Roberto Gungon doing after Venancio Roxas started the car?
A- Yes, he went back to the car, he sat at the driver's seat, he faced in front of me (sic), took the gun and
poked it at me and then Gungon alighted from the car and he was the next one who took a leak (sic), sir.
A - He was holding me sir.

xxx
Q - How was he holding you?

Q - After Roxas alighted from the car, where were you at that time?
A - One hand on my shoulder and the other one is (sic) on my leg, sir.

A - I was still sitting at the car, with Gungon, sir.

xxx

Q- What was Gungon doing at that time?

Q - What did Gungon do with the bottle?

A- Yes, we were waiting for Roxas and he was holding my leg, sir.40cra1aw
A - He still forced me but when I refused he just placed it down in the car, sir.

xxx
Q - After that what happened?

Q - Previously, you testified that Gungon was holding you and everytime you made a slight movement he
A - Roxas still drove and Gungon was still holding me, then after that we went to this gasoline station to gas would grips (sic) you firmly and poke a gun at you. My question is - for how long had Gungon been doing this?
up, sir.

A - Ever since he pulled me from the driver seat to the back seat up to the time when we were cruising along
xxx South Superhighway, sir.

Q - Why were you not able to escape while you were seated and crying? Q - Up to that while you were driving?

A - Because Gungon was holding me and everytime I just made a slight move, he poked the gun at me, A - Yes, sir.
sir.39cra1aw

Q - When you reached Batangas, in the bakery, what was Gungon's (sic) doing to you, if any?
xxx
A- He kept on holding me although from time to time and only when I made a slight move, sir.41cra1aw
Q - While you were praying, do you know what Gungon and Roxas were doing at that time?

Thus, based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the crime
xxx of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime, thus:chan
robles virtual law library

A - Yes, Roxas was driving and Gungon was still holding me and he asked Roxas if he could relieve himself,
sir. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

xxx
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

Q - After your car stopped, what happened?

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;

33
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats A- Actually we were not really there, its (sic) we were headed towards South Superhighway. I mean I don't
to kill him shall have been made; know the exact place but I am familiar that we were heading towards South super highway, sir.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female xxx
or a public officer.

Q - When you reached the South Superhighway at that time what happened?
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense. A - While we were in the car Gungon got his beeper and then he told Roxas "Boss, negative Philcoa," sir.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or xxx
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No.
7659).42cra1aw
Q - While you were driving along South super highway at that time, do you know what happened inside the car
between the three of you?
The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the commission of frustrated murder as qualified by the
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The medical findings show that had it not been due to
A - Yes, sir. That time Gungon was still holding me and then he told Roxas "boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati,
the timely and proper medical attention given to the victim, the gunshot wound sustained by the victim would
doon na natin siya i-s."
have been fatal.

Q - After you heard that remark of Gungon, what did you do?
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself,
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. As narrated by Agnes, she could not have A - Well, of course I was shocked and I asked them if they were going to rape me or kill me or just leave me
been aware that she would be attacked by appellant. In the darkness of the night while she just finished somewhere, I do not know, sir.
relieving herself and still trying to get up, she was shot by appellant in the head with a gun. There was no
opportunity for her to defend herself, since appellant, suddenly and without provocation, shot her as she was
about to get up. The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders Q - After you uttered those words, do you know if Gungon answered?
the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
This criterion applies whether the attack is frontal or from behind.43cra1aw
A - Yes, sir, he told me that don't give us ideas (sic).46cra1aw

Moreover, the requisites of evident premeditation was likewise duly established in this case, to wit: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung xxx
to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.44cra1aw Q - What did you do when the bottle of softdrink was being offered to you?

The prosecution's evidence particularly the testimony of Agnes demonstrated that Gungon and Roxas had A - I refused to get it, sir.
indeed planned to kill her from the time they took the car. As testified to by Agnes:chan robles virtual law
library
Q - When you refused to drink it, do you know what did Gungon do?
Q- You said that Roxas returned with a biscuit and a bottle of softdrink, what was done with the biscuit and
bottle of softdrink, if you know? A - Yes, he got mad and furious, he held me so tight and forced me to drink it, sir.

A - I refused to accept it, he insisted but still I refused so he just handed it to Gungon. He just told Gungon Q - Now, because he was furious and he was angry at you, what did you do?
"mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya," sir.

A - I took the softdrink, sir.

Q - Why did you refuse the softdrink?

Q- After you drank that softdrink, what happened?

A- Simply because when he handed it to me I saw tablets floating inside the bottle, sir.45cra1aw

xxx
xxx

A - Yes, sir, after drinking it Roxas offered two (2) more tablets to Gungon, he told to Gungon "ipainom mo pa
Q - At about 5:00 and 6:00 in the evening of January 12, 1994 where were you at that time? sa kanya itong dalawang tabletas dahil malaki siya, mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya".47cra1aw

xxx xxx

34
Q - Do you know what time was it when you woke up?
A - I guess it was about 9:30 or 10:00 in the evening, sir.
Q - How were you able to place the time?
A - There is a watch on the dashboard of the car, sir.48cra1aw
Thus, from the foregoing, it is evident that the commission of the killing, albeit frustrated, was formed from the
moment the accused took the victim in Quezon City until she was ultimately "executed" in Batangas. The
lapse of more than eight hours, that is, approximately from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., satisfies the last requisite
for the appreciation of evident premeditation as there was sufficient time for meditation and reflection before
the commission of the crime yet appellant proceeded with the same.
Likewise, we agree that Roxas is also guilty of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law. R.A. 6539, otherwise
known as An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." More specifically, the elements of the crime are as
follows:chan robles virtual law library
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
A careful examination of the evidence presented would show that all the elements of carnapping were proven
in this case. It cannot be denied that the 1993 Nissan Sentra with plate number TKR-837 was unlawfully taken
from Agnes without her consent and by means of force or intimidation, considering that he and his co-accused
alternately poked a gun at Agnes. After shooting her, appellant also flee with the subject vehicle which shows
his intent to gain. Agnes also positively identified appellant and Gungon as the ones who took the subject
vehicle from her.
Finally, we likewise agree that Roxas is only guilty of theft and not robbery as initially charged.
From the records, it appears that the jewelries and cash were taken from Agnes without the attendance of
violence or intimidation upon her person. Agnes herself testified that when she regained consciousness, she
already found her necklace, pair of earrings, watch and cash, to be missing.49cra1aw While it was proven
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant took Agnes' personal things, there was no evidence, however, that the
taking was employed with the use of force, violation and intimidation.
PENALTIES
As to the imposable penalty, we sustain the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, with
modification as to the penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder
and the awarding of damages.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the RTC with frustrated
murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more, grave or less grave,
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more serious crime, the proper
penalty under Article 26750cra1aw of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in
its maximum period; thus, the penalty should be death. However, in light of R.A. 9346, or the Anti-Death
Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of death is, thus, proper and ineligible for parole.
Likewise, in accordance with current jurisprudence, we modify the award of damages, and apply People of the
Philippines v. Richard O. Sarcia51cra1aw where we said:chan robles virtual law library
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v.
Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heineousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
xxx
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for
by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for
the victim is still Php75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also rationcinates as follows:chan robles virtual law library
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly
awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages because the
victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even
without proof thereof, x x x.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346,
the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the rationcination in People v. Victor, the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The
Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of
the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.52cra1aw
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 13, 2006,
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00666, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, insofar as to sentence appellant Venancio
Roxas y Arguelles to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention with Frustrated Murder, and to declare him ineligible for parole. Appellant is, likewise, ordered to pay
Agnes Guirindola P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
35

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, JR. and EMILIANO ENRIQUEZ, Appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were convicted of kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cavite City, Branch 16, and each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as
maximum.1 They appealed to the Court of Appeals which not only affirmed their convictions but imposed upon
each of the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.2 The Court of Appeals refrained from entering
judgment and certified the case to us pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.3
On July 8, 1985, Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were charged with kidnapping in the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16. The Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January 1985, in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with the use of firearm (nickel plated revolver), motor vehicle (tricycle) and by
simulating public authority, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, forcibly kidnapped
Alexander Pureza y Mendoza by the point of [a] gun (revolver) and forcibly loaded said Alexander M. Pureza
to (sic) a yellow colored tricycle (Hazel) with Plate No. MTC H8242 and brought somewhere else and detained
in an undisclosed place for more than five (5) days since the kidnapping took place and up to the present time
could not be located, with the aggravating circumstances of the use of a firearm, force, motor vehicle and
simulation of public authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge during arraignment. Trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence shows that at about 6:50 p.m. of January 24, 1985, Rogelio Andico, Edwin Pugay,
Esmi Saquilayan, and twenty-one-year old Alexander Pureza were conversing in front of the Barangay Hall of
Silangan, Rosario, Cavite. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., alias "Bonggo," who was dressed in military fatigue
pants, camouflage jacket, brown hat, and wearing dark glasses, arrived on board a tricycle driven by appellant
Emiliano Enriquez, alias "Emil Tate." After Bonggo alighted, Emil parked the tricycle about ten (10) meters
away from the group. Bonggo then pulled out a .38 caliber revolver from his jacket and warned the group,
"Huwag kayong tatakbo, awtoridad ako." He singled out Alexander Pureza, poked his gun at him and ordered
him, "Sama ka sa ‘kin." He dragged Alexander to the tricycle, and forced him to board the same. The tricycle
sped off. Alexander Pureza was never seen again or heard from since then.
Rogelio Andico, who was left behind after his companions scampered away, hurried to Alexander’s house and
informed his parents about the incident. At about midnight of the same day, Rogelio gave his statement5 to the
police upon the advice of his uncle, Atty. Ernesto Andico, the Vice-Mayor of Rosario, Cavite. Rogelio executed
two other statements on January 25 and 29, 1985. 6
Feliciano Castro, a resident of Rosario, Cavite, corroborated Rogelio’s testimony. He testified that at about
6:30 to 7:00 p.m. of January 24, 1985, he was waiting for a ride when he saw Alexander Pureza being pushed
by appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. into a waiting tricycle driven by appellant Emiliano Enriquez.7 Alexander was
struggling to free himself. Feliciano did not do anything to help or tell anyone what he witnessed. He feared for
his life because Bonggo was the grandson of then Mayor Calixto Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite. At that time,
many people just disappear or get killed in Rosario. It was only in July 1987 when Mayor Calixto Enriquez was
no longer mayor that he revealed the above information to P/Lt. Col. Rogelio Pureza, the victim’s father.
The two appellants had a different story to tell. They denied any involvement in the kidnapping and interposed
the defense of alibi. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. testified that he was in Bulan, Sorsogon from January 21 to
24, 1985 with his live-in partner visiting her sick father. He left Sorsogon in the morning of January 24 and
arrived at Rosario, Cavite at about 11:00 p.m. to midnight of the same day. He went to sleep immediately upon
arrival, and was awakened at 1:00 a.m. when the police picked him up for investigation.
Appellant Emiliano Enriquez claimed that he did not leave his house during the night in question as he was
taking care of his child. He also alleged that his tricycle had a broken shock absorber.
In addition, appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. ascribed improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Andico and Castro. He alleged that Rogelio Andico testified against him because he caused the arrest of
Rogelio’s uncle, Antonio Andico, known as the "king pusher" of Rosario, Cavite. He also charged that
Feliciano Castro testified against him because Castro is a trusted employee and bodyguard of Jose Abutan,
the uncle of Col. Pureza. He further alleged that Col. Pureza filed the case at bar against him in retaliation for
having been implicated in the case involving the killing of his (Elpidio’s) father.
After trial, appellants were found guilty as charged and meted indeterminate prison terms, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. alias Bonggo and
Emiliano Enriquez alias Tate GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment consisting of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim ₱50,000.00. (underlining supplied)8
Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. As aforestated, the appellate court did not apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law but imposed upon
the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated May 28, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 finding herein accused-appellants Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano
Enriquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in that We hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let this case be certified and the entire records hereof elevated to the Supreme Court for review
pursuant to Sec. 13 (2), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 9 (emphasis supplied)
Appellants state a lone assignment of error in their Appellant’s Brief, viz: that the lower court gravely erred in
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping despite the insufficiency of the
evidence. More specifically, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witness Rogelio Andico because he
did not give his eyewitness account of the alleged kidnapping in one sworn statement only but executed two
supplemental statements as well. They allege that the execution of three statements to the police shows that
Andico was a coached witness. They argue that Andico’s excuse for the piecemeal testimony, i.e., he was
nervous and confused at the time he gave his first statement to the police, is not worthy of belief considering
that he gave his statement to Col. Pureza’s men. Appellants likewise contend that prosecution witness
Feliciano Castro does not deserve credence because it took him two (2) years to report the incident which is
counter to the natural tendency of a person who witnessed a crime to report the same at the earliest possible
opportunity.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
36
We hold that the execution of not one but three statements to the police does not necessarily render
prosecution witness Andico incredible. Andico testified in court and was cross-examined by counsel for
appellants. Andico testified in a clear and straightforward manner detailing how Alexander Pureza was taken
at gunpoint and spirited away by appellants on the night of January 24, 1985, never to be seen or heard from
again. His testimony was given credence both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We find no reason to
disturb their calibration of the credibility of Andico’s testimony.
To be sure, the first statement, by itself, executed by Andico at midnight of January 24, 1985 sufficiently
proved the elements of the crime of kidnapping charged against the appellants. In this statement,10 Andico
categorically narrated how his friend Alexander Pureza, a private citizen, was taken at gunpoint by appellant
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., who did not have authority to do so, with the connivance and participation of a tricycle
driver. The victim was never seen or heard from again. In his second statement executed on January 25,
1985,11 Andico merely added that appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., aside from being dressed in military-like
clothes, likewise introduced himself to them as someone in authority. This addition is a superfluity for the
purpose of proving the crime of kidnapping against the appellant. It is undisputed that at the time the
Information was filed on July 8, 1985,12 the victim had been missing for more than five (5) months, more than
the five (5) days’ deprivation of liberty required under the former Art. 26713 of the Revised Penal Code.
Alexander Pureza has not been seen again or heard from since his abduction on January 24, 1985. The
former Art. 267 mentioned four circumstances for the crime of kidnapping to be committed,14 but they need not
be present simultaneously as the presence of just one circumstance is enough to establish the crime.15 Hence,
the added circumstance of simulation of public authority alleged in Andico’s second sworn statement was
unnecessary. Examining the third supplemental sworn statement,16 Andico merely supplied the name of the
tricycle driver whom he saw but did not immediately recognize. This is not fatal as there is the testimony of
Feliciano Castro who identified appellant Emiliano Enriquez as the tricycle driver to corroborate Andico’s
account. Although Castro reported the incident only two (2) years after the incident, his reason for not
reporting the same immediately, i.e., fear for his life, is reasonable considering that one of the appellants is the
grandson of the incumbent mayor. His initial reluctance is not unusual and is a matter of judicial notice.17
Appellants’ attempt to discredit Andico by imputing improper motive upon him for testifying in the case, i.e.,
that Andico testified to avenge his "Uncle" Antonio Andico who was apprehended by Narcom agents at the
instigation of appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., cannot succeed. For one, the exact relationship between Rogelio
and Antonio Andico was not proved. The uncle-nephew relationship was merely speculated from the fact that
Rogelio called Erning Andico, the brother of Antonio, as "mama" or uncle.18 Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr.,
admitted that he does not know the exact relationship between Rogelio and Antonio Andico.19 But even if
Antonio was Rogelio’s uncle, their relationship is not enough reason for Rogelio to avenge Antonio’s
apprehension. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the natural interest of Rogelio, who is a friend
of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating a person other than the
true culprit.20 Col. Pureza’s alleged motive for filing this case against appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., i.e., Col.
Pureza filed this case in retaliation for having been implicated in the case involving the killing of Elpidio’s
father, is equally tenuous. The facts show that Col. Pureza had been cleared of any involvement in the killing
of Elpidio’s father by the Investigating Panel of the Judge Advocate General’s Office.21 A contrario, it is Elpidio
who may have the reason to retaliate at Col. Pureza who walked away from the charge.
We join the lower courts in rejecting appellants’ alibi. In the case of Elpidio, we find it incredible that he did not
inform the police about his alibi when he was brought in for questioning just hours after he came back from
Bulan, Sorsogon. Neither did his mother, who followed him to the police station, nor his live-in partner, who
was allegedly his companion in Sorsogon, say anything to the police to defend him. Their silence was
deafening. It was almost a month later or only on February 20, 1985 that Elpidio foisted the defense of alibi in
his counter-affidavit22 submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. We have repeatedly ruled that
alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and is highly unreliable,23 more so when
corroborated only by relatives and friends.24 It cannot stand against the positive identification of appellant by a
credible witness to the crime.25 On the other hand, appellant Emiliano alleged that he was in his house taking
care of his child when the kidnapping took place, and that his tricycle, which was allegedly used in the crime,
had a broken shock absorber. However, he admitted that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes away from
the place of the incident.26 He also conceded that a vehicle can run even without a broken shock absorber,
although he qualified that his tricycle’s shock absorber was seriously broken.27 We reiterate the age old rule
that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.28 In the case at bar, appellant Emiliano failed to show that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering
that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes’ drive away from the barangay hall where the victim was
abducted.
In sum, we find that the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. All
the elements of the crime of kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private individual; (2) the accused kidnaps
or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code are present,29 have been proven through the eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico,
corroborated by Feliciano Castro, who have not been shown to have any improver motive in testifying in this
case.
Finally, we come to the correctness of the penalty. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it.30 Republic Act No.
765931 which classified kidnapping as a heinous crime punishable by death took effect on December 31, 1993.
The crime at bar was committed in 1985. We have ruled that R.A. No. 7659 cannot be applied to a crime that
transpired prior to its effectivity under the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws which are unfavorable to
the accused.32 Consequently, reclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed against the
appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, cannot be applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2 thereof, viz:
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment x x
xx
Indeed, in People v. Asturias,33 Serrano v. Court of Appeals,34 People v.
Lampaza35 and People v. Tan,36 to name a few cases, we in effect equated the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that
the latter law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. Consequently,
we affirm the Court of Appeals in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23589 convicting
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez of the crime of kidnapping.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE TY AND CARMEN TY, Accused-
Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME;
DELIBERATE FAILURE OR REFUSAL; CONSTRUED. — Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely:
(a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to
restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted
with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of
the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore
37
the latter to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must
also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to
obtain custody. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS ‘DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE
CHILD TO HER MOTHER,’ AND CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
2. ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must AND SENTENCING THEM TO ‘RECLUSION PERPETUA’;
imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring
or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or
II
failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant’s child to her. When the
accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent
wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT
the clinic’s care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella’s guardians but as soon as
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 277 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians’
residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. When the guardians refused
to return the child, Accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation III
(NBI) which conducted a conference among the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the
minor remained with the guardians. The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in
finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO
the child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting in this regard. It is worthy to note that accused-appellants’ PRECEDENT IN ‘PEOPLE v. GUTIERREZ,’ 197 SCRA 569; and
conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic’s care up to the time the child was given up for
guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for her
IV
welfare and well-being.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ‘COMPLAINANT THE SUM OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF
MORAL DAMAGES.’ 3
DECISION
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
KAPUNAN, J.:
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only seven
(7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue,
Grace Park, Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the Accused-Appellants. Arabella was
Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an
diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the
information filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory portion
clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but
of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
complainant was not around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have enough
money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise confided to accused-appellant
That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired about
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owners, proprietors, manager and administrators
the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child
of Sir John clinic and as such said accused had the custody of Arabella Sombong, a minor, conspiring
to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from the ward to the nursery. 4
together and mutually helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of the child of her
custody, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the custody of said Arabella
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that accused-appellant Dr. Ty
Sombong to her parents by giving said custody of subject minor to another person without the knowledge and
suggested to the complainant that she hired a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00.
consent of her parents.
Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the nursery to the
extension of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff. 5
Contrary to Law. 1
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor alleged to inquire about
Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October 27, 1992 when they pleaded not guilty to the
her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to get in
crime charged.
touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number where she can be
reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the child’s abandonment. 6
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella. 7
123, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty beyond reasonable
the clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who could give
doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor and failure to return the same as defined and penalized by Article
the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as she was thin and sickly.
270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The
The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri. 8
accused are hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages
caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled by the fact that up to this date she should not
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years back.
determine the whereabouts of her child Arabella Sombong.
When her pleas alleged went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellant
SO ORDERED. 2
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course and was
summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been
The accused now interpose this appeal alleging the ensuing assignment of errors, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
perpetrated in Kalookan City.
library
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against Accused-Appellants.
I

38
Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission. This case was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, this time against the alleged guardians of her daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On
January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering the guardians to
immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court having found Cristina to the
complainant’s child. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, said decision was reversed on the ground
that the guardians were not unlawfully withholding from the complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after
finding that Cristina and complainant’s daughter are not one and the same person. On January 31, 1996, this
Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals 9 affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.
In this appeal, Accused-appellant would want us to take a second look and resolve the issue of whether or not
they are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Accused-appellants of course contend that they are
not guilty and the Solicitor General agrees. In its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee’s Brief, the Office
of the Solicitor General recommends their acquittal.
We agree.
As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals, 10 affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s ruling that complainant has rightful custody over the child, Cristina
Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with complainant’s daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed,
thusly:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed
before the court a quo, Cristina had not been shown to be petitioner’s daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina.
x x x weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on coolly and steadily, especially
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence
of petitioner’s child Arabella, from that of private respondent’s foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner’s own witness, testified in court that, together with
Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella or
some other baby that was given to private respondents. Petitioner’s own evidence shows that, after the
confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the
clinic. This corroborates the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically
confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in her
counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this, when
juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina in
April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that
Cristina is not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of the herein assailed
decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing petitioner’s
demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the following personal but relevant manifestation.
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged
mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost
child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the courtroom
looking for a seat without even stopping at her alleged daughter’s seat; without even casting a glance on said
child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving mother with her
missing dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed to signs of endearment and
affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace of her little child for many years. The
conclusion of finding of undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by aforestated observation . . .
x x x
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding
from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the validity of the
mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.
x x x
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants must
perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to return one
Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to be complainant’s daughter, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one
and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the accused-appellants must fail.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Code can be
had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor,
and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element
herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what us actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the articles seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal
of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. 11 Said failure or refusal,
however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. 12 The key word therefore of this element is
deliberate and Black’s Law Dictionary defines deliberate as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining.
Willful rather than merely intentional. Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
according to a preconceived design; given to weighing fact and arguments with a view to a choice or decision;
careful in considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried; characterized by reflection;
dispassionate; not rash. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives for
the act and its consequences, the nature of the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with a
view to a decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that the act is not suddenly committed. It
implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers are called into use by
deliberation and the consideration and weighing of motives and consequences. 13
Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
DELIBERATE.
As a Verb
The word is derived from two Latin words which means literally ‘concerning’ and ‘to weight;’ it implies the
possession of a mind capable of conceiving a purpose to, and the exercise of such mental powers as are
called into use by the consideration and weighing of the consequences of the act; and has been defined as
meaning to consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed course of
action; to consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon, or weigh
in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh the motives for an act and its consequences,
with a view to a decision thereon.
As an Adjective
The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the end proposed;
indicates a purpose formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon an intention
accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose and design. It has
been defined as meaning carefully considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed
purpose, formed after careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or consequences of
an act or measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable consequences of
a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice of decision;
39
well-advised.
Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO’s Office (sic)?
Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with, or equivalent to, ‘intentional,’ ‘premeditated,’
and willful.’ A: No mam, she did not appear.

Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared with or distinguished from, ‘premeditated,’
‘sudden,’ and ‘willful. 14
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it
must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-
appellants to restore the custody of the complainant’s child to her. When the accused-appellants learned that
complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their
best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic’s care. Accused-
appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella’s guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe
Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians’ residence and informed
them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the child under the (sic) guardianship, you are (sic)
aware that the natural mother will get back the child, why did you not return the minor to the natural mother?
Q: Why?
A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contact a lawyer but for (sic) several days, she did not respond
anymore, mam. 15
When the guardians refused to return the child, Accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference among the parties but since a case was
yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained with the guardians. This fact is evident from the following
testimony, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the whereabouts of the child sometime later, what
steps did you take up (sic) after you found the child?
A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement between the supposed to be guardianship was only a
plain guardianship and not as an adoption, sir.
Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why did you go the NBI?

A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic) discharged the baby was not present because A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the child to the PAO’s Office (sic), that is why I
she was abroad. asked their help, sir. 16

Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child was and to whom it was given?
x x x
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the resident physician left for abroad so, I asked the
PAO to give me one month to have (sic) a long distance call to this doctor and asked her for the
Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the natural mother is now claiming the child, why were
whereabout(s) of the child.
you not able to get the minor?
Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer of the PAO?
A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the NBI to have the child surrender (sic), mam.
A: Yes, mam.
ATTY. WARD:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period?
Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of the NBI?
A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me the exact address of the guardian, mam.
A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender the child, mam.
Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the guardian, did your informed (sic) the PAO?
Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written agreement between you or your hospital and the guardian
of the minor, is that correct?
A: Yes, mam.
A: Yes, mam.
ATTY. WARD:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardianship did (sic) not follow you or obey you when you want
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?
(sic) to get back the child?
A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the child was really there, mam.
A: I don’t know of any reason, mam. 17
Q: And did you see the child?
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the
finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence is
A: Yes, mam.
simply wanting in this regard.
Q: What did you do with the child?
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants’ conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic’s care up
to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to
A: I just tell (sic) the child.’Ay ang laki po pala,’ I just told the child like that and I’ve (sic) talked also to the
help the child a high regard for her welfare and well-being.
guardian during that time, mam.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Q: And what did you tell the guardian?
Accordingly, Accused-appellants VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged and are ordered to be released immediately unless they are being detained for other lawful causes.
A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for the child and that we should talked (sic) with
Costs de oficio.
each other at the PAO for the decision, mam.

40

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSMUNDO FUERTES @ "Dodo" ; AGUSTIN
LUYONG @ "Jack" and "Jackie Pangalan" (at large); EDGAR GIBONE; FRANCISCO SALVA @
"Bochoy" ; and ROLANDO TANO @ "Boy Negro" and "Brando", Accused. OSMUNDO
FUERTES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For gathering firewood and quenching their thirst with coconuts gathered from a tree inside a hacienda
managed by Osmundo Fuertes, napoleon Aldeguer, aged 14, and Mateo Aldeguer, aged 16, were bound,
gagged, and brutally hacked to death and thrown at the bottom of a dried creek.chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary:red
Indicted for the dastardly deeds were Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" and "Jackie
Pangalan", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva @ "Buchoy," and Rolando Tano @ "Boy Negro" and "Brando" in
two (2) Informations for Murder docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1582 and 1583.
Criminal Case No. 1582 charges —
"That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp bladed/pointed
instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hack and/or stab with said weapons, one NAPOLEON ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which caused his death, and not contented with that, sliced the left leg of the lifeless body of said Napoleon
Aldeguer.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of superior
strength; (2) adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was committed in
consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Criminal Case No. 1583 alleges-
"That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp bladed/pointed
instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack
and/or stab with said weapons one MATEO ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his death, and not contented with that, stabbed the abdomen of the lifeless body of said Mateo
Aldeguer.chanrobles.com.ph:red
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of superior
strength; (2) adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was committed in
consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accused Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva @ "Butchoy" and Rolando Tano @
"Boy Negro", upon arraignment, entered pleas of "not guilty" to both charges. 1 Trial thereafter proceeded
against the four (4) accused because accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", and "Jackie Pangalan" was still at
large.
Accused Francisco Salva was, upon motion of the prosecution, 2 discharged by the trial court in order to be
utilized as a state witness. Joint trial of the two cases, upon motion of the prosecution without any objection
from the defense, 3 thereafter ensued.chanrobles.com : red
Subsequently, Accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" was apprehended and committed to the Provincial Jail. On
September 1, 1987, said accused assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "guilty" upon arraignment 4 in both
cases. On the basis, among others, of his extra-judicial confession, 5 executed in the presence of his defense
counsel, narrating the incident and his participation therein as well as the post-mortem examination reports 6
made by Dr. Gil G. Mantilla, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, judgment 7 was thereafter rendered against
accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", in a Decision dated September 14, 1987, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, in Crim. Case No. 1582, the Court finds the accused
Agustin Luyong alias "Jack" guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder for the killing of
Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr., and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment), with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased,
Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr. in the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
Crim. Case No. 1583, the Court likewise finds the accused Agustin Luyong alias "Jack" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder for the killing of Mateo Aldeguer, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), with the accessory penalties provided for by
law, to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim, Mateo Aldeguer, in the sum of P30,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay proportionate costs of these proceedings.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In the service of the above penalties, the rules provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a joint trial, Accused Rolando Tano, Edgar Gibone, and appellant Osmundo Fuertes, were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged in a judgment dated December 4, 1989, 8 the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) in Criminal Case No. 1582, the Court finds the accused Osmundo Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and
Rolando Tano alias "Boy Negro" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of MURDER for
the killing of Napoleon Aldeguer, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly, and severally, the heirs of
the victim napoleon Aldeguer, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30, 000.00);chanrobles.com :
chanrobles.com.ph
(b) in Criminal Case No. 1583, the Court finds the accused Osmundo Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and
Rolando Tano alias "Boy Negro" GUILTY as principals of the crime of MURDER for the killing of Mateo
Aldeguer, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim Mateo
Aldeguer the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), plus the cost of the
proceedings.chanrobles.com : law library
The rules provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed in the service of the above
sentences.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Dissatisfied, Accused Osmundo Fuertes @ Dodo interposed this appeal alleging —
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO, AND RELYING HEAVILY ON,
THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS FRANCISCO SALVA.chanrobles.com : law library
II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED AMONG
THE ACCUSED.
41
The prosecution’s version of the incident as summed in the People’s brief:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the morning of November 1, 1986, Francisco Salva was riding on a horse and pasturing some cows and
carabaos within the premises of Hacienda Ong located in Lumagaob, Barrio Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental. 9
Thereupon, he saw two boys gathering young coconuts. 10 Salva approached the two boys and asked them
why they were gathering young coconuts and the two boys replied that "they were thirsty." 11
Thereafter, Salva reported the matter to appellant (who was overseer of the Hacienda) and the latter promptly
ordered Salva and some other persons including accused Edgar Gibone to board a jeep which he drove to the
place where the two boys were gathering coconuts. 12 When they arrived at the place, the two boys were
already on a hill, prompting appellant and his group to chase them, but they failed to catch them. 13chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary
Later in the day, Rolando Tano and Jack allegedly arrived at the house of appellant and were met by the latter
in his office where he gave each a small envelope. 33
In the afternoon of November 2,1986 the bodies of Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer were found in Hacienda
Ong.
The Postmortem Examination Reports 34 Issued by Dr. Gil Mantilla who examined the bodies of the victims
contained the following findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
NAME : MATEO ALDEGUER
SEX : Male

Thereafter, appellant and his companions returned to appellant’s house bringing with them two bundles of AGE : 16 Years Old
firewood allegedly gathered and left by the two boys. When they arrived at appellant’s house, appellants and
his companions "ate" and thereafter appellant sent somebody to fetch accused Rolando Tano and Jack. 14 ADDRESS : Mapantad,Mati Davao Oriental

Later in the afternoon, Rolando Tano and Jack arrived at appellant’s house. Thereupon, Salva and Edgar TIME EXAMINED : 5:45 P.M.
Gibone were summoned by appellant and were instructed to go with Rolando Tano and Jack to the place were
the two boys were earlier seen gathering coconuts to apprehend them should they return. 15 Upon arriving at PLACE EXAMINED : Padilla Funeral Parlor
the place, they allegedly hid in the "Canyan tree" and after a while the two boys appeared. After a brief chase,
they were able to catch the two boys. The two boys were "hand-tied" and brought to the house of Joaquin Rizal Extension, Mati,
Reyes. 16
Davao Oriental
Upon reaching the house of Joaquin Reyes, Jack ordered Salva and Gibone to hide. 17 Thereafter, Jack and
Tano asked Felisa Reyes, the wife of Joaquin Reyes, for water to drink and also instructed the latter to fetch FINDINGS
appellant at the latter’s house. 18
1. Hacked Wound, Neck, Right Side, 2 Inches along the level of the jaw:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Felisa Reyes complied with the request and proceeded to appellant’s house and informed the latter that two
persons were waiting for him in her house. She described the two persons to appellant who, in turn, told her 2. Stabbed Wound, 1. 2 Inches Anterior
that said persons were Jack and Boy Negro. 19
Axillary Line below
Thereafter, appellant instructed Felisa Reyes to go home as he and his companions "will just follow." 20 Felisa
Reyes went back home and after a while appellant, together with two other persons arrived. Upon seeing the The Clavicle
two boys, appellant allegedly started scolding them and called them thieves. 21

After scolding the two boys, appellant and Jack had a conversation during which they allegedly agreed that the 2. 1/2 Inch below the
two boys be killed. 22 Thereafter, appellant and his two companions left Jack then ordered Salva and Gibone
to proceed to the "dead creek" which they promptly did.chanrobles.com.ph : red Right Nipple, 2 Inches

Later on, Jack, Rolando Tano and the two boys also arrived at the "dead creek" followed by appellant. 23 Mid-Axillary, 2 Inches

At the "dead creek" Jack removed the shirts of the two boys upon being ordered to do so by appellant. 24 Jack along the 12th Rib:
and Rolando Tano tore the shirts and with the torn shirts covered the mouths of the two boys. 25 Jack stabbed
the smaller of the two boys, who was later identified as Napoleon Aldeguer, with the bolo at the latter’s
3. 1 1/4 Epigastric Area:
abdomen. 26 Upon being stabbed, Napoleon fell to the ground as Jack kept on stabbing him. 27

Jack handed the bolo to Rolando Tano and the latter started stabbing the other boy who was later identified as 4. 1 Inch Anterior
Mateo Aldeguer. 28
Axillary from the
Rolando Tano handed the bolo to Edgar Gibone who was threatened by Jack that should he not stab Mateo
Aldeguer, he will in turn, be stabbed by Jack. Edgar Gibone complied by stabbing Mateo Aldeguer. 29 Nipple (sic):

Edgar Gibone was instructed by Jack to hand the bolo to Salva but the latter refused to accept the bolo
prompting Jack to threaten him with death. Salva accepted the bolo and hacked the left thigh of Napoleon 5. 1 1/2 Inches located
Aldeguer as instructed by Jack. 30
below the Nipple or
Jack took the bolo from Salva and hacked the neck of napoleon Aldeguer. 31
the 6th Rib:
After stabbing the Aldeguers, Jack and Rolando Tano left and "followed" the dead creek. Appellant Edgar
Gibone and Salva left and proceeded to the house of one Nardo where appellant allegedly warned Gibone
and Salva "not to reveal what happened." 32

42
6. 1/2 Inch Middle
Clavicle;
Third, Left Arm:

2. 1/2 Inch below the Nipple,

7. 2 Inches, right Side,
5th inter Costal Space;
Posterior axillary line:

3. 1 Inch at the Right Sternal

8. 2 Inches, Left scapular
Line, at the Level of the 4th
Angle:
Vertebral(sic), Right:

9. 1 1/2 Inches along the

4. At the 8th rib Mid-Axillary
Lumbar Vertebra:
Lane, Right:

RIGOR MORTIS : Present

5. 2 Inches at the Mid-Scapular
POSTMORTEM LIVIDITY : Present region, 2 Inches at the

Scapular Angle, Left:

CAUSE OF DEATH : Severe Hemorrhage,

Secondary to Stabbed 6. 2 Inches at the 8th Posterior

Wounds and Incised Rib, 1 Inch Left from the Mid-

Wounds. Spinal Column;

SGD. GIL. G. MANTILLA 3. Incised Wound, Middle Third, Left Thigh, dorsal side, 3 inches by 4 inches.

Assistant Provincial Health Officer RIGOR MORTIS : Present

POST MORTEM EXAMINATION POST MORTEM LIVIDITY : Present

NAME : NAPOLEON C. ALDEGUER, JR. CAUSE OF DEATH : Severe Hemorrhage,

SEX : Male Secondary to Stabbed

AGE : 14 Years Old Wounds and Incised

ADDRESS : Mapantad, Mati, Davao Oriental Wounds

TIME EXAMINED : 5:30 P.M.. SGD. GIL G. MANTILLA

PLACE EXAMINED : Padilla Funeral Parlor, Assistant Provincial Health Officer

Rizal Extension, Mati, Accused-appellant Osmundo Fuertes had a different story to tell. He declared that he had nothing to do with
the twin killings. 35 He testified that as of November 1, 1986, he was the overseer of Hacienda Ong, having
Davao Oriental been employed in that capacity since 1972. 36 On that fateful day of November 1, 1986, he was at home. 37
The first thing he did in the morning was to take a bath. 38 Thereafter, he checked the daily time record and
FINDINGS prepared the payroll. 39 At around 5:00 p.m., Francisco Salva who was watering the plants went upstairs and
informed him that there were persons looking for him. Upon going downstairs he saw Bebing Aldeguer-
1. Incised Wound, at the Level of Adam’s Apple, 4 Inches Cutting the Trachea and Carotid Banudan who asked him if he saw her brothers, 40 the two victims. He replied that he did not see them. 41
Arteries:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Thereafter, he together with his wife, two children — namely, Osmundo Jr. and John, Ayster Tucayao, Allan
Pisetas, Edgar Gibone, Mauricio Hornejas and Francisco Salva, Jr. had supper at 6;00 p.m. 42 While having
2. Stabbed Wound. 1. 2 Inches, Mid Clavicular supper, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived with some companions also looking for the Aldeguer boys. 43 He
likewise told Valles that he did not see them. 44 Later at around 9:00 p.m. when they were already sleeping,
Area, 1 Inch below the they were roused by a shout from the gate. 45 When he went downstairs to verify who it was, he came upon
P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions who were still looking for the two
43
victims. 46 He allowed the group to go to the playground of the house and upon the latter’s request that they
be permitted to search the bodega and the surrounding areas of the hacienda he gave them his permission
and accompanied them going to the bodega. He even gave them flashlight to use but they only saw copra, big
baskets and a pail. 47
Accused-appellant further declared that on November 2, 1986 at 6:00 a.m., he, his wife, his sons, Osmundo
Jr. and John, Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva and Ayster Tucayao went to the San Nicolas Tolentino church.
48 From there, they proceeded to the Madang public market to buy vegetables and at the same time to meet
his children from Davao City, namely, Estella and Ana Grace. 49 From the public market, they proceeded back
to the hacienda arriving at around 9:30 a.m. 50 While they were having breakfast, he heard someone calling
outside. Upon peeping out of the window to verify who it was, he found out that the callers were policemen
inquiring about the Aldeguer boys. 51 Again, he told the police that he did not see the victims. The policemen
declined his offer to have breakfast settling for a drink of water instead, then left. 52 After lunch, at around 2:00
p.m. accused-appellant presided at a purok meeting being its president. 53 At around 4:00 p.m., while the
meeting was still going on, a jeep with policemen on board arrived. 54 One of the policemen alighted and
informed accused-appellant that the two Aldeguer boys had been found, that they were dead and that the
bodies were already at the funeral parlor. 55 After informing accused-appellant of the whereabouts of the two
victims, the police left and the purok meeting continued, ending at 4:30 p.m. 56 At around 5:00 p.m. while
accused-appellant was at home, one Jun Talaboc, an ex-policeman came. 57 Upon apprising Talaboc about
what transpired on that afternoon, particularly the discovery of the two dead bodies, Talaboc advised accused-
appellant to transfer to the Mati poblacion warning him that it was dangerous to stay. Talaboc cited several
violent incidents which resulted in the shooting of a policeman at Matiao; the killing of a father and son at
Pomoanon and the slaying of an ex-councilman in Mapantad. 58chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Testifying that he feared for his safety and that of his family, Accused-appellant ordered his wife to pack up
everything and immediately proceeded to the place of Police Chief Cipriano Sefuentes at past 6:00 p.m. 59
Upon being advised by Sefuentes to check in at a hotel because his life was in danger, Accused-appellant
decided to proceed to the house of one Captain Serrano at Capitol Hill, Mati, Davao arriving therein at 8:00
p.m. 60 Accused-appellant and his family stayed at the Serrano residence up to the time of his arrest. 61
Greta Fuertes, the wife of the accused-appellant corroborated her husband’s story practically echoing the
latter’s account point by point. She testified that she and the accused-appellant had four children, two of whom
are in Davao City while the other two are living in Hacienda Ong. 62 On November 1, 1986, she and her
husband were at home. 63 In the afternoon of the same day while her husband was playing with their two
sons, 64 Francisco Salva @ Butsoy informed them that Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan was looking for her
brothers. 65 Later, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived also looking for the Aldeguer boys. 66 At 9:00 p.m. of the
same day, Pat. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions arrived again looking for
her brothers. 67 Her husband lent a flashlight to Napoleon Aguinaldo and together with the group, her
husband went to the copra drier. 68
She further testified that on November 2, 1986, they went to the Catholic church and attended the first mass at
6:00 a.m. 69 Thereafter, they proceeded to the public market to buy some things and to meet their two
children from Davao City. 70 They returned to the Hacienda at 9:30 a.m. 71 After lunch, they attended a purok
meeting until 4:30 p.m. when policemen arrived and talked with her husband. 72 Later, retired policeman
Talaboc informed her husband that their lives were in danger as a result of which they hastily left and
proceeded to Captain Serrano’s house at Capitol Hill with their four children where they slept. 73
Accused-appellant, in sum, denies any participation in the commission of the crime claiming that he is being
framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes who wanted to extort P50,000.00 from him.
Accused-appellant also claims that Francisco Salva is a ‘coached’ witness whose credibility is suspect, hence,
his guilt can not be predicated thereon. He likewise points out certain excerpts from the testimony of self-
confessed killer Agustin Luyong allegedly clearing him of any participation in the crime charged. He concludes
that "the passion and outrage which attended the commission of the crime should not blur the evidence" which
points to his innocence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We disagree.
While it is true, as pointed out by accused-appellant, that the challenged decision convicting him of the crime
charged rests mainly on the testimony of Francisco Salva @ Butsoy who was initially accused together with
appellant but was subsequently discharged and utilized as a state witness, a circumspect scrutiny of the
record discloses that appellant’s conviction is not predicated solely on Salva’s testimony. Appellant’s
conviction is amply supported by the mass of evidence on record. Particularly damaging to accused-
appellant’s pretensions at innocence is the following Sworn Statement 74 of Agustin Luyong who entered a
plea of guilty and was convicted on the basis thereof, 75 viz:chanrobles.com : red
Q4: Of your own personal knowledge, do you know who killed the aforesaid minors?
A: Yes, sir. They were killed by me and boy Negro in the presence of Francisco Salva and Edgar Gibone at a
dried creek (logot) outside the Ong Hacienda at Sitio Lomogaob, Barangay Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental.
Q5: Will you please narrate to me in brief the circumstances which led to the killing of Napoleon and Mateo
Aldeguer?
A: In the afternoon of November 1, 1986, at about 3:00 o’clock, more or less, while I was in the house of the
grandparents of Boy Negro at Mapantad, Barangay Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental, the Manager of Ong
Hacienda, arrived and then and there requested Boy Negro and myself to go to Ong Hacienda and help him
apprehend the two boys, should they come back, who at about 10: o’clock that morning were seen eating
stolen young coconuts inside the (sic) who according to Osmundo "Dodo" Fuertes, they chased but failed to
catch because they (young boys) run fast. Because of the request, Boy Negro and myself went to the Ong
Hacienda at past 3:00 o’clock that afternoon of November 1, 1986. At about 4:00 o’clock, more or less, two
young boys who at that time I do not know, but were identified by Francisco Salva alias "Buchoy" and Edgar
Gibone, as the persons whom they chased in the morning but escaped, appeared. Then and there Boy Negro,
Francisco Salva, and Edgar Gibone including myself chased and caught the two minors and immediately
brought them to the house of Joaquin Reyes near the Ong Hacienda. Shortly after we arrived the house of
Joaquin Reyes, I requested Mrs. Reyes to go and inform Dodo Fuertes that we already caught the two boys.
Mrs. Reyes left and not long afterwards, Dodo Fuertes with companions arrived, investigated the two boys and
later signal me to go inside the sala of the house of Joaquin Reyes and there hired me to kill these two boys at
and for a price of P5,000.00 of which he immediately gave me P200.00 as down payment with the assurance
and promise to pay the full balance of P4,800.00 after I shall have accomplished the job because according to
Dodo Fuertes, he will get the money from Mr. Bernardo Ong, the owner of the Ong Hacienda.chanrobles.com :
chanrobles.com.ph
Q6: After your short conversation with Dodo Fuertes, as stated above, what happened next, if any?
A: Immediately after coming out from the sala, Boy Negro and myself hogtied one of the boys while Dodo
Fuertes hogtied the other one.
Q7: After that, what happened next?
A: Dodo Fuertes left with his companion, and at about 6:00 o’clock that evening, Boy Negro, Francisco Salva,
Edgar Gibone and myself brought the two boys to the dried creek (logot) and there, despite of the pleadings of
the two young boys for us not to kill them, Boy Negro and myself took turns in stabbing them to death, after
which I let Francisco Salva and Edgar Gibone stab the deceased also so they will not reveal the incident to
anyone.chanrobles.com.ph : red
Q8: Before Dodo Fuertes left the house of Joaquin Reyes, did he not have any conversation with the two
boys?
A: There was sir, the two young boys as a matter of fact, pleaded and asked forgiveness saying, "PASAYLOA
INTAWON KAMI NONG, DUHA RA BITAO KADTO KA BUTONG, AMO LANG BAYARAN." Which in English
means, "Sir, forgive us for the two young coconuts that we got, we will just pay them", to which Dodo Fuertes
got mad and said, "DILI KANA MAHIMO, ANG ORDER KANAKO NI MR. ONG MAO NGA PATYON ANG SI
BISAN KINSANG MADAKPAN NGA MANGAWAT SA SULOD SA HACIENDA." Which in English means, "No,
that cannot be done because the order to me by Mr. Ong is, whoever is caught stealing anything inside the
hacienda must be killed." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Q9: By the way, when did you come to know Dodo Fuertes for the first time?
A: It was in the month of April, 1986 when while passing inside the Ong Hacienda with Boy Negro, Dodo
Fuertes called us to his house where we ate cooked banana[s].
Q10: After you and your group killed the two young boys, where did you go?
A: I went home to the house of my parents-in-law at Magsaysay Beach, Mati, Davao Oriental, there I went into
hiding.
44
 x x x Q18: Can you tell us what was that conversations(sic) about?
Q15: Can you still picture (sic) the face of the person whom you know the person who induces(sic) and hired
you to kill the two minor victims? (At this juncture, Agustin Luyong was brought to (sic) the Mati Provincial Jail
to pinpoint the person whom (sic) really knows to be Osmundo "Dodo" Fuertes).
Q16: Now, we are at the Mati, Provincial Jail, Mati Davao Or. Can you pinpoint to me where is Dodo Fuertes?
A: Yes, sir. That person, and I positively identified him as the person who induces and hired me to kill the two
minor victims. (Investigator observed that Agustin D. Luyong is pointing to the person of Osmundo "Dodo"
Fuertes from among several prisoners at Mati Provincial Jail).
Q17: Were you able and (sic) questioned fairly and enough so that you were states (sic) or say what you
wanted to say in this investigation?
A: Yes sir. I would like to inform you that I would like to add [to] this statement I have.
Q18: What else can you say?
A: For the information of the proper government authorities, I really admitted that I am the one who killed the
two minor victims. I did that because of the assurance given to me by Dodo Fuertes [that he would pay me]
the price of P5,000.00 which in return he fails (sic) to give me, and I ask this through my defense counsel of
my own choice that if ever I will be punished of the crime committed I am willing to suffer it so long as also
Dodo Fuertes would also suffer for the consequences he does. That’s all I can say.chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary:red
Equally damaging to the cause of accused-appellant is the Sworn Statement of Edgar Gibone 76 which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q12: What was the action made by the manager upon receiving the report of Francisco Salva, alias Buchoy, if
you know?
A: Mr. Osmundo Fuertes got his Air Rifle and called myself, Buchoy Allan Posidas, Ayster Tucayao, Ernesto
Conejos to go with him to apprehend the two boys, but before we could reach them, they fled away and our
group tried to chase the two but [they] were able to escape and Dodo Fuertes was mad and angry because we
failed to catch the two boys.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Q13: What transpired, more if any?
A: Dodo Fuertes called us and said "lets go home" and ordered us to load the two bundles of coconut palm
(dried) left behind by the two boys into his service jeep and we bring (sic) it to the compound.
Q14: In the afternoon of the same day, can you recall where were you?
A: I was in the house of [t]he manager inside the Hacienda Compound.(sic)
Q15: What time was that?
A: At about 3:30 o’clock, more or less.
Q16: While you were in the house of Dodo Fuertes, do you know if there is any unusual incident that
transpired?
A: Osmundo Fuertes hired alias Jack and alias Brando to kill the two boys if they will come back inside the
Hacienda.
Q17: How do you know that Osmundo Fuertes alias Dodo hired alias Jack and alias Brando to kill the two
boys?
A: Because I was present when Osmundo Fuertes and alias Jack were having a conversation (sic) while alias
Brando was waiting outside the house.
A: I heard Dodo Fuertes telling alias Jack that he will knot allow anybody to enter the hacienda compound as
ordered by the owner. He ordered alias Jack to kill the two boys and to kill the thieves who ever, [may be]
seen inside the Hacienda Ong.
Q19: What was the answer of alias Jack in response to the order of Dodo Fuertes to kill the two boys, if you
know?
A: Alias Jack assured to kill the two boys and to kill the thieves who ever [they may be] seen inside the
Hacienda Ong.
Q20: After their conversation, what more that (sic) transpired?
A: Dodo Fuertes handed an airmail envelope containing money to alias Jack to proceed to the place where the
two boys filed the two bundles of dried coconut palms and told me to guide or accompany alias Jack and alias
Brando with Buchoy because he is very certain that the two boys will go back to get the dried coconut
palms.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Q21: Where did Dodo Fuertes get the airmail envelopes, if you know?
A: I saw the two airmail envelopes placed on the table where Dodo Fuertes and alias Jack were having
conversation and after their conversation Dodo Fuertes handed the envelop[es] to alias Jack and alias
Brando, respectively.
Q22: How do you know that the said airmail envelopes contained money?
A: I saw money because the envelop was half opened.
Q23: Do you know if how much [was] the money that was put inside the two envelopes(sic)?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q24: After Dodo Fuertes gave an envelope to alias Jack and alias Brando, what did the two do?
A: Alias Jack, alias Brando, Buchoy and myself proceeded to the place were the two boys were gathering
dried coconut palms and stealing young coconut[s] (butong).
Q25: Please tell us if (sic) what happened when you arrived at the said place together with alias Jack, alias
Brando and Buchoy?
A: When we arrived at the said place, we saw the two boys inside the hacienda and they managed to run but
finally we caught and apprehended them outside[the] fence of the Hacienda Ong.
Q26: Do you know the names of the two boys before they were apprehended?
A: I do not know their names but when they were apprehended they identified themselves as Mateo Aldeguer
and Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q27: After you had caught the two boys, what happened?
A: Boy Brando ordered me to hogtie Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon Aldeguer with the use of the nylon ropes.
Q28: From the place where you had abducted the boys, where did you go?
A: We brought the two boys leading to the Dacalos Coconut plantation, and passed by the house of Samuel
Baay employee of Dr. Dacalos.
Q29: What was your purpose in passing the house of Samuel Baay?
A: Alias Jack and Boy Negro passed by the house of Samuel Baay and asked water.
Q30: From there where did you go?
45
A: We proceeded to the house of Joaquin Reyes.
Q31: What happened when you reached the house of Joaquin Reyes?
A: I was told to hide at the back of the house of Joaquin Reyes with Francisco Salva and they removed the
nylon rope that were (sic) used in tying Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q32: When you hide (sic) at the house of Joaquin Reyes, where did alias Jack and alias Boy Negro go?
A: They proceeded to the house of Juaquin Reyes with the two boys already untied.
Q33: When alias Jack and alias Boy Brando were in the house of Juaquin Reyes, can you recall if there was
another unusual (sic) incident that transpired?
A: There was, we saw one Felisa Reyes going to the Hacienda Ong.
Q34: Do you know where did Felisa go?
A: We came to know later on that Felisa Reyes went to the house of Dodo Fuertes as requested by Alias Jack
and Alias Boy Negro to inform Dodo Fuertes that they are waiting for him in their house.
Q35: Did Dodo Fuertes go to the house of Joaquin Reyes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q36: Who were the companions of Dodo Fuertes in going to the house of Joaquin Reyes, if there is (sic) any?
A: Samuel Arceno and Antonio Gibone.
Q37: Did Dodo Fuertes meet alias Jack and alias Boy Negro at the house of Juaquin Reyes?
A: Yes, sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q38: From the house of Juaquin Reyes where did you go?
A: After Dodo Fuertes had left the house of Juaquin Reyes we brought Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon
Aldeguer loading to the deep creek or ravine between two hills, a distance of 150 meters more or less from the
house of Juaquin Reyes.
Q39: While on your way, was there any unusual incident that transpired?
A: The mouths of Napoleon Aldeguer and Mateo Aldeguer were covered/wrapped by their own clothes by
alias Jack and alias Boy Negro, respectively and we proceeded to the place where they were being killed (sic).
Q40: You said that Napoleon Aldeguer and Mateo Aldeguer were being killed (sic) where was this two boys
killed?
A: At the deep clip (sic) between two hills.
Q41: Who killed Napoleon Aldeguer?
A: Alias Jack stabbed him with the use of the sharp and pointed bolo.
Q42: How many times did Alias Jack stabbed (sic) Napoleon Aldeguer?
A: I cannot exactly remember but many times.
Q43: How did alias Jack stabbed (sic) or killed (sic) Napoleon Aldeguer?
A: Alias Jack stabbed Napoleon Aldeguer on his stomach and at the back.
Q44: It appearing in the dead body of Napoleon Aldeguer that the neck was cut or sliced, who sliced the neck?
A: Alias Jack Sir.
Q45: At what time was the killing incident done?
A: At about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, because it was already dark.
Q46: Showing to you this picture of the dead wearing short pants without dress, the breast is lying flat on the
ground, do you know or recognized this picture?
A: Yes, sir. I recognized it as the picture of Napoleon Aldeguer that was stabbed or killed by Alias Jack. (The
picture of the dead body of Napoleon Aldeguer was positively identified by the affiant to be the same picture of
Napoleon Aldeguer that was killed by Alias Jack).chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Q47: It appearing on the picture that portion of the flesh of the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer as you have
recognized, was sliced and who sliced the flesh?
A: Francisco Salva alias Buchoy upon order of Alias Jack.
Q48: What was your participation in the stabbing or killing, if any?
A: I have stabbed Mateo Aldeguer once upon order of Jack, and I have no participation in killing Napoleon
Aldeguer.
Q49: What was the participation of Boy Negro in the killing?
A: He was the one who killed Mateo Aldeguer and who stabbed him with the use of the bolo, the same bolo
used in the killing of Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q50: Victim Mateo Aldeguer sustained a cut or sliced wound on the neck, who sliced or cut the neck?
A: Alias Boy Negro.
Q51: Showing you this picture of the dead without dress with stab wounds on the body with blood stain, do
you know or recognized him?
A: That is the picture of the dead body of Mateo Aldeguer, the one stabbed or killed by Alias Boy Negro.
Q52: Do you know if who cut or sliced the neck of Mateo Aldeguer, please tell us if you know?
A: Alias Boy Negro, Sir.
Q53: What did they do (Jack and Boy Negro), after killing Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer?
A: Their dead bodies were transferred to the other side of the hills and I asked permission from Jack and
Negro that I will go ahead to pasture carabaos and cows.
Q54: Did they permit you to go ahead?
A: Yes, sir. because they know my work.
Q55: From that place were the two bodies were transferred, do you know if what did they do with the dead
bodies, please tell us if you know?
A: I have learned that the dead bodies were dragged to the dead creek by alias Jack and alias Boy Negro.
The foregoing statements of Luyong and Gibone were executed separately in the present of lawyers
personally chosen by them and after they were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. It also appears that the above statements were not merely subscribed and sworn to before Fiscals
Salvador M. Bijis and Niño A. Batingana, respectively, but they also bear certifications that show clearly that
the statements of Luyong and Gibone were given freely and intelligently. Writing finis to any further
pretensions of innocence by the accused-appellant are the following excerpts from the testimony of Felisa
Reyes:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
46

Q: Now, on November 1, 1986, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, can you tell the Honorable
Court where were you?
A: I was in our residence.
Q: Now, during said time and date while you were in your house, can you recall of any incident that happened.
A: Yes.
ATTY. VALENTEROS, JR.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court, what that incident was?
A: There were two boys who arrived in our house, one is white and the other is black, and their ages were
from 16 to 19 years old, respectively, if I am not mistaken and together with them were two young boys, male.
x x x
Q: Now, when Dodo Fuertes arrived in your house with Antonio Gibone and Samuel Arceño, can you tell the
Court what did Dodo Fuertes do?
A: When Dodo Fuertes arrived in our house, he went upstairs and upon seeing the two boys, he said, now you
were already caught and you are picking things in the hacienda, you are thieves.
Q: Now, what else did Dodo Fuertes do while he was in your house?
A: After scolding the two boys, Jack called him to our kitchen.
Q: Did he go, when Jack called him?
A: Yes, together with Jack.
ATTY. MANIWANG:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It was Jack who called Dodo.
ATTY. VALENTEROS, JR.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What did he do there?
A: They have (sic) a secret conversation, which we cannot hear.
Q: How long did they talk with each other?
A: If I am not mistaken, about five minutes.
Q: Now after the conversation, can you tell the Court, what happened?
A: After that secret conversation, they went back to the balcony and then Jack called Dodo Fuertes, what to
do, and according to Dodo Fuertes ‘I am entrusting them to you, take care of them.’" 77
As a crime, murder is looked upon as" [o]ne of the instances when men descends to a level lower than that of
a beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a deliberate destruction of a member of the same species for reasons
other than survival. 78 Nowhere is it more evident than in this case.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
From the above-quoted testimonies of Luyong and Gibone on how the crimes were committed, there is no
doubt that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime." [C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be
deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed, 79 or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest," 80 It is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement to
commit the crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly
indicate unity of action and purpose. 81
Conspiracy is undoubtedly present in the case at bar since all the accused performed concerted acts in pursuit
of a joint purpose: they lay in wait for the two (2) victims, captured, hogtied and gagged them and finally took
turns in stabbing and hacking them to death with bolos — at the instigation of herein accused-appellant who
promised and, in fact, paid Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy Negro sums of money
enclosed in small envelopes. 82 Parenthetically, the records show that accused-appellant even took active
part in trussing up the victims before they were brought to the place were they were killed. 83 Conspiracy
having been established, ‘[a]ll the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent
of their participation since in the contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all." 84
Treachery, likewise, attended the killing of the two(2) victims. There is treachery when the offender commits
the crime employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. 85
For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that: 1.] the means of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2.] the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. 86
In this case, the means, method and form of execution employed gave the victims no opportunity to defend
themselves or to retaliate; they, likewise, were deliberately adopted by the malefactors to ensure that their
persons would not be endangered 87 considering that the victims’ hands were tied behind their backs with
nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns in
hacking them with bolos. 88 The obvious helplessness of the victims when they were killed and even as they
pleaded for their lives need not be overemphasized.chanrobles.com.ph:red
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, although alleged, is absorbed in treachery and
can no longer be appreciated separately. 89 In this connection, it bears stressing that when treachery qualifies
the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily
included in the former. 90 Stated differently, when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, it absorbs abuse of
superior strength and the latter can not be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance. 91
Evident premeditation must likewise be appreciated in the commission of the offenses. Evident premeditation
can be presumed where, as in this case, conspiracy is directly established. 92 The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 93 Its
requisites are: 1] the time the accused determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that the
accused has clung to his determination; 3.] a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. 94
In this case, when accused-appellant was informed by Francisco Salva in the morning of that fateful day of
November 1, 1986 that he saw the two(2) victims gathering young coconuts at the hacienda grounds,
appellant promptly ordered Salva and some others, including Edgar Gibone, to board a jeep which he drove to
the place where the victims were seen gathering coconuts 95 with the intention of pursuing them. Although
they gave chase, appellant and his group failed to catch the two (2) boys who were already on the crest of a
hill at the time. 96 The chase was then called off and the pursuers returned to appellant’s house where he sent
somebody to fetch Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Boy Negro/Brando. 97
Later in the afternoon, Jack and Boy Negro/Brando arrived at appellant’s house were the latter ordered them
to catch the victims and to kill them 98 should they return. 99 The two boys indeed returned and were caught
by Jack and Boy Negro/Brando who "hand-tied" them and brought them to the house of Joaquin Reyes. 100
Appellant was then fetched from his house upon the capture of the victims, 101 where, after castigating the
two boys and calling them thieves, 102 ordered Jack and Boy Negro/Brando to kill them. 103
Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and preparation. 104 The foregoing facts show too clearly
that the killing of the victims were calculated and premeditated. In this case, Accused-appellant had more than
ample time to coolly reflect upon the consequences of his act when the victims were able to escape the first
time they were pursued by appellant and his group. Instead, appellant had Jack and Boy Negro/Brando
summoned and ordered them to catch the victims and kill them if they returned. Appellant was afforded even
more time to contemplate on the repercussions of his deed when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando set out to do his
bidding. However, instead of desisting from his murderous inclinations, Accused-appellant clung to his resolve
when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando returned with the two victims and ordered them
killed.chanrobles.com.ph:red
47

Likewise, there can be no question, that the crimes were committed in consideration of a price promise or
reward (precio promesa o recompensa) considering that Agustin Luyong @ Jack was hired by accused-
appellant for a price of P5,000.00 to kill the two(2) victims and in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail
envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the job. 105 However
while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other
qualifying circumstances like treachery, 106 as in this case.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy (ignominia), although alleged cannot be appreciated in this case.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to a moral order which add disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. 107 The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a
situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more
humiliating or to put the offended party to shame. 108 In this case, there is no showing that the offenses were
perpetrated in a manner which tended to make its effects more humiliating to the victims.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
Neither can the act of slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer’s lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo
Aldeguer’s corpse in the stomach be considered indications of ignominia because what is required is that the
crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his
moral suffering. 109 Thus, it was held that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs,
legs and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of
the act. 110
Before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon
a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing
at his person or corpse."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering the presence of several aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance the penalty in
its maximum period which is death 111 would be imposable under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
Fortunately for accused-appellant, since the crimes were committed during the suspension of the imposition of
the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. 112 This penalty is single and indivisible, thus, it shall be imposed regardless of any attending
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 113
The civil indemnity which is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim is
affirmed. 114 Conformably, however, with controlling jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased to
P50,000.00. 115
The trial court, in sentencing the accused-appellant, erroneously equated reclusion perpetua to life
imprisonment This Court once again reiterates that the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua
are not the same.
"While ‘life imprisonment’ may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes
deeper than that. First, ‘life imprisonment’ is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua, is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, ‘life imprisonment’, unlike
reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, ‘life imprisonment’ does not appear to
have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case
exceed forty (40) years." 116
WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the civil indemnity for the heirs of the victims be increased to
Fifty Thousand Pesos(P50,000.00), the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.chanrobles.com.ph:red
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,1 in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67171, convicted accused-
appellant of the crime of Rape and sentenced him to death by lethal injection. The case is now before us on
automatic review.
Accused-appellant is a 30 year old Libyan national, a student of Oriental Institute in its electronic technicians
course, a resident of Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City,2 and married to a Filipina nurse working in Libya3 with
whom he has a one-and-a-half year old son.
Complainant is Gina Rozon y Freo, aged 17, having been born on May 30, 19794 in Sta. Barbara, Bulusan,
Sorsogon. At the time of the alleged offense she was newly graduated from high school. Her complaint told of
a harrowing tale of abduction, starting from the Lagro Post Office and ending in her alleged detention for ten
days at appellants house where he forced her to take drugged drinks, while he repeatedly abused her.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and on record are as follows:
Prior to the incident, complainant was on vacation and staying with her aunt, Francia. Her aunts family
occupied the second floor of an apartment unit in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.5 Appellant and his son
occupied the ground floor. Being neighbors, Gina and appellant became acquainted with each
other.6 However, on July 14, 1996, appellant transferred to another house in Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City.
In the morning of July 17, 1996, complainant asked permission from her aunt to mail a letter at the Lagro Post
Office.7 By chance, she saw appellant walking behind her.8 Suddenly, appellant grabbed her hand,9 placed his
right arm on her back and pushed her inside a waiting tricycle that was parked some meters away from the
paradahan of tricycles.10 While holding complainant with one arm, he barricaded the tricycle door with his
other hand. The tricycle sped off.11 Complainant was overcome by nervousness and was unable to shout for
help.12 The tricycle driver stopped in front of a house in Lagro Subdivision. Appellant asked complainant to
step down and pushed open the gate of the house and asked her to get inside. He pushed her towards a
chair, then padlocked the room.13 Appellant got a glass of softdrink and forced Gina to drink it. Thereafter,
Gina became drowsy and fell asleep.14 She woke up the next morning and stood up. To her utter shock, she
saw herself completely naked in bed, feeling weak and her vagina in pain.15 She saw plenty of blood on the
bedsheet. Because she was still feeling weak, she fell down on the bed.16 Appellant later entered the room
and asked if she was all right. She pleaded with him to let her go home. Appellant did not respond, but stood
up and changed the bedsheets. He then left and locked the door. After about an hour, appellant came back
48
and brought with him macaroni and orange juice. Complainant noticed some white sediments floating on the On August 2, 1996, complainant filed charges against appellant for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape
orange juice, but appellant told her they were vitamins and forced her to drink the juice. This caused her to fall committed as follows:
asleep again for a long time. When she woke up afterwards, she was naked again and her vagina was in pain.
Appellant was inside the room sitting on a chair. Complainant got the bedsheet to cover her body, and
appellant went out of the room. Complainant opened the window jalousies in the hope of calling the attention The undersigned complainant accuses SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
of the neighbors but appellant, who was outside fetching water, saw her and went back to the room with a WITH RAPE, committed as follows:
kitchen knife. Appellant pushed a cabinet to cover the window and threatened to kill her if the neighbors saw
her. Drained, she sat on the bed. Appellant went out and came back with some juice and forced her to drink
That on or about the 17th day of July 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, an Arab
again, causing her to fall asleep once more. When she woke up, she tried to open the bedroom door, but it
National, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design forcibly abduct one GINA
was locked.17 She went back to the bed and again fell asleep. Thereafter, appellant came into the room and
ROZON Y FREO, a minor, 17 years of age, a student, by forcing her to board a tricycle along Assession
fed her Jollibee chicken chili wings with rice.18 Appellant changed his clothes and went out.19 She then
Road, Post Office, Barangay Pasong Putik, Quezon City, and brought her to his apartment also at Lagro,
attempted to go out of the room but appellant was outside, in the sala. Appellant pulled her back to the room,
Quezon City, where accused locked her, then made her drink Coke, a softdrink, that made her feel dizzy and
then poked a knife at her, threatening to kill her if she went out of the room again.20 Appellant then asked her
thereafter accused sexually abused her repeatedly up to the time she was released on July 26, 1996, all
to drink two types of medicine, one was Propan and the other a white tablet.21 She did not want to drink the
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said GINA ROZON Y FREO.
white tablet but appellant pushed it inside her mouth for her to swallow it. Then she fell asleep and when she
woke up, her private part was in renewed pain (Mahapding-mahapdi at nanghihina).22 During her incarceration
in the house of appellant, he asked her to take a bath around three times and dressed her in his clothes.23 She CONTRARY TO LAW.
became so weak (hinang-hina) that she could hardly shout for help. Nor could she go to the comfort room
without being carried by appellant.24 When she urinated, her private part was painful and when she checked it,
she saw a big wound.25cräläwvirtualibräry Quezon City, Philippines, July 30, 1996.

At one point, appellant went inside the room and told complainant that her aunt was outside, but threatened Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.38cräläwvirtualibräry
her not to shout, otherwise, he would kill her.26 She was then shaking with fear.27 Appellant changed his
clothes and went out. When he came back, he told her that if her aunt came back, he would also kill her
aunt.28cräläwvirtualibräry During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: complainant herself, her aunt Francia Rozon,
her uncle Joseph Rozon, and Dr. Erlinda R. Marfil, the Chief Psychiatrist of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
When complainant failed to return home on July 17, 1996, her aunt (Francia) became worried. She called up
their relatives asking for her, but no one knew her whereabouts.29 Francia told her husband, Joseph, about her
suspicion that appellant might have something to do with complainants disappearance because the aunt had The defense presented the appellant and his counsel, Atty. Manuel de Jesus. Appellants version of the
seen him suspiciously looking at their house prior thereto. Joseph and a brother of complainant immediately incident, as set out in his Brief, is as follows:39cräläwvirtualibräry
went to appellants house in Lagro.30 They saw that the doors and windows of appellants house were
padlocked,31 so they knocked on the main door. Appellant peeped through the windows and told them to enter [O]n July 17, 1996 - the date of the supposed forcible abduction with rape - he was in the Libyan Embassy
through the side door.32 They informed him about complainants disappearance, but he denied any knowledge
where he repaired the Embassys television set (t.v.) (tsn, pp. 8-12, April 10, 1997). It was a certain Mr. Aghila
regarding her whereabouts. They nonetheless noticed that the house was in disarray. One of the rooms was
Gheldan, head of the Consular section, who requested him to do such work. He left his residence at the Lagro
padlocked. Suspecting that complainant was inside the padlocked room, they insisted on getting inside, but
Subdivision at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, and finished the repair at about 6:00 oclock in the evening.
appellant warned them against intruding into his privacy. Fearing that they would be accused of trespassing,
(tsn, pp. 4-9, April 17, 1997). Appellant also submitted a Certification dated August 19, 1996, signed by
they immediately left, but reported complainants disappearance to the nearby Lagro police station. They also
aforementioned Mr. Gheldan, that the accused has visited the Bureau (referring to the Libyan Peoples Bureau,
reported their suspicion about appellants possible involvement in her disappearance.33 The police were alerted or the Libyan Embassy) twice (d), dated July 12 and July 17, 1996 respectively) Exh. 36, p. 86, records).
and together with complainants relatives, they went to appellants house, but no one opened the
door.34cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant also testified that before he transferred residence to Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City on July 14,
1996, he lived in the ground floor of an apartment in Pecsonville Subdivision, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On the tenth day of her abduction (July 26, 1996), appellant informed her that there were policemen outside. The complainant lived with her aunt Francia Rozon in the second floor of the same apartment and it was in
For reasons known only to appellant, he immediately got some love letters from his cabinet. He ordered her to that apartment that appellant came to know complainant since September 3, 1995 (TSN, pp. 10-11, April 10,
copy them on several pieces of paper and affix her signature in every letter to make it appear that the same
1997; pp. 30-32, April 24, 1997). Appellant likewise claimed that the complainant is his girlfriend and that as a
were her love letters to him. She complied, literally at knife-point. Only then did appellant release
consequence of that relationship, he had had several sexual contacts with her prior to his transfer to the Lagro
her.35 Appellant waited until there were no people outside the house, then he hailed a cab and brought Subdivision. As evidence of that relationship, he submitted several love letters which were signed by the
complainant somewhere in Blumentritt, Manila, where he hailed another taxi. He boarded her in the taxi, paid
complainant (TSN, pp. 10-16, 22, April 10, 1997; Exhibits 3 to 35, inclusive, pp. 196-A to 231, folder of
the fare, and instructed the driver to bring her to Lagro. He told her that he would be going to the
exhibits). Asked why Gina filed the case against him, he answered that Auntie and Uncle discovered our
embassy.36cräläwvirtualibräry
relations and Gina was compelled to file this case, and they were asking P500,000 from me in order to drop
the case (TSN, pp. 21-22, April 10, 1997).
Though still very weak, complainant went to her brother, Arnold, who worked in a barber shop in Lagro and
told him what happened. He then went to fetch their uncle for help. Together, they went home to the aunts
On July 24, 1997, after due trial, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
house in San Jose del Monte, where they arrived at around 8:00 in the evening. The aunt asked complainant
what happened and where she had been, but she merely cried and cried and cried. When asked during the
trial to describe complainants appearance at that time, the aunt said that she looked dazed and very tired. ACCORDINGLY, the court renders judgment finding accused SHAREFF ALI AKHTAR GUILTY beyond
(Pagod na pagod, mga mata ay maga at parang wala sa sarili.) Complainant still felt very weak but she reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape charged in this case and hereby sentences him to suffer the
narrated to her relatives her ordeal. The following morning, accompanied with her aunt and uncle, complainant penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
reported the incident to the Lagro police station.37 Then, they went to the NBI for her medical examination.

49
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay GINA ROZON y FREO the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his bid for acquittal, appellant now makes the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
COMPLAINANT NOTWITHSTANDING ITS IMPROBABILITIES AND INCONSISTENCIES WITH ORDINARY
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND EXPERIENCE, THEREBY IMPAIRING HER OWN CREDIBILITY AS WELL.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MANIFESTING BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
THEREBY TOTALLY DISREGARDING HIS DEFENSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH, INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING HIM.
Appellant assails the credibility of the complainant considering her conduct during the alleged
abduction wherein she did not even resist nor shout for help from the tricycle driver or the other
people around the highly-populated area of Lagro during her alleged captivity inside his house. He
stresses that she made no strong efforts to thwart him from making her drink the supposedly drugged
softdrinks or juice. He contends that they already had prior sexual relations since they were
sweethearts.
It is well settled doctrine that in a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility becomes the
single most important issue. Thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.40 Assessing the credibility of the witnesses is a function that is best
discharged by trial courts.41 Factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect unless it
is shown that certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which if considered could affect the
result of the case.42 After a thorough review of the records of the case, we see no reason to depart
from this rule.
Complainants failure to ask for help when she was abducted, or to escape from appellants house
during her detention, should not be construed as a manifestation of consent to the acts done by
appellant. For her life was on the line. Against the armed threats and physical abuses of appellant, she
had no defense. Moreover, at a time of grave peril, to shout could literally be to court disaster. Her
silence was born out of fear for her safety, to say the least, not a sign of approval.
Behavioral psychology, moreover, teaches us that people react to similar situations
dissimilarly.43 There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.
The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. This Court
indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been
abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the
circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted by any modicum of doubt. 44 Thus, physical
resistance is not the sole test to determine whether or not a woman involuntary succumbed to the lust
of an accused,45 particularly where accused employed drugs in order to render the woman
unconscious during coitus.
In People v. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, 566-567 (1991), we ruled that-
The appellants submission that the victim failed to raise an outcry or offer serious resistance when
she was abducted and later raped has no merit. The suggestion of the victim that she was drugged
after drinking the lemon juice given by the appellant explains why the victim was unable to resist the
accused effectively or make an outcry. While no chemical test was undertaken to concretely prove that
the juice she drank actually contained drugs, the fact remains uncontroverted as appellant did not
even take the witness stand in order to deny that after the victim drank the lemon juice already
prepared for her, she began to feel weak and dizzy. x x x. It is clear that the acts of appellant were
deliberately done to deprive the victim of reason and the will to resist his sexual assault. The effect is
thus similar to that of violence in overcoming resistance with which she could very well have
successfully thwarted the lustful act. Appellant undoubtedly had clearly committed the crime charged
by depriving complainant of reason to be able to have carnal knowledge of her without the latter
having in least shown any sign of consent. (People v. Bautista, No. L-49778, January 27, 1981, 102
SCRA 483). In a rape of a woman deprived of reason or who is unconscious, the victim has no will. In
that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual
intercourse.
Moreover, the physical examination of her person supports the testimony of the victim that she has
been raped. The medico-legal report dated July 26, 1996, by Dr. Floreto D. Arzala, Jr. of National
Bureau of Investigation reveals that, while there were no extra-genital physical injuries on
complainant, recent genital trauma was present (Exhibit C). After the examination, the medico-legal
officer told complainant that her private part had lacerations (Maraming gasgas at mga sugat.)
whereupon she again burst into tears.46 Physical injuries such as bruises or bleeding tend to confirm
the fact that a violent assault did take place.47 Further, after the medico-legal department of the NBI
had referred complainant to the Psychiatric Section of the NBI for a neuro-psychiatric examination on
December 6, 1996, witness Dra. Erlinda Marfil testified that as a result of said examination, she
concluded that complainant was suffering from post-traumatic stress reaction as a result of what
happened to her person.48cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant claims that on the day of the abduction, July 17, 1996, he was at the Libyan embassy fixing a
television set. He even presented a certification that he indeed visited the embassy on said date.
However, this proferred defense of alibi could not overcome the overwhelming evidence against him.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense whose value loses a lot when time and distance do not make the
imputed offense impossible of commission. In this case, more than a certification of an embassy visit
is needed to overthrow the positive evidence on hand.
Appellant makes much of the love letters allegedly sent by complainant to him with her protestations
of love and devotion. Complainants testimony negated this contrived posture known as the sweetheart
defense. Even assuming that appellant and complainant were lovers, however, this fact alone would
not negate the commission of rape, especially where coitus occurred when the woman was drugged.
We have repeatedly declared that a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually
violated against her will.49 A man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his
carnal desires.50 By asserting the existence of such a relationship, appellant seeks to prove that the
victim willingly participated in the sexual act. But she did not. Complainant was just a former neighbor,
not a lover of the appellant. The evidence in this case clearly shows that she could not resist the
sexual assault upon her person because she was made to drink liquids which rendered her
unconscious and a defenseless prey to the repeated sexual assault of appellant. The situation in this
case does not speak of consensual love but of criminal lust which could not be disguised by the so-
called sweetheart defense.
While appellant was charged with the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, he was convicted by the
trial court of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of R.A. No. 7659 which provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of woman
under any of the following circumstances:
(1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. x x x
50
As to the crime committed by the appellant, we have held that forcible abduction is absorbed in the A: I saw plenty of blood on the bedsheet when I stood up, sir.
crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim. 51 As can be gleaned from the
testimony of complainant, she was raped by appellant no less than three times. The first rape occurred
as follows:52cräläwvirtualibräry Q: What did you do?

FISCAL RAMOS: After that what else did he do? A: Because I was feeling weak, I fell down.

COMPLAINANT: He forced me to drink the coke. He inserted the mouth of the bottle inside my mouth Q: Where did you fall down?
so I could drink it maam (sic).
A: On the bed, maam.
Q: Were you able to drink the coke?
Q: Thereafter, what else if anything, happened?
A: Yes, because he was forcing me to drink it.
A: He went inside, maam.
Q: After that, how did you feel?
Q: After that, what did he do?
A: I fell asleep, walang malay po.
A: He asked me if I am okay.
Q: After that, when did you regain your senses?
Q: What did you tell him?
A: When I woke up it was already the next morning, maam.
A: I pleaded with him to allow me to go home, maam.
Q: And what did you do when you wake up (sic) the following morning?
Q: What did he say?
A: I was trying to remember the room where I am, maam.
A: He did not speak or say anything, maam.
Q: Did you finally come to your senses?
From the testimony of the complainant, the second rape occurred as follows: 53cräläwvirtualibräry
A: Yes, and I became afraid, maam.
FISCAL RAMOS: After one hour what happened next?
Q: Why?
COMPLAINANT: The accused went inside the bedroom bringing with him food to eat.
A: Because I know I was not in the house of my auntie when I woke up.
Q: What did you do?
Q: What did you do?
A: He brought with him macaroni with plenty of pepper that is why I did not eat it.
A: I stood up from the bed and I felt that my private part was aching.
Q: After that what else happened?
Q: What private part?
A: That same time he also asked me to drink softdrinks.
A: My vagina was aching.
Q: How did he tell you to drink softdrinks?
Q: How did you find yourself when you wake up?
A: He told me that is vitamins and asked me to take it.
A: I was naked, completely naked when I woke up.
Q: Did you take it?
Q: What did you see in your vagina, you said it was painful, what did you see if any?

51
A: Yes, because he was forcing me to take it, maam. A: It took a long time before I woke up again.

Q: Is that in a bottle? Q: When you woke up, what happened?

A: Yes, sir. A: I saw I was naked again, maam.

Q: What kind? Q: And how about your private part, what did you feel?

A: Glass, maam. A: It was painful, maam.

Q: Is it Coca-cola or what? The third rape occurred as follows:54cräläwvirtualibräry

A: Glass bottle, maam. FISCAL RAMOS: After that what else happened after he went out of the bedroom?

Q: What color, is that? COMPLAINANT: He returned and asked me to drink two types of medicines.

A: Color orange. Q: What medicine?

Q: And he said, he told you its vitamins, what is that he told you vitamins? A: I know the other one is vitamins, but the other one I dont know, but its a tablet colored white.

A: That orange colored liquid, there was something floating colored white and I asked him about it and Q: Why do you know the other one as vitamins?
he said thats vitamins.

A: I saw in the packet the name of the vitamins, maam.

Q: Did you drink that?

Q: What is the name?

A: Yes, sir.

A: Propan, maam.
Q: After that, how did you feel?
Q: He came in bringing those two tablets, what did he do with it?
A: I fell asleep, maam.

A: He asked me to drink them.

Q: Did you regain your senses again after that?

Q: How did he ask you to drink the white tablet?

A: Yes, maam.

A: I did not want to drink the white tablet, but he pushed it inside my mouth, maam.
Q: Would you know what time was that when you wake up after getting another sleep?
Q: After that, what else happened?
Q: Do you have wrist watch?

A: I fell asleep again. When I woke up I was again naked, maam.

A: None sir,

Q: How about your body, was there anything unusual upon your body when you woke up?
Q: No clock there?

A: Mahapding-mahapdi at nanghi-hina.
A: No clock, maam.
Q: What is that part of your body which you said mahapding-mahapdi?
Q: What time was that when you woke up again?

52
A: My vagina, sir.
In this connection, Section 3 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that-
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and
everyone of them setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case.
Appellant should therefore be held responsible for as many rapes as were committed by him which
were duly proven during trial.
As to the proper penalty, the trial court imposed the supreme penalty on death on the appellant for the
following reason:
And since it appears that Shareff did not hesistate twice to threaten Gina with a kitchen knife during
her detention and likewise Gina being a minor was forced by the accused to drink certain liquids to
render her unconscious thereby adding ignominy to her long ordeal, the penalty should be imposed in
the maximum.
However, we find that appellant was convicted under Article 335, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, wherein the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. Appellant used
the knife not to consummate the crime of rape but to threaten Gina not to leave the bedroom where
she was locked up. Hence, we find appellant herein guilty of three (3) counts of simple rape.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Shareff Ali El
Akhtar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMEDwith the
MODIFICATIONSthat the death sentence imposed by the court a quo is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua for each of the three counts of rape, and that appellant is hereby ordered to pay complainant
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH and RUDY
GAID, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid were each charged with two counts of forcible
abduction with rape, 1 one count of robbery with frustrated homicide 2 and one count of robbery. 3
I. In Criminal Case No. 3809 — Forcible Abduction with Rape
"That on or about March 31, 1983 in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring, confederating together with one Rudy Gaid alias Boy Gaid, who is
presently at large, and mutually helping one another; did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct the herein complainant, Marilou Nobleza by then and there taking and carrying her away with her
sister, Maritess Nobleza, and loading said complainant on board a stolen pick-up, against her will and consent
and with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city, and while
at Malasag, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge (by accused
Permonette Joy Fortich) of the herein complainant, against her will and consent, to her great damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
II. In Criminal Case No. 3877 — Forcible Abduction with Rape
"That on or about March 3, 1983, in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with violence and intimidation and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct the complainant Maritess Nobleza, by then and there taking
and carrying her away with her sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen pick-up with her sister, against
her will and consent and and (sic) with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this City,
to Malasag, this city, and while at Malasag, this city (sic) did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means of violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge (by accused Permonette Joy Fortich) of the
complainant, against her will and consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
III. In Criminal Case No. 3878 — Forcible Abduction with Rape
"That on or about March 31, 1983, in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named (accused), with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, and a motor vehicle, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct the complainant Maritess Nobleza,
by then and there taking and carrying her away with her sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen pick-
up with her sister, against her will and consent and with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city, and while at Malasag, this city (sic), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge (by accused Rudy
Gaid alias Boy) of the said complainant, against her will and consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
IV. In Criminal Case No. 3896 — Forcible Abduction with Rape
"That on or about March 11, 1983 (sic), in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with violence and intimidation and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, and motor vehicle, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with
(sic) one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct the complainant Marilou
Nobleza, by then and there taking and carrying her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and loading in a
stolen pick-up with her sister, against her will and consent and with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta
Tierra, Carmen Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city (sic), and while at Malasag, this city, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means by violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge (by accused
Rudy Gaid alias ‘Boy’) of the complainant, against her will and consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
V. In Criminal Case No. 3977 — Robbery with Frustrated Homicide
"That on or about March 31, 1983, at Carmen Hill, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with firearms, with violence and intimidation upon
persons, with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof, conspiring, confederating together with
one Rudy Gaid alias ‘Boy Gaid,’ and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away a polo shirt, pants while being worn by Luis S. Tumang and a cash worth
P60.00, a wrist watch (Elgin) worth P500.00, valued all in all in the total amount of P660.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum; that on the occasion of the robbery and to enable them
53
to facilitate the taking and robbing (sic) the offended party, and to carry out with ease the commission of the
offense, Accused Permonette Joy Fortich with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked and mauled the said Luis S. Tumang, struck and hit him with a firearm, thereby inflicting
the following injuries, to wit: fracture depressed type left perietat (sic) bone; contussion (sic) hematoma left
temporal area; abrasion behind left ear; multiple linear abrasion both thigh and leg, which ordinarily would
cause the death of the said offended party, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the offended party which
prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 294 in relation to Article 249 and Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw
library
VI. In Criminal Case No. 4162 — Robbery
"That on or about March 31, 1983, more or less 10:30 in the evening at Carmen Hill, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent of gain by means of violence and intimidation on the person take, steal and carry away polo shirt
and pants while being worn by one Rolly (I)mperio and a wallect (sic) contained (sic) P85.00 in cash, who was
at the same time attacked and beaten up by the said accused, inflicting upon him physical injuries, to wit:
Laceration of parietal area, 2 cm. in length, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code." cralawnad
Upon arraignment, Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
On November 25, 1983, the six criminal cases, upon agreement of the prosecution and the defense, were
consolidated and tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution elicited the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On March 31, 1983, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, after attending mass at St. Augustine Church,
Cagayan de Oro City, sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza, together with their friends Rolly Imperio and Luis
Tumang, proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill using an Isuzu pick-up owned by the latter’s mother.
After a while the group decided to go home. Suddenly, two men armed with handguns who were later
identified as appellants emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left side
of the pick-up. They introduced themselves as members of the New People’s Army (NPA) and ordered the
sisters to get inside the vehicle while Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38 caliber revolver causing him to fall down, while Tumang was hit
several times by Fortich in various parts of the body and momentarily lost consciousness. Tumang was
divested of his wallet containing one hundred sixty pesos (P160.00) in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00), six
Saudi Arabian Riyals (P30.42), one 12K gold wristwatch worth P500.00, pants valued at P140.00, and shoes
worth P125.00. All of these items were not recovered. 4 Imperio, on the other hand, was stripped of his pants
valued at P135.00, a wallet worth P45.00 containing P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt. 5
Appellants drove the pick-up, with Marilou and Maritess at the back seat, towards Acuña Beach some ten
kilometers away from the city, but found it to be closed for the night. While traversing the highway leading to
Barangay Puerto, appellants spotted a military checkpoint along the highway, made a hasty U-turn, and
returned to the city. All the time, the sisters were consistently threatened with summary execution. Marilou
pleaded for their freedom and told them to just take the pick-up. The plea, however, fell on deaf ears.
Appellants detoured and entered a dirt road leading to Malasag where they parked the vehicle. At this
juncture, Gaid had transferred to the backseat with Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in front with
Fortich. Gaid poked his gun at the right side of Marilou’s neck and ordered her to remove her pants under pain
of death. Aware that she was biding her time, he himself removed her pants with the gun still pointed at her.
She implored that she be spared but Gaid, who was obviously much stronger, forced her legs apart,
positioned himself on top of her, kissed and fondled her, and succeeded in consummating his bestial act.
Maritess, on the other hand, was ravaged by Fortich. Appellants switched victims twice before divesting them
of their watches, a handbag containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt, toilet tissue and toothbrush, and the pick-up’s
stereo and tools. They then drove down the highway and left the sisters at a gasoline station some three
kilometers from the city. Unable to contact the police, the victims proceeded to the Cagayan de Oro Medical
Center (CMC) and submitted themselves to medical examination.
Meanwhile, soon after appellants left Carmen Hill with the two sisters, Imperio and Tumang ran to the City Hall
and reported the robbery incident. Acting on this report, the police immediately scoured the city for the
suspects but this proved unavailing. The victims proceeded to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training
Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City where Imperio’s injury was examined and treated.
Prosecution witness Jaime Rivera testified that appellants went to his house at about 4:00 o’clock in the
morning of April 1, 1983, bringing with them a revolver and a bag containing a car stereo, watch and wallet. He
was apparently asked to sell the revolver for not less than P300.00, with a promise that he would receive a fifty
percent commission. In the course of selling the firearm, he was apprehended by the police and detained at
the City Hall for six days.
Police investigator Eulalio Rafesora of the Cagayan de Oro Integrated National Police (INP) testified that upon
Fortich’s arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights which he, however, expressly waived.
Accordingly, on April 4, 1983, an interrogation conducted by the police ensued and statements elicited therein
were reduced to writing and sworn to before another prosecution witness, Deputy City Clerk of Court Aurelio I.
Zaldivar, who also reminded him of his rights.
Dr. Socrates Sabanal of CMC declared that he examined Marilou Nobleza and found her to be suffering from
the following injuries, viz.: superficial abrasions (P) inner aspect, labia minora, hematoma, antero-medial
aspect P/3 (R) thigh. He stated that the abrasions on the labia minora were caused by the forceful penetration
of a penis into the vagina. As regards Maritess, Dr. Sabanal revealed the extent of her injuries suffered as
"labial skin discoloration," probably caused by a penis or a finger.
CMC Medical Director Dr. Francisco L. Oh testified that he treated Luis Tumang for the following injuries, to
wit: (1) fracture, depressed type left parietal bone; (2) contusion hematoma left temporal area; (3) abrasion
behind left ear; and (4) multiple linear abrasions on both thighs and legs. A neuro-surgeon of CMC, a certain
Dr. Valmores, advised Tumang to seek further treatment in another hospital as the head injury could have
fatally affected the brain. Tumang was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, from April 7 to 16, 1983, under the care of Dr. Bienvenido B. Aldanese, incurring a total expense of
P22,603.85.
Contrary to the foregoing facts, the defense relied on the uncorroborated testimonies of appellants.
Appellant Fortich, a 20-year old driver residing at Buenavista Village, Cagayan de Oro City, recounted that at
about 8:30 in the evening of March 31, 1983, he left Barangay Gusa for the city and there met Gaid with whom
he has applied for a driving job. He was invited to dinner and a few drinks at Gaid’s house. After sometime,
they allegedly got drunk and hied off to Carmen Hill to appreciate its cool and breezy atmosphere. Thereafter,
a pick-up arrived from which a group of two men and two women alighted. They then laid a mat on the grass
behind their vehicle. Appellants were ten meters away from them when suddenly the two men piqued by their
presence, furiously rushed towards them. Fortich allegedly defended himself by striking one of them with a
flashlight causing the latter to fall down.
To escape the wrath of the two men, appellants drove the pick-up with the two sisters and headed towards
Acuña beach which, however, was closed for the night. Fortich alleged that after conversing with the sisters for
some time, the latter alighted at Marcos Bridge while Gaid drove him to his house in Patag.
Fortich denied, among other things, that he sexually violated Marilou or that he even possessed a firearm, as
alleged by Tumang and Imperio. As regards the affidavit taken during the custodial investigation, he admitted
that the signature appearing therein was his but the same was obtained through duress.
Appellant Gaid had a slightly different version of what transpired on March 31, 1983. He narrated that after
consuming hard liquor, both of them proceeded to Carmen Hill. Upon reaching said place, they noticed a pick-
up with a male and female inside and another couple at the open rear end of the vehicle. As the two pairs
were allegedly caressing and kissing, they stood watching for almost thirty minutes. Later, the couple inside
emerged from the vehicle and joined the other two at the back. All of them were naked and engaged in sexual
congress on a mat lying on the grassy spot. The women, later identified as sisters Marilou and Maritess,
noticed them and immediately grabbed their clothing and scampered inside the pick-up, while their male
partners confronted the appellants. A scuffle ensued. After throwing several punches, Gaid darted towards the
pick-up and saw Fortich already seated on the driver’s seat with the sisters at the back seat.
Fortich drove towards Acuña beach at Baloy. During the trip, Gaid chatted with Maritess who appeared to be
an old acquaintance of his. Apparently, it was Maritess who urged them to proceed to Acuña beach. The
54
sisters even drank bottles of beer and smoked three sticks of marijuana.
It was past midnight when they reached Acuña beach and after having gone through a horrible night, they
decided to park the vehicle to rest. Fortich fell asleep while Maritess vomitted. When the latter felt better, Gaid
drove the sisters to somewhere in Licoan and Fortich to his house in Patag. While traversing the Patag-
Carmen road, he observed that a police vehicle was following him. Alarmed, he hurriedly accelerated his
speed. When he passed a military check-point, he was fired upon. Fortunately, only the rear portion of the
vehicle was hit.
Gaid reached Kamarok, an interior barangay of Opol, at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning and repaired to the
house of his mother-in-law Beatrice Rivera. He told his brother-in-law Jaime Rivera, a witness for the
prosecution, the details of what allegedly transpired in the night. Two days thereafter, he slipped back into the
city by passing through another town and resumed driving his passenger jeep.
In its decision dated August 15, 1984, 6 the trial court convicted appellants in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the court(:)
(1) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3977 both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH and RUDY (Boy)
GAID, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals, of the crime of simple ROBBERY as defined and
penalized under Article 294, paragraph five (5) of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness, which is not habitual and not offset by any aggravating circumstance, and applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, hereby imposes upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of Four
(4) Years and Two (2) Months of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as minimum, to Six (6) Years, One (1) Month
and Ten (10) Days, of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the costs; and to indemnify Luis S.
Tumang, the amounts of One Thousand Twenty-Five (P1,025.42) Pesos and Forty-two Centavos, for the cash
and articles stolen; and the total amount of Twenty Two Thousand Six Hundred Three Pesos and 85/100
(P22,603.85) for plane fare, hospitalization and medical expenses; and the further sum of P5,000.00, for moral
damages. Accused shall be credited with the period of their preventive imprisonment. The home-made
revolver .22 cal., (Exh. A) is hereby forfeited in favor of the Government;
(2) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4162, both accused Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy (Boy) Gaid, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principals of the crime of Simple ROBBERY, as defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph five (5) of the Revised Penal Code, with the sole mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness, which is not habitual, and not offset by any aggravating circumstance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby imposes upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years
and Two (2) Months of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as minimum, to Six (6) Years, One (1) Month and Ten
(10) Days of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum; and to pay the costs; and to indemnify ROLLY IMPERIO the
amount of Two Hundred Sixty Five (P265.00), value of the cash and articles stolen; and Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for moral damages. Accused shall be credited with the full period of their preventive
imprisonment. The .22 caliber homemade Revolver (Exh. A) is hereby confiscated in favor of the Government;
likewise, the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8.
(3) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3809, both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH and RUDY (Boy)
GAID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, with
the use of a deadly weapon as defined and penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the lone mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual and with no
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, hereby imposes upon each of them the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; and to indemnify MARILOU NOBLEZA, the amount of Twenty Four (P24,000) Thousand Pesos;
and the costs. The .22 cal. Revolver (Exh. A) is hereby forfeited in favor of the Government. Accused shall be
credited with the period of their preventive imprisonment. Likewise, the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8 are
confiscated in favor of the government.
(4) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NOS. (sic) 3896, that the crime herein charged is already included in the
aforementioned Crim. Case No. 3809, hence the same is dismissed, with costs de oficio.
(5) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3877, both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH AND RUDY (Boy)
GAID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTlON, as defined and
penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, with the sole mitigating circumstance of drunkenness
which is not habitual, and with no aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby imposes upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
DAY, of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as maximum; and to pay the costs; and to indemnify MARITESS NOBLEZA the amount of
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) Pesos. The Revolver (Exh. A) is forfeited in favor of the Government;
likewise the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8.
(6) FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3878, that the crime charged herein is already included in the
aforementioned Criminal Case No. 3877, hence the same is hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED." 7
From this judgment, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following assignment of
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The trial court erred in admitting the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant Permonette Joy Fortich
despite the fact that it was taken in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
2. The trial court erred in convicting herein accused-appellants despite failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 8
We find no reversible error impelling a reversal of the trial court’s decision.
We cannot sustain the argument for the defense that the extra-judicial confession of Fortich obtained without
the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was first
pronounced on April 26, 1983, in Morales v. Enrile 9 and reiterated in People v. Galit 10 on March 20, 1985.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, it affords no
relief to appellants, for the requirements and restrictions outlined therein have no retroactive effect and do not
affect waivers made prior to April 26, 1983.
In the instant case, the extra-judicial confession and waiver were executed on April 4, 1983. The trial court
correctly admitted the same for "there was at that time no pronounced guidelines requiring that the waiver of
counsel by accused can be properly made only with the presence and assistance of counsel." 11 If indeed
Fortich’s confession was extracted from him as a result of coercion by policemen at the police station, he
could have informed Deputy Clerk of Court Zaldivar and his counsel Atty. Leo Roa of the maltreatment he
suffered.
Thus, the Court has ruled that where one who has made a confession fails to present any evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of extracting a confession; where he failed to
complain to the officers who administered the oaths, such as the fiscal in this case; where he did not institute
any criminal or administrative action for maltreatment against his alleged intimidators; where he did not have
himself examined by a reputable physician to buttress his claim of maltreatment; and where the assailed
confession is replete with details which could not have been known to the police officers if they had merely
concocted the confession, since the statements were inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial confession may
be admitted, with the above circumstances being considered as factors indicative of voluntariness. 12
Accordingly, the extra-judicial confession and waiver voluntarily and intelligently made by Fortich are
admissible in evidence.
Appellants anchor their defense solely on the denial of the charges imputed to them.
It is an established doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused. 13 The court is convinced that Marilou did recognize the physical features of her tormentors as she
was in a supine position when appellants successively mounted her. "The victim’s recognition of appellant as
her attacker cannot be doubted for she had ample opportunity to see the face of the man who ravaged her
during the carnal act." 14 She was as close to the appellants as was physically possible, for a man and a
woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during a sexual act. 15 Marilou had ample opportunity
to observe appellants while she was being terrorized and, subsequently raped. Thus, there is no reason to
doubt the veracity of her statement where she declared that she recognized appellants as her transgressors.
Moreover, the latter failed to show any reason why Marilou would impute such a serious charge against them.
Needless to state, a "straightforward, clear and positive testimony, coupled with the absence of any motive to
fabricate or to falsely implicate the accused, may be enough to convict the appellant." 16
Aside from being positively identified, the different versions presented by appellants are contrary to ordinary
human experience.
55

The following declaration of the trial court that the testimonies of appellants are incredulous is well taken.
"The claim of the accused that the departure from Alta Tierra, on the pick-up to Acuña beach was the idea of
Maritess Nobleza does not inspire belief. Marilou testified that it was the idea of one of the two accused. The
sisters, Marilou and Maritess, are single, presumably virgins, and absent contrary proof, (the accused having
adduced none) are presumed to be modest and chaste in keeping with traditional Filipina disposition. The
court cannot be believe that in a gunshot-filled atmosphere, almost chameleon-like (-) the girls would transfer
their promiscuous desires (if ever they were) from their erstwhile male companions (Tumang and Imperio) in a
brief encounter and stoically abandon the two companions and in turn seek pleasure somewhere with new
partners who had earlier allegedly come upon them in the act of making love on a mat behind the pick-up. The
court cannot believe that Maritess and Marilou — sisters as they are — would be so promiscuous and
profiligately (sic) libidinous that they would make love with two male companions, in the presence, and within
sight of each other." 17
It should be noted that Maritess Nobleza, for unknown reasons, did not testify for the prosecution. Marilou’s
assertion that her sister was simultaneously violated, however, supports a finding of appellants’ guilt. Time and
again, the Court has declared that "in crimes of rape, conviction or acquittal virtually depends entirely on the
credibility of the victim’s testimony because of the fact that usually only the participant can testify to its
occurrence." 18 The case at bar presents an unlikely situation wherein two sisters were simultaneously
ravaged in the presence of, and in plain view, of the other. Accordingly, the failure of one to declare in court
her ordeal may be adequately proved by the other. In light of this factual setting, there is, therefore, no doubt
that Maritess was likewise a victim of multiple rapes.
As regards Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162 for robbery with frustrated homicide and robbery, respectively,
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or using force upon anything
shall be guilty of robbery."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime committed as robbery with frustrated homicide. There
is no such crime. 19 There should have been two separate informations: one for robbery and another for
frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in the information, the Court finds no reason to
overturn the conviction of appellants for the crime of simple robbery.
The asportation by appellants of the personal properties was done by means of violence against or
intimidation upon the persons of Imperio and Tumang. It appears further that Imperio suffered cranial injury
which allegedly required three stitches to repair. Inasmuch as the doctor who issued the medical certificate did
not testify thereon, said certificate is hearsay evidence as to the nature of the injuries inflicted and, therefore,
inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Pesena, 20 it was ruled that when there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, it is only slight physical
injuries.
As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, we subscribe to the finding of the lower court that,
notwithstanding the non-presentation of Dr. Aldanese of the Medical City General Hospital at the trial,
Tumang’s credible testimony bolstered by documentary evidence, such as progress payments and
professional fees for neurological management and craniatomy excision of depressed fracture, proved that the
latter suffered less serious physical injuries, as defined in Article 265 21 of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3977, the trial court correctly observed
that the element of intent to kill was not present. It must be stressed that while Fortich was armed with a
handgun, he never shot Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it. In Mondragon v. People, 22 it was held
that the intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence
of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
The physical injuries inflicted upon Imperio and Tumang by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
penalized under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. — Penalties. — Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
x x x
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other
cases." 23
The trial court correctly disregarded the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place, and use of
a motor vehicle. The mitigating circumstance of intoxication, however, was erroneously appreciated in favor of
both appellants.
Nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being
recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape. 24 There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to
insure the commission of the crime and that appellants took advantage thereof. In the instant case, there is
paucity of evidence that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the
accused; ‘’the fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad."25cralaw:red
Neither can the use of a motor vehicle be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, the
offenses of robbery and forcible abduction with rape could have been effected even without the aid of a motor
vehicle. In the case of People v. Mil, 26 it was held that use of a motor vehicle is not aggravating where it was
not used to facilitate the crime or that the crime could not have been committed without it. In People v. Garcia,
27 the use of motor vehicle was deemed unaggravating if its use was merely incidental and was not purposely
sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his
apprehension difficult.
As regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, the records do not show that appellants
actually sought an isolated place to better execute their purpose. The evidence needed to support its
application are insufficient. Accordingly, this circumstance should not be considered against appellants.
The lower court, however, erred in appreciating intoxication as a generic mitigating circumstance. Under the
Revised Penal Code, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or delinquent, that is, not subsequent to
the plan to commit the crime. In People v. Apduhan, Jr., 28 it was held that to be mitigating, the accused’s
state of intoxication must be proved. Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. In the case at bar, appellants
merely alleged that when the offenses were committed, they were already drunk. "This self-serving statement
stands uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value." 29
The trial court found ample evidence to support a finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 30 Direct proof
is not essential to show conspiracy as its existence could be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that the accused had acted in unison with each other,
evincing a common purpose or design. 31 It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out. 32 Conviction is proper upon evidence showing that appellants acted in
concert, each of them doing his part in the commission of the offense. In People v. Gundran, 33 it was held
that in such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.
In the case at bar, the evidence revealed that appellants arrived together at Carmen Hill and, at gunpoint,
forcibly took Imperio and Tumang’s personal belongings and fled with the sisters on board the stolen pick-up.
After fleeing, appellants successively abused Marilou and Maritess inside the vehicle. These acts manifestly
disclose their "joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest." 34
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellants’ criminal culpability of every charge was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the case of People v. Julian, 35 however, it was ruled that when the first act of rape was committed by
appellant, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was then consummated. Any subsequent acts of
intercourse would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of
forcible abduction with rape. Accordingly, a modification of trial court’s decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 15, 1984 is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
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In Criminal Case No. 3809: Forcible Abduction with Rape

Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape and, likewise, of three counts of rape as defined and penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article 335, of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants shall each suffer four terms of reclusion perpetua. In line with
recent jurisprudence, 36 appellants are further ordered to indemnify Marilou Nobleza in the amount of
P200,000.00 each as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 3877: Forcible Abduction with Rape

Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape and, likewise, of three counts of rape as defined and penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article 335, of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants shall each suffer four terms of reclusion perpetua. In line with
recent jurisprudence, appellants are further ordered to indemnify Maritess Nobleza in the amount of
P200,000.00 each as moral damages.

In Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162: Robbery

Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of simple robbery as
defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellants shall each suffer twice the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days, of prision mayor and shall
solidarily indemnify Luis S. Tumang in the amount of (1) P1,025.42 for the cash and articles stolen; (2) the
aggregate amount of P22,603.85 for the plane fare and medical expenses; (3) and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages. Appellants shall likewise pay Rolly Imperio the amount of P265.00 for the cash
and articles stolen and P10,000.00 as moral damages.

The .22 caliber revolver and ammunitions are FORFEITED in favor of the Government. Costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

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