League of Provinces of the Philippines v.

DENR
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as
unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code
of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent
Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the
Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing
for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits amounts to
executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the
Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of
small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the
Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-
Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government
authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to
the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments
of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions
thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no
doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and
Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the
Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary
under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide
the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended
by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights
of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A.
No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations
over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of
judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
Province of Batangas vs Romulo

FACTS:

In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-
99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the
portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked
for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

HELD:

Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding”
of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes
supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order
his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are
followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the
“just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to
perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall bereleased to them “without need of further action“. To subject
its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate. The only
possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections
for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not
apply in this case.

The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert
the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs. Congress may amend any of the provisions of
the LGC but only through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation. A general
appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a
specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit –any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is
considered an “inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters
of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would
unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within
30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The
President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the
Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount of
P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA,
which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can
be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies,
namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount
of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the
occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at
bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against
respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit,
challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by
petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the
GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by
10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the effectivity of
the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case,
it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of
automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the
revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the
allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than
making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to
the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon
the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the
government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to
withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the President or any member of the
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in
the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing
this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided
it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is
patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA
conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the
words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized
by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held
in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the
preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of
the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the
actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to
“lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must
be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby
declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

Lagcao vs. Labra G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

Eminent Domain
FACTS:

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by
squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented,
Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC
issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a
socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their
property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use
contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people.

ISSUE:

What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in this case?

RULING:
It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent.

No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain should be a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing
at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site
of a socialized housing project.

It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction
against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition
on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for
a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which
the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160
and RA 7279.
MASIKIP vs PASIG G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006 Power of Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Genuine Necessity
FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig
City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion
of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive.

Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation,
ISSUE:

Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?

RULING:

The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council,
the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended
beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility
for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents
of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private
property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown
to exist.