PEOPLE VS AYAYA
Facts:
About 1 o'clock in the morning of January 16, 1928, Jose
Fajardo, the chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed
by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk,
wounded, and vomiting in his house in said municipality. Said
chief of police went to the place and found Benito, the
deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and
unconscious, for he did not answer the questions put to him.
When his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned
as to the cause of that wound, she replied that she, with her
husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in
the store of one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they went
to a cinema; that while returning home and without any
warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which
she dodged; that then her husband went home, preceding her
and her son and when they arrived at the house they found the
door closed; that she and her son pushed the door and
attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside,
prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat and her
son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the opening
of the door and the wall and ;n order to prevent the door from
crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then poked his head
out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she
jabbed him with the umbrella she carried; that she does not
know where she jabbed him although she thinks it was in the
body; and that when she and her son finally succeeded in
entering the house, they found that Benito was already in bed
with a wound in the forehead. Health officer Victoriano
Litonjua was then called, and upon examining Benito, found he
had a wound on the left upper eyelid which was bleeding; that
his pupils were dilated and, from the odor of his breath and
from his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was drunk. In view
of the wounded man's condition he was later taken to the
provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he died four days after
the incident.
Held:
The appellant Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she hereby is,
acquitted. In thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door
in question, she did so to free her son from the imminent
danger of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if
she thus caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere
accident, without any fault or intention to cause it. This being
so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in
accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because, it
being a licit act to free her son from the grave danger
threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of
her husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her
umbrella, does not make her criminally liable.
PEOPLE VS GENITA
Facts:
On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were
loading firewood in a truck in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City,
appellant who was drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle, asked
Reynaldo for a Christmas gift. Reynaldo told him to just come
back because they were still loading firewood. Appellant left
the place. Not long after, he returned and fired his gun at Jesus'
feet, hitting his left leg. He immediately jumped into the truck.
Appellant then went near its bumper and fired at the tire near
the chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun and fired
again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg. Reynaldo ran
away, his right hand covering his head. Appellant chased him
and fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After the
commotion, the victims' co-workers who were able to take
refuge from the cascade of bullets returned to the scene and
found the dead body of Reynaldo. Jesus was immediately
brought to the Butuan City General Hospital but died
thereafter.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance?
Held:
No. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. It must be stressed that in raising this
defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was
incumbent upon him to establish that he was exempt from
criminal liability. He must show with clear and convincing
proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due care,
2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no
fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering appellant's
evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven.
First, appellant's manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his
claim of "due care" in the performance of an act. Knowing that
his rifle was automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety
lock was intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was
constantly on the trigger. With the safety lock released and his
finger on the trigger, how can we conclude that he acted with
due care?
Second, the number of wounds sustained by the victims shows
that the shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims
sustained more than one wound. While it could have been
possible that the first wound sustained by both victims was by
accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them
in different parts of their bodies could not have been similarly
inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an unmistakable
intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first
unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus had already sought
refuge by jumping into the truck when another bullet hit his
right leg. Reynaldo was already running away when he was
shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant chased the
victims and shot them several times clearly show that he had
the intent to kill them.
AMPLOYO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997,
having celebrated her eighth year the day before. A grade III
student, she was walking to school (which was just a short
distance from her house) at around seven o'clock in the
morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from
hiding from a nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy were
neighbors. Petitioner approached Kristine Joy, touched her
head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it then moved
down to touch her breast several times. Petitioner thereafter
told Kristine Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her.
This was not the first time that the incident happened as
petitioner had done this several times in the past, even when
Kristine Joy was still in Grade II. However, it was only during
this last incident that Kristine Joy finally told somebody - her
grandmother, who immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera,
Kristine Joy's mother.
Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who said that
petitioner would sometimes even insert his hand under her
shirt to caress her breast. Mother and child then reported the
matter to the barangay. From the barangay, the case was
referred to the DSWD then to the Police Department of Subic,
Zambales.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
No. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his version of the story as
he has conveniently left out details which indubitably prove
the presence of lewd design. It would have been easy to
entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an
accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case,
however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to
the very same victim in the past.[20] Moreover, the incident
could never be labeled as accidental as petitioner's hand did
not just slip from Kristine Joy's shoulder to her breast as there
were times when he would touch her breast from under her
shirt.[21] Finally, the theory that what happened was
accidental is belied by petitioner having threatened Kristine
Joy to keep silent and not tell on him.
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
Facts:
Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his
wife with a dart from a rubber sling, hitting her at the neck and
causing her instantaneous death. In his defense, the accused
said that he had no intention of killing his wife and that he was
practicing the use of the weapon when his wife was
accidentally hit by the arrow. However, the trial court
nonetheless found him guilty on the ground that the evidence
showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon his wife was
preceded by a quarrel between her and the appellant, thus
negating the latter’s defense. The same was affirmed on
appeal. In the present petition, the appellant contends that
assuming that he was the one who killed his wife the same was
accidental and not intentional.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the
instant case?
Held:
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is
burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The
defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The
essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a
deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful
act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of
accident must be struck down because he was performing an
unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial
court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable
under the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into
consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal
purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons.
Let it be stressed that this crude weapon cannot attain the
standards as an instrument for archery competitions. To
sustain the accused's assertion that he was practicing the use
of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd.
The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's
testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow
inside his house.
PEOPLE VS ABRZALDO
Facts:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant,
then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto,
but instead, hit the post of the latter's house. The incident was
reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban,
Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of
the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene.
Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant
shouting at his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw
accused-appellant coming out of Quinto's house with blood
oozing from his forehead. At that time, the place was well
lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-
appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant
and Guban shouted at each other and grappled "face to face."
Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the
abdomen and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the
latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo. Fajardo,
together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the
Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated
by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few
hours, Guban died.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not
only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but
in itself is extremely doubtful. In the present case, accused-
appellant's tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders
his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of
the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that
Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence.
Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while
self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by
necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his
natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very
least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the
justifying circumstance of self-defense or the exempting
circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering
accused-appellant's flight from the crime scene and his failure
to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he
did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent
with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability
of the crime charged.
PEOPLE VS LATOSA
Facts:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon,
appellant and her husband Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr.
(Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae
Latosa (Sassymae) and Michael Latosa (Michael), were at their
house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr. was then asleep when
Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.'s gun from the
cabinet and leave. She asked her mother where she was going
and if she could come along, but appellant refused.
Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy
ice cream at the commissary. Appellant gave her money and
asked her to leave. After Sassymae left, appellant instructed
Michael to follow his sister, but he refused as he was hungry.
Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any
noise as his father was sleeping. Nevertheless, appellant went
back inside the house and turned up the volume of the
television and the radio to full. Shortly after that, she came out
again and gave Michael some money to buy food at the
grocery.
Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned
to the barracks located at the back of their house. Michael
thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that
he saw appellant running away from their house. Michael did
not pay any attention to his friend's comment, and simply
continued eating his ice candy. Moments later, a certain Sgt.
Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their
house. Michael replied in the negative then entered their
house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a
hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos
about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant had
reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office.
Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a bullet
wound on his head and a gun near his left hand.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
No. In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand
and extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed.
Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how to
fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm over to the
deceased, the muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic
firearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to have already
known since she admitted, during trial, that she sometimes
handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming further that
she was not aware of this basic rule, it needed explaining why
the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless
there was pressure on the trigger.
PEOPLE VS MORENO
Facts:
The appellant was at the outbreak of the war a prisoner serving
sentence in the San Ramon Penal Colony Farm, situated in the
City of Zamboanga. During the Japanese occupation, he
befriended and gained the confidence of the Japanese naval
authorities, was released from prison, and appointed Captain
of a semi-military organization known as Kaigun Jeutay,
composed of Filipinos and sponsored by the Japanese navy. On
October 23, 1944, the defendant was appointed by the
Japanese naval authorities as section commander of the San
Ramon Penal Colony with plenary powers of supervision and
control over said colony and its environs.
On November 23, 1944, a group of defendant's soldiers went
to the house of Paciano de los Santos, and too with them two
single young daughters of said Paciano, and on the next day,
when the deceased went to San Ramon Penal Colony, he was
confined in a cell by order of the defendant.
On the night of December 1, 1944, defendant gathered all the
prison officials and employees of San Ramon Penal Colony in a
meeting in the house of P. D. Dellosa then Assistant
Superintendent of the institution, and in that gathering the
accused arrogantly announced that he was not afraid to cut
the head of anybody, ordered all those present to witness the
execution of Paciano de los Santos the following day, and
instructed Gregorio Magalit, a prisoner employee of said
institution to prepare the grave for said Paciano and issue a
formal memorandum to that effect. And in the morning of
December 2, 1944, Paciano de los Santos was taken to a place
known as Fishery Division of the colony with both hands tied
at the back, and there the defendant ordered the victim
Paciano to kneel down with the head bent forward by the side
of the grave already prepared for him by order of the accused,
and in that position the accused with a Japanese sobre held in
the handle by his both hands, hacked the head of Paciano de
los Santos, and immediately kicked the prostrate body of the
victim into the grave.
Issue:
Is there a mitigating circumstance of uncontrollable fear?
Held:
No. Because it is plain that there was no compulsion of an
irresistible force that compelled the defendant to kill the victim
against his will; nor was there any threat of such a serious
character and imminence as to create in the mind of the
defendant an uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil
or injury would be inflicted upon him if he did not comply with
the alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part of the
defendant's testimony relating to a sort of a threat is the
following: "As they insisted and I informed them that I could
not do it, then Capitan Susuki told me: You have to comply with
that order of Major Sasaki; otherwise you have to come along
with us." It is evident that the mere alleged statement of said
Susuki that if the accused did not comply with the order, he
had to come along with them, is not such a threat as
contemplated by said provision of the Revised Penal Code;
especially, taking into consideration that the defendant
himself declared that the captain told him "that they could not
be present (at the execution of the deceased) because they
had to return that same day to Zamboanga."
PEOPLE VS FIELDAD
Facts:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista, and Edgar
Pimentel are detention prisoners who are charged with the
murder of two jail guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the
CA found petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.
Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2
Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that
day. JO2 Niturada answered the telephone in the
administration building and upon returning, he saw Chan place
an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and
Chan shot the latter with a short firearm.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for
the possession of an Armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at
the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down.
Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor
twice. Florante Leal took the Armalite from JO1 Bacolor and
shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38
caliber handgun.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and
Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to
Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’s knowledge and consent.
They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the
way. The group then transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck.
Eventually, they abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane
field where they were arrested.
Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of
carnapping, they allege that they were under the influence of
uncontrollable fear from Leal, who forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail. With regards to
the crime of murder, accused-appellants allege that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and that there can be no treachery in the case since the
jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves
from danger.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear?
Held:
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim
that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his
flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt
from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.49 For such
defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as
to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act be done.50 A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well.51 It is necessary that
the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the
first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarily
followed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was
parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to
board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In
addition, according to appellants’ testimonies, only Leal was
armed.
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstance.54 The
circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way
their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the
circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight
from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to
take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
PEOPLE VS LICAYAN
Facts:
In an On-August 15, 2001 Decision, the Supreme Court (SC)
affirmed the RTC Decision convicting Roderick Licayan and
Roberto Lara of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom of Joseph
Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay, and sentencing them to the
penalty of death. A Writ of Execution was issued ordering the
execution of Licayan and Lara on January 30, 2004 at 3:00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, two
of their co-accused in the original Information were arrested.
Pedro Mabansag, a double arm amputee and suspected
mastermind of the kidnapping, and Rogelio Delos Reyes.
The Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with the Supreme
Court an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case which the SC
granted on the condition that insofar as the accused Lara and
Licayan are concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand,
although additional evidence may be introduced to be taken
and considered.
The prosecution evidence showed that the victim Joseph
Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Mami House
with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's
regular routine was for him and Linda Manaysay, the
restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to make the
rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of
left-over food and cash sales.
On August 9, 1998, while Co was at the Sampaloc branch,
supervising the loading of left-over food into the back of his
Tamaraw FX service vehicle, three men approached him from
behind. The men were armed with two caliber 45 pistols and a
.38 revolver. None of the men wore any mask. Co told the men
that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store.
They refused. One of the men's guns went off. When
Manaysay heard the shot, she came out. Co and Manaysay
were amde to board the Tamaraw and their hands were tied
and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps
over their heads. They were brought inside a room of a house
and the masking tape was removed from their eyes. Accused
Lara was left to guard them inside the room.
On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan who was
guarding them at that time fell asleep and Co and Manaysay
somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the
look-out outside their room. Complainants took refuge in a
house from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters.
Lara and Licayan were thereafter identified by Co and
Manaysay in a line-up. Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph
Tomas Co's brother, also testified that he was twice called in
his office by unidentified persons who demanded P10 million
for the release of complainants.
In 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City
Jail. The trial against Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded.
In 2009, the RTC of Marikina City rendered its Decision finding
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced them each to reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto. In the appeal now before
the Supreme Court, accused Delos Reyes reiterates his defense
that the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was
present in his case while accused-appellants Licayan and Lara
seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence presented during their retrial.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of irresistible force?
Held:

No. Delos Reyes claimed that he went to the house of Pedro

Mabansag on August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend who
would buy a fighting cock. Inside the house, he was met by a
certain Tata and Jojo and they pointed a gun at him and he was
told not to leave. He saw two persons inside the house near
the kitchen and the woman was hand tied. Delos Reyes claims
that when Tata and Jojo poked a gun at him and was told not
to leave and not to report to the police, he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force. The Court begs to disagree.
Delos Reyes testified that even before August 10, 1998, he
knows already Tata and Jojo because they went to the house
of his Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three times.
Since they all know each other, then the court cannot
comprehend whyTata and Jojo still need to poke a gun at Delos
Reyes and threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of said
accused to deny any participation in the conspiracy in
kidnapping the two victims. The Court also observed the
demeanor of said accused when he testified and he is
obviously lying through his teeth. Manifest falsehood and
discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony seriously impair their
probative value and cast serious doubts on their credibility

A mere examination of the transcript of his testimony

convinces us of the hesitation and untruthfulness of his
testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details and correcting
himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The
content of the testimony was itself incredible. This Court finds
it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers
kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to
guard said victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping
syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling
activities in the regular meeting place, would invite a recent
affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that
Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her
hands tied.