Civpro 3rd Syllabus Digest

THIRD SYLLABUS CASE DIGESTS
CASE NAME NAME

1 Obando v. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. v. J.O.S. Managing

2 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
Builders, Inc. v. United Overseas Bank Philippines
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM

3 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
Prime Holdings Inc., G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Aguirre, G.R. Nos.

4 Bautista, Rey Matthew
170746-47, March 9, 2016
5 Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply Inc. Capellan, Ace Lemuel
6 Maramag v. Maramag Cruz, Joan mae
Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No.

7 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
198680, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 778
Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk v. Spouses Sison, G.R. No.

8 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
191132, January 27, 2016
9 Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, August 6, 2018 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
FAJ Construction v. Saulog, G.R. No. 200759,

10 Dulay, Robert Ross
March 25, 2015
11 Macedonio v. Ramo, G.R. No. 193516, March 24, 2014 Esquilona, Veniflor
12 Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
13 Blay v. Baña, G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
14 Yap-Co v. Uy, G.R. No. 209295, February 11, 2015 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty, G.R. No. 207376,

15 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
August 6, 2014
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative,

16 Julian, Jenelyn D.
G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of

17 Lagasca, James Ellis
Miñoza, G.R. No. 186045, February 2, 2011
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,

18 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
G.R. No. 178221, December 1, 2010
19 Otto Gmur Inc. v. Revilla, 55 Phil. 627 Manalili, Mart
20 Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 170 Manliclic, Marianne P.
21 Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, Mercado, Ralph Louie
February 16, 2010
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.

22 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
175573, September 11, 2008
Office of the Ombudsman v. de Chavez, G.R. No.

23 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.
172206, July 3, 2013
24 Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
25 People v. Montejo, L-24154, October 31, 1967 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC.

26
November 29, 2005 III
27 Autographics Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 198 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
DFA v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858,

28 Saligan, Constantine
June 29, 2016
Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515,

29 Santiago, Melody R.
October 31, 2008
Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. v. UCPB General

30 Sibal, Tricia
Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 146018, June 25, 2003
31 Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Africa), G.R. No. 152375,

32 Songco, Ken Felix C
December 16, 2011
Ayala Land Inc. v. Judge Tagle, G.R. No. 153667,

33 Sy, Exequiel
August 11, 2005
Spouses Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145,

34 Viran, Archimedes John
February 5, 2014
Diman v. Judge Alumbres, G.R. No. 131466,

35 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
November 27, 1998
36 Duque v. Yu, Jr., G.R. No. 226130, February 19, 2018 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville

37 Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700, April 10, Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
2013
Yu v. Basilio Magno Construction, G.R. No. 138701-02,

October 17, 2006
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375,

39 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152
40 Corp. v. Mangosing, 70 SCRA 598 Cruz, Joan mae

41 Superlines Transportation Co. v. Victor, 124 SCRA 939 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
42 Vallacar Transit v. Yap, 126 SCRA 500 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
Metrobank v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677,

43 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
February 18, 2013
Maraño v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 196592,

April 6, 2015
45 Claudio v. Saraza, G.R. No. 213286, August 26, 2015 Esquilona, Veniflor
46 Republic v. de Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
Agoy v. Araneta Center Inc., G.R. 196358,

47 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 883
48 Navarra v. Liongson, G.R. No. 217930, April 18, 2016 Lagasca, Ellis
Multinational Village Homeowners’ Association v.

Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017
Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corp.,

G.R. No. 206841-42, January 19, 2018
GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.,

G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013
52 Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
53 Bank of Philippine Islands v. Yu, January 20, 2010 Manalili, Mart
54 Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, 654 SCRA 643 Manliclic, Marianne P.
Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251,

55 Mercado, Ralph Louie
July 9, 2014
56 Basbas v. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
Philippine National Bank v. San Miguel Corp.,

G.R. No. 186063, January 15, 2014
58 Fernando v. Santamaria, December 10, 2004 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899,

59 Lagasca, Ellis
November 15, 2010
60 Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017 Sibal, Tricia
DIGESTS PROPER
RULE 16, RULES OF COURT
Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

1 Obando v. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148
B.
FACTS: Alegria Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for
settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras. While settlement of
the estate was pending, she died and Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of Jose
and Alegria. Not long after, a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Dona Alegrias Last Will
and Testament was filed by Felizardo S. Obando, a nephew of Dona Alegria. The alleged Will
bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and several other members of the Obando clan properties left
by the Figueras couple, including two parcels of land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon
City. When the probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Obando was
appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estates.
As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was submitted to the NBI
for examination; it was found that the questioned and the standard signatures were not made by
the same person. Obando was convicted for estafa through falsification of a public document.
The probate court denied Eduardo’s Motion for authority to sell the aforementioned two parcels
of land in New Manila. Despite such, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation.
The probate court removed Obando from his office as co-administrator of the estate.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the civil case to which the trial
court granted the motion. Obando then filed an MR but to no avail. Petitioner argues that the
motion to dismiss was invalid since at the time of the filing, Atty. Yuseco no longer represented
the respondents, as shown by Eduardo’s Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998,
dispensing with said counsel’s services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise Agreement
with Petitioner Obando.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COULD ACT ON A MOTION FILED BY A LAWYER
WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY NO LONGER EDUARDO’S COUNSEL OF RECORD?
HELD: Petitioners claim that when Atty. Joaquin Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss, he no longer
represented the respondents, as shown by Eduardo’s Manifestation and Motion, dispensing with
said counsels services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner
Obando.
No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance
with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the
following requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for substitution;
(2) the clients written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be
substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the
application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the
attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules.
In this case,the SC said that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former
manifested that he had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation
and Motion and Compromise Agreement. At the discretion of the court, an attorney who has
already been dismissed by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the clients
rights. In the present case, had there been any irregularity, it should have been raised by the
respondents, not the petitioners.
ISSUE: WHETHER A MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AFTER THE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

WERE ALREADY MADE CAN STILL BE GRANTED?
HELD: The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only before the filing of a
responsive pleading. Thus, petitioners complain that it was already too late for Respondent
Eduardo Figueras to file a Motion to Dismiss after Obando had finished presenting his evidence.
This is not so. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be
filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss
alleging improper venue cannot be entertained unless made within that period.
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of
action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16
may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed
at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules.
Applying this principle, the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the
civil case based on Petitioner Obando’s lack of legal capacity. It was only after he had been
convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation
of the Figueras’ estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the respondents.
Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss filed after their
Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the
case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss,
even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER OBANDO FOR ESTAFA THROUGH

FALSIFICATION AND THE REVOCATION OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS ADMINISTRATOR,
BOTH OF WHICH ARE ON APPEAL, CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO DISMISS
THE CIVIL CASE?
HELD: Petitioners aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because
Obando’s conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal.
No. This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando
derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-
administrator. When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he
lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figuera’s estates, he could not continue
prosecuting the civil case. Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this
ground. Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove
him from his administration is not a proper issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his
appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras’ estates.
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal from administration are on appeal only
means that his legal standing could be restored; thus, the civil case was correctly dismissed
without prejudice. If his conviction is reversed and his appointment restored by the probate court,
the case may continue without being barred by res judicata. The lower court’s Decision showed
that it was careful in its action. On the other hand, Obando has yet to show that he has regained
administration of the Figuera’s estates. Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from office
was predicated not only on his conviction for a crime, but also on his failure to render an
accounting of the rentals of a property leased to the Community of Learners.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ORDER DISMISSING THE
CIVIL CASE AND THE PREVIOUS ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT?
HELD: Respondent Eduardo Figueras earlier Motion to Dismiss was denied in the trial courts
March 4, 1993 Order. Thus, petitioners allege that the trial court whimsically and capriciously
departed from its previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted
Eduardo’s later Motion to Dismiss.
There is no conflict between these trial court rulings. They were based on different grounds. The
first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity
to sue as co-administrator of the Figuera’s estates. On the other hand, the second Motion was
granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as co-administrator.
The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court.
We see no reversible error in the appellate courts affirmance of the trial court.
J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. v. United Overseas

Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan
2 Bank Philippines, G.R. No. 219815, September 14,
G
2016
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Petition for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale (annulment
case) against UOBP and Atty Guzman in RTC. Subsequently, on May 17, 2000, the RTC issued
a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents prohibiting them from (a) consolidating the
title to the subject properties and (b) committing any acts prejudicial to petitioners. Eventually, on
June 12, 2008 it also issued a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed an appeal to CA.
On May 5, 2008, while the annulment case was still pending, respondents sold the properties to
Onshore Strategic Assets Inc.
Thus, petitioners filed a Petition to Declare respondents in Contempt of Court in RTC. Petitioners
averred that respondent’s sale of the properties constitutes indirect contempt of court because it
was done in violation of the 2000 writ issued by RTC. The respondents filed MD on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. The Court denied the MD and on appeal to the CA it also
dismissed it.
Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to another RTC branch and respondents filed a 2nd MD and
argued that CA dismissal of the annulment case automatically dissolved or set aside the 200 writ
because a writ of preliminary injunction is merely ancillary to the main case. Therefore, the
contempt case which seeks to punish them become moot and academic. The Court granted
respondent’s motion and dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a MR and respondents filed a Motion
to Expunge the MR claiming petitioners violated the 3-day notice rule under Sec 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules. Respondents alleged that hearing for petitioner’s MR was set on Nov 7, 2014 but they
received the notice only on Nov 6 or 1 day before the scheduled hearing. The Court granted the
ME by the respondents. Petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO

RESPONDENT’S MD AFTER THEIR ANSWER AD CAUTELAM?
HELD: YES. The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Section
4 of the Rules is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process. The purpose
of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but
rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to
study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.
Thus, the test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. When the
adverse party had been afforded such opportunity, and has been indeed heard through the
pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement
is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially
complied with.
Here, respondents claimed to have received the notice for the November 7, 2014 hearing only on
November 6, 2014.37 On the supposed day of hearing, however, RTC Br. 87 issued a Constancia
resetting the hearing to December 5, 2014. Thereafter, on November 11, 2014, respondent filed
a motion to expunge petitioners’ MR.39 Clearly, respondents’ right to due process was not
violated as they were able to oppose petitioner’s MR in the form of their motion to expunge
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM

3 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
Prime Holdings Inc., G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013
FACTS: Respondent is the owner and operator of cinema houses at SM Cebu in Cebu City in
which the Local Government of Cebu City collects amusement tax. On the other hand, RA 9167
created the petitioner, affecting the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines, which has the mandate to give
incentive and reward equivalent the amusement tax to the producers based on merit to encourage
the production of quality film. The City of Cebu filed a declaratory relief petition in Cebu City RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529 against the petitioner seeking the unconstitutionality of
Section 14 of RA 9161 because the revenue from the collection of amusement taxes that would
otherwise accrue to and form part of the general fund of the LGU concerned would now be directly
awarded to a private entity―the producers of graded film.
The petitioner through the OSG sent a demand letter to respondent for the payment of amusement
tax rewards due to the producers of 89 films. Said collection suit was docketed as Civil Case No.
72238 of the RTC of Pasig City. Respondent filed its Reply to petitioner’s Comment maintaining
that its remittance of the amusement tax incentive reward to the City of Cebu extinguished its
obligation to petitioner, and argued that the case should be dismissed on the additional ground of
litis pendentia.
The Pasig City RTC issued the assailed order granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the
action before the Cebu City RTC is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the
parties in Civil Case No. 72238. Moreover, said court found all the elements of litis pendentia
present and accordingly dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: WON THE PASIG CITY RTC ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA?
RULING: The SC denies the petition. The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Petitioner submits that while there is identity of parties in Civil Case Nos. CEB-35529 and 72238,
the second and third requisites are absent. It points out that in the former, it is not claiming any
monetary award but merely prayed for the dismissal of the declaratory relief petition. Moreover,
since the issues raised in the former case are purely legal, petitioner is not necessarily called
upon to present testimonial or documentary evidence to prove factual matters.
Petitioner thus concludes that the judgment in former case would not amount to res judicata in
the latter case. Petitioner further notes that when a judgment dismissing the former case is
appealed and the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9167 are declared constitutional by this Court,
petitioner will not be automatically awarded the unpaid amusement taxes it is claiming against
respondent in Civil Case No. 72238.The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a
party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Aguirre, G.R. Nos.

170746-47, March 9, 2016
FACTS: M/V Dona Paz was an inter-island passenger vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) traversing its Leyte to Manila route on the night of December 20, 1987, when
it collided with M/T Vector, a commercial tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping
Corporation. The heirs of the victims of the tragedy (respondents), instituted a class action with
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, United States of America
(Louisiana Court).
The Louisiana Court entered a conditional judgment dismissing the said case on the ground of
forum non-conveniens. This led the respondents, composed of 1,689 claimants, to file on March
6, 2001 a civil action for damages for breach of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar.
The RTC of Catbalogan, motu proprio dismissed the complaint pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the respondents' cause of action had already prescribed.
The dismissal of the complaint prompted the respondents to have the case reinstated with the
Louisiana Court. The Louisiana Court once again conditionally dismissed the respondents' action,
ordering the latter to bring their claims to the RTC of Manila by intervening in the consolidated
cases filed before the latter court. Following the Louisiana Court's order, the respondents filed a
motion for intervention on May 6, 2002, and a complaint in intervention.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDERS OF THE RTC OF CATBALOGAN BARRED THE
FILING OF THE MOTION AND COMPLAINT FOR INTERVENTION BEFORE THE RTC OF
MANILA?
HELD: YES. The RTC of Manila denied the respondents' motion for intervention on the ground
of the finality of the order of the RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal
remedy perfected in due time by either the petitioners or the respondents. While the RTC of
Catbalogan merely noted the motion for reconsideration in its Order dated September 4, 2001,
the effect is the same as a denial thereof, for the intended purpose of the motion, which is to have
the complaint reinstated, was not realized.
This should have prompted the petitioners to explore and pursue other legal measures to have
the dismissal reversed. Instead, nothing more was heard from the parties until a motion for
intervention was filed by the respondents before the RTC of Manila, in conformity with the order
of the Louisiana Court.Since the dismissal of the complaint was already final and executory, the
RTC of Manila can no longer entertain a similar action from the same parties.
The bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners' execution of waivers of the defense of
prescription, but the effect of finality of an order or judgment on both parties. The petitioners
attempted to justify their failure to file an action to have the orders of the RTC of Catbalogan
annulled by ratiocinating that the respondents precluded them from doing so when the latter filed
their complaint anew with the RTC of Manila.
This is untenable, as it is clear that the respondents filed the said complaint-in-intervention with
the RTC of Manila more than a year after the case was ordered dismissed by the RTC of
Catbalogan.Aside from this, the petitioners offered no other acceptable excuse on why they did
not raise their oppositions against the orders of the RTC of Catbalogan when they had the
opportunity to do so. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that the petitioners abandoned their right
to waive the defense of prescription.
5 Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply Inc. Capellan, Ace Lemuel
6 Maramag v. Maramag Cruz, Joan mae
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners in this case are the legitimate heirs
of deceased Loreto Maramag. The petitioners were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance
policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. Respondents here are the concubine and illegitimate
child of Loreto Maramag. Petitioners claim that Eva, the concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his
murder, is disqualified from being designated of the insurance policies. They further add that Eva’s
children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of
the policies. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the share of Loreto’s
illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to
their respective legitimes
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF MOTION TO DISMISS WAS BASED ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PETITION FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION?
HELD: The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition
failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which
reads
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint
states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action(1) the legal
right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of
the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on
the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on
whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the
general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. The falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

2. Such allegations are legally impossible;
3. The allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. By the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. There is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in
the course of the hearings related to the case.
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued
by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto
and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance
policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the
Insurance Code, Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having
brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the
shares of Loretos illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of
Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment
in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall
be governed by special laws.
Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No.

198680, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 778
FACTS: On July 2010, petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance
with Damages against Gaudioso. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno died intestate
and childless on June 1968 leaving behind four lots which were covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title
to transfer in his name under TCT No. T-2637 and T-2638 to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno's collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno through his certificate of Live Birth, two
letters from Polytechnic School, and a certified true copy of his passport, with an affirmative
defense claiming that petitioners has failed and has no cause of action against him. The RTC
found that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. The previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration does not mean that the petitioners
could already be considered as the decendent's compulsory heirs. The motion for reconsideration
was denied.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC'S DISMISSAL OF THE CASE ON THE GROUND
THAT THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION WAS
PROPER?
HELD: Yes, the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action. The rule that the determination
of a decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes
the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. It must also
be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso's heirship which should be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. The Court denied the petition and affirmed the
dismissal of the Civil Case filed by the petitioners.
Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk v. Spouses Sison, G.R. No.

8 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
191132, January 27, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner, Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk represented by Fr. Gerry Gudmalin, filed a petition
in the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao, to annul the judgment render by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Kabugao-Conner in the Special Civil Case No.32-05-Cr. In the said case, MCTC
ordered the petitioner to refrain from further construction in the respondents property and to
remove, vacate and pay damages to the respondents, Spouses Sison. The petitioner contended,
among other things, that the MCTC render a decision without acquiring jurisdiction over its person.
The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition had no
cause of action and Vicariate of Tabuk had no juridical personality or legal capacity to sue. The
RTC dismissed the motion of the respondents. Upon motion of reconsideration filed by the
respondents, their motion was granted wherein the RTC dismissed the petition filed by the
petitioner for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the case.
ISSUE/S: W/N THE DISMISSAL MADE BY THE RTC OF THE PETITION TO ANNUL THE
JUDGMENT OF THE MCTC WAS VALID?
HELD: YES. the Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal made by the RTC was valid not because
of failure to state a cause of action but due to lack of a cause of action. Failure to state a cause
of action and lack of a cause of action are not the same. Failure to state a cause of action refers
to an insufficiency of the allegations in the petition/Complaint. It is a ground for dismissal under
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court before the defendant or respondent file a responsive pleading.
On the other hand, lack of a cause of action refers to an insufficiency of factual or legal basis to
grant the complaint. It applies to situation where the evidence failed to prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleadings. It is a ground for dismissal using a demurrer of evidence under Rule 33
of the Rules of Court after the plaintiff has completed presenting his evidences. The dismissal
constitutes res judicata on the issue and will bar future suit based on the same cause of action.
In the present case, the petition for annulment of judgment actually stated a cause of action: that
the MCTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner without acquiring jurisdiction over its
person. If the RTC hypothetically admitted this allegation, the petitioner becomes entitled to the
relief prayed for: the annulment of the MCTC judgment.
Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, August 6,

2018
FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed before the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac (MCTC) by petitioner
against respondent Antonio Caisip (respondent).
Petitioner, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park, Concepcion, Tarlac, alleged that
respondent, a resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a promissory note
in her favor in the amount of €2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments. As respondent defaulted
in his obligation under the promissory note and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply,
the latter was constrained to file the said complaint.
Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default
and for the MCTC to render judgment, which was granted in an Order. Accordingly, the case was
submitted for resolution.
The MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of
1991," which requires the prior referral of the dispute between residents of the same barangay for
conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in court. RTC and CA affirmed the case.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner's complaint?
HELD: YES. As a general rule, the grounds in Section 1, Rule 16 must be invoked by the party-
litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such
grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio
dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
In Aquino v. Aure, the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay
conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was
declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was
grave error for the courts a quo to order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground.
Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it proper that the case be reinstated and
remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its resolution on the merits.
FAJ Construction v. Saulog, G.R. No. 200759, March

25, 2015
FACTS: FAJ Construction and Saulog entered into an agreement for the construction of a
residential building in Makati for Php 12.5-M. Payment to FAJ Construction shall be on a progress
billing basis, after inspection of work by Saulog. For 2 progress billing statements, Saulog refused
to pay. FAJ Construction terminated the construction contract, pursuant to Art 27(b) of the Uniform
General Conditions of COngrat for Private Construction (Document 102) of the Construction
Industry Authority of the Philippines. FAJ Construction sent demand letters to Saulog, but Saulog
claimed that FAJ Construction’s work was defective and that it should instead be made liable
thereon.
FAJ Construction filed of sum of money. After several opportunities for the presentation of its first
witness, FAJ failed to proceed with trial. Hence the RTC dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute. CA affirmed the RTC decision, declaring that FAJ adopted a pattern of delay and
impeded the administration of justice. FAJ Construction sought that a new trial of the case be
held; it argued that res judicata cannot be made as basis to deny it the opportunity to question
the dismissal of its case because the dismissal was not an adjudication of the case on its merits.
The SC denied the petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether res judicata apply to this case?
HELD: No. The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed
before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation
among the members of the Court. When the Court does not find any reversible error in the
decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial,
since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a factual
matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. We will not review, much less
reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially where, as in this case, such
findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier of facts.
Macedonio v. Ramo, G.R. No. 193516, March 24,

11 Esquilona, Veniflor
2014
FACTS: On January 6, 2004, Vilma Macedonio filed a civil case for rescission with damages
against Catalina Ramo with the Baguio RTC. The contract to be rescinded was in the form of an
agreement for the purchase by Macedonio of a portion of Ramo’s unregistered lot, assured by
the latter to be free from liens and encumbrances; Macedonio later discovered this assurance to
be untrue, which in time led to the filing of the case. During the course of the proceedings, the
parties mutually agreed to settle.
However, the parties were unable to submit a compromise agreement on the date set by the trial
court, which led to the issuance of an Order dismissing Civil Case for failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, Remo was able to secure a Sales Patent–and later on, a certificate of title over the
subject property in her name. The trial courts issued an Order considering the case
terminated.Later, Ramo caused the subject property to be subdivided into three lots, which she
then transferred to her co-respondents. No part of the property was transferred to Macedonio,
who filed a Motion praying that the trial court issue an Order directing Ramo to return her advance.
Ramo opposed the motion, arguing that the subject of the motion has become moot and academic
for petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s last Order. The trial
court issued a new Order allowing the parties to agree orally on how Macedonio is to be given
her downpayment back, which was done by the parties. All seemed to be well at that point, but
due to a disagreement arising as to how much money should be reimbursed, Macedonio prayed
that the case be set for pre-trial in view of failure to settle the issues between the parties. Ramo
opposed the same manifestation and motion, insisting that the case has been terminated. The
trial court later issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that the Order terminating Civil Case already
became final and executory.
In the meantime, Macedonio filed a written Protest with the office of the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, CAR Branch, seeking an investigation into Ramo’s acquisition of the
subject property. No action has been taken on the protest. On April 21, 2010, Macedonio filed
with the Baguio RTC another civil case–this time for specific performance and annulment of
documents and titles with damages.
Ramo filed her answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that in filing the case, petitioner violated
the rule against forum–shopping since there had already been a prior terminated case and a
pending Protest with the DENR. To this, Macedonio filed her comment and opposition, arguing
that since the previous case was not decided on the merits and no trial was conducted. The trial
court issued an Order dismissing the case with prejudice on the grounds of forum-shopping,
failure to inform the court of the existence of Civil Case No. 5703-R, and litis pendentia.
Macedonio moved to reconsider, but the trial court stood its ground. Thus, this direct recourse.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MACEDONIO’S FAILURE TO INFORM THE TRIAL COURT OF

THE EXISTENCE OF A PREVIOUS CASE GROUND TO DISMISS THE SUBSEQUENT CASE
WITH PREJUDICE?
HELD: NO. It is true that while it was incumbent for petitioner to have informed the trial court of
Civil Case No.5703-R and the pending DENR Protest, this Court is inclined to forego petitioner’s
failure to abide by the requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forum-
shopping, [in] favor of deciding the case on the basis of merit, seeing, as the Court does, that a
rigid interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result insubstantial injustice to petitioner. The
circumstances require that substance must prevail over form, keeping in mind, as the Court has
held countless times, that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice; their application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial
justice.
Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as possible be resolved on the merits and
not on technicalities. Besides, “the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always
applied with inflexibility.” More to the point, “the hallowed office and cardinal objective of the Rules
is to provide, at each possible instance, an expeditious and full resolution of issues involving the
respective rights and liabilities of the parties under substantive law.” “The interests of truth and
justice are better served where the court, giving due consideration to technical objections, goes
deeper into the basic legal merits of the controversy and concentrates itself on the fundamental
principles of fairness and square dealing which always outweigh technical considerations.
Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia

12 Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
E.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
FACTS: It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which
was Po Wing Properties, Incorporated. Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio
Ching with his common-law wife, Lucina Santos. Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other
hand, claim to be Antonio Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne.
Antonio Ching was murdered. After a year of investigating Antonio Ching’s death, the police found
Ramon Ching to be its primary suspect.
The Chengs filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the
RTC Manila. This case was docketed as the first case. The complaint was amended, with leave
of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching
was a primary stockholder. Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The RTC Manila Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
The Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching
and Po Wing Properties (the second case).The Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to
dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. Branch
6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not yet been
served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not yet filed any responsive
pleading. The dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice.
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the
"two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND CASE OPERATED
AS A BAR TO THE FILING OF A THIRD CASE, ASPER THE "TWO-DISMISSAL RULE"
HELD: NO. The "two-dismissal rule"
RULE 17
SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. (Codal)
SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. (Codal)
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. (Codal)
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the
case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice
by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise
declared by the court. The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a
counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court.The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the
plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the
defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise
declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers
motions to dismiss.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is
the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as
an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the
ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in view of the "two-dismissal rule"
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only
new defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants onthe ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court granted that motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the first case was done
at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that had
been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the
second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s
instance. Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before
the service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of
right that is not subject to the trial court’s discretion
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one
prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the
defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not
necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to
determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
13 Blay v. Baña, G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
FACTS: On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently,
respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated December 5, 2014.
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdral his
petition. In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as
remaining for the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply, averring that
respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure
to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which
- according to petitioner - was required under the same Rules of Court provision.
In particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30,
2015. However, respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on
March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial
court her desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RTC ORDERS

DECLARING RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION
BEFORE THE SAME TRIAL COURT?
HELD: The petition is meritorious. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the
procedure relative to counterclaims in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the
plaintiffs instance. As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal -
as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate
action. Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to
which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such
dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action.
Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order
granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he
choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint
had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's
motion to dismiss.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order
to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the
aforesaid period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
14 Yap-Co v. Uy, G.R. No. 209295, February 11, 2015 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
FACTS: Spouses William T. Uy and Ester Go-Uy had secured a favorable Decision rendered by
the RTC for collection of sum of money and damages against Joseph Chung. Subsequently, the
spouses Uy were the sole bidders of Chung’s property sold at public auction in order to satisfy
the judgment. After the lapse of the allowable period for redemption, they were issued a Final
Deed of Sale, which they registered with the Registry of Deeds. However, they were unable to
secure their new title after being informed that one had already been issued in favor of Diana Yap-
Co. The Uys filed a Complaint for annulment of title.
Yap-Co filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint allegedly stated no cause of
action. However, at the initial presentation of their evidence, the Uys failed to appear in court. The
presiding judge gave them another chance to present evidence. The Uys were able to present
their testimony on the next hearing and, thereafter, failed to appear at the third setting of their
direct testimony. Thus, the RTC granted Yap-Co’s motion to dismiss. The CA annulled the RTC’s
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA IS CORRECT IN ANNULLING THE RTC’S ORDER TO DISMISS

THE CASE?
HELD: YES. the SC held that the CA is correct in annulling the RTC’s order to dismiss the case
and ordered the reinstatement and full blown trial of the case.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the
trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules
or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise provided by the court."
However, the application of this rule is NOT applicable in this case since the Uy’s counsel
acted negligently in failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates. Verily, relief is accorded
to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence and
where the interest of justice so requires.
Further, the cited motion to dismiss was not premised on the spouses’ failure to prosecute their
case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Fundamental is the rule
that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the
insufficiency of the pleading.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. In this case, the
Court finds that the subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of Yap-Co in
procuring her title to the subject property to the prejudice of the spouses who claim to have
acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper.
15 Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty, G.R. No. 207376,

August 6, 2014 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative,

G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015
FACTS: The case stemmed from the three complaints for sum of money separately filed by the
respondent, Lightbringers Credit Cooperative. On the scheduled pre-trial conference, only
respondent and its counsel appeared hence allowing respondent to present evidence exparte.
MCTC dismissed the complaint in Civil Case 1428 where Tantiangco allegedly borrowed
P206,315.71 because there was no showing that she received the amount being claimed. On civil
case No. 1429 and 1430, however found petitioners liable for their respective debts and attorney’s
fees. On appeal before RTC, the trial court affirmed the MCTC decisions. Thereafter, petitioners
filed their joint motion for reconsideration/new trial, but was denied.
Aggrieved petitioners filed petition for review before the CA, but was dismissed because the
petition was formally defective because the verification and disclaimer of forum shopping and the
affidavit of service was defective for failure of the notary public to indicate his notarial commission
number and office address, and the entire records of the case were not attached in the petition in
contravention of Sec 2 Rule 42. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER FAILURE TO ATTEND THE PRE-TRIAL BE CONSIDERED AS IN

DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT?
HELD: NO. Failure to attend pre trial does not result in the default of the defendant, instead shall
be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment
on the basis thereof. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then case shall be dismissed.
Wherefore, petition is partially granted. RTC decision is affirmed and the award of attorney’s
fees is however deleted.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs

of Miñoza, G.R. No. 186045, February 2, 2011
FACTS: On July 6, 1998, a Complaint for Reconveyance, Cancellation of Defendants Title,

Issuance of New Title to Plaintiffs and Damages was filed by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for
herself and on behalf of the other heirs of the late Estanislao Miñoza. The complaint alleged that
Leilas late great grandfather, Estanislao Miñoza, was the registered owner of Cadastral Lots
located at Cebu City. It was, likewise, alleged that the late Estanislao Miñoza had three children,
namely, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, all surnamed Miñoza. In the late 1940s, the National
Airports Corporation (NAC) embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport. For said
purpose, the NAC acquired several properties which surrounded the airport either through
negotiated sale or through expropriation. Among the properties that were acquired by the NAC
through a negotiated sale were the said lots alleged to be owned by Estanislao Miñoza.
Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago
executed a Deed of Sale on February 15, 1950 conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the
assurance made by the latter that they (Leilas predecessors-in-interest) can buy the properties
back if the lots are no longer needed. Consequently, they sold the subject lots. However, the
expansion project did not push through. More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs informed
the NACs successor-in-interest, the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, that they were
exercising the buy-back option of the agreement, but the MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase
on the ground that the sale was in fact unconditional.
Before MCIAA could present evidence in support of its case, a Motion for Intervention, with an
attached Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed before the RTC by the heirs of Filomeno T.
Miñoza, Pedro T, Miñoza, and of Florencia T. Miñoza (Intervenors), who claimed to be the true,
legal, and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao Miñoza. The RTC denied the motion for
intervention.
The intervenors filed a MR, however, the RTC denied the same. Aggrieved, the intervenors
sought recourse before the CA where their motion to intervene was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, however the same was denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ALLOWING

RESPONDENTS TO INTERVENE?
HELD: YES. True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would
surely have a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, the Court had ruled that the
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy between the original
parties and the intervenors. In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit
by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in
the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts
giving the intervenors case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of
the original parties. The proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a
separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself,
or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is
not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the
action.
Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. It is not an absolute
right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure
to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention
can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable provision.
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,
18 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
G.R. No. 178221, December 1, 2010
FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate, thereafter his brother Bernandino filed for an issuance
of letters of Administration with the CFI of Negros Occidental for the judicial settlement of the
deceased’s estate. Several years after, the herein petitioners and their siblings filed for a
manifestation before the intestate court. They contend that their grandmother Isabel was the legal
spouse of Rodolfo during his death, thus she is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. To
which the petitioner pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf for the intestate
proceedings. To support such action they attached to their manifestation the respective marriage
certificate, birth certificates.
ISSUE/S: W/N THE INTERVENTION IS PROPER.
HELD: NO. The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that
Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the
estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement
proceedings cannot be justified.
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by

the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or
proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a
person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene
in a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event,
the allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an
exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action
for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari,
when it examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or
insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have
successfully established Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an
indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court
were issued in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
19 Otto Gmur Inc. v. Revilla, 55 Phil. 627 Manalili, Mart
FACTS: After Lim Cuan Sy & Co. had taken out several policies of insurance on a certain stock
of goods in different insurance companies, a fire occurred which destroyed the insured
merchandise. The insurance companies concerned refused to pay the policies on the ground of
fraud on the part of the insured in submitting its claims of loss. The case thus tried was fought to
a finish in the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the Court of First Instance favorable to the
plaintiff was finally affirmed. At the conclusion of this litigation, the attorney for the plaintiff filed a
motion in the Supreme Court, asking that his fees as attorney in the case be noted as a lien of
record. This motion was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff had assigned his interest in the policies to
third persons (the present petitioners).
When the record was finally returned to the lower court, the money due to the insured under all
of the policies was paid into court by the insurers; and in natural course it became incumbent
upon the court to fix the fees of the attorney for the successful plaintiff. At this stage the present
petitioners sought to intervene, and the respondent judge having refused to accede to the motion
of intervention, the present applications for the writ of mandamus were filed in this court.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE PETITIONERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INTERVENE IN THE

MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEE TO BE PAID TO THE ATTORNEY WHO
SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED THE INSURANCE CLAIMS?
HELD: YES. When the insurance policies now held by these petitioners were assigned to them,
they became the real parties in interest, and it is a statutory rule of procedure in this jurisdiction
that litigation must be conducted in the name of the real party in interest. As a general rule, the
right of a stranger to intervene in an action as an active litigant is dependent upon the discretion
of the court, but it is an abuse of judicial discretion to refuse to allow the intervention when the
intervenor shows an interest in the subject matter of the litigation of such character that
intervention is necessary for the reasonable protection thereof. In the case before us, if the fee of
the attorney representing the insured were to be fixed at an excessive amount, the petitioners, if
not permitted to controvert the right to such fee in the proceeding to determine the amount due to
the attorney, would have no remedy whatever.
It is suggested that the right to intervene should be denied to the petitioners because their motion
to intervene was not presented until after the test case was decided and the money recovered
upon the insurance policies had been paid into court. HOWEVER, this suggestion loses its force
when it is considered that an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation
has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over
the attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be
paid.
NOTE: Mandamus will not prosper because the granting or refusal of a motion to intervene is a
matter of judicial discretion.
20 Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 170 Manliclic, Marianne P.
FACTS: A collection suit with preliminary attachment was filed by Equitable Banking Corporation
against Freeman, Inc. and Saw Chiao Lian, its President and General Manager. The petitioners
moved to intervene but was denied, and the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Equitable and Saw Chiao Lian entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to
and was approved by the lower court. But because it was not complied with, Equitable secured a
writ of execution, and two lots owned by Freeman, Inc. were levied upon and sold at public auction
to Freeman Management and Development Corp.The Court of Appeals sustained the denial of
the petitioners' motion for intervention, holding that "the compromise agreement ...will not
necessarily prejudice petitioners.
The petitioners base their right to intervene for the protection of their interests as stockholders on
Everett v. Asia Banking Corp.The well-known rule that shareholders cannot ordinarily sue in
equity to redress wrongs done to the corporation, but that the action must be brought by the Board
of Directors, x x x has its exceptions.[If] the corporation [were] under the complete control of the
principal... defendants Equitable... contending that the collection suit against Freeman, Inc. and
Saw Chiao Lian is essentially in personam and, as an action against defendants in their personal
capacities, will not prejudice the petitioners as stockholders of the corporation.
Equitable also argues that the subject matter of the intervention falls properly within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Equitable maintains that
the petitioners' appeal could only apply to the denial of their motion for intervention and not to the
main case because their personality as party litigants had not been recognized by the trial court.
ISSUE/S: WON Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioners cannot intervene... because
their rights as stockholders of Freeman are merely inchoate and not actual, material, direct and
immediate prior to the dissolution of the... corporation
HELD: NO. The Court finds that the respondent court committed no reversible error in sustaining
the denial by the trial court of the petitioners' motion for intervention.The interest of shareholders
in corporate property, is purely inchoate; and this purely inchoate interest will not entitle them to
intervene in a litigation involving corporate property.
Viewed in the light of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court affirms the
respondent court’s holding that petitioners herein have no legal interest in the subject matter in
litigation so as to entitle them to intervene in the proceedings below.
In the case of Batama Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Rosal, we held: “As
clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, to be permitted to intervene in a
pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether... the
intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.
The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded,
and which would put the intervenor- in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint,
without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover. Here, the interest, if it exists at all,
of petitioners-movants is indirect, contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral.
At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in the
management of the corporation and to... share in the profits thereof and in the properties and
assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate debts and obligations.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. No. 185954,

February 16, 2010
FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement filed a letter-complaint addressed to the Ombudsman
accusing Governor Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including
respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them. Sison was
the Provincial Budget Officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials
of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and dismissing him from service.
The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman against Sison that the Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order
to convict Sison. The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO

INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS?
HELD: NO. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but
claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or
interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all
conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA
held correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative
case against the petitioner such that it would be directly affected by the judgment that this Court
had rendered. It must be remembered that the legal interest required for an intervention must be
direct and immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten, what was brought on appeal before this
Court is the very Decision by the Office of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman,
as an adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule
43 Petition.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego,
22 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
G.R. No. 175573, September 11, 2008
Office of the Ombudsman v. de Chavez,

G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013
FACTS: On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor
Fernandez directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision and Supplemental Resolution. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution
No. 18, series of 2005, dated August 22, 2005, resolving to implement the Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City,
against the BSU-BOR. The RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for
injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action. However the CA granted it, because the
administrative penalty of dismissal from the service imposed upon the respondents is “not yet
final and immediately executory in nature in view of the appeal interposed therefrom.”
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA’S GRANT OF THE PETITION FOR INJUNCTION
WITH PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF A TRO IS VALID?
HELD: NO. The Court provided in its decision that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue,
the following essential requisites must concur:
(1) That the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
(2) That the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and,
(3) That there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable,
because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on
government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of
execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases. An appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA.
The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court.
When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case
must prevail over the other. Thus, there is no doubt that respondents do not have any right to a
stay of the Ombudsman’s decision dismissing them from service.
24 Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
FACTS: Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her, claiming that respondent husband failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially
agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim
Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
However, that same form carried a physician's handwritten note that the husband suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical
records. The husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege. The request of the wife was denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: DID THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
THE ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM COVERING THE HUSBAND'S HOSPITAL
RECORDS ON THE GROUND THAT THESE ARE COVERED BY THE PRIVILEGED
CHARACTER OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT COMMUNICATION?
HELD: NO. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife made the
request before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering her husband's hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x
x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are “not privileged.” Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject
of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation.
The privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s
illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
25 People v. Montejo, L-24154, October 31, 1967 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, Quirolgico, Bienvenido

26
November 29, 2005 Miguel DC. III
FACTS: Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband, Philip Sy Yu
(petitioner) an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds
of marital infidelity and physical abuse. During the trial, private respondent moved for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co.
Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be
petitioners illegitimate child.
The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the insurance contract was inadmissible as
evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which
presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged
information pertaining to insurance policies. It added that the production of the application and
insurance contract would violate Article 280 of the civil code which prohibit the unauthorized
identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.
Private respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial
court. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to tender excluded
evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a trial court has the discretion to deny a party’s motion to attach
excluded evidence?
HELD: NO. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered. For a long time, the Court has
recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court
judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be avoided.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented
in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for
the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued
the assailed Order.
Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was
not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the
production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth.
As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of
evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial. Thus, in declaring
that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before they were formally offered, much
less presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its discretion.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
27 Autographics Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 198 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
FACTS: Autographics, Inc. (AGI) and Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), entered into several
contracts which would provide support services to PAL's operations. Under these contracts, AGI
would provide PAL with cars, motorcycles, crew-cab pick-ups and shuttle buses. For its part, PAL
undertook to pay a semi-monthly contract price payable every 14th and 29th of each month.
Initially, the parties complied with their respective undertakings. However, while these contracts
were still in force, PAL notified AGI of their termination. AGI filed a complaint to recover the sum
of P30,000,000 against PAL. AGI rested its case with a a 42-page Offer of Exhibits consisting of
382 annexes. The trial court then issued an order setting the continuation of the trial with PAL
presenting its evidence. However, these scheduled trial dates were later cancelled because of
typhoon.
The hearing then was reset. PAL filed before the trial court a Manifestation/Motion stating that it
had conferred with the persons whom it intended to present as witnesses and that said witnesses
by reason of distance and personal matters had expressed willingness to testify by
deposition; that PAL was thus constrained to avail of Rule 24 (Depositions and Discovery)
of the Rules of Court. PAL prayed that its manifestation be noted and that the subsequent
hearings be cancelled. No action was taken by the trial court on the request of PAL for the
cancellation of the hearings.
The counsels for AGI moved that PAL's right to present evidence be considered waived and the
case be deemed submitted for decision. In open court, the trial court granted the oral motion
of counsels for AGI and declared the case submitted for decision, PAL having been
considered to have waived its right to present evidence. The trial court rendered its decision
adverse to PAL. On PAL’s appeal, the CA remanded the case to the RTC for continuation of
hearing for the reception of evidence of PAL.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION
IN RENDERING THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT GIVING PAL THE CHANCE TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. the SC held that PAL was not given equal opportunity to ventilate their claim because
the trial court ordered it to present evidence within 1 month. With AGI's voluminous
exhibits/annexes and the limited period alloted to it by the trial court within which to present its
evidence, PAL's resource to Sec. 1 Rule 24, of the Rules of Court is well-taken. Section 1
provides: Sec. 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of
the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written iterrogatories.The attendace of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23. Depositions shall be taken
only in accordance with these rules. The depositions of a person confined in prison may
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
Under the aforequoted provisions, a party, without a court intervention, can take a deposition of
any person after answer has been served. This right, however, is not absolute. The trial court
may, in its discretion, order that a deposition shall not be taken. The trial court's discretion on this
matter must nonetheless be exercised not arbitrary, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.
In this case, the SC failed to see how the trial court could have considered PAL to have waived
the presentation of its evidence. In availing of the provision of Sec. 1, Rule 24, of the Rules of
Court, PAL clearly indicated its keen interest in the early resolution of the case. The trial court
gave AGI a period of more than 2 months to fully ventilate its claim. On the other hand, PAL was
afforded only a period of one month to present evidence. The grounds adduced by PAL to avail
itself of Rule 24 do not appear to be unreasonable. The decision of the RTC is repulsive to PAL’s
fundamental right to due process. The appellate court was therefore correct in nullifying the orders
and decision of the trial court.
DFA v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858,

28 Saligan, Constantine
June 29, 2016
FACTS: The DFA entered into an Agreement April 5 2002 with the BCA international corporation,
wherein the latter was awarded the Machine readable Passport and Visa Project (MRPN Project)
by the former. During the implementation the DFA sought to terminate the Agreement. However,
BCA opposed the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration under Section 19.02 of the
Agreement.
BCA sought the assistance of the RTC by filing a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence
pursuant to the IRR of the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004”. In the petition, BCA sought
the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum to certain witnesses and
documents in the custody.
The DFA opposed the petition alleging that the presentation of witnesses and documents by law
and protected by the deliberative process privilege.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE DFA ARE PROTECTED
BY THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE?
HELD: NOT NECESSARILY. (THE PETITION OF THE DFA WAS PARTIALLY GRANTED)
The Deliberative Process Privilege exempts materials that are predecisional and deliberative, but
requires disclosure of policy statements and final opinions “that have the force of law or explain
actions hat agency has already taken.
For Deliberative Process Privilege to be invoked two requirements must be met which are:
1. The Communication must be predecisional ie “antecedent to the adoption of an agency
policy; and
2. The Communication Must be deliberative ie “a direct part of the deliberative process in
that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal policy or matters.
As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency asserting the deliberative
process privilege to prove that the information in question satisfies both requirements:
predecisional and deliberative. There is no showing in the records that the DFA complied with
the two requirements.
Hence, the case was remanded to the RTC to determine whether the documents and records
sought by BCA are protected by the deliberative process privilege as explained in this decision.
Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515,

29 Santiago, Melody R.
October 31, 2008
FACTS: Upon the parties failure to reach an amicable settlement, Thomas T. Kalangeg
(respondent) filed with the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Branch 36, a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Isidro T. Pajarillaga (petitioner).
On March 1997, Kalangeg presented his 1st witness. At the next scheduled hearing neither
Pajarillaga nor his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon Kalangeg’s motion, the trial court
allowed him to present his remaining 2 witnesses subject to Pajarillaga’s cross-examination on
the next scheduled hearing on September 1997. But when the case was called on that date,
Pajarillaga and his counsel were again absent. Upon Kalangeg’s motion, the trial court declared
Pajarillaga to have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed Kalangeg to make a formal
offer of evidence.
On October, the trial court admitted all the exhibits formally offered by Kalangeg. It also scheduled
Pajarillaga’s presentation of evidence on October 28, 29 and 30, 1997. However, the Pajarillaga
moved to reset the hearing to November 17, 1997. The trial court granted his motion and reset
the hearing to December 15, 1997.
Prior to the hearing, Pajarillaga filed a Motion for Leave of Court to take the Deposition of the
Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories on the grounds that: (1) petitioner resides in Manila which
is more than 400 kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province; and (2) petitioner is suffering from an
illness which prohibits him from doing strenuous activities. Kalangeg opposed the motion. Thus
on the said date of hearing which was December 15, 1997, neither Pajarillaga nor his counsel
again appeared. The hearing was then reset to January 12, 1998 for the presentation of
Pajarillaga’s evidence. The records of the court regarding the said hearing on January 12, 1998
was not disclosed.
The case has been pending since November 24, 1995 and hearings have been always delayed.
Wherefore, in the interest of justice defendant is granted one more chance to adduce his evidence
on February 18, 1998 otherwise, he shall be deemed to have waived his right thereto. Pajarillaga
moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied. It also reset the hearing to April 20, 1998.
In this, Pajarillaga elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court. The appellate court ruled that: 1) the denial of petitioner’s motion was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the trial court gave petitioner full opportunity to present
his evidence. 2) petitioner’s motion came much too late in the proceedings since private
respondent has already rested his case. 3) the medical certificate which petitioner submitted to
validate his allegation of illness merely contained a remark that the "patient is advised to avoid
strenuous activity." It did not state that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled
hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health. 4) the threats to petitioner’s life by
private respondent’s relatives were belatedly alleged only in his motion for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied with the said decision, Pajarillaga appealed on the ground that the CA erred in
denying the petitioner’s prayer that his deposition be taken through written interrogatories in
connection with a case which is being heard by the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province that can be
reached after a gruelling 7 hour rider traversing very rough and rugged roads.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE TAKING OF PETITIONER’S DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN

INTERROGATORIES IS PROPER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE COURT?
HELD: NO. The petitioner’s request for deposition by written interrogatories lacks merit.
The depositions is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording
an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing
that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty
of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It
is also allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent
with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
There is nothing objectionable with petitioner availing of this discovery measure after private
respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioner’s presentation of evidence because
depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient.
However, in the case at bar, there are several postponements made by petitioner for the initial
presentation of his evidence. It also showed that the petitioner stopped attending the hearings
after the private respondent presented its witness.
Also, the petitioner does not show any exceptional or unusual case because under the under
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used; and
Here the petitioner invokes the distance and illness to avail the discovery measure. However, it
is not sufficient because the matter of distance could be settled had he requested for the change
of venue earlier in the proceeding. With regards to the illness, the medical certificate submitted
by petitioner merely contained a remark that the "patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity." It
was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too
strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health.
Thus, while the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth and to expedite
the disposal of cases, the trial court may disallow a deposition if there are valid reasons for so
ruling. So in this case, the protracted delay in the litigation at petitioner’s instance coupled with
the belated and unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to petitioner’s life, more than
sufficient reasons for the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion.
Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. v. UCPB General

30 Sibal, Tricia
Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 146018, June 25, 2003
Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, Siman, Don Johnson Dela
31
2005 Chica
FACTS: In a complaint for recovery of his bank deposit with prayer for a writ of attachment and
damages, Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, alleged his brother Godofredo S.
Dulay, Sr. and nephew Pfeger R. Dulay immigrated to the United States of America. The two
stayed with him. Godofredo, however, decided to return to the Philippines because he could not
endure the weather. Pfeger stayed behind to take care of Rodrigo. Having nurtured affection, love
and trust for his nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trust account naming Pfeger as trustee thereof.
Five months later, Pfeger left Rodrigo’s house allegedly to join his girlfriend in California. Rodrigo
learned only later that Pfeger actually went back to the Philippines. Pfeger returned to the United
States in November of 1997, but after a brief stay returned again to the Philippines where he went
on a spending binge. Upon knowing this, Rodrigo verified the status of his account with the Bank
of Boston, and to his shock and dismay discovered that Pfeger had already emptied the account.
Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the depositions of several
witnesses residing abroad.
Petitioners. Pfeger, filed an Omnibus Motion,14 praying that the written interrogatories be
declared inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE DEPOSITION FILED BY RODRIGO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED

WITH THE RULES OF COURT?
HELD: The Court finds that respondent substantially complied with the requirements for
depositions taken in foreign countries.
In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken:

(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory;
(c) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties.
While letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of
the issuing jurisdiction. Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines and the defendant’s answer has already been served. However, if the
deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the
notary public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through
a commission, and no longer through letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even
sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its Order dated 28 September 2000.33 With the ratification
of the depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the
adverse party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their
cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of
delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result
of the trial court’s action. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Costs
against petitioners.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Africa), G.R. No.

32 Songco, Ken Felix C
152375, December 16, 2011
Ayala Land Inc. v. Judge Tagle, G.R. No. 153667,

33 Sy, Exequiel
August 11, 2005
FACTS: ASB Realty and EM Ramos and Sons filed an action for nullification of contract to sell
the real properties, cancellation of annotations against Ayala Land. After Ayala Land filed its
answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim, ASB filed a motion for leave to take
testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos Sr. as he was already 87 yrs.
old and that although he was of sound mind, he may not be able to testify on the ASB’s behalf.
The trial court granted the motion. Ayala Land Inc. objected to the depositions conducted with
Emerito Ramos Sr. with respect to their propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition
proceedings. The trial court sustained some of its objections, while it overruled the others. It
upheld the propriety of the presentation of evidence through deposition.
Ayala Land Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with TRO and injunction before the
CA to restrain Judge Tagle from setting the case for cross examination and to declare null and
void the entire deposition proceedings. The CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition. CA
denied Ayala Land’s motion for reconsideration as well. When Emerito Ramos Sr died at the age
of 92 yrs old, ASB filed before the RTC a motion to introduce in evidence the old man’s deposition.
Ayala Land filed its opposition. The trial court issued an order admitting in evidence the deposition.
Since Ayala Land’s motion for reconsideration had been denied, it elevated the matter before the
CA via petition for certiorari. The Appellate court dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF VALID

DEPOSITION?
HELD: YES. The depositions of Ramos Sr were substantially made in accordance with the
requirements of the Rules; 1. Ayala Land Inc. confirmed the taking of depositions, and that it was
duly represented by its counsel during the proceedings; 2. As to the manner by which the
deposition was taken in compliance with the rules, the deposition was taken inside the courtroom
of the trial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer was present, tape recorders and a video
camera were even utilized to record the proceedings, in the presence of all the opposing counsels
of record; 3. A deposition not signed does not preclude its use during trial.
A deponent’s signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of
the signature goes primarily to the form of deposition.
a. That the deposition must be examined and signed by the witness only ensures that the
deponent is given the opportunity to correct any errors therein and ensure the deposition
accuracy. In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the
determination of its probative value at the appropriate time.
b. Deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty
of a party to make a discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law.
Spouses Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145,

34 Viran, Archimedes John
February 5, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Co. After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s
officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006
hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their
loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’
200-square meter land in Bulacan.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must
be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the
hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule
25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be
compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with
written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the
documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum stating that the motion under consideration is a mere scrap of
paper by reason of its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as
specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, the defendant
bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written
interrogatories are first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Petitioners raised it to the CA but was also denied for lack of merit
ISSUE: WON CA COMMITED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS

MUST FIRST SERVE WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS
BEFORE THEY CAN BE SUBPOENAED?
HELD: NO. In civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section
6, Rule 25 of the Rules. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions
and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand
will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to
the witness stand as its witness.
Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might
bring.Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,
compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging
its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through
the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse
party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s
being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial
and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their
principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient
phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who
are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through
their officers and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to
gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent.
The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot
prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be
pressured to hang itself from its own defense. It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good
cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the
adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against
the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very
evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed
to do.
Diman v. Judge Alumbres, G.R. No. 131466, Anyog, Rona Graziela

35
November 27, 1998 Pauline B.
FACTS: The case began in the RTC Las Pinas where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and
Damages" was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno
Lacalle) against the Diman(s). The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially
dismissed via Resolution on January 1998 but after deliberating on petitioners' MR on February
1998, the private respondents' comment thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record
of the case itself, the Court was convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and
the petition reinstated.
The Dimans served on the Heirs on the Heirs a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION (dated February 2,
1995) of the truth of the some specified matters of fact. The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was
received by Jose Lacalle himself through registered mail on February 6, 1995, and copy thereof,
by the latter's lawyer. However, no response whatever was made to the request by Lacalle, his
lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not
less than ten days after service). The Dimans thereupon filed with the Court a "MANIFESTATION
WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated
March 28, 1995, giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the request for
admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but again, no response
whatever was made.
The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT" dated April 17, 1995. In
that motion they drew attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the several
instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled hearings resulting in the dismissal of their
complaint, which was however later reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had failed to
respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters of which an admission was
requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this basis, and on the basis
of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina Diman Tan -- attached to the
motion and substantiating the facts recited in the request for admission -- the Dimans asserted
that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a summary judgment be entered dismissing the
case for lack of merit."
ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was implied admission on the part of the Lacalles by reason
of their failure to reply to a Motion for such?
HELD: YES. A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's
refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it
is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that
refusal as mandated by law. Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit :
(1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said
party is bound within the period designated in the request,[27] to file and serve on the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn statement,
each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.
In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by registered mail on Jose Lacalle
on February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof on his lawyers on February 4, 1995. Neither made any
response whatever within the reglementary period. Nor did either of them do so even after
receiving copy of the Dimans' "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO
ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION." dated March 28, 1995. On account thereof, in legal
contemplation, the Heirs impliedly admitted all the facts listed in the request for admission. These
plain and simple legal propositions were disregarded by His Honor.
These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He denied the Dimans' motion for summary
judgment in his Order of June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal of the Complaint and the Answer
will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and defendants claimed
ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective titles thereto and accused each
other of possessing false title to the land." He added, citing cases, that a summary judgment "is
not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the
presentation of evidence." Such a ratiocination is grossly erroneous.
When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans moved to dismiss on
ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence, the Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess
the evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law the plaintiff(s) ** (have)
shown no right to relief." It was in the first place incumbent on His Honor to hold the Heirs bound
to their admissions appearing in the record, express and implied.
In accordance with Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were impliedly, but
no less indubitably, deemed to have admitted the facts on which admissions had been duly
requested by reason of their failure to reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
twn (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion
and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters on which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.
Duque v. Yu, Jr., G.R. No. 226130, February 19, Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan
36
2018 G
FACTS: Spouses Duque allegedly executed a Deed of Donation over the subject property that
they owned in favor of their daughter Delia Capacio, who in turn, sold a portion of it to their co-
respondents Spouses Yu. Thereafter, Spouses Duque filed a Complaint for Declaration of Non-
Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of TD
against respondent before the RTC and claimed that the Deed of Donation was forged.
Capacio admitted that the signature in the Deed of Donation was indeed falsified but she did not
know the author thereof. Respondents Spouses Yu, for their part, refuted Spouses Duque's
personality to question the genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale for it was their daughter
who forged the Deed of Donation. They even averred that Spouses Duque's action was already
barred by prescription.
Subsequently, a Motion for Admission by Adverse Party under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
(Motion for Admission) was filed by respondents Spouses Yu requesting the admission of these
documents: (1) Real Estate Mortgage (REM); (2) Deed of Donation; (3) Contract of Lease; (4) TD
No. 07-05616; (5) TD No. 14002-A; (6) Deed of Absolute Sale; and (7) TD No. 01-07-05886. In
an Order dated October 3, 2008, Spouses Duque were directed to comment thereon but they
failed to do so. By their silence, the trial court, in an Order dated November 24, 2008, pronounced
that they were deemed to have admitted the same.
Thus, during trial, instead of presenting evidence, respondents Spouses Yu moved for demurrer
of evidence in view of the aforesaid pronouncement. Spouses Duque vehemently opposed such
motion. The Court granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the Complaint. The
subsequent MR, was denied and on appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S FAILURE

TO REPLY TO THE REQUEST FOR ADMISSION IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION OF THE AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS OF THE DOCUMENTS
SUBJECTS THEREOF?
HELD: YES. Clearly, once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material
and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to
file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule, however, admits of an exception,
that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already
controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if
the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings
by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the
requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and, thereafter,
assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule
26.
The rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates of

interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in
a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the
pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a useless, pointless process
which petitioner should not be subjected to. "Here, the respondents served the request for
admission on the petitioners to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation,
among other documents.
But as pointed out by petitioners, the matters and documents being requested to be admitted
have already been denied and controverted in the previous pleading, that is, Verified Complaint
for Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale
and Cancellation of TD. In fact, the forgery committed in the Deed of Donation was the very
essence of that Complaint, where it was alleged that being a forged document, the same is invalid
and without force and legal effect. Petitioners, therefore, need not reply to the request for
admission. Consequently, they cannot be deemed to have admitted the Deed of Donation's
genuineness and authenticity for their failure to respond thereto.
Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Baquiran, Maria

37
Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013 Vanessa D.
FACTS: Petitioners EDC, and sureties Marcelo N. Naval and Crispin I. Oben are the defendants
in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) through a Complaint. By virtue of a
Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC’s outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron
since EIB and Cameron had a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA). Cameron filed its
Motion to Substitute/Join EIB which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Production/Inspection of the LSPA referred to in the Deed of Assignment. Respondent Cameron
filed its Comment alleging that petitioners have not shown “good cause” for the production of the
LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. In response, petitioners filed
their Reply explaining that the production of the LSPA was for “good cause”.
As petitioners’ alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed up to the extent of the amount paid by
Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it becomes necessary to verify the amount of the
consideration from the LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on this matter.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion for production for being utterly devoid of merit. It ruled
that there was failure to show “good cause” for the production of the LSPA and failure to show
that the LSPA is material or contains evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari with CA, to nullify and/or set aside the RTC’s
Resolutions. The CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
PRODUCTION AND/OR INSPECTION OF THE LSPA?
RULING: This Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control;
xxx The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery
sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to
discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.
As respondent Cameron’s claim against the petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the Deed
of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all
documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express terms, were
referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject
matter—the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners’ defense.
Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with
information essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the
parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of
the case.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part
of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to
do so would bar access to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and hence,
impair his fundamental right to due process. The exercise of discretion by the RTC judge
pertaining to discovery will be set aside where there is abuse, or the trial court’s disposition of
matters of discovery was improvident and affected adversely the substantial rights of a party. In
this case, the trial court had effectively placed petitioners at a great disadvantage inasmuch as
respondent effectively suppressed relevant documents related to the transaction involved in the
case a quo. Furthermore, the remedies of discovery encouraged and provided for under the Rules
of Court to be able to compel the production of relevant documents had been put to naught by
the arbitrary act of the trial court.
A.M. NO. 14-03-02-SC (PILOTING OF A NEW SYSTEM FOR SPEEDY COURT

TRIAL), RULE 24 ON TRIAL OF ISSUES
Yu v. Basilio Magno Construction, G.R. No. 138701-

02, October 17, 2006
FACTS: Engr. Basilio G. Magno (Magno) entered into a verbal agreement with Leyte Lumber
through Roque Yu, Sr., whereby the latter agreed to supply Magno with building materials he may
need in his construction business. The success of Magno's business gave birth to the Basilio G.
Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. (BG Magno).By the time the business
relationship between Yu and Magno was coming to an end.
The parties have dealt with each other to the amount of at least P7,068,000.00. After his death,
the petitioners instituted two (2) separate complaints for sums of money with damages and
preliminary attachment against the respondents. The two separate decisions of even date were
penned by Judge Getulio M. Francisco, the presiding judge of Branch 6 to which only Civil Case
No. 5823 was raffled. The parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions nor did
they call the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an order for consolidation of the two
cases. Instead, they directly interposed their respective appeals to the CA.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE TWO CASES (CIVIL CASE
NOS. 5822 AND 5823) A PROCEDURAL STEP WHICH THE COURT COULD HAVE
PROPERLY TAKEN?
HELD: YES. The two cases were filed just a few months apart;they involve simple cases of
collection of sums of money between identical parties and no other; the respondents (as
defendants therein) claim, in both cases, essentially the same defense, which is overpayment;
they cover the same period of transacting continuous business that spans four years; they relate
to simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other; they entailed the presentation of
practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a broad part of the evidence and testimonies
in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or both parties.
And the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either
or both cases on their own.
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the
same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially
on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated
and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights
of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347). Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:
"Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375,

39 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152
WHAT IF THE CASES ARE BEFORE DIFFERENT COURTS SITTING IN DIFFERENT

JURISDICTIONS, IS CONSOLIDATION POSSIBLE?
Delta Motors Sales Corp. v. Mangosing, 70 SCRA

40 Cruz, Joan mae
598
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari seeks to annul certain orders of the Court of First
Instance of Manila denying its motion to set aside the order of default and the judgment by default
in Civil Case No. 97373 and granting the motion for execution of Jose Luis Pamintuan.
The case involves a recovery of the sum of money as damages and attorney’s fees. The basis of
the action was that the herein petitioner sold an alleged defective car to Mr. Pamintuan and failed
to fulfill its warranty obligation. Hence this case.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Delta Motor was properly served with summons or whether the Manila
court had jurisdiction to render the judgment by default against it and to execute that judgment.
HELD: In the instant case the Manila court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor because
it was not properly served with summons. The service of summons on Dionisia G. Miranda, who
is not among the persons mentioned in section 13 of Rule 14, was insufficient. It did not bind the
Delta Motor.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of the subject-matter of the
action by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law. Where there is no
service of summons or a voluntary general appearance by the defendant, the court acquires no
jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the cause. (Syllabi Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co.
vs. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 556).
Consequently, the order of default, the judgment by default and the execution in Civil Case No.
97373 are void and should be set aside.
It appears that Civil Case No. 21303 filed b Delta Motor against Pamintuan in the Pasig court
which is in effect t counter-claim to the Manila case, deals with the sale of the Toyota car which
is involved in Civil Case No. 97373 of the Manila court.
In the interest of justice and to avoid conflicting decisions, the trial of the two cases should be
consolidated The Pasig case should be transferred to Branch XXI of the Court of First Instance
of Manila where Civil Case No. 97373 is assigned. Apparently, Delta Motor filed its replevin case
in Pasig because it was stipulated in the invoice covering the sale that any action thereunder may
be instituted in any competent court of Rizal.
Superlines Transportation Co. v. Victor,

124 SCRA 939
FACTS: On December 1982, Bus No. 3008 of Pantranco driven by Dillomas collided with Bus
No. 331 of Superlines driven by Lorca along Lumilang, Quezon, resulting in the death of Moralde
who is a passenger in the Pantranco bus. On January 1983, Superlines instituted an action for
damages before the CFI of Quezon in Gumaca against Pantranco and the driver, Rogelio
Dillomas. In its complaint, Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the
Pantranco bus driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that there was want of diligence
on the part of Pantranco in the selection and supervision of its driver.
On February 1983, the widow and the children of the deceased Moralde filed a complaint for
damages in the RTC of Cavite against Superlines and its driver, Erlito Lorca, as well as Pantranco
and its driver, Dillomas. The cause of action against Superlines was based on quasi-delict, while
that against Pantranco was based on culpa-contractual.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED IN GUMACA SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED

WITH THE CASE IN CAVITE?
HELD: YES. The cases in Gumaca and Cavite should be consolidated.
DI PA PO AKO TAPOS ^ ;) go mamahhh

42 Vallacar Transit v. Yap, 126 SCRA 500 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
FACTS: On May 16. 1979, a collision between petitioner, Vallacar Transit driven by Mario
Hambala and a dump truck owned by Hanil Development Co. Ltd. driven by Eddie Gonzaga
occured injuring one of the passenger namely private respondent Celestino Yap and the
petitioners driver while Eddie Gonzaga died. Private respondent Yap filed a case for damages
against Vallacar, Hambala, and Hanil docketed as Civil Case No. 264 in the Court of First Instance
in Agusan el Sur wherein the cause of action against Vallar was based on culpa contractual while
that against Hanil was based on quasi-delict but Hanil was removed as a party defendant in Civil
Case No. 264 by the private respondent because they cannot be served with summons.
Subsequently on September 30, 1979, Hanil filed a separate complaint for damages against
Vallacar before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental docketed therein as Civil Case No.
6742 wherein Hanil alleged that the accident was the fault of Vallacar but Vallacar claimed
otherwise. On August 8 1981, concerning Civil Case No. 264, Vallacar filed a motion for leave to
file a third party complaint against Hanil which was granted by the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Sur which prompted Hanil to dismiss the third party complaint on the ground of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 6742 in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental involving the
same parties and the same cause and relief sought. The Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Sur dismissed the third party complaint filed by the Vallacar on the grounds of litis pendentia.
Hence, the case.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 6742 SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITH
CIVIL CASE NO. 264 IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF AGUSAN DEL SUR?
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that Civil Case No. 6472 should be consolidated and tried
with Civil Case No. 264 in the Regional Trial Court of Agusal del Sur. Such Consolidation is
desirable in order to prevent confusion, to avoid multiplicity of suits, and to save unnecessary cost
and expense. Needless to add, this procedure is well accord with the principle that the rules of
procedure “shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpenisve determination of every action and proceeding.
Metrobank v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677,

February 18, 2013
FACTS: The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of the action
were two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City, of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and
Ludivina L. Genito.
The Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an
additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It appears that Asian Bank claimed
ownership of the two parcels of land as the registered owner by virtue of TCT No. N-201383 and
TCT No. N-201384 issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian Bank was
also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued by the RTC in
Quezon City. When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the
original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE REPUBLIC WAS ENTITLED TO A SEPARATE TRIAL

AGAINST ASIAN BANK?
HELD: NO. Separate Trials are Improper. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in
Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held,
provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice
to any party.
The general rule is that all issues in every case must be tried at one time. Exceptions to the
general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate
trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials
of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all
parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
Here, Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to
Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and
separate from that against the original defendants. The justification of the Sandiganbayan for
allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the
exceptions.
To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate
trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian
Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants.
Maraño v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 196592,

April 6, 2015
FACTS: Spouses Juvy and Maria Luisa Maraño filed a free patent application for a 9,074-square
meter parcel of land in Damulaan, Albuera, Leyte which thereafter, the application was granted
and they were given a OCT. An ejectment complaint was filed by the petitioners against Pryce
Gases, Incorporated for illegal entry and construction of building in the lot. The MTC of Albuera,
Leyte granted the petitioners' complaint, but the RTC reversed the MTC decision. On further
appeal, the CA remanded the case to the MTC for trial as a reivindicatory action.
The petitioners filed an action to quiet title against the respondent with the RTC, 8th Judicial
Region, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte. A month later, the respondent filed a complaint for
reconveyance. The petitioners moved to dismiss the respondent's complaint, but the RTC denied
their motion. The respondent later moved to amend its complaint from reconveyance to the
cancellation of the petitioners' certificate of title.
The petitioners again moved to dismiss the respondent's amended complaint on the ground of
litis pendentia in view of the then pending reivindicatory action with the MTC. The RTC dismissed
the petitioners' motion. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was likewise
denied by the RTC. The petitioners questioned the RTC's resolution in their petition for certiorari
in CA
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF TITLE

SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE ISSUED IN THEIR NAMES OVER THE SUBJECT LOT IS ALREADY BEING
LITIGATED IN THE REIVINDICATORY ACTION CASE THAT IS PENDING APPEAL BEFORE
THE RTC?
HELD: NO. There are three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property, namely:
(1) actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, also denominated as accion interdictal,
which are summary in nature and seek to recover only physical possession (possession
de facto) of the property;
(2) an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right to possess the property,
without claim of title; and
(3) an accion reivindicatoria (or accion de reivindicacion) or a reivindicatory action, which is a
plenary action to recover not only possession of, but also ownership of the real property.
Since a reivindicatory action includes a claim of title or ownership, the court must necessarily
inquire into the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s acquisition of his or her title to the real
property sought to be recovered.
The petitioners point out that the MTC in the subject reivindicatory case already conducted a full-
blown trial on the issue of validity of their claim of ownership and had, in fact, ruled that their
certificate of title is inoperative and has no binding effect. They argue that for the RTC to conduct
another full-blown trial in the cancellation of title case on the same issue would, in effect, nullify
the MTC’s decision in the reivindicatory case.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of

certificate of title, the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of
certificate of title case is the appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation is
proper when two or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the same court involve
a common question of law or fact.
In such cases, the court may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions, order all the actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the
proceedings therein for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title is the crucial issue in both
the reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate
of title case filed by the respondent, these two cases should be consolidated in order to
avoid the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration
of justice.
RULE 33, RULES OF COURT; READ: HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW

VOL. II, PP. 110-112 SEE RULE 119, SEC. 23
Claudio v. Saraza, G.R. No. 213286,
45 Esquilona, Veniflor
August 26, 2015
FACTS: Porfirio Claudio and his wife, Mamerta, are owners of the ten parcels of land including
the property subject of the present case. Florentino, son of the said spouses, made it appear that
the former sold to him the subject property thru a deed of absolute sale. Florentino then executed
a deed of real estate mortgage over the subject lot with special power to sell the mortgaged
property without judicial proceedings, in favor of spouses Saraza. Petitioner averred that spouses
Saraza are mortgagee in bad faith becuase they knew full well that Florentino could not have
acquired the subject property from his parents because Porfirio had long been deceased while
Mamerta was in the US at the time of the alleged sale; that the real estate mortgage was void
because it emanated from a falsified deed of sale.
Spouses Saraza moved for the dismissal of the complaint contending that the issue as to whether
or not the petitioners had the legal right to proceed against them could be resolved even without
a trial. On May 18, 2005, the RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
After the presentation of the petitioners' evidence in chief, Spouses Saraza moved for leave of
court to file a demurrer to evidence. On December 15, 2009, they filed their Demurrer to Evidence
praying for the dismissal of the civil case anchored on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
RTC granted spouses Salaza’s demurrer of evidence and dismissed the complaint filed against
them.
Unfazed, petitioner appealed the dimissal of the case before the CA. In its assailed decision, the
CA found no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC. It held that
Spouses Saraza had the right to rely in good faith on TCT No. 145979, which covered the lot
given as security by Florentino, considering that there was no showing of any sign to excite
suspicion. Thus, they were under no obligation to look beyond what appeared on the face of the
certificate of title and investigate it. The appellate court deemed Spouses Saraza as innocent
mortgagees for value and as such, the petitioners had shown no right to relief against them. Thus,
Spouses Saraza and their mortgage lien were entitled to protection.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN GRANTING SPOUSES SALAZA

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an
action to the effect that the evidence, which his adversary produced, is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. In the case at bench, the petitioners'
evidence, together with such inferences and conclusions as may be reasonably drawn therefrom,
amply supports the allegations in their complaint necessary to their claim against Spouses
Saraza. The evidence in chief of the petitioner clearly made out a very strong case against them
which would warrant recovery from them.
All told, the Court holds that the petitioners' evidence, standing alone and in the absence of
controverting evidence, would afford sufficient basis for a judgment in their favor and against
Spouses Saraza. Despite the fact that Spouses Saraza are deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence before the RTC pursuant to Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, still this
disposition is without prejudice to the judgment on the merits to be handed down by the RTC.
Republic v. de Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia
46
2017 E.
RULE 33 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner Republic, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, for "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture,
Restitution, and Damages" (Complaint) before the SB for the recovery of ill-gotten assets
allegedly amassed by the individual respondents therein, singly or collectively, during the
administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Velasco, one of the defendants, was
the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.
It appears from the records that PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, would regularly enter into
charter agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay
"address commissions" to PNOC as charterer, amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight.
Allegedly, during the tenure of Velasco, no address commissions were remitted to PNOC.
Given the foregoing, petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these address
commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F. Verano
(Verano), a witness for petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to have acted as
Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or controlled, such as
DRMC.
After the filing of the parties' responsive pleadings, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, upon
the conclusion of its presentation of evidence, petitioner Republic submitted its Formal Offer of
Evidence dated March 6, 1995.
On April 15, 2005, respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date.
Ruling of the SB
In its Resolution dated July 31, 2008, the SB found that the evidence presented was insufficient
to support a claim for damages against De Borja, thereby granting respondent De Borja's
Demurrer to Evidence.
This Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that defendant
De Borja is liable for damages as averred in the complaint.
Witness Verano admitted that although he was instructed to deliver two envelopes to the office of
De Borja, he did not know for a fact that De Borja actually received them. Moreover, witness
Verano testified that after he delivered the envelopes, he did not receive any word that they did
reach De Borja, nor did Verano confirm De Borja's receipt of them.
Where the plaintiff's evidence against defendant De Borja consists only of Verano's testimony
and Reyes' affidavit, no preponderance of evidence has been satisfactorily established.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE SB COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING

RESPONDENT DE BORJA'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. The Court finds it proper to first discuss procedural matters.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a

remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue.The question
in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to
establish a prima facie case.
In Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corp., wherein the propriety of the trial court's granting of a
demurrer to evidence was the crux of the controversy. Where the resolution of a question requires
an examination of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance
of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations, the same involves a
question of fact.
The singular question for the Court now is this: whether petitioner Republic was able to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove the alleged complicity of respondent De Borja with the required
quantum of evidence. After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties,
the Court rules in the negative.
Case law has defined "burden of proof' as the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or
issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In
civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, i.e., superior weight of evidence on the issues involved. "Preponderance of evidence"
means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.
In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of evidence"

because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a
demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the defendant's
evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiffs evidence entitles
it to the relief sought.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the
allegations of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show
any right to the relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to
Evidence.

READ: HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW VOL. II, PP. 113-117, 118-138, 139- 20
Agoy v. Araneta Center Inc., G.R. 196358,

47 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 883
FACTS: On June 15, 2011 the Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoys petition for review through
a minute resolution. The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), for failure to show that the CA committed
reversible error when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy. Petitioners repeated
delays in remitting the excess cash advances and admission that he spent them for other
purposes constitute serious misconduct and dishonesty which rendered him unworthy of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by respondent Araneta Center, Inc.
Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the above minute resolution
that he received through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have
his case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who
took part in the deliberation. On September 21, 2011 the Court denied Agoys motion to rescind
the subject minute resolution and confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011
resolution. It also treated his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the
same with finality.
Upon receipt of the Courts September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the
same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec.
4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide
his petition by a minute resolution. He thus prayed that it rescind its June 15 and September 21,
2011 resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the Court to resolve his petition through a
minute resolution, and submit the case to the Court en banc for proper disposition through a
signed resolution or decision.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO DENY HIS PETITION
THROUGH A MINUTE RESOLUTION.
HELD: While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the
fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course
to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases
are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution.
Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court denies a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error
committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below. The minute
resolutions in this case complied with this requirement. The Court has repeatedly said that minute
resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits.
Navarra v. Liongson, G.R. No. 217930,

48 Lagasca, Ellis
April 18, 2016
FACTS: On September 23, 1993, Jose Liongson, filed a complaint for damages based on
malicious prosecution against herein petitioners Spouses Navarra before the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City. After eight years, Jose died and his counsel informed the court of Jose’s death.
On May 2, 2001, a decision was rendered in favor of Jose ordering Spouses Navarra to pay.
Spouses Navarra contested the same based on the absence of a valid substitution of Jose.
Consequently, Jose’s counsel filed the Motion for Substitution, praying that Jose be substituted
by his surviving wife, Yolanda Liongson. The RTC ruled against Spouses Navarra whom then
elevated the matter before the CA which also denied the same.
Yolanda, thru her new counsel, Atty. Bonifacio G. Caboboy, filed her Motion to Substitute the
Plaintiff Jose Liongson which was finally granted by the RTC in the Order, dated January 25,
2008. Defendant spouses then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, assailing the
orders of the RTC. Meanwhile, Yolanda filed her Motion for Execution of Judgment which was
granted by the RTC. A writ of execution was issued and the was served upon Spouses Navarra.
Spouses Navarra then filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105568 insisting that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it allowed the substitution and then issued the writ of execution.
Meanwhile, on October 28, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and declaring the
substitution of plaintiff in order. On December 8, 2011, a decision was rendered in favor of
Spouses Navarra, where the CA reversed and set aside the questioned RTC order granting the
motion for execution and the issuance of the writ of execution.
On January 6, 2012, the December 8, 2011 decision of the CA became final and executory
and the entry of judgment was issued. Yolanda filed a motion praying for the recall/lifting of the
entry of judgment on the basis that she was totally unaware of this petition for certiorari filed before
the CA and docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105568 due to her counsel’s negligence.
On August 28, 2014, the CA promulgated an amended decision that granted the omnibus motion
and the motion for reconsideration filed by Yolanda. The appellate court recalled and set aside
the entry of judgment and reversed its December 8, 2011 decision in the interest of substantial
justice. The CA discovered that it rendered two conflicting decisions where the appellate
court allowed the substitution of Jose and another where it didn’t.
On the merits, the CA ruled that the action filed by Jose before the RTC was not extinguished
upon his death as it was one for recovery of damages for injury to his person caused by defendant
spouses tortuous conduct of maliciously filing an unfounded suit. Spouses Navarra filed their
separate motions for reconsideration, but both were denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT BREACHED THE WELL-SETTLED RULE THAT A FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENT MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE
MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSION OF LAW OR FACT?
HELD: NO. Where a certain case comprises two (2) or more conflicting judgments which are final
and executory, the Court, in the case of Collantes v. Court of Appeals (2007), offered three options
in resolving the same. First, the court may opt to require the parties to assert their claims anew;
second, to determine which judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments
had been rendered by a court of last resort.
The Court applied the second option. The case involves three conflicting final and executory
judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA.
● The first is the May 2, 2001 RTC decision which granted the complaint for damages.
● The second is the October 28, 2009 CA decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 104667 which
granted the motion for substitution and the motion for execution.
● The third, which is obviously in conflict with the first and second judgment, is the December
8, 2011 CA decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105568 which not only reversed and set aside
the motion for execution but also declared the May 2, 2001 RTC decision a void judgment.
The Court agrees with the CA that it would be more equitable to make use of the second option
mentioned in Collantes and sustain the finality of the earlier decisions rendered by the RTC and
the CA in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 104667. The only reason why the said decision was not immediately
executed was the petitioners’ insistence on the improper substitution of plaintiff. This issue,
however, was laid to rest on October 8, 2009 by the CA when it rendered, its decision in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 104667. The CA declared that the decision and the proceedings in the said case
were not rendered nugatory notwithstanding the belated compliance with the rules on substitution
as none of the parties was denied due process.
OTHER DOCTRINES: Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality “becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.”
Nonetheless, this doctrine may be relaxed in order to serve substantial justice in case compelling
circumstances that clearly warrant the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction are extant. Thus,
like any other rule, it has exceptions, such as:
1. The correction of clerical errors;
2. The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause, no prejudice to any party;
3. Void judgments; and
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
After all, the rules of procedure intend to promote the ends of justice, thus, their strict and rigid
application must always be eschewed when it would subvert its primary objective
Multinational Village Homeowners’ Association v.

Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017
Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corp.,

G.R. No. 206841-42, January 19, 2018
FACTS: Respondent East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a complaint against
Go before the RTC for collection of sum of money. Armando Go obtained a loan from respondent
in the amount of P14,062,888, His loan was approved by Theodore Sy which specified that the
purpose of the loan was for the upgrading of the bus fleet and replacements of all units of Oriental
Bus lines. Go issued 6 post dated checks, unfortunately, checks were dishonored by the DBP for
the reason that it was stamped with “Account under garnished.” East oceanic informed GO and
demanded payment, however Go failed to do so.
On the other hand, while the case was pending, East Oceanic filed complaint against Sy for
damages due to Sy’s false report and recommendation pertaining to the real purpose of the loan
application.
RTC rendered decision ordering Go and defendant Sy to pay East Oceanic.
Go moved for reconsideration arguing that the RTC failed to cite any factual and/or legal basis as
to his civil liability.
ISSUE: WHETHER RTC DECISION IS VOID FOR HAVING NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW
AS REGARDS HIS CIVIL LIABILITY?
HELD: YES. The decision is void because the Constitution expressly provides that "no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. As reflected in
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that:
Sec 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. - A judgment or final order determining the merits
of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably
a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties to litigation should be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and
against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing
party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed.
GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.,

G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. The rule is stated in Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules which reads as follows: Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. —Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.
In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply
with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules,
resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it
is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction
of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.
FACTS: The National Electrification Administration (NEA) entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement with Government Service Insurance System insuring all real and personal properties
mortgaged to it by electrical cooperatives under an Industrial All Risks Policy (IAR policy). Out of
which, 95% was reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a period of one year or from March 5, 1999 to
March 5, 2000. GSIS agreed to pay PGAI reinsurance premiums in an amount per quarter. While
GSIS remitted to PGAI the reinsurance premiums for the first three quarters, it, however, failed to
pay the fourth and last reinsurance premium due on December 5, 1999 despite demands. This
prompted PGAI to file, on November 15, 2001, a Complaint for sum of money against GSIS before
the RTC.
On December 18, 2001, PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings averring that GSIS
essentially admitted the material allegations of the complaint, such as: (a) the existence of the
MOA between NEA and GSIS; (b) the existence of the reinsurance binder between GSIS and
PGAI; (c) the remittance by GSIS to PGAI of the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums; and
(d) the failure/refusal of GSIS to remit the fourth and last reinsurance premium. Hence, PGAI
prayed that the RTC render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Section 1, Rule 34 of
the Rules of Court (Rules). GSIS opposed the foregoing motion by reiterating the allegations
and defenses in its Answer.
On January 11, 2002, the RTC issued an Order (January 11, 2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dissatisfied, GSIS filed a notice of appeal. The RTC granted
PGAI’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, conditioned on the posting of a bond. Accordingly,
PGAI duly posted a surety bond which the RTC approved through an Order dated February 19,
2002, resulting to the issuance of a writ of execution and notices of garnishment, all of even date,
against GSIS. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal of GSIS, hence this case.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC’S JANUARY 11, 2002
ORDER RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS?
HELD: NO. See the doctrine above. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on
the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain
uncontroverted. In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material
allegations of PGAI’s complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS
admitted that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance
binder effective for one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to
PGAI; (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it
received demand letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled
reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds
that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed.―The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the
general rule that only a final judgment may be executed. In order to grant the same pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion
by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for
execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
52 Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
FACTS: Petitioner Estrada filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents, because
of the ir breach of their obligations as a common carrier, which caused the death of Petitioner’s
wife as she was a passenger of the vehicle. Petitioner’s wife was a passenger of the AC Jeep,
the said jeep bumped a Ford pick-up truck to which she sustained injuries and died later on. Thus
the claims of Petitioner’s for damages.
ISSUE/S: W/N THERE’S JUDGEMENT RENDERED BY THE RTC JUDGE?
HELD: NO. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34, of the Revised Rules, "A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof." The
defendant who believes that he is entitled to a judgment either on the pleadings or on the basis
of extrinsic facts established by affidavits or depositions may move for summary judgment in his
favor. In other words, when the moving party is a defending party, his pleadings, depositions or
affidavits must show that his defenses or denials are sufficient to defeat the claimant's claim.
The affidavit submitted by the party moving for summary judgment shall be by persons having
personal knowledge of the facts; it shall recite all material facts and show that there is no defense
to the cause of action or that the cause of action has no merits. This motion shall be served on
the adverse party at least ten (10) days prior to the time specified in the hearing. The adverse
party may also, prior to said date, serve opposing affidavits. The opposing papers, including
pleadings, depositions, and affidavits must establish a genuine issue of fact in order to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.
After hearing, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted if, on the basis of all the papers
and proofs submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant
the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party. The motion shall be denied
if any party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact other than an issue as
to the amount or extent of the damages.
This Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved
in a trial. The very object is "to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from
what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.
In conducting the hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but merely to determine
whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried.
Where a motion is made for summary judgment, such motion is not directed to the pleadings and
deals only with the question of whether there are triable issues of facts and where such issues
exist summary judgment must be denied.
Summary judgment should not be granted where it fairly appears that there is a triable issue to
be tried. "The Court should not pass, on questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that
the summary judgment procedure 'should not be perverted to the trial of disputed questions of
fact upon affidavits". The test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is whether the
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing
papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim
is clearly meritorious.
In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the cause
of action and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After plaintiff's
burden has been discharged, defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to
defend.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not submitted opposing affidavits to controvert private
respondents' evidence that the driver of the passenger jeepney was free of contributory fault as
he stopped the jeepney to avoid the accident, but in spite of such precaution the accident
occurred, respondent Judge did not, therefore, act arbitrarily in declaring in his Order of May 20,
1975, that "there is no genuine issue to any material fact and no controversial question of fact to
be submitted to the trial court."
This was, however, a mere interlocutory order directing that a hearing be conducted for the
purpose of ascertaining the amount or the assessment of damages which may be adjudged in
favor of the prevailing party. It is a determination of the court of a preliminary point or directing
some steps in the proceedings, but not a disposition of the merits. "Upon the rendering of the
assessment, the Court shall direct the entry forthwith of the appropriate summary judgment."
In the absence of any findings of fact and conclusions of law, the aforesaid order of respondent
Judge cannot be considered a judgment. It has been held that "a trial court in granting summary
judgment should file findings of fact and conclusion of law or a memorandum opinion so as to
disclose grounds upon which the trial court reached its determination." In this jurisdiction, pursuant
to Section 9 of Article X of the Constitution and the procedural rules, all judgments determining
the merits of cases should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
There being no judgment, the present petition is, therefore, premature. Certainly, petitioner could
move for the setting aside of the aforesaid Order of May 20, 1975 by the presentation of opposing
affidavits showing that, other than the issue as to the amount or extent of damages, there is a
genuine issue of fact on the carrier's liability.
53 Bank of Philippine Islands v. Yu, January 20, 2010 Manalili, Mart
FACTS: Spouses Yu, as Tuanson Builders, borrowed a sum of money from FEBTC secured by
a real estate mortgage. Unable to pay, they asked for the restructuring of the loan which was
granted by BPI (already merged with FEBTC). However, they still failed to pay. They asked BPI
to release some mortgaged lands as the value exceeded the amount of the total debt but this was
ignored. By this, the Yus withheld their amortizations and thus BPI extra-judicially foreclosed. The
Yus sought annulment of the foreclosure sale. A compromise agreement was entered into by the
Yus and Magnacraft (highest bidder) whereby the charges against the latter were dropped.
The Yus filed their new complaint before the RTC against BPI for recovery of alleged excessive
penalty charges, attorney’s fees, foreclosure expenses that the bank caused to be incorporated
in the price of the auctioned properties. The Yus also claimed that BPI was in estoppel to claim
more than the amount stated in its published notices.
After pre-trial, the Yus moved for summary judgment, pointing out that based on the answer, the
common exhibits of the parties, and the answer to the written interrogatories to the sheriff, no
genuine issues of fact exist in the case.
Initially, the RTC granted only a partial summary judgment. The Yus moved for partial
reconsideration. They argued that, since BPI did not mark in evidence any document in support
of the foreclosure expenses it claimed, it may be assumed that the bank had no evidence to prove
such expenses. As regards their right to the pro-rating of their debt among the mortgaged
properties, the Yus pointed out that BPI did not dispute the fact that the proceeds of the sale of
the properties in Legazpi City fully satisfied the debt. Thus, the court could already resolve without
trial the issue of whether or not the foreclosure of the Pili property was valid.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE CASE PRESENTED NO GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT SUCH AS TO
WARRANT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE RTC?
HELD: YES. A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or
the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. Here, to resolve the issue of the excessive
charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a) the
pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate
mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and
other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not only the
existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these documents but also what they stated, the
trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties.
BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues that the parties
raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid and enforceable; 2)
whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper
parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from questioning the foreclosure
proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the
penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether
or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act.
These are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings
and the admissions of the parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact
that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such a great
waste of time and resources.
Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, 654 SCRA

54 Manliclic, Marianne P.
643
FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various parcels of land
registered in the names of the respondents.Petitioners purchased 2 lots from Cobarde in 1980
who in turn had purchased these lots from Ouano in 1948. Notwithstanding the sale, the 2 lots
remained registered in the name of Ouano. Ouano was able to sell these same lots to the National
Airports Corporation (NAC) in 1952 for its airport expansion project. When the airport expansion
project fell through, respondent and the legal heirs of Ouano succeeded in reclaiming title to the
2 lots through an action for reconveyance. The titles over these lots were thereafter registered in
their names then they subdivided the lots and sold them to various buyers who registered the
titles over their respective lots in their names.
Since good faith is always presumed, the RTC concluded that the National Airports Corporation
was a buyer in good faith and its registration of the properties in its name effectively transferred
ownership over the two lots, free from all the unrecorded prior transactions involving these
properties, including the prior sale of the lots to Cobarde.The CA ruled that the petitioners should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court instead of an ordinary appeal since they only raised a question of law, i.e., the propriety of
the summary judgment.
ISSUE/S: WON THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL AND IN HOLDING THAT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE ONLY
THROUGH A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 TO THE SUPREME
COURT?
HELD: NO. The CA correctly dismissed the action. The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second
mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA
from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.Where
a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal
is not reviewable by that court.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
While the petitioners never filed their appellants brief, we discern from the petitioners submissions
to the CA as well as from their petition with this Court, where they perceived issues with respect
to the RTCs summary judgment. Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there
are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial. Even
if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the
Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary
judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251,

July 9, 2014
FACTS: Castillo was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT 19972. The Philippine Tourism
Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land based on TCT 18493. Castillo
and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo Olivarez, entered into a contract of
conditional sale over the property.
Olivarez Realty failed to comply with the conditions, to wit: a) pay the full purchase price; b) failed
to file any action against PTA; c) failed to clear the land of the tenants nor paying them disturbance
compensation. For breaching the contract, Castillo prayed for rescission of contract under Art.
1191 of Civil Code, plus damages.
In their defense, Olivarez Realty alleged that Castillo failed to fully assist in filing the action against
PTA; that Castillo failed to clear the property of the tenants within 6 months from the signing of
the deed. Thus, they had all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments to fully pay the
purchase price.
Both RTC and CA ruled that Olivarez Realty breached the contract and ordered the rescission of
the sale plus damages. Petitioners reiterate that there are genuine issues of material fact to be
resolved in this case. Thus, a full-blown trial is required, and the trial court prematurely decided
the case through summary judgment.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

HELD: NO. In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase
price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo,
it set up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a case to void the Philippine
Tourism Authority’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third,
Castillo allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is currently being
litigated before a Quezon City court.
Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered an issue,
Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. As demonstrated, there are
no genuine issues of material fact in this case. These are issues that can be resolved judiciously
by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file. As the trial court
found, Olivarez Realty Corporation illegally withheld payments of the purchase price. The trial
court did not err in rendering summary judgment.
56 Basbas v. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
Philippine National Bank v. San Miguel Corp.,

G.R. No. 186063, January 15, 2014
FACTS: On July 1, 1996, respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into an Exclusive
Dealership Agreement with a certain Rodolfo R. Goroza wherein the latter was given by SMC the
right to trade, deal, market or otherwise sell its various beer products. Goroza applied for a credit
line with SMC, but one of the requirements for the credit line was a letter of credit. Thus, Goroza
applied for and was granted a letter of credit by the PNB in the amount of two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00). Goroza applied for an additional credit line with the PNB. Initially, Goroza was
able to pay his credit purchases with SMC. However, Goroza started to become delinquent with
his accounts. SMC filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money against PNB and Goroza.
After summons, herein petitioner filed its Answer, while Goroza did not. Upon respondent's Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default, Goroza was declared in default. The RTC denied PNB's motion
in its Resolution and the CA rendered its questioned Decision denying the petition and affirming
the assailed Resolution of the RTC.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court was correct in rendering a supplemental judgment and
amended order against the bank despite the perfection of appeal of one of the defendants.
HELD: YES. Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, provides that "in an action against several
defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or
more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others." It is clear from the proceedings
held before and the orders issued by the RTC that the intention of the trial court is to conduct
separate proceedings to determine the respective liabilities of Goroza and PNB, and thereafter,
to render several and separate judgments for or against them. While ideally, it would have been
more prudent for the trial court to render a single decision with respect to Goroza and PNB, the
procedure adopted by the RTC is, nonetheless, allowed.
In addition, Section 5 of the same Rule states that "when more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the claim may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim." Further, the
same provision provides that "the judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so
disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims." Thus, the appeal of Goroza,
assailing the judgment of the RTC finding him liable, will not prevent the continuation of the
ongoing trial between SMC and PNB.
58 Fernando v. Santamaria, December 10, 2004 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
FACTS: Fernando obtained on 3 separate occasions a loan from Chua for 5.5 Million. As security
she executed a REM over her Makati property. Before the 3rd loan could be released, she
executed a Deed of Absolute sale over the property in favor of Chua in consideration of 3 Million
upon the assurance of Borres who acted as Chua's agent that the deed was a mere formality.
She learned that her title was cancelled and a new one was issued to Chua. She also learned
that Chua sold the property to Uy and a new title was issued in favor of the latter.
Fernando then filed the following causes of action: (a) annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of
Chua and Uy and the cancellation of the titles issued in the name of Chua and Uy; (b) recovery
of certain amounts of money from Borres; and (c) recovery of damages against all the defendants.
RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against Chua and Uy but the case was to
proceed against Borres.
ISSUE/S: IS THE RTC CORRECT IN ITS DECISION?
HELD: YES. Notice of appeal should be accompanied by a record on appeal. Rationale is to

enable the appellate court to decide the appeal without the original records. Which should remain
with the court a quo pending disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the 1987 Constitution on periods to decide cases – All cases or
matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within 24 months
from date of submission for the SC and, unless reduced by the SC, 12 months for all lower
collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.
Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899,

59 Lagasca, Ellis
November 15, 2010
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of

cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
or affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
The appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that
may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a
substantial controversy exists.
SYNOPSIS: In a cross-claim by PBB against its co-defendant Chua, RTC rendered a partial
summary judgment in favor of PBB and found Chua liable for the PNs. Chua failed to timely file a
certiorari so RTC found the order to be final and executory. CA reversed RTC because a partial
summary judgment is only an interlocutory order and cannot attain finality. SC agreed with CA
and held that the appeal for a partial summary judgment must be taken together with a judgment
in the entire case.
FACTS: Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director of CST Enterprises (CST), turned over to Felipe
Chua, a director and President of CST, original copies of TCTs of properties owned by CST.
Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Soriano issued a secretary’s certificate which stated that John
Dennis Chua was authorized during a CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain
credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. The certificate also authorized John Chua to
use CST’s properties as security for these loans. Felipe Chua signed as a co-maker. Tan sued
PBB, Chua and Chua to annul the mortgage and loans.
In its answer, PBB filed a cross-claim against Felipe Chua, demanding payment of the PNS he
signed as co-maker with John Chua. Felipe Chua answered the cross claim admitting that he
signed the PNs as co-maker. PBB later filed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claiming that
since Chua already admitted execution of the PNs, there was no genuine issue on any material
fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. RTC issued a partial summary judgment finding Chua
liable as signatory to the PNs and ordered him to pay P 75M.
RTC denied Chua’s Notice of Appeal because he could not do so under Rule 41 and he should
have filed a Rule 65 certiorari. However, the period for filing a certiorari already lapsed so the
partial summary judgment has become final and executory.
CA ruled that RTC erred in holding that the partial judgment became final and executory when
Chua failed to timely avail of certiorari. It ruled that the partial summary judgment is an
interlocutory, not final, order.
ISSUE/S: WON THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A FINAL ORDER?
HELD: NO. A partial summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment. It is merely a pre-
trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed established for the trial of the case.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of

cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
or affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are
not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts.
Partial summary judgment (Rule 35, Sec. 4)

Judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary.
Court shall make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy.
The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the
controverted facts accordingly.
Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, an interlocutory order (such as partial
summary judgment) may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
In Guevara v. CA, it had been held that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be
taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted
on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists.
Petitioner argued that Guevara not applicable because the partial summary judgment in this case
is a full adjudication because the award is for the whole claim. The Court disagrees. The partial
summary judgment in this case only resolved the cross claim made by PBB against Chua. The
main issues in Tan’s complaint are still unresolved.
Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30,

60 Sibal, Tricia
2017

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THIRD SYLLABUS CASE DIGESTS

CASE NAME NAME

J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. v. J.O.S. Managing

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Aguirre, G.R. Nos.

5 Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply Inc. Capellan, Ace Lemuel

6 Maramag v. Maramag Cruz, Joan mae

Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk v. Spouses Sison, G.R. No.

FAJ Construction v. Saulog, G.R. No. 200759,

Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty, G.R. No. 207376,

Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative,

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of

Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,

19 Otto Gmur Inc. v. Revilla, 55 Phil. 627 Manalili, Mart

20 Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 170 Manliclic, Marianne P.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.

Office of the Ombudsman v. de Chavez, G.R. No.

Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC.

27 Autographics Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 198 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

DFA v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858,

Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515,

Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. v. UCPB General

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Africa), G.R. No. 152375,

Ayala Land Inc. v. Judge Tagle, G.R. No. 153667,

Spouses Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145,

Diman v. Judge Alumbres, G.R. No. 131466,

Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville

Yu v. Basilio Magno Construction, G.R. No. 138701-02,

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375,

40 Corp. v. Mangosing, 70 SCRA 598 Cruz, Joan mae

42 Vallacar Transit v. Yap, 126 SCRA 500 Domalanta, Marc Denver L

Metrobank v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677,

Maraño v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 196592,

Agoy v. Araneta Center Inc., G.R. 196358,

Multinational Village Homeowners’ Association v.

Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corp.,

GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.,

52 Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 Lazaro, Ivan Rei

53 Bank of Philippine Islands v. Yu, January 20, 2010 Manalili, Mart

54 Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, 654 SCRA 643 Manliclic, Marianne P.

Olivarez Realty Corp. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251,

56 Basbas v. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151 Navarro, Bryan Christopher

Philippine National Bank v. San Miguel Corp.,

58 Fernando v. Santamaria, December 10, 2004 Oliveros, Keisha Camille

Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899,

RULE 16, RULES OF COURT

Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

ISSUE: WHETHER A MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AFTER THE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

ISSUE: WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER OBANDO FOR ESTAFA THROUGH

J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. v. United Overseas

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Aguirre, G.R. Nos.

5 Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply Inc. Capellan, Ace Lemuel

6 Maramag v. Maramag Cruz, Joan mae

1. The falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk v. Spouses Sison, G.R. No.

Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, August 6,

RULE 17, RULES OF COURT

FAJ Construction v. Saulog, G.R. No. 200759, March

ISSUE/S: Whether res judicata apply to this case?