EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y.
2018-2019
1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs Republic of the
Philippines
KEYWORD:
AFP Land Registration; Authority of Witness
DOCTRINE:
There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a
witness for a party to present some form of authorization to
testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. All that
the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over
three parcels of land located in West Bicutan, Taguig City,
before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later
docketed and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo.
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former
President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998.
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr.
Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized
to do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as
evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate dated August
18, 2003.
After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and
since no oppositor registered any oppositions after the
petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo
issued an order of general default against the whole world,
and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P.
Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its Asset
Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among her
main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of
petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and freed
of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties were
acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential
Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful
possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time
immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines
transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful
possession and occupation, and exercised control over them in
the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the obligations of
an owner; petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on
the subject properties; and the subject properties are not
mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted. Subsequently,
petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following
which, the court a quo granted the application in a Decision
dated April 21, 2008.
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2008, wherein it
argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has
personality to own property in its name and the petitioner
1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
failed to show that the witness it presented was duly
authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order
granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s application for
land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to
prosecute the subject case.
RULING:
YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides only three instances wherein the Court
may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute.
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of
the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for
an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply
with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a
case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise
provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless
there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is
without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.
First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the
trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008
ordering the registration of petitioner’s title to the subject
lots shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court and
was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that
the petitioner was able to present its evidence, and as a
result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor.
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject
case considering that it appeared during trial, presented Ms.
Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of
the subject lots, and the court a quo never held petitioner
liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject case.
Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the
petitioner did not fail to comply with the Rules or any order
of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the
latter to this effect.
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that
the petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case, because
none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a
case due to failure to prosecute is present.
On the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms. Aban, to
testify on behalf of the petitioner. (Related to Evidence Class)
The SC ruled that there is no substantive or procedural rule
which requires a witness for a party to present some form
of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would
support the conclusion that such omission can be considered
as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting
such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided therein.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are
mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or
immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses.
Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for
disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section
15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes
the operation of causes of disability other than those
mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the
operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied.
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception
not embodied therein.
Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the
petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able
to perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to
others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.
The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did
they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject
application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records would
reveal that the application was signed and filed by Mr.
Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized by
petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The authority of Mr. Azcueta to
file the subject application was established by a Secretary’s
Certificate attached to the said application. The asseveration
that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly
authorized representative of the petitioner is thus
unfounded.
2) Alvarez vs Ramirez
KEYWORD:
Arson by hubby
DOCTRINE:
The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and admits of
exceptions such as when the relationship of the husband and
wife is already strained that the preservation of the marriage
the two is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
FACTS:
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness
in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
2| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Note (sa later part sa case nani gi discuss): Maximo Alvarez
set Susan Ramirez’ house knowing fully well that his wife,
Esperanza was there. Their relationship was already strained
and that they already separated de facto six months prior to
the incident.
ISSUE:
WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
the case for Arson
RULING:
Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions.
As a general rule, Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. —
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and
wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there
is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification
rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting,
will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner,
directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his
wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for
arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of
marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by
which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes. |
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to
the commission of the offense, the relationship between
petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
were separated de facto almost six months before the
incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested
in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be
punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in
Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity."
3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co.
KEYWORD:
St. Claire
DOCTRINE:
Dead man’s statute applies only if the defending party is sued
in his representative capacity.
FACTS:
Petitioners’ original and amended complaints alleged that
during their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay
Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property,
which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal. During their lifetime the land were conveyed to Andres
Guerrero, one of their sons and took possession over the
property. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese
occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister,
Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property
cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests.
Subsequently, Andres died, and his surviving heir succeeded
but, it was around this time that a relative named Manuel
Guerrero came forward and told them the property they were
supposed to inherit from their father, Andres, was already
owned by Manuel Guerrero.
It was discovered by the heirs of Andres that Manuel Guerrero
supposedly bought the property from their aunt Christina. So,
the heirs of Andres went to court and filed an action to
recover the property.
At this time, the property was already owned by St. Claire,
who bought it from the relatives of Manuel Guerrero, who in
turn bought the property from Manuel Guerrero himself.
There were already series of transfers, from Manuel Guerrero
to St. Claire.
During trial, they presented witnesses (Laura and Jose
Cervantes) to prove that Manuel Guerrero did not acquire
ownership over the property, because, Christina who
purportedly executed a deed of sale in favor of Manuel
Guerrero, was not the real owner as the real owner was
Andres Guerrero. Also, they tried to prove that the actual
transaction entered into was not a sale but a mortgage to
guarantee the loan obligation of Christina
Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify
Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a),
Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court.
3| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion
and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as
other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify
in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the
case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section
20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in error.
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are
not parties in the present case, and neither are they
assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose
testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not
Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely
mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
"Following this rule of construction, it may be said that
incompetency to testify established in the provision above
quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no
others, that is, only parties’ plaintiff or their assignors,
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere
witnesses who are neither parties’ plaintiff, nor their
assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
are not included in the prohibition.”
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against
the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators
or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in
interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is
dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with
their express wording, irrespective of their spirit.
The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator
or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be
noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator
the words or other representative follows, which means that
the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the
executor or administrator, are sued in their representative,
not personal, capacity.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
4) Goni vs CA
KEYWORD:
Sale of Hacienda; Recovery of Property and Damages
DOCTRINE:
The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person
which were made with an agent of such person in cases in
which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the
testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those
transactions or communications which were had with the
agent.
FACTS:
The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]
owned the three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria
and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of
Bais, Negros Oriental. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T.
Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of
said haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the
price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to
sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later
substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar
Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
TABACALERA. Villanueva further contracted or promised to
sell to the latter (Vicente) fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00.
Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his
account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance
of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of
P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase
price, only the latter amount was debited from private
respondent’s account. The difference was supposedly paid by
private respondent Vicente to Villanueva, but as no receipt
evidencing such payment was presented.
Subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell,
Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in
Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private respondent
Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to
sell. However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been
debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that
lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would
merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of
five (5) years.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed
of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva.
Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva.
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private
respondent Vicente.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings
were instituted, among the properties included in the
inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of
property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement
thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late
Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.
4| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein
defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to
execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court.
ISSUE:
1. May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva,
which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate,
in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a)?
2. May not a written promise to sell dated October 24
1949 be novated into a verbal agreement of lease
during the lifetime of the promisor, whose death
occurred on November 12, 1951, by facts and
circumstances substantiated by competent oral
evidence in this case?
RULING:
1. YES. Gaspar Vicente is qualified to testify on matters of
fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva. Under
ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be
disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T.
Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section
20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute. The object and
purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality
in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death
has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove
from the surviving party, the temptation to falsehood and the
possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of
Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been
distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the
protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are
properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only
because they succeeded to the decedent’s right by descent
or operation of law, but more importantly because they are
so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which
they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense
which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish
a claim which deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living.
HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively
waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s
deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the
plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It
must further be observed that petitioners presented a
counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When
Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity
as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as
defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender
of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
by the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased
person.
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is
competent to testify to transactions or communications with
the deceased or incompetent person which were made with
an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive
and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse
party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent. The
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a)
of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the
opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the
other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips,
does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that
petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of
the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni
testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria.
2. YES. The contract was validly novated. Novation takes place
when the object or principal condition of an obligation is
changed or altered. In order, however, that an obligation may
be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that
the old and the new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other.
The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a
verbal agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly proven
not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by
the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the
execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the
milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13
were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4
and 13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name.
Villanueva likewise executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda
Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to
private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps
toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3,
4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of
Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his
favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated
on the certificate of title of said lots.
5) Tongco vs Vianzon
KEYWORD:
“Widow asked for annulment of decrees of lots issued in the
name of the conjugal partnership after husband’s death”
DOCTRINE:
Dead Man’s Statute; the suit must involve a claim against the
estate of the deceased; the law was designed to aid in arriving
at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.
FACTS:
Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage
on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925, leaving
Anastacia as his widow. Shortly before the death of Marcelino,
he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had
5| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the
conjugal partnership. Corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership.
After the death of Marcelino, the Judge of First Instance in a
cadastral case rendered a decision annulling decrees Nos.
191390, 191504, and 190925, as well as the original
certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 and ordering
that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be
issued as the exclusive property of Anastacia. A motion for
new trial by counsel for the losing party was denied.
In an action for recovery of specified property filed by the
administratrix of the estate against Anastacia on July 19,
1926, a judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in
the following language: "Therefore, the court renders
judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in this
case, and only declares that one-half of the value of the
shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani,
to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the intestate
estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must
appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the
deceased Marcelino Tongco." The motion for new trial was
denied.
From both of the judgment, the administratrix of the estate
of Marcelino Tongco has appealed. As pursuant to the
agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together.
ISSUE:
Whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the
estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it should be set aside
as belonging exclusively to the widow.
(This was not state in the case but to answer Atty Torreg’s
question, “so tell me, why should we be interested in this
case?” the evidence related issue I think is: WON the widow’s
testimony should be disqualified pursuant dead man’s
statute)
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Vianzon and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of
the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the
spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that
it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even
proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow
has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the
property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it
would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony.
The administratrix of the estate attack the ruling of the trial
judge to the effect that the widow was competent to testify.
Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of
parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose
behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that
the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. He
has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the
law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of
the word "against." The actions were not brought "against"
the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon
claims "against" the estate.
In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix
to enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the second case at
bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented
in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no
plaintiff and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was
accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-
examination the interested person with respect to the
prohibited matter.
president-treasurer of the claimant corporation. Respondent
also argues that the Exhibit 1 is not self-serving
ISSUES:
1. Whether the vice-president-treasurer and president of
the corporation which are a party to an action against
the executor or administrator are disqualified from
testifying under the Rule 123, section 26 (c) of the rules
of court?
2. Whether the Exhibit 1 is be admitted as evidence?
HELD:

1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers and/or

6) Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf
KEYWORD:
Pacific war, settlement of estate, claim against the estate, self-
serving statement
2.
DOCTRINE:
A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the
interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible.
A declaration against interest of the person making it is
admissible in evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character,
if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died,
become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a
witness.
FACTS:
Fitzsimmons was a president of a corporation. He held 1000
shares of stock in a corporation, 545 shares of which were not
fully paid which was evidenced by a promissory note in favor
of the corporation. Soon after the Japanese invasion,
Fitzsimmons died in an internment camp in Santo Tomas. A
special proceeding was for the settlement of the estate was
instituted. The corporation of Fitzsimmons filed a claim of
63,000 pesos of which Fitzsimmons owed to the corporation.
The claim was evidenced by the testimony of the chief
accountant and assistant accountant of the corporation. Aside
from the accountant, it also presented the vice-president-
treasurer and the president but was objected to by the
administrator of the estate for being violative of the Rule 123.
The administrator of Fitzsimmons denied the claim and
presented the Exhibit 1 which was an inventory made by Atty.
Linchauco in the settlement of the conjugal partnership
brought about by the divorce of Fitzsimmons and his wife. In
the inventory there was no mention of any liabilities
pertaining to the corporation.
Complainant Contention: The testimony of the vice-president
and president are not violative of the Rule 123. Plaintiff also
argues that the Exhibit 1 is self-serving.
stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from
testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party
to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person.
YES. A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to
the interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible. The vital
objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its
hearsay character. On the other hand, a declaration
against interest of the person making it is admissible in
evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the
declaration is relevant and the declarant has died,
become insane, or for some other reason is not available
as a witness. “The true test in reference to the reliability
of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem
motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of
hearsay evidence, but whether the declaration was
uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion
that there was no probable motive to falsify.
In this case, there was no probable motive on the part of
Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not
including therein the claim of the corporation to be
deducted from the assets of the conjugal partnership. On
the other hand, if Mr. Fitzsimmons, who was the
president and one of the largest stockholders of the
claimant corporation, really owed the latter around
P63,000, and had not paid it before he liquidated his
conjugal partnership as a consequence of the decree of
divorce he obtained against his wife, we see no reason
why he did not include such obligation in said
liquidation.
Judging from the high opinion which the officers and
stockholders of the corporation entertained of
Fitzsimmons as shown by their resolution hereinafter
quoted, they cannot impute bad faith to him in not
acknowledging the claim in question. We find, therefore,
that Exhibit 1, insofar as the omission therefrom of the
claims in question was concerned, far from being self-
serving to, was a declaration against the interest of, the
defendant Fitzsimmons. He having died and therefore
cannot be made as a witness, said document was
correctly admitted by the trial court in evidence.

Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and treasurer

of the corporation were incompetent under Section 26 (c) of
the Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and
members of the board of directors but they are also vice-

6| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
7) Razon vs IAC
KEYWORD:
Dead Man’s Statute rule does NOT apply in a case filed by the
administrator.
DOCTRINE:
Failure to object timely to oral testimony on the basis of DMS
rule is a WAIVER.
Mere oral testimony is NOT enough to prove valid transfer of
shares of stocks.
FACTS:
In 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the
purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor,
Manila. On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500
shares of stock was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
This was registered under his name in the books of the
corporation. No one questioned his ownership of the stocks.
He was even elected as a director. When he died intestate, his
estate was administered by his son Vicente. Razon refused to
deliver the stock certificate to Vicente, prompting the latter to
file this case.
Alleging that Chuidian is a mere nominal investor, Razon
asserts that he himself paid for the stocks, making him the
true owner thereof. He claims that he and the late Chuidian
had an understanding that Razon would possess the stock
certificate until and if Chuidian will pay for the same. The CFI
(now RTC) of Manila ruled in favor of Razon. However, this was
reversed by the IAC (now CA), which applied the Dead Man’s
Statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Razon argues that the rule does not apply because
Vicente did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
agreement between him and Chuidian.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Dead Man’s Statute rule applies in this case.
2. W/N Razon’s oral testimony is enough to prove that he
owns the stocks
RULING:
1. NO, the Dead Man’s Statute rule does not apply. Razon’s
testimony is admissible.
The DMS rule applies only to a case filed AGAINST the
administrator of an estate upon a claim against the estate.
This case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Rather, it is the administrator Vicente who is filing this
case. Furthermore, he did not object to the oral testimony.
A failure to make a timely objection is deemed to be a
waiver the rule.
2. NO, mere oral testimony is insufficient to prove ownership
over stocks.
Several evidences show that Chuidian was considered a
valid stockholder of the corporation: the stocks were
registered under his name in the books, he was elected as
a director. In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of
7| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Appeals, the Supreme Court held that, to be effective, the
transfer of shares of stock must follow the mode and
manner prescribed by law. Razon must show that the
transfer satisfied all the requirements under the
corporation's by-laws. Since he failed to present any by-
laws, the provisions of the Corporation Code apply.
Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate must be
properly indorsed. The title to such certificate of stock is
vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly
indorsed certificate of stock. Since the stock certificate
was no indorsed, the inevitable conclusion is that the
shares of stock belong to Chuidian. Furthermore,
preponderance of evidence shows that the stocks were
given to Chuidian for value, since he was the legal counsel
who handled the legal affairs of the corporation.
The decision of the IAC is AFFIRMED. All cash and stock
dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have
accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc.,
since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T.
Chuidian.
8) Mendezona vs Viuda de Goitia
DOCTRINE:
Dead Man's Statute does not apply if what is being testified
against the executor is a denial of something that happen
before the deceased passed away.
FACTS:
Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly
appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband Benigno Goitia in special proceeding No.
30273 of this court.
Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of
the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the
"Tren de Aguadas" and located in the City of Manila, of which
the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista
Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff
Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200.
Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time the manager of
the aforesaid co-partnership, collected the dividends for the
plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year.
Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia
forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were
P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216,
that from 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno
Goitia failed to remit to the dividends upon their shares in
the "Tren de Aguadas".
That sometime before his death, more particularly, in July,
1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the manager of the
said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the
amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor
Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y
Nazabal's stock, that from 1915 to 1926, the "Tren de
Aguadas" paid dividends to the share-holders, one of them,
Ramon Salinas, having received the total amount of P1,155 as
ordinary and special dividends upon his 15 shares that
calculating the dividends due from 1915 to 1926 upon
Leonor Mendezona's 180 shares at P540 per annum, and at
P216 yearly upon the 72 shares held by Valentina Izaguirre y
Nazabal.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the
committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of Benigno
Goitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed from the
committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two
cases.
One of the assignment of errors raised by defendant relates to
Exhibits A and B, being the appellees' depositions made before
the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with
section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the
appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and
he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the
questions of the committee. When these depositions were
read in court, the defendant objected to their admission,
invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her
objection referred mainly to the following questions:
1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your
partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — Yes, until the year
1914.
2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any
report or money on account of profits upon your shares? —
He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my letters.
3. did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your
account — Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an
answer.
The first of these questions tends to show the relationship
between the principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno
Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a
question, it would not be reversible error, for that very
relationship is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I. As to the
other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny
having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money
on account of profits on their shares, since 1915.
ISSUE:
WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute
RULING:
No.
We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact
occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno
Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section
383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a
witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took
place before the death of the deceased. The underlying
principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate
from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be
treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just
claims against the decedent's estate
The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390),
differ from those in the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff
Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo
during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in
his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency.
The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In
spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a
claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican
currency, alleging that P750 which included the 1899
8| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore
instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should
have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is
evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383,
paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could
not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as
to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between
himself and the decedent. But in the case before us there has
been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the
deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation.
To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of
one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would
be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the
testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was the
legislator's intention.
The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took
place before their representative's death, but on the contrary
denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a
liquidation had been made or any money remitted on
account of their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the
ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant
to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition
was true, either by bringing into court the books which the
attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing
copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as
was the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or
by other similar evidence.
The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept
by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of
Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of
Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of
Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in the
administration of said partnership, to the effect that the
deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the
plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May
and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for
Valentina Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by
the deceased to the plaintiffs.
9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles
KEYWORD: Leasehold Agreement which excluded 2 heirs.
DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that "if one
party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."
FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm being
tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee under a leasehold
agreement. Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by
her nephews and niece, namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto.
On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and
Pedro – succeeded him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as
her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro
entered into a leasehold agreement, “Kasunduan sa
Buwisan”, which installed and recognized Pedro as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga, took over
as agricultural lessee.
Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded Pedro’s
heirs - Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia
and Salamat, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees
of Pedro.
Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint
for nullification of the first leasehold agreement.
Garcia and Salamat claimed that:
1) they entered into an agreement with their brother
Pedro to farm the land on a "per-season basis";
2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and cultivated
the land all by himself;
3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing
him as sole agricultural lessee;
4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s
misrepresentations, she executed an Affidavit stating
among others that Pedro assured her that he would
not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory
rights"; and
5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and
Augusto executed in their favor the "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co-
lessees.
In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed that:
1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date
between her and the petitioners are self-serving and
violate the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Contract;
2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in
possession of the land even while Eugenio lived;
3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed
the land even for a single cropping; that Pedro has
been the one paying the lease rentals as evidenced
by receipts;
4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his
rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she had
been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since
1985; and
5) that petitioners had no right to institute themselves
as her co-lessees.
Ruling of the PARAD
The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the July 10,
1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted
to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without
cause
Ruling of the DARAB
Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa" between the landowners and petitioners cannot defeat
Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and his rights as
the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on their rights,
petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they
are co-lessees
9| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the late) Pedro
assured her (Amanda) that he would not deprive Garcia and
Salamat of their "cultivatory rights” is admissible.
RULING:
No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.
Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged
admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute,
which provides that "if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased,
and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold
agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and
which is now the subject matter of the present case and
claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-
in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted
and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair
situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or
disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-
declarant Pedro’s prior death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under
their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate
the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they
should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with
Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-
lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after
the passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was
only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant
in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came
forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As
correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights,
and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979
agricultural leasehold contract.
Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro
deceived her into believing that he is the sole successor to
the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s
representative or administrator was to know the personal
circumstances of the lessee Eugenio; more especially so,
when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry
as to who survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or
she as representative – could choose from among them who
would succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844,
Makapugay, or Amanda – as Makapugay’s duly appointed
representative or administrator – was required to make a
choice, within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would
succeed as agricultural lessee.
There is no other logical conclusion than that the "Kasunduan
sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners,
which is grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission,
and which agreement was entered into without obtaining
Dominga’s consent, constitutes an undue infringement of
Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest under
Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and
dispossess her of the leasehold against her will. Under
Section 732 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to security of
tenure; and under Section 16, any modification of the lease
agreement must be done with the consent of both parties
and without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
10) People v. Carlos
PRINCIPLE: If documents were obtained from the addressee
by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but if they were
obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the consent,
the privilege should cease.
FACTS:
Dr. Pablo Sityar was a victom of an alleged murder. He
performed surgery on defendant Carlos’ wife for appendicitis.
Thereafter, the wife was required to go to the Doctor’s clinic
several times to dress the wounds. Carlos had always
accompanied his wife. On one visit, Dr. Sityar asked Carlos to
do an errand and buy medicine. While he was away, the
Doctor outraged his wife. Nevertheless, Carlos went a week
after to his clinic to consult his lung problem. Several months
after, he was admitted to PGH where he remained under the
care of two other Physicians. While he was there, Dr. Sityar
billed him for professional services he had rendered for his
wife. A few days later, Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar,
found him there alone, and without any preliminary quarrel,
attacked the Doctor and stabbed him twice.
Carlos surrendered himself to police, admits he killed the
deceased but argues that it was in self-defense. He says that
he went over the clinic to protest the charges of the doctor
and asked for an extension. He was allegedly insulted by the
doctor, and a quarrel ensued. The deceased took a pocket
knife from his desk, attached Carlos, but Carlos was able to
take away the knife from him, and stabbed him.
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle described is in
conflict with the evidence presented by the prosecution. But
assuming that it is true, it is very evident that it fails to
establish a case of self-defense and that, in reality, the only
question here to be determined is whether the defendant is
guilty of murder or of simple homicide.
The court found that there was premeditation that
constituted murder. A letter written to Carlos made by the
wife was presented where the wife feared that Carlos would
result to physical violence with the Doctor. Carlos argued that
such letter was a privileged communication and not
admissible as evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was admissible as evidence
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was not.
The letter was a privileged communication and not
admissible. Where a privileged communication from one
spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party,
whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary
disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent,
becomes admissible.
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
For documents of communication coming into
the possession of a third person, a distinction should
10| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's
communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they
were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery,
they should still be privileged (for otherwise the
privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for
written communications); but if they were obtained
surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's
consent, the privilege should cease.”
However, if the letter was obtained through a search with no
warrant, the documents are considered as obtained through
illegal search and thus inadmissible as evidence in a criminal
case. The letter must be excluded for reasons not discussed
in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might
have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was
not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore
not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by
answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter it might also have been
admissible, but such is not the case; the fact that he had the
letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or
assent on his part.
The letter is nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in
evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in
a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the
prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine
them.
The question is radically different from that of the
admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the
ground that it relates to a conversation in which both
spouses took part and on the further ground that where the
defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made
to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies
assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained
in an unanswered letter.
Defendant is only guilty of homicide and not murder.
11) Uy Chico v. Union Life
KEYWORD: Attorney compromised
FACTS:
The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at which
time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy
Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business
and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." The
plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and
continued to carry on the business under the father's name.
A fire engulfed the business premises. At the time of the fire
"Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent to the fire,
the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father.
During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's
attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the
administrator of the estate, who compromised with the
insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000.
This money was paid into court and is now being held by the
sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that
the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not
bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his
father's estate.
Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the
compromise and his had surrendered the policy to the
administrator. To prove this, the defendant introduced
evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered
the policies to the administrator with the understanding that
such a compromise was to be effected.
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had
any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the
surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative.
The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon,
counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver
previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony
of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
ISSUE: Was the testimony privileged?
RULING: The communication was not privileged.
The evidence in question concerned the dealings of the
plaintiff's attorney with a third person. The very essence of the
veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made
between attorney and client is that such communications are
not intended for the information of third persons or to be
acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client
as to his rights.
It is evident that a communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to
a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the third
person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney
and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and
that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or
agent.
The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney
delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that
there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he
informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that
purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The
evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in
the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to
the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an
action for the recovery of their face value.
12) Regala v Sandiganbayan
KEYWORD: Who’s your client?
PRINCIPLE:
As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the attorney-client
privilege and refuse to identify the identity of his client.
However, such rule is qualified if revealing the client’s identity
would implicate the client in the very activity for which he
sought legal advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil
liability or if revealing the client’s name would establish the
11| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual and as such, refuse to give the client’s
identity in invoking the privilege.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for
the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, among the
defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the
law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law
Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm).
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in
Civil Case No. 0033**, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, he in turn undertaking
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-Motion
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent Roco.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG
ISSUE:
W/N the revelation of the client’s identity is within the ambit
of the attorney-client privilege
HELD:
Under the circumstances of this case, yes.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The
reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood; Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established, privilege
does not attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege
generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
The general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
his identity is privileged
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
The circumstances in this case would reveal that the instant
case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case,
which is privileged information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists.
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances
such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to
sanctioning 􏰾fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and
litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. The
logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much "communication" as information revealed directly
about the transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged.
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents
related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of
the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
(back story)
**In Civil Case No. 0033, defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to
the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that
through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
million shares.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers
that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence,
petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by
allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument
12| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, 􏰾flagrant breach of public trust.
13) Barton v Leyte Asphalt
PRINCIPLE:
The privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter
written by the client to his attorney which comes to the
hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such a
document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the
manner in which it was obtained.
FACTS:
James Barton, a US citizen residing in Manila sough to
recover $318,563.30 in damages for breach of contract from
Leyte Asphalt, a Philippine company with principal office in
Cebu. Leyte Asphalt is the owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a
valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt
products.
William Anderson, president and general manager of Leyte
Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton authorizing him to sell the
products in the Commonwealth of Australia and New
Zealand. Barton also eventually entered into sub-agency
agreement in San Francisco and Australia.
There was a large order from Ludvigsen and McCurdy for
6,000 ton of bituminous limestone. However, Anderson told
Barton that the company was behind construction so it could
not make big contracts at the moment. Despite Anderson’s
response, Barton wrote a notification to Leyte Asphalt for the
company to be prepared to ship 5,000 tons.
There were six causes of actions for various agreements that
Barton filed with the CFI. However, CFI only allowed Barton
to recover from two.
Among the evidences present in the case was a carbon copy
of a letter written by Barton to his lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. He
wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract would
have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter
was offered in evidence by Leyte Asphalt, Barton’s lawyer
announced that he had no objection to the introduction of
the letter evidence if counsel for the company would explain
where the letter was secured. Upon this the attorney for the
defendant informed the court that he received the letter
from the former attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the document had come
into their possession.
Upon this Barton’s lawyer made this announcement: "We
hereby give notice at this time that unless such an
explanation is made, explaining fully how this carbon copy
came into the possession of the defendant company, or any
one representing it, we propose to object to its admission on
the ground that it is a confidential communication between
client and lawyer."
No further information was then given by the attorney for
the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come
to his hands.
Trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground
that it was a privileged communication between client and
attorney.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
RULING:
CFI ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter
was within the privilege which protects communications
between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the
letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no
difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law
protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him
to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but
when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary,
it is admissible in evidence.
Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are
entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is
derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be
strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the
communications. One who overhears the communications,
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within
the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply
to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.
14) Orient Insurance Company vs. E. P. Revilla
ONE LINER: Insurance Company only read the part of the
letter which is advantageous to it. Deemed waiver of
privileged communication.
FACTS:
The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition for writs
of certiorari and mandamus is to require respondent judge to
permit Orient’s counsel to examine a letter, part of which has
already been read into the record in the course of the
examination of one of the witnesses testifying for private
respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC).
TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for the
purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance policies issued by
the latter over TMC’s stock merchandise. The policy contained
a clause stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be
forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the
insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months after
such rejection. Orient’s defense alleges that the claim was
rejected on April 15, 1929, and that notice of such rejection
was given to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit
was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months
after rejection of the claim.
According to TMC, on the day they were notified of the
rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser expressly requested
TMC to defer judicial action until after July 31 for possibilities
of compromise between the parties. TMC relied on the
request and delayed institution of action.
However, during the trial of the civil case, witness TMC
president E. M. Bachrach made an oral statement as to the
substance of part of a letter received by TMC from its
attorneys, saying that he waited for about a week longer and
13| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
not having heard anything about it, he received a letter on
July 13 from our attorneys urging me to file these cases.
When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the letter,
Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the letter
supporting his testimony (relating to the urging of the filing
of complaints) but refused to reveal the other part as it
contained private matter privileged in nature between the
attorneys and TMC (relating to contract of fees, retaining of
counsel’s services in connection with the cases, alleged to be
matters entirely distinct from the issue).
Orient demanded for the production of “the best evidence,”
it being well-known a rule of law that a witness cannot be
permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper
writing which can be produced in court. In response, only a
portion of the letter referred to by the witness was read into
the record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the letters
refers to the case then in court, the entire document should
be exhibited pursuant to the rule that when part of a
document is offered in evidence, the entire document must
be presented.
ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter constitute
waiver to present the whole document? Yes.
Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment
between attorney and client privileged in nature? No.
RULING:
The excerpt in question must be considered as proof
submitted by TMC, and there can be no question that, part of
the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff,
the whole of the letter could properly be examined by Orient,
in accordance with the express provision of section 283, Code
of Civil Procedure.
As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of
employment between attorney and client as contained in
other portions of the letter, the court found it difficult to
consider a contract for fees as privileged. However irrelevant
under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature.
Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently
personal and considered as private matters, but they are a
constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees
are essentially not of privileged nature.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter contained
privileged matters, such was waived by the introduction in
evidence of part of the letter. Section 238 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, making the whole of a declaration, conversation,
or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence
by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and
neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any
exception. Hence, Orient was entitled to examine the whole
of the letter, with a view to the introduction in evidence of
such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial,
and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit
the inspection by Orient.
But even supposing that the matter contained in the letter
and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by
the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision
in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the
whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible
when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no
exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on
the subject does not recognize any exception.
15) People v Sandiganbayan
KEYWORDS: Congressman falsified his arraignment; Counsel
testified against him; Privileged communication does not apply
FACTS:
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney
of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and
then the Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was the counsel
for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present case.
Paredes applied for a free patent over a land which was
approved and was granted an original certificate of title in his
favor. However, the Director of Lands filed an action for the
cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of
title since the land had been designated and reserved as a
school site. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said
patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the
same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil
case.
An information for perjury was then filed against respondent
Paredes in the MCTC. However, the proceedings were
terminated on the ground of prescription. In this criminal case,
Paredes was likewise represented by Sansaet as counsel.
After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing of a
criminal case against Paredes for violation of the provisions of
the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that by
using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence
and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet was Paredes’
counsel of record therein.
By way of defense, Paredes alleged that double jeopardy has
already attached since the second complaint filed in court
arose from the same set of facts and same evidence of the
earlier perjury case which, after its arraignment, was ordered
dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the
Department of Justice. To support such defense the accused
presented court records and transcripts as proof that he was
arraigned in the perjury case.
Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the 3 respondents
herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that
respondent Honrada, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and
certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a
notice of arraignment, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the
perjury charge.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a
certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
14| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in connection with that
perjury case; and a certification of the Presiding Judge that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment
stage since action thereon was suspended pending the
review of the case by the Department of Justice.
To avoid responsibility, Sansaet revealed in an Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, that Paredes contrived to
have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned. He
further revealed that the documents were prepared and
falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
Paredes. He claimed that he participated in the scheme upon
the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was to pave
the way for Sansaet’s discharge as state witness.
The proposal for Sansaet to be a state witness was rejected
by the Ombudsman since it was difficult to believe that a
lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to
conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to
commit a crime.
Sandiganbayan ruled that a lawyer-client relationship existed
between Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods so
the facts and other confidential matters involved in this case
must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to
respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Because of this, Sansaet
cannot be presented as a witness against accused Paredes
without the latter’s consent.
ISSUE:
W/N the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege.
RULING:
No, the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet is not
barred by the attorney-client privilege.
The facts of the case constitute an exception to the rule on
privileged communication made during lawyer-client
relationship.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present
evidential rule was taken, the privilege is not confined to
verbal or written communications made by the client to his
attorney but extends as well to information communicated
by the client to the attorney by other means.
In the present case, it may correctly be assumed that there
was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with falsification, and this may
reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and
Sansaet his counsel therein. The clincher for this conclusion is
the undisputed fact that said documents were filed by
Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft
case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the
parties during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would
not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to
witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
However, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed,
and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period
to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with
respect to a crime that the former has committed, he is given
the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the
attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the
future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s
advice.
In the present case, the testimony sought to be elicited from
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to
him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes
at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the
process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in
the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal
charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by
Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed
in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his
present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made
for purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the
commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes
and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is
well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In
fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the
prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client
will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest
of justice.
To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client,
would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence
and practice in the noble profession of law.
16) US v. GORDON-NIKKAR
KEYWORD: lawyer’s advice to commit perjury; not protected
by the attorney-client privilege)
15| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PRINCIPLE: A communication divulged to "strangers" or
outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
communication between attorney and client.
The attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications regarding an intended crime.
FACTS:
Appellant Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after trial by jury of
the crime of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the possession
with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine. On
appeal, she contends her conviction should be reversed
because the district court permitted a Government witness,
Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly
privileged conversations between appellant's attorney and
his clients
Brenda Marchand was charged as a co-defendant with the
crimes for which appellant was convicted. Marchand
subsequently pled guilty and testified at trial for the
Government. Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two
meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa.
Marchand, however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is
unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were
Estrumsa's clients.
Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the second
was the subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa.
The second conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged
recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go to
Venezuela. On redirect, the Government inquired, over
defense objection, into the substance of the conversation
during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this
meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion,
agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the
effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but
instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine
was discovered.
ISSUE:
Whether the statements in Attorney Estrumsa's office were
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
HELD:
No.
There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's office
on this occasion; at least one of the persons, Brenda
Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr.
Estrumsa. A communication divulged to "strangers" or
outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this
communication is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
But even if it appeared that the communication in question
were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the communication was
considered confidential despite the presence of a stranger),
the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations
in question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide
the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond
dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
communications regarding an intended crime. The policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the
administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the
privilege to extend it so as to protect communications
designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to
conceal past misdeeds.
17) US v. MCPARTLIN
KEY WORDS: bribery, sludge-hauling contract, attorney-client-
privilege
PRINCIPLE: Communications by a client to his own lawyer
remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them
with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. Waiver
is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-
party's attorney for a common purpose.
The privilege protects communications to the attorney's …
agents... for rendering his services.
FACTS:
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary
responsibility for disposing of sewage from Chicago and
surrounding areas. The Sanitary District operates a sewage
treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois. The District announced
plans to have the sludge from its treatment plant be
transported to Fulton County, Illinois, and solicited bids on the
project.
During the week before the bids were to be submitted, Bull
(president of a towing company, and of the alleged
intermediaries through whom many of the bribe payments
were made) visited Robert Howson (vice president of Ingram
Contractors, Inc.), and told Howson that if Ingram
Corporation expected to secure the contract, it would have
to make a "political contribution." Howson responded that he
was not in that sort of business, but then took Bull to meet
William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram Corporation and
president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.) Benton then telephoned
defendant Frederick Ingram (chairman of the board of Ingram
Corporation) to inform him of Weber's "political contribution"
proposal. Ingram agreed, provided that the contribution
could be added to the cost of the contract. These was the
beginning of a series of transactions between the defendants
which are the basis of the charges in this case.
The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B.
Ingram, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an Illinois
legislator (introduced by Weber to Benton as the man who
handled all political contributions for the Democratic Party in
Illinois), defendant Valentine Janicki, a trustee for the
Metropolitan Sanitary District, and others more than $900,000
to secure for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million-dollar
sludge-hauling contract with the District. Defendants Franklin
H. Weber, a businessman, and Edwin T. Bull, were alleged to
be intermediaries through whom many of the payments were
made. William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram
Corporation) was an unindicted co-conspirator who played a
major role in the conspiracy and testified as a witness for the
prosecution.
Sometime later, a federal grand jury commenced an
investigation of the events surrounding the sludge-hauling
contract. Later, the government granted immunity to Benton
(vice president of the Ingram Corp).
16| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Evidence showed that Benton, acting with the knowledge
and complicity of Frederick Ingram and through
intermediaries Bull and Weber, bribed McPartlin and Janicki
to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to
Ingram Corporation and one of its subsidiaries, and later
bribed the same officials to secure favorable treatment under
the contract and modifications of the contract.
At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn until the
February, 1972 meeting with Benton that his company had
secured a multi-million-dollar contract by paying more than
$300,000 to Chicago officials. Ingram testified that he
protested against paying the bribes, but reluctantly agreed
when Benton informed him that if he refused to pay, the
Sanitary District would not pay the additional $2,100,000 for
the pipeline and would use the liquidated damages clause to
penalize Ingram Corporation.
Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton
kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in which he made
notes concerning meetings and telephone conversations,
naming the persons involved and often recording the
substance of the conversations.
The defendants were convicted of numerous violations of the
Travel Act,18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the Wire, Radio, Television
Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and of conspiring to violate those
acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Destroying Benton's credibility was important to Ingram, as
it was to the other defendants, even though Ingram's
defense was based, in part, on the argument that he had
made the payments in response to the threats Benton had
reported to him, because Ingram's account of events in issue
differed materially from Benton's, and because the
government's case hinged largely on Benton's testimony.
Since Benton's diaries corroborated so much of his
testimony, it was imperative from the standpoint of all
defendants that an effort be made to discredit them.
Such an effort was made, and Frederick Ingram and McPartlin
cooperated in that effort.
An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's counsel twice
interviewed McPartlin with the consent of the latter's
counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was
a basis for challenging the truth of some of the diary
entries. In the second of these interviews McPartlin made
certain statements, which Ingram argues tend to support his
defense. At trial, when Ingram offered evidence of these
statements, McPartlin's counsel objected on the ground of
the attorney-client privilege, and the court, after an in-
camera hearing, sustained the objection on this ground.
ISSUES:
1. Whether statements made by McPartlin are covered
under the lawyer-client privilege communication.
2. Whether the statement was covered by the privilege
since it was made to an investigator rather than an
attorney.
HELD:
1. YES, the statements made by McPartlin cannot be
disclosed because they remain protected by the attorney-
client privilege.
McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-
client privilege, because his statements were made in
confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
purpose related to both defenses. They were made in
connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton,
a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys
were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants.
Ingram acknowledges that communications by a client to his
own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently
shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common
defense. This is known as the common-defense rule which has
been recognized in cases. Uninhibited communication among
joint parties and their counsel about matters of common
concern is often important to the protection of their interests.
In criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to
defend. Therefore, waiver is not to be inferred from the
disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a
common purpose.
In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary question
of fact, that McPartlin had made the statements to the
investigator in confidence. That finding is not clearly
erroneous.
Ingram even argued that the co-defendants' defenses must be
in all respects compatible if the joint-defense privilege is to be
applicable. The cases do not establish such a limitation, and
there is no reason to impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the
Supreme Court, stated that the privilege applies to
communications by a client "to a lawyer representing
another in a matter of common interest." The Advisory
Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that
the joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in which
the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects.
In this instance the US SC followed such recommendation. The
privilege protects pooling of information for any defense
purpose common to the participating defendants.
Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is
often not only in their own best interests but serves to
expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation.
NOTE: The exclusion of the McPartlin statements would not be
reversible error even if he had not been entitled to claim the
privilege. The Court was satisfied from their examination that
the statements merely corroborated facts which were
admitted in evidence and which the jury obviously found to be
true. The Court did not disclose the contents of the statements
because they remain protected by the attorney-client privilege,
on which they alternatively based their ruling on this point.
2. The argument of Ingram that the communication was not
privileged because it was made to an investigator rather than
an attorney will not prevail. The investigator was an agent for
Ingram's attorney, however, so it is as if the communication
was to the attorney himself. It has never been questioned that
the privilege protects communications to the attorney's
agents for rendering his services.
It was also not fatal to the privilege that McPartlin made the
statement to Ingram's attorney rather than his own. When the
Ingram and McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to
discredit Benton, the attorney for each represented both for
purposes of that joint effort. The relationship was no different
than it would have been if during the trial the Ingram and
McPartlin attorneys had decided that Ingram's attorney would
cross-examine Benton on behalf of both, and during cross-
examination McPartlin passed Ingram's attorney a note
containing information for use in the cross-examination. The
attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-
17| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
defendant for a limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's
attorney for that purpose.
18) Lim v. Court of Appeals
KEYWORD: Annulment of Marriage; physician-patient
relationship; wife is allegedly schizophrenic
PRINCIPLE: The physician may be considered to be acting in
his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore
not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated."
Facts:
Nelly and Juan Lim are lawfully married to each other. Juan
filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that
Nelly has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and
until the present."
Juan’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine
who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel orally applied for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr.
Acampado to testify. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on
the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since Dr. Acampado had examined Nelly
in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition,
the subpoena was issued.
Nelly's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash
the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending
resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard
this urgent motion. Nelly’s counsel argued that having seen
and examined Nelly in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado
is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality
of a physician-patient relationship. Juan’s counsel contended,
however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an
expert witness and would not testify on any information
acquired while attending to Nelly in a professional capacity.
The trial court denied the motion and allowed the witness to
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was
qualified by Juan’s counsel as an expert witness and was
asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise.
She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated
Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she had prescribed.
Nelly filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
annul the order of respondent Judge allowing Dr. Acampado
to testify on the ground that the same was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to
prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
Acampado's testimony.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
CA denied the petition ruling that Nelly failed in establishing
the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained
from Dr. Acampado when she testified. Hence, the respondent
Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
W/N the information given by the physician (Dr. Acampado) in
her testimony in open court a privileged communication? NO.
HELD:
Paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which reads:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice
or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient."
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to
facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the
patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand,
to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and
be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests
in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it
may be waived if no timely objection is made to the
physician's testimony.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the
following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient."
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental
conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege
against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. the communications must originate in
a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties.
18| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation."
The physician may be considered to be acting in his
professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure,
so long as the subject communicated is not stated." One
who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites.
In this case, Nelly failed to establish the presence of the
requisites.
Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert
witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course
of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated,
her expert opinion excluded whatever information or
knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony
before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
While it may be true that Nelly’s counsel opposed the oral
request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of
the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify,
Nelly makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel
had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the
privilege, despite the trial court's advice that said counsel
may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is
covered by the privileged communication rule." The
particular portions of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in Nelly's Petition and
Memorandum, and in Juan's Memorandum, do not at all
show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex
gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered
by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.
19) Krohn vs CA
KEY WORDS: annulment, psychiatric evaluation report
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
PRINCIPLE: The person against whom the privilege (physician-
patient) is claimed is must be one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in
Manila on June 14, 1964 and had three children. Their
blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the
couple developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent
psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain. The effort however proved futile. Later, they
finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz. Presenting the report among
others, he obtained a decree from the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." This
decree was eventually confirmed and pronounced “Final and
Definite”.
On 1993, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his marriage
with the RTC. In his petition, he cited the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in
her Answer as “either unfounded or irrelevant”.
Petitioner’s arguments: She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c),
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending
to a patient in professional capacity, with more reason should
a third person (like respondent-husband) be PROHIBITED from
testifying on privileged matters between a physician and
patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has
acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation
with a patient.
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the
contents of the psychiatric evaluation report will set a very
bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention
of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient. Her
thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be
allowed to be done indirectly.
Respondent’s arguments: Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends
that the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to
a physician. Thus, the legal prohibition to testify is not
applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be
barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the
husband and not the physician of the petitioner. In fact,
according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering
that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed
by one against the other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged
communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto,
and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her
unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation
report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in
deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void.
Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave
her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to
the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely
described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection
19| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on
privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
ISSUE: WoN the psychiatric evaluation report is admissible.
RULING: YES.
Statutes making communications between physician and
patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the
patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his
physician of his symptoms and condition. Consequently, this
prevents the physician from making public information that
will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the
patient. For the patient should rest assured with the
knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings
being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their
subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient privilege
creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the
humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of
his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information
communicated in the context of the physician-patient
relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his mental
health records confidential. Thus, it has been observed that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the
notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be
prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for
emotional problems to secure the services of a
psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the
requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c)
such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered
a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was
privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated
10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as
hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and, consequently,
the evidence offered may be admitted.
20) Blue Cross Health v. Olivares Gr. No. 169737
PRINCIPLES: Presumption; more specifically Disputable
presumption; presumptions are satisfactory if
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence. However, there are exceptions, one of which
when “suppression is an exercise of a privilege.” As such, the
presumption that an evidence willfully suppressed is adverse
when produce does not apply.
FACTS:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program with Blue
Cross for the amount of 12,000 pesos. 38 days after she
applied, she suffered from a stroke. Ailments due to “pre-
existing conditions” were excluded from the coverage. She
was confined in Medical City and discharged with a bill of Php
34,000. Blue Cross refused to pay unless she had her
physician’s certification that she was suffering from a pre-
existing condition. When Blue Cross still refused to pay, she
filed suit in the MTC. The health care company rebutted by
saying that the physician didn’t disclose the condition due to
the patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege. The MTC
dismissed for a lack of cause of action because the physician
didn’t disclose the condition. In the RTC, the spouses were
awarded the amount of the hospital bills plus 60,000 in
damages. This was under the ratio that the burden to prove
that Neomi had a pre-existing condition was under Blue Cross.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the
health care company.
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent
Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and
therefore was excluded from the coverage of the
health care agreement.
RULING: No. Petition dismissed.
The contract of insurance as in this case is a contract
of adhesion. If there is ambiguity in the terms must be
interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which
prepared the contract.
The agreement defined a pre-existing condition as:
“A disability which existed before the commencement
date of membership whose natural history can be
clinically determined, whether or not the Member was
aware of such illness or condition. Such conditions also
include disabilities existing prior to reinstatement date in
the case of lapse of an Agreement.”
“Under this provision, disabilities which existed before the
commencement of the agreement are excluded from its
coverage if they become manifest within one year from its
effectivity.”
Petitioners averred that the non-disclosure of the pre-existing
condition made a presumption in its favor.
Respondents maintained that the petitioner had the duty to
prove its accusation.
(This is the one relevant in the subject of evidence)
Petitioner never presented evidence to prove its presumption
that the Doctor’s report would work against Neomi. They only
perceived that the invocation of the privilege made the report
adverse to Neomi and such was a disreputable presumption.
20| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
They should have made an independent assessment of
Neomi’s condition when it failed to obtain the report. They
shouldn’t have waited for the attending physician’s report to
come out.
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced.
The exception on presenting evidence applies when the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Hence, Neomi had the privilege not to present the Doctor’s
report under the doctor-client privilege.
21) Chan vs. Chan
KEYWORDS: Nullity of Marriage Case; Wife requested
subpoena duces tecum for the medical records of husband
before trial, latter objected under Privileged Communication
Rule
PRINCIPLES:
 Objections to evidence must be made after the offer
of such evidence for admission in court.
 Physician-Patient Privileged Communication does
not only cover the hospital records, but also the
examination of the physician at the trial. Physician
memorializes all this information in the patient's
records. Disclosing them would be equivalent to
compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latter's prior consent.
FACTS: Josielene Chan filed with the RTC a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan, the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
award of custody of their children to her. She claimed that
Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. She
had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for
detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny claimed that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely
duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage
counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave
him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the
police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime
and released her only after the case against her ended. By
then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the
Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit
of a hospital. The form carried a physician's handwritten
note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse."
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering
Johnny's medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to
submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records
were covered by physician-patient privilege.
RTC: sustained the opposition.
CA: denied Josielene's petition. If courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left
with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they
may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential.
The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records.
Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in
this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for
the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.
ISSUE:
WON the denial of the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny's hospital records on the ground that these
are covered by the privileged character of the physician-
patient communication is correct
RULING:
Yes.
The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the
hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The
offer could be made part of the physician's testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those
records that concern the patient's health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must
be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in
court.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will
have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's
hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not
just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure.
It is possible to treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a
motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. But the right to compel the
production of documents has a limitation: the documents to
be disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case
is not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the
physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of
Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding
their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene,
does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination
of the physician at the trial.
21| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that
the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness,
and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to
allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient's consent. Physician memorializes all this
information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would
be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latter's prior consent.
Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to
the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a
hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should
be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
records.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it
cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the
Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated
above which would justify Josielene into requesting an
inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny
was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital
records would again be premature.
22) NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
DOCTRINE:
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality
of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the
right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated
by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
separation of governmental powers.
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations of the Senate (popularly known as the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee), among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of
NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees
and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
Project"), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). He disclosed that
the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he
informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking
executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent
Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to
explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations
unsatisfactory, citing petitioner in contempt of respondent
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege;
(3) Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
critical to the exercise of their functions;
RULING:
(1) There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential
Communications Privilege
The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed
that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental
to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution.
“There are certain types of information which the government
may withhold from the public". There is a "governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters". "The right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of
powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the
Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is "By order of the President", which means that he
personally consulted with her. President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific
matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3)
questions.
(2) There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the
Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are
Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
22| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a
large swath of the executive branch" is absent because the
official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,
properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact,
her alter ego and a member of her official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent
Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court
did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of
information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in
relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. It is easy to
discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project
involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was
actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials
of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says
about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations
are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with
particular interest.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the state
of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information."
No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional
functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative
incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making
process, which inevitably would involve her conversations
with a member of her Cabinet.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision
did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
matters that are covered by executive privilege.
(3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show that the
Communications Elicited by the Three Questions Are Critical
to the Exercise of their Functions
In U.S. v. Nixon, Court ruled that the President's generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on
the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence
that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and
gravely impair the basic function of the
courts. A President's acknowledged need for
confidentiality in the communications of his office
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for
production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding
is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a
particular criminal case in the administration of
justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's
broad interest in confidentiality of
communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a
limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to
have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege
as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal
trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration
of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege
must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need
for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but
rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its
legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again just
how critical is the subject information in the discharge of
respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is
on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into
the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather
information which, according to said respondents, would "aid"
them in crafting legislation.
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the
counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that
the Senate could still come up with legislations even without
petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words,
the information being elicited is not so critical after all.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject
to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at
accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence,
Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect
substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee."
Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive
questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a
few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from
the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper
proceedings by a competent court or body.
23) Lee vs. CA
KEY WORDS: cheater Chinese husband; 1st family (KEH) vs 2nd
family (Tiu)
ONE LINER/PRINCIPLE: The parental and filial privilege rule
applies only to “direct” ascendants/descendants, a family tie
connected by a common ancestry. It has no application to a
stepdaughter who has no common ancestry to her
stepmother.
FACTS:
23| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) came
to the Philippines as immigrants from China. They have 11
children (Lee-Keh children).
Lee then brought from China Tiu Chuan (Tiu), a young
Chinese woman to serve as housemaid. The respondent Leh-
Keh children believes that Tiu left the Leh-Keh household and
move into another property of Lee and had an illicit relation
and made 8 children
After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s
children with Lee (Lee’s other children) claimed that they
were too children of Lee and Keh. Leh-Keh children then
requested the NBI to investigate.
NBI’s Findings
NBI concluded that the mother of the 8 children is obviously
not Keh, but most probably Tiu. Upon further evaluation, this
could be Lee’s grand design in order to elevate the status of
his 8 children as legitimate children and secure their future.
NBI also found out from the hospital records that the eldest
among the Lee’s other children (who was recorded as the
12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17 yo mother, when
Keh was already 38 years old at the time and so forth. IOW,
by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she
supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering 8.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Leh-Keh children
file two separate petitions for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of Petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s
other children, the name Keh and replace the same with Tiu
to indicate her true mother’s name.
Lee-Keh children then filed a request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, petitioner’s
presumed mother, to testify in the case. RTC granted it. Tiu
moved to quash the same.
Tiu’s contention
The subpoena issued on Tiu are:
1. Oppressive considering her advanced age; and
2. It violates Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rule parental privilege, compelling her to testify
against her stepdaughter
RTC – granted the quashal for being oppressive considering
Tiu’s old age and the purpose of the subpoena is to badger
her to admit the she was petitioner’s mother.
CA - set aside the order of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THE
CORRECTION OF ENTRY CASE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER
EMMA LEE IS NOT KEH’S DAUGHTER
RULING:
YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against
petitioner
24) ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada (Erap)
was elected president while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
was elected as his VP. 10 million Filipinos voted for petitioner
believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. They
were both to serve a 6-year term commencing June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends, of receiving millions of pesos from juteng lords.
The next day, Senator Teofisto Guingona then took the floor
and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled “I Accuse”. He
accused the petitioner of receiving P220 million in jueteng
money from Governor Singson from 1998-2000. He also
charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson 70
million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The
privilege speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue-Ribbon Committee and the
Committee on Justice for joint investigation.
The HREP did no less. The House Committee on Public Order
and Security decided to investigate the expose of Governor
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Alvarez, Herrera,
and Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. The
church and former Presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos
joined the cry for resignation. Respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services
and later asked for the petitioner’s resignation. However,
petitioner held on to his office and refused to sign. 4 economic
advisers resigned, as well as Secretary Mar Roxas II of DTI.
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a
tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
HREP to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both
house of the Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by
Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Fuentebella. On November 20, the Senate
formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with SC CJ Justice Hilario
Davide presiding.
In December, the impeachment trial started. They day to day
trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the
highest viewing rating. The dramatic point of the hearings was
the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner
Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on
documents involving a P500 million investment agreement
with their bank.
On January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
24| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
allegedly contained evidence showing that the petitioner
held a 3.3 billion secret bank account under the name Jose
Velarde. The prosecutors walked out in protest. This led to
protests all over Metro Manila demanding petitioner to
resign.
On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed inevitable. At
2:30pm petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not
diffuse the growing crisis. At 3pm, the AFP withdrew their
support for the government. A little later, PNP Chief Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar
announcement. Rallies for resignation exploded around the
nation. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced that
he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
highly controversial second envelope.
January 20 was the day of surrender. At 12 noon, Chief
Justice Davide, after negotiations in the Malacañang,
administered the oath to respondent GMA as President of
the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family
hurriedly left the Palace. He then issued a press statement
stating that:
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that
may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
ISSUE:
(daghan nig issue but I’ll just include the ones related to
evidence)
WON the use of the Angara Diary as evidence was proper -
YES
WON the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of
mind of petitioner violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence – NO it does not violate hearsay evidence
rule
RULING:
To begin with, the Angara diary is NOT an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the
cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished
a copy of the Angara Diary. The said diary was frequently
referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
of the diary were attached as Annexes A-C of the
Memorandum of private respondents. In fact, petitioner even
cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both
the second part of the diary, and the third part. It was also
extensively used by the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in
his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to
contest to the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do
so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of
court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule.
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than
the witness. There are 3 reasons for excluding hearsay
evidence, namely: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. Not
all hearsay evidence however is inadmissible as evidence. Over
the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted
by the courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and
necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we
further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one
exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do
not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs
to this class.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner
which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his
proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not
be a candidate, his statement that he would leave by Monday
if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and
“pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to
clear my name then I will go”. The reason for the meltdown is
obvious – his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, not binding on him. The argument overlooks
the doctrine of Adoptive Admission. An adoptive admission is
a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the other
person. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner
started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its
support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of a
dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara Diary
against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is
expressed in Section 28 of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as herein
otherwise provided.
Petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in Section 29
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court with respect to admissions
by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the
petitioner. He was the little president. Indeed, he was
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours
and days before he left the Palace. Thus, according to the
25| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Since the
start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve
listened to. And now, at the end, you still are.” True to this
trust, petitioner has to ask Secretary Angara if he already had
to leave the Palace after their final lunch. Angara told him to
go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Angara headed his
team of negotiators that met with the team of respondent
Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
after his relinquishment. The Diary shows that petitioner was
always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took
her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by
the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, the ban on hearsay evidence
does not cover independently relevant statements. These
are statements which are relevant independently of
whether they are true or not. They belong to 2 classes: (1)
those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2)
those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the
facts in issue. The second class includes the following:
(a) Statements of a person showing his state of mind,
that is his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention,
ill will and other emotions;
xxx
As afore-discussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of
the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are
circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rules on hearsay.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of
private writings and best evidence were violated. It is true
that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of
the Angara Diary. In doing so, the Court did NOT, however,
violate the best evidence rule.
The Court held that with regard to the Best Evidence Rule,
the production of the original may be dispensed with
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be
received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.
With regard to the authentication, it is no longer required
because the genuineness of such was not denied.
25) PEOPLE v GODOY (Teacher falsely prosecuted for rape)
PRINCIPLE: No implied admission can be drawn from the
efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate
informations filed before the RTC of Palawan with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of
January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point
which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot
Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door
at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside.
As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed
her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and
told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize
her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through
his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her
Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her
panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other
hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his
private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt
pain because it was her first experience and she cried.
Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was
very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her.
She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to
rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of
him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone
or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed
that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with
her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to
the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where
appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she
arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she
did not mention anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went
home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She
likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear
that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00
P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant
could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a
candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she
was constrained to go with appellant because she did not
want her parents to get into trouble.
She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened
to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep
proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's
Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to
a room where they stayed for three days. During the entire
duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was
not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked.
She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious.
Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant
because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought
her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where
she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained
and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant.
After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place
because appellant came to know that complainant had been
reported and indicated as a missing person in the police
blotter. They went to see a certain Naem from whom
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but
only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Early the next morning, Helen (mother of Mia) and her
husband went to the PNP station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and
had the incident recorded in the police blotter. When she
returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he
26| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further
conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he
could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily
acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of
Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified
that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that
she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to
kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this,
she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter
was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall
to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and
Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the
PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house
and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On
their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all
three of them, Adjeril(father), Helen and Mia Taha, went to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with
the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril
and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of
desistance for the case of kidnapping pending in the
prosecutor's office.
The defense presented a different version of what actually
transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in
August, 1993 at the PNS. Although he did not court her, he
fell in love with her because she often told him " Sir, I love
you". What started as a joke later developed into a serious
relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else.
He stated that there was no rape and kidnapping that was
done as they were in a serious relationship. The defense
presented witnesses that corroborated their alleged
relationship (will be discussed in the ruling). The appellant
also said that whenever she wanted to leave the
complainant, she threatened to commit suicide.
While appellant was already on his way out of Edward's
Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who
invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the
police station the whole afternoon but when complainant,
her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was
not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That
afternoon of January 2 7, 1994, appellant was no longer
allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station
after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and
kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan,
delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from
complainant. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and
was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters
as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through
his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly
executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never
knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day
he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's
father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither
did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to
settle the case. However, pursuant to a joint resolution issued
on March 11, 1994 by the Prosecutor, two separate
informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise is an admission of
guilt of the appellant
RULING: NO.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply
demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there
was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and
that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an
actual wrong.
The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond
peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress
with complainant against her will. According to complainant,
when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house,
appellant was already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it
is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she
was going there on that particular day and at that time,
considering that she does not even live there, unless of course
it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on
anybody who happened to come along. But then this would
be stretching the imagination too far aside from the fact that
such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never
established nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day,
he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of
complainant because the latter requested him to help her with
her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were
not able to go inside the house because it was locked and
there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the
house and talked. This testimony of appellant was
substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena
Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994,
she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench
outside the boarding house.
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged
ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where
they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the
natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of
the woman he had raped, and in public in a highly populated
area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the
anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-
incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his
victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and
apprehension.
Complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding
house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was
at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she
said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and
said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore,
she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00
P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her
cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another
version and said that when she reached the boarding house it
was dark and there was nobody inside.
Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the
use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to
her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court
as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of
force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio
27| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said
findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape
was so committed through forcible means by appellant
against complainant on January 21, 1994.
In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the
testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by
physical evidence showing use of force.
There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a
struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor,
removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and
inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she
demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act,
subjected her to any force of whatever nature or form.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged
ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so
strangely normal as to be abnormal. It seems odd, if not
incredible, that upon seeing allegedly raped her only the day
before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show
rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went with
appellant despite the presence of her parents and the
proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would
naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil
design.
The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and
complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart
theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not
always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the
supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that,
as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the
victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in
some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the
alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather
take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that
the court would take the cudgels for them than for the
woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as
the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is
fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
witnesses for the defense, viz.: (daghan ni pero ang
significant ra ako gi-include para di na kaayo taas)
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of
January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house
where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and
the couple were talking intimately. She had warned
Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant
and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision,
testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have
an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia
answered that she really loves him. He heard her call
appellant "Papa". The couple looked happy and
were sweet to each other.
3. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the
couple the day before the alleged rape incident,
inside one of the classrooms and they were holding
hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant "Mahal na
mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at
tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade complainant
from continuing with her relationship with
appellant.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an
intimate relationship with complainant, which were
substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never
successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant
merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive,
definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. Mere
denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain
evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible
disinterested witnesses.
(TOPIC) The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise
made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This
inference in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the
party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in
the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public
interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that
in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer
was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt
or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the
defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the
offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did
not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a
certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who
likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a
Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact,
when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined
because of the fact that he was already married. On top of
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that
his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of
these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified
that present during the negotiations were herself, her
husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was
never present in any of said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present at
the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such
offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take
part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case
was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is,
Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the parties.
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to
appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of
desperation and exasperation with the way she was being
treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the
winds when she wrote. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko
nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat
kong ipaglaban obviously referring to her ineptitude and
impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It
could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was
merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to
avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral
pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to
concoct her account of the alleged rape.
28| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
(Re: Kidnapping) When they left the house, appellant walked
ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors
witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how
one could deduce from these normal and innocuous
arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive
complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case
where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious
circumstances as described by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha
family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which
later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left
behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore
noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto
Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation
where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and
pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant
sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and
consent of her parents who passively looked on without
comment.
26) People vs Gener de Guzman
FACTS:
Gilda Ambray filed with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a
complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime
of rape. On even date, de Guzman was arrested and detained
but was later released upon the filing and approval of his bail
bond.
Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record
of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the
necessary information with the appropriate court. A case for
rape was then filed. Trial followed.
Testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established
the following facts:
Homeward bound from a Department Store where she
worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was at the
gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision waiting for a tricycle ride
toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes.
When she noticed the accused, sitting at the guardhouse, she
approached him and asked him some questions. He
answered in a stammering manner. The complainant
recognized the accused very well because it was summertime
and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle,
followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed.
While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused
took a different route. The accused would once in a while
stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good
condition.
When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an
unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to
push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him,
which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after
she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her
from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly.
The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot 10 meters away
from the unfinished house. Afterwards, the motherfucker
consummated his ill intention. The accused then warned
Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all
members of her family. Gilda picked up her pants and
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without
looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her
husband, Aquilino Ambray, that she was raped by the accused.
Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed
upon not to by Gilda's mother.
Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony
Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association. The
accused was then brought to the municipal jail which
ultimately resulted to the filing of the instant case.
Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi. According
to him, he had a drinking session with his friends. In its
decision, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The accused appealed
hence the case at bar.
The upshot of the accused's stance in the errors assigned is
that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor
intimidation was proven
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape – YES oy
RULING:
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally
attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places
away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences
solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and
conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's
single witness of the actual occurrence.
The determination of the guilt of the accused depends
primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray,
since only she and the accused witnessed the incident when
it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render
the accused's conviction inevitable.
A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates
beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she
narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner.
Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal
at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately
after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back,
and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband
and her mother. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to the
President of the Homeowners' Association who then sought
police assistance.
All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within 24 hours after
the commission of the crime. The quickness and spontaneity
of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous
woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against
herself.
We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used
force and intimidation upon Gilda.
In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held
her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she struggled to
free herself, she sustained her injuries. Moreover, the accused
also threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his
bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.
The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that
there was force or intimidation since the assailant committed
three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours,
29| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Gilda
explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time
which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of
Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the
incident to the President of the Homeowners' Association.
The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent
injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by
affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the
testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any
apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an
opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-
examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose
of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new
matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible
misinterpretation of testimony.
In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda
categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert
his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second
attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third
because she was already weak. While it may be true that on
cross-examination, she testified that she was raped once, yet
on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three
times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom.
There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of
the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were
conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to
a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one
of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful,
is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or
not a party is responsible to the law. The accused is guilty of
rape.
27) San Miguel vs Kalalo
KEYWORD: Inumin ng Tagumpay, San Miguel Beer
FACTS:
Kalalo was a dealer of San Miguel Corp. In the course of the
dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC requested her to issue
several postdated checks to secure her credit overdraft for
the delivery of SMC beer products over the Christmas season.
After making several cash payments and returning a number
of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed she still owed
SMC a substantial amount. She insisted a detailed statement
of account but SMC failed to do so. To protect her rights, she
ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks
she had issued to SMC totaling 921,215. SMC sent demand
letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in return an Offer of
Compromise which SMC did not accept but instead, it filed a
case for violation of the Bouncing Check Law. During trial and
after the prosecution rested its case, SMC now complied with
the statement of account showing that she owed SMC
71,009. Kalalo recanted her Offer of Compromise stating that
at the time she prepared the letter, she was threatened by
SMC for imprisonment and that she does not know how
much she owed. She was acquitted by the MeTC. The appeal
before the RTC by SMC on the issue of civil liability (arguing
that SMC is entitled 921,215) and a subsequent Petition for
Review before the CA was likewise dismissed. Hence this
petition.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE:
WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered in evidence
against Kalalo?
SMC argues that her Offer of Compromise unequivocally
admitted her liability while being assister by her counsel.
RULING: No
Contrary to SMCs contention, the aforequoted letter does not
contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what
respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of
account, not the existence of her liability to SMC.
Furthermore, the fact that Kalalo made a compromise offer to
SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In
Pentagon Steel vs CA, the reason why compromise offer may
not be considered as evidence against the offerror:
1. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as
evidence against a person who presents it, many
settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would
dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a
confession of weakness.
2. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a
defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the
part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless
or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid
controversy and save the expense of litigation.
SMC argues that Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Sec.
27 Rule 130 ROC.
RULING: No
The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint against her for a violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in
the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally, during the
testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt of the Statement of
Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of
Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the
letter prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of
imprisonment from SMCs agents.
28) PEOPLE v YPARRAGUIRRE
PRINCIPLE:
An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal
complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in
evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative
makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
FACTS:
Rosita Bacaling, a 17-year-old barrio lass, who was not yet
deflorated, was working as a housemaid with accused-
appellant Yparraguirre and his wife. While she was cooking
30| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
porridge for the Yparraguirres, appellant arrived from work.
Finding out that the children were sleeping, he gave Rosita a
white envelope with 15 tablets inside, allegedly for the skin
disease of Rosita’s thigh. The latter took all the tablets as
instructed. However, she became weak and fell down. She
later on found herself on the bed of the appellant who
pointed a hunting knife at her neck and succeeded carnal
knowledge against her will. She was later on punched on the
stomach and lost consciousness. She was threatened by the
appellant should she report the incident. After one month,
she went home to her mother where her mother found her
helpless, not being able to talk and eat, which resulted to her
confinement in a mental hospital in Davao. When Rosita
finally revealed to her mother the incident, a case of rape
was filed against appellant who pleaded not guilty. He was
later on convicted.
Note: Prior to the filing of the case, the wife of the appellant
went to the house of Rosita and offered compromise with her
mother so as to drop the case. Not discussed in the facts.
ISSUE:
WON the offer of compromise made before filing of a
criminal complaint should be admitted as evidence.
RULING:
There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her
mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann, offered the mother,
Merlyn P15,000.00 to dissuade her from filing the complaint.
When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to
P25,000.00. Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out
by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the
time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape
incident was already known to appellant's wife. Wife herself
testified that Merlyn told her about it on the day when wife
first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not
require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
required is that after committing the crime, the accused or
his representative makes an offer to compromise and such
offer is proved.
The prosecution’s evidence, which rests mainly on the
testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and trustworthy.
Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and
rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor
which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion
that her testimony was not contrived. Appellant's allegation
that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting
the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the
tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened
Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to
appellant's lewd acts. The delay in filing the complaint does
not in any way affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of
appellant's threat to her life.
Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school
dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the family. It is
hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of
defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family,
who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all. She had been
working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the
spouses actually found her to be a good worker. Rosita's
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-
motive and fabrication.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist
prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the
crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from
their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would
sometimes go home to bring food to his children.
29) Bank of Commerce v Manalo
KEYWORD: (Spouses purchased Lot 1 & 2, Block 2 in
installments)
PRINCIPLE: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at
another time, although such evidence may be received to
prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the
parties.
FACTS:
In 1967, Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank
of Manila (OBM) through a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" Lot 1,
Block 2 and Lot 2, Block 2 in Xavierville subdivision.
Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.
In 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos contracted the
services of Engr. Manalo who works for Hurricane Commercial
for the installation of a water pump at the former's residence
for P34,887.66. Engr. Manalo proposed to XEI, through Ramos,
to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as
part of the down payment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
XEI, through Ramos, agreed. The Manalo spouses chose both
abovementioned lots for reservation which was later on
confirmed by Ramos. Eventually, the respondent spouses took
possession of the lots and constructed a house thereon.
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their
monthly installments until they were assured that they would
be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. The
spouses were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling
operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the
down payment because XEI failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to them for their
signature. XEI furnished Manalo spouses with a statement of
their account showing that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34
on the down payment of the two lots after deducting the
account of Ramos plus interests.
The spouses Manalo received another statement of account
from XEI, inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the
lots. In reply, Manalo Jr. stated they had not yet received the
notice of resumption of XEI's selling operations, and that there
had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence,
they should not be charged with interest on the balance of the
down payment on the property. Further, they demanded that
a deed of conditional sale over the two lots be transmitted to
them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands.
Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the balance of the
down payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a business sign in
the sidewalk near his house. XEI informed Manalo that
business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It
31| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among
others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he
had purchased on installment basis from XEI.
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business sign
is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional sale"
and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it
to avail of the remedies as provided in their contract of
conditional sale.
The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested
Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the
property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had
no permission for such construction. Perla informed them
that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the
documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But
later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of
the issues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the
Boston Bank of the Philippines.
Respondent Spouses then filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank. alleged therein
that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the
installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was
forthcoming; they constructed their house worth
₱2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo
informed the defendant that he would abide by the terms
and conditions of his original agreement with the OBM;
during the hearing of the ejectment case, they offered to pay
₱313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price
of said lots; such tender of payment was rejected, so that the
subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to
third parties.
Both RTC and CA upheld the respondent spouses.
ISSUE: W/N XEI impliedly granted the respondent spouses
the option to pay in 120 or 180 monthly installments when it
did so for the other lot buyers.
RULING:
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected
contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must
be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the
property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid
by the vendee. Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code. In a
contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that
the parties agree on the price as well as the amount of down
payment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of
payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the
other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the
buyer makes a down payment or portion thereof, such
payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the
perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties.
We reject the submission of respondents that they and
Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment
contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed
by XEI and other lot buyers in the "corresponding contract of
conditional sale," which would later be signed by them. We
have meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint and
find no such allegation therein. Indeed, respondents merely
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
alleged in their complaint that they were bound to pay the
balance of the purchase price of the property "in
installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was
never asked, on direct examination or even on cross-
examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of
the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would
form part of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale"
to be signed by them simultaneously with the payment of the
balance of the down payment on the purchase price.
We note that, in its letter to the respondents which was sent
to them almost three years from the execution by the parties
of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part,
that respondents had purchased the property "on installment
basis." However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a specific
amount for each installment, and whether such payments
were to be made monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also,
respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of
evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay the
₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The
allegation that the payment of the ₱278,448.00 was to be paid
in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that,
for a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and
explicit, not vague or indefinite.
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their
complaint that the terms of payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be
incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional
sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They likewise
failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the
balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in
120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute
evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the
same mode and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court,
evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at
another time, although such evidence may be received to
prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the
parties.
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial
court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the
balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months
of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI
and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of
payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question.
Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the
subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots,
not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the
balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It
further failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said
deeds as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.
32| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved
like any other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat
that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern
of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of
specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures
more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The
offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive
conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The
examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of
evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not
present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to
outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough,
and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of
sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means
a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like
circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and
uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed
is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market or
profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of
the United States Supreme Court: "Life casts the moulds of
conduct, which will someday become fixed as law. Law
preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from
life." Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of
many of the rights and acts of men. It is also well-settled that
parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which
known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication
into their agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary.
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce
sufficient competent evidence to prove usage, habit or
pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of
payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus
grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120
months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the
manner of payment of the said amount is not an essential
element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or
OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot
buyers who pay part of the down payment of the property
purchased by them in the form of service, had executed
contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the
subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to
pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but
granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on
record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or
more lots.
30) The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang
(TAKE NOTE: 3 CONSOLIDATED CASES)
FACTS:
Ayala Land, Inc. (herein known as “ALI”) sold a parcel of land
to Spouses Yuson. Spouses Yuson in turn sold it to spouses
ALFONSO. In the TCT, there was a “Deed of Restrictions”
which stated that the lot shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance of a preparatory school
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
(KINDERGARTEN and NURSERY) with playground and garage.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions
to Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
The spouses Alfonso opened a preparatory school named The
Learning Child, Inc. However, subsequently the spouses
decided to include a GRADE SCHOOL program in violation of
the Deed of Restrictions, and did not hear the cries of AVAA to
cease from such. Hence, AAVA filed a case for injunction in the
RTC against the school and the spouses.
AAVA reasoned before the RTC that the construction of grade
school rooms is contrary to (1) the Deed of Restrictions and
also contrary to the (2) Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of
NCR and its related Barangay ordinance. The ordinance stated
that Block 3 (where the school is located) is a “residential
area” and the ordinance allows only preparatory schools with
TWO classrooms. Hence, RTC ruled in favour of AAVA.
However, when the spouses filed a motion for
reconsideration, the Municipality of Muntinlupa corrected the
ordinance and stated that Block 3 is an “institutional area”
and no longer a “residential area” (hence NO MORE limit as to
classrooms). This was because of a typographical error since
what should’ve been residential was Block 1 and NOT Block 3
(where school was located). Because of this, RTC granted the
MR and ruled in favour of spouses. CA however reinstated the
earlier decision of RTC. Hence, this petition was filed.
Before the Supreme Court, the spouses alleged that AAVA
should be now estopped since it seems to have abrogated the
agreed Deed of Restrictions due to the ff. acts:
1. AAVA Manager admitted that the construction of a
school building with 24 rooms was approved in a
“Site Development Plan” with his signature
2. AAVA President authorized via letter the construction
of a “new school building extension”
3. ALI (NOT AAVA) impliedly requested the
reclassification of the property as “institutional”, and
4. ALI subsequently assented to the reclassification of
the property via letter
ISSUE:
1. WON acts 1 & 2 constitute estoppel by deed?
2. WON acts 3 & 4 comes under the rule of res inter
alios acta, it being done by a third party?
RULING:
AAVA is not estopped, and the acts do NOT come under the
rule of res inter alios acta.
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from
asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or
title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of
any material facts asserted in it. We have previously cautioned
against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of
estoppel.
ACT#1 and #2
The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional
classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the
Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject
property exclusively for the establishment and maintenance
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school
33| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
which may include such installations as an office for school
administration, playground and garage school vehicles. The
deed did not limit the number of buildings or rooms. The
construction of more rooms and building extensions is
contrary to the ORDINANCE, but NOT to the Deed of
Restrictions.
ACT#3 and # 4
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA
claims that these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar
under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the
case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies
said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, IF DAMAGING to
AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The terms attached to
the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject property,
expressly state that “compliance with the said restrictions….
and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court
action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang
Village Association, their respective successors and assigns”.
[52] As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY
INTERESTED with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of
Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to
the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or OTHER
PERSON JOINTLY INTERESTED with the party. (Emphasis
supplied.)
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the
position of AAVA. Since although ALI indeed “assented” to
the reclassification and expansion, the assent stated that:
“we interpose no objection as long as the conditions are
met” which are (1) the approval of the Board and (2) the
approval of the residents. None of these were met based on
the records. Hence, in other words, the conditions for the
assent were NOT met.
IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding), although
Ayala Land Inc. (AYALA) is a party jointly interested in the case
and falls under the exception to res inter alios acta rule, the
required conditions to its assent to the changing/alteration of
the terms of the Deed of Restrictions were not met.
Hence, the acts enumerated above cannot prejudice AAVA. In
fact, records show that AAVA has consistently insisted upon
the compliance with the Deed of Restrictions by: consistently
denying the requests and letters of the spouses, and by
immediately asking the spouses to cease and desist. Hence,
AAVA is not estopped.
SC ruled in favor of AAVA in upholding the Deed of
Restrictions since such Deed may be harmonized with the
ordinance in this way: there could be construction of MORE
rooms provided it is used for preparatory schools. However,
since this will prejudice the grade school students already
enrolled, they were allowed to graduate elementary.
However, the school was not anymore allowed to accept
grade school enrollees.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
OTHER TOPICS NOT RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
I. Intervention:
Motion for Intervention was denied since intervention was
done during appeal and not before judgment as required by
the rules.
II. The spouses cited Ortigas case
Ortigas case ruled that the ordinance could change the
contract owing to police power. However, the Ortigas case
does not apply here since 1.) the factual antecedents are not
the same and 2.) harmonization with the law can still be done.
31) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated
KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as exception to
Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
FACTS:
Respondent Redmont, domestic corp organized under Phil
Laws, took interest in mining certain areas of Palawan. After
inquiring with DENR, it learned that said areas were already
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners. Later, Redmont filed before the
Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of DENR 3 petitions for the denials
of the said applications. It argued that at least 60% of the
capital stocks of petitioners are owned and controlled by
MBMI Resources, a Canadian corp, hence disqualified since
mining activities are reserved only for corporations deemed
Filipino Citizens. In their Answer, petitioners averred that 60%
of the capital stocks are owned by Filpinos, POA has no
jurisdiction, and Redmont has no standing to sue since it has
no present application over the areas.
POA issued a resolution disqualifying petitioners,
since they are not qualified being foreign corporations
effectively controlled by MBMI. Aggrieved, appealed to the
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), again stressing that they are
qualified and that they had their MPSAs converted to
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs).
Pending resolution, Redmont filed a complaint before the SEC
for the revocation of the petitioners’ respective certificates
for registration. Later, Redmont filed with the RTC a complaint
praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending
resolution by the SEC. Before the RTC can decide, MAB issued
a resolution finding the appeals meritorious.
` Later, RTC issued an order granting the injunction
prayed for by Redmont for MAB to defer ruling. Nevertheless,
MAB, ruling on the reconsideration of Redmont, denied such.
So, Redmont went to the CA assailing the MAB
orders. It reversed the MAB orders and upheld the POA
decision that petitioners are disqualified. Reconsideration was
likewise denied. The decision is premised on the doubt as to
the nationality of petitioners because they had a common
major investor, MBMI. Also, the conversion of their MPSAs to
FTAAs were suspicious. Moreover, POA was declared to have
jurisdiction over petitioners, with the capacity to ascertain
their nationality.
Prior resolution by the CA, Redmont also filed with
the Office of the President a petition for the cancellation of
petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP canceled and revoked the same
because they misrepresented that they are Filipino
34| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
corporations. It held that the filing of the conversion to FTAA
by petitioners while the case was still pending is indicative of
their lack of qualification.
Hence, the present petition assailing the orders of
the OP and CA.
ISSUES:
1) WON CA erred in not dismissing the case on the
ground of mootness coz the MPSAs were already
converted to FTAAs
2) WON petitioners are Foreign corps
3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions to res
inter alios acta rule (RELEVANT TO EVIDENCE)
4) WON POA had jurisdiction
RULING: PETITION WITHOUT MERIT
1. NOT MOOT
 Exception to Mootness principle (all must concur)
a. grave violation of the Constitution – misrepresented that
they are Filipino corporations
b. exceptional character and paramount public interest
involved – the intricate corporate layering made by MBMI
greatly affects the exploitation of our resources
c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public – a ruling on this
case will guide the bbp
d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI can keep
utilizing dummy Filipino corporations
All requisites are present.
 Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA
applications
The CA’s analysis of the actions of petitioners after
the case was filed against them by respondent is on point.
The changing of applications by petitioners from one type to
another just because a case was filed against them, in truth,
would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is the reason
for such conversion?
The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement application is a clear admission that the
respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale
mining operation and that they need the financial and
technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation
that is why they sought the participation of MBMI
Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation
only proves the fact that it is the Canadian company that
will provide the finances and the resources to operate the
mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the
same and not the Filipino stockholders who only have a less
substantial financial stake in the corporation.
In their last attempt to prove that they are Filipino
corporations, they alleged before the Court that they have
already sold/assigned their shares and interest to DMCI
Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp. This only proves that they were
in fact not Filipino corporations from the start.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
2. GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE 60-40 FILIPINO-
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS ARE IN DOUBT
(NOT FILIPINO NATIONALS)
2 Acknowledged Tests in determining the Nationality of a
Corporations: NATIONALITY TEST and GRANDFATHER TEST
CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE):
shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens
shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, (1 st par. DOJ
Opinion 020)
GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE):
If the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number
of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted
as Philippine nationality (2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020). Under
this rule, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and
the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e.,
"grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of Filipino
ownership.
In other words, this rule applies ONLY when the 60-
40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases
where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign
stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or
59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either
60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated
differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership
is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.
While corporate layering is allowed under FIA, if it is
used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, then
it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners
that the grandfather rule has already been abandoned must
be discredited for lack of basis.
Revisiting the intent behind Art. XII of the
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony, vis-à-vis
corporate layering , it was the intention of the framers to
apply the grandfather rule in cases of corporate layering.
Applying the statutory construction, when there is a conflict
between the Constitution and a statute (FIA), the former
prevails.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Grandfather rule
applies when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership is in doubt.
In this case, this rule should be applied based on the rulings of
the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists
in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by
the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity
ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since
their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––
MBMI, funded them.
IN THIS CASE, grandfathering” the petitioners, it was
established that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are
not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns
60% or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is
derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners,
namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to
the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting
Policies statement– –regarding the "joint venture"
35| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and
"Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra.
Noticeably, the ownership of the "layered" corporations boils
down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha"
group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with,
practically exercising majority control over the corporations
mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure
or the underlying relationships between and among the
corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must
be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital
stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.
3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE APPLIES –
Sec. 29 Rule 130 ROC – ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR
AGENT and ADMISSION BY PRIVIES
Contention of Petitioners vis-à-vis the application of Sec. 29
Rule 130:
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec.
29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a
joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro
and McArthur. They challenged the conclusion of the CA
which pertains to the close characteristics of "partnerships"
and "joint venture agreements." Further, they asserted that
before this particular partnership can be formed, it should
have been formally reduced into writing since the capital
involved is more than three thousand pesos
(PhP3,000).Being that there is no evidence of written
agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and
MBMI, no partnership was created.
A partnership is defined as two or more persons
who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or
industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the
profits among themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures
have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
partnerships.
The relations of the parties to a joint venture and
the nature of their association are so similar and closely akin
to a partnership that it is ordinarily held that their rights,
duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are
closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not
exactly the same, as those which govern partnership. In fact,
it has been said that the trend in the law has been to blur the
distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, very
little law being found applicable to one that does not apply
to the other.
Though some claim that partnerships and joint
ventures are totally different animals, there are very few
rules that differentiate one from the other; thus, joint
ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In
fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents
governing partnerships are applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records
of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered
between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple
"joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture
agreements with other corporations or partnerships for
certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by
and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering
into partnerships, then the relationship created should be
deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership
should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between
and among corporations may be seen as similar to
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between
petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships,
then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the
Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI
have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS
The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights
to mining areas. This refers to any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim,
protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral
agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the
MGB.
DENIED
32) People V. Bokingo & Col
KEYWORD: Res inter acta alio; Construction workers killed
boss; Conspiracy; Confession of one of the accused
FACTS:
The victim, Noli Paison, was the owner of several apartment
units which were being constructed by the accused.
Prosecution’s witness who was the victim’s brother in law
testified that he saw the accused (Bokingo) mauled and killed
the victim. On the other hand, the victim’s wife saw the other
accused(Pol) who sprayed tear gas to her and hit her with a
sharp object. Upon hearing Bokingo shouting “Tara, patay na
sya”, Pol fled the scene with him. Subsequently the accused
were caught and during the Preliminary Investigation, accused
Bokingo admitted to the crime and that they planned the
killing days ahead. On such extrajudicial admission, an
information was filed against the accused for murder. In
addition, on the basis of the statement of Paison’s wife,
conspiracy was alleged to be present in the commission of the
crime.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible?
RULING: No. The extra judicial confession is
inadmissible for it violated his constitutional rights.
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
36| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, we held that "the right
to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings
that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal
process. The preliminary investigation can be no
different from the in-custody interrogations by the
police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the
State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for
criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an
uncounselled admission before the police. He later
acknowledged the same admission before the judge
in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into
the preliminary investigation and while he did have
a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and
commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually
denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled
admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case,
the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by
counsel during the time his confession was taken
before a judge.
MAIN TOPIC (CONFESSION OF A CONSPIRATOR AS
TO THE CONSPIRACY)
Since the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against the confessor Bokingo, the same may not be
used against accused Pol.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet.Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused, and is considered as hearsay against
them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is
an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act
or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by
such act or declaration. In order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; second, the admission relates
to the common object; and third, it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did
not find any sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Since no sufficient evidence was given to show col’s
guilt and conspiracy was not established, Col is
acquitted.
33) City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
KEYWORDS: “City of Manila seeking recovery of a parcel of
Land”
FACTS:
Petitioner(plaintiff) sought the recovery of a parcel of land in
Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo. This parcel of
land was registered in the name of and was in possession of
respondent(defendant) Jacinto Del Rosario.
Jacinto Del Rosario alleged that he bought the land
from his brother Lorenzo Del Rosario. Lorenzo Del Rosario in
turn bought the land from a certain Cipriano Roco.
Petitioner alleged that it was the owner of such land,
and to prove his claim, he presented documentary evidence
consisting of a document containing an offer by the City of
Manila to purchase the land and another document
establishing the transfer of such land to respondent Jacinto.
A map was also presented as evidence.
1st document – offer to purchase by City of Manila
nd
2 document – evidence of the transfer of the land
to respondent Jacinto
It was however established that Lorenzo del Rosario
signed the first document (the offer by the city of manila to
purchase the land) before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y
Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second
document being signed after he had transferred the land to
the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the
same and had it registered.
Further, petitioner offered the testimonies of several
witnesses including the ones who vouched for the authenticity
of the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner:
1st witness - testified that he did not know of his own
knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city.
2nd witness - testified that the land included in Calles Clavel
and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which
belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that
he did not know to whom it now belongs.
rd
3 witness - testified that the land in question was formerly
included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in
it belonged to the city.
4th witness - testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid
100 pesos to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of
instituting a possessory information as to the property
abutting on Calle Clavel.
Lorenzo Del Rosario – testified as to the authenticity of the
documents but he made a statement that the President of the
Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order
to avoid litigation with the city, and such was not contradicted.
(it was thus akin to a compromise agreement)
At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant
moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the
complaint. This motion was overruled by the court.
37| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling the motion
of defendant.
HELD: No, the court was wrong in overruling the motion.
The case was remanded to the Trial court for further
proceedings.
As to the testimony of the third witness.
Villega's [third witness] testimony was merely
hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of
the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony
was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of
proving that the city was generally considered the owner of
the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual
ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not
constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the
section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that
section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony
of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption
referred to.
As to the testimony of Lorenzo
We accordingly hold that the provisions of section
346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case
at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is
not admissible in evidence.
Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document
before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership
of the land referred to therein, the second document being
signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant
Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had
it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint),
on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever
statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the
documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the
defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from
another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former only
when made while the latter holds the title."
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of
Manila. This map is not before us. It is sufficient to say, in
order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the
reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The map
identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by
the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of
the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in
establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a
perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling
his motion to dismiss.
34) GEVERO VS IAC
FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the
Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said
Lot was acquired by purchase from Luis Lancero in Sept. 15
1964 whom in turn issued TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis
Lancero acquired such parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on
Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which
was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified
as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2
share and her children the other undivided share of the whole
area. Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was survived by 6
children namely Maria, Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop
and Ursula all surnamed Gevero.
The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed
an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of
Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was
lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and
partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha,
Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration
Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to
Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial
settlement and partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the
CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul
the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar
as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of
lot 2476.
RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff corporation as
the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot. 2476. From
said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners
herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision
appealed from.
ISSUE: 1.)WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to
Lancer is valid, 2.) WON the ½ interests of Teodorica Babangha
in one of the lots under Lot 2476 is included in the deed of
sale and 3.) WON the respondents action is barred by Laches
RULING:
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid
citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that the signature of
Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact and
that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed
of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled
"Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will be
observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with
all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed
was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary
public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal
presumption of the regularity of the notarized document. It
has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these,
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the
fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in
1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule
of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130,
Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim
"res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to
38| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is
evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the
admission of the former owner of a property must have
been made while he was the owner thereof in order that
such admission may be binding upon the present owner.
Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968
document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership
of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by
laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the
actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof
until at present. ). The execution of a public instrument is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal
delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient
delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold is a
registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the
ownership of the land sold. If the property is a registered
land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look
for flaws.
The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and
checked the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise
inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding
technical description and the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything
in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero
to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other
person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in
purchasing the land in question.
35) US v. Pineda
KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium Chlorate
PRINCIPLE: Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which
tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the
commission of another offense by the defendant."
FACTS:
Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist and was an
owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick
horses, presented a copy of a prescription (obtained from Dr.
Richardson) to Pineda to buy medicine for his sick horses. The
prescription specifically read “POTASSIUM CHLORATE”. After
it was prepared he used it on 2 horses which were sick.
Shortly thereafter they died. When he had the medicine
checked with the Bureau of Science, they found out that the
medicine contained “BARIUM CHLORATE”. At the instance of
Santos, two chemists also went to the drug store and and the
same happened. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed
an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the
result of poisoning. They were given Barium Chlorate.
(Barium chlorate is a poison, potassium chlorate is not.)
ISSUE:
Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs. Pena and
Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate which
turned out to be poison. (Four issues here as this is for the
most part a torts case, but this is the issue relevant to
evidence)
HELD:
The lower court in admitting the testimony of the chemist
Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on
analysis to be barium chlorate. What appellant is here relying
on is the maxim res inter alois acta. As a general rule, the
evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is
inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this
rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to
convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and
thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain
defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence is
intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents.
The United States Supreme Court has held that:
"On the trial of a criminal case where the question
relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct
of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on
the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will
not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that
the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the
accused.
"Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to
circumstancial evidence, either from the nature of
the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections
to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are
not favored.
"Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which
tends to show motive, although it tends to prove
the commission of another offense by the
defendant."
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all
drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that
it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under
any "fraudulent name."
Where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless
remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the
druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him
to show that the mistake was under the circumstances
consistent with the exercise of due care. The druggist cannot,
for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium
chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a
poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium
chlorate", and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of
mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for
himself, was negligence.
A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot
take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness
and neglect. How the misfortune occurs in unimportant, if
under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is
attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering
the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law
imposes on druggist and the position of the made unlawful is
the giving of a false name to the drug asked for.
36) People vs Irang
KEYWORD: The pockmark on his face
39| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PRINCIPLE: Res inter alios acta rule, second batch.
FACTS:
The accused is charged with robbery with homicide.
On the night of November 9, 1935, 7 armed individuals with
white stripes on their faces went to the house of spouses
Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Some went
upstairs, ordered Perfecto to bring out his money, and was
attacked with bolos and fell to the floor. Some also went up,
approached Maximinia, struck her in the face with the butt of
the gun, and lost consciousness.
When she regained consciousness she saw her husband
already dead. Maximinia turned over to the man who had
struck her with the butt of his gun P70 and jewelry valued at
P200. She looked at the man's face and saw that he had
pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid.
That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assualted
by malefactors. All of them had white stripes upon their
faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a
maong-colored suit.
Maxima Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of
the Constabulary that a person who struck her with the butt
of his gun and taker her money and jewelry was a man of
regular stature, with a lead body and pockmarked face.
Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to
Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might
identify. She identified the herein accused-appellant
Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt
of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his
pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who
had gone up her house that same nght.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me
admitted as evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang
as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes, the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me admitted as
evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang as the
perpetrator of the crime charged.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible
in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as
the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his
presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the
time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her
house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of
Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by
some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and
that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on
his left eyelid and dressed in a maong colored suit, who later
turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her
box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony
that the man of the same description was the one who went
to her house and demanded delivery of her money and
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-
appellant.
37) PEOPLE v. BABIERA
KEYWORD: Doctrine of Ratification
PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances which
would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes
admissible as such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the
declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery.
FACTS:
Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with
the right of repurchase, but having failed to repurchase them
within the period stipulated, the title thereto was
consolidated in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino
Haro. Justo Babiera resorted to every lawful means to regain
possession of said two parcels of land, but he failed.
The prosecution’s version:
On the day of the incident, Severino visited his land with three
companions. When he arrived, he was told by Fermin Bruces,
Severino’s copartner, that he had found Clemente Babiera’s,
son of Justo Babiera, cow grazing on the land. Severino
informed Clemente of what his cow had done and told him to
take better care of his animal and not to let it run loose.
Severino then ordered Fermin to take the cow where the
Babiera family lived. Severino and his companions made use
of a torch when they were making their way back to town
because it was already dark. When they were on the road
near Rosendo Paycol’s house, Clemente suddenly sprang from
the cogon grass, went after Severino and struck him with his
bolo in the back. When Severino turned to see who attacked
him, Severino received another bolo blow in the forehead.
Then, Dominga Bores, Clemente’s partner, and Justo
appeared, and pinned down Severino. Severino’s companions
were not able to help him because of the threat from
Clemente. When the assailants already departed, Severino’s
companions were directed to bring him to town. They were
able to bring Severino to the hospital. Severino made a sworn
statement before the deputy fiscal about the incident. This
sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy
fiscal when he was near death.
The defense’s version:
Clemente was in the house of one Oper, when Justo arrived,
and later on, Severino, who at once said to him, “Clemente,
why do you leave your cow loose?” Clemente denied the
imputation, but Severino insisted and the latter added that
the cow had damaged his plantation. Severino charged him of
2 pesos for the damage, however Clemente told him that he
had no money. Clemente told Severino that he will pay on the
following day. At about 7pm, Clemente saw Buenaventura
Cabalfin leading his cow, and Severino and his companions
followed. Clemente asked them why they are taking the cow
away when they already have an agreement with regards the
payment of the damaged plantation. A commotion then
happened wherein Clemente was allegedly struck by one
Margarito Mediavilla, and Severino was hit in the back by a
bolo blow. The defense attempted to prove that Severino was
40| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond
of starting quarrels in the municipality.
The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera, and
Dominga Bores guilty of the crime of murder, the first as
principal, and the last two as accomplices.
ISSUE:
Whether the ante mortem declaration of the deceased is
admissible in evidence.
RULING:
YES. while the first affidavit could not be admissible, the
second affidavit which confirms the first is now admissible.
When a witness made a certain statement unconscious of
impeding death and reiterates at the time he is already
conscious, is deemed to have ratified the earlier statement.
Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-
mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show
that at the time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly
believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless,
having ratified its contents a week later when he was near
death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible
as a part of that which he made ante-mortem. “A statement
made under circumstances which would not render it
admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as
such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after
he had abandoned all hope of recovery.”
38) US vs Mercado
KEYWORD: “He has a Pugnacious Disposition”
PRINCIPLE:
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom
he has been called, except by showing
(a) that he has made contradictory statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
FACTS:
The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of
coaccion (translates to coercion):
That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the
municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did
willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority
therefor, and by means of violence or force
employed upon the person of Claro Mercado,
prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R.
Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his
pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in
violation of law."
They were then found guilty of the crime charged. During
trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private
prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said
Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint
presented in said cause, the following question:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
"How many times have you been convicted of assault
upon other persons?"
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on
the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret
explained the purpose of his question by saying:
"I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious
disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in
various causes for assault."
The defendants contended that the character of the witness,
Santiago Mercado, has an intimate relation or may have a
strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present
cause,” but this objection was overruled.
The only argument which the appellant presents in support of
his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to
the question which was being discussed by the court and did
not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not
guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose
the character of a witness are immaterial.
In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-
General contends that the question was a proper question,
because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and
that such questions were for that purpose material and
pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged
that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed
Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and
illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the
witness admitted that complaint had been presented against
him for the offense of assault and battery.
ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached due to the
character of the witness.
HELD:
The prosecution, to show the circumstances under which the
crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this
witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria
R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint.
That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually
take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If
there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no
occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said
Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of
the defendants is greatly lessened.
If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had
assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor,
may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof
and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an
important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time
and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or
attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to show that
there was occasion for the interference of Claro Mercado.
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he
has been called, except by showing
(a) that he has made contradictory statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
The question to which the defendant objected neither
attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory
41| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the
credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made
contradictory statements or that his general reputation for
truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may
show by an examination of the witness himself or from the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high
crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
In the present case, the other offense to which the question
above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally
used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in
section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes
are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as
are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies.
We believe that the objection to the above question was
properly interposed and should have been sustained. If there
was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause,
excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to
show that the defendants are guilty of the crime, then the
question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the
same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the
defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are
not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be
disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly
shows that the witness committed the assault to which
reference is made in the complaint in the present cause.
Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a
matter of no importance in the present action. The admission
or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question
related could in no way prejudice the rights of the
defendants.
After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded
that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the
sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
39) Gonzales v. People
FACTS:
Gonzales was charged with arson for allegedly burning two-
storey residential building to which he pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C. Canlas,
owner of the two-storey building testifying that at about 9:30
p.m. he was watching television in his room when his
daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an
adjacent room. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales,
he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it
on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where
Gonzales had also placed an LPG tank. Fire quickly spread to
the other parts of the building.
The prosecution also presented two tenants, Villaflor and
Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he heard
Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he
heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!"
Alarmed, he went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident
but immediately went back to his place when someone
informed him his house was on fire. Simpao testified that he
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
saw the fire coming from Gonzales's room. He added that
Gonzales was laughing while the building was burning.
The testimonies were corroborated by P01 Mendoza, who
testified that when he and his fellow officer arrived at the
crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire.
On the other hand, Gonzales averred that the fire was caused
by faulty electrical wiring. He testified that he was napping
inside his room when he was awakened by heat beside his
bed. The room was on fire. He shouted for help and Canlas
tried to help him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales
denied he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before
the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said he had to
speak in a loud voice. He averred that he merely asked his
aunt to buy food because they ran out of LPG. Gonzales said
that when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that he noticed
the fire had started in his room. He sought police protection
from his neighbors who accused him of starting it.
The defense presented a Physical Science Report prepared by
a Police Inspector showing that the ashes obtained from the
burnt premises were negative of any flammable substance.
RTC convicted petitioner. The CA sustained the conviction
holding that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the
positive identification of a witness, that the prosecution
established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and that
although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas
and his affidavits, the discrepancies did not necessarily
discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged
discrepancies pertain to minor matters negated any suspicion
that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed.
In this petition for review, petitioner argues that the trial court
and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Canlas. He claims that the
sworn statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of
the fire department and before the city prosecutor were
inconsistent.
Petitioner cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where the material
discrepancies between the court testimony and prior
statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made
the testimony incredible.
The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of
the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial
to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court.
The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified,
corroborated and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the
testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated
Canlas's testimony
42| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ISSUE:
Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court
testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales
of the crime of arson.
HELD:
NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged
is complete where the evidence establishes the corpus delicti
and the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for
the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by
proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus
delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present,
the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever
there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are
inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of
suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances
necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.
The eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit
who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found
the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general
rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this
Court will not reverse their findings of fact.
The findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative
evidence and taken together with the bare denial of
petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives,
constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial
evidence coupled with the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible
witness..
40) Republic v Kenrick Developent
KEYWORD: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of paper;
Adoptive admission constituting judicial admission
PRINCIPLES:
 By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it.
 Only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one
that is unsigned to one that is signed.
FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around parcels of
land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger Center of the Air
Transportation Office. As a result of this, ATO was
dispossessed of huge tracts of land. Kenrick, on the other
hand, claimed that the land was theirs, showing a TCT issued
in its name which was sold to it by Alfonso Concepcion.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT nor of its
ascendant TCT. ATO verified the authenticity of Kenrick's titles
with the Land Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report.
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the TCT and
its ascendant title. The land allegedly covered by Kenrick's
titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base
(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for revocation,
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title against
Kenrick and an Answer was filed by the latter which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the
matter of land registration and titling. During the hearing,
Atty. Garlitos (former counsel of Kenrick) testified that he
prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft
to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated that the
signature in the answer was not his and he authorized no one
to sign in his behalf and he did not know who signed the
answer.
When the Republic found out about this, they promptly filed
an urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default for failure to
file a valid answer since it was an unsigned pleading which in
effect is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect
pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found Kenrick's
answer to be sham, false and intended to defeat the purpose
of the rules. It ordered the answer stricken from the records,
respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its
evidence ex parte.
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and directed
the lifting of the order of default against respondent and
ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It
found that Atty. Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing
were unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-
examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the
filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the
signing of the answer by somebody in his stead which
supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had.
ISSUE:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default
RULING: YES
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer was
invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic
was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or
ratify another's statement. Where it appears that a party
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the
statements of another, evidence of those statements is
admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of
adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party's reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person.
43| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes
the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. This
may occur when a party:
a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made
by another
b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of
another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
by another but ignores further points which he or she
has heard the other maker
e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another
Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and
built itscase on them. At no instance did it ever deny or
contradict its former counsel's statements. It went to great
lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos' testimony as well as its
implications, as follows:
1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact
was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned
pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically
authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing
was that the answer bore a signature.
2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit
a counsel from giving a general authority for any person
to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos
did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of
no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be
signed by another, similar to addressing an authorization
letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person
could act on it even if he or she was not known
beforehand.
3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he
never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another. Kenrick
completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its own.
The adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission
which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one
that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
(Section 3, Rule 7)
Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is
unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty
to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it
to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an
assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation
and. signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons something the law strongly
proscribes.
The blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos
entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to
that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could
have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of
the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft."
We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket
authority for just anyone to sign
the answer.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere
technicality that could
be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d'
etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily
brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Respondent failed to show any
persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly
abiding by the rules.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus,
he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
Decision is furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of
disbarment proceedings against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his
possible unprofessional
41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan
PRINCIPLE: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the
reputation shown should be that which existed before the
occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is
because a person of derogatory character or reputation can
still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints
filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of
the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a
public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School,
against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the
44| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from
Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual
indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of
sexual harassment and various malfeasances
MAGDALENA:
Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS Office in
Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-school. One of the
requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection
of the school premises by the DECS Division Office.
Respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course
of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around complainant's shoulders
and kissed her cheek.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized
and that her husband might harm respondent, Magdalena
just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS
Division Office and asked respondent about the status of her
permit. His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined,
explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the
matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from
a local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS
in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with
sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official
being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a
letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to
former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under
suspension.
LIGAYAN:
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her
breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her
from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ pressing
against her. Aside from this, Ligaya charged him with delaying
teachers' salaries, failing to release differentials to
substitutes, refusing to release teachers' uniforms and
allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection and
Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and
regulations.
DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and
ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges of
administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty
CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which
requires a high degree of moral uprightness
Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has never been
charged of any offense in his thirty-seven years of service.
By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses
before the MTC of Baguio City. (Respondent listed all the
cases; there were A LOT)
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against
Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and
credibility, MR was denied
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an unreliable
witness, her character being questionable
ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena , is Credible
RULING:
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally
irrelevant in determining a controversy. 15 One statutory
exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a)
3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote
here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions. —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended
party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains
only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And
even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be
applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent's posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party
may be proved under this provision. Only those which would
establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. This means that the character evidence must be
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape — character for
chastity, on a charge of assault — character for peaceableness
or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement — character for
honesty. In one rape case, where it was established that the
alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring
about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused
doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment,
respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on
Magdalena's chastity. What he presented are charges for grave
oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical
injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above
provision because they do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the
truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person's integrity,
and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. 19A witness may be
discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for
truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11, Rule 132 of
the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. —
A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, but not by evidence of
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
by the examination of the witness,
45| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
or the record of the judgment, that he
has been convicted of an offense."
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is
correct in holding that the character or reputation of a
complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of
inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question — is
Magdalena's derogatory record sufficient to discredit her
credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to
discredit her credibility. Evidence of one's character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote
from the time in question. What is to be determined is
the character or reputation of the person at the time of
the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. Most of the
twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City
relate to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one
was in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or
reputation. Every person can change
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was
convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or
that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of
impairing his credibility
42) People vs Noel Lee
FACTS:
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the
living room of their house. They were watching a basketball
game on television. Herminia was seated across, Joseph, who
sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their
hous. When Herminia casually glanced at her son, she saw a
hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind
Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee
peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body
towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his
gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant
fired a second shot at Joseph and three shots more, two hit
the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots
were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-
appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his
house. Joseph was then brought to the MCU Hospital where
he later died.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against
accused-appellant. The trial court ruled against accused-
appellant and sentenced him with the penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the
eyewitness testimony. In her affidavit before the police
officers, Herminia declared that the hand holding a gun
pointed at her son came out of a hole in the window,
i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination, Herminia stated
that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window,
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
i.e., bukas na bintana. According to accused-appellant, this
inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by
her statement on the witness stand.
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad
reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s
drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have
been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen. As
proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented
Herminia’s letter to the mayor of Caloocan City seeking his
assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the trial court should not have accepted
Herminia’s testimony because it is inconsistent.
2) Whether or not the character evidence is admissible in this
case.
RULING:
1) Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open
court that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the
open window, not from a hole in the window. Between
Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement,
any inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the
witness. Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open
court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and
are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
2) Character is defined to be the possession by a person
of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him
from others; his reputation. Good moral character includes all
the elements essential to make up such a character; among
these are common honesty and veracity. The rule is that the
character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally
irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence
relating thereto is not admissible.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of
Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the
accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer
to character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must
be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged,
meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and
germane to the kind of the act charged.
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule
refers to the character of the offended party. Character
evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character
of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged
that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made
in self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death
in the hands of accused-appellant.
46| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character
is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery
and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case, the
Supreme Court held: “While good or bad moral character
may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not
necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is
committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of
such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to
show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent
danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary.”
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with
murder committed through treachery and evident
premeditation. The evidence shows that there was
treachery. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his
death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling
in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is
not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance
negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to
establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph
Marquez to murder.
Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the penalty
from death to reclusion perpetua.
43) Primo Miro v Porferio Mendoza
FACTS:
Mendoza is the Director of LTO Cebu, Erederos is his niece
and secretary, Alingasa was an LTO Clerk and Peque is the OIC
of the Operation Division of LTO.
They were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct
for the alleged selling of confirmation certificates supposed
to be issued by the LTO for free.
The affidavits of the respondents read:
“3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and
witnessed the following anomalies concerning the
processing of vehicle registration, . . ., as follows:
a. That in order to secure the forms of
Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy
the same at the present price of P2,500.00 per
pad from Catalina Alingasa, an LTO personnel,
who will remit her collections to a certain
Marilyn Mendoza Vda. [de] Erederos, a niece
and the Secretary of the Regional Director,
Porferio Mendoza; EACIcH
b. That Confirmation Certificates processed
during previous administration would not be
honored and under such situations, they would
require that the same be reprocessed which
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
means that we have to buy and use the new
forms supplied by the present administration[.]”
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also
revealed that the confirmation certificates were given to the
representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply
the needed data therein. Pertinent provision of said report
reads:
“06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G.
HUETE, a resident of Lahug, Cebu City and liaison
Officer of GCY Parts, Kabancalan Mandaue City and
Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS a resident of Basak,
Mandaue City and liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in
Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among others and
both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1."
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of
Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present
cost of P2,500.00 per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA,
an LTO Personnel, who will remit her collections to a
certain MARILYN MENDOZA Vda. De EREDEROS, a
niece and secretary of the Regional Director,
PORFERIO MENDOZA.”
Deputy Ombudsman’s Ruling:
Found Mendoza, Erederos, and Alingasa guilty of grave
misconduct, and found Peque guilty of simple misconduct,
relying largely on the NBI/ Progress Report.
CA: Reversed the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision, ruling that
the finding of grave misconduct was not supported by
substantial evidence.
Found that affiants failed to categorically specify that the
respondent’s personally demanded from them the payment of
P2,500.00 — an allegation that the appellate court deemed
material in establishing their personal knowledge.
Held that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay.
ISSUE:
whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the
administrative charge against the respondents
RULING: NO.
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact
is not absolute.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive except when not supported by substantial
evidence.
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof. 15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman's findings were found
wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not
bind this Court.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative
cases
47| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants
to establish the respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1)
their complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBI/Progress
report. As correctly found by the CA, these pieces of
evidence do not meet the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases.
i. Private complainants' affidavits
These affidavits indicate that the complainants have
commonly "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous sale
transaction concerning the confirmation certificates.
While the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on
personal knowledge, the alleged remittance to Erederos and
Mendoza — on its face — is hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows
himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only
limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies
to written statements, such as affidavits.
The records show that not one of the complainants actually
witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos
and Mendoza. Further, There is no averment relating to any
"personal demand" for the amount of P2,500.00.
That the complainants alleged in the preface of their
affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous
act complained of does not take their statements out of the
coverage of the hearsay evidence rule.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
Non-hearsay Legal hearsay
fact that utterances or consists of the truth of
statements were made the facts asserted in
the statement
is offered as an are offered as evidence
assertion to prove the of the truth of the fact
the fact of the asserted
utterance made
Not covered by the Covered by hearsay
hearsay rule rule
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible
under the hearsay evidence rule
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements,
and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their
affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be
treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.
ii. NBI/Progress report
-should not be given any weight
It was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas'
affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay because the
material facts recited were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation.
Reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers
or other public officials are hearsay unless the three
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties,
or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
Conclusion
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to
establish the elements of grave misconduct.
Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly anomalous
scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the
complainants and the NBI/Progress report, which are both
hearsay.
44) GERALDO & ARIATE vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter
Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being
informed of the shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim),
repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and
found him lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping
for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing
distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing and Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing"
and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were
subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. However, the
qualitative examination conducted gave NEGATIVE results for
powder residue.
In documents denominated as affidavits, Arnel and
Mirasol separately gave a statement that the petitioners were
the one who shot his father. At the witness stand, Mirasol
echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado"
shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's
statement.
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod, raised as a
defense that at 3 am of July 1, 2002, a barangay kagawad
woke him up and informed him that the victim was shot. He
and the barangay kagawad proceeded to the crime scene and
brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival. Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in
his house and at 6:30 am he saw many people in the vicinity
where the victim’s body was found and learned that the victim
was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his house and
advised him to take a paraffin test.
The Trial Court ruled against the petitioners. It was
convinced of Mirasol’s testimony which was corroborated by
her brother Arnel Ronquillo and it gave weight to the dying
declaration of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the trial court's decision. It found that the trial
court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating
circumstance.
ISSUE:
48| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of
appeals erred in relying on the dying declaration of the victim
as recounted by Mirasol and corroborated by Arnel.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled on the negative.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his
children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the
victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary
to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it
suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of his
injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to
him that it may safely be inferred that such ante mortem
declaration was made under consciousness of an impending
death. The location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his
gasping for breath, and his eventual death before arriving at
the hospital meet this requirement.
It has not been established, however, that the victim
would have been competent to testify had he survived the
attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to
see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication
whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination
report having merely stated that the points of entry of the
wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the "right iliac
area".
(RULING NOT RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration
were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant
with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance. In convicting
petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the
testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, which was
corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and
"Amado" mentioned by the victim as his assailants are herein
petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live in
the same barangay. The Court of Appeals believed too the
siblings' testimonies.
Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling
of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners,
which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the
material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such
nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to
discharge.
When there is doubt on the identity of the
malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.The Court
notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal
complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel
proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to
shoot the victim. 34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive
was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of
denial and alibi thus assumes importance
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
45) PEOPLE VS DE JOYA
FACTS:
A case regarding the crime of robbery and homicide
committed by a stabbing of an 88 year old woman in Bulacan
and the taking of her jewelries and other. Accused Paquito De
Joya allegedly committed the crime, when the other
companions – her daughter, her son in law, both school
teachers, and their child - were away from the house. The RTC
ruled the accused guilty of reasonable doubt but sentenced
him only to life imprisonment because he was already 72 years
old.
The conviction of the accused was based on the ff. evidence:
1) The testimony of Alvin, the grandson of the deceased,
that the latter was still able to utter “si paqui” to him
when he found her bloodied and asked her what
happened.
2) A quarrel that ensued earlier between the accused
and the deceased regarding the former taking a bike
without the latter’s permission.
3) A step in sandal found inside the house that was
alleged to belong to the wife of the accused and
sister of the deceased.
4) The accused’s evasive nature during the wake, which
was evidenced by his attending only once.
5) A neighbor saw the accused looking at the house a
few moments before the event took place.
6) Attempt of the accused to settle amicably the
criminal charge.
The accused questioned the ruling of the RTC finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence
adduced against him.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC’s ruling was correct finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that the RTC erred on convicting the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence
adduced.
1) The dying statement “si paqui” while referring to the
accused is not a sensible sentence in itself. It can either be: a)
a subject of a sentence or (b) an object of a verb; if it was a
subject then there was no predicate uttered by the deceased
and if it was an object of a verb then there was also no verb
uttered by the deceased. Aside from that the statement must
be related to the question asked by the child which was: “Apo,
Apo what happened?” instead of “Apo, Apo who did this to
you?”
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must
be complete in itself. It does not mean that the declarant must
recite everything that constituted the res gestae of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
49| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
full expression of all that he intended to say as converying his
meaning in respect of such fact.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally
excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that
since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say what he
did say might be qualified by the statements which he was
prevented from making. Such incomplete statement is thus
not entitled to the presumption of truthfulness, which
constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
Basically the SC held here that the RTC assumed that the
uttered words pointed out the accused as the one who
committed the crime but the deceased never said such and
so the SC said that such should not be speculated.
2) The quarrel is insufficient to prove a credible motive for
the commission of such a violent and gory death especially
with the failure of the prosecution to properly identify the
perpetrator.
3) The slipper even if proven to belong to accused wife has
no relevant connection to the commission of the crime.
4) Failure to attend to the wake is not enough indication of
guilt as the accused was able to explain that he was busy in
his profession as a tailor and that he had already viewed the
body at the night the murder took place. Such behavior is not
contrary to the common experience of man despite the fact
that respect for the dead is common cultural trait for
Filipinos.
5) Mere sighting by her neighbor of the accused in the yard
of the house of the deceased, in itself, is not proof of any act
or circumstance that the accused, a 72 year old man,
committed such act.
6) In regards to the attempt to compromise the SC ruled that
such fact was not considered by the RTC and so it inferred
that the RTC either did not believe of such fact and that a
greater degree of explicitness and detail that the accused
impliedly admitted his guilt to a crime as serious as Robbery
with Homicide.
Thus the SC concluded: That the totality of the case made
against the accused consisted of an aborted, incomplete
dying declaration, and a number of circumstances that does
not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that the
accused indeed committed the crime. The sum total of all the
evidence was insufficient to induce that moral certainty of
guilt that characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt.
46) Fuentes vs. CA
FACTS:
Alejandro Fuentes has been convicted for murder by the RTC.
On appeal, he argued that he is innocent and only a victim of
mistaken identity.
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto
Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok
and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site,
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Fuentes, the petitioner, called
Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the
latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you
have a short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in
the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the
ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his
abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed
him.
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who
autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989,
reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar
region 1-1⁄2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and
large intestines."
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina. Zoilo allegedly
confessed to petitioner and Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of
petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt.
Benjamin Conde, Jr., that he (Zoilo) killed Malaspina.
Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at
Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed
Malaspina in "retaliation"; that he even showed him the knife
he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail
and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives
of the deceased. The following day however he learned that
the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had
been arrested for a crime he did not commit.
RTC found Fuentes guilty of Murdering Malaspina. CA also
affirmed RTC’s decision.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued the following
contentions:
1. Appellate court erred when it held that petitioner
was positively and categorically identified as the killer
of Malaspina.
2. That there is an inconsistency between testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio
Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab
Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the
testimony of the attending physician that the victim
was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the alleged declaration of Zoilo against his
penal interest, (that he killed Malaspina and not
petitioner) can be accepted by the court.
2. Whether or not the argument of petitioner of alleged
inconsistency of the witnesses can be given credence.
RULING:
1. No. Zoilo was not presented in court to testify and
they were not able to prove that Zoilo is “UNABLE
TO TESTIFY”.
Here, petitioner is claiming that Zoilo killed Malaspina based
on the alleged confession Zoilo made to him and to Felicisimo.
But this is only hearsay as when Zoilo is not presented in
court. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
50| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of
a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In this case, DECLARANT IS NOT “UNABLE TO TESTIFY”. There
is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under
this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce
each and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant
and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed
Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert
any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be
misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by
the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not
altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to
testify.
Furthermore, even petitioner’s own witness, Nerio Biscocho,
who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro
Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and
the same person.
2. No. The discrepancy in inconsequential.
Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and
Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab
Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of
the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the
left lumbar region.
This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that
Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3)
prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the
knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had
known petitioner for quite some time and never had any
personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as
to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives
to falsely implicate him.
47) DANILO L. PAREL vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO
KEYWORD: two-storey residential house
FACTS:
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner
of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park
National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS)
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely
from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of
said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when
the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and
Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor
while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;
when the construction of the second floor was finished in
1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s parents and children to
transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of
sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of
their own and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985, respondent
wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as
the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to
which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S.
in 1986; however, without respondent’s knowledge, petitioner
and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to
vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of
possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly
rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month
thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and
surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging
that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential
house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the
ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying
the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino,
with respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own
resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey
house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an
awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-
owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the
demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to deprive
petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said
house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as
criminal cases against them involving the subject house which
were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel
failed to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence
before the trial court and that the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered, he maintains
that the said rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v.
Borja; that his documentary evidence which were not formally
offered in evidence were marked during the presentation of
the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses and were part of their
testimonies; that these evidence were part of the
memorandum filed by him before the trial court on July 12,
1993.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary
evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses
substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house
between his late father and respondent as found by the trial
court.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the
affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring respondent as owner
51| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is
the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit
should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed.
Petitioner further contends that since he had
established his father’s co-ownership of the subject house,
respondent has no legal right to eject him from the property;
that he could not be compelled to pay rentals for residing in
the ground floor of the subject house; that respondent
should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for
damages which petitioner sustained for being constrained to
litigate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of
the subject two-storey residential house.
RULING:
NO. The respondent had shown sufficient evidence to
support his complaint for recovery of possession of the
ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner
thereof. Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides: SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.
The theory under which declarations against
interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against
his own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was
petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect
to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit,
Florentino categorically declared that while he is the
occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of
the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in
Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have
made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as
his heirs.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The house which petitioner claims to
be co-owned by his late father had been consistently
declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent,
and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-
mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that
respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of
the litigation.
In this case, the records show that although
petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his
documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file
the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provides:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a
settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party.
Petitioner insists that although his documentary
evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked
during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it
can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v.
Borja.
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed
evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of
the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was
not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that
the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion
for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was never
challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of
the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case
was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which
provides: Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is
based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions; and
not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the
one applicable to the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary
evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the
evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal
cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the
alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner’s parents
whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground floor
of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and
respondent of the subject house. The testimonies of petitioner
and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-
owned by petitioner’s father and respondent.
48) People v. Alfredo Alegado y Delima
KEYWORD: Pedigree testimony is an exception to Hearsay
Rule; Statutory Rape
FACT:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two
counts of rape, narrated as follows:
1. On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, complainant was playing at the Freedom
Square inside the public market of San Carlos City
when appellant, a 170-pound, 53-year old, market
watchman at the time, held her by the hand and took
her upstairs to the second floor of the public market
building which houses some government offices and
which at the time was expectedly deserted. When
they reached the upper floor of the building,
appellant ordered complainant to hold his penis and
masturbate it. After, appellant ordered complainant
to lie down, and when she refused he pushed her
down on the floor. Appellant then tried to insert his
52| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully
before he ejaculated.
Thereafter, appellant gave complainant P2.00 and
left. Complainant stood up and went down the
building but never told anybody about it because
she was afraid appellant would kill her.
2. On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening complainant was sitting at the Freedom
Square when appellant approached her and told her
to go with him upstairs. Complainant refused but
appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by
the left arm, and brought her to the upper floor.
Appellant inserted his penis into complainant's
vagina but it took sometime before his organ could
penetrate the girl. When it did, complainant felt
excruciating pain and begged appellant to stop.
Appellant just ignored her and continued on without
saying anything. And after appellant had withdrawn
his sex organ, complainant discovered that her
vagina was bleeding. Appellant then stood up and
told her not to tell anybody about it. Then appellant
gave her P 2.00 and left.
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by
Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San Carlos
City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the
main entrance of the public market. Pat. Alfaro knew
appellant well because he was the public market watchman
at the time. A minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant
coming down the same stairs. Pat. Alfaro noticed that
complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her thighs and
legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what
happened to her. Complainant answered that she was taken
upstairs and raped by appellant. Immediately, Pat. Alfaro
brought complainant to the city hospital where she was
examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported
the incident to the Station Guard by phone then took
complainant to the police station after the medical
examination. When they reached the station, appellant who
had already been taken into custody was readily identified by
complainant as the rapist. Complainant was then investigated
and she rendered her statement to the police.
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
punished under Article 335 paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code. (Statutory Rape)
Complainant’s Contention: CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA
alleged that the accused raped her twice “against her will and
without her consent”, and that she was below twelve (12)
years of age on both rape instances.
Accused’s Contention: The accused-appellant contends that
the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged
incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it
was error on the part of the trial court to convict the him of
Statutory Rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The testimonies of
complainant and complainant’s grandfather do not come
from their personal knowledge of the fact of birth of the
complainant. Hence, their testimony to that fact constitutes
Hearsay. Also, the accused-appellant contends that the RTC
erroneously found that the rapes were committed with force
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
and intimidation, as the victim even accepted payment of
P2.00 each time.
ISSUES:
1. Do the testimonies of complainant and complainant’s
grandfather constitute Hearsay?
2. Was there force and intimidation in both rape
instances?
3. Did the acceptance of the victim of P2.00 on both
instances amount to tacit consent on her part?
RULING:
1. No. Their testimonies do not constitute hearsay, as
they are exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided
under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: (1) the offended
party herself and (2) her maternal grandfather, Cornelio
Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on
September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39
and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under
Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. ...
The word “pedigree” under Section 39 of the same Rule
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and
the names of the relatives.
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we
stated that:
…Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth (See Sec. 39, Rule 130
under the new Rules). Pedigree testimony is admitted because
it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because
greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than
from its admission.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is
beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites
for its admissibility, namely:
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of
the person concerned existed previous to the
controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or
tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must
be a member of the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar
considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being
put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather
relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching
the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed;
53| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the
maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Pertinent part of the transcript:
Q The complainant in this case is a certain Cristina
Deang. Do you know her?
A: Yes, sir. She is my
granddaughter.

Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang? A: My
daughter, Angelita Villarosa.

Q Is she here?
 A: No, she is not here.

Q Where is she now?
 A: I don't know where she
works now, because she did not send a letter to
me.
 My last knowledge about her whereabouts was
that she was in Manila.
Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living now?
 A: In
our residence.

Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has been
living with you?
 A: The mother left her to me.

Q When was it that the mother left her to you?
 A: In
1983.

Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time her
mother left her to you?
 A: The mother of Cristina
Deang told me that she was born in 1976 and please
let her go to school.

ATTY. BRIONES:
 I would like to make it of record that
the information gathered by the mother, Angelita, is
a hearsay your Honor. PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
 I would
like to prove the fact about the birth of the child..

COURT: Let it stay in record.
PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
 Q By the way, did you have a
talk or conversation with your daughter, Angelita,
the mother of the complainant Cristina Deang,
about when Cristina Deang was born?
 A: We did not
talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told me to
let her daughter Cristina go to school because she is
already 7 years old.

Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina Deang?
ATTY. BRIONES:
 I think that is misleading your Honor.

COURT:
 Witness may answer.

WITNESS: That is what she told me, she was born
on September 5, 1976.

Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in
open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. It is
long-settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino, that
the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible,
although hearsay, and though a person can have no personal
knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a
person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his
parents– he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case
is an assertion of family tradition.
Hence, inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present
contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that the
victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at the
time of the rape incidents under consideration, the SC
affirmed the trial court's finding that the victim in these rape
cases was under twelve years of age.
2. Yes, there was force and intimidation found by the
Trial Court, although for conviction under Article 335
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such finding
is no longer necessary.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Time and again we have held that the gravamen of the offense
of statutory rape as provided under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve years old. It is not necessary to prove that the
victim was intimidated or that force was used against her
because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim on
account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of
her own. Hence, the only elements of statutory rape are: (1)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2)
that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age.
Considering that in the instant case there is clear and
competent evidence that the victim was under twelve (12)
years old at the time of the rape incidents complained of, the
second argument purported by the accused-appellant that the
alleged rapes were not attended by any force or intimidation
must also fail. Proof of carnal knowledge of the victim in this
case who was only eleven (11) years old on the two separate
occasions reported (April 14 and 20, 1988) is overwhelming
while unnecessary force and intimidation also appear in the
records. The offended party’s testimony regarding the
abominable and wicked acts of the accused-appellant against
her chastity on the two occasions indicated in the separate
informations filed by the victim herself was given in a
straightforward manner without any indication that the same
was motivated by any ill-feeling toward the pinpointed
perpetrator. The fact of rape on the said occasions related by
the offended party was corroborated by the examining
physician whose medical finding revealed the presence of
sperm cells inside the victim's sexual organ due to partial
penetration of the male organ into it. It is axiomatic in rape
cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private
organ is sufficient to consummate the crime.
There is no merit in the accused-appellant's contention that
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there
was force and intimidation since the information did not
contain any allegation to that effect simply because the phrase
"against her will and without her consent" contained in both
informations charging the accused-appellant of rape connotes
the attendance of force and intimidation.
3. No. It did not amount to tacit consent.
The accused-appellant's act of giving the offended party the
sum of P2.00 after each instance of "forcible copulation"
apparently as "full atonement for his dastardly act" smacks of
"insult a hundred times compounded." The accused-appellant,
despite the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to
reiterate before us his claim that the acceptance of the said
measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to a tacit consent on
the part of his victim. We deplore such a highly offensive and
depraved argument for we cannot allow the innocent and
helpless victims of unsolicited and forcible defloration to be
brutally insulted while yet nursing their irreparably wounded
sexual purity.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of
civil indemnity which the accused shall pay to the offended
party in each of the two rape cases is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
 wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal
49) Tison vs CA
54| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
FACTS:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece
and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who
appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller.
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by
right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly
as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT
was issued in the latter’s name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed
an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences
offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their
aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance.
Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring
that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture,
and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not
the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the
petitioners.
2. Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum
of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish legitimacy and filiation
3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
RULING:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
NO. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
— can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult
to his memory.
2. YES. With regard to legitimacy, both the trial court and CA
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. Well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be
resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the
presumption in their favor, but on private respondent
who is disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy
is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the
burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy.
And in order to destroy the presumption, the party
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and
credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an
entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a
presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a
finding or decision. When private respondent opted not
to present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such
fact.
With regard to their filiation to Teodora Guerrero, the
primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the ROC,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration
was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of
the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon. Of the four, only (3) remains disputable, so the
question remains if the evidence was enough to
corroborate w/ each other. Court holds that all the
evidence presented, can be deemed to have sufficiently
established the relationship between the declarant and
herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that
a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight
proof of the relationship is required.
(SUCCESSION TOPIC BUT JUST IN CASE)
3. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the
manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be
divided in this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or
sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from
the latter by representation, if they survive with their
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
55| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.”
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half
of the subject property was automatically reserved to
the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in
the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted
statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners
who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own
right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate
his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire
property to herein private respondent. Resultantly,
petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-
owners of the property covered by the Transfer
Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-
fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
50) Mendoza vs. CA
FACTS: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the
herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to
Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically
denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for
damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her
mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called
him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro
was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck
and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood.
Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the
sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her
son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he
gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente
Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings
account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City
branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter,
took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned
to her after admonishing Margarita.1
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he
considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so.
He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and
Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him
to his house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather
learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man
allowed him to build a house on the former's land.2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely,
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of
Casimiro.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida
Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in
Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later,
Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which
eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and
giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be
given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him
P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.3
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of
Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and
his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He
worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him
his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00
to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that
Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista. 4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age,
but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article
283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable
not only to natural children but also to spurious children. 7 The
said article provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is
obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that
of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of
status of a child of the alleged father by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time
when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father.
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family
Code as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:l
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P.
Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in
continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family.
On appeal, however, the respondent courts8 disagreed and
arrived at its own conclusion as follows:
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We
find that appellant has sufficiently proven her
56| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
continuous possession of such status. Although the
court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the
various witnesses presented, We consider the
witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased.
No proof was shown to render them otherwise.
There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio
testified falsely. They were disinterested parties with
no axe to grind against the appellee or the people
actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a
quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their
testimonies.
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested
party who was claiming to be the sole recognized natural
child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if
Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft
charges against his own sister and libel charges against her
husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it
difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista although
both of them have been living in the same barangay since
birth.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on
August 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, and
it was only from the opposition thereto of the private
respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client
had died on May 1986. He immediately informed the
respondent court build the motion for reconsideration was
denied without any substitution of parties having been
effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring,
then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased
Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro
haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears
to be the former's illegitimate son, pursuant to Sections 16
and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This disposes of the
private respondent's contention that the lawyer-client
relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that
Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.
Now to the merits.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not
mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.10 The possession of such status means that the
father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate).11 There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his
own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care.12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court
that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the
status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza,
under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the
defendant although they were both residents of Omapad,
Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed,
that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate
wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his
legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this
case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an
illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also
note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro
although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less
significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money
to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court
correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not
continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony
on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her
mother solely spent for her education and in another that
Casimiro helped in supporting her.13
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that
status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not
take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil
Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant
is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence
may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well
as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130,
Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
It was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of
pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony
was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own
mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.15
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature
of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended
from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.16
Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the
following requisites that have to be complied with before the
act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in
evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
57| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
5. The relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The
persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza,
and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very
issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed
by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and
Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants
and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of
the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was
mentioned as one of his heirs.18 The said declarations have
not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of
the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath
by the private respondent and her witnesses, we can
reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby
rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the
illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled
to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the
petitioner.
51) Solinap v Locsin
PRINCIPLE: Birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence
of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
FACTS:
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11,
1990, pursuant to this, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed
with the RTC of Iloilo, a Petition for Letters of Administration
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he
is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin;
(b) that during his; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal
heir of the decedent.
Petitioners in this case which are the nephews and nieces of
Juan Sr. claims to be the lawful heirs of the deceased. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
Evidence of Respondent, Juan Jr.:
1. Machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
2. Presented as witness: Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City to prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477.
3. Photograph (Exhibit C”) showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. TN: Respondent
claims that such shows that he and his mother have
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
been recognized as family members of the deceased.
Evidence of Petitioners:
1. Certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila,
marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of
respondent was reported by his motherand does not
contain the signature of the late Juan Sr.
TN: While respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and
his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957his Certificate
of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on
a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand,
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used
before respondent's birth.
2. Presented as witness: Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting
expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin
and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in (Exhibit "D") are forgeries
TC Decision: Granted Petition of Juan E. Locsin, Jr as
administrator fidning Exhibit "D" and “C” as sufficient proofs
of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased.
Court of Appeals: affirmed in toto the order of the trial court
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: WON Respondent presented sufficient evidence that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased thus
entitling him for the issuance of letters of administration?
RULING:
NO. Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court states
that if no executor is named in the will, or are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
Undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was
not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters
of administration, respondent alleged that he is
an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that
he is an interested person in the estate and is considered
as next of kin.
SC held that:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil
Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by
the Local Civil Registrars.
Facts which made SC decide that Exhibit D was a spurious
document thus making Juan Jr. not illegible as administrator:
58| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
a. The testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City - She testified about an event which
took place 37 or 38 years ago which made
knowledge of respondent’s birth record based
merely on her general impressions of the existing
records in that Office.
TN: (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958
revised form. When Vencer was asked how a 1958
form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was
recorded, Vencer answered that maybe the forms in 1956
were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised
Form.
b. The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the
Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is
merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like
the other entries.
c. Exhibit "D" is a typewritten carbon copy of the
alleged original while the records of all other
certificates are handwritten.
d. Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which
calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is
blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
SC As to Exhibit 8:
a. Found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila
on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956.
TN: It is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would
continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a
1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
b. Shows that respondent's record of birth was made
by his mother.
c. Does not show signature and name of Juan C. Locsin
listed as respondent's father and the entry that he
and respondent’s mother were married in Oton,
Iloilo.
A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in
substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In this case,
Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Also as to Exhibit “C” of respondent, such cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
there exist strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry has
all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
on file in that office was removed and substituted with a
falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
It also bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by
a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
Certificates of Live have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit
"D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. Thus, what is authentic
is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
52) Jison v CA
 without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
KEYWORD: Proof of paternity filiation, wala gi angkon ni
Daddy Francisco
PRINCIPLE: Circumstantial Evidence & Hearsay exception Rule
Note: This case was really loaded and had several issues
related to evidence, I just followed the notes to guide me in
pinpointing which issues to include.
FACTS:
Monina Jison (respondent) alleges that she is the daughter of
Francisco (petitioner) who had been married to a certain Lilia
Lopez Jison since 1940. She further alleges that her mother
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
Francisco's daughter, Lourdes), was impregnated by petitioner
At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar and that since childhood
she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an
illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family.
MONINA further alleged that Francisco gave her support and
spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's
degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and
eventually, a Central Bank examiner. Monina filed for a
judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
Francisco support and treat her as such.
Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations
with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as
1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then;
further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly,
as his illegitimate child.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven
(11) witnesses: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela
Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez,
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador
Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the Certificate issued by the Local Civil
Registrar & baptismal certificate to prove filiation is
admissible.
2. Whether or not various notes and letter written by
Francisco’s relatives attesting to Monina’s filiation is
admissible.
RULING:
1. Court ruled in favor of respondent but disagreed with
respondent regarding this issue: (Note: Several evidence were
59| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
presented from witnesses to documents like school records,
birth and baptismal certificates) Respondent’s reliance on
the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
concerning her birth is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity,
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in
the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself,
the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
acknowledgment on the latter's part. In like manner,
Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of the
baptismal certificates and school records renders the
documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being
competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.
Furthermore, the certificates issued by the Local Civil
Registrar and the baptismal certificates cannot be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove respondent’s filiation.
Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
2. As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's
relatives, allegedly attesting to MONINA's liation, while their
due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless,
under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing
that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify,
neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in
question. As to the admissibility of these documents under
Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration. We hold that the scope of the enumeration
contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of
the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles
which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its
belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the
family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be
regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of
these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on
tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
Plainly then, the various letter as private documents not
constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may
not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule
130, Section 41 regarding common reputation.
Their inadmissibility not withstanding, the various letters of
Francisco’s relatives inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of
her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed,
relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
EXTRA INFO: Ratio for why the court ruled in favor of
respondent:
Under Family Code provides the various forms of evidence by
which legitimate filiation is established:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation
of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not
be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such
indulgence, this does not favor Francisco. Akin to the crime of
rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the
felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in
deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the
victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative
father's protestations. In the instant case, Monina's mother
could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she
had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of
the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that
Monina could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her
birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question
then is whether Monina's evidence is coherent, logical and
natural.
The complaint stated that Francisco had carnal knowledge of
respondent’s mom "by about the end of 1945." This was
broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence
her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual
relations between Francisco and Monina’s mother. The
evidence in this case established that respondent’s mother
was still in the employ of petitioner at the time respondent
was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual
contact between petitioner and respondent’s mother was not
at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming
evidence, that indeed Francisco fathered Monina, has
recognized her as his daughter and that Monina has been
enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
Francisco’s illegitimate daughter.
53) Ferrer, et. al. v. de Inchausti, et. al.
60| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PRINCIPLE: Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments
and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books
or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like,
as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the said
booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
events.
FACT:
This is an action by the third generation parties
traced from their alleged common ancestors filed on 1916 on
the accounts of events that transpired somewhere in the
1800s.
Plaintiffs allege that they are the children of a
certain Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzales (Rosa) – the
alleged daughter of a certain Isabel. They filed the complaint
to recover the share of their mother in the estate of Isabel at
the rate of 1/5. (the whole estate to be shared with the other
4 siblings of Rosa allegedly)
They further alleged that Isabel Gonzales had a first
marriage with a Ramon Viademonte, Sr. who had two
children, one Ramon, Jr., the other is their mother. Ramon,
Sr. died and Isabel contracted another marriage with Don
Jose Joaquin de Inchausti who, then, had three children who
are the respondents in this case. Thus, according to the
plaintiffs, there are five (5) siblings in total. They claimed that
Rosa’s siblings called her as sister and them as
brothers/sisters. (mostly in the school)
Upon death of Isabel, Don Jose executed an
extrajudicial partition dividing the estate of Isabel with the
four (4) siblings giving them ¼ of the estate to the exclusion
of Rosa.
The common defenses of the respondents are as
follows:
1. Rosa was not married to the father of the
plaintiffs (making them illegitimate);
2. Rosa’s surname is not Viademonte y Gonzales;
3. Rosa is not a daughter of Isabel;
4. As per Rafael (who is now dead), Rosa is not
their sister but a protégé of her mother Isabel;
5. That the action has prescribed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the plaintiffs are legitimate children of
Rosa?
2. WON Rosa is a legitimate daughter of Isabel?
3. WON testimony of Joaquin Jose as to the
declaration of Rafael is a heresay.
4. WON entries in family books be entered should
be made at the same time it occurred?
5. WON Rosa can inherit if she will be considered
as natural child of Rosa?
RULING:
1. No. In different proceedings, Rosa made
contradicting statements where on some occasions,
she claimed that she was not married to Ferrer
(father of plaintiffs) and on some occasions, she is a
widow of Ferrer. it is undeniable that she could not
duly justify the marriage contracted by her with
Benigno Ferrer.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
2. No. From all the evidence adduced, the slightest
indication cannot be inferred that Rosa Matilde was
born during the marriage of Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, Sr., with Isabel Gonzalez or within the
300 days after the dissolution of their marriage by
the death of the husband, nor has the said Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his lifetime
recognized said Rosa Matilde as his daughter. If Rosa
Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it
follows that she was also a daughter of Isabel's
husband, Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, under the
assumption that she was born in the marriage of
both or at a time prior or subsequent to that of the
celebration of the marriage, as fixed by law.
It was established that Ramon, Sr. died on 1836
(tho death certificate was not presented, conclusion
was based on consequential evidence). However, it
was established that Rosa was born after such date,
around 1850s. The evidences are as follows:
a. Baptismal certificate which provides that on
September 1, 1862, a child three days old, born
of unknown parents, was baptized in the
Cathedral Church of this city, and given the name
of Rosa Matilde Robles which Rosa (in another
proceeding against Rafael) admitted that such
might be hers;
b. On page 9 of the day-book which Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his
lifetime, appears a memorandum which says:
"On September 1, 1852, at seven o'clock in the
evening, a child three days old, named Rosa
Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal
certificate issued by the acting rector Don
Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of
Manila, was delivered to my mother; this child
was baptized by the priest Don Remigio
Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and
according to the baptismal certificate, it was a
child of unknown parents.
c. Joaquin Jose de Inchausti stated that one day he
was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez
Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister,
but that she was only a mere protegee and that
her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and
that on that occasion the said brother showed
him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a
copy, which he took from the parochial church.
3. No. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez
Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin
Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is
admissible, for they are members of the same family,
in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of
Act No. 190 (now Rulem 130, Section 39, The
declaration, act, or omission of a member of a family
who is not living, or is outside the jurisdiction of the
Philippine Islands, is admissible as evidence of
pedigree or relationship, or family genealogy in cases
where pedigree, relationship, or family genealogy are
questions at issue.)
4. No. The law does not require that the entries in the
said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events.
5. No. The hereditary rights of the successors of the
Isabel should be determined in accordance with the
61| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
law in effect at the time of her death (Law of Toro),
which provides, among other things, that natural
children have no right to succeed to their natural
mother when, on her death, the latter leaves
legitimate children, as in the present case, and for
this reason it is useless to inquire as to whether
Rosa Viademonte or Robles was a natural or even
an acknowledged natural child of Isabel Gonzalez.
6. The action has prescribed. Libog siya coz ang basis is
the Old Civil Procedure. 10 years prescription from
the date of enactment of Old Civil Procedure which
was August 7, 1901, this was filed on 1916.
54) In Re: Florencio Mallare | 1968
Case: Disbarment on the ground of citizenship
FACTS:
 Florencio Mallare (Florencio) is a practicing lawyer.
 Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P.
Vivo denounced Florencio as a Chinaman and
prayed for his disbarment.
FLORENCIO’S CONTENTIONS
(1) His parents are Filipinos.
 Florencio’s father Estaban is Filipino citizen by choice
(election) because Esteban was only an illegitimate
son (as opposed to legitimate) of a Chinese father and
a Filipina mother named “Ana.”
 Florencio’s mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the
citizenship of her husband Esteban upon their
marriage, thereby making her a Filipina.
(2) Res Judicata.
 Florencio, and his siblings, have been declared Filipino
citizens in a final judgment in a Civil Case.
 Florencio’s birth record, wherein he was originally
registered as a Chinese, has likewise been ordered
corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in a Special
Proceeding.
ISSUES:
I. W/N FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
HELD: NO. The evidence is clearly preponderant, if not
overwhelming that Florencio's father, Esteban, was and
remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, Florencio's
mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original
citizenship, and their offspring are likewise Chinese.
EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
(1) Testimonial Evidence
(a) Testimony of Catarroja, an ex-municipal president
o Catarroja met Florencio’s grandmother Ana and
her son Esteban (Florencio’s father) when the
latter was 8 years old in 1902, but he had not
seen her actually deliver or give birth to the baby
boy Esteban.
o HELD: There was no evidence that Ana was an
"inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine" as required by the Philippine Bill of
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
July 1, 1902 (en masse Filipinization) and she
cannot, therefore, be considered a Filipina.
(b) Testimonies of the Mallare children
o The Mallare children testified that their
grandmother Ana had NOT actually married her
Chinese husband, therefore she remained a
Filipina.
o HELD: Insufficient to overcome the presumption
that persons living together as husband and wife
are married to each other.
(2) Documentary Evidence
(a) Landing Certificate of Residence
 Te Na, Florencio’s Chinese mother, was described in
a landing certificate of residence issued to her as
"wife of P.I. (Philippine Islands) citizen" and as wife
of Esteban, P.I. citizen".
 HELD: A landing certificate of residence issued
under Section 7, Act 702 by the Collector of
Customs is based upon an administrative ex
parte determination of the evidence presented and
the facts as stated by the applicant and, therefore,
carries little evidentiary weight as to citizenship.
The truth of Te Na's declarations when she applied
for the landing certificate could have been inquired
into had she been presented as a witness in these
proceedings, but this was not done.
(b) Affidavit of Election of Citizenship
 Esteban executed an affidavit stating therein that
when he reached the age of majority he had
"definitely elected to be a Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of my mother."
 HELD: Self-serving and not a substitute for a duly
recorded election of Philippine citizenship. When
Esteban executed it, he was already thirty-six (36)
years old and he executed it for the purpose of
making a change in a miscellaneous lease
application wherein he had previously stated that
he is a citizen of China.
(c) Voter’s registration
 Esteban was a registered voter in Macalelon,
Quezon.
 HELD: Esteban’s registration as a voter indicates his
desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to
Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determinable by his blood ( jus sanguinis).
EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A CHINESE CITIZEN
(1) All children of Esteban and Te Na were registered at birth
as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and
with the added detail that their parents were born in
China.
(2) The birth certificate of one of the Mallari children bears
the Esteban’s own signature as the father. If Esteban was
indeed a Filipino by choice, then he should have so stated
in this birth certificate, instead, he admits, against his own
interest, that he is a Chinese.
(3) Esteban’s own death certificate, signed by his son, shows
that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang, China.
 The affidavit of said son denying that the signature is
his is inadmissible as it was offered in evidence for the
first time after trial was closed.
(4) The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and
their children were registered as aliens in the then
Division of Alien Statistics.
(5) Florencio himself was again registered as an alien in 1950,
his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and
62| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to
the yellow race and that he had used these other names:
"Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac."
 His explanation that it was his mother who registered
him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated hereinbefore,
he did not present his mother as a witness.
II. W/N THE JUDGMENT IN THE CIVIL CASE AND THE SPECIAL
PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED RES JUDICATA.
HELD: NO. The Civil Case and Special Proceeding are not
modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship; neither is the
Chinese citizenship of Florencio converted to Filipino because
certain government agencies recognized him as such. He
remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is naturalized.
(a) The civil case was instituted by the vendor of a certain
parcel of land to rescind the sale and recover the land
sold from the the Mallari siblings on the ground that
they are Chinese. Thus, their citizenship was not the
thing adjudicated in the judgment and the declaration
that they are Filipinos was but a necessary premise for
the court to arrive at a conclusion that the sale of the
realty was valid. Not being the thing directly
adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res
judicata, and cannot become conclusive.
(b) Florencio’s claim for citizenship was never given
adequate publication so as to apprise all concerned and
give them opportunity to contest it. Hence, neither
decision constitutes res judicata on the issue of
respondent's alleged Filipino nationality.
(c) The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its inherent and
constitutional authority, may not be precluded from
inquiring into the citizenship of persons admitted to the
practice of law, independently of any other court's
findings in the cases or proceedings brought or
instituted therein.
55) DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v Radio
Mindanao Network, Inc
FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network Inc owns several
broadcasting stations in the country. It contracted a fire
insurance policy with Provident Insurance Corporation
covering its various equipment while Petitioner covered its
other equipment under another fire insurance policy.
On July 27, 1988, Radio Mindanao’s radio station in Bacolod
was razed by fire so it sought recovery under the two
insurance policies. The insurance companies denied its claim
on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
under their contract (loss caused by war, invasion, hostilities,
military or popular uprising, insurrection, rebellion, mutiny
and the like). It maintained that the evidence showed that
the fire was caused by NPA members. So, Radio Mindanao
sued petitioner and Provident.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Radio Mindanao since it found
the insurance companies’ evidence were insufficient to prove
that the cause of the loss was due to such excepted risk. The
testimony of its witnesses, Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar
was only based on the bystanders’ statements during their
investigation that heavily armed men entered and started the
fire shouting, “Mabuhay ang NPA!” since both were
admittedly not present when the fire occurred. The persons
who were investigated and actually saw the burning were not
presented as witnesses. Also, the documentary evidence
presented consisting of the police blotter, certification from
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the Bacolod Police Station and Fire Investigation report also
did not categorically state that the 20 armed men were
members of the NPA. Petitioner argues that the testimonies of
Torres and Rochar be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule as part of res gestae
ISSUE:
(1) WON testimonies are considered res gestae
(2) WON petitioner’s documentary evidence was sufficient to
prove the cause of the fire was due to an excepted risk
RULING:
(1) NO, not considered as res gestae. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge (derived from his perception). A witness may
not testify as to what he merely learned from others
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth. The problem with hearsay evidence
is its trustworthiness and reliability due to its lack of oath
or affirmation and cross-examination by the adverse party
(to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor).
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies
when the declarant himself did not testify and provided
that the testimony of the witness who heard the
declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that
the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediate attending circumstances.
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as
part of res gestae for lack of requisite #2. Both Rochar and
Torres received the bystanders' statements while they
were making their investigations and it can be reasonably
assumed that the bystanders already had enough time
and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and
exchange information, not to mention theories and
speculations. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth.
At best, these testimonies may be considered as
independently relevant statements and are admissible not
as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had
been thus uttered. However, even if admitted, it would
not be sufficient proof. The declarations should be
considered alongside other evidence on record.
(2) While the documentary evidence presented may be
considered as exceptions to the hearsay rule being entries
in official records, none of these documents categorically
63| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
stated that the perpetrators were members of the NPA.
They were merely believed to be members or suspected
to be members.
56) TALIDANO VS. FALCON MARITIME
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by
Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private
respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a
vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu)
which is based in Korea. His one (1)-year contract of
employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated
the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of
$270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always
discriminated against and maltreated the vessel’s Filipino
crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the
officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation
(ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the
chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21
January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27
October 1999.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several
times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner’s
incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it
presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due
to petitioner’s neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy
of the report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying
merely on fax messages to support the validity of his
dismissal from employment. He maintains that the first fax
message containing the information that the vessel
encroached on a different route was a mere personal
observation of the ship master and should have thus been
corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of
the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also
contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the
incident would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the
theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify
his unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he
believes that his dismissal from employment stemmed from
his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his superiors
resented.
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct
in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It
likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is
justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because
Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it
refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
because he filed a complaint with the ITF in behalf of his
fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner’s allegation is a
hoax because there is no showing that the alleged complaint
has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF.
Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was not
dismissed but that he voluntarily asked for his repatriation.
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. It is
highly illogical for an employee to voluntarily request for
repatriation and then file a suit for illegal dismissal. As
voluntary repatriation is synonymous to resignation, it is
proper to conclude that repatriation is inconsistent with the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid.
RULING:
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the
satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit: (1) the
dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article
282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded
due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner’s absence during his
watch duty when an emergency call was received from the
Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was
"invading other route" constituted neglect of duty, a just
cause for terminating an employee. Records reveal that this
information was related to private respondent via two fax
messages sent by the captain of M/V Phoenix Seven.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a
report of crew discharge essentially containing the same
information as the first fax message. The Court of Appeals
treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving
neglect of duty on the part of petitioner.
Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court mentions two
acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts,
the res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot be
deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is
required that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly
caused the ship to deviate from its course—is the startling
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after
the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the
critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be
admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites
for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be
characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must
64| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany
the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act.
Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so
by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine
whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with
the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are
unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily,
the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax messages in
dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages
were addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to
petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts
showing neglect of duty. Neither was he informed of his
dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an
opportunity to present his side. The failure to comply with
the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent’s liability on
top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the NLRC is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that in addition to the payment of the sum
equivalent to petitioner’s three (3) months’ salary, the full
amount of placement fee with 12% legal interest must be
refunded.
57) Canque VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business
under the name and style RDC Construction. At the time
material to this case, she had contracts with the government
for
the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road;
(b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and
(c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.
In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into
two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction
Corporation.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill
(Exh. C), containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75,
plus interest at rate of 3% a month, representing the balance
of petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials
delivered and services rendered by private respondent under
the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit
the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric
tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by
the government.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from
petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of
3% a month.
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It
held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible Accounts
particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this Court is convinced
that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat
are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account
of SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC which were
entered therein in the course of business. We cannot
therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit "K"
because the fact of their having been made in the course of
business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness.
Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the
irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent
reason for us to doubt their authenticity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts
constitute competent evidence?
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, 10 of the
Rules of Court?
RULING: NO.
Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the course of
business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know
the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside
the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.
First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by
private respondent to testify on the account. There was,
therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was
available to testify in court.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal
knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she
made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has
no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the
bills.
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A
witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a
65| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at
the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter,
or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the
writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and
may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it
in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated
the transaction when made; but such evidence must be
received with caution.
Thus, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In
other words, where the witness has testified independently
of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is
not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident
that a witness may not be corroborated by any written
statement prepared wholly by him.
However, the entries recorded under Exhibit “K” were
supported by Socor's Billings under the account of RDC
Construction. These billings were presented and duly
received by the authorized representatives. The
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that
for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never
manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated
billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant
immediately protest to plaintiff’s alleged incomplete or
irregular performance.
58) Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC & Macatuno
FACTS:
Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by
Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning
agent, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., as an able-bodied
seaman on board the M/T Fortuna,. Under the employment
contract, Macatuno was employed for ten (10) months, with
a monthly salary of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US
$276)
On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of
Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took place as with private
respondent and fellow Filipino crew member, Julius
Gurimbao, on one hand, and Mr V.S. SASON, a
cadet/apprentice officer (of the same nationality as the
captain of the vessel), on the other. The master entered the
incident in the tanker's logbook.
As a consequence, private respondent and Gurimbao were
repatriated to the Philippines where they lost no time in
lodging separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the
POEA. The pertinent facts are as follows:
At the wee hours of June 24, 1989, private respondent was
on duty along with Gurimbao, checking the manifold of the
vessel and looking for oil leakages, when a cadet/apprentice
(Mr. Sason) approached them. Sason ordered Gurimbao to
use a shovel in draining the water which was mixed with oil
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
and dirt. Gurimbao explained to the cadet/apprentice that
the throwing of such at sea was prohibited by the laws of
Japan; Hearing this, the cadet/apprentice got mad and
shouted at Gurimbao, which the latter took offense to, but to
avoid trouble, did as he was ordered.
Gurimbao then complained to private respondent about the
incident. The two then went to the cadet/apprentice and
reminded him that as a mere apprentice and not an officer of
the vessel, he had no right to order them around. However,
the cadet/apprentice reacted violently, as if challenging the
two to a fight. Private respondent pushed twice the
cadet/apprentice's chest while Gurimbao "mildly hit" his arm.
Frantic and shouting, being not so tough after all, the
cadet/apprentice cried daddy to the captain who
coincidentally happened to witness the incident.
As a result, the captain told them to pack up their things as
their services were being terminated. The two attempted to
explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them
and firmly told them to go home.
To make matters worse, they were made to pay their own
way back to the Philippines.
Upon arriving in the Philippines, private respondent took no
time in filing a case for illegal dismissal with POEA.
In their defense, petitioners alleged that the incident was not
the first infraction committed by the two, and to prove that
the dismissal of the respondent was in fact not illegal, it
presented copies of the entries of captain’s the log book
stating the facts of the alleged incident which occurred in
Japan.
The POEA Deputy Administrator ruled in favor of the Private
Respondent, not giving credence to the evidence submitted,
the same appearing to be dubious. The CA likewise affirmed
the decision of the POEA.
ISSUE:
WON, the copies of the entries of the captain’s logbook was
sufficient to warrant the dismissal of herein private
respondent.
RULING:
No. The respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner.
It is undisputed that the ship captain's logbook is a vital
evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce, as the same
requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted
as the vessel's head.
In fact, in Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, the Court held that
a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and
serves as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find
unqualified application in the case at bar. In that case, an
investigation of the incident which led to the seaman's
dismissal was conducted before he was dismissed.
Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were
supported by the facts gathered at the investigation.
However, in this case, because no investigation was
conducted by the ship captain before repatriating private
respondent, the contents of the logbook has to be duly
identified and authenticated lest an injustice result from a
66| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima
facie evidence of the incident in question.
Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton Shipping
case was a copy of the official entry from the logbook itself.
In this case, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the
POEA the logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of
pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily
xeroxed or photocopied considering the present technology
on reproduction of documents. What was offered in
evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from
what could be the logbook because by their format, they
could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel
in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.
Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy
that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many
questions unanswered. Although private respondent
candidly admitted in his affidavit having hit Sason on the
chest twice, he did not admit using a spanner. The conflicting
versions of the incident rendered it impossible to determine
whether it was private respondent or Gurimbao who wielded
said tool. In the absence of a more detailed narration in the
logbook entry of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
assault, the same cannot constitute a valid justification to
terminate private respondent's employment. 19
Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the "logbook" were
the only pieces of evidence presented by petitioners to
support the dismissal of private respondent, have no
probative value at all, petitioners' cause must fail. Their
failure to discharge the onus probandi properly may have no
other result than a finding that the dismissal of private
respondent is unjustified.
Thus, the petition at bar is DISMISSED.
59) Northwest Airlines, Inc vs. Steven P. Chiong
FACTS:
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime
Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent
of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven
Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia
bound for San Diego, California.
For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a
Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a
departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. So the time had
come for Chiong to head off to the U.S. Arriving 3hrs ahead
of his scheduled flight and with his family to see him off, he
pro was met by Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer,
met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong's
seaman service record book for clearance. Chiong's passport
was duly stamped, after complying with government
requirements for departing seafarers.
However, when Chiong's proceeded to check-in, the
Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not
appear in the computer's list of confirmed departing
passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in
barong" standing outside Northwest's counters from whom
Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. To his
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
surprise, the "man in barong" demanded US$100.00 in
exchange therefor.
Having failed to pay such an amount and as a result, Chiong
was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for
San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at
the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time).
It was later on found out that Chiong's name was crossed out
and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest's Air
Passenger Manifest. 6
Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of
contract of carriage before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the
evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion
that Chiong was deliberately prevented from checking-in and
his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an
American passenger by the name of W. Costine.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON, Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight
Manifest and the Passenger Name Record, respectively, were
hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records.
RULING:
The petition must fail.
Exception to Hearsay Evidence: Entries Made in the Official
Course of Business
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest's Exhibits "2"
and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that the
RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay
evidence. We quote with favor the CA's holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised
Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the
course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person who
made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the
entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e)
the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and
passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While
there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who
individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person
who supervised them while they were making the entries
testify that the account was prepared under his supervision
and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary
course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was
the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal
knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not
supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no
67| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
evidence was presented to prove that the employee who
made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant
set forth the circumstances that would show the employee's
inability to testify. 38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
60) Patula v. People
KEYWORD: Estafa, ledgers and receipts
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case was charged with estafa filed in
RTC Dumaguete City to which she pleaded not guilty. Upon
trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses.
The first witness was Lambert Go who was the branch
manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores where petitioner
works. He alleges that petitioner was a sales representative
who was authorized to take orders from customers, collect
payments and issue and sign official receipts for them. It
came to a point that he noticed a drop of volume in sales but
petitioner merely says the business was slow. Eventually, it
prompted him to summon an accounting clerk to verify the
sales. The accounting clerk found out that there were some
erasures on the collection receipts. Go also asked an audit
from the company auditor Karen Guivencan. At that time, he
learned some other discrepancies such as the fact that a
customer had already paid his outstanding balance but it
appeared unpaid in the records of Footlucker’s.
The other witness of the prosecution was Karen Guivencan
who was asked by Go to audit petitioner based on what he
learned from the customers of balances being recorded as
unpaid in the office ledgers. She discovered in her audit that
the amounts appearing on the original copies of the receipts
in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts
petitioner submitted to the office. For this information, she
submitted a written report to Go marked as Exhibit A.
As to the other evidence presented by the prosecution, the
ledgers of the petitioner’s various customers allegedly with
discrepancies were marked as Exhibits B to YY and their
derivaties inclusive.
During Guivencan’s direct examination, petitioner’s counsel
objected that the Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inclusive were hearsay because the persons who made the
entries were not presented in court.
On January 28, 2004, RTC rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt and denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Petitioner now comes to the Court with the following issues:
1. WON the failure of the information for estafa to allege
the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
petitioner to her customers violated petitioner’s right ro
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
- (Petitioner, in the main attacks RTC’s adverse
decision because the prosecution’s charge was
estafa but her conviction was based on evidence
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
for falsification without it being alleged in the
information)
2. WON the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives inclusive) were admissible as evidence despite
not being authenticated
3. WON the testimony of Karen Guivencan on the ledgers
and receipts were inadmissible as hearsay to prove
petitioner’s guilt
RULING:
I. As to the first issue
There was no need to allege the act of falsification by
petitioner in the information because falsification is not an
element of estafa. Further, the theory of the prosecution
hinges on conversion of petitioner of sums paid by customers
and later the duplicates of the receipts were falsified, then
prosecution can prove her acts of falsification as a means of
establishing her misappropriation and conversion. Thus, her
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation was not
violated.
II. As to the second issue
The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its o cial or
sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public o cial with the formalities required by law, or because it
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order
to be presented as evidence in court. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its
acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of
authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient
one within the context of Section 21,Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an
actionable document have not been speci cally denied under
oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d)
when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs
authentication of private documents:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. —Before any
private document offered as authenticis received in
evidence, itsdue execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) B y evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identi ed as
that which it is claimed to be.
Exhibits B to YY and their derivates were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for
private or business purposes or uses.
68| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate
petitioner’s signature in various receipts. One of them was a
machine copy of a receipt used for purposes of the
testimony, the original was promised to be presented on a
later date. As matters turned out in the end, the effort to
have Go authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt
with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine
copy was inexplicably forgotten and was no longer even
included in the Prosecution's Offer of Documentary
Evidence.
As to Guivencan, she could not honestly identify petitioner's
signature on the receipts either because she lacked
familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
petitioner affix her signature on the receipts. Guivencan
exclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated
ledgers to support her audit report on petitioner's supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries,
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not
themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,
the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives conformably with the rules. Hence,
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
III. As to the third issue
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a
witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal, that is which are derived from her own perception.
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of
the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness
is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is
not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-
examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not
upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the
declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot,
therefore, be cross-examined.
The prosecution presented two witnesses - Go and
Guivencan. Go, on his part described the various duties of
petitioner. Guivencan on the other hand, admits that she has
no personal knowledge of tha amounts actually received by
petitioner from customers. She based her testimony on the
entries found in the receipts issued by petitioner to various
customers, the ledgers held by Footluckers and the unsworn
statements from customer, with her being the only witness
who can testify on the entries. Her being the only witness
deprive RTC to test and validate the veracity of the entries as
evidence of petitioner’s guilt and thus rendered her
testimony hearsay. Moreover, Exhibits B to YY and their
derivates inclusive were also rejected as proof by the Court.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
61) Africa v Caltex
FACTS: A fire broke out at a Caltex service station. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring houses including
the house of petitioners. The fire started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted.
There were reports presented for evidence; Police Department
Report, the Fire Department Report and by a certain Capt.
Tinio of the AFP. According to the Police Department Report,
an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning
match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank.
According to the Police department Report, that in the
premises there was a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.
The report of Capt. Tinio reproduced the information given by
a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline
station and what the chief of the Fire Department had told
him.
Court of Appeals:
The reports were ruled as double hearsay, hence inadmissible.
Petitioner’s Contention:
1. The reports were admitted by the trial court without
objection on the part of Caltex.
2. The police report which was signed by detective
Zapanta allegedly “for Salvador Capacillo”, Capacillo
was presented as witness but respondent waived
their right to cross examination.
3. The reports are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 35 of Rule 123 now Rule
130. The report without further testimonial evidence
on their contents, fall within the scope of Section 35
of rule 123.
ISSUE: Whether the reports are admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule
RULING:
1. The reports in question when offered were objected
on the ground that they were hearsay and that they
are “immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent”.
2. Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand but he
was not examined and he did not testify as to the
facts mentioned in his alleged report. All he said was
that he was one of those who investigated the
location of the fire gather witnesses. Therefore there
was no need to a cross examination and the contents
of the report in which he did not testify did not
become a competent evidence. Even if he testified,
the information gather by him from third persons is
still objectionable.
3. Section 35, Rule 123, provides that “entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
69| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The three requisites for admissibility under Section 35, Rule
123:
1. That entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so
2. That it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duty, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
3. That the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated which must
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information
The third requisite is not present in the case. The material
facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances
of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. The sources of
some facts were not identified while some facts were
attributed an employee of Caltex, the driver of the tank
truck, and respondent. To qualify their statements as “official
information acquired by the officers who prepared the
reports”, the persons who made the statements not only
must have personal knowledge of the facts but must have the
duty to give such statements for record. THE REPORTS DO
NOT CONSTITUE AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. The
facts stated in the reports were not given by informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
(under Torts, Res Ipsa Loquitor, just in case sir asks)
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
form want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of respondent. A fire
occurred therein and spread. The persons who knew or could
have known how the fire started were respondents and their
employees but can give no explanation. It is a fir inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.
62) People v San Gabriel
FACTS:
RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder in an
Information alleging that on 26 November 1989, armed with
a bladed weapon, in conspiracy with "Ramon Doe," with
treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, he
assaulted and stabbed to death Jaime A. Tonog. The
prosecution witness positively identified the suspects, thus
the conviction.
Accused only used alibi as his defense. Tried to prove that it
was Ramon Doe, and some person named “Mando” who
killed the victim.
The accused also leans his defense heavily on the Advance
Information Sheet (blotter) prepared by police office
Casimiro. The accused contends that entries in the Advance
Information Sheet did not mention him at all and named only
Ramon Doe as the principal suspect. Such blotter however
contains information acquired by said police officer only after
his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness of the crime.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: Whether or not the Advance Information Sheet falls
under the Hearsay Rule Exception, for being an ‘Entry In
Official Records’.
RULING: The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute
an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
The public officer who prepared the document had no
sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident.
Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba
which therefore could not be categorized as official
information because in order to be classified as such the
persons who made the statements not only must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty
to give such statements for the record. In the case of Camba,
he was not legally so obliged to give such statements.
Supreme Court sustained findings of Trial Court.
63) Barcelon v. CIR
PRINCIPLE:
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. For this presumption to apply, the
following must be present:
a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and
c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information
FACTS:
Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities,
Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. On
14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual ITR for taxable year
1987. After an audit investigation conducted by the BIR, CIR
issued an assessment for deficiency income tax since
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and
allowances to withholding taxes. This assessment was covered
70| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
by a Formal Assessment Notice dated 1 February 1991,
which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through
registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner
denies receiving such. Petitioner alleges that it only knew
about it when it was served with the Warrant of Distraint and
Levy on 17 March 1992. The respondent presented the BIR
record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax
assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing
were noted. Respondent offered (1) the entry in the BIR
record book and (2) the testimony of its record custodian as
entries in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
CTA: unnecessary to decide the issues on the validity and
propriety of the assessment since the right of the BIR to
assess petitioner has already prescribed.
CA: reversed the CTA decision;
ISSUE:
WON the evidence offered by respondent, Versola’s
testimony, qualifies as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence? NO
WON the right of the BIR to assess petitioner has already
prescribed? YES
RULING:
Under Section 203, NIRC, respondent is given 3 years from
the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return, or
from the day of actual filing, whichever is later. An
assessment is made within the prescriptive period if notice to
this effect is released, mailed or sent by the CIR to the
taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer
within the prescriptive period is not necessary. But the rule
does not dispense with the requirement that the taxpayer
should actually receive, even beyond the prescriptive period,
the assessment notice which was timely released, mailed and
sent.
While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in
the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable
presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of
the receipt thereof, as what happened in this case, shifts the
burden upon the party favored (CIR) by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
addressee (Barcelon). In this case, CIR intended to show that
all assessments made are entered into a record book in
chronological order outlining the details of the assessment
and the taxpayer liable thereon. However, all entries thereon
appear to be immaterial and impertinent in proving that the
assessment notice was mailed and duly received by Barcelon.
What is essential to prove the fact of mailing is the registry
receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts or the Registry return
card which would have been signed by the Petitioner or its
authorized representative. And if said documents cannot be
located, Respondent at the very least, should have submitted
to the Court a certification issued by the Bureau of Posts and
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
any other pertinent document which is executed with the
intervention of the Bureau of Posts.
Furthermore, presenting as witness their records custodian
still proved to be insufficient. There are three requisites for
admissibility under the rule mentioned in Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that
the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information . . . .
In this case, the entries made by Versola were not based on
her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that
she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice.
Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how
and from whom she obtained the pertinent information.
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the
reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not
qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Since the evidence offered by the respondent fails to convince
that FAN was released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, it
is insufficient to give rise to the presumption that the
assessment notice was received in the regular course of mail.
Consequently, the right of the government to assess and
collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription.
64) Juanito Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services,
Inc.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by
Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent)
and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and
operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in
Korea. His one (1)-year contract of employment commenced
on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the monthly wage at
$900.00 with a fi􏰾xed overtime pay of $270.00 and leave pay
of $75.00.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always
discriminated against and maltreated the vessel's Filipino
crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the
officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation
(ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the
Korean chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed
on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
on 27 October 1999.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several
times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner's
incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route at
the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who
was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it
presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident, reporting the vessel's deviation from its course due
to petitioner's neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy
of the report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
71| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The labor arbiter held that petitioner was validly dismissed
for gross negligence of duty.
The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by
private respondent to prove petitioner's neglect of his duties,
thus:
. . . The fax message said that the Master of M/V Phoenix
Seven received an emergency warning call from Japan Sisan
Sebo Naika Radio Authority calling attention to the Master of
the vessel M/V Phoenix Seven that his vessel is invading
other route [sic]. When the Master checked the Bridge, he
found out that the Second Officer (complainant) did not
carry out his duty watch. There was a confrontation between
the Master and the Complainant but the latter insisted that
he was right. The argument of the Complainant asserting
that he was right cannot be sustained by this Arbitration
Branch. The fact that there was an emergency call from the
Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was
invading other route simply means that Complainant
neglected his duty. The fax message stating that Complainant
was not at the bridge at the time of the emergency call was
likewise not denied nor refuted by the Complainant. Under
our jurisprudence, any material allegation and/or document
which is not denied specifically is deemed admitted. If not of
the timely call [sic] from the port authority that M/V Phoenix
Seven invaded other route, the safety of the vessel, her crew
and cargo may be endangered. She could have collided with
other vessels because of complainant's failure to render
watch duty.
The NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter.
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the
alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have
no probative value and are self-serving. It added that the
ship's logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it
is the repository of all the activities on board the vessel,
especially those affecting the performance or
attitude of the officers and crew members, and, more
importantly, the procedures
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member.
The CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship
master shortly after petitioner had committed a serious
neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages
constitute the res gestae.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying
merely on fax messages to support the validity of his
dismissal from employment. He maintains that the 􏰾fax
message containing the information that the vessel
encroached on a different route was a mere personal
observation of the ship master and should have thus been
corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of
the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also
contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the
incident would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the
theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify
his unceremonious dismissal from employment.
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct
in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It
likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is
justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because
Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed
because he 􏰾led a complaint with the ITF in behalf of his
fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner's allegation is a
hoax because there is no showing that the alleged complaint
has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF.
Records reveal that this information was related to private
respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V
Phoenix Seven. The fax message dated 18 January 1997 is
reproduced below:
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER
THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA
PORT.
DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL ORDER.
CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM
JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP IS
INVADING OTHER ROUTE.
SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O
NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.
MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT
HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE
WILL COME BACK HOME.
ACTESI
FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE
SCALE. MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS
REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U.
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a
report of crew discharge essentially containing the same
information as the fax message. The Court of Appeals treated
these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect of
duty on the part of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fax messages constitute the res gestae?
RULING:
No.
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two
acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts,
the res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. 41
The SC ruled that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
To be admissible under res gestae of the first kind it is
required that:
(1) the principal act be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which allegedly
caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the startling
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after
the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical
72| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be
admitted as part of the res gestae of the 􏰾first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The
requisites for its admissibility are:
(1) the principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal;
(2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue;
(3) the statement must accompany the equivocal
act; and
(4) the statements give a legal significance to the
equivocal act.
Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by
the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No
date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the
fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are
unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily,
the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
Private respondent's sole reliance on the fax messages in
dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages
were addressed only to itself.
Talidano is illegally terminated.
65) Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs Alberto & Alberto Reyes,
PRINCIPLE: Exception to the hearsay rule are the entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines. Failure to make a timely
objection to the police report’s presentation in evidence is a
waiver of right.
FACTS: At around 5 o’clock in the morning, an accident
occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue involving
four (4) vehicles: (1) a Nissan Bus, (2) an Isuzu Tanker, (3) a
Fuzo Cargo Truck, and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the
Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator SPO1
Alfredo Dungga, the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side
shortly before the incident. All three (3) vehicles were at halt
when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear
portion of the Galant and the rear left portion of the Bus.
Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
forward and the Galant rammed into the Tanker.
Previously, Malayan Insurance issued a car insurance policy
insuring the Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability,
own damage and theft, among others. Malayan paid the
damages and maintaining that it has been subrogated to the
rights of the assured, it sent several demand letters to
respondents, the registered owner and the driver,
respectively of the Cargo Truck. Respondents refused forcing
petitioner to file a complaint for damages for gross
negligence against respondents.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Respondents asserted that the proximate cause of the
accident was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver
alleging that that the speeding bus, coming from the service
road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane
without due regard to Reyes' right of way. When the Nissan
Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but
the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to
gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo
Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn,
hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on
the other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing
damage to the latter. They also controverted the result of the
Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased
narration of the Bus driver.
At the trial, Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of it
lone witness, motor car claim adjuster, who attested that he
processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the
documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the other
hand, failed to present any evidence.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
respondents liable for damages. CA reversed and set aside the
decision. It noted that the police report was not properly
identified by the police who conducted the on-the-spot
investigation of the subject collision. It thus, held that an
appellate court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document,
much less accord it evidentiary value.
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the
presentation of the police investigator who prepared the
police report, said report is still admissible in evidence,
especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection
to its presentation in evidence. Respondents counter that
since the police report was never confirmed by the
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of
the evidence on record.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the police report is admissible
2) Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support
the claim for gross negligence
3) Whether or not subrogation is valid in the instant case
RULING:
1) Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to
those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness' own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on
matters which he or she merely learned from others either
because said witness was told or read or heard those matters.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is
known as the hearsay rule.
As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 21 "Hearsay is not
limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements."
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the
Rules of Court, among which are entries in official records.
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
“Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
73| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.”
In Alvarez v PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the
requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to
the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his or her duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
stated, which must have been acquired by the public
officer or other person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the
police investigator who prepared it was not presented in
court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately
proved. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-
the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in
the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is
whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of
the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is
lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police
report's presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to
have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report
is still admissible in evidence.
2) Even if we consider the inadmissibility of the police report
in evidence, still, respondents cannot evade liability by virtue
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
To reiterate, res ipsa loquitor is a rule of necessity which
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. The
requisites are the ff.:
(a) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(b) the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and
(c) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability
by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this
allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no
contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the
Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on
the part of respondents.
Just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the
presumption of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by
other evidence to the contrary. It is unfortunate, however,
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
that respondents failed to present any evidence before the
trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains.
3) Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid
subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced by the claim
check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation
Receipt presented by it before the trial court. Respondents,
however, claim that the documents presented by Malayan
Insurance do not indicate certain important details that would
show proper subrogation.
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all the
opportunity, but failed to object to the presentation of its
evidence. Thus, and as We have mentioned earlier,
respondents are deemed to have waived their right to make
an objection.
The rule is that failure to object to the offered
evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot,
on its own, disregard such evidence.
XXX
Note also that when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the
form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the
objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal.
Because of a party's failure to timely object, the
evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case.
Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by
any outcome arising from the offer of evidence
properly presented (ACDC v COMFAC Corp).
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the Release
of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by Malayan
Insurance are already part of the evidence on record, and
since it is not disputed that the insurance company, indeed,
paid PhP700,000 to the assured, then there is a valid
subrogation in the case at bar.
66) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA & Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corp.
KEYWORDS: collision of vessels; price quotations
PRINCIPLES: The price quotations presented as exhibits
partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the
persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses.
FACTS:
In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune
Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel, which at
the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LSC).
The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation and
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on
petitioner, private respondent sued the LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court
of First Instance of Caloocan City. Meanwhile, during the
pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had
already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.
74| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PR later sought for the amendment of its complaint on the
following grounds:
1. Original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of
the value of the lost hull;
2. Vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that,
after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should
likewise be claimed;
3. Inflation resulted to the devaluation of Philippine
peso and had affected the value of replacements,
thus there should be a reasonable determination
thereof; and
4. Due to the sinking of the vessel, PR incurred
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include
petitioner as a defendant which the lower court.
During trial, PR presented evidences: (1) testimony of its
general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario, and
(2) documentary evidence to prove actual damages:
(you can just skip this part…)
Exhibit B — a document titled "Marine Protest"
executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22,
1977 stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side
that caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 bañeras
valued at P170,000 00;
Exhibit C — a quotation for the construction of a 95-
footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A.
Magalong Engineering and Construction on January
26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of
such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
Exhibit D — pro forma invoice issued by E.D. Daclan
of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987
to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units of
CUMMINS Marine Engine model would cost
P1,160,000.00;
Exhibit E — quotation of prices issued by Scan
Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight
Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00
while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model
FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two
units would cost P145,000.00;
Exhibit F — quotation of prices issued by Seafgear
Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope would cost
P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope, P42,750.00;
one (1) binocular, P1,400.00, one (1) compass,
P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total
of P197,150.00;
Exhibit H — price quotation issued by Seafgear
Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of
400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls
of 400/18 5kts 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50
rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00,
and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P146,500 and bañera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a
total of P414,065.00.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Except for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 bañeras of
fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the
collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence
proffered by private respondent with respect to items and
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with
corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10)
years after the collision.
Petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at
PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, who testified that
the price quotations submitted by private respondent were
"excessive" and not proved by competent and admissible
evidence, and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However,
he failed to present such quotations of prices from his
suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of
the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme."
CFI – rendered its decision in favor of the PR and against the
defendant PNOC.
CA – affirmed decision of CFI in toto. It further ruled that it
was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness
because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his
knowledge and competency to identify and determine the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel
ISSUE: Whether the price quotation exhibits presented should
be admitted as evidence to prove actual damages
RULING:
NO. As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to
recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del
Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did not present any
other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in
the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We
hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
been proffered along with the testimony of the authors
thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of
the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only
to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent
incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be
admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it
was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent
evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private
respondent corporation, whatever testimony he would give
with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and
cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest
therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony
as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity
thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that
his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore,
75| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the
nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons
who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is
not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. On this point, we
believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the
exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under Section 45,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 45
of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the
same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H
are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the
category of "other published compilations" under Section
45. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned." The exhibits
mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to
Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject
matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations"
within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not
"standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of
the occupation." These are simply letters responding to the
queries of Del Rosario.
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence
but these are, however, subject to the general principles of
evidence and to various rules relating to documentary
evidence. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon
the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the
author of the letter should be presented as witness to
provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contents suspect. Accordingly, as stated at the
outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not
mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress
for the loss of its vessel. Nominal damages are awarded in
every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded. Under
Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "the adjudication of nominal
damages shall preclude further contest upon the right
involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns." Considering the
fact, however, that (1) technically petitioner sustained injury
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly
proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
decades, an award of P2,000.000.00 in favor of private
respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
67) Tan v CA
KEYWORD: “Unable to testify” – what does it mean?
PRINCIPLES: The testimony of a witness, given in a former case
between the same parties, the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be
given in evidence, when said witness is: (a) deceased; (b) out
of the Philippines; or (c) unable to testify [such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as
when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech].
FACTS:
 July 22, 1955 – petitioner, through their mother Celestina
Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Francisco
Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
acknowledgement and support, alleging respondent to be
the illegitimate father of the minors Carmelita and
Rodolfo [Civil Case 26909].
 March 26, 1956 – after petitioners had presented oral and
documentary evidence and were about to rest their case,
they moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the
ground that the parties had come to an amicable
settlement.
On the same day, Celestina Daldo subscribed before the
clerk of court an affidavit categorically stating that
respondent Francisco Tan “is not the father of my said
minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo, but another
person whose name I cannot divulge”
As prayed for by plaintiffs, on the ground of amicable
settlement between the parties, the aforementioned civil case
was dismissed by the court with prejudice.
 November 25, 1957 – one year and eight months after Civil
Case 26909 was dismissed, petitioners, this time through
their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian
ad litem, commenced the present action (Civil Case
00855) for acknowledgement and support, involving the
same parties, causes of action, and subject matter.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were
subpoenaed by the Court a number of times – these
witnesses, however, never appeared to testify.
76| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The plaintiffs presented evidence, among others,
“EXHIBIT H and I,” testimonies of plaintiffs’ witnesses in
the former case (basically, testimonies of witnesses from
Civil Case 26909 was exhibited as evidence in the present
action, Civil Case 00855).
 The Court of First Instance in Manila DISMISSED the
present case on the ground of res judicata.
 Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision was
REVERSED and a decision against respondent Francisco
Tan.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the lower
court’s decision and DISMISSED the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not EXHIBITS H and I (testimonies of
plaintiffs’ witnesses from the past case) is admissible in the
present case?
RULING:
No. The controlling statute is Section 41, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
“SECTION 41. Testimony at a former trial. – The
testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or
unable to testify, given in a former case between the same
parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party having
had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in
evidence.”
The aforesaid rule allows testimony from a former trial to be
admissible in evidence. In the present case, however, the
witnesses whose testimonies (from the former trial) were
offered into evidence, were neither dead, nor were they
outside of the Philippines. Can they then be categorized as
witnesses of the class ‘unable to testify’? The Court, in
construing this term held it to mean: “subsequent failure or
refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since
testifying at the first does not amount to inability to testify,
but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost
amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost
the power of speech.”
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only they
refused to testify – they do not come within the legal
purview of those ‘unable to testify.’ In the situation here
presented, petitioners are not bereft of remedy. They could
have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested,
punished for contempt – petitioners however failed to avail
of said remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.
EXHIBITS H and I thus being inadmissible, the instant case
must fail. The evidence for the plaintiffs fall short of the
requirement of strong and convincing evidence – such
evidence is necessary whether to prove legitimate or
illegitimate paternity and filiation, considering the
seriousness of the relationship and its far-reaching
consequences.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
68) Manliclic vs. Calaunan
PRINCIPLE: Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made
thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and
given the importance it deserves.
FACTS:
At around 6-7am, respondent Calaunan, together with
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on
board his jeep. The Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. The two vehicles collided. Respondent
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason
of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic
and Philippine Rabbit Bus Line (PRBL).
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed
that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in
the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil
case. Then, the trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of
the RTC-Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case was tried, to
bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in said case, together with
other documentary evidence marked therein.
Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan,
left for abroad and has not returned since then. Rogelio took
the stand and said that his brother, Ramos, left for Amman,
Jordan, to work. Rosalia testified that her husband, Mendoza,
left their residence to look for a job but has not returned
home yet.
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the
instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial
court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as
rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the testimonies of Ganiban,
Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case.
Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with
the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
77| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all
the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in
a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case, had no opportunity to cross-examine the 3
witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively
against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee.
Second, Petitioners contend that the documents in the
criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant
civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition.”
Lastly, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible
than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted of the charge
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries.
ISSUES:
1. WON the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the
Criminal Case should be admitted in evidence in the
Civil Case
2. WON the documents in the criminal case
should be admitted in the instant civil case because
Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or
deposition.”
3. Can Manliclic still be held liable for the
collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an
absence of negligence on his part?
RULING:
1. Yes. An objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit
but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.
In the case at bar, it is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 as a
ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. And the
fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal
case, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are still admissible
on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
And if petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban in the civil case
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that
petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. To
disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies
of Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal case and to
admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
2. Yes. Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former
case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can
be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses
that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the
same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.
3. Yes. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of. But the extinction of civil liability referred to
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
In this civil case, it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that
caused the smash up and so there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family. But due to lack of supervision of its employees,
petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
69) Ernesto Francisco vs. People
FACTS:
Jovita Rodriguez (Jovita for brevity) and her husband acquired
several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a locked
cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the
key to the cabinet inside the room. They hired Pacita Linghon
(Pacita for brevity), as one of their household helpers
sometime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the
room periodically. In May 1991, she left the employ of the
Rodriguez family.
Sometime in October, Pacita contacted his brother, Macario,
and asked him to sell some jewelries (two rings, one bracelet,
and a pair of earrings). She told Macario that a friend of hers
owned the jewelry. Macario obliged and sold them to Ernesto
Francisco (Ernesto for brevity).
After sometime Jovita found out that her jewelries were gone
and accused Pacita for stealing the same, which was then
proved by the court. Later on, Jovita filed against Ernesto
Francisco for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.
RTC ruled against him which was affirmed by the CA. Accused
then petitioned that the court erred in proving him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and that there was no sufficient
evidence to prove that he was liable for PD 1612.
ISSUE:
78| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
WON there is sufficient evidence for the accused to be liable
under PD 1612.
RULING:
No, there is no sufficient evidence to hold the accused liable
under PD 1612.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
1. a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft;
3. the accused knew or should have shown that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and,
4. there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain
for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery
or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is
not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence
adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
With respect to the first element of the crime: The
court ruled that the conviction of Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him. There is no showing that the
said decision was already final and executory when the trial
court rendered its decision in the instant case.
Anent the second element, the Court find and hold the
following:
First. Jovita’s testimony in the criminal cases against
Pacita, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four
pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in
evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a
party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is
that only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of the
trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case. Furthermore, the prosecution did not
present Pacita as witness; hence, the petitioner was not able
to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or
declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence
against a third party.
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary
investigation in the criminal case filed against Ernesto, as well
as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible
against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the
court a quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his right of
cross-examination.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that Pacita
pointed to the petitioner as the person who bought the
subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
against the petitioner. However, such testimony is admissible
only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner
as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the
policemen, that the petitioner was the one who purchased
the jewelry from her. It must be stressed that the policemen
had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more
importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo.
Fourth. The testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation of this criminal case is admissible in evidence
against the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution
and was cross-examined on his testimony during the
preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove
that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and
Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1
Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the
preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo, which is
found by the court as dubious.
During the preliminary investigation in this criminal case,
Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991, he and his sister
Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the petitioner, while
in November 1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the
petitioner. On direct examination in the court a quo, Macario
testified that he and Pacita sold the earrings to the petitioner
in May 1992. On cross-examination, Macario testified that he
and his sister Pacita went to the petitioners shop and sold the
subject jewelry on both occasions. On further cross-
examination, Macario changed his testimony anew. Further,
Macario testified during the preliminary investigation that
when he transacted with the petitioner for the second time,
he was with a friend, and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect
examination, Macario declared that in October 1991, he and
Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry contrary to his testimony
on direct examination. Such inconsistencies pertained to
material points and not merely to minor matters.
Assuming that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry
from Macario, there is no evidence on record that the
petitioner knew that they were stolen. Even Macario did not
know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that Pacita told
him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they
belonged to a friend of hers. Macario only learned, after the
case against Pacita had already been filed in court, that the
jewelry was owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform
the petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen.
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the
petitioner should have known which pieces of jewelry were
stolen. This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce
sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the said
stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and
uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were
worth P655,000. It is a well-entrenched rule that an ordinary
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry, nor may the
courts take judicial notice of the value of the same. The trial
court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods
which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a
matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of
unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts
or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving
valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the
reparation for the stolen jewelry.
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is
79| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it
can be concluded that the accused should have known that
the property sold to him were stolen; which in this case, the
prosecution failed to establish. Hence, petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
70) Gen. Avelino Razon v. Tagitis, et. al
KEYWORD: KASIM EVIDENCE (hearsay; based on an
informant) Writ of Amparo
Flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that
enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have
an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced.||| The
court reduce its rules to the most basic test of reason —
i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if
it satisfies this basic minimum test.||
FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the
World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme,
together with his student Kunnong, an IDB scholar,arrived
in Jolo by boat from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip
the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The
receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at
around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a
text message to the latter's secretary who did not know of
Tagitis' whereabouts and activities either. He then reported
Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later the respondent, Tagitis wife filed
a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA. The petition
was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP);Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG);Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
The petition alleged that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a
couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a
motor vehicle then sped away. That when Kunnong reported
the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could
have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other
groups known to be fighting against the government. And
when the wife filed a complaint with the PNP in the ARMM,
she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband was not missing but was with another woman
having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in ISSUE: Whether hearsay evidence is admissible in a petition
locating her missing husband. for writ of Amparo.{evidence whose probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the
respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
In their verified Return filed, the petitioners denied any
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction.
(the informant)}
They argued that the allegations of the petition were
incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely RULING:
based on hearsay evidence.
YES. Based on these considerations and the unique
CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS. On hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the
February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that respondent and her friends, based on the informant's letter,
Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been
efforts in resolving Tagitis' disappearance. under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands"
and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI
after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain
(relevant to the topic on hearsay evidence): In her direct
"Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
testimony, respondent pointed to two sources of
terrorism. The respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's testimonies
information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had
cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim's plain denial and his
been placed under government custody. The first was a
claim that he had destroyed his informant's letter, the critical
friend in Zamboanga Col. Ancanan, who occupied a high
piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties'
position in the military and who allegedly mentioned
conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's admitted destruction of this
that Tagitis was in good hands. (Nothing came out of this
letter — effectively, a suppression of this evidence — raises
claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs.
the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof
Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any
of what the respondent claimed. For brevity, we shall call the
information that Tagitis was in government custody.)
evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to
be the "Kasim evidence".
The second, more specific and productive source of
information was Col. Kasim, (high ranking PNP, mistaken to
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide
be a military man) whom the respondent, together with her
whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct
witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao
evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was
City. ||The respondent and Talbin testified that Kasim
due to action with government participation, knowledge
(Kasim Evidence) read to them a "highly confidential report"
or consent and that he was held for custodial
that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis"
investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was
and informed her that her husband was abducted because
never quoted to have said that the custodial
"he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for
investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim
"J.I. or Jema'ah Islamiah". The report indicated that her
evidence only implies government intervention through
husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group.
the use of the term "custodial investigation", and does
She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic
not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis' custodian.
taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel
relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a
medication. classic case of hearsay evidence — i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col.
Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and
Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other
her friends, and that he provided them information based
person not on the witness stand (the informant).
on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his
testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his To say that this piece of evidence is
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it
custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information substantively states is to acknowledge — as the
he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from petitioners effectively suggest — that in the absence of
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the
"follow up" as to its veracity. petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this
reason is no different from a statement that
the Amparo Rule — despite its terms — is ineffective, as
CA: confirmed that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that
"enforced disappearance" under the UN Declaration on the
are unavoidably present inAmparo situations,
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
respondent's testimony, corroborated by her companion,
with this intent or with the intent to make it a token
Mrs. Talbin. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report"
gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
from Col. Kasim's asset, pointing to the CIDG's involvement
promulgated to provide effective and timely
in Tagitis' abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an
remedies, using and profiting from local and
"asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim's subsequent and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
80| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim's
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
demand. investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction),
without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the
him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasim's
rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should
story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen
at least take a close look at the available evidence to
talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan,
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
— even of those usually considered inadmissible under
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao,
the general rules of evidence — taking into account the
Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we
investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task
can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In
Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did
the present case, we should at least determine whether
not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects
the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful
of the case. DICSaH
to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent
with other evidence in the case. More denials were manifested in the Returns on
the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP
The evidence about Tagitis' personal
Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the
circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He
directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and
was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a
the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these
Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a
reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report
seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo
of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of
for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong
its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP
for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day
Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts".
after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates
PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his
the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in
part, also reported negative results after searching "all
the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police
divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a person
that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for
named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent
IDB scholars. Prof. Matli later on stated that he never
and thorough research, records show that no such
accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust,
person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking
department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional
in Tagitis' personal account. Other than these pieces of
Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better
evidence, no other information exists in the records
in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported
relating to the personal circumstances ofTagitis.
the results of their directives to their units to search
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as for Tagitis.
his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
The extent to which the police authorities acted
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to
was fully tested when the CA constituted Task
be police intelligence operatives", no evidence
Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation.
negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were
Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last
again replicated during the three hearings the CA
seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 — the day he
scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
arrived in Jolo — and was never seen again.
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for
given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that
of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or
into and clarified by police investigation. It is the complicity in any abduction and said that there was no
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had
into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he
element of participation by agents of the State and thus likewise considered it premature to conclude
brings into question how the State reacted to the that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his
disappearance. custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably
did not pursue any investigation about the personal
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and
circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to
frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police
itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists
informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by
and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt
the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the
appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged
government. No evidence was ever offered on whether
IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the
there was active Jolo police investigation and how and
"assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this
why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The
nature. These omissions and negative results were
respondent's own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that
aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as
he was not missing but was with another woman
January 28, 2008 or three months after the
somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this
disappearance that the police authorities requested for
explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As
clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the
already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in
trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the
Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for
fact that he was designated as Ajirim's replacement in
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from

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EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the latter's last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then
questioned. No investigation — even an internal one —
appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity
of Col. Kasim's "asset" and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and
developments a consistency in the government's denial
of any complicity in the disappearance ofTagitis,
disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however,
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for
complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs
through these developments is the government's
dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from
the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong's initial
reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to
the respondent when she herself reported and inquired
about her husband's disappearance, and even at Task
Force Tagitis itself.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that
Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and
the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this
conclusion. For why would the government and its
officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the
intent had not been to deny what they already knew of
the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough
investigation that at least credibly determined the fate
of Tagitis be a feather in the government's cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of
enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers.
From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited
and quoted, the evidence at hand and the developments
in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a
background of consistent and unfounded government
denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as
well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of
the law — a situation that will subsist unless this Court
acts.
Disappearances Cases
These characteristics — namely, of being summary
and the use of substantial evidence as the required
level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance
of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) — reveal the clear intent of the
framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of
an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The
standard of diligence required — the duty of public
officials and employees to observe extraordinary
diligence — point, too, to the extraordinary measures
expected in the protection of constitutional rights
and in the consequent handling and investigation of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Thus, in these proceedings,
the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply
with the substance and form requirements of a Writ
82| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable
case has been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the standard
of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course,
must show that an enforced disappearance took place
under circumstances showing a violation of the victim's
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the
failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez, the
IACHR — faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez
Rodriguez' disappearance — adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule
that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government
carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances
and the specific case can be linked to that practice. The
IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced
disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and
domestic courts shows that direct
evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately
considered in reaching a
decision. Circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive
evidence is especially important in
allegations of disappearances, because
this type of repression is characterized
by an attempt to suppress all
information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the
victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of
Manfredo Velasquez (Manfredo) was carried out by
agents who acted under cover of public authority, the
IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the
hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velasquez, the victim's
sister, who described Manfredo's kidnapping on the
basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw
Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad
daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran
military official had announced that Manfredo was
kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under
orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. The IACHR
likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second
witness who asserted that he had been told by a
Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and
a third witness who testified that he had spoken in
prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is

necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an
effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the
one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and
appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation
of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-
measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is
addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the
other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary
rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the
usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings
before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule,
technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed.
Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the
evidence we shall take into account.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to

consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason — i.e.,to the relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

83| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS