OMAR O. SEVILLANA v. I.T. (INTERNATIONAL) CORP.

G.R. No. 99047

April 16, 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts: Petitioner Omar Sevillana was contracted to work as a driver by private respondent I.T.
Corporation for its foreign accredited principal, Samir Maddah, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After working
twelve (12) months with his employer, petitioner said that he was repatriated without any valid and
justifiable reason. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration against I.T. Corporation, Samir Maddah and Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation.

In answer thereto, private respondent I.T. denied the material allegations but admitted that the
petitioner was one of several workers it deployed and employed abroad. I.T. Petitioner continuously
worked with Samir for more than one (1) year until his blood pressure was considered critical. When
petitioner's blood pressure did not stabilize and begun affecting his work as driver due to frequent
headaches and dizziness, I.T. alleged that Samir decided to repatriate the petitioner to avoid further
injury and complication to his health. I.T. claimed that after the petitioner had received all the benefits
accorded to an employee consisting of full salaries and separation pay, the petitioner refused to be
repatriated and instead decided to run away.

After both parties have submitted their respective position papers the POEA rendered a decision holding
the private respondents jointly and severally liable to the petitioner.

Issue: Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed?

Held: Yes, petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondent Samir Maddah.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee
was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer. It should be noted that the said provision of
law does not distinguish whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal.

Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law
considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. The burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination of employment was for a valid and legal cause. For an employee's dismissal to be valid, (a)
the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.

In the case at bar, neither of the two (2) conditions precedent were shown to have been complied with
by the private respondents. All that private respondent I.T. did was to rely on its claim that petitioner
was repatriated by its foreign principal, respondent Samir Maddah, due to hypertension. In all
termination cases, strict compliance by the employer with the demands of both procedural and
substantive due process is a condition sine qua non for the same to be declared valid.

Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code, for a
disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such
employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-employees, there must
be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a
stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months, even with proper medical treatment.
The defense of complainant's medical problems (alleged hypertension of complainant) interposed by
respondents to justify the dismissal of the former is totally bereft of merit. The said defense of
respondents is not only uncorroborated by documentary evidence but is also not a just or valid cause for
termination of one's employment. While an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease, it is authorized only if his continued employment
is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees (Art. 284,
Labor Code). This is not present in the instant case, for there is no finding from a medical practitioner
certifying that complainant is really hypertensive.

Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the
latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a
disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public
health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employee’s dismissal.
 Romeo Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan
G.R. No. 169191
June 1, 2011
Peralta, J.

Facts: Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for payment of separation pay against Yuhans
Enterprises. Petitioner alleged that on October 5, 1998, he got sick and was confined in a hospital; on
December 12, 1998, he reported for work but was no longer permitted to go back because of his illness;
he asked that respondent allow him to continue working but be assigned a lighter kind of work but his
request was denied; instead, he was offered a separation pay; however, the said amount corresponds
only to the period between 1993 and 1999; petitioner prayed that he be granted separation pay
computed from his first day of employment in June 1963, but respondent refused.

On the other hand, respondent averred that petitioner was hired as machine operator until he stopped
working on the ground that he was suffering from illness; after his recovery, petitioner was directed to
report for work, but he never showed up. Respondent was later caught by surprise when petitioner filed
the instant case for recovery of separation pay. Respondent claimed that he never terminated the
services of petitioner and that during their mandatory conference, he even told the latter that he could
go back to work anytime but petitioner clearly manifested that he was no longer interested in returning
to work and instead asked for separation pay.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.

Issue: Whether respondent dismissed petitioner from his employment, thus entitled to separation pay?

Held: No, Court agrees with the CA in its observation of the following circumstances as proof that
respondent did not terminate petitioner's employment: first, the only cause of action in petitioner's
original complaint is that he was offered a very low separation pay; second, there was no allegation of
illegal dismissal, both in petitioner's original and amended complaints and position paper; and, third,
there was no prayer for reinstatement.

Article 284: An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid
separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half () month salary for
every year of service whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six months being considered as
one (1) whole year.

The provision presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the services of the employee found to
be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to
his health as well as to the health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is
the employee who severs his or her employment ties. This is precisely the reason why Section 8, Rule 1,
Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not
terminate the services of the employee unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of
six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
The Court finds that petitioner was the one who initiated the severance of his employment relations
with respondent. It is evident from the various pleadings filed by petitioner that he never intended to
return to his employment with respondent on the ground that his health is failing. Indeed, petitioner did
not ask for reinstatement. In fact, he rejected respondent's offer for him to return to work.

Aside from Article 284 of the Labor Code, the award of separation pay is also authorized where there is
illegal dismissal and reinstatement is no longer feasible. However, there is no provision in the Labor
Code which grants separation pay to voluntarily resigning employees. In fact, the rule is that an
employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay, except when it is
stipulated in the employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer practice or
policy.

In the present case, neither the abovementioned provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
rules and regulations nor the exceptions apply because petitioner was not dismissed from his
employment and there is no evidence to show that payment of separation pay is stipulated in his
employment contract or sanctioned by established practice or policy of herein respondent, his
employer.
 Wuerth Philippines, Inc. v. Rodante Ynson
G.R. No. 175932
February 15, 2012
Peralta, J.

Facts: Petitioner Wuerth Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Wuerth Germany, hired respondent Rodante
Ynson, as its National Sales Manager. As NSM, respondent was required to travel to different parts of
the country so as to supervise the sales activities of the company’s sales managers. On January 24, 2003,
he suffered a stroke, and on the succeeding days, he was confined at the Davao Doctor's Hospital. He
immediately informed petitioner about his ailment.

Dr. Daniel de la Paz, a Neurologist-Electroencephalographer in Davao City, issued a Certification stating

that respondent has been under his care since January 24, 2003 and was confined in the hospital from
January 24 to February 3, 2003 due to sudden weakness on the left side of his body. In another Medical
Certificate, Dr. De la Paz certified that respondent may return to work, but advised him to continue with
his rehabilitation regimen for another month and a half.

Respondent sent an e-mail to Hans Sigrit of Wuerth Germany, informing the latter that he can return to
work on June 19, 2003, but in view of the recommendation of doctors that he should continue with his
rehabilitation until July, he requested that administrative work be given to him while in Davao City, until
completion of his therapy.

Thereafter, Ricanor sent a letter to respondent, directing him to appear before the formers office for an
investigation, relative to the following violations which carry the penalty of suspension and/or dismissal,
based on the following alleged violations: (1) absences without leave since January 24, 2003 to date, and
(2) abandonment of work. In a letter respondent replied that his attending physician advised him to
refrain from traveling, in order not to disrupt his daily schedule for therapy and medication.

On June 18, 2003, Knapp sent an e-mail to respondent, informing him that his request for detail in
Davao was disapproved, as petitioner did not have any branch in Davao and there was no available
administrative work for him.

Later, Ricanor sent two letters to respondent, resetting the investigation. Both letters reiterated the
contents of his first letter to respondent, but included gross inefficiency as an additional ground for
possible suspension or dismissal. In his letters, respondent reiterated the reasons for his inability to
attend the investigation proceedings in Manila and, instead, suggested that Ricanor come to Davao and
conduct the investigation there.

Finally, in a letter, Ricanor informed respondent of the decision of petitioner's management to

terminate his employment, effective upon date of receipt, on the ground of continued absences without
filing a leave of absence.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner and Ricanor, for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of allowances. The parties submitted their respective Position Papers. Thereafter, Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision, finding respondents guilty of illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed?

Held: No, pursuant to Article 284 of the Labor Code, respondent’s illness is considered an authorized
cause to justify his termination from employment. The CA ruled that although petitioner did not comply
with the medical certificate requirement before respondents dismissal was effected, this was offset by
respondent's absence for more than the six (6)-month period that the law allows an employee to be on
leave in order to recover from an ailment.

In order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code requires that:

Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. Where the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the
disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the
employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee
to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.

As of June 4, 2003, respondent would have been capable of returning to work. However, despite notices
sent by the petitioner, requiring respondent to appear for the hearing and investigation, respondent
refused to report to his office. Even considering the directive of respondent's doctor to continue with his
present regimen for at least another month and a half, it could be safely deduced that, counted from
June 4, 2003, respondent's rehabilitation regimen ended on July 19, 2003. Despite the completion of his
treatment, respondent failed to attend the investigations set on July 25, 2003 and August 18, 2003.
Thus, his unexplained absence in the proceedings should be construed as waiver of his right to be
present therein in order to adduce evidence that would have justified his continued absence from work.

Respondent alleged in his letters, that he is not capable of returning to work, because he is still
undergoing medications and therapy. However, apart from the clearance of respondent's doctors
allowing him to return to work, he has failed to provide competent proof that he was actually
undergoing therapy and medications.

Since there is no more hindrance for him to return to work and attend the investigations set by
petitioner, respondent's failure to do so was without any valid or justifiable reason. Respondent's
conduct shows his indifference and utter disregard of his work and his employer's interest, and displays
his clear, deliberate, and gross dereliction of duties.