Phil Society v.

Commission on Audit
G.R. NO.169752 2007-09-05 Austria-Martinez, J.

Art. II Sec. 1 Lozares L.

Petitioner: Philippine Society for the Respondent: Commission on Audit
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Recit Ready Summary:

The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act
No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the
time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The
mandate of the Phil Society, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating
to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and
generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of
animals and promote their welfare. The nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity is
distinguished from the sociedad anonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce and that the
original corporate law was not yet in existence at the time of the enactment of Act. 1285. The
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal
welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. It is for the purpose of
enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of
animals.
However, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 148. Immediately thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 63 dated November 12, 1936 which directs the Commissioner of Public Safety, the
Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, every
Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and organize special members
of the police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute
offenders against the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent Commission on Audit (COA) visited the
office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey pursuant to COA Office Order No. 2003-051
dated November 18, 2003 addressed to the petitioner. The petitioner demurred on the ground
that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of
the Constitution which specifies the general jurisdiction of the COA.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner as public entity subject to an audit by COA

Rationale:

The court agrees that the charter test cannot be applied to the petitioner. The charter test
provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or
private in nature is simple.
Since the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution, it subsequently follows that
the test cannot applied to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285,
enacted on January 19, 1905. It is a general rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided; (2)
remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others. None of the exceptions
apply in the instant case.

The following are the arguments that PSPCA is a private entity.

1) The petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency
of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner.
2) The PSPCA is exempted from taxes;
3) The employees are registered and covered by the SSS, not the GSIS;
4) PSPCA does not receive any form of financial assistance from the government.
The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private
corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63,
issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of
the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest "corrected a serious defect"
in one of the laws existing in the statute books.
The respondents contend that the petitioner is a "body politic" because its primary purpose is to
secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good.
However, it is incorrect because The PSPCA is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private
domestic corporation. These are private corporations created for public benefit. Example of
these corporations are Universities/Colleges, water concessionaires, private hospitals, and
transportation companies.
Therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter's
own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces,
chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the
State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared that the PSPCA is a private domestic corporation not subjected to
the jurisdiction COA. The PSPCA is subjected under the jurisdiction of SEC.