FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. and FAIRWAYS AND
It later emerged that
BLUE-WATERS RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., Petitioners, v. HON. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-
VALENCIA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, and
SULLIAN SY NAVAL, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 173942
October 15, 2007]
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the
reversal of the rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61567 involving the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari wherein petitioners assailed
the Decision dated 28 February 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1, Kalibo,
Aklan1 in Civil Case No. 5626.
We begin with the salient facts.
The case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of
possession dated 5 November 1998 filed by private
respondent Sullian Sy Naval (Naval) against
petitioners Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (Fil-Estate) and
Fairways and Blue-Waters Resort and Country Club
Inc. (Fairways). Naval alleged that she was the
registered owner of a 1,000-square meter parcel of
land located in Barangay Yapak, Malay, Aklan and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
22944.2 This lot as admitted by petitioners is situated
within the vicinity of Holes 12 and 13 of the Fairways
and Bluewaters Golf and Country Club, a golf course
owned by Fairways and developed by Fil-Estate.
According to the complaint, petitioners took
possession of the subject property and constructed
thereon a portion of the golf course without Naval's
consent. Despite written demands, petitioners
refused to vacate the property. This prompted Naval
to file the complaint, seeking the recovery of
possession of the property and rentals for the use
thereof, as well as actual damages plus moral and
exemplary damages "of at least P500,000.00."
Petitioners filed an answer3 wherein they alleged
that Naval had purchased the subject lot from Divina
Marte Villanueva (Villanueva) with whom they
entered into a joint venture agreement for the
development into a golf course of several parcels of
land owned by Villanueva.
Villanueva had previously sold said parcels of land to
third persons, one of whom was Naval. Thus,
Villanueva assured petitioners that she would
convince Naval and the other previous buyers to
swap the lots they had bought from her for lots of
equal size within a subdivision that was to be
developed adjacent to the golf course. While several
buyers did agree to the swap, Naval held out. The
impasse did not constrain petitioners from
developing the golf course and later commencing its
operations. Petitioners did manifest though in their
answer that they "took pains to exclude
development work on the said lot as there is no
definitive agreement yet between [the parties]
concerning the same."4
The answer was filed for petitioners by Atty. Alfredo
Lagamon, Jr., then employed as an in-house
corporate legal counsel for petitioners. Pre-trial was
set for 16 July 1999, with notice thereof received by
Atty. Lagamon, Jr. eight days prior. However, on 12
July 1999, Atty. Lagamon, Jr. filed a motion for
postponement, wherein it was adduced that he had
already tendered his resignation as corporate legal
counsel for petitioners effective 15 July 1999 and
thus, the prayer for postponement of the pre-trial to
a later date. Accordingly, pre-trial was reset to 27
September 1999, with notice thereof served on Atty.
Lagamon, Jr. However, nobody appeared for
petitioners on the new pre-trial date. Hence, the RTC
issued an order setting the date for presentation of
Naval's evidence as plaintiff. At the trial, only Naval
presented evidence on her behalf.
On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a
decision5 in favor of Naval, ordering petitioners to
restore to her possession the subject property. The
trial court cited Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as bases for allowing
Naval to present evidence ex parte in view of
petitioners' non-appearance at the pre-trial. It
concluded that petitioners had indeed illegally
occupied the subject property from the start of the
construction of the golf course. Thus, the RTC
ordered petitioners to pay monthly rentals
amounting to P50,000.00 from April 1997 to October
1998, and P70,000.00, compounded by a 20%
increase per annum thereafter until possession is
restored to Naval. In addition, Naval was awarded
the sum of P261,177.75 as "attorney's fees and other
compensatory damages," P3,000,000.00 as moral
damages and another P3,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Petitioners apparently received a copy of the
decision on 27 April 2000.6 Thirteen days later, on 10
May 2000, they filed before the RTC a motion for
reconsideration, later followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration. Both motions were
prepared for petitioners by Atty. Edgar B. Uytiepo.
These motions recounted that Atty. Lagamon, Jr., on
whom notice of pre-trial and other succeeding
processes were served in behalf of petitioners, had
already resigned effective 15 July 1999. Thus, the
subsequent trial held without their participation
violated their right to due process. The RTC in an
order dated 26 July 2000 pointed out, among others,
that Atty. Lagamon, Jr. had never formally
withdrawn his appearance and that the service of
subsequent orders and notices at his given address
at Renaissance Bldg., Meralco Avenue, Pasig City,
which was the same address as petitioners,' was
sufficient notice to petitioners.7
Petitioners received a copy of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 11 August
2000.8 Through Atty. Uytiepo, they filed a notice of
appeal on the same day. However, they did not pay
the docket fees contemporaneously with the filing of
the notice. Instead, they obtained the postal money
orders covering the docket fees from the Bacolod
City post office only on 25 August 2000, or outside
the reglementary period to appeal which, according
to the RTC, expired on 13 August
2000.9 Consequently, in an order dated 13
September 2000, the RTC denied the appeal of the
petitioners and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment of the court.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari assailing the 13 September
2000 order of the RTC disallowing the notice of
appeal, as well as its earlier decision and order
denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals, in a decision10 promulgated on 26 March
2004, reiterated the rule that full payment of docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory and
non-compliance therewith is cause for the dismissal
of the appeal. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision proved unsuccessful;
hence, the present petition.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
"rigidly and perfunctorily" sustaining the dismissal of
their appeal on account of their failure to timely pay
the requisite docket fees, as they rely instead on the
liberal application of procedural rules in their favor.
They contend that prior to its amendment in 2000,
Section 13 of Rule 41 had originally provided only
one ground for the dismissal of appeal by the trial
court which is that the appeal was "taken out of
time," adding that it was only with the adoption of
A.M. 00-2-10-SC that the rule was amended to
include the non-payment of docket fees among the
grounds for the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners
admit that the amendment took effect on 1 May
2000, or around three (3) months before the subject
incidents had transpired, yet they claim that such
amendment was "a very recent or novel
development" which their former lawyer, or even
the respondent judge, might not have been aware of
at the time the notice of appeal was filed. They
further point out that the rule respondent judge had
cited in dismissing the appeal is Section 4, Rule 41,
which required the payment of the full amount of
the appellate court docket fees within the period for
taking an appeal. Said rule, petitioners say, did not
grant the trial court authority to dismiss the appeal
on the ground of late payment of the appellate
docket fee.
Petitioners likewise cite arguments concerning the
imputed violation of their right to due process by the
RTC when it proceeded to receive Naval's evidence
ex parte, as well as in view of the "excessive"
damages awarded in favor of Naval and the alleged
disastrous effects on the golf course should the RTC
decision be finally executed. These arguments
though cannot merit the attention of this Court
unless petitioners first overcome the jurisdictional
barrier caused by the non-perfection of their appeal
from the RTC decision. It is a serious complication of
petitioners' own making which they are unable to
untangle.
According to petitioners' analysis of the Rules, it was
only with the adoption of A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC,
amending Section 13 of Rule 41 effective 1 May
2000, that it became obligatory on the part of the
trial courts to dismiss appeals on account of the
failure to pay the full docket fees. The argument is
self-defeating given the fact that petitioners' failure
to pay the requisite docket fees on time precisely
occurred after the amendments had taken effect. It
has somehow persuasive effect only to the extent
that the requirement might have been new and
hardly intuitive at the time it applied to petitioners in
August of 2000. Yet the argument, if considered, is
ultimately erroneous and baseless. The dismissal of
the appeal as the inevitable aftermath of the late
payment of the appellate docket fee has been
mandated since the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, with Section 4 of Rule 41 in
connection with the old Section 13, Rule 41 covering
the situation.
The old Section 13 provided that "the trial court
may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal
for having been taken out of time." Petitioners may
be correct in stating that under the old rule, there
was only one provided ground for the dismissal of
the appeal ─ that it was "taken out of time." Yet
Section 4 also provides for a rule that helps delineate
how exactly an appeal is timely taken. The rule,
which incidentally was cited as the basis for the
RTC's dismissal of the notice of appeal, states in full:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other fees. ─
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant
shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal.
It bears further notice that had the RTC anyway
allowed the notice of appeal, Section 1(c) of Rule 50
of the 1997 Rules would have authorized the Court
of Appeals to also dismiss the appeal on account of
the non-payment of the docket fees within the
period for taking an appeal.
Taking into account all of these provisions, the Court
has consistently upheld the dismissal of an appeal or
notice of appeal for failure to pay the full docket fees
within the period for taking the appeal. Time and
again, this Court has consistently held that the
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal.
Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory.11
In Enriquez v. Enriquez,12 we illustrated at length the
scope and history of the requirement laid down in
Section 4, Rule 41.
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate court
docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of
an appeal. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that although an appeal fee is required to be
paid in case of an appeal taken from the Municipal
Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under
Sections 20 2 and 23 3 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983
implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are
only two requirements for the perfection of an
appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial court of a
notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and
(b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997, now
require that appellate docket and other lawful fees
must be paid within the same period for taking an
appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of
Section 4, Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "(W)ithin
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees."
The use of the word "shall" underscores the
mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is
a word of command, and one which has always or
which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
generally imperative or mandatory. Petitioners
cannot give a different interpretation to the Rule and
insist that payment of docket fee shall be made only
upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to
pay. For it is a rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be interpreted together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot
deviate from the Rule.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to
the Court of Appeals from a case decided by the RTC
in the exercise of the latter's original jurisdiction,
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Such appeal is made by filing a notice thereof with
the court that rendered the judgment or final order
and by serving a copy of that notice upon the
adverse party. Furthermore, within this same period,
appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. The payment of docket fee within
this period is mandatory for the perfection of appeal.
Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to
act on the subject matter of the action, and the
decision sought to be appealed from becomes final
and executory.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
payment of docket fee within the prescribed period
is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory.13
We have upheld the dismissal of such deficient
appeals even when the incidents preceded the
amendment of Section 13, Rule 41, as in such cases
as Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,14 Chan v. Court of
Appeals,15 Oriental Assurance Corp. v.
Solidbank,16 Manalili v. De
Leon,17 La Salette College v. Pilotin,18 Navarro v.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,19 Saint Louis
University v. Cordero,20 M.A. Santander Construction
v. Villanueva,21 and Tamayo v. Tamayo.22 Tellingly, in
all these cited cases, the dismissal of the appeals or
notices of appeal was undertaken prior to the
amendment of Section 13, Rule 41 in 2000.
That circumstance certainly undercuts petitioners'
claim that it was only upon the effectivity of that
amendment that trial courts were compelled to
dismiss notices of appeal if the full payment of
appellate docket fees was not made within the
period to take the appeal. After all, Section 4 of Rule
41, in conjunction with the old Section 13 of the
same Rule, already authorizes such dismissal. The
2000 amendment, which added the clause "or for
non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period," did not introduce a
novel ground for dismissal, but only made clear what
was already a logical consequence of Section 4, Rule
41.
Notwithstanding the catena of cases we had earlier
cited, there are, admittedly, exceptions to the
general rule on the timely payment of appellate
docket fees which are also embodied in
jurisprudence. The petition adverts to two of these
cases which were decided under the ambit of the
1997 Rules, MCIAA v. Mangubat23 and Ayala Land v.
Carpo,24 and there are indeed others, such as
Yambao v. Court of Appeals,25 Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,26 Alfonso v. Andres,27 and Villamor v. Court
of Appeals.28 Yet a common thread in all of said
cases is an exceptionally meritorious reason why the
appellate docket fees in the cases were not timely
paid. In MCIAA, Alfonso and Villamor, the notices of
appeal were filed therein less than a month after the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which had instituted appellate docket fees in lieu of
the old appeal bond. Hence, the appropriate finding
then that "the changes introduced by the 1997 Rules
of Civil procedure were yet novel, and even judges
and lawyers needed time to familiarize themselves
with the rules' intricacies." In Yambao, the non-
payment of the full docket fees was caused by the
erroneous assessment thereof by the RTC Clerk of
Court, whereas in Buenaflor, the postal money
orders used to pay the docket fees were erroneously
addressed to the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
In their supplemental reply, petitioners cite the
recent decision in Villena v. Rupisan29 where the
appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after the
lapse of the period to appeal. The Court therein did
uphold the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the
trial court's denial of the notice of appeal. The
appellants in Villena explained that their failure to
timely pay the docket fees was on account of their
avowed poverty, a justification of a somewhat
differing variety from those above-cited. Still, Villena
cannot apply as precedent in this case, or indeed as
a super-precedent that cleanses any tardiness
accompanying the payment of appellate docket fees.
At most, it adds to the exceptions, rather than
establishes a new general rule. It bears notice that in
Villena, the Court affirmed the exercise of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals, which had opted
for a liberal application of the Rules, since such
exercise of discretion did not constitute an error of
law as is clear from the ample precedents allowing
for such liberal construction.
In contrast, the option in this case on the part of the
Court of Appeals to apply what is the clear general
rule as established in the Rules did not constitute a
reversible error of law that would impel us to
reverse. Villena may stand as a more appropriate
precedent in cases acknowledging no reversible
error when the appellate court chooses to liberally
apply the rules and allow belatedly perfected
appeals; but it does not have similar influence as
indicia of reversible error in cases where the
appellate court opts instead to apply the general
rule.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Besides, in Villena and the other above-cited cases
where the Court upheld the liberal application of the
rules the appellants therein hinged their arguments
on exceptionally meritorious circumstances peculiar
to their particular situations that would convince the
Court that they were entitled to a lax application of
the Rules. Petitioners herein did not pursue such
tack. Instead, they have opted to construct the
paradigm where prior to 1 May 2000, trial courts had
no authority to dismiss notices of appeal for non-
payment of the full appellate docket fees. But then,
where is the subsequent amendment to the rule
constituting a revolution in procedural law that
necessarily entails a grace period so that our
magistrates could imbibe this new learning?cra
lawlibrary
If we were to concede the fundamental premise of
petitioners, we would be negating a considerable
sum of our jurisprudence that affirmed dismissals of
appeals or notices of appeal for non-payment of the
full appellate docket fees from the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, until the adoption of
A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC. We are not inclined towards
that radical direction. As a rule of thumb, arguments
that seek to carve exceptions to precedents
generally hold greater sway than those designed to
eradicate said precedents altogether.
Thus, our only point of focus in determining whether
there stands an exceptionally meritorious reason
why petitioners' appeal should be given due course
is the justification offered as to why the appellate
docket fee was posted only on 25 August 2000,
several days after the expiration of the period for
undertaking the appeal.30 The only reason provided
for the delay in the petition is "due to inadvertence
[of] Atty. Uytiepo."31 That is all. To their credit,
petitioners do not fashion the argument that
"inadvertence of counsel" is an admissible standard
that would warrant the liberal application of
procedural rules concerning jurisdictional
requirements. Yet if we were to grant the petition, it
would set an ignoble precedent wherein the
negligence of appellant's counsel is sufficient to relax
the jurisdictional requirements for the perfection of
an appeal. That reason suffices for us to uphold the
general rule requiring the timely payment of
appellate docket fees, despite the jurisprudential
exceptions to such rule. After all, exceptions were
meant to be exceptional.
Since the appeal was not perfected on time in this
case thereby rendering the decision of the RTC final
and executory, any consideration, however due, of
the remaining arguments would be an exercise in
futility. We do wish to note in passing a few
observations concerning the merits of the case. The
RTC, in denying the motion for reconsideration, did
point out that Atty. Lagamon, Jr. never formally
withdrew his appearance for petitioners and that the
judicial notices and orders issued subsequent to his
resignation as in-house counsel, while addressed to
him, were received at the same address maintained
by petitioners. The counter-arguments raised by
petitioners to these points do not sufficiently
disquiet the suspicion, as maintained by the RTC,
that petitioners were well aware of the forthcoming
pre-trial and of the subsequent ex-parte
presentation of evidence by Naval.
Finally, the Court is aware of the somewhat farcical
nature of the ensuing result - a 1000-square meter
parcel of land surrounded in its entirety by a golf
course, right in the middle of the 12th and 13th
holes. Yet Naval has every right to blame petitioners
for her predicament while petitioners in turn have
nobody else to blame but themselves for the
predicament they are entrapped in. Still, this
decision does not deprive the parties of the
necessary tools to clear up the resulting untidiness,
and it is hoped that they do take on the opportunity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.