Republic of the Philippines gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
14 It explained that, based on his
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and
"the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4
February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from
the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who
called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice
of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that
petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that
he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake
of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as
it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt
of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is
in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the
conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining
thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and
the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the
views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of
as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to
the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for
the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as
Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability
and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to
Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as
well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on
Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly
of local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor
restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration
of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional
— hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on
Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of
law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is
far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body;
no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the
most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court,
in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a
proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power
to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment
of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject
in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
 For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration
has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2)
greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of
the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and
services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession;
and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to
its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are
envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal
Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored
public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled
by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers
from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45
per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it,
and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single
local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the
13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80
per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All these clearly
indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration
of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with
the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
 EN BANC
B.M. No. 793 July 30, 2004
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY.
LEON G. MAQUERA.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same
sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision covering this case's central issue. Up to this
juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,1 the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2)
years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in
Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics
Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for
comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.3 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a
foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his
disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an
act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa
recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera's case since the
documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases
for Maquera's suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether
Maquera's acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.4
Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,5 the Bar Confidant
sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified
copies of the record of the disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him.6
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's case from the District Court of
Guam on December 8, 1997.7
Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP's receipt
of the case records.8
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission
on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998.9 However, the notice was returned unserved because
Maquera had already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave
any forwarding address.10
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and
its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law
within the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full.11
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's
property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.12
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente,
the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera
served as Castro's counsel in said case. Castro's property subject of the case, a parcel of land,
was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro,
however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of
redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the
aforesaid period.13
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.14
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's legal services in the civil case
involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter.15
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente
US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the
property transferred in his name.16
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).17
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings
regarding Maquera's alleged misconduct.18
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that
Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.519 and 1.8(a)20 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed
that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further
alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8
(a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and
are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing.21
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for a period of two 2 years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of
suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of
the property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3)
required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also
recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to
disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam.22
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was
oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that
the transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client
relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his
legal services to Castro.23
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision24 suspending Maquera from
the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-
State Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that
the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely
terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castro's right of redemption
to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the
eventual transfer of Castro's property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs
with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro
amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his
admission during the hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model
Rules regarding business transactions between an attorney and his client "in a very general
sort of way."25
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although
the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines." 26 However, the IBP still resolved
to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since
1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.27
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a
foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended
by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts, namely: acquiring by
assignment Castro's right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case
where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption;
and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the
standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute
grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising
the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal
services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 149128 prohibits the
lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the litigation
handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492,29 the prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public
policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that
case, the attorney acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was acting as
counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the
sale was made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his
services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's acquisition of the property of his clients under the
circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
…Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses
driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's
behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an
 attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the
client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both".32 present.38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of
membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's acquisition of Castro's right of default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent
redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property member from the Roll of Attorneys.39
for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera
charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from
of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave
property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his
date when the right of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in
Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law
in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's personal record in the Office of
trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.33
SO ORDERED.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension
from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment
in the Philippines. Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which
led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. 35 Likewise, the judgment of the Superior
Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a
lawyer.36 More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to
defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an
investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.
Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against
him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to
appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.37

The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf
regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he
did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus,
there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that
another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through
this Resolution), may be sent to him.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109149 December 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial,
the judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A
person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect contempt of
court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than nine
(9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin,
Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the
medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied
committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her
playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision 2 finding appellant guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another amount for costs,
without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the
cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
6127, as amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full
duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be
credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 In his brief, 4 appellant made the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF
HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW
AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve
the issue of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C.
Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct
examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured
the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C.
Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar
Confidant confirmed this fact. 5 Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact
that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due
process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said
person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in
general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner." However, the right
of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper than the
question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where the
interplay of basic rights of the individual may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we
need a professional learned in the law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused by
all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a
similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 In Delgado, petitioner and two others
were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or official
documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her co-
accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of
the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the
assailed judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that —
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional
Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger
that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering
the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process. 7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was
represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorney's Office, the Court has
ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively
accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420,
April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers
for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having fallen much too
short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can
do no less where the accused was not even duly represented by a certified member of the
Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his representation might have been.
is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment,
but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public
trust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 13 a
Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet taken
his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the unauthorized practice of
law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court
for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong
in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo
City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to
report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this, order. Let
all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of
this Decision for their appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly. 8 Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 9 The right of an
accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where
the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. 10 Such a right
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person
must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. 11

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2)
of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial to be
present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to
the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests
the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to the Supreme
Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice
law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all
applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice law
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and
one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued
a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment
on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also
told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.
He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which]
makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is
no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is
not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration
of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED
 SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the
application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject
to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of
the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election
upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a)
the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27,
1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when
a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years
was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
 4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to
vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority"
are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge
had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to
by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved
by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made
on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels
as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
 And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married
to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are
very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment
of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it
was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he
came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot
be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is
an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain
us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time
he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has
only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED

EN BANC
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he
was directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course
within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations."
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court
disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations
null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of
completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999
Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit
to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the
1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School
(PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course
since 1967.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was
denied.
On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of
petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of
27 November 2001 "noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no
further pleadings will be entertained."
On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons
why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and
regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22
July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.
Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in
and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a
"self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a
deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood."
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his
signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A.
Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations,"
petitioner admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the
information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe
had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the
school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.
Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take
the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review
as Annex "D" of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review
course in UST.
To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his
payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to
the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST that
petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the review course; (e) separate affidavits
of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the
review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance
of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST
Faculty of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST Law
Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who would arrive early
and request her to open the reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes
started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law,
that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner
was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started
on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the
pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he
thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D"
of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but
also his completion of the pre-bar review course.
In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru
Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee
on Bar Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that
his son took the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his son’s Petition that he
took it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was
really a falsehood and forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have
been a fatal defect, why then was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations?
Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing
on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from
petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.
On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
"Considering petitioner’s explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in
support thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the
doubt.
The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said
case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath.
In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave
Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8,
1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual
knowledge of his conviction.
In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer’s Oath, the Court stated, thus:
‘It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer’s oath.
Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to
do some introspection.’
In his letter, petitioner’s father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his son’s request
for oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have
unwittingly committed.
It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar
Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may
be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any
crime.
As regards petitioner’s failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of
completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to
submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified
not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth.
Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the
Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also
Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their
failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the examinations the certification of
completion of the pre-bar review course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20,
2000, acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April
13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both were allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was
due to his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review
course, had filed the required certification together with other required documents, was
accepted.
In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the
60-day period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment
and attendance was arequired, was likewise accepted.
The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit
within the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially
complied with the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought
that the required certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the
certificate of enrollment and attendance in the said course.
The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner’s explanation should also be given credit just like
his three co-examinees.
Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas
Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal
Education which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness,
equal treatment and protection, considering that his co-accused in a criminal case have been
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27,
2001, that there was no reason to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the
dispensation of justice should be even-handed and consistent."
The recommendation is well taken.
The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-
bar review course in UST as he herein avows.
The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject
Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the
Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence
showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.
Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of
the pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to
petitioner considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is,
the fact remains that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be
genuine. This finding is backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of
Civil Law, that she was the one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.
Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of
the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by
petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST,
not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the
"taking and completion" of the pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render
it difficult to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day for several
months.

Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very

least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.

The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and
kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioner’s father pleaded
that "the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should
be enough penalty." It is time to move on.

At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern over the apparent laxity of
law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed
that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able
to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar
review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who
failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.

For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be
done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it
is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its
Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and
986 is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar
Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar.
He is further allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1179 January 8, 1913
In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar.
Mario Guariña in his behalf.
CARSON, J.:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing
as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or
associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the
city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of
Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice
law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said
court."
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this applicant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the
face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required
qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on
that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds
the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment
to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination, the clause "may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without and examination" should
be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in the Philippine Islands without
an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de
jure to have the power exercised.
It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly to the provisions of local law
touching this matter, the contentions of the applicant would have great weight . For it is well
settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where such
construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock
Island County Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says:
The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that where power is given to
public officers, in the language of the Act before us, or in equivalent language,
whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language
used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered
to do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not for
their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depository to meet the demands of
right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to
invoke its aid, who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that the
intent of the Legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but
to impose a positive and absolute duty.
Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or
merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from the
apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language
of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed
in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of
the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it should be given a
mandatory effect. (Colby University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas
Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128
Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs. Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168;
People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953, 956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24
S.W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.)
Applying these canons of construction to the statute under consideration, and limiting
ourselves strictly to the provisions of local law touching the admission of candidates to the bar,
we might, as we have said, be inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect which applicant
claims should be placed upon it. But we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded
by the provisions of the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902, which confirm and secure to this
court the jurisdiction theretofore conferred upon it. Section 9 of that Act is as follows:
That the Supreme Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of
said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal
courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and
amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the compensation
heretofore prescribed by the Commission until otherwise provided by Congress. The
judges of the Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil Governor, by and
with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That the
admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance shall not be
changed except by Act of Congress.
Prior to the passage of this Act the power and jurisdiction of this court in relation to the
admission of candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had been fixed by the provisions
of the Organic Act (No. 136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as we
understand these provisions this court was vested thereby with authority, and charged with a
duty to pass upon the "moral character" and the "qualifications and ability" of all candidates
for admission to the bar.
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are as follows:
(Act No. 136.) "SEC . 2. Constitution of judiciary. — The judicial power of the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of
First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with such special
jurisdictions of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as now are or hereafter
may be authorized by law. The two courts first named shall be courts of record.
(Act No. 136.) "SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court shall be of two kinds:
1. Original; and
2. Appellate.
SEC. 17. Its original jurisdiction. — The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure,
and to hear and to determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other
cases provided by law.
(Act No. 190.) "SEC. 13. Who may practice as lawyers. — The following persons, if
not specially declared ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing
as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Code;
2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein prescribed.
SEC. 14. Qualifications of applicants. — Any resident of the Philippine Islands, not a
subject or citizen of any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three years, of
good moral character, and who possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability, is entitled to admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and to
practice as such in all their courts.
SEC. 15. Certificate of good character required. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must produce the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character, and must satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all the
codes of law and procedure in force in the Philippine Islands, and upon such other
branches of legal learning as the Supreme Court by general rule shall provide. . . .
SEC. 16. Place and manner of examinations. — Such examinations shall be conducted
at Manila, by the judges of the Supreme Court or by a committee of competent
lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall be held at such times as the judges of
the court shall provide by general or special rules.
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any Act of the Commission
which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
The Act of Congress was the creator of the Commission and indeed of the Government of these
Islands, which is the creature of its creator. Its powers are defined, prescribed and limited by
the Act which created it, and by such other lawful acts of its creator as may further define,
prescribe, limit or expand these powers. It cannot lawfully transcend or infringe upon the limits
thus prescribed, and any Act of the Commission repugnant to the Act of Congress which
created it, or which is repugnant to any other lawful Act of its creator defining, prescribing or
limiting its authority is void and invalid. The various Acts of Congress conferring power upon
the Philippine Legislature, and defining, prescribing and limiting this power, especially the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that Legislature in the nature of an organic act with its
amendments, binding on it in like manner as is the Constitution of the United States upon
Congress itself.
In the great case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 175), the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall, laid down the doctrine in this regard
which has been followed by that court unhesitatingly ever since. In that case the court held
that an Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law, and that the courts
of the United States are bound to take notice if the Constitution.
Applying the reasoning of that case to the question of the validity of an Act of the Philippine
Commission enacted since the date of the passage of the Philippine Bill which is found to be in
conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress dealing with the same subject matter, and
especially with the provisions of the Philippine Bill itself, we think there can be no doubt as to
the result. The Act of the Commission in so far as it is in conflict with or in any wise repugnant
to the various Acts of Congress dealing with the same subject matter must be held to be void
and of no effect. Paraphrasing slightly the language used in the early case of
Kemper vs. Hawkins (1 Va. Cases, 20-24), it may be said that the Acts of the Congress of the
United States are to the Commission, or rather to all the departments of the Philippine
Government, what a law is to individuals; nay, they constitute not only a rule of action to the
various branches of the Government, but it is from them that the very existence of the power
of the Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts of Congress that the powers (or portions
of the right to govern) which may have been committed to this Government are prescribed.
The Act of Congress was the Commission's commission; nay, it was its creator.
Section 9 of the Act of Congress, set out above, placed it beyond the power of the local
Legislature to deprive this court of the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it; leaving
however, to local legislative authority the right to confer additional jurisdiction, or to change
the practice and method of procedure. The above-cited provisions of Act No. 190, in force at
the time when the Act of Congress was enacted, conferred upon this court the power and
jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar unless, in addition to certain other
prescribed conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in the
law, by passing an examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the
Commission, while it was undoubtedly authorized to modify the provision requiring the
holding of examinations under general rules (that being merely the prescribed mode of
procedure whereby the court was required to ascertain the qualifications of the candidate),
had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny admission to any candidate who
fails to satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar of the
Philippine Islands.
In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give
it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute
is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we
think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the
legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in
violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two
possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the
contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his
authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law.
Black on Interpretation of Laws at page 87 says: "In construing a doubtful or ambiguous
statute, the courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. The construction should be
in harmony with this assumption whenever possible."
The same author, at pages 93 and 94, says: "Hence it follows that the courts will not so
construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an
interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect,
if this can be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of
the legislature, if the words of provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is
fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will
avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed."
Without undue straining of the language used in the statute under consideration, the word
"may" may be construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to construe it as
mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we conclude
therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the
legislator, that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that the true
intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar
without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is
otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications.
Ordinarily, and in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it may fairly be assumed that an
applicant who has held one of the offices mentioned in the statute, and who, prior to his
appointment, had been admitted to the practice of law in the courts of these Islands under the
former sovereign or in some other jurisdiction is duly qualified for admission to the bar of these
Islands. In the case In re Du Fresne (20 Phil. Rep., 488, 492), speaking of the provisions of this
Act, we said:
Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No. 1597 are made either by the
President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or
by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands by and with the advice and consent
of the Philippine Commission, and the legislator evidently conceived that the fact
that such an appointment is made is a sufficient guaranty that after due inquiry the
appointee has been found to be possessed of at least the necessary qualifications
for admission to the bar.
In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments
had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient
in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application
for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial
fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a
committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general
rule. So ordered.

RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. —
Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members
of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular
standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be
allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice
of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission
who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of
the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest
court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory
certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice
began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the
discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other
than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and
successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved
and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by
a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and
further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed
the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political
law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science,
logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with
the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen
(15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of
this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by
section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the
fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked,
and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time
their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by
the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at
least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4
of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and
Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public
Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial
Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions
shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to
each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it
will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow
such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall
be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names
on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines
shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated
by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as
follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation
(afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile
Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of
bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a
Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the
court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold
office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published
in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of
the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other
nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any
other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a
failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may
be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the
subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent;
Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per
cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per
cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February
15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall
file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the
committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest,
after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they
show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year
review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule
shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the
subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in
the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member
of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that
effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of
court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his
certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged;
 (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every
defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney
who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully
appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance
in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by
the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard
such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court,
on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full
compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained
by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of
the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall
not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of
First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt
of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the
attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear
and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the
duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom
by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be
provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de
oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this
rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any
case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One
hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies
other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or
other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government
of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in
any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the
purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court
to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of
his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment
of his just fees and disbursements.