OBSERVATIONS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDINGS DURING

EARTHQUAKES
By J. P. Moehle and S. A. Mahin

Structural Engineering, Mechanics and Materials Department, University of California Berkeley

Note: The text of this article first appeared in the American Concrete Institute publication SP-127,
Earthquake-Resistant Concrete Structures - Inelastic Response and Design, (S.K.Ghosh, editor) in
1991. It is re-published here for educational purposes by kind permission of the authors and the ACI.

INTRODUCTION

Observations on the performance of structures during strong earthquakes have served as an age-
old means of educating builders on proper and improper construction of earthquake load resisting
systems. In regions that have long been inhabited, and that are subjected to relatively frequent
strong ground shaking, design procedures have evolved that result in relatively good performance of
engineered structures. Although such design procedures are not universally applicable because of
regional differences in construction styles, structural engineers can learn much by studying such
procedures. The structural engineer can also draw upon a broad data base of engineering
observations that have been reported systematically following recent earthquakes. It is the objective
of this paper to highlight some of the observations as they apply to design of reinforced concrete
structures.

GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBSERVATIONS

The damaging potential of strong earthquakes is well known and is accepted as an underlying
premise by most design codes. For example, the Seismology Committee of the Structural Engineers
Association of California (SEAOC) adopts the philosophy that structural damage is acceptable during
the rare earthquake but that collapse is not acceptable in any event (1). Thus, an engineer should
not be surprised if buildings designed according to the SEAOC recommended lateral force
provisions exhibit structural damage following a severe earthquake. However, an observation of
performance that suggests the possibility of incipient collapse is certainly noteworthy. From such
observations can be gleaned lessons on construction to be avoided.

Observations on good performances of buildings are also noteworthy, as they provide lessons on
desirable structural systems. We are fortunate that most engineered buildings have performed well
during recent earthquakes. Still, within this sea of successes, we as observers are prone to focus on
the few failures. An effort will be made in the following to present observations on good structural
performances where appropriate.

The subjective nature of observations of earthquake performance should be immediately clear. In

most instances, observations must be drawn from incompletely documented performances of
buildings with uncertain structural characteristics and subjected to unknown earthquake motions.
Conclusions that are drawn from such observations are dubious. Several systematic studies of
earthquake performance have been undertaken (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). These can provide conclusions
of greater substance, and will be cited where possible in the following.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE STRUCTURAL CONCEPT

It has been observed repeatedly that proper selection of the load carrying system is essential to
good performance under any loading. A properly selected structural system tends to be relatively
forgiving of oversights in analysis, proportion, detail, and construction. On the other hand, extra
attention to analysis and detail is not likely to improve significantly the performance of a poorly-
conceived structural system. This observation is particularly appropriate in earthquake-resistant
design where the intensity and orientation of loading are highly uncertain. Buildings having simple,
regular, and compact layouts incorporating a continuous and redundant lateral force resisting system
tend to perform well and thus are desirable. Complex structural systems that introduce uncertainties
in the analysis and detailing or that rely on effectively non-redundant load paths can lead to
unanticipated and potentially undesirable structural behavior. These general observations are further
elaborated in the following.

Continuity

An essential characteristic of any lateral load resisting system is that it must provide a continuous
load path to the foundation. Inertial loads that develop due to accelerations of individual elements
must be transferred from the individual reactive elements to floor diaphragms, to vertical elements in
the lateral load system, to the foundation, and eventually to the ground. Failure to provide adequate
strength and toughness of individual elements in the system, or failure to tie individual elements
together can result in distress or complete collapse of the system.

One of the earliest lessons from earthquakes was realization that structural and nonstructural
elements must be adequately tied to the structural system (9). Numerous examples can be found of
detachment of exterior cladding (10,11,12), of parapets (7,13,14), and of various nonstructural
elements within buildings (9,16). This observation has resulted in local ordinances and building code
provisions (1,17) that specifically require that individual elements of a building be adequately tied to
the structure.

Inertial loads that develop in individual elements must be carried to the vertical elements of the
lateral load resisting system by horizontal floor diaphragms. Concrete diaphragms, with appropriate
struts, ties, and boundary elements should be provided with adequate reinforcement to transmit
these forces. Examples of distress in diaphragms and collectors have been reported (14,15).

Failures due to discontinuity of vertical elements of the lateral load resisting system have been
among the most notable and spectacular. One common form of this type of discontinuity occurs
when shear walls that are present in upper floors are discontinued in the lower floors. The result is
frequently formation of a soft first story that concentrates damage. A well-known example (shown
below) is the Olive View Hospital, which nearly collapsed due to excessive deformation in the first
two stories during the 1972 San Fernando earthquake and subsequently had to be demolished
(6,18).

Another well-studied example is the Imperial County Services Building, which nearly collapsed
during the 1979 El Centro earthquake (3,4,19). In this latter building, lateral forces that accumulated
in exterior walls in the upper stories had to be transmitted by the diaphragms through shear to
interior first-story walls. Large overturning forces that developed in the discontinued exterior walls
had to be carried by columns supporting the walls, an effect that contributed to severe damage in the
columns. Numerous other examples where discontinuity in shear walls contributed to failures have
been identified (20,21).
Regularity

Sudden changes in stiffness, strength, or mass in either vertical or horizontal planes of a building
can result in distributions of lateral loads and deformations different from those that are anticipated
for uniform structures. Although the effects of such irregularities can and have been designed for
with success, the uncertainties associated with the effects of such irregularities are such that they
are better avoided if possible.

Sudden changes in stiffness and strength between adjacent stories are commonly observed. Such
changes are associated with setbacks (including penthouses and other small appendages), changes
in structural system over height (eg., discontinuous shear walls), changes in story height, changes in
materials, and unanticipated participation of nonstructural components. A common problem of such
discontinuities is that inelastic deformations tend to concentrate in or around the discontinuity.
Examples where discontinuity apparently resulted in severe damage or collapse are commonplace in
the earthquake reconnaissance literature (4,7,14,18,21,22,23,24,25,26).

Apparent vertical irregularities can occur due to the interaction between adjacent structures having
inadequate separation. A tall building adjacent to a shorter building may experience irregular
response due to effects of impact between the two structures. The effect can be exacerbated by
local column damage due to pounding of the roof of the small building against the columns of the
taller one. Examples of distress due to this phenomenon were observed following the 1985 Mexico
earthquake (22).

The most common form of vertical discontinuity arises because of unintended effects of
nonstructural elements. The problem is most severe in structures having relatively flexible lateral
load resisting systems because in that case the nonstructural component can compose a significant
portion of the total stiffness. A common cause of failure occurs in infilled frames. If properly
designed, the infill can improve the performance of the frame due to its stiffening and strengthening
action (27). However, soft stories can result if infills are omitted in a single story (often the first story),
as apparently has occurred in several instances (7,9,20,21,22). Even if placed continuously and
symmetrically throughout the structure, a soft story can form if one or more infill panels should fail
(7,13,22,28).

Partial-height frame infills are also common. In this form of construction, an infill extends between
columns from the floor level to the bottom of the window line, leaving a relatively short portion of the
column exposed in the upper portion of the story (as shown below). The shear required to develop
flexural yield in the effectively shortened column can be substantially higher than that which would
develop for flexural yield of the full-length column. If the design has not considered this effect of the
infill, shear failure of this so-called 'captive column' can result before flexural yield. Complete
collapse of the column (and building) can occur if it is not well equipped with transverse steel. This
form of distress is a common cause of building damage and collapse during earthquakes
(7,14,21,22,26,29).
Mass, stiffness, and strength plan irregularities can result in significant torsional response. Inelastic
torsional response cannot at present be rectified with results of elastic analysis, and techniques for
inelastic analysis of complete building systems considering torsion are largely unavailable and
unverified. Given such uncertainties and difficulties with analytical techniques, prudence will direct
the engineer to design buildings to have substantial torsional resistance, near symmetry, and
compactness of plan. Examples of structural distress attributed to torsion abound. For example,
collapses have been attributed to torsional effects associated with L and U-shaped plans (21).
Asymmetric layouts of lateral load resisting elements has also been cited (22, 23). Asymmetric
layout of infill panels has contributed to many structural failures. Of special note is the high
proportion of failure of corner buildings that have infill panels on the two inner perimeter walls and
open frames on the street-side perimeter walls (22). Torsion due to asymmetric failure of infill panels
also appears to have contributed to building failures (22). Following the 1985 Mexico City
earthquake, torsion was identified (22) as one of the most prevalent contributors to failure.

Stiffness

Although not currently the focal point of most seismic design codes, control of lateral drift should be
a central element of any seismic design. Excess drift can lead to excessive distortion, and thence,
damage, of structural and nonstructural components. Because repair cost is the primary measure of
the success of a building that has survived an earthquake, damage control is essential. Control of
damage in nonstructural components is important because they typically comprise a significant
majority of the total value of a building and because falling nonstructural elements can cause injury
and death to building inhabitants. Widespread environmental disaster due to nonstructural damage
is not inconceivable for certain industrial facilities. Numerous examples can be found where a
structure has survived an earthquake without damage but significant repairs to the architectural
components and contents have been required (16).

Control of drift is also important because nonductile or moderately-ductile elements of the structural
system can be damaged by excessive distortion. Control of drift by structural walls is a proven
means of reducing damage to weak, low-ductile framing. For example, in Chile multistory RC
structures are provided with a stiff, continuous system of structural walls to control drift. Conventional
detailing practice in that country generally does not follow the ductile detailing conventions of seismic
regions of the U.S., but rather follows those of the nonseismic provisions of ACI 318-89 (35). The
exceptionally good performance of these buildings during the 1985 Chile earthquake bears
testimony that drift control by structural walls can protect relatively nonductile framing elements (8).
Similar conclusions can be drawn by comparing earthquake performances of various buildings
reported in the literature. The relative performances of the Banco de America and Banco Central
(shear wall versus frame buildings) during the Managua earthquake (14) are commonly cited in this
regard.

Drift control is important also in preserving the vertical stability of a structural system. If a structural
system is excessively flexible, and particularly if it is also massive, collapse can occur due to P-delta
effects. Observations following the 1985 Mexico earthquake demonstrated that this was a
particularly prominent problem with flat-slab structures because of their relatively low lateral load
stiffness (22).

Proximity to Adjacent Buildings

Where buildings are constructed in close proximity to one another, damage due to pounding
between the buildings is possible. Several examples of building failures due to pounding have been
observed (9,11,14,22,28,30,31). Pounding may result in irregular response of buildings of different
heights, local damage to columns as the floor of one building collides with columns of another,
collapse of damaged floors, and in many cases collapse of entire structures (22). Damage due to
pounding can be minimized by drift control, building separation, or as a last resort, aligning floors in
adjacent buildings so that columns do not bear the blows of oncoming floor slabs.

Several examples can be cited where buildings in close proximity apparently supported one- another
rather than resulting in damage (9). In most cases, the buildings are of similar story and total height,
of similar stiffness, and located sufficiently close that pounding impacts are of relatively low energy.

Mass

Excess mass can lead to unnecessary increases in lateral inertial forces, reduced ductility of vertical
load resisting elements, and increased propensity toward collapse due to P-delta effects (6,21,22).
For these reasons, efforts should be made to achieve a system that is as lightweight as possible.
This is not to suggest that lightweight concrete aggregates be used for all concretes, as laboratory
research has shown that performance of elements of lightweight concrete can be inferior to that of
normal weight concretes (32). However, concrete as an architectural fill and soil for landscaping on
top of structural slabs provide unnecessary mass without structural benefit. Numerous examples of
buildings that collapsed due to the presence of excessive vertical loads were identified following the
1985 Mexico city earthquake (22). In many cases, the excesses were attributable to dead loads that
exceeded the specified values; more often excessive live loads resulted from change in occupancy
of a building.

Irregularity of mass distribution in vertical and horizontal planes can result in irregular responses and
complex dynamics (6). These should be avoided where practicable.

Redundancy

Structural systems that combine several lateral load resisting elements or subsystems generally
have been observed to perform well during earthquakes (2,9,23). Redundancy in the structural
system permits redistribution of internal forces in the event of failure of key elements. Without
capacity for redistribution, global structural collapse can result from failure of individual members or
connections. Redundancy can be provided by several means; a dual system, a system of
interconnected frames that enable redistribution between frames after yield has initiated in individual
frames, and multiple shear walls. Redundancy, combined with adequate strength, stiffness, and
continuity, can alleviate the need for excesses in ductile detailing. This aspect was discussed
previously with regard to the redundant shear-wall systems used in buildings in Chile (2). The
benefits of redundancy are also apparent by comparing the successful performance of bearing wall
buildings with the generally poor performance of nearby precast frame buildings as reported for the
1988 Armenia earthquake (15).

Previous Earthquake Damage

Cyclic deterioration in the hysteretic response has been observed to occur in reinforced concrete
structures in the laboratory under certain conditions, in particular, where behavior is influenced by
concrete in compression, by shear, and by anchorage. This deterioration is believed to be the cause
for damage in buildings that have experienced successive earthquakes. Several examples of
buildings that had been damaged during previous earthquakes and were damaged more severely in
subsequent earthquakes have been reported (2,21,22,33). In many cases, following the previous
earthquake these buildings had not been repaired, had received only cosmetic repair, or had been
repaired in a manner that induced more severe damage in subsequent earthquakes. Detailed
evaluations of the damage state and implementation of appropriate reparative measures are clearly
important.

OBSERVATIONS ON STRUCTURAL PROPORTIONING AND DETAILING

Conventional earthquake resistant design of buildings relies on element ductility to enable

redistribution and reduction of internal actions, and dissipation of earthquake energy. Observations
have shown repeatedly the necessity of attention to proportioning, to ensure that inelastic action
occurs at appropriate locations, and detailing, to ensure adequate ductility in these locations that
yield. Some of the more prominent observations and lessons are summarized in the following.

Locations of Inelastic Deformation

Structures should be proportioned to yield in locations most capable of sustaining inelastic

deformations. In reinforced concrete frame buildings, attempts should be made to minimize yielding
in columns because of the difficulty of detailing for ductile response in the presence of high axial
loads and because of the possibility that column yielding may result in formation of demanding story
sway mechanisms and collapse. Examples of collapse of stories or complete structures due to
column weakness and limited ductility can be found following many destructive earthquakes
(7,14,20,21,22,25,26). The problem of yielding in columns rather than beams is particularly
pronounced in structures for which gravity load effects control proportions and strengths, resulting in
beam flexural strengths exceeding by some margin the column flexural strengths. This situation
typically occurs in buildings having long beam spans, and in the upper floors of buildings where
design seismic effects are relatively low. The latter situation may be a contributing factor for failures
in upper stories of frames (20,22,26).

Observations of failures due to yielding in columns have led to formulation of the weak beam- strong
column design philosophy in which column strengths are made at least equal to beam strengths. The
intended result is columns that form a stiff, unyielding spine over the height of the building with
inelastic action limited largely to beams. Even in structures so designed, yielding in first-story
columns should be anticipated and appropriate details provided (34). In buildings where architectural
requirements require wide bays with resulting strong girders, the strong column-weak beam design
philosophy may be difficult to implement. In such cases, columns should be detailed to sustain
inelastic action or, preferably, continuity of deformations over height should be enforced by providing
continuous structural walls.

Coupled wall systems are generally proportioned so that a considerable portion of the inelastic
energy dissipation occurs in the coupling beams. Performance of such systems generally has been
good, although damage to coupling beams and slabs is not uncommon (2). Closely spaced
transverse reinforcement or special reinforcement details (34,35) are recommended.

Determination of Member Actions

The structure should be proportioned and detailed in a manner that is consistent with the expected
inelastic deformation mode. If inelastic flexure is preferred in selected elements, design actions and
appropriate proportions should be selected to ensure that the elements can achieve the flexural
strengths. For beams and columns, shear failures have occurred because design shear forces were
determined on the basis of design lateral forces rather than the shear required to equilibrate the
plastic moment capacities of the member (6,7). Consequently, most modern codes stipulate that
design shears be evaluated on the basis of likely plastic hinge locations with appropriate factors of
safety applied to member strengths and transverse loading.
Failures have also apparently occurred because bar cutoffs were inconsistent with the moment
distribution that develops when flexural strengths are reached at member ends (14,20). Uncertainties
in determining these moment distributions has in part motivated most model code writing bodies to
recommend continuous nominal reinforcement on both faces of all structural elements.

Nonstructural components have been observed to substantially alter structural behavior. For
example, slabs on grade can change assumed base fixity conditions, and stairways and partial infills
in frames can alter the member actions. These interactions can result in increased member shear
demands as well as formation of plastic hinges away from those regions detailed for ductile action on
the basis of intended behavior. Numerous examples of this type of damage (3,5,14,26) emphasizes
the need for realistic assessment of member behavior.

Corner columns have statistically greater damage rates than other columns in moment resisting
frames (9). An apparent cause is the combined effect of actions from perimeter frames oriented
perpendicular to one another and connecting at the corner column. Extra attention appears
warranted in selection of design actions considering orthogonal effects and in detailing and
construction.

Transverse Reinforcement

Generous supply and appropriate placement of transverse reinforcement in reinforced concrete

beams, columns, beam-column connections, and walls have proven to be desirable. Such
reinforcement is useful for concrete confinement, resistance to shear, restraint of longitudinal
reinforcement buckling, and improved anchorage. Failure to provide transverse reinforcement at
member ends where plastic hinges are anticipated results in reduced flexural strength (particularly
sustained strength) and ductility, as well as degradation of shear resistance. Closely spaced
transverse reinforcement is particularly recommended for the unrestrained length of captive columns
where inelastic flexure is combined with high shear force. Boundary elements of walls where
significant inelastic action is anticipated should be well confined to provide ductility under axial
compression. Columns supporting discontinuous walls should be confined over their entire height
(35).

Distress in beam-column joints, in some cases leading to building collapse, has been attributed to
inadequate joint confinement (7,13,22,29). Several disastrous failures during the 1985 Mexico City
earthquake could apparently be attributed to joint failure in cases where heavy spiral or rectilinear
confinement in columns above and below a joint was discontinued at the joint. In general,
confinement in columns should continue through the connection region.

Effective concrete confinement can be obtained using either spiral or rectilinear reinforcement. The
former is generally the more effective form of confinement reinforcement (18). To be effective,
transverse reinforcement must be coupled with well distributed longitudinal reinforcement. Poorly
spaced and bundled column bars have been displayed by past earthquakes in a manner suggesting
that they contributed to the structural distress (22). In addition, the transverse reinforcement must be
anchored so as to remain effective in the event that concrete cover spalls. Perimeter hoops without
hook anchorage into the core concrete were observed to be largely ineffective following the 1985
Mexico earthquake, as judged by the fact that they could be easily removed by hand following the
earthquake.

Anchorage and Connections

Strength and toughness must be developed not only within members themselves but also in the
connections between members. Numerous examples can be found where beam-column connections
with inadequate transverse reinforcement failed (22,25,29). Few examples, if any, have been found
where joints with transverse reinforcement approaching current recommendations have failed.
Problems have been observed in joints where the members frame eccentric to the joint, and where
members having non-coincident longitudinal axes frame into a single joint (25).

Slab-column connections have suffered distress in numerous earthquakes, and in several cases
have contributed to collapse (21,22,28,36). In the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the presence of
heavy vertical loads is believed to have resulted in excessive shear stress on connections, with
resultant decrease in connection moment capacity and ductility and increase in P-delta moments.
Combined with the relatively large flexibility of slab-column frames, several collapses resulted
(22,26). In the event of punching failure at a connection, bottom slab reinforcement anchored
through the columns has been observed (Mexico, 1985) to be an effective means of preventing or
delaying collapse; lack of such reinforcement has been observed to result in catastrophic failures.

Continuity between members and between members and joints is also essential. Following the 1985
Mexico City earthquake, several collapsed buildings were found where columns had not been
adequately interconnected through the joints by continuous longitudinal reinforcement. Failures have
also been observed where reinforcement splices within members were of insufficient length or were
inadequately located (28). The ability of continuous bottom reinforcement passing through
connections to support beams and slabs by catenary action following initial shear or connection
failures was evident following the 1985 Mexico earthquake and 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake
(10). These observations point to the general need of providing continuous ties within the structure,
and the specific need of considering distributions of internal member actions that can occur under
severe seismic loading.

Proper anchorage of reinforcement under the action of cyclic inelastic load reversals requires that
the reinforcement to be developed have adequate transverse reinforcement and concrete
surrounding each bar. In particular, inadequate bond of bundled column reinforcement is believed to
have been the cause of damage to and collapse of several buildings in the 1985 Mexico City
earthquake.

Construction

Observations of earthquake performance demonstrate clearly and repeatedly the need for
punctilious attention to design, detail, and construction. In particular, structures that rely on ductile
response and that do not provide multiple load paths to the foundation require dedicated,
professional inspection to ensure that required ductile details are properly implemented. The
designer must ensure that construction drawings and documents are clear and unambiguous, and
that actual conditions of construction do not interfere with the behavior intended in design.

As examples of the importance of construction, inadequate details at the base of columns in the
Imperial County Service Building (shown below) are believed to have been contributory to the
column failure (3).

Improper anchorage of transverse reinforcement has resulted in failure of confinement in columns

during the 1985 Mexico earthquake, and improperly executed construction joints in shear walls have
resulted in movement and damage along the joints (23,28). Numerous other examples where poor
construction and material quality contributed to building failures can be found (7,9).
Of particular note is the practice of providing reliable strength, redundancy, and continuity in lieu of
requiring ductile detailing and inspection. In Chile, this practice has resulted in a high-rise reinforced
concrete building form that has performed exceptionally well in recent earthquakes (2). Although still
under study, this simple and apparently effective alternative to current practice in the U.S. is among
the important lessons to be derived from recent observations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The occurrence of inelastic action in some buildings during strong earthquakes is evident in the
observations that have been made thus far. Perhaps less evident, and deserving emphasis, is the
observation that the inelastic action often is attributable to effects that were not foreseen during
design. Procedures for inelastic design are of little use if the analyst is unaware of the potential
modes of inelastic action. The less than omniscient designer should not attempt to replace simplicity,
continuity, redundancy, and detail with computed predictions that such qualities are unnecessary.

Furthermore, behavioral aspects of many forms of inelastic response (for example, joint
deformations, failures in shear and anchorage, severe discontinuities, and three-dimensional
inelastic response including torsion) at present cannot be modeled confidently even when identified.
The influence of such behaviors should be minimized by layout of the structural system, and
proportion and detail of its components. Simple design techniques usually are sufficient for this
purpose. Inelastic design procedures should steer clear of responses involving the uncertain modes
mentioned above.

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34. Park, R., and Paulay, T., Reinforced Concrete Structures, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York,
1975, 769 pp.

35. "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, and Commentary" (ACI 318-89),
American Concrete Institute, Detroit, Michigan, 1989.

36. Rosenblueth, E., "The Earthquake of 28 July 1957 in Mexico City, " Proceedings, Second World
Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Tokyo, July, 1960, pp. 359-378.

37. Housner, G. W. , and Jennings, P. C. , Earthquake Design Criteria, EERI Monograph, El Cerrito,
CA.

38. Arnold, C., and Reitherman, R., Building Configuration and Seismic Design, Wiley- Interscience,
New York, 1982.

Updated January 23, 1998.

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