EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 10179 (Formerly CBD 11-2985), March 04, 2014 ]

BENJAMIN Q. ONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the canon
of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct.

Antecedents

In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff
Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between
them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.[1] In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to
encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded
upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty.
Delos Santos' financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for the latter's Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.[2] However, the check was
dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed. [3] Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to
Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him.[4] When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty.
Delos Santos.[5] Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP Bar Commissioner

In his Commissioner's Report,[6] IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had sufficiently
established the existence of the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite notice,
and did not also present contrary evidence.[7] He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the
complainant,[8] be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment case brought against him (Lucman v.
Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).

Resolution No. XX-2013-253

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and approving the
findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr.,[9] to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years and ORDERED to RETURN the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant
with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Issue

By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty.

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral character. In this
regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is
a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.[10] The Court unwaveringly
demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose
confidence.[11] Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.[12]

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account users.[13] The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
according to Lozano v. Martinez,[14] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate
the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice
is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v. Martinez:

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.[15] xxx
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he
did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance
of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference
towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order.[16] He thereby swept aside his
Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express
commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,[17] required of him as a lawyer an enduring high sense of
responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the
practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and
keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated
to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses
upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with
others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if
such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[18]
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him whether he was
acting as such or in a non-professional capacity with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his
relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity. [19] His being a lawyer
demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.[20]

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal integrity
but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos' request
for encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the Legal Profession. The following
excerpts from Ong's testimony bear this out, to wit:

COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you were issued a bounced check by the respondent?

MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him money because actually he was not even my friend. He was just
referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to loan him money was because the sheriff told me that abogado
eto. It is his license that would be at stake that's why I lent him the money. [21]

x x x x

COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer issued a
bounced check in your favor.

MR. ONG : Yes, Commissioner.

COMM. DELA RAMA: Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?

MR. ONG : They uphold the law, they know the law. He should not have issued the check if you know it cannot
be funded because actually I have many lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for lawyers.[22]
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his dealings
with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good financial
standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead the latter
into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak well of
him as a member of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative sanction.
Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed,
and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,[23] both of which are treated as mitigating
circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the practice of law to
six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.[24]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS GUILTY of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF SIX
MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Delos Santos'
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* (Acting Chief Justice), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
 EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014 ]

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who
had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts
because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has
initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. [1] Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for
the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where "he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned."[2]

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca's motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007,[3] viz:

x x x x

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was
not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province
as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge
which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted
this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It
is the lawyer's duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the
Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.

Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29,
2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint[4] in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca's
unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext
of previous adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to
submit his comment.[5]

In his comment-complaint,[6] Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid's issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report and
recommendation.[7] Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer Merlyn D.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid). [8]

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint against
Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative
or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued
adversely to him and his clients.[9]

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:[10]

x x x x

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1)
Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases
that respondent had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A.
Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic)
out of the unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The
other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a
favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid
(RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled
by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.

OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al.,
vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for
the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca
Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady's Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A.
Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant
Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his
clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003
in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-CARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE
OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida)
The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for
lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs.
Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by
Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases against
all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the
verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons
other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against
respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the
complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in
the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent's sister member of the Bar. All these
documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member
of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court
in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation [11] finding Atty.
Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous
administrative and criminal complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on
purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,[12] the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Judge Madrid filed a petition,[13] which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon
denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.[14]

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No.
2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

I
Atty. Dealca must guard against
his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.[15]

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca's arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca's complaint against Judge Madrid has failed
our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out,[16] his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues
in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew,
therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit
should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.[17]

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.[18] The oath exhorts upon the members of
the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.[19]

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to initiate groundless, false or
unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients'
propensities to litigate,[20] so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court's duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. [21]

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. [22] Atty. Dealca's bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good
faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and
are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court's precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel 'for lack of merit', i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.[23]
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute resolutions have been
issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.[24] Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review
for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with
all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,[25] and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual
adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course indicates the Court's
agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.[26]

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issues in
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: [27]

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for
non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal
basis.

x x x x

The Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.[28] The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,[29] Article VIII of the
Constitution. The Court, through Justice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions within the
constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's
denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal's decision." It pointed
out that the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due
course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after
deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the
questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court's decision, there was a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.[30]

II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to inhibit in
order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." [31] However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely
based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. [32]

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.[33]

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

x x x x

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[34]

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not
appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned x
x x.[35] (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca's averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and
the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because
it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that
could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter's sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.[36] The latter's bare allegations of
Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility did not suffice,[37] because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer
as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,[39] we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22
and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same
offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers
found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,[40] and Canon 11, Rule 11.04[41] of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend
Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on Wellness Leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
 A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015

PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant) against Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr.
(respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1 After respondent filed his Answer2 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.3redarclaw

Factual Background

The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of
taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162,
Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.

Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant complained that Respondent
had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.

She narrates as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its resolution in
her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR CV
No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed an appeal
before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.

Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by bringing to the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to
the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before the
Court of Appeals.

Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the
Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping
the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil
Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to
delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch
153, Taguig City. Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as
a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon
10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on the
legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for
cancellation of the title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC Branch 153,
Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a
reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of
Lumberio.

With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained that the said case does not show
that herein counsel committed any act of dishonesty which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just exercising
his profession to the best of his ability.4

In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions
and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client"5 which he considered as tantamount
to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment." 6 He noted that after the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162 issued a Resolution in Civil Case No. 65147 adverse to his client, respondent filed a
barrage of cases/pleadings such as an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC ruling, a petition
for review with the Supreme Court which was denied for having been filed out of time; a petition for annulment of the
RTC judgment which was dismissed by the CA; another petition for review before this Court which was again denied;
a petition for certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon which
was dismissed for "improper venue, res judicata, and violation of the anti-forum shopping law"7 and that it involved
the same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several inhibitions, motions and an administrative
complaint against the presiding judge. The Investigating Commissioner, stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of Respondent. He as a lawyer could
have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent actions were merely meant to harass the opposing litigant as in fact
the Supreme Court had already issued its final ruling on the matter. After the ruling of the High Court, Respondent
should have known that the case had been finally adjudicated and no amount of judicial exercise could turn the
decision in his client's favor. From then on, he should have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in court, as
they are futile anyway, because he has his duty to the court above that to his client.

Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR
for which he should be meted with the appropriate administrative penalty.8

He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;

x x x x

With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal duty as a lawyer to exhaust all
legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He has not done any wrongdoing while taking such routes. He has
never been dishonest;

x x x x

4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it was not shown that he acted in bad:
faith in taking such legal remedies.

5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because complainant has other recourse available
to execute the said decision in her favor while there were petitions filed, complainant also did not allege that
respondent has abused the judicial process. The courts to which the said petitions were filed also did not cite the
respondent in contempt of court [nor was a warning] given.

xx x x

6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to undergo dialysis three (3) times in a
week. To suspend him for four months would mean that he would stop his dialysis for four moths [sic] which may
cause his immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy to see one of its members begging
for alms from PCSO and government officials to shoulder his dialysis of about P100,000.00 per month.9

In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed its earlier
Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, saying that there was no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

The Court's Ruling

While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it cannot be emphasized enough that
their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of justice."11 Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered
by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the la|wyer for the losing party should
not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and
professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The Lawyer's Oath:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

x x x x

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied)

Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
(Emphasis supplied)

Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that
obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him.12redarclaw

In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent
however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of
Judgment:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Regional Trial Court of Taguig City:

1. Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006

2. Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant

3. Motion for Early Resolution

4. Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the Court of Appeals

5. Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA

6. Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order

Court of Appeals:

1. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
 2. Motion for Reconsideration

3. Petition for Certiorari

4. Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy

Supreme Court:

1. Petition for Certiorari

2. Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order

From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was to delay the
execution of the final judgment.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal
remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie his claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil
case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum-shopping.
Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion to
cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.

In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his improper behavior and dilatory tactics.
This is not true. In her Order inhibiting herself from the case, Judge Homena-Valencia stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as acting presiding judge of this
branch only last September 2005, she does not know any of the parties from Adam. As such, she could not be inclined
to show bias in favor of one of them. She refuses, however, to be drawn into a discussion, to put it mildly, with
respondent's counsel as to her knowledge of the law.

However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from further hearing this case although the
reasons stated by the defendant are not one of those provided for in the Rules for the voluntary inhibition of a judge.

Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he, being a lawyer, is first and
foremost an officer of the court.13

In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent was rebuked for the misuse of
court processes, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the execution of the 31 July 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162, which has long attained finality.

x x x x

In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of Our judicial system. We take
exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become
final and executory. This is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.15

Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C. Ygaña17 stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of judgment or misuse court processes. Defendant and counsel are very lucky that the herein plaintiff has the patience
of Job. Should this case reach the attention of the Supreme Court, where the whole story will be known, they will have
a lot of explaining to do.18

It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing
dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the
court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the
Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of
the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.

Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do x x x.

In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes,19 this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension ranging
from six months to two years. In light of the following aggravating circumstances - multiplicity of motions and cases
filed by respondent, the malice evinced by his filing of various motions to prevent the judges and sheriff from
fulfilling their legal duties, feigned ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court, and his lack of remorse for his
actions - the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for 18 months would be commensurate to the damage and
prejudice that respondent has inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Villaruel's record as a
member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016

ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty and
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00
as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his
being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted
the check without question.3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids. Respondent
failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant
to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May
26, 2006 recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court
of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent guilty of violation
of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure
to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with
interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint;
(2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees
of P1,500.00 per hearing.11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67
(RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the
MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory. 14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this administrative
complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005,
he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he
merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did
not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means
by which to pay for the amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his
unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage.18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well
as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. 21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of
the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to
protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character" 22 which justifies either his
suspension or disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution 24 adopting and
approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and modified by the
IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law x x x."
Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the
orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the
law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to
be abated.

x x x x

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his
illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support
the Constitution and obey the laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath,
as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary
action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v.
Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent
for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and
failure to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had
shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the
foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the
Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or
private capacity.36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole. 37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., on official leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5951, July 12, 2016

JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. LORENZA A. ABION, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a verified Complaint,1 filed on January 23, 2003, complainant Jutta Krursel, a German national, charges respondent
Atty. Lorenza A. Abion with forgery, swindling, and falsification of a public document. She asks that respondent be
disbarred.2chanrobleslaw

Complainant alleges that she engaged the services of respondent to assist her in filing a case against Robinsons
Savings Bank - Ermita Branch land its officers, in relation to the bank's illegal withholding/blocking of her
account.3chanrobleslaw

In March 2002, respondent filed, on complainant's behalf, a complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank and its
officers before the Monetary Board I of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for "Conducting Business in an Unsafe and
Unsound Manner in violation of Republic Act No. 8791[.]"4chanrobleslaw

Without complainant's knowledge, respondent withdrew the complaint with prejudice through a letter 5 dated April 15,
2002 addressed to I the Monetary Board. Complainant claims that respondent forged her signature and that of a certain
William Randeli Coleman (Coleman) in the letter.6 She adds that she never authorized nor acceded to respondent's
withdrawal of the complaint.7chanrobleslaw

Complainant was further surprised to discover two (2) Special Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 2002 8 and March
24, 2002,9 which appear to have her and Coleman's signature as principals. The documents constituted respondent as
their attorney-in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts receivables, wired
remittances, hi their legal and extra legal efforts to retrieve and unblock the peso and dollar savings accounts opened
up with the Robinsons Savings Bank at its branch office at Ermita, Manila, in order for her to withdraw and to encash
all their accounts, receivables, checks, savings, remittances.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Again, complainant claims that the signatures were forged.11 She denies ever having executed a special power of
attorney for respondent.12chanrobleslaw

Complainant further alleges that on March 24, 2002, respondent filed before this Court a Complaint for "Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction with Damages[.]"13 For such services, respondent demanded and
received the following amounts on May 7, 2002:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Php
- For filing fee to the Supreme Court
225,000.00

Php
- For Sheriff's Service Fee
55,000.00

Php
- For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters
50.000.00
Php
- Total14 (Emphasis in the original)
330,000.00
Respondent failed to account for these amounts despite complainant's demands for a receipt. 15 Complainant's demand
letter16 dated June 24, 2002 for accounting and receipts was attached to the Complaint as Annex E.

Instead of providing a receipt for the amounts received, respondent allegedly presented complainant a document
purporting to be an Order17 dated May 10, 2002 from this Court's First Division, resolving the case' in complainant's
favor. The Order was purportedly signed by Atty. Virginia; R. Soriano, "Division Clerk of the First Division of the
Supreme Court."18 Complainant sought the advice of Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., who, in turn, wrote to Atty.
Virginia Ancheta-Soriano (Atty. Soriano) on July 30, 200219 inquiring about the supposed Order.20 Atty. Soriano
replied21 denying the signature as hers. She stated that the Order did not even follow this Court's format, and that, on
the contrary, the case had been dismissed.22chanrobleslaw

Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002, while she was sick and in the hospital, respondent asked for
complainant's German passportj to secure its renewal from the German Embassy.23 For this service, respondent asked
for the total amount of P440,000.00 to cover the following expenses:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 - For Processing of Travel Papers
May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 - For Additional Fee for the Travel Papers
June 3, 2002 - Php 350.000,00 - For the release of Travel Papers
as required by Atty. O. Dizon, BID
24
Php 450,000.00 [sic] (Emphasis in the original)
These sums were allegedly not properly accounted for despite complainant's demand. 25cralawred Respondent
eventually presented a purportedly renewed German passport, which complainant rejected because it was obviously
fake.26 Complainant later found out that her original German passport was in the possession of Robinsons Savings
Bank.27chanrobleslaw

Complainant avers that respondent's malicious acts warrant her removal from the roster of lawyers. 28 She adds that she
and Coleman filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a criminal Complaint29 against respondent
for the unlawful acts committed against them.30chanrobleslaw

In the Resolution31 dated February 24, 2003, this Court required respondent to file her comment.

Copies of the February 24, 2003 Resolution were subsequently served on respondent's various addresses. However,
these were returned unserved with the notations "Unclaimed," "Party Moved Out," "Moved Out," and "Party in
Manila."32 This Court requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, but respondent could still not
be found.33chanrobleslaw

In the Resolution34 dated October 10, 2011, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

On March 14, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed both parties to
appear for mandatory conference.35 However, copies of the Notice of Mandatory Conference were returned unserved
as both parties were stated to have "moved out."36chanrobleslaw

Hence, in the Order37 dated April 24, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline deemed the case submitted for
resolution on the basis of the Complaint (with attachments) filed before this Court.

In his Report and Recommendation38 dated July 6, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Peter Irving C. Corvera
recommended that respondent be disbarred for fabricating and forging Special Powers of Attorney and an order from
this Court, coupled with her exaction of money from complainant without receipt or accounting despite
demands.39 These acts are in culpable violation of Canon 1; Rule 1.01; Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.40chanrobleslaw

In the Resolution41 dated October 10, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent did hot file a motion for
reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.

On October 13, 2015, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final action under Rule 139-
B of the Rulesj of Court.42chanrobleslaw
The issue for resolution is whether respondent should be disbarred for committing forgery, falsification, and
swindling.

At the outset, we cannot ignore this Court's several attempts to serve a copy of the February 24, 2003 Resolution
(requiring respondent to file a comment on the Complaint for disbarment) on respondent at her address ion record and
at the different addresses provided by complainant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, only to be returned
unserved. On June 1, 2011, this Court requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to locate
respondent, but to no avail.43 All these circumstances reveal that either respondent was disinterested in contesting the
charges against her or she was deliberately eluding the service of this Court's Resolutions to evade the consequences
of her actions.

Respondent's willful behavior has effectively hindered this Court's process service and unduly prolonged this case.
This evasive attitude is unbecoming of a lawyer, an officer of the court who swore to "obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."44chanrobleslaw

In Stemmerick v. Mas,45 this Court held that proper notice of the disbarment proceedings was given to the respondent
lawyer who abandoned his law office after committing the embezzlement against his client.
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction
over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts.
Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was sufficient notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to him
and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad
impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they
are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. In case such change is not
duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him. 46 (Citations
omitted)
Here, respondent's apparent disregard of the judicial process cannot be tolerated. Under the circumstances, respondent
is deemed to have waived her right to present her evidence for she cannot use her disappearance as a shield against
any liability she may have incurred.

Respondent's evasive attitude is tantamount to "a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,"47 which
alone is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

We proceed to address the charges raised in the Complaint.

II

Complainant claims that respondent forged her and Coleman's signatures in two (2) documents: first, in the Special
Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 200248 and March 24, 2002;49 and second, in respondents April 15, 2002
letter50 withdrawing her complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank before the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas.

A comparison of the signature of complainant Jutta Krursel in her Complaint and Verification and Certification, on
one hand, and her contested signature in the Special Power of Attorney dated March 7, 2002, on the other, visibly
shows significant differences in the stroke, form, and general appearance of the two (2) signatures. The inevitable
conclusion is that the two (2) signatures were not penned by one person. Similarly, complainant's contested signature
under the Conforme portion in the April 15, 2002 letter of respondent clearly appears to have been forged.

Nonetheless, with respect to complainant's forged signature in Special Power of Attorney, we find no other evidence
pointing to respondent as the author of the forgery. Jurisprudence 51 creates a presumption that a person who was in
possession of, or made use of, or benefitted from ithe forged or falsified documents is the forger. However, in this
case, the facts are insufficient for us to presume that respondent forged complainant's signature.

Although the Special Power of Attorney may have been executed in respondent's favor—as it authorized her to
represent, receive, and sign papers, checks, remittances, accounts, and receivables on behalf! of complainant—her
appointment as attorney-in-fact was only in relation to complainant's "legal and extra[-]legal efforts to retrieve and
unblock [complainant's] peso and dollar savings accounts with Robinsons Savings Bank, Ermita."52chanrobleslaw

The authority given was only in furtherance of complainant's employment of respondent's legal services. There was no
allegation or proof that respondent benefitted from or used the falsified document.53 Moreover, complainant had
possession of the Special Power of Attorney, a icopy of which was attached to her Complaint. In all likelihood, the
Special Power of Attorney may not only have been known to complainant; she may have conformed to its preparation
all along.

However, the same conclusion cannot be made with regard to compiainant's forged signature in the April 15, 2002
letter. In the Verification54 attached to the letter, respondent declared under oath that she jcaused the preparation of the
letter of withdrawal of the complaint with prejudice. She declared under oath that she also caused the conforme of her
clients after informing them of the facts, both as counsel and attorney-in-fact.

Thus, respondent committed serious acts of deceit in: (1) withdrawing the complaint with prejudice, without the
knowledge and consent of complainant; and (2) forging complainant's signature or causing her signature to be forged
in the April 15, 2002 letter, thus making it appear that complainant conformed to the withdrawal of the complaint.

In Sebastian v. Calis:55
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an
attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law.56 (Citations omitted)
Respondent's deception constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a breach of her fiduciary duty to her
client, subjecting her to disciplinary action.57chanrobleslaw

III

Furthermore, we agree with the Committee on Bar Discipline's fmding that complainant has sufficiently proven her
allegations regarding the falsified order.

The appearance of the purported May 10, 2002 Order58 in G.R. No. 152946 is markedly different from the orders and
resolutions of this Court. Indeed, it was later confirmed through the letter 59 issued by Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court of
the First Division, that there was no such order issued, that the signature there was not hers, and that the format did not
follow this Court's format.

Complainant avers that she paid substantial amounts of money to respondent in relation to the filing of the complaint
for injunction in G.R. No. 152946, though respondent did not issue any receipt or accounting despite her demands.
Instead, respondent allegedly furnished complainant with the fabricated May 10, 2002 Order purportedly ruling in her
favor. Complainant later found out that no such order existed. The case was already dismissed.

Respondent's acts amount to deceit, malpractice, or gross misconduct in office as an attorney. 60 She violated her oath
to "do no falsehood"61 and to "conduct [her] self as a lawyer . . . with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to; [her]
clients."62 She also violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

. . . .

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
. . . .

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

. . . .

CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

. . . .

CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

. . . .

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his elient informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
Respondent's transgressions are grave and serious. She abused her legal knowledge and training. She took undue
advantage of the trust reposed on her by her client. Her misconduct exhibits a brazen disregard of her duties as a
lawyer. The advocate for justice became the perpetrator of injustice.

Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Arty. Soriano's career in jeopardy by fabricating an order,
thus making a mockery of the judicial system. That a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court cannot be overemphasized. She owes the courts of justice and its judicial officers utmost respect. 63 Her conduct
degrades the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial system. She inexorably besmirched
the entire legal profession.

In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,64 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule
7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."65 Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer's
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the
respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of
the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.66 (Citations omitted)
Respondent's unethical and unscrupulous conduct proves her unworthy of the public's trust and confidence. She
shamelessly transgressed all the things she swore to uphold, which makes her unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
Hence, we find no hesitation in removing respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

However, we find a dearth of evidence to support complainant's claim as to the amounts demanded and received by
respondent, that is: (1) a total of P330,000.00 in relation to G.R. No. 152946; and (2) a total of P440,000.00 for the
renewal of complainant's passport. The demand letter dated June 24, 2002, attached to the Complaint as Annex E, is
not competent proof of the actual amounts paid to and received by respondent. The demand letter does not contain the
date when the addressee received the letter; this produces doubt as to whether the demand letter was actually
sent/delivered to respondent.

In administrative cases, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove, by substantial evidence, 67 the allegations in
the complaint.68chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Arty. Lorenza A. Abion GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Lorenza A. Abion from the Roll of Attorneys.

This Resolution is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against respondent.
The Legal Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to file the appropriate criminal charges
against respondent!for falsifying an order of this Court.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., on official leave.