Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 23, No.

3, 1999

What Is Forensic Psychology, Anyway?

John C. Brigham1

The issue of how "forensic psychology" is defined has taken on a new urgency in
the context of an application to have forensic psychology designated a "specialty"
by the American Psychological Association. To provide a historical perspective, I
briefly review early attempts to apply psychological concepts to legal issues, beginning
with the McNaughten trial in England in 1843. I then review current conceptualiza-
tions of forensic psychology, which have either a broad focus on all psychology-law
interactions or focus more narrowly on clinical applications to the legal system.
Potential advantages and disadvantages of each conceptualization are briefly dis-
cussed. After touching upon the major differences in the "cultures" of psychology
and of law, I discuss three law-related areas of contemporary controversy: use of
clinically based evidence in the courtroom, "recovered" memories of child abuse,
and the use of the criteria-based content analysis technique to evaluate children's
claims of sexual abuse. Issues concerning the education and training of psychology-
law scholars and practitioners are briefly surveyed. I conclude that a broad conceptual-
ization of forensic psychology is important in terms of relevant ethical standards, but
that a more narrow distinction that differentiates between clinicians and researchers
or legal scholars also is useful.

"What is forensic psychology, anyway?" I have heard this plaintive question many
times over the past few years, asked by bewildered undergraduate students, graduate
students, and fellow professionals. Indeed, I have asked myself the same question,
and I have never been able to come up with an entirely satisfactory answer. This
vexing question is not simply of arcane academic relevance. Recently the American
Psychological Association (APA) opened the gates for the certification of new
"specialties" in psychology, and "forensic psychology" is one specialty that will be
considered. The specialty designation issue has engendered heated and lengthy
debate among many members of the American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS)
about whether or not AP-LS should be an active participant in the specialty applica-
tion process. Much of this debate has been centered around the basic question of
what is, and is not, "forensic psychology." There seems to be general agreement
1
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-1270 (e-mail: brigham®
psy.fsu.edu).

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0147-7307/99/0600-0273$16.00/1 © 1999 American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychology Association
274 Brigham

that forensic psychology involves the interaction of psychology and the legal process
(indeed, that's what the dictionary says), but beyond this general conceptualization,
things become murky.
I will attempt to shed some light on this contentious issue, with particular
attention to the perspective of AP-LS. I will begin by briefly discussing several
important milestones in the intersection of psychology and law over the past 150
years. This will be followed by an analysis of the ways in which "forensic psychology"
has been defined by contemporary professionals. I will then turn to a brief analysis
of problematic issues in the interface of psychology and law, after which I will
discuss three law-related areas in psychology in which controversy has been particu-
larly salient. The first issue is a general one—the use (or rejection) of clinical/
practice-oriented and of research-based data in the courtroom. The remaining two
areas pertain to allegations of child sexual abuse: the heated psycholegal debate
on "recovered memories" of childhood sexual abuse (as represented by the report
of the APA Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse),
and the validity of the criterion-based content analysis (CBCA) technique that is
intended to assess whether or not a child's allegation of sexual abuse is truthful.
Finally, I will touch upon some issues concerning the education and training of
future psychology-law scholars and practitioners.

PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS

In 1843 Daniel McNaughten (or M'Naghten), a woodturner and shopkeeper

from Glasgow, Scotland, attempted to assassinate British Prime Minister Robert
Peel. Instead, he mistakenly shot and killed the Prime Minister's secretary, Edward
Drummond. In his only public statement about his motives, McNaughten said, "The
Tories in my native city have compelled me to do this. They follow, persecute me
wherever I go and have entirely destroyed my peace of mind. They followed me
to France, into Scotland, and all over England. In fact they follow me wherever I
go. I cannot sleep nor get no rest from them. I shall never be the man I was. I used
to have good health and strength, but I have not now" (quoted in Moran, 1981, p.
10). McNaughten's statement formed the basis for an insanity defense at his trial.
The concept of an insanity defense was not new to the British legal or medical
communities. One well-known previous case involved James Hadfield, who in 1800
had attempted to assassinate King George III. Hadfield, who had suffered a head
wound while fighting the French 6 years earlier, was found not guilty by reason of
insanity. Hadfield's defense attorney argued successfully that one did not have to
be a raging "wild beast," totally out of contact with reality (as had been the standard
up to then), to be considered insane.
When arrested, McNaughten had in his pocket a deposit slip for 750 pounds,
a huge sum for a man in his position. These funds were used to hire what might
be called the first legal defense "Dream Team," 150 years before the O. J. Simpson
murder trial. McNaughten was defended by four barristers; they called nine medical
experts who testified that he was insane or "partially insane." The prosecution did
not attempt to counter the defense's medical testimony and the prosecutor withdrew