2018 PoliticalLaw PreWeek PDF

I.
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
1. What are the basic principles of constitutional interpretation?
a. Verba legis – whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning, except where technical terms are employed.
b. Ratio legis est anima – the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of the framers.
c. Ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole. (Francisco, Jr. vs.
House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
2. Distinguish Amendment from Revision.

AMENDMENT REVISION
Definition An addition or change within the lines of A change that alters a basic principle in the
the original constitution as will effect an Constitution. (Lambino vs. Commission on
improvement, or better carry out the Elections, G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
purpose for which it was framed. 2006)
Scope Envisages a change of only a few specific Involves alterations of different portions of
provisions. the entire document. (Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, 1935)
Intention To improve specific parts or to add new To determine how and to what extent a
provisions deemed necessary to meet new document should be altered. (Sounding
conditions or to suppress specific portions Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3,
that may have become obsolete or that are 2006)
judged to be dangerous.
Who may propose? A People’s Initiative may propose only Only the Congress or a Constitutional
amendments to the Constitution. Convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. (Lambino vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006)
3. Amendatory or Revision Process

BY PROPOSAL RATIFICATION
AMENDMENTS Congress (as Constituent By a vote of ¾ of ALL its Via a plebiscite, 60-90 days
Assembly) members after submission of the
amendments.
Constitutional Convention Either by a 2/3 vote of all
the members of the
Congress, or (if such vote is
not obtained) by a majority
vote of all the members of
Congress
Peoples’ Initiative A Petition of at least 12%
of the total number of
registered voters, of which
every legislative district
must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered
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voters therein.
REVISIONS Congress (as Constituent By a vote of ¾ of ALL its Via a plebiscite, 60-90 days
Assembly) members after submission of the
revisions.
Constitutional Convention Either by a 2/3 vote of all
the members of the
Congress, or (if such vote is
not obtained) by a majority
vote of all the members of
Congress
4. Limitations on Amendment through People’s Initiative
a. No amendment within five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution;
b. No amendment through People’s Initiative more often than once every five (5) years after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution; and
c. People’s Initiative applies only to an amendment. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
5. Illustration of Philippine Maritime Regimes.
(Source: University of Maine School of Law)
a. What are the maritime zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS), in relation to the territory of the Philippines?
1. Internal Waters – consist of waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
Philippine Archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including the
waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exists
in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law,
1998)
2. Contiguous Zone – the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to 12

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nautical miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise
control necessary to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within the territory or territorial sea. (Art. 33, UNCLOS)
3. Territorial Sea – extends up to 12 nautical miles outward from the baselines.

4. Exclusive Economic Zone – the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the
baselines of a State over which the Costal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing its natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the waters super adjacent to the seabed and the of the seabed and subsoil
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone. (Arts. 56-57, UNCLOS)
6. The Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9552 (or the Baselines Law) classifying the Kalayaan Island
Group and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) as regimes of islands. Petitioners, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as it reduces
Philippine maritime territory in violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Is R.A. No. 9552
unconstitutional as it alter the national territory?
No. The Supreme Court upheld Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9522 as constitutional and discussed the following
points in relation to territory:
1. R.A. No. has merely demarcated the country’s maritime zones and continental shelves in
accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III.
2. The framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the
Philippines’ enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan group of Islands and
the Scarborough.
3. The claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments.
4. The Baseline Laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the
delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is no way affecting or
producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
5. Moreover, the argument that R.A. No. 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic
waters is untenable. The political branches of the Government can pass domestic laws that will aid
in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage – as innocent
passage is a right based on customary law – no State can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a
right acknowledged by modern states. (Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011)
7. Discuss (a) Right of Innocent Passage and (b) Right to Sealane or Air Route.
a. Innocent passage is a concept in the law of the sea that allows for a vessel to pass through the
territorial waters of another state, subject to certain restrictions. Passage is innocent so long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take
place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. (Art. 19,
UNCLOS)
b. Archipelagic sealanes passage means the exercise in accordance with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of the right of navigation in the normal mode solely for the
purpose of continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
While the right of innocent passage may be suspended in certain circumstances, the right of
archipelagic sealanes passage cannot be suspended by an archipelagic State. (Art. 53, UNCLOS)
8. In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the Department of Health (DOH), issued a Memorandum No.
209 inviting accredited drug companies, including Pharmarich, to a meeting. In the meeting, the
DOH Undersecretary handed them copies of the report of Food and Drugs Authority, which detailed
violations relative to the products of the invited drug companies. After giving Pharmarich a chance
to reply, and the latter having failed to do so, its accreditation was suspended for two years, effective
immediately. Pharmarich filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint seeking to declare null

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and void certain administrative issuances with prayer for damages and injunction against DOH
officials. Can Pharmarich file a suit against DOH and its officials?
No. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity is violated.
Conversely, when the Government Agency has a charter of its own, and if its charter provides that it has the
right to sue and be sued, it is an express consent and it is suable. (Department of Health vs. Phil
Pharmawealth, Inc (G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
9. X filed an action against the Republic of the Philippines seeking payment for a parcel of land which
the national government utilized for a road-widening project. Can X garnish public funds to satisfy
his claims for payment?
No, X cannot garnish public funds to satisfy his claim for payment. Sec. 7 of Act No. 3083 prohibits
execution upon any judgment against the government. Even if the government may be sued, it does not
follow that its properties may be seized under execution. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions, to
wit:
1. Where the law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a
valid governmental obligation;
2. Funds belonging to government corporations, which can sue and be sued, that are deposited with a
bank. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Palacio, G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1969; and University
of the Philippines vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54, August 23, 2012)
10. State the Double Effect Doctrine.

The intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good"
effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the
above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never
pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014)
11. What are the unconstitutional provisions in Republic Act No. 10354 (Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012) and its counterpart provisions in its implementing rules and
regulations?
a. Section 7: (a) requiring private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and (b) allowing minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
b. Section 23(a)(l): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
c. Section 23(a)(2)(i): allowing a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, to

undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
d. Section 23(a)(2)(ii): limiting the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures;
e. Section 23(a)(3): punishing any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

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f. Section 23(b): punishing any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
g. Section 17: rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
h. Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations: adding the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 10354 and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
12. What is the nature of the Visiting Forces Agreement?

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is a treaty. As held in BAYAN vs. Zamora (G.R. No. 138570, October
10, 2000), the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by
the United States (US) as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines
to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
a. Is it constitutionally infirm?
No. The role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate,
as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or
reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of
discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate
partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of
checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to
their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this
treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable
toward our nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the
principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and
province of the courts to inquire. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
13. Petitioners requested assistance from the Government of the Philippines in filing a claim against
the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women”
stations in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation. However, the Executive Department
refused to give them assistance ratiocinating possible tarnishing of its good foreign relations with
Japan. Can the court interfere with the said decision?
No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. The Supreme Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department. (Vinuya vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 [J. Del
Castillo])
III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
14. Distinguish Initiative from Referendum.

On one hand, initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative,
namely: (a) Initiative on the Constitution, (b) Initiative on statutes, and (c) Initiative on local legislation. On
the other hand, Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two (2) classes, namely: (a) Referendum on statutes and (b)

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Referendum on local laws. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
15. Qualifications of Senators, District Representatives, and Party-List Nominees.

SENATORS DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES PARTY-LIST NOMINEES
a. Natural-born citizen of the a. Natural-born Filipino citizen; a. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; b. On the day of the election, at Philippines;
b. On the day of the election, is least twenty five (25) years b. Registered voter;
at least thirty-five (35) years of age; c. Resident of the Philippines for
of age; c. Able to read and write; at least one (1) year
c. Able to read and write; d. Except for Party-List immediately preceding the
d. Registered voter; Representatives, a registered day of the elections;
e. Resident of the Philippines for voter in the district in which d. Able to read and write;
not less than two (2) years he shall be elected; and e. Bona fide member of the party
immediately preceding the e. Resident thereof for not less or organization which he
day of the election. (Sec. 3, than one (1) year seeks to represent for at least
Article VI, 1987 immediately preceding the ninety (90) days preceding
Constitution) day of the election. (Sec. 6, the day of the election; and
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) f. At least twenty five (25) years
of age on the day of the
election. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law,
2016)
16. Can mandatory drug testing be imposed on the following classes of persons: (a) candidates for
public office; (b) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (c) employees of public and private
offices; and (d) persons charged with certain offense?
a. No. If Congress cannot require a candidate for Senator to meet such additional qualification, the
Commission on Elections, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution. The unconstitutionality of this requirement is rooted
on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as Senator.
b. Yes. The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities.
c. Yes. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
d. No. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the Prosecutor’s Office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made Defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are

singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being hailed before the Prosecutor’s Office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of Republic Act No. 9165. (Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R.
No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
17. Parameters to guide the Commission on Elections in determining who may participate in the
Party-List elections.

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a. Three (3) different groups may participate in the Party-List system, namely: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations;
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized or under-represented” sector;
c. Political Parties can participate in Party-List elections provided they register under the Party-List
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections;
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and under-represented” or “lacking

well-defined political constituencies”;
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
under-represented” must belong to the “marginalized and under-represented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined
constituencies”, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy of their respective sectors;
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided they have at least one (1) nominee who remains qualified.
(Atong-Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)
18. Grounds for refusal or cancellation of Registration.

The Commission on Elections may motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or sectoral party,
organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds: (a) it is a religious sect or denomination
organization, or association organized for religious purposes; (b) it advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal; (c) it is a foreign party or organization; (d) it is receiving support from ay foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers
or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes; (e) it violates or fails to
comply with laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections; (f) it declares untruthful statements in its
petition; (g) it has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; (h) it fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (i) it fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the Party-List system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (Sec. 6, Party-List System Act)
19. Ladies and Lads Party is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals. It first applied its Party-List accreditation
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), however, the same was denied for failure to
acquire substantial membership. The Party refiled its application and interposed that its community
represents a marginalized community and those disadvantaged due to their sexual orientation. Once
again, in denying the application, the COMELEC cited Ang Bagong Bayani case, such that the
segment represented by the said Party is not included in the marginalized sectors enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. Is the COMELEC correct in denying their accreditation as a Party-List?
No. COMELEC mistakenly opines that the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party vs.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001) stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As the Supreme Court explicitly ruled in the
aforesaid case, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, or the guidelines laid down in the
aforesaid case. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J.
De Castillo])
20. Antonio Trillanes was charged with a coup d’état offense, a non-bailable offense. Four (4) years
later, Trillanes, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term. Now a
Senator, Trillanes filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court
to be allowed to attend Senate sessions. The RTC denied the same. Was the RTC correct?
Yes. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of Representatives has

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always been granted in a restrictive sense. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Election
to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions, which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. As discussed in the case of People of
the Philippines vs. Jalosjos (G.R. No. 132875, February 3, 2000), allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him
a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. (Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, G.R. 179817, June 27, 2008)
21. Distinguish Incompatible Office from Forbidden Office.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
The first part of this section refers to what are known as incompatible offices, which may not be held by the
legislator during his tenure in Congress. The purpose is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another
branch of the government, to the detriment of the independence of the legislature and the doctrine of
separation of powers. But even if a member of Congress is willing to forfeit his seat therein, he may not be
appointed to any civil office in the government that has been created or the emoluments thereof have been
increased while he was incumbent in the legislature. Such a position is a forbidden office. The purpose is to
prevent trafficking in public office.
22. What is an Enrolled Bill? State the Enrolled Bill Theory.

An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper
officers of each House, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The court is bound
under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of legislature.
(United States vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916; Mabanag vs. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5,
1947; Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
23. Differentiate the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) over election contests. What are the requisites to oust the COMELEC of
jurisdiction?
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) may take cognizance of any matter raised by a
losing candidate related to the election, returns, and qualifications as soon as the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) proclaims the winning candidate and the latter shall have taken his oath as a member of the
House of Representatives. To be considered a member of Congress, there must be concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption to duty. The following
requisites would bring the election contest under the jurisdiction of the HRET. Absent any of the foregoing,
the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over said contest. (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264,
June 25, 2013)
24. What is the composition of Commission on Appointments?
a. Senate President – acts as ex officio chairman who shall not vote except in case of a tie;
b. Twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) Representatives (Sec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

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The Senators and Representatives are elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties, as well as parties and organizations registered under the party-list system. For the
Senate, a political party must have at least (2) senator members to be entitled to one seat in the Commission
on Appointments. Rounding off is not allowed. It is also not mandatory to elect twelve (12) Senators as
what the Constitution only requires that majority of the entire membership is filled. (Guingona v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992; Madrigal vs. Villar, G.R. No. 183055, July 31, 2009)
25. Petitioners alleged that Sec. 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006 entitled “An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices”,
insofar as it repeals sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
the constitutional requirement that every law should have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title. The Petitioners allege that the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 9006. Are Petitioners
correct?
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Republic Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the
title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code and the Sec. 14 of the R.A. No. 9006 does not violate "One Subject-One Title Rule". The Supreme
Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject. (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10,
2003)
26. Distinguish Legislative Inquiry from Oversight Function.

IN AID OF LEGISLATION OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
Who may appear? Any person Department Heads
Who may be summoned? Anyone, except the President and the No one. Each House may only request
members of the Supreme Court the appearance of the Department
Heads
Subject matter Any matters for purposes of pending Matters related to the Department
legislation only
Obligatory force of appearance Mandatory Discretionary
27. Distinguish Inquiry in Aid of Legislation from Question Hour.

INQUIRY IN AID OF QUESTION HOUR (Sec. 22)
LEGISLATION (Sec. 21)
Relates to? Relates to the power to conduct Pertains to the power to conduct a
inquiries in aid of legislation. question hour.
Purpose To elicit information that may be used To obtain information in pursuit of
for legislation. Congress’ oversight function.
Nature of attendance Attendance is compulsory. Attendance is discretionary.
Persons required to attend Any person. Only Department Heads.
Who conducts? Committees Entire body
Subject matter Any matter for the purpose of Only matters related to the
legislation. Departments.
Basis Grounded on the necessity of Congress merely seeks to be informed
information in the legislative process on how Department Heads are
(the power of inquiry) being co- implementing the statutes which it has
extensive with the power to legislate. issued.
28. Distinguish Bicameralism from Unicameralism.

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BICAMERALISM UNICAMERALISM
Definition The practice of having two legislative The practice of having only one
or parliamentary chambers. legislative or parliamentary chamber.
Passing of the Bill Every Bill must pass two (2) Houses Every Bill must pass by only a single
of Congress to become a law. House of Congress to become a law.
Organization There is an Upper House that looks at Simplicity of organization resulting in
problems which form the national economy and efficiency.
perspective and, thus, serves as a
check on the parochial tendency of a
body elected by District.
Legislation Allows for a more careful study of Facility in pinpointing responsibility
legislation. for legislation, avoidance of
duplication, and strengthening of the
Legislature in relation to the Executive.
Vulnerability Less vulnerable to attempts of the Drawing from the recent experience
Executive to control the Legislature. with People power, there is greater
responsiveness to the needs of the
masses because the Representatives are
forced to interact more intensely with
their limited and clearly identifiable
constituencies.
29. What are the acts and practices that were declared unconstitutional in relation to the
Disbursement Acceleration Program in the case of Araullo vs. Aquino III (G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)?
a. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the withdrawn allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA); and
b. The cross-border transfer of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive.
c. The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
GAA; and
d. The use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer
that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions
provided in the relevant GAA.
30. What is Pork Barrel System? Is it valid and constitutional?

The Supreme Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members. The Pork Barrel System was held as invalid and unconstitutional for violating the following
principles:
a. Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment

authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of
powers;
b. Insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power;
c. Insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,

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denied the President the power to veto items;
d. Insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in
the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability;
e. Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely
local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine
local autonomy; and
f. Insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under
the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013)
a. What are the kinds of lump sum discretionary funds under the Pork Barrel System?
1. Congressional Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum discretionary fund wherein

legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, were able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices.
2. Presidential Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum discretionary fund which allowed the
President to determine the manner of its utilization. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)
31. What is Impoundment?

Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. (Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
a. What are the sources of impoundment?
1. The authority to impound given to the President, either expressly or impliedly, by the
Congress;
2. The executive power drawn from the President’s role as the Commander-in-Chief; and
3. The Faithful Execution Clause. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
b. May the Disbursement Acceleration Program be considered as impoundments by the

Executive?
No, there is no executive impoundment in the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain
or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the General
Appropriations Act, unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Nevertheless, there is no impoundment because what was involved in the DAP was the transfer of
funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287,
July 1, 2014)
32. State the Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions.

Under Sec. 25(2) of the 1987 Constitution, “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general

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appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates." Explicit is the
requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some "particular
appropriation" therein. (Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990)
33. Discuss the Power of Augmentation.

As a general rule, no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. As an exception, the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice, and the
Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations
(Sec 25[5], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
a. What is a “cross-border” transfer? Is it allowed?

Cross-border transfers refer to the movement of funds from one branch of government to another.
It is not allowed. For instance, the use of Disbursement Acceleration Program funds to augment
funds of the Commission on Audit (for its information technology infrastructure program) and the
House of Representatives (for its legislative library and archives building or e-library) violated the
1987 Constitution because funds appropriated by the General Appropriations Act for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. (Araullo vs.
Aquino III, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014)
IIII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
34. Qualifications of the President.
a. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

b. Registered voter;
c. Able to read and write;
d. At least forty (40) years of age on the day of the election;
e. Resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years immediately preceding the election. (Sec. 2,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
35. What is the rule on presidential immunity?

This privilege is enjoyed only during the tenure of the President. After his tenure, the Chief Executive
cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President
which were not performed in the exercise of official duties. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15,
March 2, 2001)
a. During his Presidency, Joseph Estrada was charged with the crimes of plunder, bribery, and
graft and corruption case. He is invoking presidential immunity from suit. Can he validly do
so?
No. The cases filed against Joseph Estrada are criminal in character. By no stretch of imagination
can these crimes be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He
cannot cite any Decision of the Supreme Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
in the same footing as any trespasser. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)

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36. What is Executive Privilege?
Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts,
and the Congress. Similarly, it also defined as the right of the President and high level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. (Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008) The
necessity of withholding the information must be of such a high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April
20, 2006).
a. What are the elements for communications to fall under the Presidential Communications
Privilege?
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power”;
2. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of

the president or the president himself or herself, with the advisor being in operational
proximity with the president; and
3. The presidential communications privilege is a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information likely contains
important evidence that is unavailable elsewhere. (Neri vs. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008)
b. What are the varieties of Executive Privilege?
1. State Secret Privilege – invoked on the ground that the information is of such nature
that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives;
2. Informer’s Privilege – the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law; and
3. Generic Privilege for Internal Deliberations – attaches to intra-governmental

documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
37. What are the requirements before someone may be held liable under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility?
Under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, any government official or supervisor, or officer of the
Philippine National Police, or that of any law enforcement agency shall be held accountable for neglect of
duty if he has knowledge of a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed by his subordinates,
or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. (Sec. 1, Executive Order No.
226, February 17, 1995)
a. Noriel Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he
refused to confess his membership in the New People’s Army. When released, Rodriguez
filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data against
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA). Can PGMA be included as
Respondent?

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Yes. While a President cannot be included as a respondent in a Petition for the Writ of Amparo or
for the Writ of Habeas Data while currently sitting as President, he or she may no longer be
protected by Presidential immunity from suit after his or her incumbency. To hold someone liable
under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and

the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility. On the issue of knowledge, such may be established through circumstantial
evidence. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively command,
control, and discipline the military. However, proving that the former President is responsible or
accountable is another matter entirely and should be proven with substantial evidence. (Rodriguez
vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
38. What are the classification of appointments?
a. Permanent Appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and
are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure;
b. Temporary Appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and
without necessity of just cause or valid investigation; made on the understanding that the
appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee
may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made;
c. Regular Appointment is one made by the President while the Congress is in session, takes effect
only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until
the end of the term of the appointee.
d. Ad interim Appointment is one made by the President while the Congress is not in session, takes
effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
upon the next adjournment of Congress.
e. Midnight Appointment is one made two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the incumbent President. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2016)
a. Distinguish disapproved ad interim appointment from by-passed appointment.

On one hand, ad interim appointments are appointments made by the President while Congress is
not in session or doing recess. An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes effect
immediately. Thus, one who was issued an ad interim appointment may immediately enter upon
the discharge of his functions. An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or, if not confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress. On
the other hand, a by-passed appointment is one, which receives neither approval nor rejection from
the Commission. (Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
39. Distinguish ad interim appointment from appointment in acting capacity.

AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT APPOINTMENT IN ACTING

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CAPACITY
Effectivity Effective upon acceptance Effective upon acceptance
Extendibility Extended only during a recess of May be extended any time there is a
Congress vacancy
Need for Commission on Submitted to the Commission on Not submitted to the Commission on
Appointment’s confirmation Appointments for confirmation or Appointments. Acting appointments are
rejection a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. (Pimentel vs. Ermita,
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
40. Is the prohibition on midnight appointments applicable to appointments made by the local chief
executive?
No. The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply
to appointments made by the local chief executives. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Nonetheless, the Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, may establish rules and regulations to
promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. (Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco,
G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)
41. State the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the Alter Ego Principle.
Under this Doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in case where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources
[DENR] vs. DENR Region XII Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003)
42. State the “Take-Care” or Faithful Execution Clause.

Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that “The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The obligation to
see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the President to conduct
investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department. (Biraogo vs.
Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010).
43. What are the Military or War Powers of the President? Explain briefly.
a. Calling-out Power – the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. (David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006);
b. Power to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus – in cases of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, the President may, for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days,
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution); and
c. Power to declare martial law – invoked as an extreme measure, and rests upon the basic principle
that every state has the power of self-preservation, a power inherent in all states, because neither
the state nor society would exist without it.

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44. Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol of Marawi. Gov. Abdusakur Tan declared a state of emergency and called
upon the armed forces through Proclamation No. 1, and established implementing guidelines for it.
Are Proclamation No. 1 and its implementing guidelines ultra vires acts and unconstitutional?
Yes, they are ultra vires acts and unconstitutional. Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces, the police, and his own civilian emergency force at his own bidding. The calling-out
powers contemplated under Art, VII of the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Sec. 465 (regarding powers and functions) of the Local Government Code. In describing the
calling out power, as exercised by the President, the Supreme Court ruled that the only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298,
July 3, 2012)
45. What are the parameters for review to determine whether there exists factual basis for the
proclamation of Martial Law? What is the standard of proof required in determining such?
The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: (a) actual rebellion or
invasion; (2) public safety requires it; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion. The first two requirements must concur. The President needs only to satisfy
probable cause as the standard of proof in

determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion
for purposes of declaring Martial Law. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict
the exercise of his emergency powers. (Lagman, et. al. vs. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del
Castillo])
a. The hostilities were reported only in Marawi City, but the President has declared Martial
Law on the whole of Mindanao. Is this valid?
Yes, for the following reasons:
1. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President was convinced
that the atrocities escalated to a level that risked public safety. The President receives
vital, relevant, classified, and live information which equip and assist him in making
decisions. President believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and
public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Supreme
Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and
events included in the Report, which it find sufficient.
2. The Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial
coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under Martial Law.
3. Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range,
extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are
in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless
elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their
supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. (Lagman, et. al. vs. Medialdea,
GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])
46. In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling-out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood Occupation ended and
the President lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion. In the interim, the Petitions were filed
assailing the declaration. Petitioners contended that Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution does
not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call-out the AFP; that there is no factual basis for

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such declaration; that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President; and that it “opens the door to
the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion. Are
Petitioners correct?
No. In calling out the armed forces, the declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it
only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or
suppress it. The Supreme Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all
legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the
declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of
Congress. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights. Indeed, if a state of Martial Law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically
suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military
tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration
that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law power. (Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R.
No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
47. What are the forms of executive clemency? Explain briefly.
a. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed;
b. Commutation – the reduction or mitigation of the penalty;

c. Reprieve – the postponement of a sentence or stay of execution;
d. Parole – the release from imprisonment but without full restoration of liberty as parolee is still in
the custody of the law although not in confinement;
e. Remission of fines and forfeitures – prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of
forfeited property and it cannot have the effect of returning properly which has been vested in
third parties or money ion the public treasury; and
f. Amnesty – an act of grace concurred in by the legislature and usually extended to groups of
persons who committed political offenses, and which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
48. What are the limitations on the exercise of the pardoning power?
a. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
b. It cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable recommendation
of the Commission on Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution);
c. It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (People of the Philippines vs. Salle, Jr.,
G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995, reiterated in People of the Philippines vs. Bacang, G.R. No.
116512, July 30, 1996);
d. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative or civil contempt;

e. It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability (People of the Philippines vs. Nacional, G.R. Nos.
111294-95, September 7, 1995); and
f. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9,
1989).
49. Distinguish Pardon from Amnesty.

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PARDON AMNESTY
Judicial notice Private act of the President upon Public act of the President that courts
which there can be no judicial may take judicial notice of
scrutiny; it must be pleaded and
proved
To whom granted; when Granted to an individual after Granted to classes of persons or
conviction communities before the institution of
criminal prosecution or sometimes after
conviction
Concurrence by the Congress No need for the concurrence of the Need the concurrence of the Congress
Congress
Acceptance Acceptance is necessary No need for distinct act of acceptance
Offense Generally granted for infractions of Addressed to political offenses
peace of the state
Effect Looks forward and relieves the Looks backward and abolishes and puts
offender from the consequences of an into oblivion the offense itself, as if no
offense of which he has been offense was committed. (Barrioquinto
convicted. vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278,
January 21, 1949)
50. Discuss the Doctrine of Non-Diminution or Non-Impairment of the Pardoning Power of the
President.
Under the present Constitution, a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action. Thus, the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not
be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution. (Risos-Vidal vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
51. What are the requisites for the validity of transferring savings between Departments?
a. There must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the transferring agency;

b. There must be an existing item, project, or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency
to which the savings will be transferred. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
52. Vacancy in the Office of the President.

Circumstance Who will succeed?
Vacancy at the beginning of the Death or permanent disability Vice President-elect
term of the President-elect
Fails to qualify Vice President-elect shall act as
President until the President-elect
shall have qualified
President shall not have been chosen Vice President-elect shall act as
President until a President shall have
been chosen and qualified
No President and Vice President The President of the Senate or, in case
chosen nor shall have been qualified, of his inability, the Speaker of the
or both shall have died or become House of Representatives shall act as
permanently disabled President until a President or Vice
President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the

officials mentioned, Congress shall,
by law, provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President
shall be selected until a President or a

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Vice President shall have qualified.
Vacancy during the term Death, permanent disability, removal Vice President
from office, or resignation
Death, permanent disability, removal The President of the Senate or, in case
from office, or resignation of the of his inability, the Speaker of the
President and Vice President House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or Vice
President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the

officials mentioned, Congress shall,
by law, provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President
shall be selected until a President or a
Vice President shall have qualified.
Temporary disability When President transmits to the Vice President as Acting President
Senate President and the Speaker of
the House his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a writing
declaration to the contrary
When a majority of all of the Vice President as Acting President
members of the Cabinet transmits to
the Senate President and the Speaker Thereafter, when the President
of the House their written declaration transmits to the Senate President and
that the President is unable to Speaker of the House his written
discharge the powers and duties of his declaration that no inability exists, he
office shall re-assume the powers and duties
of his office.
Serious illness Does not result to vacancy because
the Cabinet members in charge of
national security and foreign relations
can still access the President.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
53. Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President.

The President shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of Congress voting separately. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
54. What is Deliberative Process Privilege?

It is the privilege against disclosure of information or communication to enable the members of the Court to
“freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation
for one’s comments. Philippine laws, rules, and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of privileged
information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level, and subject to the Principle of Comity,
members of the Court and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify on matters that
are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of its adjudicatory functions
and duties. (In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and
Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters from the
Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012)
55. What is the expanded judicial power to review under the 1987 Constitution?

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Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power by granting the courts the
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R.
No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
56. What are the requisites of judicial review?
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court;

b. The question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very lis
mota of the case. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
57. What is a moot and academic question?

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. (Abdul vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO.
184496, December 2, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Antolin vs. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010 [J. Del
Castillo])
58. What is a political question?

Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or (to the) executive branch of the government (Mamba vs. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December
14, 2009 [J. Del Castillo])
a. What is the test whether a question is political or justiciable?

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question “whether there are constitutionality imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.” If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. (Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
b. Is the burial of Former President Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani a
political or justiciable question?
President Rodrigo Duterte's decision to have the remains of Former President Marcos interred at
the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order No. 292
to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for
national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of
policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no
taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, President Duterte's decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
November 8, 2016)
59. Appointment to the Judiciary.

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Supreme Court Court of Appeals Regional Trial Court Metropolitan Trial Sandiganbayan
Court, Municipal
Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit
Trial Court
Natural born citizen of the Philippines
A judge of a lower A judge of a lower Has been engaged in Has been engaged in Has been a judge of a
court of engaged in court of engaged in the practice of law in the practice of law in court of record or
the practice of law in the practice of law in the Philippines or has the Philippines or has been engaged in the
the Philippines for the Philippines for held a public office in held a public office in practice of law in the
fifteen (15) years or fifteen (15) years or the Philippines the Philippines Philippines or has
more. more.* requiring admission to requiring admission to held office requiring
the practice of law as the practice of law as admission to the bar
*Same qualifications an indispensable an indispensable as a pre-requisite for
as provided in the requisite for at least requisite for at least at least ten (10) years.
1987 Constitution for ten (10) years. five (5) years.
Justices of the
Supreme Court. (Sec.
7, Ch. 1, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129)
At least 35 years of At least 30 years of At least 40 years of
At least 40 years of age
age age age
60. Composition of Judicial and Bar Council.
a. Ex-Officio members: (a) Chief Justice, as Chairman; (b) Secretary of Justice; and (c) a
Representative of Congress;
b. Regular members: (a) Representative from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; (b) Professor of
Law; (c) Retired Justice of the Supreme Court; and (d) Representative of the private sector; and
c. Secretary ex-officio: Clerk of the Supreme Court
61. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two (2) more Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan with three (3) Justices each, thereby resulting in six (6) vacant positions. The Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) submitted to the President six (6) clustered and separate shortlists for the
th th th th th st
16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , and 21 Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. The President appointed
nominees from one cluster to a different position from which they were nominated for, such that the
th
21st nominee of the JBC was appointed as the 16 Associate Justice, therefore offending the order of
preference and seniority. Can the President validly do this?
Yes. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) cannot be
used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone
whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in
the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. The JBC cannot,
by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective appointees. The
numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan is
determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or appointment by the President.
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President. It bears to point out that part
of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power
to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date
and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. (Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R.
No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
62. Discuss the Unanimity Rule.

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The “unanimity requirement” under Sec. 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 states that in case the integrity of an
applicant (not otherwise disqualified) to the Judiciary, to the position of Ombudsman, or his Deputies, is
challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members of the Judicial and Bar Council must be obtained for the
favorable consideration of his nomination, imposing a higher voting requirement. It follows then that the
"unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness. (Jardeleza vs.
Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
63. Overview of Constitutional Commissions.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON COMMISSION ON
COMMISSION ELECTIONS AUIDIT
Composition 1 Chairman 1 Chairman 1 Chairman
2 Commissioners 6 Commissioners 2 Commissioners
Qualifications a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens;
b. At least 35 years at the b. At least 35 years at b. At least 35 years at
time of the the time of the the time of the
appointment; appointment; appointment;
c. With proven capacity c. Holders of College c. Certified Public
for public Degrees; and Accountant with at
administration; and d. Not candidates for least 10 years of
d. Not candidates for any any elective auditing experience
elective position in position in the or a lawyer who
the election election practiced law for at
immediately immediately least 10 years;
preceding preceding
appointment appointment N.B.: At no time shall all
Members of the Commission
N.B.: Majority, including the belong to the same
Chairman, must be members profession
of the Philippine Bar and
practiced law for at least 10 d. Not candidates for
years. any elective
position in the
election
immediately
preceding
appointment
Appointments Needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
Disqualifications Same as President and Vice President (under Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution) and
members of the Congress (under Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution)
64. Can the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission be included in the Board of Trustees/Directors
of the Government Service Insurance System, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Employees’
Compensation commission, and, Home Development Mutual Fund without violating the
independence of the Constitutional Commission?
No. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, the designation of the Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as member of the governing Boards of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) impairs the
independence of the CSC. Under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President exercises control
over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the
President is not part of the Executive Branch. As provided in their respective charters, PhilHealth and ECC
have the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the
Department of Labor and Employment, respectively. On the other hand, GSIS and HDMF fall under the
Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF are exercised

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through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC, and HDMF and the members of their respective governing
Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in
the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. (Funa vs. Duque, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
65. The Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Office 10 appointed Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a
temporary status. He took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test
(CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and passed the same. Thereafter, he was
conferred permanent status as PO1. The CSC-Caraga informed PO1 about certain alleged
irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took. A Preliminary Investigation was then
scheduled by CSC. PO1 then argued that it is the National Police Commission which has sole
authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the
CSC. Is PO1 correct?
No. Sec. 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
connected with the examinations. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its
jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service
examination irregularity committed by PO1. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended
to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or
the rules of the service. (Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009
[J. Del Castillo]; Balasbas vs. Monayao, G.R. No. 190524, February 17, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; Catipon,
Jr. vs. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
66. On February 15, 2001, the President appointed X as the Chairman of the Commission of Audit for
a term of seven (7) years, whose term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2,
2008. In the interim, on February 7, 2004, Y was appointed as a member of the said Commission for
a term of seven (7) years, starting from February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Upon retirement of
X, Y was then appointed as COA Chairman on April 18, 2008 and was to serve until the expiration of
his original term of office as Commissioner (or on February 2, 2011). Y contends in the proper forum
that a “fresh period” should apply to him – that is, he should be allowed to serve the full seven (7)
years. Is Y correct?
No. In no case can one be a member of the Commission on Audit (COA), either as Chairman or
Commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years. A contrary
view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation. Where the Constitution or, for
that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If the vacancy
calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional
appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. (Funa vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791,
April 24, 2012)
67. Classes of Service in the Civil Service Commission.
a. Career Service – characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, by competitive examinations, or based on highly-technical qualifications; opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions and security of tenure.
b. Non-Career Service – characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests
utilized for the career service; tenure limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminus
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration
of a particular project for which purposes the employment was made. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law, 2016)
VII. BILL OF RIGHTS
68. Requisites of the fundamental powers of the state.

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POLICE POWER POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER OF TAXATION
a. Lawful subject a. Private property a. Public purpose
b. Lawful means b. Taking in the constitutional b. Uniform, equitable, and
sense progressive
When exercised by a delegate c. Public use c. Within the jurisdiction of the
(additional): d. Just compensation taxing authority
e. Due process of law d. Certain guarantee against
a. Expressly granted by law injuries to individuals shall
be provided. (Nachura,
b. Within the territorial limits When exercised by a delegate
Outline Reviewer in Political
c. Must not be contrary to law (additional):
Law, 2016)
a. There is a genuine necessity
69. Distinctions of the fundamental powers of the state.

POLICE POWER POWER OF EMINENT POWER OF TAXATION
DOMAIN
Basis Public necessity and right of Necessity of the property for Power emanating from
State and of public to self- public use. necessity (Lifeblood
protection and self- Doctrine Theory)
preservation.
Scope Liberty and property. The Property rights only. The Property rights only. The
property taken are usually property is wholesome and property is wholesome and
noxious or intended for devoted to public use or devoted to public use or
noxious purpose, and may purpose. purpose.
thus be destroyed.
Who may exercise? Only by the government May be exercised by private Only by the government
entities
Compensation Intangible, altruistic feeling Full and fair equivalent Protection and public
that the individual has value of the property improvements for the taxes
contributed to the public expropriated. paid. (Bernas, The 1987
good. Philippine Constitution
Reviewer, 2011)
70. X failed the National Medical Admission Test three times and was barred from taking it the fourth
time because of the three-flunk rule. He files a Petition in court alleging that such rule is
unconstitutional as it impairs his constitutional right to education. Is he right with his contention?
No. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the
longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to
see to it that they are not dissipated or not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. (Department of
Education vs. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989)
71. ABC Taxi Corporation assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out
taxicabs more than six (6) years old on ground that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal
protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directly solely towards the taxi industry. Is the
administrative regulation valid?
Yes. The Equal Protection Clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It
applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or
subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the
Equal Protection Clause is the uniform operation by legal means, so that all persons under identical or
similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities

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imposed. (Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of transportation, G.R. No. L-59234,
September 30, 1982)
72. Can establishments claim as tax deductions the Senior Citizen Discounts that they give?
Yes. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
(Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
175356, December 3, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
73. What is Inverse Condemnation? How is it different from payment of damages?

It is an action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency. It has the objective to
recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no formal exercise of the power
of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. As regard damages, inverse condemnation, on
one hand, is an action to recover, while on the other hand, payment for damages is predicated on statutory
enactments and emanates from a transgression of a right. (National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011)
74. Requisites for valid taking.
a. The expropriator must enter a private property;

b. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
c. The entry must be under warrant or color of authority;
d. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
e. The utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Castelvi, G.R. No. L-20620,
August 15, 1974)
75. X’s lot was taken by the government in line with the road-widening project in Manila in 1981.
Upon full payment to him in 1983, he alleges that the amount paid was insufficient as the valuation
should be based on the value of the lot when the payment is made. Is he right with his contention?
No. For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
(City of Iloilo vs. Contreras-Besana, G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of
the Philippines vs. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the
Philippines vs. Heirs of Maximo Puyat, G.R. No. 175055, June 27, 2012 [J. Del Castillo]; National Power
Corporation vs. Zabala, G.R. No. 173520, January 30, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Department of Agrarian
Reform vs. Galle, G.R. No. 171836, August 11, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; National Power Corporation vs.
Samar, G.R. No. 197329, September 8, 2014 [J. Del Castillo]; Spouses Mercado vs. Landbank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015 [J. Del Castillo]; Landbank of the Philippines vs. Spouses
Chu, G.R. No. 192345, March 29, 2017 [J. Del Castillo])
a. What are the factors that should be considered in determining just compensation in
expropriation cases under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law?
1. Cost of acquisition of the land

2. Current value of the like properties

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3. Its nature, actual use, and income
4. Sworn valuation by the owner
5. Tax Declarations
6. Assessment made by government assessors
7. Social and economic benefits contributed by farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property
8. Non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said loan. (Sec. 17, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Department of Agrarian
Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998)
76. Expansive concept of “Public Use” in Power of Expropriation.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that
is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit (of the public)." If the
genuine public necessity – the very reason or condition as it were – allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws. The expropriator should commit
to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the Petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another Petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return
the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. (Vda. de Ouano vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168770, February 9, 2011)
77. X was granted a franchise by several Municipal Councils and the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Province of Laguna. Upon
enactment of the Local Government Code, the Provincial Governments issued a tax ordinance
imposing franchise tax. X paid under protest and claims for refund because of the duplicity with an
existing law. X contend that the imposition of franchise tax under the provincial ordinance is
violative of the non-impairment clause since the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the
National Government already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance.
Is X correct?
No. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution. Sec. 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is explicit that no franchise for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted, except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires. (Manila
Electric Company vs. Province of Laguna, G.R. No. 13159, May 5, 1999)
78. What are the aspects of due process and its requisites?
a. Substantive – serves as a restriction on government’s lawmaking and rule-making power. Its

requisites are: (a) the interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the intervention of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals;
b. Procedural – serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of

government. See table below for its requisites. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
79. Requisites of Procedural Due Process in different proceedings.

TYPE REQUISITES

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Judicial Proceedings a. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the Defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceedings;
c. The Defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. The judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. (El Banco Español-Filipino vs.
Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918)
Administrative and a. There must be a right to a hearing;
Quasi-Judicial b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
Proceedings
c. The decision must have something to support itself;
d. The evidence must be substantial;
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or, at least,
contained in the record and disclosed to parties;
f. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
g. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decision. (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R.
No. L-46496, February 27, 1940)
Disciplinary sanctions in a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
schools against them;
b. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance
of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. (Guzman vs.
National University, G.R. No. L-6828, July 11, 1986)
80. State the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine.

A law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. (Spouses Romualdez v. Commission and Elections, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008)
81. Requisites for valid classification.
a. Substantial distinctions which make for real differences;

b. Germane to the purpose of the law;
c. Not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law, 2016)
82. Levels of scrutiny used by the courts in reviewing the constitutionality of a classification embodied
in a law.
a. Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny – the challenged classification needs only be shown to be
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;
b. Middle-Tier or Intermediate Scrutiny – the government must show that the challenged
classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is, at least, substantially
related to serving that interest; and
c. Strict Judicial Scrutiny – a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is

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presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. (Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009)
83. After several Committee Hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 to impose a ban against aerial spraying as
an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. The City Mayor approved the
Ordinance and took effect after its publication in a newspaper circulating in Davao City. The Pilipino
Banana Growers and Exporters’ Association and its members, filed a Petition in the Regional Trial
Court to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance for being violative of, among others, Equal
Protection Clause when (a) it prohibits the use of aerial spray per se regardless of the substance or
the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and (b) it imposes the 30-meter buffer zone
in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of sizes of the landholding. Is it unconstitutional?
Yes. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the Ordinance seeks to achieve. In the
process, the Ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically
“underinclusive” with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end
because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law. Further, the establishment and maintenance of the
buffer zone will become more burdensome to the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to
reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be identified through Global
Positioning System; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for
submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated
therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being
grown therein. (Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters’ Association, G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016)
84. Define zones of privacy.

Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible, unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard accorded to these zones arises not only from the conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men", but also
from the adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks. (In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Camilo L. Sabio vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006)
a. What are the zones of privacy identified in the 1987 Constitution?
1. Sec. 2, Art. III: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.
2. Sec. 3, Art. III: Renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and

correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
85. What is a scatter-shot warrant? Is it valid?

Where a search warrant charged violations of two (2) special laws, it was considered a scatter-shot warrant,
and was declared null and void. Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of Rules of Court prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specific offense. (Tambasen vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 89103, July
14, 1995)
a. Does it have exception?

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Yes. In People of the Philippines vs. Dichoso (G.R. No. 101216-18, June 4, 1993), it was held that
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of offenses
which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species; thus, one search warrant
may be validly issued for several violations thereof. This is reiterated in People of the Philippines
vs. Salanguit (G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001).
86. What are the instances of valid warrantless arrest?
a. In flagrante delicto: When, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (Sec. 5[a], Rule 113,
Rules of Court);
b. Hot Pursuit Doctrine: When an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has committed it. (Sec. 5[b], Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court);
c. Escape Rule: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Sec. 5c, Rule
113, Rules of Court);
d. Abscond Rule: An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant
if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is
pending. (Sec. 23[2], Rule 114, Rules of Court); and
e. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 130644,
March 13, 1998)
87. What are the instances of valid warrantless search?
a. When the right is voluntarily waived (People of the Philippines vs. Omaweng, G.R. No. 99050,
September 2, 1992);
b. Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court);
c. Search of vessels and aircraft (People of the Philippines vs. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December
18, 2000);
d. Search of moving vehicles (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002);
and
e. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances (Spouses Veroy vs. Layague, G.R.
No. L-95630, June 18, 1992)
88. What is “Stop and Frisk”?

In the landmark United States case, Terry vs. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]), it was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may be
afoot. In People of the Philippines vs. Sy Chua (G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003), the Supreme
Court said that for a “stop and frisk” situation, the police officer should properly introduced himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in
order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer
must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband and concealed about
him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle
to apply.
89. State the Plain View Doctrine.

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Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It is usually applied where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the Accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating object. It has
the following requisites: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who has the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d)
“plain view” justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search. (People of the Philippines vs.
Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993)
90. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Cardo Dalisay went to X’s residence, introduced himself to the latter,
informed him of his authority and purpose, and showed him a search warrant. However, SPO1
Dalisay was denied entrance. In this light, SPO1 Dalisay broke in and conducted his search. X filed a
case contending that the search was unlawful. Is X correct?
No. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein. (People of the Philippines vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No. 139301,
September 29, 2004)
91. X was riding a jeepney on his way home when the jeepney driver, in a checkpoint, made a signal to
the police informing the latter that X was carrying marijuana. The police officer approached X and
asked about the contents of his bag. When asked if the police can open his bag, X kept his silence.
When asked for the bag, X handed it to the police. Thereafter, the police saw marijuana; hence, X
was arrested. Was there a valid search?
No. The situation does not fall under the conditions where a warrantless search is allowed. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the
person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement
upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects. (People of the Philippines vs. Cogaed, G.R.
No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
92. X’s counsel wants to admit into evidence an audio recording involving X and Y in a heated
discussion. Y’s counsel contested this because Y did not know that their conversation was being
recorded. However, X’s counsel argued that only one party’s consent is needed for the recording to be
admissible. Is X’s counsel correct?
No. The Anti-Wiretapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) provides that all parties in a private
communication need to give their consent for it to be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative hearing or investigation. Further, the exclusionary rule as enshrined in Sec.
3(1)(2), Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, prohibits the admission of pieces of evidence that are
in violation of the privacy of communications in any proceeding. (Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110062, August 4, 1994)
93. AB Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Spouses A and B) filed a case for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the Spouses
X and Y. The Spouses A and B claimed that Spouses X and Y constructed a fence without a valid
permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack
of evidence. So in order to get pieces of evidence for the case, Spouses A and B illegally set-up two (2)
video surveillance cameras facing Spouses X and Y’s property. The former’s employees even took
pictures of the said construction of the fence. Spouses X and Y then filed a case against the Spouses A
and B for violating their right to privacy. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an order granting
the application and directed Spouses A and B to remove the video surveillance cameras they
installed. Spouses A and B appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which annulled and set aside
the RTC Decision. Spouses X and Y elevated the case to the Supreme Court with this legal question:
Is the installation of the two video surveillance cameras of Spouses A and B violated their right to
privacy?

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Yes. Such act of the Spouses A and B violated the right of privacy of Spouses X and Y under Art. 26(1) of
the Civil Code prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. (Spouses Hing
vs. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
94. Distinguish Content-Based Regulations from Content-Neutral Regulations.

On one hand, under the content-based regulations, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, extremely serious, and the degree of imminence is extremely high. Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. On the other hand, content-neutral
regulations are concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, and
manner. It must pass the substantial interest test. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
95. X contends that Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 violates the due process and eminent domain provision
of the 1987 Constitution, by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without
payment of just compensation. He further claims that the primary source of revenue of radio and
television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers, and that to require these stations to provide
free airtime is to authorize taking which is not a “de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property”. Is X correct?
No. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
(Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
132922, April 21, 1998)
96. X, a senatorial candidate, filed a Complaint before the court alleging the unconstitutionality of Sec.
9(a) of Resolution No. 9615 of the Commission on Elections limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisement of candidates and political parties for national elections to an aggregate total of 120
minutes and 180 minutes, respectively. He contends that such restrictive regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage, as well as their
right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections. Is X correct?
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits
– leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut
basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. (GMA Network vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
97. Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Tuwid na Daan” of a religious group were
rated “X” – that is, not for public viewing – by the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board. This TV program allegedly offended and constituted an attack against other religions, which
is expressly prohibited by law. The religious group which airs the said program filed a case in court
alleging that there is grave abuse of discretion in classifying their program as X-Rated. Is their
contention correct?
Yes. The Supreme Court, in finding grave abuse of discretion, gave the following reasons:
a. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted

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with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
b. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some
of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs.
c. The MTRCB rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious
program. Even a side-glance at the relevant law will reveal that it is not among the grounds to
justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television program. It runs smack against the hoary
doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law
they seek to enforce.
d. In x-rating the TV program, the court and the MTRCB failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule. The records show that the decision of the MTRCB is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. (Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996)
98. Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile filed a case against Ayer Productions for the projected production and
filming of “The Four Day Revolution”, which relates to the non-bloody change of government that
took place at EDSA, for its intrusion upon his right to privacy. Is the projected motion under the
guaranty of protected speech?
No. The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of freedom of expression over Sen. Enrile’s right to privacy
because he was a “public figure” and a public figure’s right to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen. Besides, the movie “A Dangerous Life” would not have been historically faithful without including
therein the participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution. Thus, the intrusion into Enrile’s right to privacy
is not unreasonable. (Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988)
99. State the Overbreadth Doctrine.

The Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001)
100. Briefly discuss the following:
a. Gag Law – it was inappropriate to bar media reporting on a criminal case prior to the trial itself,
except in matters where a "clear and present danger" existed that would impede the process of a
fair trial. (Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 [1976])
b. Sub Judice Rule – restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. It applies
not only to the parties to the case, but also to the public in general, including the media. (Romero
et al. vs. Estrada et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009)
c. Shield Law (Republic Act No. 1477) – designed to shield journalists from being forced to reveal
the sources of information they gathered or obtained in confidence.
101. Basic guidelines of obscenity.
a. Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;

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b. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and
c. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
(Miller vs. California, 413 U.S. 15, June 21, 1973 cited in Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 159751, December 6, 2006)
102. Requirements for the protection of commercial speech.
a. The speech must not be false or misleading or proposing an illegal activity.

b. The governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must be substantial.
c. The regulation must directly advance the governmental interest.
d. The regulation must not be overboard. (Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 US 557 [1980])
103. X posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH LAW!”, referring to the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law; and the second tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote”
and lists candidates as either “Anti-RH/Team Buhay” with a check-mark, or “Pro-RH/Team
Patay” with an x-mark, clearly referring to how the politicians vote on the adoption of the RH
Law. Can the Commission on Elections assume jurisdiction on the matter?
No. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted
"in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. (Diocese of Bacolod vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
104. X, a chief of an executive agency, filed and charged Y, author/writer, with the crime of libel
because the latter wrote an article indicating the former as an extortionist, a corrupt public official,
smuggler, and having acquired his wealth illegally. Y contested that her article is protected as
qualified privileged communication and should not be convicted with libel. Is Y correct?
No. The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was
clearly abandoned by Y when she wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest
mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating her responsibility to verify her story and instead
misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their
profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may
make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of
responsibility. (Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008)
105. The host of a prime-time show – rated “G” for general viewership – managed by a certain
religious group made obscene remarks against members of another religious group. Offended by
these remarks, some members and officials of the latter religious group went to the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) to ask for the former’s television program.
The MTRCB granted their prayer. Aggrieved with the suspension, the former religious group filed
a case contending that the State cannot regulate one’s right. Is the contention correct?
No. The suspension of the television program did not constitute prior restraint, but partook of the nature
of subsequent punishment for statements which were contextually violative of the program’s “G” rating
that should be suitable for all ages. The vulgar language used on prime time television was inappropriate
for children. (Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)
106. Briefly discuss Heckler’s Veto.

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Under the Free Speech Clause (Sec. 4, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution), the government may not silence
speech based on the reaction (or anticipated reaction) of a hostile audience, unless there is a "clear and
present danger" of grave and imminent harm.
107. Rule on Right to Assemble.

If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required. But the power of local officials in this regard is merely one of regulation,
not prohibition. However, a permit to hold a public assembly shall not be necessary where the meeting is
to be held (a) in a private place, (b) in the campus of a government-owned or –operated educational
institution, or (c) in a freedom park. Where permit is required, the written application shall be filed with
the Mayor’s office at least five (5) days before the scheduled meeting and shall be acted upon within two
(2) days, otherwise the permit shall be deemed granted. Denial of the permit may be justified only upon
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, safety, convenience, morals, or health. Action on the application shall be communicated within 24
hours to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the appropriate court. The law permits law
enforcement to detail a contingent under a responsible officer at least 100 meters away from the
assembly, in case it becomes necessary to maintain order. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law,
2016)
108. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an
organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), as a party list based on moral grounds, saying that it is in
violation of the principles laid down in the Bible and the Koran. Can the COMELEC refuse
recognition on the aforesaid ground without violating constitutional precepts?
No. The non-establishment clause calls for government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It was a
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission
on Elections (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. De Castillo])
109. Exceptions to the Non-Establishment Clause.
a. Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious
purposes (Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution);
b. Citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established by

religious groups and mission boards (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution);
c. Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools (Sec. 3[3], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution); and
d. Appropriation allowed where minister or ecclesiastic is employed in the armed forces, in a penal
institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 29[2], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
110. What is Benevolent Neutrality Approach?

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
(Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. Del
Castillo])

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111. State the Lemon Test.
The Supreme Court, citing Lemon vs. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 [1971]), said that a regulation is
constitutional when (a) it has a secular legislative purpose; (b) it neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (c) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
112. Do students have the right to not participate in a flag ceremony?

Yes. However, the students’ right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to
disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, the
Supreme Court does not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any legitimate public
interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent. (Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools
of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993)
113. X inherited a piece of land that was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have
been the birth site of Felix Manolo, the founder of Ang Tuwid na Daan. NHI issued a Resolution
declaring it to be a National Historical Landmark. Later, the State filed an action to expropriate
the land. Julio filed a Complaint alleging that the expropriation should not proceed as the act
would constitute an application of public funds in favor of a religious group which is contrary to
constitutional mandate on the Separation of Church and State. Is Julio correct with his contention?
No. The purpose is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than
by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property
does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. (Manosca vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996)
114. Justice X initiated the holding of masses in the Hall of Justice. Justice Y filed a Complaint
against the former contending that such act is unconstitutional being that the separation of the
Church and State should be inviolable. Is Justice Y correct?
No. The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and
State. The 1987 Constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if
further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each
other. (In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7, 2017)
115. Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local government units in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
Ordinances with respect to curfew for minors through police operations. Petitioners filed a Petition
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because, among others, it deprive minors
the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process. Are they correct?
No. Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence
provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. The stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably
serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce
the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As

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to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law", our legal system is replete with
laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children. (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan et al. vs. Quezon City et al., G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
a. What are the restrictions to right to travel?
a. Interest of national security;

b. Public safety; and
c. Public health. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July
18, 2012)
In Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986), the Supreme Court held that
a lawful order is also a valid restriction on the right to travel.
116. Reconcile the cases of Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) and Kilusang Mayo Uno vs.
National Economic Development Authority Director-General (G.R. No. 167789, April 19, 2006) in
relation to National ID System vis-à-vis right to privacy.
On one hand, in Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998), the Supreme Court ruled that the
Administrative Order No. 308, which establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System, was a violation of the right to privacy because it does not provide in clear and
categorical terms how the information to be gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data, under what circumstances, and for what purpose. It falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. On the other hand, in Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. National Economic
Development Authority Director-General (G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006), the Supreme Court ruled
that no constitutional infirmity on the right of privacy was shown by Executive Order No. 420, which
streamlines and harmonizes the existing ID system within each government agency. It limits the data to
be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system, and it applies only to government entities that
already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. It
does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.
117. What are some of the recognized exception on the right to information?
a. In Chavez vs. Philippine Commission on Good Governance (G.R. No. 130716, December 9,
1998), the Supreme Court ruled that there is a privilege against disclosure on certain matters
involving State secrets regarding the military, diplomatic, and other national security matters.
b. In Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), the Supreme Court ruled
that secrets involving military, diplomatic, and national security matters, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were
exempted from the right to information. The right to information does not also extend to
presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussion in closed-door cabinet meetings.
c. Executive Order No. 02, series of 2016 categorized the recognized exceptions submitted by the
Department of Justice and Office of Solicitor General as follows: (a) information covered by
Executive Privilege; (b) privileged information relating to national security, defense, or
international relations; (c) information concerning law enforcement and protection of public and
personal safety; (d) information deemed confidential for the protection of the privacy of persons
and certain individuals, such as minors, victims of crimes, or the accused; (e) information,
documents, or records known by reason of official capacity and are deemed as confidential,
including those submitted or disclosed by entities to government agencies, tribunals, board, or
officers, in relation to the performance of their functions, or to inquiries or investigation conducted
by them in the exercise of their administrative, regulatory, or quasi-judicial powers; (f) prejudicial
premature disclosure; (g) records of proceedings or information from proceedings which, pursuant
to law or relevant rules and regulation, are treated as confidential or privileged; (h) matters
considered confidential under banking and finance laws, and their amendatory laws; and (i) other
exceptions to the right to information under laws, jurisprudence, and implementing rules and

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regulations.
118. State the Doctrine of Prejudicial Publicity.

To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (Webb vs. De Leon, G.R.
No. 121234, August 23, 1995 citing Martelino vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894, March 25, 1970)
119. When is there substantial impairment in relation to Non-Impairment Clause?

There is substantial impairment (a) when the law changes the terms of a legal contract between the
parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or (b) imposes new conditions, or (c) dispenses with
those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.
(Clements vs. Nolting, G.R. No. L-17959, January 24, 1922)
120. X was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses
for the prosecution was Y, a barangay tanod. Y testified that after his assistance was sought earlier,
he proceeded to X’s house and found that the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited X to
the police station, to which X obliged. At the police outpost, X admitted to him that he raped his
daughter. The confession was offered in court. X contested the admissibility in evidence of his
alleged confession with Y, arguing that even if he, indeed, confessed to Y the confession, the same
was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer, and there was no valid
waiver of such requirement. Rule on the admissibility of X’s confession.
It is inadmissible. Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 7438 provides that any extrajudicial confession made by
a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person
in the presence of his counsel, or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any
of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
121. During a nationwide broadcast of controversial interview conducted by ABC News Reporter X,
Y confessed that he killed a family of five. Two (2) days after the interview, he was arrested and
brought into questioning where he said same things as in the interview. His confession was put into
writing and he signed the same attesting that he was not coerced and he fully understood the
gravity of his actions. He was charged and convicted of the appropriate offense. Did the court
correctly admit the confession into evidence?
No. Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession to be
admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be
voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must be in writing. Among all these
requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to adequately
protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense. (People of the Philippines vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154,
June 29, 2000)
122. Distinguish bail as a matter of right from bail as a matter of discretion.

BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BAIL AS A MATTER OF
DISCRETION
Before conviction a. Cases filed before the a. Cases filed before the Regional
Metropolitan Trial Court, Trial Court of an offense
Municipal Trial Court, and punishable by death, reclusion

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Municipal Circuit Trial Court; perpetua, or life imprisonment
and depending if the evidence of
b. Cases filed before Regional guilt is strong;
Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment
After conviction a. Cases filed before the a. Cases filed before the Regional
Metropolitan Trial Court, Trial Court for offenses not
Municipal Trial Court, and punishable by death, reclusion
Municipal Circuit Trial Court; perpetua, or life imprisonment;
b. Accused convicted by Regional b. Cases filed before the Regional
Trial Court, but the penalty Trial Court if the penalty
imposed does not exceed six imposed is imprisonment
(6) years and the judgment is exceeding six (6) years,
not yet final. provided none of the
circumstances enumerated in
Sec. 5(3), Rule 114 are present.
(Padilla vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121917, July 31, 1996)
c. When the accused is charged with
a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment,
and evidence of guilt is not
strong. (Sec. 7, Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Court)
123. On June 5, 2014, Sen. X was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund Scam. Initially, Sen. X, in an
Omnibus Motion, requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a
warrant for Sen. X's arrest was issued, leading to his voluntary surrender. He again asked the
Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender and that he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. Was the Sandiganbayan correct in denying his motion?
No. The Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age
of Enrile. His social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. Further, bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. (Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015)
124. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were charged with violation of Articles
of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). They were
questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a Motion to Bail was filed
but was denied. They applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court
which was granted. However, the Court Marshall refused to release them for provisional liberty
pending the resolution of the appeal he has taken before the court invoking that military officers
are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered
reiterating the release for provisional liberty of the AFP members with the court stating that there
is a mistake in the presumption of the Court Marshall that bail does not apply among military men
facing court martial proceeding. Is the Court Marshall’s argument meritorious?
Yes. The bail invoked by Petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military

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where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military
and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will
be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the
government. (Commendador vs. De Villa, G.R No. 93177, August 2, 1991; Arula vs. Espino, G.R. No. L-
28949, June 23, 1969)
125. Auditors of ABC Bank conducted an audit where they found some questionable transactions. X,
an employee of the bank, was summoned by the Vice President for an administrative hearing.
When he arrived, he was surprised to see that there were other people in the Office of the Vice
President: two lawyers and two policemen. He was asked to sign a written statement and was
threatened to be brought to the precinct should he not sign, so he signed it. The paper he signed
turned out to be a confession. During trial, his counsel contends that the written statement should
be declared inadmissible for X was deprived of his rights in a custodial investigation. Is X’s counsel
correct?
No. The rights of a person to remain silent, have competent and independent counsel and to be informed
of the two mentioned are present only in custodial investigation. Such rights are not present in an
administrative investigation. (Tanenggee vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013)
126. What judicial action may the Supreme Court perform if the President suspends the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus or declare Martial Law?
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
127. Can a writ of amparo be issued without government acquiescence?

No. A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be
held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. (Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No.
184467, June 19, 2012 [J. Del Castillo])
128. What is the Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation in relation to Writ of Kalikasan?
Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation (SLAPP) is a legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take
in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental
rights. (Sec. 1, Rule 6, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
129. What are the immunities that may be granted to a witness?
a. Transactional Immunity – that which may be granted by the Commission on Human Tights to
any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, which
makes the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates (Sec. 18[8], Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution);
b. Use and Fruit Immunity – prohibits the use of witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. (Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R.
No. 71208-09, August 30, 1985)
130. Exceptions to the prohibition of involuntary servitude.

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a. Punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted;
b. Service in defense of the State (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1987 Constitution; People of the Philippines vs.
Zosa, G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938);
c. Naval (merchant marine) enlistment (Robertson vs. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 [1897]);
d. Posse comitatus or the obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good
order of his community (United States vs. Pompeya, G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915);
e. Return-to-Work Order in industries affected with public interests (Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa
sa Kahoy vs. Gotamco Sawmill, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948);
f. Patria potestas (Art. 311, Civil Code of the Philippines);

g. Compulsory overtime work (Art. 89, Labor Code of the Philippines); and
h. Working on a rest day (Art. 92, Labor Code of the Philippines)
131. Requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach.
a. A valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the
crime charged;
b. A competent court of competent jurisdiction;

c. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
d. The accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
(Chiok vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015)
132. Kinds of ex-post facto law.
a. Every law that makes criminal an action done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such action.
b. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed.
c. Every law that changes punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed.
d. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.
e. Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
or the deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.
f. Every law which deprives persons accused of a crime some lawful protection to which they have
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
133. Define the following:
a. Bill of Attainder – It is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. (People of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)
b. Bill of Pains and Penalties – It is a special act of the legislature which inflicts a punishment less
than death upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses. (People of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)

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VIII. CITIZENSHIP
134. Comparison of 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution vis-à-vis Citizenship.

1935 CONSTITUTION 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION
a. Those who are citizens of the a. Those who are citizens of the a. Those who are citizens of the
Philippine Islands at the time Philippines at the time of the Philippines at the time of the
of the adoption of this adoption of this Constitution. adoption of this Constitution;
Constitution. b. Those whose fathers and b. Those whose fathers or
b. Those born in the Philippine mothers are citizens of the mothers are citizens of the
Islands of foreign parents Philippines. Philippines;
who, before the adoption of c. Those who elect Philippine c. Those born before January 17,
this Constitution, had been citizenship pursuant to the 1973, of Filipino mothers,
elected to public office in the provisions of the who elect Philippine
Philippine Islands. Constitution of nineteen citizenship upon reaching the
c. Those whose fathers are hundred and thirty-five. age of majority; and
citizens of the Philippines. d. Those who are naturalized in d. Those who are naturalized in
d. Those whose mothers are accordance with law. (Sec. 1, accordance with law. (Sec. 1,
citizens of the Philippines Art. III) Art. IV)
and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
e. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. (Sec. 1,
Art. IV)
N.B.: The following persons were

citizens of the Philippines on May 14,
1935, the date of the adoption of the
1935 Constitution:
a. Persons born in the Philippine

Islands who resided therein
on April 11, 1899 and were
Spanish subjects on that
date, unless they had lost
their Philippine citizenship
on or before May 14, 1935.
b. Natives of the Spanish
Peninsula who resided in the
Philippines on April 11,
1899, and who did not
declare their intention of
preserving their Spanish
nationality between that date
and October 11, 1900, unless
they had lost their Philippine
citizenship on or before May
14, 1935.
c. Naturalized citizens of Spain
who resided in the
Philippines on April 11,
1899, and did not declare
their intention to preserve
their Spanish nationality
within the prescribed period
(up to October 11, 1900).
d. Children born of (a), (b) and
(c) subsequent to April 11,
1899, unless they lost their
Philippine citizenship on or

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before May 14, 1935.
e. Persons who became
naturalized citizens of the
Philippines in accordance of
naturalization law since its
enactment on March 26,
1920.
135. X was born to a Filipina mother on February 14, 1973. He elected Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority – which was obviously done after January 17, 1973. Is X a natural-
born Filipino citizen even if he did not elect Filipino citizenship prior January 17, 1973?
Yes. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to
equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born
Filipino citizens. Those born to Filipino mothers prior to January 17, 1973 must still elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The
election may be made before or after January 17, 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance
with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution to protect and enhance the people’s individual interests,
and to foster equality among Filipinos. (Co vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
92191-92, July 30, 1991)
136. Who are natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution?

Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with Paragraph
(3) of Sec. 1, Art. IV shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)
It includes:
a. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines, under the jus sanguinis principle;
b. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching majority age;
c. Those former natural born citizens who reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation;
d. Foundlings who, as a class, are treated by law as natural-born citizens. (Poe-Llamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 [J. Del Castillo])
137. How did the Supreme Court treat foundlings?

The Supreme Court pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural born-citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens. Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Art. 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness (Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March
8, 2016 [J. Del Castillo])
138. Modes of acquiring, losing, and re-acquiring citizenship.

ACQUIRE LOSE RE-ACQUIRE
a. By birth; a. By naturalization in a foreign a. Under Republic Act No. 9225,
b. By naturalization: (i) Direct country; by taking the Oath of
Naturalization; (ii) Derivative b. By express renunciation of Allegiance;

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Naturalization; and citizenship; b. By judicial or legislative
c. By marriage c. By subscribing to an oath of naturalization; and
allegiance to support the c. By repatriation of deserters of
Constitution or laws of a the Army, Navy, or Air
foreign country upon attaining Corps. (Nachura, Outline
21 years of age; Reviewer in Political Law,
d. By rendering service to or 2016)
accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign
country;
e. By cancellation of the
Certificate of Naturalization;
and
f. By having been declared by
competent authority a deserter
of the Philippine armed forces
in time of war.
139. Modes of acquiring citizenship by direct naturalization.
a. Administrative Naturalization (pursuant to Republic Act No. 9139);

b. Judicial Naturalization (pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473);
c. Legislative Naturalizations in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien;
d. Collective change of nationality as a result of cession or subjugation;

e. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the state where they are born.
140. Modes of acquiring citizenship by indirect naturalization.

Citizenship conferred on (a) wife of naturalized husband; (b) minor children of naturalized person; or (c)
alien woman upon marriage to a national. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
141. Qualifications, Disqualifications, and Ground for Denaturalization under Commonwealth Act
No. 473 (Judicial Naturalization).
QUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATIONS GROUNDS FOR

DENATURALIZATION
a. Not less than 21 years of age a. Opposed to organized a. Naturalization certificate is
on the date of the hearing of government or affiliated obtained fraudulently or
the Petition; with any association or illegally;
b. Resided in the Philippines for group of persons who b. If, within five (5) years, he
a continuous period of not uphold and teach doctrines returns to his native
less than ten (10) years. The opposing all organized country or to some foreign
period may be reduced to governments; country and establishes
five (5) years if he (a) b. Defending or teaching the residence there, provided
honorably held office in necessity or propriety of that one-year stay in
Government; (b) established violence, personal assault, native country, or two-
a new industry or introduced or assassination for the year stay in a foreign
a useful invention in the success or predominance of country, shall be prima
Philippines; (c) married to a their ideas; facie evidence of intent to
Filipino woman; (d) been c. Polygamists or believes in take up residence in the
engaged as a teacher in the polygamy; same;
Philippines (in a public or d. Convicted of a crime c. Petition was made on an
private school not involving moral turpitude; invalid declaration of
established for the exclusive intention;
e. Suffering from mental

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instruction of persons of a alienation or incurable d. Minor children failed to
particular nationality or contagious disease; who, graduate through the fault
race) or in any of the during the period of their of the parents either by
branches of education or residence in the Philippines, neglecting to support them
industry for a period of not have not mingled socially or by transferring them to
less than two (2) years; (e) with the Filipinos, or who another school; and
was born in the Philippines; have not evinced a sincere e. Allowed himself to be used
c. Good moral character; desire to learn and embrace as dummy.
believes in the principles the customs, traditions, and
underlying the Philippine ideals of the Filipinos;
If the ground for denaturalization
Constitution; must have f. Citizens or subjects of nations affects the intrinsic validity of the
conducted himself in a with whom the Philippines proceedings, the denaturalization
proper and irreproachable is at war during the period shall divest the wife and children of
manner during the entire of such war; and their derivative naturalization. But if
period of his residence in g. Citizens or subjects of a the ground was personal to the
the Philippines in his foreign country whose laws denaturalized Filipino, his wife and
relations with the do not grant Filipinos the children shall retain their Philippine
constituted government as right to become naturalized citizenship. (Nachura, Outline
the community in which he citizens or subjects thereof. Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
is living;
d. Own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less
than Php 5,000.00, or must
have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
e. Speak and write English or
Spanish and any of the
principal Philippine
languages; and
f. Enrolled his minor children of
school age in any of the
public or private schools
recognized by the
government where
Philippine history,
government, and civics are
taught as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire
period of residence in the
Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his
Petition for Naturalization.
142. Effects of naturalization.
a. Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized (Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971);
b. Minor children born in the Philippines before the naturalization shall be considered citizens of the
Philippines;
c. Minor child born outside the Philippines who was residing in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization shall be considered a Filipino citizen;
d. Minor child born outside the Philippines before parent’s naturalization shall be considered Filipino
citizen inly during minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines;
e. Child born outside the Philippines after parent’s naturalization shall be considered a Filipino,
provided that he registers as such before any Philippine consulate within one year after attaining
majority age, and tales his oath of allegiance. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
143. What does the phrase “lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” signify?

Page 44 of 99
The qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that
the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income
should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with
the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Lao, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012 [J. Del Castillo];
Republic of the Philippines vs. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013 [J. Del Castillo]; Republic of
the Philippines vs. Huang Te Fu, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
144. Qualifications, Disqualifications, and Grounds for Cancellation of Certificate of Naturalization

under Republic Act No. 9139 (Administrative Naturalization)
QUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATIONS GROUNDS FOR

CANCELLATION
a. Born in the Philippines and a. Opposed to organized a. If the naturalized person or
residing therein since birth; government or affiliated his duly authorized
b. Not be less than 18 years of with any association or representative made any
age at the time of filing group of persons who false statement or
his/her Petition; uphold and teach doctrines misrepresentation, or
c. Of good moral character and opposing all organized committed any violation of
believes in the underlying governments; law, rules, and regulations
principles of the b. Defending or teaching the in connection with the
Constitution and must have necessity or propriety of Petition, or if he obtains
conducted himself/herself violence, personal assault, Philippine citizenship
in a proper and or assassination for the fraudulently or illegally;
reproachable manner success or predominance of b. If, within five (5) years, he
during his/her entire period their ideas; shall establish permanent
of residence in the c. Polygamists or believes in residence in a foreign
Philippines in his relations polygamy; country, provided that
with the duly constituted d. Convicted of a crime remaining for more than
government as well as the involving moral turpitude; one (1) year in his country
community in which he/she of origin or two years in
e. Suffering from mental
is living; any foreign country shall be
alienation or incurable
d. Have received his/her prima facie evidence of
contagious disease; who,
primary and secondary intent to permanently reside
during the period of their
education in any public or therein;
residence in the Philippines,
private educational have not mingled socially c. If he allowed himself or his
institution duly recognized with the Filipinos, or who wife or child with acquired
by the Department of have not evinced a sincere citizenship to be used as
Education, where desire to learn and embrace dummy; and
Philippine history, the customs, traditions, and d. If he, his wife, or his child
government, and civic are ideals of the Filipinos; with acquired citizenship
taught and prescribed as f. Citizens or subjects of nations commits any act inimical to
part of the school with whom the Philippines national security. (Nachura,
curriculum and where is at war during the period Outline Reviewer in
enrolment is not limited to of such war; and Political Law, 2016)
any race or nationality,
g. Citizens or subjects of a
provided that should he/she
foreign country whose laws
have minor children of
do not grant Filipinos the
school age, he/she must
right to become naturalized
have enrolled them in
citizens or subjects thereof.
similar schools;
e. Have a known trade,
business, profession, or
lawful occupation, from
which he/she derives
income sufficient for
his/her support and that of
his/her family;
f. Be able to read, write, and
speak Filipino or any of the

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dialects in the Philippines;
and
g. Have mingled with the
Filipinos and evinced a
sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs and
traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people.
145. What are the age requirements for Administrative Naturalization (under Republic Act No. 9139)
and Judicial Naturalization (under Commonwealth Act No. 473)?
On one hand, the rule for Administrative Naturalization (under Republic Act No. 9139) is that the
applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of filing his/her petition. It covers
native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country, and all
along thought they were Filipino; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity
to the customs and traditions. On the other hand, the rule for Judicial Naturalization is that the applicant
must be twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of the hearing of the Petition. It covers all aliens
regardless of class. (So vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007)
146. Distinguish Dual Citizenship from Dual Allegiance.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Definition Arises when, as a result of concurrent A situation in which a person
application of the different laws of simultaneously owes, by some
two or more states, a person is positive act, loyalty to two or more
simultaneously considered a national states. It is a result of an individual’s
by the said states. violation.
Application of law May arise from as a consequence of Inimical to the national interest and
different laws or mode of acquiring shall be dealt by law (Sec. 5, Art. IV,
citizenship. 1987 Constitution)
147. State the Principle of Effective or Active Nationality.

If a person has more than one nationality, he shall, within a third State, be treated as if he had only one;
the third State shall recognize exclusively either the nationality of the State in which he is habitually and
principally resident, or the nationality of the State with which he appears in fact to be most closely
connected. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2014)
148. State the Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance.

An individual may be compelled by municipal law to retain his original nationality even if he has already
renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose nationality he has acquired. (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
149. Who are qualified for repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171?
Republic Act No. 8171 (lapsed into law on October 23, 1995) governs the repatriation of Filipino women
who may have lost Filipino citizenship by reason of marriage to aliens, as well as the repatriation of
former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity, including their minor children, provided the applicant is not a person:
a. opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

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b. defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for
the predominance of his ideas;
c. convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; or

d. suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. Repatriation is effected by taking
the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
150. X is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) and lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2009, he applied for repatriation under
Republic Act No. 9225, before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In 2009, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Mayor in Bustos, Bulacan, Y, another candidate for the same position, filed a Petition to disqualify
or to cancel X’s COC on the ground that the latter is a foreigner. To support his claim, Y presented
X’s travel record indicating that he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines even after renouncing his American citizenship. Is X disqualified from running?
Yes. X’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA, through using his US passport after the
renunciation of his USA citizenship, reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Sec. 40(d) of the Local
Government Code. A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. Even if it made no finding that X had
deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the
Commission on Elections could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility
under the Local Government Code. (Agustin vs. Commission on Election, G.R No. 207105, November
10, 2015)
IX. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
151. What does “public office is a public trust” mean?

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (In
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint on the Alleged Involvement and for Engaging in the Business of
Lending Money and Usurious Rates of Interests of Ms. Dolores T. Lopez, SC Judicial Staff Officer, and
Mr. Fernando M. Montalvo, SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, Checks Disbursement Division, Fiscal
Management, and Budget Office, A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014)
152. Elements of Public Office.
a. Created by law or by authority of law;

b. Possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government, to be exercised for the
benefit of the public;
c. Powers conferred and duties imposed must be defined, directly or impliedly, by eh legislature or
the legislative authority;
d. Duties must be performed independently and without the control of a superior power other than
the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the
legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a superior office or body; and
e. Must have permanence or continuity. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
153. Modes of acquiring title to public office.

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a. By appointment – the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
perform the functions of a given office (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law Review,
2016);
b. By election – the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period
and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of the government
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law Review, 2016); and
c. By being a de facto officer – one who has the reputation of being the officer that he assumes to
be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. (Torres vs. Ribo, G.R. No. L-2051, May 21, 1948)
154. Elements of De Facto Officers.
a. A validly existing public office;

b. Actual physical possession of said office;
c. Color of title to the public office. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
155. Distinguish De Facto Officer from De Jure Officer.

DE JURE OFFICER DE FACTO OFFICER
Basis Takes possession of an office based on Has possession of a public office
right. based on reputation.
Authority An officer who in all respects is Has possession and performs the
legally appointed or elected and duties under color of right without
qualified to exercise the office. being technically qualified in all
points of law to act.
Removal Cannot be removed in a direct May be ousted in a direct proceeding
proceeding against him by quo warranto.
Security of tenure Enjoys security of tenure. May be Does not enjoy security of tenure.
removed from office only with just May be removed from office even
cause. without just cause.
156. Distinguish De Facto Officer from a usurper.

DE FACTO OFFICER USURPER
Color Of right or title Has color of right or title to the office Has neither lawful title or color of
right or title
Public knowledge of lack of Assumes to exercise functions where Simply assumes to act as officer
authority public does not know his lack of title where the public knows he is such a
or authority usurper
Removal May be removed only in a direct Can be ousted at any time in any
proceeding against him proceeding
Validity of acts De facto officer’s acts done in the Usurper’s acts are absolutely null and
exercise of authority are valid in so void
far as the public is concerned
157. Disqualifications to hold public office under the Constitution.
a. No candidate who lost in an election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the Government. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-B)
b. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public

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office or position during his tenure. (Sec. 7[1], Art. IX-B)
c. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary function of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other position in Government. (Sec 7[2], Art. IX-B)
d. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. (Sec. 13, Art VII)
e. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations of their subsidiaries, during his term for which he was elected.
(Sec. 13, Art. VI; Adaza vs. Pacana, G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985)
f. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII; In Re:
Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as Member of Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988)
g. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment (Sec. 2, Art IX-A). The same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman and his
Deputies. (Sec. 8, Art. XI)
h. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office. (Sec. 11, Art. XI)
i. Members of constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment. (Sec.
1, Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art IX-C; Sec. 1, Art IX-D; Sec. 8, Art. IX)
j. Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed to a term
of seven (7) years, without reappointment. (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art IX-C; Sec. 1[2],
Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art XI)
k. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
158. Prohibitions for public officers or employees.
a. No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or political campaign. (Sec. 2[4], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
b. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. (Sec.
8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
c. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or –controlled bank or financial
institution to the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in
which they have controlling interest. (Sec. 16, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
d. No public officer or employee shall be assigned to perform clerical duties.

e. No detail or re-assignment shall be made within three (3) months before nay election without the
approval of the Commission on Elections.
f. All appointments made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the
chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are
prohibited. (Laurel V vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 71562, October 28, 1991)
159. Can a Reserved Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines engage in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign despite the constitutional prohibition to do so?

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No. Sec. 2, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Officers and employees in the Civil Service,
including members of the armed forces, shall not engage directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities or take part in any election except to vote." It was evident that the intention was to continue by
incorporation in the Constitution the then existing prohibition against officers and employees of the civil
service from engaging in political or electoral activities, except to vote, for the reason that public officers
and employees in the Civil Service "are servants of the State and not the agents of any political group".
(Cailes vs. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-45937 February 25, 1938)
160. Who should file his/her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth?
a. Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
b. Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President;
c. Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions;
d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the
President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
and
e. All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the
Civil Service Commission. (Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6713)
161. When should a public officer file his/her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth?
a. Within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

b. On or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
c. Within thirty (30) days after separation from the service. (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 6713)
162. Distinguish ministerial function from discretionary function.

MINISTERIAL DISCRETIONARY
As to discharge Discharge is imperative and it must be Public officer may do whichever way he
done by the public officer. wants provided it is in accordance with law
and must not be whimsical; otherwise it is
subject to judicial review.
Applicability of Can be compelled by mandamus. Cannot be compelled by mandamus except
Mandamus when there is a grave abuse of discretion.
Delegability Can be delegated. Cannot be delegated, unless otherwise
provided by law.
163. State the Next-in-Rank Rule.

When a vacancy occurs, employees next-in-rank should be considered for promotion (Sec. 21, Civil
Service Law). The person next-in-rank shall be given preference in promotion when the position
immediately above his is vacated. But the appointing authority still exercises discretion and is not bound
by this rule, although he is required the special reasons for not appointing the officer next-in-rank. This
means that the one who is next-in-rank is given only preferential consideration for promotion; but it does
not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. (Panis vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 102948, February 2, 1994)

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164. State the Automatic Reversion Rule.
All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by
the Civil Service Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher
position invalidates the promotion of those in the lower positions and automatically restores them to their
former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to payment of salaries for services actually
rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments. (Sec. 13, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292)
For this rule to apply, the following must concur: (a) there must be a series of promotions; (b) all
promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Civil Service Commission; and (c) the
Civil Service Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position. (Divinagracia
vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995)
165. Distinguish official immunity from state immunity.

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY STATE IMMUNITY
Consent Public officers of the government, in The state cannot be sued without its
the performance of their public consent.
functions, are not liable to third
persons, either for the misfeasance or
positive wrongs, or for the
nonfeasance, negligence or omissions
of duty of their official subordinates.
Scope Limited in scope. Protects only the Has a broad application. Protects the
public official in the performance of entire sovereign.
his governmental function.
Basis A protective aegis for public officials Rests upon the principle that the king
against tort liability arising from could do no wrong. Protects the entire
discretionary acts or functions in the government from any liability arising
performance of their official duties. from tort.
Nature Only a qualified immunity. Protection Absolute immunity
applies only to activities within the
scope of office that are made in good
faith and are not reckless, malicious,
or corrupt.
166. Modes of terminating official relationship.

Natural causes a. Expiration of the term or tenure of office;
b. Reaching the age of retirement; and
c. Death or permanent disability.
Acts or neglect of officers a. Resignation;
b. Acceptance of an incompatible office;
c. Abandonment of office;
d. Prescription of the right to office;
e. Failure to assume elective office within six (6) months from proclamation;
f. Filing of a certificate of candidacy.
Acts of the government a. Removal;
b. Impeachment;
c. Abolition of office;
d. Conviction of a crime; and
e. Recall (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
167. State the Principle of Hold-Over.

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In the absence of any express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the public
officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and shall have
qualified. The purpose of the hold-over principle is to prevent hiatus in public service. (Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999)
168. Did the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada really resign? If so, how is this confirmed by
the Supreme Court?
In Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001), the Supreme Court said that the
resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (a) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo; (b) he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears); (c) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them as President; (d) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come in the same service of the country; and (e) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
169. How often may a public officer be impeached?

According to Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period. (Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
170. Classifications of vacancy.
a. Original – office is created and no one has been appointed to fill it;
b. Constructive – incumbent has no legal right or claim to continue in office and can be legally
replaced by another functionary;
c. Accidental – incumbent having died, resigned, or removed, there is no one in ease discharging the
duties of the office; and
d. Absolute – term of an incumbent has expired, and the latter not having held over, no successor is
in being, who is legally qualified to assume the office.
171. Kinds of Preventive Suspension.
a. Preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51, Administrative Code); and

b. Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the public officer is exonerated (Sec. 47, Administrative
Code)
172. Is the preventive suspension of an elective local government official an interruption of his term of
office for the purpose of the three-term limit rule?
No. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials’ continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. (Aldovina vs.

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Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009)
173. On several occasions, X, an employee of the National Power Corporation as Supervising

Property Officer, withdrew several items from the warehouse/property office without the required
Warehouse Requisition Slip. The Regional Board of Inquiry and Discipline heard the case and
promulgated the Decision recommending that X suffer the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of
all cash and non-cash benefits due him by virtue of his employment. On appeal, X was ordered for
reinstatement with reprimand. Is backwages proper in the given case?
Yes. A reprimand usually carries a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Under normal circumstances, an employee who is reprimanded is never prevented from
reporting to work. He continues to work despite the warning. Thus, in the case at bar, since X’s penalty is
a reprimand, the Supreme Court deems it proper and equitable to affirm the award of backwages.
(National Power Corporation vs. Olandesca, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010)
174. May an officer be specified as legally demoted when she was appointed as Bank Executive
Officer II with Salary Grade 24 after originally being appointed as Account Officer with Salary
Grade 24?
Yes. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an
appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve a
reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a
demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition
of public office is essential. (Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010 [J.
Del Castillo])
175. Does the administrative jurisdiction cease upon the resignation of a public officer?
No. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he or she shall still be answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of
separation from service may no longer be imposed xxx there are other penalties which may be imposed
xxx namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. (Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Kasilag, A.M. No. P-08-2573, June 19, 2012)
176. Mayor A sought re-election but lost to Mayor B. Outgoing Mayor A promoted several city hall
employees and regularized another set of city hall employees. Mayor B publicly announced that he
will not honor said appointments. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) resolved that the said
appointments are invalid on the ground that these were mass appointments made by an outgoing
local chief executive. Mayor A maintained that CSC does not have authority to issue regulations
prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level. Are mass appointment prohibited?
Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No.
010988 does not purport to nullify all mass appointments. However, it must be shown that the
appointments have undergone the regular screening process; that the appointee is qualified; that there is a
need to fill up the vacancy immediately; and that the appointments are not in bulk. (Nazareno vs. City of
Dumaguete, G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009 (J. Del Castillo))

177. What is the nature of Ombudsman’s recommendation?
The Ombudsman's recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. (Fajardo vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012 [J. Del Castillo])
a. May the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion be reviewed by courts?

As a general rule, no. The Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory

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powers on offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive, or judicial
intervention. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the
complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the Complaint insufficient in form or
substance, it may also dismiss the Complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of the Court to
review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a Complaint filed
before it, except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (King vs.
Robles, G.R. Nos. 197096-97, December 7, 2015 [J. Del Castillo])
178. State the Threefold Liability Rule.

Any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, and administrative
liability. (Regidor vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009)
179. Is a law fixing the terms of local elective officials, other than barangay officials, to six (6) years
constitutional? (Bar Exam 2006)
The law is unconstitutional and not valid. Under Sec. 8, Art. X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, "the
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." The law
clearly goes against the aforesaid constitutional requirement of three year terms for local officials except
for barangay officials.
X. ADMINSTRATIVE LAW
180. Powers of administrative bodies.
a. Quasi-Legislative or Rule-Making Power – the exercise of delegated legislative power,

involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of a policy set out on the law itself (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Drugmakers Lab. Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014);
b. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power – the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law (Smart Telecommunications, Inc. vs.
National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003); and
c. Determinative Power (Cruz, Administrative Law, 2007)
181. Doctrines relative to Administrative Law.
a. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction (also known as Doctrine of Prior Resort) -

Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government
agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical training
and knowledge and the latter are given wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the
exercise of their adjudicative functions. (Ayala Land, Inc. vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110, June 15,
2011);
b. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies – Where a remedy before an

administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the
opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought to the courts.
(University of Santo Tomas vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010 [J. Del Castillo];
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165155, April 13,
2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Catipon, Jr. vs. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 [J. Del Castillo]);
c. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action - No resort to courts will be allowed unless

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administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative
structure. (Political Law Purple Notes 2018)
d. Doctrine of Res Judicata – A final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. (Brillantes vs.
Castro, G.R. No. L-9223, June 30, 1956)
182. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
a. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
b. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
c. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
d. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
e. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;
f. Where judicial intervention is urgent;

g. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
h. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
i. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
j. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
k. When strong public interest is involved; and
l. In quo warranto proceedings. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2,
2007).
XI. ELECTION LAW
183. Qualifications and Disqualifications of voters.

QUALIFICATIONS DISQUALIFICATIONS
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the a. Any person sentenced by final judgment to
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are suffer imprisonment of not less than one year;
at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in b. Any person adjudged by final judgment of
the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place having committed any crime involving
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months disloyalty to the government or any crime
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, against national security; and
property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage. (Sec. 1, Art. V,
c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by
competent authority. (Sec. 118, Batas
1987 Constitution)
Pambansa Blg. 881)
184. Is the Resolution of the Commission on Elections providing for the deactivation of the
registration records of those who failed to submit themselves to mandatory biometrics pursuant to
Republic Act No. 10367 valid and constitutional?
No. The Supreme Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate. Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with
the registration procedure in order to vote. Unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the
level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the

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Constitution – that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational
basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good, the same cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case. (Kabataan Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 221318, December 16, 2015)
185. Period of registration.

The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. (Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 8189)
186. Challenges to Right to Register.

Who Any voter, candidate, or representative of a registered political party.
Form a. In writing;
b. Stating the grounds therefor;
c. Must be under oath and attached to the application, together with the proof of notice
of hearing to the challenger and the applicant.
Hearing 3rd Monday of the month.
Decision Before the end of the month. (Sec. 18, Republic Act No. 8189)
187. Causes of deactivation of registration records.
a. Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year (unless granted
plenary pardon or amnesty);
b. Adjudged by final judgment for having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government (e.g. rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms law) or any crime against
national security (unless restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with law) shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon the expiration of five (5) years after the service of
sentence;
c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority;

d. Did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections (excluding Sangguniang
Kabataan elections);
e. Registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and

f. Loss of Filipino citizenship. (Sec. 27, Voters’ Registration Act of 1996)
188. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Overseas Absentee Voter.

QUALIFICATIONS DISQULAIFICATIONS
All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not Those who:
otherwise disqualified by law, at least 18 years of age
on the day of elections may vote for president, vice- a. have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance
president, senators and party-list representatives (Sec. with Philippine laws;
4, Republic Act No. 9189)
b. have committed and are convicted in a final
judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than
one (1) year, including those who have
committed and been found guilty of disloyalty
as defined under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code;
c. are immigrant or a permanent resident who is

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recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that: (a) he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration, and (b) he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another
country; and
d. have been previously declared insane or
incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the
Philippine embassies, consulates, or foreign
service establishments concerned. (Sec. 5,
Republic Act No. 9189)
189. Can a person not physically present in the polling place be able to vote?
There is now an exception to the residence qualification of a voter under Sec. 1, Art. V of the 1987
Constitution, and that is, with respect to overseas Filipinos, permanent residents of a foreign country
under Republic Act No. 9189 (The Absentee Voters Act of 2003). Under the said Act, overseas
Filipinos, permanent residents in a foreign country, are now allowed to register and vote before our
embassies and consulates abroad for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Party-list Representative.
There is a clear intent on the part of the framers of our Constitution to enfranchise as many of our
overseas countrymen in recognition of their tremendous contributions to the national economy in terms
of dollar remittances. It is but fair that their voices should be heard on who should be our national
leaders. (Makalintal vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2013; Executive Order No.
157 [dated March 30, 1987])
190. Distinguish Residence from Domicile.

Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Saludo v.American Express International, Inc.,
G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006)
191. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings.

PETITION FOR INCLUSION PETITION FOR EXCLUSION
When to file Any time, except 105 days before a Any time, except 100 days before a
regular election or 75 days before a regular election or 65 days before a
special election. special election.
Who may file a. One whose application for a. One whose application for
registration has been registration has been disapproved
disapproved by the Board of by the Board of Election
Election Inspectors; or Inspectors, or
b. One whose name has been b. One whose name has been stricken
stricken out from the list out from the list
Period to decide Within 15 days after its filing Within 10 days from its filing. (Sec.
32, Republic Act No. 8189)
192. X filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Representative of their District. He indicated that
he resided in the District where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months.
Immediately preceding the election, Y filed a Petition to seek the cancellation of X’s COC on the

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ground that he is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the said District. The Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that he is a resident. It was appealed to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) with this question: Was the ruling of MeTC conclusive upon the COMELEC?
No, The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of X to
be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct is within its territorial jurisdiction, but does
not preclude the Commission on Elections, in the determination of his qualification as a candidate, to
pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. Except for the right to remain or be
excluded in the list of voters, a decision in inclusion/ exclusion proceedings does not acquire the nature
of res judicata and is not conclusive on the COMELEC. (Domino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
134015, July 19, 1999)
193. Summary of qualification of candidates.

REQUIREMENTS President and Vice Senators District Representatives Governor, Vice
President Governor, Mayor,
Vice Mayor, Punong
Barangay, Members
of the Sanggunian
Citizenship Citizen of the
Natural-Born
Philippines
Registered voter ü ü ü ü
Read and Write ü ü ü ü
Age At least 40 years old At least 35 years old At least 25 years old on On election day:
on election day. on election day. election day.
23 years old: for
Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor,
Vice Mayor, and
members of the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the
highly-urbanized
cities.
21 years old: for

Mayor or Vice Mayor
of independent
component cities,
component cities, or
municipalities.
18 years old: for

members of the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod,
Sangguniang
Pambayan, Punong
Barangay, or members
of the Sangguniang
Pambarangay.
Residence Ten (10) years Two (2) years Resident of the same One (1) year
immediately preceding the district for a period of not immediately preceding
preceding the election day. least than one (1) year the election day.
election day. immediately preceding
the election day.
Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of
the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be
seasonably challenged. (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996; Labo
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)

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194. Disqualifications of candidates.
Under the 1987 Constitution Three-term limit for local elective officials (Sec. 8, Art. X)
Under the Omnibus Election Code a. Declared incompetent or insane by competent authority (Sec.
12);
b. Sentenced by final judgment for: (a) subversion, insurrection,
rebellion; (b) any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment; or (c) a
crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 12);
c. Given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce, or corrupt voters of public officials performing
electoral functions (Sec. 68);
d. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy (Sec.
68);
e. Spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed (Sec. 68);
f. Solicited, received or made prohibited contributions (Sec. 68);
g. Permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
unless he has waived such statues (Sec. 68);
h. Engaged in election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period and not pursuant to a political
party nomination (Sec. 80);
i. Removed, destroyed, defaced lawful election propaganda (Sec.
83);
j. Engaged in prohibited forms of election propaganda (Sec. 85);
k. Violated election rules and regulation of election propaganda
through mass media (Sec. 86);
l. Coerced, intimidated, or influenced any of his subordinates,
members, or employees to aid, campaign or vote for or
against any candidate or aspirant for the nomination or
selection of candidates (Sec. 261[d]);
m. Threatened, intimidated, caused, inflicted or produced any
violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage
upon any person or of the immediate members of his family,
his honor or property, or used fraud to compel, induce or
prevent the registration of any voter, or the participation in
any campaign, or the casting of any vote, or any promise of
such registration, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom
(Sec. 261[e]);
n. Unlawful electioneering (Sec. 261[k]);
o. Violated the prohibition against release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds 45 days before a regular election
or 30 days before a special election (Sec. 261[v]); and
p. Violated Sec. 261(cc).
Under the Local Government Code a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded. (Sec. 40)

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195. X, currently a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines commissioned at Camp Bagong
Diwa, files his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Municipal Mayor at his
hometown. Upon losing the election, he then returned to Camp Bagong Diwa, but he was informed
that he was already resigned from service. He files a Complaint questioning his dismissal from
service. Can he be reinstated?
No. Any person holding an appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned and –controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Such
resignation is irrevocable. (Sec. 66, Omnibus Election Code)
a. Is X considered resigned if he is an elective official?

No. Any elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
the same or any other office, shall not be considered resigned from his office (Sec. 26, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3636)
b. Is X considered resigned if he is a judge?

Yes. A judge is considered resigned from the judiciary from the time he files his/her Certificate of
Candidacy for an elective office. A judge should be able to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Running for an elective position would be
an interference in the disposition of a judge’s duties. (Uy vs. Pantanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2094, December 10, 2007)
196. Instances when the Commission on Elections may go beyond the face of the Certificate of
Candidacy.
a. If its shown that the Certificate of Candidacy was filed (a) to put the election process in mockery
or disrepute; (b) to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates; or (c) by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the Certificate of Candidacy
has been filed, and thus, prevent faithful determination of the true will of the electorate;
b. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy; and

c. A disqualification based on any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68 of Omnibus Election Code.
197. Rules on substitution of candidates.

After the last day of the filing of Certificate of a. Only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
Candidacy, an official candidate dies, withdraws, or is same political party may file a certificate of
disqualified for any cause candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
day of the election. (Sec. 77, Omnibus Election
Code)
b. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate. (Recabo vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)
c. A candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy has
been cancelled or not given due course cannot
be substituted by another belonging to the same

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political party. (Ong vs. Alegre, G.R. No.
163295, January 23, 2006)
If death, withdrawal or disqualification should The Certificate of Candidacy may be filed (a) with any
happen between the day before the election and mid- Board of Election Inspectors in the political subdivision
day of the election day where he is a candidate; or (b) with the Commission on
Elections, if it is a national position. (Sec. 77, Omnibus
Election Code)
Substitution on the day of the election itself Only on death and disqualification shall substitution may
take place upon the start of the campaign period until
mid-day of the election. (Sec. 77, Omnibus Election
Code)
198. Effect of disqualification.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If, for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the court or the Commission on Elections shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the Complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (Sec. 6, Electoral Reforms Law of 1987; Gonzalez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 192856, March 8, 2011)
However, if the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate, votes cast for the candidate shall not be counted. (Grego vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
199. Distinguish Petition for Disqualification from Petition to Deny Due Course to a Certificate of
Candidacy.
On one hand, a disqualification case under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is hinged on either (1)
a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (2) his commission of
certain acts of disqualification. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Sec. 68 is still
technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of
supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. On the other hand, a
denial of due course to or cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy proceeding under Sec. 78 is
premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks relevant qualification; he or she must have also
made a false representation of the same in the Certificate of Candidacy. (Tagolino vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
200. X, Miss Universe 2018 and a renowned actress, during a Guilty-or-Not Guilty portion in Vice
Ganda’s late night show, announces her intention to run for 2019 elections and talks about her
advocacy on ending poverty in the country. The video went viral. Later, it was used against her as
constituting an act of early campaign, which clearly violates the law. Upon filing her Certificate of
Candidacy, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cancels the same and disqualifies her from
running for the election. Was the cancellation and disqualification made by the COMELEC
proper?
No. The Supreme Court, citing the case of Penera vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 181613,
November 25, 2009), held that the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited
premature campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may have filed his/her Certificate of Candidacy
within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of
the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or
partisan political activity designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public
office because there is no candidate to speak of. (Lanot vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164858,
November 16, 2006)

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a. As it is, is X liable for an election offense?
No. The acts conducted after filing of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) prior to the campaign
period constitute premature campaigning. When the campaign period starts and a person proceeds
with his/her candidacy, his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign
period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, constitute premature campaigning, for
which s/he may be disqualified. But in this case, there is no act of premature campaign since the
act was made prior to her filing of certificate of candidacy or even the campaign period. (Penera
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009)
201. X is an avid blogger and travel enthusiast and a supporter of a particular candidate who,
incidentally, was a member of the Constitutional Convention as Lone District Representative in
North Cotabato. Being constrained to show her support via blogging due to regulation of what is-
called COMELEC Space (under Sec. 12[f] of 1971 Constitutional Convention Act), she files a
Petition before the court praying that the said provision be declared unconstitutional as it denies
private individuals their freedom of speech and of the press. As it is, outside this COMELEC
Space, it shall be unlawful to print and publish any comment or article unless all the names of
other candidates are mentioned with equal prominence. Is she correct?
No. The underlying issue is the contested restriction provided under Section 12(f), where the moneyed
candidate or individual who can afford to pay for advertisements, comments, or articles in favor of his
candidacy or against the candidacy of another or which mention his name and the fact of his candidacy, is
required to mention all the other candidates in the same district with equal prominence, to exempt him
from the penal sanction of the law. The evident purpose of the limitation is to give the poor candidates a
fighting chance in the election. The restriction is only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve
suffrage pure and undefiled and to achieve the desired equality of chances among all the candidates.
Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 12(f) designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality
of chances among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of
expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the individual’s liberty of
expression. The limitation in Section 12(f) is a reasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of
Congress. It is not unconstitutional. (Badoy vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32546, October 17,
1970)
202. When is the reckoning point of election period?

Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission on Elections in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter (Sec. 9,
Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution). The election period is distinguished from the campaign period in that the
latter cannot extend beyond election day (Peralta vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March
11, 1978). In fact, it ends two (2) days before the election. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014)
203. X runs for the position of District Representative in 2010 but fails to submit his Statement of
Contributions and Expenses (SOCE). In 2013, he decided to run again for the same position, but he
later withdrew his candidacy. When the 2016 election came, he wishes to run again but the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifies him for failure to submit SOCE for two
consecutive elections, and imposed on him perpetual disqualification. He comes to the court
questioning the imposition of perpetual disqualification as constituting grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC. Decide.
The allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for
imposing upon X the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office is hollow. In imposing the
penalty, the COMELEC clearly acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction in view of the clear language
of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. Nonetheless, X submits that he only failed to submit his Statement
of Contributions and Expenses (SOCE) once in 2010. He pleads good faith because he thought that he
was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the 2013 elections because of his having withdrawn from
the mayoral race in that year. His plea of good faith is undeserving of consideration. X should have paid
heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Commission of Elections (G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995), where the
Supreme Court ruled that every candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is
required to file his SOCE. Accordingly, X could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having
withdrawn his candidacy a day before the 2013 elections. (Maturan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.

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No. 227155, March 28, 2017)
204. Composition and Powers of Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS BOARD OF CANVASSERS
Composition A chairman and two members, all of whom are The Municipal Board of Canvassers shall be
public school teachers. composed of the Election Officer or a
representative of the Commission on
Elections, as Chairman, the Municipal
Treasurer, as Vice Chairman, and the District
School Supervisor, or in his absence, the most
senior principal of the school district, as
member. (Sec. 3, COMELEC Resolution No.
6669)
The City Board of Canvassers shall be

composed of the City Election Officer or a
lawyer of the Commission, as Chairman, the
City Prosecutor, as Vice Chairman, and the
City Superintendent of schools, as member. In
cities with more than one Election Officer, the
Commission on Elections shall designate the
Election Officer who shall act as Chairman.
(Sec. 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 6669)
The Provincial Board of Canvassers shall be

composed of the Provincial Election
Supervisor or a lawyer of the Commission on
Elections, as Chairman, the Provincial
Prosecutor as Vice Chairman, and the
Provincial Superintendent of schools, as
member. (Sec. 5, COMELEC Resolution No.
6669)
The District Board of Canvassers for the

legislative districts of Metro Manila shall be
composed of a lawyer of the Commission on
Elections as Chairman, a ranking Prosecutor in
the district to be appointed by the Commission
on Elections, upon consultation with the
Department of Justice, as Vice Chairman and
the most senior District School Supervisor in
the district to be appointed by the Commission
on Elections, upon consultation with the
Department of Education, as member. (Sec. 6,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6669)
Powers a. Conduct the voting and counting of votes a. Canvass election returns;
in the polling place; b. Prepare certificate of canvass;
b. Act as deputies of the Commission on c. Proclaim the elected official. (Sec. 28,
Elections in supervision and control of Republic Act No. 7166)
the polling place;
c. Maintain order within the polling place The Congress, acting as the National Board of
and its premises to keep access thereto Canvassers for the Election of President and
open and unobstructed and to enforce Vice President, shall determine the authenticity
obedience to its lawful orders; and and due execution of Certificates of Canvass.
d. Perform such other functions as prescribed (Sec. 30, Republic Act No. 7166)
by law or by the rules of the Commission
on Elections. (Sec. 8, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3743)
205. What are the qualifications of a watcher?

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No person shall be appointed watcher unless he is a qualified voter of the city or municipality, of good
reputation and shall not have been convicted by final judgment of any election offense or of any other
crime, must know how to read and write Pilipino, English, Spanish or any of the prevailing local dialects,
and not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the chairman or any member
of the board of election inspectors in the polling place where he seeks appointment as a watcher. (Sec.
178, Omnibus Election Code)
206. What are the grounds for the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy?
a. False material representation in the certificate of candidacy; and

b. If the certificate filed is a substitute Certificate of Candidacy, when it is not a proper case of
substitution under Sec. 77 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (Engle vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 215995, January 19, 2016)
207. What are the instances where failure of election may be declared?
a. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
b. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
c. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. (Sison vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 134096, March 3, 1999)
208. Requisites of Failure of Elections.
a. No voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was
voting, the election resulted in failure to elect;
b. The votes not cast would have affected the results of the election; and
c. The cause of such failure of election should have been force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes. (Pasandalan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 150312, July 18,
2002)
209. What are the grounds for pre-proclamation controversy?

Any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board if canvassers which may be raised
by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Secs. 233 (election returns are delayed, lost, or
destroyed), 234 (material defects in the election returns), 235 (election returns appeared to be tampered
or falsified), and 236 (discrepancies in election returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code)
210. What is the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy?

A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. Indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-
proclamation controversies be promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board
of Canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of the election
returns (ERs) that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. The allegations that the election
returns were obviously manufactures must be evident from the face of the said documents to justify the
exclusion of the said election returns and to fall within the ambit of the issues that can be raised in pre-

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proclamation controversy. (Saño vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010 [J.
Del Castillo])
211. X, a balikbayan, decided to run for Mayor during the 2013 elections. She has a group of friends
which volunteered to be her campaign manager and poll watchers for the said election. They even
made a manual tally of votes of avid supporters for each precinct, which assures them that she will
win. But she lost in the margin of ten (10) votes as reflected in the election return. X's side contests
the result and requests for the review of the election return. Will it prosper?
No. It is the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return, which appears regular on
its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be used to convert the
election return’s authenticity, and operate as an exception to the general rule that, in a pre-proclamation
controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election return. In the absence of clearly
convincing evidence, the validity of the election returns must be upheld. Any plausible explanation, one
which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation,
should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised
their right of suffrage. Where the Commission on Elections disregards the principle requiring “extreme
caution” before rejecting election returns, and proceeds with undue haste in concluding that the election
returns are tampered, it commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Doromal vs. Biron, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010 [J. Del Castillo])
212. Jurisdictions over election contests.

Tribunal
Official Appellate Court
(Original and Exclusive)
President and Vice President Supreme Court, as Presidential Supreme Court, via Petition for
Electoral Tribunal Review on Certiorari (under Rule
65): Within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy of the decision.
Senator Senate Electoral Tribunal
Representative House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal
Regional, Provincial, or City officials Commission on Elections Supreme Court, via Petition for
Review on Certiorari (under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court): Within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy of the decision.
Municipal officials Regional Trial Court Commission on Elections, whose
decision shall be final, executory, and
not appealable: Within five (5) days
from promulgation or receipt of a
copy of the decision.
In Galido vs. Commission on

Elections (G.R. No. 95346, January
18, 1991), it was held that the decision
on appeal does not preclude a recourse
to the Supreme Court, by way of a
special civil action of certiorari on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Barangay Municipal (or Metropolitan) Trial
Court
213. Applicability of Doctrine of Statistical Improbability.

The doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the
votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the
candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. The bare fact that a candidate for

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public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot
adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero
vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial
evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation. The Doctrine of
Statistical Improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing
fraudulent and corrupt practices which is truly called for innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result
that hardly commends itself. (Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009)
214. Requisites of Election Protest.
a. Must be filed by a candidate who has filed a Certificate of Candidacy and has been voted upon for
the same office;
b. Hinged on the grounds of fraud, terrorism, irregularities, or illegal acts committed before, during,
and after the casting and counting of votes; and
c. Filed within ten (10) days from proclamation of the results of the election. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
215. Requisites of Quo Warranto.
a. Filed by any registered voter in the constituency;

b. Hinged on the grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
c. Filed within ten (10) days form proclamation of the results of the election. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
216. Distinguish Quo Warranto in Election Law and Remedial Law.

In Election Law In Remedial Law
As to governing law In elective office, the governing law is the In appointive office, the rules that govern
election law. are the provisions of the Rules of Court.
As to issue In elective office, the issue is the In appointive office, the issue is the
eligibility of the person elected. legality of the occupancy of the office by
virtue of a legal appointment.
As to period of filing In elective office, the petition is filed In appointive office, the petition is filed
within ten (10) days after the within one (1) year from the time the
proclamation of the results of the cause of ouster, or the right of the
election. petitioner to hold the office or position,
arose.
Where to file In elective office, the Petition is brought In appointive office, the Petition is
in the Commission on Election, the brought in the Supreme Court, the Court
Regional Trial Court, or the Municipal of Appeals, or the Regional Trial Court.
trial Court, as the case may be.
Who may file In elective office, the Petitioner may be In appointive office, the Petitioner is the
any voter even if he is not entitled to the one entitled to the office.
office.
As to judgment In elective office, when the tribunal In appointive office, the court will oust
declares the candidate-elect as ineligible, the person illegally appointed and will
he will be unseated but the petitioner will order the seating of the person who was
not be declared the rightful occupant of legally appointed and entitled to the
the office. office. (Riano, Civil Procedure: The Bar
Lecture Series, 2016, Vol. II, 2016)
217. Is good faith a defense in relation to election offense?

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No. Election offenses are generally mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary; good faith,
ignorance, or lack of malice is not a defense; the commission of the prohibited act is sufficient. (Nachura,
218. Rules on chain of custody over ballots and election paraphernalia.

Before voting or canvassing For official ballots:
1. Packing and Shipping Committee (PSC), while the official

ballots (OBs) are in its custody;
2. Forwarder, after the OBs are dispatched by the PSC, until the
same are delivered of Provincial/ City/ Municipality
Treasurers;
3. Provincial/ City/ Municipality Treasurer, upon receipt of OBs
until actual distribution to the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEIs);
4. BEIs, upon receipt of the OBs
For Vote-Counting Machines (VCM) and accessories,
transmission equipment, and other paraphernalia:
1. PSC, whiles the VCM are in its custody;

2. Forwarder, after the VCM are dispatched by the PSC, until the
same are delivered to the Provincial Election
Supervisor/Election Officers (EOs) through the BEIs at the
polling places; and
3. Election Officer, through BEIs upon receipt from the
Forwarder.
For Canvassing and Consolidation System (CCS) and
accessories, transmission equipment, and other paraphernalia:
1. PCS, while the CCS are in its custody;

2. Forwarder, after the CCS are dispatched by the PSC, until the
same are delivered to the Provincial Election Supervisor/ EOs;
and
3. PES/ EOs, upon receipt from the Forwarder.
For ballot boxes (originating from Manila):
1. PSC, while the ballot boxes are in its custody;

2. Forwarder, after the ballot boxes are dispatched by the PSC,
until the same are delivered to the Eos through the BEIs at the
polling places; and
3. EOs through the BEIs, upon receipt of the ballot boxes from
the Forwarder.
After voting and canvassing For Automated Election Machines (AES) and peripherals:
1. BEIs/BOCs while the AES machine and peripherals are in its

custody;
2. Forwarder while the same are in in its custody;
3. PSC through Administrative Services Department (ASD)
after receipt from the Forwarder
For ballot boxes with content:
The BEIs shall deliver to the City/Municipality Treasurers the ballot

boxes with contents used in the elections for safekeeping. (Sec. 1,
COMELEC Resolution No. 10097)
219. Is pilot testing a mandatory requirement before the full implementation of Automated Election
System?

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No. Pilot testing is not a mandatory requirement for the enactment of a fully Automated Election System
(AES). The mechanism of the machines does not infringe on the constitutional right of the people to
secrecy of the ballot enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution. The plain wordings of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9369 (that amended R.A. No. 8436) commands that the 2010 elections shall be fully
automated, and such full automation is not conditioned on “pilot testing” in the May 2007 elections.
Congress merely gave the Commission on Elections the flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts
of the country for the May 2007 elections. Any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full
automation of the 2010 regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES should be put
to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of R.A. No. 9525, in which Congress appropriated Php 11.301
Billion to automate the 2010 elections. (Roque vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188456,
September 10, 2009)
220. Does the enactment of the Election Automation Law circumvent the 1987 Constitution, not being
germane to its subject matter regarding the Poll Automation and Canvassing of Votes?
No, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369 does not violate Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the
case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency vs. Commission on Elections
(G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009), the Petitioner alleges that the title of R.A. No. 9369 is misleading
because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual
canvassing of election returns. Likewise, Petitioner alleges that Secs. 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither
embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 9369. Both the Commission on
Elections and the Office of the Solicitor General maintain that the title of R.A. No. 9369 is broad enough
to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its
purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. The constitutional requirement
that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
221. What is an Automated Election System?

It is the use of an appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in voting, counting, and the
consolidation, canvass, and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes. (Sec. 2[1],
Republic Act No. 9369)
XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
222. Distinguish public corporations from private corporations.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Purpose Established for purposes of Created for private aim, gain or benefit
administration of civil and local of members
governments
Origin Creation of State either by special or Created by will of incorporators with
general act. recognizance of State
Agreement by the Legislature Involuntary consequences of legislation Voluntary agreement by and among the
members
223. What is a Municipal Corporation and what are its elements?

It is a body politic established by law partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil government of
the country, chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town or district
which is incorporated (Social Security Service Employees Association vs. Soriano, GR No. L-1808,
November 18, 1963). Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and

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maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation (Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of
Makati, GR No. L- 150763, July 2, 2004).
It has the following elements: (a) The law creating or authorizing the creation or incorporation of a
municipal corporation; (b) The name by which the corporation shall be know; (c) The people residing in
the territory of the corporation; and (d) The land mass where the inhabitants reside, together with the
internal and external waters, and the air space above the land and waters. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
224. Dual nature of local government units.

Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate
endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a
political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory. (Sec. 15, Local Government Code)
225. Dual functions of local government units.
a. Constituent function (Public or Governmental) – it acts as an agent of the state for the
government of the territory and the inhabitants;
b. Ministrant function (Private or Proprietary) – it acts as an agent of the community in the

administration of local affairs. (Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-28089, October
25, 1967)
CONSTITUENT FUNCTION: MINISTRANT FUNCTION:

Public, Governmental, Political Private, Proprietary, Governmental
Acts Acts
Purpose Exercised in the administration of Exercised for the special benefit and
powers of the state and for the advantage of the community.
promotion of public welfare.
Nature Legislative, judicial, public, and Ministerial, private, and corporate
political
Liability Not liable, except if: Can be held liable ex contractu or ex
delicto
a. Statute provides otherwise;
b. Damages due to defective
condition of roads, streets,
buildings, and other public
works. (Art. 2189, Civil Code)
As to defense No valid defense for non-performance Defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its
officers
As to personal liability of officers Officers or agents acting within Officers and agents are liable for
official duties are not liable, unless negligence or torts while within scope
they acted willfully and maliciously of employment.
226. Types of Municipal Corporations.
a. De jure municipal corporations – those created or recognized by operation of law. It is

impregnable to any attack direct or otherwise.
b. Municipal corporations by prescription – exercised their powers since time immemorial with a
charter, which is presumed to have been lost or destroyed. Its existence is presumed where the
corporation has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title by

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prescription. (Martin, Public Corporations [1977])
c. De facto municipal corporations – where the people have organized themselves under color of
law, into ordinary municipal bodies, and have gone on, year after year, raising taxes, making
improvements, and exercising their usual franchises, with their rights dependent quite as much as
on acquiescence as on the regularity of their origin. Its existence cannot be collaterally attacked
although it may be inquired into by the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct
proceeding.
227. What are the municipal corporations in the Philippines and what are its roles?
a. Province – composed of a cluster of municipalities, or municipalities or component cities, and as a

political and corporate unit of government, serves as a dynamic mechanism for developmental
processes and effective governance of local government units within its territorial jurisdiction.
(Sec. 459, Local Government Code)
b. City – composed of more urbanized and developed barangays, serves as a general purpose
government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services and effective
governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 448, Local Government Code)
c. Municipality – consisting of a group of barangays, serves primarily as a general purpose

government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services and effective
governance of the inhabitants within its jurisdiction. (Sec. 440, Local Government Code)
d. Barangay – as the basic political unit, it serves as the primary planning and implementing unit if
government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities in the community, and as a forum
wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized, and considered, and
where disputes may be amicably settled. (Sec. 384, Local Government Code)
228. What are the requisites for the creation and conversion of a local government unit?
a. Income – it must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its
population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
b. Population – it shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
c. Land Area – it must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance, the National
Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. (Sec. 7, Local Government Code)
229. When can a local government unit be abolished?

A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under the Local
Government Code, as certified by the Department of Finance, National Statistics Office, and the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources to Congress or to the
Sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or
barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.
(Sec. 9, Local Government Code)

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230. Is a plebiscite required in the conversion of a city from an independent component city to a
component city?
No. Sec. 10 of the Local Government Code states that “The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress.” The creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator – material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people in the political units directly affected. (Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064,
September 16, 1999)
231. What does “gerrymandering” mean?

Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived
as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.[42] The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010)
232. What does local autonomy mean?

Under Sec. 5, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. The principle of local autonomy under
the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an "imperium in imperio". (Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
a. Differentiate Decentralization of Administration and Decentralization of Power.

On one hand, there is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. (Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989)
233. What is devolution?

Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (Sec. 17, Local
Government Code). It includes "the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and
other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions and responsibilities. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Daclan, G.R. No. 197115, March 23,
2015 [J. Del Castillo])
234. Fundamental powers of the State as exercised by the local government units.
POLICE POWER POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER OF TAXATION
(GENERAL WELFARE
CLAUSE)

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Every local government unit shall A local government unit may, Each local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly through its chief executive and have the power to create new
granted, those necessarily implied acting pursuant to an ordinance, sources of funds and to levy taxes,
therefrom, as well as powers exercise the power of eminent fees, and charges subject to
necessary, appropriate, or incidental domain for public use, or purpose or limitations as Congress may provide,
for its efficient and effective welfare for the benefit of the poor consistent with the basic policy of
governance, and those which are and the landless, upon payment of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
essential to the promotion of the just compensation, pursuant to the and charges accrue exclusively to the
general welfare. Within their provisions of the Constitution and local governments. (Sec. 5, Art. X,
respective territorial jurisdictions, pertinent laws: Provided, however, 1987 Constitution)
local government units shall ensure That the power of eminent domain
and support, among other things, the may not be exercised unless a valid
preservation and enrichment of and definite offer has been
culture, promote health and safety, previously made to the owner, and
enhance the right of the people to a such offer was not accepted:
balanced ecology, encourage and Provided, further, That the local
support the development of government unit may immediately
appropriate and self-reliant scientific take possession of the property upon
and technological capabilities, the filing of the expropriation
improve public morals, enhance proceedings and upon making a
economic prosperity and social deposit with the proper court of at
justice, promote full employment least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
among their residents, maintain market value of the property based
peace and order, and preserve the on the current tax declaration of the
comfort and convenience of their property to be expropriated:
inhabitants. (Sec. 16, Local Provided, finally, That, the amount to
Government Code) be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the
property. (Sec. 19, Local
Government Code)
235. Is the power to tax of the local government units allowed to be regulated by the Congress?
Yes. The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which
Congress may provide by law. Local Governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government, and is therefore exempt from local taxes. (Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
a. Can the Secretary of Justice review the tax imposition of the local government units?
Yes. Sec. 187, Republic Act No. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the
constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance and if warranted, to revoke it on either or both
grounds – is valid, and does not confer the power of control over the local government units in the
Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own
judgment for that of the local government unit. (Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. L-112497, August 4,
1994)
236. Distinguish Ordinance from Resolution.

ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
As to its nature It is a law. It is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter.
As to its permanence It possesses a general and permanent It is temporary in nature.

character.
As to the necessity of third reading Third reading is necessary. No third reading is required.

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(Landbank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667, April
17, 2013; Beluso vs. Municipality of
Panay, Capiz, GR. No. 153974,
August 7, 2006; Spouses Yusay vs.
Court of Appeals, GR. No. 156684,
April 6, 2011)
237. What are the requisites of a valid ordinance?
a. Must not contravene the Constitution and any statute;

b. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
e. Must be general in application and consistent with public policy; and
f. Must not be unreasonable. (Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992;
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994)
238. The city’s traffic management group observed the very unbearable traffic situation in one of the
city’s thoroughfare. They found out that the traffic is due to people lining up to bet in a lotto outlet,
probably because of the big jackpot prize. The City Mayor issued an Ordinance considering lotto
as gamble and, thus, ordered the removal of the said lotto outlet. Is the Resolution valid?
No. The legality of the operation in lotto is legal considering the authority to operate given by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by
the Congress. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through
an Act of Congress, via Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42. A local government
unit cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what
the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by
ordinance or resolution. (Lina vs. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001; Dela Cruz vs. Paras, G.R.
Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983)
239. What are the requisites for a valid tax ordinance?
a. The taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to
declared national policy.
b. The ordinance shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
c. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and municipal
tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a
newspaper of local circulation. However, in provinces cities, or municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and
publicly accessible places.
d. Copies of all provincial, city and municipal and barangay tax ordinances and revenue measures
shall be furnished the respective local treasurers for public dissemination. (Sec. 186, Local
Government Code)
240. Can a license be taken from the licensee (owner) without due process of law?
Yes. The license to operate is not a property but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public
interests so require. In addition, a license is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without
due process of law. (Du vs. Jayoma, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012 [J. Del Castillo])

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241. Due to a pending case between the Municipality of Tiwi and a private corporation, the
Sanggunian passed a Resolution authorizing its Municipal Mayor to hire the services of a legal
counsel to represent them. Due to this Resolution, a legal contract of service has been executed.
Likewise, the contract allows a contingent fee for remuneration. May the Mayor validly enter into
such contract?
Yes. A Municipal Mayor has the power to enter into contracts. As provided for under Sec. 444(b)(1)(vi)
of the Local Government Code provides: “Upon authorization by the Sangguniang Bayan, the mayor
may represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts,
and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; the municipal mayor is
required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on
behalf of the municipality. (Municipality of Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010 [J. Del
Castillo])
a. X filed a case for collection against the National Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing as
counsel for X is Atty. Y, who then the incumbent Vice Mayor. NPC filed a Motion for
Inhibition of Atty. Y arguing that he is prohibited under sec. 90(b)(1) of the Local
Government Code to appear as a counsel. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Atty. Y arguing that government-owned and –controlled corporations are not included in the
prohibition. Likewise the RTC opined that should the framers of the law intended so, they
would have expressly so stated in the law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition for lack of merit. Can Atty. Y appear as counsel against NPC?
No. Sec. 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code provides that Sanggunian Members may
practice their profession or engage in any occupation or teach in schools, except during session
hours, provided when the Member is also a member of the Bar, he shall not appear as counsel
before any court in any civil case where the local government unit or any office, agency or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. Further, Sec. 2(10) of the Revised
Administrative Code defined “instrumentality” which includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. With the foregoing provisions, it is
clear without any ambiguity that NPC is a government instrumentality.
242. Liability of local government units.

Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to their property. (Sec. 24, Local Government Code)
Liability for torts a. If the local government unit is engaged in governmental

functions, it is not liable. (Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union vs. Firme, G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991)
b. If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is
liable. (Laganapan vs. Asedillo, G.R. No. L-28353, September
30, 1987)
Liability for violation of law Municipal Corporations are liable to pay damages to person
prejudiced by their acts (Sec. 2246, Revised Administrative Code)
Liability for contracts A municipal corporation is liable on contracts it enters into provided
the contract is intra vires (City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989)
243. State the Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability.

A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefit
accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract (Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72841, January 29, 1987). It applies to all cases where money or
other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of an
express contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the same.

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244. Rules on settlement of boundary disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall
be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be

jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province concerned.
d. Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
e. In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the
date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the
dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within
sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above. (Sec. 118, Local Government
Code)
Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the
sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending
final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal
purposes. (Sec. 119, Local Government Code)
245. Succession in case of permanent or temporary vacancy in the office.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF: SUCCESSOR
Governor or Mayor Vice Governor or Vice Mayor
Vice Governor or Vice Mayor Highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian
member, and subsequent vacancies shall be filled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according
to their ranking.
N.B.: Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the

basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding election.
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Official next-in-rank of the organization concerned.
246. Grounds for disciplinary action.
a. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

b. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
c. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
d. Commission of offense involving moral turpitude or offense punishable by at least prison mayor;
e. Abuse of authority;

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f. Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days except for Sanggunian members;
g. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or status of an immigrant of
another country; and
h. Such other grounds as may be provided for in Election Code and other laws. (Sec. 60, Local
Government Code)
247. Distinguish Local Initiative from Local Referendum.

On one hand, Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It may be exercised by all registered voters of
the province, cities, municipalities, and barangays. On the other hand, Local Referendum is the process
whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend, or reject any ordinance
enacted by the Sanggunian. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
248. What is Recall?

Definition The termination of official relationship of an elective official for
loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the
will of the electorate. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law,
2016)
Ground Loss of confidence – the formal withdrawal by an electorate of
their trust in a person’s ability to discharge his office previously
bestowed on him by the same electorate. (Evardone vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 94010, December 2, 1991)
By whom exercised By the registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs. (Sec. 69, Local
Government Code)
Initiation of the recall process By a petition of a registered voter supported by:
a. 25% of registered voters, if local government unit has a

voting population of not more than 20,000
b. 20% of registered voters, if local government unit has voting
population of 20,000 to 75,000. In no case shall Petitioners
be less than 5,000;
c. 15% of registered voters, if local government unit has voting
population of 75,000 to 300,000. In no case shall Petitioners
be less than 15,000;
d. 10% of registered voters, if local government unit has voting
population of more than 300,000. In no case shall
Petitioners be less than 45,000. (Sec. 70, Local Government
Code)
When held a. In case of barangay, city, or municipal officials: Not later
than 30 days from completion
b. In case of provincial officials: Not later than 45 days from
completion. (Sec. 71, Local Government Code)
Effectivity The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon
the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the
election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive
the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed,
and he shall continue in office. (Sec. 72, Local Government Code)
Prohibition from resignation The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed
to resign while the recall process is in progress. (Sec. 73, Local
Government Code)
Limitations a. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence;
b. No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year

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immediately preceding a regular local election. (Nachura,
249. May a Vice Mayor who succeeded the term of the deceased incumbent Mayor on its third term
still qualified to run for Mayoralty position?
Yes. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local official. He
must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. (Adormeo vs. Commission on Election, G.R. No. L-147927, February 4, 2004)
XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
250. State the Regalian Doctrine.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
a. Is there an exception to this Doctrine?

An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest (Cho vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-48321, August
31, 1946).
251. What are the goals of national economy?

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth;
a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged. (Sec. 1, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
252. Petitioner is the President of Boracay West Cove. The company applied for a zoning compliance
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. The application sought the issuance of a building
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the department of Environment
and Natural Resources in favor of Boracay West Cove. The Municipal Zoning Administrator
denied Petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the
“No-Build Zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. A Cease and Desist Order was
issued by the municipal government, and then the Office of the Mayor of Malay ordered the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Petitioner alleges that the order was issued
and executed with grave abuse of discretion. Is Petitioner correct?
No. The Office of the Mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an
issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Thus, it should not be treated as an environmental
issue, but one of compliance. (Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29,
2014)
253. Rules on the operation of public utilities.

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No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must
be citizens of the Philippines. (Sec. 11, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
254. Are service contracts allowing foreign corporations to explore, develop, and exploit petroleum
resources in the Philippines to the detriment of the ecosystem constitutional? If so, what are the
rules on allowing service contracts of such nature?
Yes. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004), the
Supreme Court held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on service contracts per se. The following are the safeguards enumerated in the aforesaid
case with respect to service contracts allowing foreign corporations to explore, develop, and exploit
Philippine resources:
a. The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
b. The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
c. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascapes of Tañon Strait vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015)
255. Rules on private lands.

As a rule, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).
The following are the recognized exceptions:
a. Hereditary succession (Testate Estate of Jose Ramirez vs. Vda. de Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952,
February 15, 1982);
b. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law (Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution);
c. Americans and American-owned and –controlled corporations hold valid title to private lands
against private persons under the Parity Agreement (Republic of the Philippines vs. Quasha, G.R.
No. L-30299, August 17, 1972). However, this ruling was effectively modified by Sec. 11, Art.
XVII of the 1973 Constitutions, which reads: “Titles to private lands acquired by such persons
before such date (July 3, 1974) shall be valid as against private persons only.” Thus, a previous
owner may no longer recover the land from an American buyer who succeeded in obtaining title
over the land. Only the State has the superior right to the land, through the institution of escheat
proceedings, or through an action for reversion.
256. Does voluntary surrender require court authorization to be considered as a mode of

extinguishment of tenancy relationship?

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No. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court
authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. The voluntary surrender of the
landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his
family. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his protection. (Buada vs. Cement Center, Inc., G.R. No. 180374, January
22, 2010 [J. Del castillo])
257. What constitutes a tenancy relationship? What are its requisites?

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
requisites must be present:
a. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

b. The subject matter is agricultural land;
c. There is consent between the parties;
d. The purpose is agricultural production;
e. There is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
f. There is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must concur in order to
establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.
(Adriano vs. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010 [J. Del Castillo]; Rodriguez vs. Salvador, G.R.
No. 171972, June 8, 2011 [J. Del Castillo]; Ladano vs. Neri, G.R. No. 178622, November 12,
2012 [J. Del Castillo]; Ofilada vs. Spouses Andal, G.R. No. 192270, January 26, 2015 [J. Del
Castillo])
258. Does the mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land automatically convert a tiller or
farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws?
No. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert
a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. It is essential that,
together with the other requisites of tenancy relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he
transmitted the landowners share of the harvest. (Adriano vs. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010 [J.
Del Castillo])
259. Lazaro Gallardo’s land was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Porferio Soliman was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-
transferee thereof. Under the Deed between Lazaro and Porferio, the latter (as sole farmer-
beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of the whole of the land in his favor) obliged
himself to pay the former, but he failed to do so. Is the landownder entitled to just compensation?
Yes. When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his obligations with fealty and
good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as land, under
the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled
to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land. (Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo vs. Soliman, G.R. No.
178952, April 10, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
260. The deceased X owned a farm. As tiller of the farm, Y was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) under the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 3844). In 1980, X
threatened to kill Y if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops and house were bulldozed. For

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fear of his life, Y left. In 1993, X died. Y then returned to the farm and filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a Petition against X’s estate praying that his
possession and cultivation of the farm be respected. The administrator of X’s estate moved to
dismiss the Petition, contending that Y’s cause of action has prescribed beyond the 3-year
prescription period under R.A. No. 3844. Y argued that his tenure should be deemed uninterrupted
since his departure was due to threats, force, and intimidation. Is Y correct?
Yes. The farm has been placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform
Code). It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between X and Y. In fact, a Certificate of
Land Transfer had been issued in favor of the Y; thus, Y already had an expectant right to the farm. His
certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land. It is issued in order for the tenant farmer to
acquire the land he was tilling. (Coderias vs. Estate of Juan Chioco, G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J.
Del Castillo])
a. Should Y be evicted?
No. Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, X had no right to evict Y and enter the property. The Court cannot sanction
the use of force to evict beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force is reversion to the feudal
system, where the landed elite have free rein over their poor vassals. (Coderias vs. Estate of Juan
Chioco, G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
b. Can the administrator of X’s estate claim that Y’s cause of action had already prescribed?
No. The administrator of X’s estate had no right to claim that Y’s cause of action had prescribed.
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees, which they value as life itself, and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.
Perforce, as provided under our Agrarian Reform Law, the termination of the leasehold
relationship can take place only for causes provided by law. Here, the termination was unlawful,
thus the prescriptive period was deemed interrupted. (Coderias vs. Estate of Juan Chioco, G.R.
No. 180476, June 26, 2013 [J. Del Castillo])
261. What is an agrarian dispute?

In order to qualify as an agrarian dispute, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. A case
involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that the
land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant; there are
conditions or requisites before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the subject matter
being agricultural land constitutes simply one condition. For the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board to acquire jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. (Bumagat vs.
Arribay, G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014 [J. Del Castillo])
262. Discuss monopolies.

The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Sec. 19, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution) A
monopoly is “a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in
the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article,
or control the sale of a particular commodity”.
a. Are monopolies constitutionally prohibited?

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Monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution, but may be permitted to exist to aid the
government in carrying on an enterprise or to aid in the performance of various services and
functions in the interest of the public. However, because monopolies are subject to abuses that can
inflict severe prejudice to the public, they are subjected to a higher level of State regulation than
an ordinary business undertaking (Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Airport Terminals Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003).
263. What is the foreign equity requirement under the 1987 Constitution in relation to the case of
Rappler, Inc.?
The foreign equity restriction of the Philippine Constitution under Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1) states that "The
ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens." The
constitutional and statutory foreign equity restrictions in mass media must be related to the broader state
policy in Sec. 19 of Art. II of the 1987 Constitution which declares that: “The State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The foreign equity
restriction is very clear. Anything less than 100% Filipino control is a violation. Conversely, anything
more than exactly 0% foreign control is a violation. (In Re: Rappler, Inc. and Rappler Holdings
Corporation, SEC Resolution 437, July 8, 2017)
a. How is “capital”, in the constitutional sense, defined by the Supreme Court?

For purposes of compliance with the nationalization laws, the Supreme Court ruled in Heirs of
Wilson Gamboa vs. Teves (G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012) that the word “capital” in Sec. 11,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote.
XIIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
264. Basic characteristics of human rights.

Human rights are generally characterized as (a) inherent, (b) fundamental, (c) inalienable, (d)
imprescriptible, (e) indivisible, (f) universal, and (g) interdependent. (Coquia, Human Rights, 2012)
265. Composition of Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission on Human Rights is composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who must be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. (Nachura,
266. Powers and functions of the Commission on Human Rights.
a. To investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights (Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681,
December 2, 1991);
b. To adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court (Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
100150 January 5, 1994);
c. To provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
d. Exercise visitorial powers over jail, prisons, or detention facilities;

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e. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
f. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
g. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;
h. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
i. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
j. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

k. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. (Sec. 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution)
Likewise, the Supreme Court said, in Quisumbing vs. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No. 209283,
March 11, 2015), that the power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman is within the power of the Commission on Human Rights as an entity with its own distinct
personality and is recognized by no less than the Constitution.
XV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE, AND SPORTS
267. What are the essential freedoms of a university?

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university — to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach, (b) what may be taught, (c)
how it shall be taught, and (d) who may be admitted to study. (Sweezy vs. New Hampshire, 354 US 234,
236 [1957] cited in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Technology, G.R. No. L-
40779, November 28, 1975)
268. Is Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution (i.e., highest budgetary priority to education)
mandatory or directory?
While it is true that under Sec. 5(5) of Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign
the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion
of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect
the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
(Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991).
269. Petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, the Board of Medical Education, and the
Center for educational Measurement from enforcing an act which requires the taking and passing
of the National Medical Admission Test as a condition for securing Certificate of Eligibility for
admission to medical schools. The Petitioners invoke Sec. 1, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “the State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.” Are the
Petitioners correct?
No. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382, as amended by R.A. Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act

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of 1959, defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical
Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is
not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.” (Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987)
270. Discuss the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study.
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights
and freedoms, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who
desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that
regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. (Professional Regulation Commission vs. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004).
271. Overview of educational institutions.

Ownership Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased
Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV,
1987 Constitution)
Control and administration The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citizens of the Philippines. (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
Alien schools No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no
group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any
school. The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools
established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless
otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents. (Sec. 4[2],
Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
Tax exemptions All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner
provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may

likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by
law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. (Sec.
4[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
272. ABC College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of
producing physicians who will “emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health”. The
unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of ABC College in Rizal,
instead of Zamboanga City, where it was originally supposed to be located. Later, the Department
of Education and Board of Medical Education authorized the Commission on Medical education to
conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The report of the Commission showed
that ABC College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. The
Commission thus recommended the closure of the said school. ABC College went to the court and
filed a civil case against the Secretary of Education for grave abuse of discretion. Is ABC College
correct?

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No. It is a matter of law that the Secretary of Education exercises the power to enjoin compliance with
the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations
thereof have been committed. (Board of Medical Education vs. Alfonso, G.R. No. 88259, August 10,
1989)
273. What are the legal requisites in order for teachers to acquire permanent employment?
Probationary employment of professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards
established by the Department of Education. Full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive
years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent. However, it is the employer, in this case the
school, which sets the standards and determine whether or not the services of an employee are
satisfactory. It is the prerogative of an employer to determine whether or not the said standards have been
complied with. In fact, it is the right of the employer to shorten the probationary period if he is impressed
with the services of the employees. This prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and
to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and
constitutional autonomy which give educational institution the right to choose who should teach.
(Cagayan Capitol College vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 90010-11, September
14, 1990).
274. Can the Courts interfere with the policy of the school on conferment of honors?
No. It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and
guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within
the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who
are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter
may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise. (University of San Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79237, October 18, 1988).
275. Limitations on academic freedom.
a. The dominant police power of the State; and

b. The social interests of the community. (Kay vs. Board of Higher Education of New York, 173 Miss
943 [1940])
XVI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
276. Latin phrases relevant to Public International Law.
a. Obligations erga omnes – those obligations which, by virtue of their nature and importance, are
the concern of all States and for whose protection all States have a legal interest (Belgium vs.
Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, February 5, 1970). It is a Latin phrase literally means “towards everyone”. In
International Law, the concept refers to specifically determined obligations that states have
towards the international community as a whole.
b. Jus cogens – norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character (Ocampo vs. Abando, GR. No.
176830, February 11, 2014). It means “compelling law” and is also called peremptory norm.
c. Ex aequo et bono – basis for decision by an international tribunal on the grounds of justice and
fairness. It is an alternate means of decision-making in place of the normally employed legal rules
of treaties and custom (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice). It is a Latin term which
means “what is just and fair or according to equity and good conscience” (Bernas, International
Law, 2009).

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d. Opinio juris – the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory. (Bernas, International Law,
2009)
e. Pacta sunt servanda – every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
f. Rebus sic stantibus – a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties.
(Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
g. Par in parem non habet imperium – even the strongest State cannot assume jurisdiction over
another State, no matter how weak, or question the validity of its acts in so far as they are made to
take effect within its own territory. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
h. Restitutio in integrum – a Latin phrase meaning "returning everything to the state as it was
before". This principle is commonly followed by courts while awarding damages in common law
negligence cases. The amount of damages awarded should be sufficient bring the plaintiff back to
the position as if no tort has been committed. (Germany vs. Poland, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9 [1927])
277. Distinguish International Law from Municipal Law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW MUNICIPAL LAW
Nature Law of Coordination: Result of Law of Subordination: Command
agreement among the equal states issued by a political superior to those
forming the family of nations. subject to its authority.
What does it regulate? Regulates relations of States and other Regulates relations of individual among
international persons. themselves or with their State.
Basis and contents Derived principally from treaties, Consists mainly of statutory enactments,
international customs and general and to lesser extent, executive orders
principles of law. and judicial pronouncements.
Enforcement Enforced by subject themselves through Enforced by regular and pre-existing
methods of self-help. machinery for administration of justice.
Responsibility Entails collective responsibility Entails individual responsibility
278. Theoretical approaches to the relationship of municipal law and international law.
MUNICIPAL LAW INTERNATIONAL LAW
Monist Both laws contend that law is essentially a command binding upon the subjects independently of
their will, and it is ultimately the conduct of individuals which it regulates.
Dualist Issued by a political superior for observance Not imposed but adopted by states as a common rule
by those under its authority. of action.
Consists mainly of enactments of the law- Derived from sources such as international customs,
making authority. conventions, and the general principles of law.
Regulates relations of individuals among Applies to relations between states and international
themselves or with their own states. persons.
Violations are redressed through local judicial Resolved through state-to-state transactions.
and administrative process.
Breaches entail individual responsibility Responsibility is usually collective, in the sense that
it attaches directly to the state and not to its
nationals. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
279. Rules in resolving conflicts between international law and municipal law.
From the point of view municipal tribunal International Law vs. Constitution: Uphold the
Constitution
Constitution vs. Treaty: Uphold the constitution
International vs. Statute: What comes last in time will
usually be upheld by the municipal tribunal (Bernas,

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International Law, 2009)
From the point of view of international tribunal Since the rights and obligations of a State in its
international relations are determined by international
law, it is this law, and not the municipal law of the State,
which provides the standards by which to determine the
legality of its conduct (Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1982)
280. Distinguish Doctrine of Incorporation from Doctrine of Transformation.

DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION
International law is part of the municipal law This is based on a strict dualist approach. Since the two
automatically without the necessity for the interposition systems are distinct and operate separately, for
of a constitutional ratification procedure. international law to become part of domestic law it must
be expressly and specifically transformed into domestic
law through the appropriate constitutional machinery
such as an act of Congress or Parliament. This doctrine
flows by analogy from what is applicable to treaties.
Treaties do not become part of the law of a State, unless
it is consented to by the state. (Bernas, International
Law, 2009)
281. How does the Doctrine of Incorporation operate in the Philippines in relation to treaties?
In the case of treaties as international law, they become part of the law of the land when concurred in by
the Senate in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which sets down the mechanism
for transforming a treaty into binding municipal law. With regard to customary law and treaties which
have become customary law, by saying that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land,” the Constitution manifests its adherence to the “dualist”
theory and at the same time adopts the incorporation theory and thereby makes international law part of
domestic law. This provision makes the Philippines one of the states which make a specific declaration
that international law has the force also of domestic law. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
282. What are the sources of international law?

Primary Sources
a. Treaties or conventions – must be concluded by a sizable number of states and thus reflect the
will or at least the consensus of the family of nations (Cruz, International Law, 2003);
b. Customs – practice which has grown up between states and has come to be accepted as binding by
the mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time (Fenwick, International Law, 1948);
and
c. General principles of law – derived from the law of nature and are observed by the majority of
States because they are believed to be good and just (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
Secondary Sources
a. Decisions of courts (Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice);

b. Writings of publicists (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
283. State the Persistent Objector Principle.

An existing customary law or rule would not apply to a State if:
a. it objected to any outside attempts to apply the rule to itself (a) at the initial stages and (b) in a

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consistent manner (United Kingdom vs. Norway, ICJ 3 [1951]); and
b. if other states did not object to its resistance. (Colombia vs. Peru, ICJ 6 [1950])
284. What are the subjects of international law?
a. State – a group of people living together in a definite territory under an independent government
organized for political ends and capable of entering into international relations. (Cruz,
International Law, 2003);
b. International organizations – institutions established by a treaty composed of members that are

states or international organizations regulated by international law and endowed with a legal
personality and thus generally can engage in contracts and can sue and be sued in national courts,
subject to certain immunities. (Roque, Primer on Public International Law, 2014)
c. Individuals – basic unit of the society, national or international (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
285. What are the elements of a State?

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states or sovereignty. (Art. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States)
286. What are the requisites of a valid treaty?

To be valid, a treaty must: (a) be entered into by parties with treaty-making capacities; (b) through their
authorized representatives; (c) without the attendance of duress, fraud, mistake, or other vices of consent;
(d) on any lawful subject matter; and (e) in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
(Cruz, International Law, 2003)
287. Distinguish State from Nation.

On one hand, a State may be defined as a group of people living together in a definite territory under an
independent government organized for political ends and capable of entering into international relations.
State is a legal concept. On the other hand, nation indicates a relation of birth or origin and implies a
common race, usually characterized by community of language and customs (Hackworth, Digest of
International Law, 1943). It is only a racial or ethnic concept. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
288. Discuss the Treaty-Making Process.
a. Negotiation – the State Representative discusses the terms and provisions of the treaty.
b. Adoption – when the form and content have been settled by the negotiating States, the treaty is
adopted. This is only preparatory to (a) the authentication of the text of the treaty and (b) the
signing thereof. (Art. 9, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
c. Authentication – a definitive text of the treaty is established as the correct and authentic one (Art.
10, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)
d. Expression of consent – the State Parties express their consent to be bound by the terms of the
treaty.
e. Registration – the treaty is then registered with the secretariat of the United Nations. If not
registered, the treaty may not be invoked before any United Nations Organ (Art. 102[2], United
Nations Charter)

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289. How may a treaty be terminated?
a. By expiration of the term, which may be fixed or subject to a resolutory condition;

b. By accomplishment of the purpose;
c. By impossibility of performance;
d. By loss of the subject matter;
e. By desistance of the parties, through express mutual consent;
f. By the exercise of the right of denunciation (or withdrawal), when allowed;
g. By novation;
h. By extinction of one of the parties if the treaty is bipartite;
i. By vital change of circumstances;
j. By outbreak of war between the parties; and
k. By voidance of the treaty because of defects in its conclusion, violation of its provisions by one of
the parties, or incompatibility with international law or the United Nations Charter. (Cruz,
290. Instances of invalid treaties.
a. If the treaty violates a jus cogens norm of international law;

b. If the conclusion of a treaty is procured by threat or use of force;
c. Error of fact, provided that such fact formed an essential basis of a state’s consent to be bound;
d. If the representative of a state was corrupted to consent by another negotiating state;
e. If consent was obtained through fraudulent conduct of another negotiating state;
f. If the representative consented in violation of specific restrictions on authority, provided the
restriction was notified to the other negotiating states prior to the representative expressing such
consent;
g. If consent was given in violation of provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties that is manifest and of fundamental importance.
291. What are the grounds to invalidate a treaty?
a. Error;
b. Fraud;
c. Corruption of the representative of a State;
d. Coercion of a representative of a State;
e. Coercion of a State by the threat of force;
f. Conflict with peremptory norms (Arts. 48-53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)
292. Is Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement a treaty or an executive agreement?

Absent the concurrence of Senate, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is in the form of an
Executive Agreement as validly entered into by the President pursuant to the power of granted to the

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executive to administer affairs of the state. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January
12, 2016)
a. Does Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement violate the prohibition of entry of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippine Territory?
No. The President, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, if: (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The prohibition on entry
of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippine Territory in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities and not the supplement of an existing law or treaty. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos.
212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016)
b. Distinguish Treaty from Executive Agreement.
TREATY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Subject Matter a. Political issues a. Transitory effectivity
b. Changes in national policy b. Adjusts details to carry out well-
c. Involves agreements of a established national policies and
permanent character traditions
c. Temporary implements treaties,
statutes, policies
Ratification Requires ratification by the 2/3 of the Does not require concurrence by Senate to
Senate to be valid and effective. (Sec. be binding. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, G.R. No.
21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) 138570, October 10, 2000)
293. Modes of acquiring and losing territory.

MODES OF ACQUIRING MODES OF LOSING
a. By discovery and occupation - the acquisition of a. By abandonment or dereliction – where the state
terra nullius, that is, territory which prior to exercising sovereignty over it physically
occupation belonged to no state or which may withdraws from it with the intention of
have been by a prior occupant. Discovery of abandoning it altogether;
terra nullius is not enough to establish b. By cession;
sovereignty. It must be accompanied by effective c. By subjugation;
control. (United States vs. The Netherlands,
d. By erosion;
P.C.A., 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 829
[1928]); e. By revolution; and
b. By prescription – acquired through the exercised f. By natural causes. (Cruz, International Law,
of public, peaceful, and uninterrupted titre de 2003)
souverain which endures for a certain length of
time (Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in
International Law, 1950);
c. By cession – a method by which territory is
transferred from one state to another by
agreement between them (Cruz, International
Law, 2003);
d. By subjugation – territory is deemed acquired
when, having been previously conquered or
occupied in the course of war by the enemy, it is
formally annexed to it at the end of that war
(Cruz, International Law, 2003); and
e. By accretion – accomplished through both natural
and artificial processes, as by the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil on the coasts of the
country through the action of the water, or
effectively by reclamation projects. (Cruz,

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294. Doctrines relative to recognition of States.
a. Tobar or Wilson Doctrine – recognition shall not be extended to any government established by
revolution, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected
representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government;
b. Stimson Doctrine – it was incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to
recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the
Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris; and
c. Estrada Doctrine – the Mexican government declared that it would, as it saw fit, continue or
terminate its relations with any country in which political upheaval had taken place and in so
doing it does not pronounce judgment, either precipitately or a posteriori, regarding the right of
foreign nations to accept, maintain, or replace their government or authorities. (Cruz, International
Law, 2003)
295. Kinds of de facto governments.
a. That which is established by the inhabitants who rise in revolt against and depose the legitimate
regime;
b. That which is established in the course of war by the invading forces of one belligerent in the
territory of the other belligerent, the government of which is also displaced; and
c. That which is established by the inhabitants of a state who secede therefrom without overthrowing
its government. (Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945)
296. Effects of recognition of States and Governments.
a. Full diplomatic relations are established, except where the government recognized is de facto
(Fenton Textiles Association vs. Krassin, 38 T.L.R. 289 [1921]);
b. The recognized state or government acquires the right to sue in the courts of the recognizing state;
c. The recognized state or government has a right to the possession of the properties of its
predecessor in the territory of the recognizing state (De Haber vs. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171
[1851]); and
d. All acts of the recognized state or government are validated retroactively, preventing the
recognizing state from passing upon their legality in its own courts. (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
297. Classification of States.
1. Independent States, having full international personality.

a. Simple States – one which is placed under a single and centralized government
exercising power over both its internal and external affairs;
b. Composite States – consists of two or more states, each with its own separate
government but bound under a central authority exercising, to a greater or less degree,
control over their external relations;
i. Real Union – created when two or more states are merged under a unified
authority so that they form a single international person through which they act
as one entity;
ii. Federal Union (or Federation) – a combination of two or more sovereign

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states which upon merger cease to be states, resulting in the creation of a new
state with full international personality to represent them in their external
relations, as well as certain degree of power over their domestic affairs and their
inhabitants;
iii. Confederation – an organization of states which retain their internal

sovereignty and, to some degree, their external sovereignty, while delegating to
the collective body power to represent them as a whole for certain limited and
specified purposes;
iiii. Personal Union – two or more independent states are brought together under
the rule of the same monarch who, nevertheless, does not become one
international person for the purpose of representing any or all of them; and
v. Incorporate Union – a union of two or more states under a central authority

empowered to direct both their external and internal affairs and possessed of a
separate international personality.
2. Dependent States, which do not have full control of their external relations.
i. Protectorate – established at the request of the weaker state for the protection by
a stronger power ; and
ii. Suzerainty – the result of a concession from a state to a former colony that is
allowed to be independent subject to the retention by the former sovereign of
certain powers over the external affairs of the latter. (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
298. Generally accepted methods by which a status of a State is acquired.
a. Revolution;
b. Unification;
c. Secession;
d. Assertion of independence;
e. Agreement; and
f. Attainment of civilization (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
299. State the Principle of State Continuity.

From the moment of its creation, the State continues as a juristic being notwithstanding changes in its
circumstances, provided only that they do not result in loss of any of its essential elements (Cruz,
International Law, 2003). Once its identity as an international person has been fixed and its position in
the international community established, the State continues to be the same corporate person whatever
changes may take place in its international operation and government (Fenwick, International Law,
1948)
300. What is a Neutralized State?

An independent state, whether it be simple or composite, may be neutralized through the agreement with
other States by virtue of which the latter will guarantee its integrity and independence provided it refrains
from taking any act that will involve it in war or other hostile activity, except for defensive purposes.
(Cruz, International Law, 2003)
301. State the Drago Doctrine.

The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed forces for the recovery of contract debts

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claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its
nationals. (Art. 1, Hague Convention of 1907)
a. State the Porter Resolution, as the exception to the Drago Doctrine.

The Drago Doctrine is, however, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply
to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis from being agreed
on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award. (Art. 1, Hague Convention of 1907)
302. Give a summary of West Philippine Sea Arbitration between Philippines and China. (Republic of
the Philippines vs. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19)
a. As to jurisdiction
Art. 288 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that “In the event of a
dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of
that court or tribunal.”
b. As to Nine-Dash Line
The Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines the
scope of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits
imposed therein. As between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line,’ are contrary to the Convention and
without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of
China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the Convention
superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits
imposed therein.
303. What is the Right of Legation?

The right of the state to send and receive diplomatic missions, which enables States to carry on friendly
intercourse. This is also known as Diplomatic Intercourse. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
304. Who are the agents of diplomatic intercourse?
a. Heads of States – the embodiment of or at least the sovereignty of his State;

b. Foreign Secretary – the immediate representative of the Head of State and directly under his
control;
c. Diplomatic Envoys – members of the foreign service who are accredited by the Sending State as
its permanent envoys to represent it in the States with which it is maintaining diplomatic relations;
and
d. Diplomatic Corps – a body constituting of the different diplomatic representatives who have been
accredited to the same local or Receiving State. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
305. Define the following:
a. Exequaur – The authorization given to the consul by the sovereign of the receiving State, allowing

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him to exercise his function within the territory. (Art. 12[1], Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations)
b. Letter de creance – The instrument by which a head of state appoints ("accredits") ambassadors to
foreign countries. (Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 2005)
c. Consules missi – Professional and career consuls, and nationals of the appointing state.
d. Consules electi – Selected by the appointing state either from its own citizens or from among
nationals abroad.
e. Protocol de cloture – Summary of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually

includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts
agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.
f. Alternat – The practice among diplomats of regulating precedence among powers of equal rank by
lot or in a certain regular order; especially the practice in the signing of treaties and conventions of
giving each power the copy on which it appears at the head of the list of signatories.
g. Concordat – Bilateral treaty stipulated between the Holy See and a State to regulate subjects
relating to the organization and activities of the Roman Catholic Church inside that State.
306. What are the functions of a diplomatic mission?
a. Represent the Sending State in the Receiving State;

b. Protect in the Receiving State the interests of the Sending State and its nationals;
c. Negotiate with the government of the Receiving State;
d. Ascertain by all lawful means conditions and developments in the Receiving State and report
thereon to the government of the Sending State; and
e. Promote friendly relations between the Sending and Receiving States and developing their
economic, cultural, and scientific relations. (Art. 3, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations)
307. Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Privileges.

DIPLOMATC MISSION CONSULAR MISSION
a. Personal inviolability (Art. 29, Vienna Convention a. Right to official communication (Art. 35, Vienna
on Diplomatic Relations); Convention on Consular Relations);
b. Immunity from jurisdiction; b. Inviolability of archives (Art. 33, Vienna
c. Inviolability of diplomatic premises (Art. 22, Convention on Consular Relations);
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations); c. Exempt from local jurisdiction for crimes
d. Inviolability of archives (Art. 24, Vienna committed in the discharge of official functions
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); (Art. Arts. 40 and 43, Vienna Convention on
e. Inviolability of communication (Art. 27, Vienna Consular Relations)
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); d. Exempt from taxation (Art. 49, Vienna Convention
f. Exemption from testimonial duties (Art. 27, Vienna on Consular Relations);
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); e. Exempt from customs duties (Art. 50, Vienna
g. Exemption from taxation (Arts. 33, 34, and 36, Convention on Consular Relations);
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations); f. Exempt from service in the militia (art. 48, Vienna
h. Freedom of movement (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); and
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); g. Exempt from social security rules (Art. 28, Vienna
i. Exempt from all personal service of any kind Convention on Consular Relations)
whatever and from military obligations (Art. 35,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations);
and
j. Right to use the flag and emblem of the Sending
State on the premises of the mission (Art. 20,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations)

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308. What is statelessness?
Statelessness is the status of having no nationality, as a consequence of being born without any
nationality, or as a result of deprivation or loss of nationality. (Labo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
a. Who is a stateless person? What are its kinds?

These are persons not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its laws.
Stateless persons are those who do not have a nationality. They are either de jure or de facto
stateless. De jure stateless persons are those who have lost their nationality, if they had one, and
have not acquired a new one. De facto stateless persons are those who have a nationality but to
whom protection is denied by their state when out of the state. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
b. What are the consequences of being stateless?
1. No state can intervene or complain on behalf of a stateless person for any wrong suffered by
him through the act or omission of another state for no international delinquency is committed
in inflicting injury upon him. Any wrong suffered by him through the act or omission of a
state would be damnum absque injuria for, in theory, no other state had been offended and no
international delinquency committed as a result of the damage caused upon him;
2. He cannot be expelled by a state if he is lawfully in its territory, except on grounds of national

security or public order; and
3. He cannot avail himself of the protection and benefits of citizenship, like securing for himself
a passport or visa and personal documents. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
309. Who is a Refugee?

A refugee is an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence who is
unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. (Sec. 1[A][2], 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees)
310. State the Principle of Refoulement.

No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (Art. 33[1], 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees)
311. What is the Right of Asylum?

It is the power of the state to allow an alien who has sought refuge from prosecution or persecution to
remain within the territory and under its protection. A privilege granted by a state to allow a persecuted
alien to enter and to remain in its territory, under its protection. (Art. 14[1], Universal Declaration of
Human Rights)
a. What are its kinds?
1. Territorial Asylum – seeking asylum in another country for fear of being persecuted. This

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exists only when stipulated in a treaty or justified by established usage. It may depend on the
liberal attitude of the Receiving State on the ground of “territorial supremacy”.
2. Diplomatic Asylum – An asylum granted by a State not on its physical territory. It is granted
only when stipulated in a treaty or where established usage allows it, but within “narrowest
limits” or when the life or liberty of a person is threatened by imminent violence. The asylum
may be in the premises of legation building (e.g., embassy), warships, or international
institutions. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
312. What is Yogyakarta Principles? Does it have binding effect in the Philippines?
The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and
gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 Principles adopted by human rights practitioners and
experts, together with recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, civil
society, and the United Nations.
The Supreme Court enunciated that, at this time, the Philippines is not prepared to declare that the
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law,
and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Art. 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.
Not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is automatically a
human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the
"soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-
meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 [J. De Castillo])
313. State the Doctrine of State Responsibility.

Under this Doctrine, a state may be held responsible for an international delinquency, directly or
indirectly imputable to it, which causes injury to the national of another state. Liability will attach to the
State where its treatment of the alien falls below the international standard of justice or where it is remiss
in according him the protection or redress that is warranted by the circumstances. Its function is to assure
the traveler that when his rights are violated in a foreign State, he will not be denied any remedy simply
because he is not one of its nationals. The idea, in other words, is to encourage more intercourse among
the peoples of the world through inter-visitation of their respective countries. (Cruz, International Law,
2003)
a. Define the “international standard of justice”.

Some writers describe it as the standard of the reasonable State, that is, referring to the ordinary
norms of official conduct observed in civilized jurisdictions. It is deemed not satisfied if the laws
of a State are intrinsically unjust. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
b. State the Doctrine of Equality of Treatment.

Where the laws of the State fall below the international standards of justice, it is no defense that
they are not applicable not only to aliens but as well, and equally, to the nationals of the State. The
relations of that State with its own nationals are purely municipal; international law is involved in

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its relations with the nationals of other States. (Cruz, International Law, 2003)
314. What is the Calvo Clause?

This is a stipulation by which the alien waives or restricts his right to appeal to his own State in
connection with any claim arising from the contract and agrees to limit himself to the remedies available
under the laws of the local State. The Calvo Clause may be enforced as a lawful condition of the contract.
However, it may not be interpreted to deprive the alien’s State of the right to protect or vindicate his
interest in case they are injured in another State as such waiver can legally be made not by him but by his
own State. (North American Dredging Co. [United States of America] vs. United States of Mexico,
General Claims Commission, 1926)
315. Principles of State Jurisdiction.
a. Territoriality Principle – As a general rule, a State has jurisdiction over all persons and property
within its territory. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessary, exclusive,
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitations not imposed by itself. (The Schooner Exchange vs.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 [1812])
b. Nationality Principle – A court has jurisdiction if the offender is a national of the State.
c. Protective Principle – A court is vested with jurisdiction if a national interest or policy is injured
or violated. The international community has strictly construed the reach of this doctrine to those
offenses posing a direct, specific threat to national security.
d. Universality Principle – Jurisdiction is asserted with respect to acts considered committed against
the whole world. (People of the Philippines vs. Lol-lo, G.R. No. L-17958, February 27, 1922)
e. Passive Personality Principle – A court has jurisdiction if the victim of the act is a national of the
Forum State. (France v. Turkey, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927)
316. Jurisdictions of International Court of Justice from International Criminal Court.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The International Court of Justice acts as a world court. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction
The Court’s jurisdiction is twofold: it decides, in over individuals who commit genocide, crimes against
accordance with international law, disputes of a legal humanity and war crimes, and crimes of aggression,
nature that are submitted to it by States (jurisdiction in subject to conditions under the ICC Statute. (Art. 25[1],
contentious cases); and it gives advisory opinions on Statute of International Criminal Court)
legal questions at the request of the organs of the United
Nations, specialized agencies or one related organization
authorized to make such a request (advisory jurisdiction).
(Arts. 35 and 65, Statute of International Court of
Justice)
317. How may a Signatory State withdraw from the International Criminal Court?
Art. 127 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date
of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from
this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may
have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection
with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a
duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal

Page 96 of 99
became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter
which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal
became effective.
318. Distinguish Extradition from Deportation.

EXTRADITION DEPORTATION
Definition It is the surrender of a fugitive by one State It is the expulsion of an alien who is
to another where he is wanted for considered undesirable by the local State,
prosecution or, if already convicted, for usually but not necessarily to his own State.
punishment. The surrender is made at the
request of the latter State on the basis of an
extradition treaty.
Who effects It is effected on the basis of an extradition Effected on account of the unilateral act of
treaty or upon the request of another state. the local State.
Basis Based on offenses generally committed in Based on causes arising in the local State.;
the State of origin.
Implementation Call for the return of the fugitive to the An undesirable alien may be deported to a
State of origin. Extradition requires the State other than his own or the State of
transfer of an individual from the sending origin
State to the requesting State on the basis of
a treaty obligation.
For whose benefit Effected for the benefit of the State to Effected for the protection of the State
which the person being extradited will be expelling an alien because his presence is
surrendered because he is a fugitive in that not conducive to the public good.
State.
Receiving State The alien will be surrendered to the state The undesirable alien may be sent to any
asking for his extradition. state willing to accept him. (Cruz,
319. What is the nature of extradition? Discuss the process.

Extradition means the surrender of a person by one state to another state where he is wanted for
prosecution or, if already convicted, for punishment. The process is as follows:
1. A request for extradition is presented through diplomatic channels to the state of refuge with
the necessary papers for identification.
2. The request is received by the state of refuge.

3. A judicial investigation is conducted by the state of refuge to ascertain if the crime is covered
by the extradition treaty and if there is a prima facie case against the fugitive according to its
own law.
4. If there is a prima facie case, a warrant of surrender will be drawn and the fugitive will be
delivered to the state of origin (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18,
2000)
320. What are the postulates of extradition?
a. Extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime.

b. The Requesting State will accord due process to the Accused.
c. The proceedings are sui generis.
d. Compliance shall be in good faith.
e. There is an underlying risk of flight. (U.S.A. vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)

Page 97 of 99
321. Generations of Human Rights.
a. First Generation of Human Rights – It covers civil and political rights. It conceives of human
rights more in negative (“freedom from…”). It favors the abstention rather than the intervention of
the government in the exercise of freedoms and in the quest for human dignity.
b. Second Generation of Human Rights – It covers economic, social, and cultural rights. It
conceives of human rights more in positive terms (“right to…”). They are the fundamental claims
to social equality.
c. Third Generation of Human Rights – It covers collective rights. (Coquia, Human Rights, 2012)
322. State the Principle of Progressive Realization.

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the to
strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the International Convention on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures. (Art. 2, International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights)
323. State the Martens Clause.

In cases not covered by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. (Bernas, International Law, 2009)
324. Principles of International Humanitarian Law.
a. Principle of Distinction – persons fighting in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish
between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives;
b. Principle of Military Necessity – the belligerents may employ any amount and kind of force to
compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible loss of lives, time, and
money;
c. Principle of Humanity – prohibits the use of any measure that is not absolutely necessary for the
purposes of the war;
d. Principle of Chivalry – requires the belligerents to give proper warning before launching a
bombardment or prohibits the use of perfidy in the conduct of hostilities; and
e. Principle of Proportionality – attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss to civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited. (Cruz,
325. Basic Principles in International Environmental Law.
a. Precautionary Principle – a moral and political principle which states that if an action might
cause severe or irreversible harm to the public and to the environment, and in the absence of
scientific proof that such harm shall not follow, the one advocating the action shall have the
burden of proof. Where there is good reason to believe that there is a threat of serious or
irreversible damage to the environment, a lack of full scientific certainty shall not be a valid
excuse to postpone employing cost-effective measures to prevent the damage.

Page 98 of 99
b. Polluter-Pay Principle – the polluting party pays for the damage done to the natural environment.
c. Principle of Sustainable Development – a pattern of resources that aims to meet human needs
while preserving the environment so that these needs are met not only in the present, but in the
indefinite future.
d. Principle of Subsidiarity – things that an individual can do himself, should not be transferred to
society. If the individual is not capable of solving certain problems, the society is obliged to give
aid.
e. Principle of Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities – recognizes historical differences in

the contributions of developed and developing States to global environmental problems, and
differences in their respective economic and technical capacity to tackle these problems.
f. Principle of Good Neighborliness – prohibits States from using or permitting the use of its
territory in a manner that is injurious to another State, or that other State’s persons or property.
(Bernas, International Law, 2009)
326. May a State who caused transboundary pollution be held responsible by another State?
Yes. It is the responsibility of the State to protect other states against harmful act by individuals from
within its jurisdiction at all times. No state has the right to use or permit the use of the territory in a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein as
stipulated under the principles of international law. (U.S. vs. Canada, 33 AJIL 182 [1939] and 35 AJIL
684 [1941])
HAIL TO THE CHIEFS!

Page 99 of 99

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I.

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

1. What are the basic principles of constitutional interpretation?

2. Distinguish Amendment from Revision.

3. Amendatory or Revision Process

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4. Limitations on Amendment through People’s Initiative

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. Illustration of Philippine Maritime Regimes.

(Source: University of Maine School of Law)

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3. Territorial Sea – extends up to 12 nautical miles outward from the baselines.

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10. State the Double Effect Doctrine.

c. Section 23(a)(2)(i): allowing a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, to

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12. What is the nature of the Visiting Forces Agreement?

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

14. Distinguish Initiative from Referendum.

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15. Qualifications of Senators, District Representatives, and Party-List Nominees.

charged, they are ​

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d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and under-represented” or “lacking

18. Grounds for refusal or cancellation of Registration.

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21. Distinguish Incompatible Office from Forbidden Office.

22. What is an Enrolled Bill? State the Enrolled Bill Theory.

24. What is the composition of Commission on Appointments?

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26. Distinguish Legislative Inquiry from Oversight Function.

27. Distinguish Inquiry in Aid of Legislation from Question Hour.

28. Distinguish Bicameralism from Unicameralism.

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30. What is Pork Barrel System? Is it valid and constitutional?

a. Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment

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1. Congressional Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum discretionary fund wherein

31. What is Impoundment?

a. What are the sources of impoundment?

b. May the Disbursement Acceleration Program be considered as impoundments by the

No, there is no executive impoundment in the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

32. State the Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions.

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33. Discuss the Power of Augmentation.

a. What is a “cross-border” transfer? Is it allowed?

IIII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

34. Qualifications of the President.

a. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

35. What is the rule on presidential immunity?

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1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

2. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of

3. The presidential communications privilege is a qualified privilege that may be

b. What are the varieties of Executive Privilege?

3. Generic Privilege for Internal Deliberations – attaches to intra-governmental

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a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and

38. What are the classification of appointments?

a. Distinguish disapproved ad interim appointment from by-passed appointment.

39. Distinguish ad interim appointment from appointment in acting capacity.

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42. State the “Take-Care” or Faithful Execution Clause.

charged, they are

probable cause as the standard of proof in