WEBB V.

DE LEON - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

WEBB V. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

FACTS:

Accused Hubert Webb et. Al, the prime suspects of the sensational Visconde Rape with Homicide case filed petitions for the issuance of
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.
The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following:
(1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission
of the crime;
(2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S. Gaviola;
(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No.
808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip;
(4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;
(5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal
White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they
showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). The genital examination of Carmela
confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence
and Documents for the NBI to produce the documents he’s asking.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States
on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.
His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and
Pamela Francisco.
To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car.
while in the United States on said dates and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.
Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain
records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines
Flight No. 808.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending
that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents.
Judge Raul de Leon (J.Escano’s pairing judge) issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused because Judge Escano inhibited
himself to the case.
Webb, Lejano and Gatchalian voluntary surrendered to the police authorities.
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated.
They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements.
They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. T
hey also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and
inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
 ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT:
Respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them:
the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide;
the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and
the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

HELD

1. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges
should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject
petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule
requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

2. NO. The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.
Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-
blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement.
The DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she first executed the first statement
and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in
Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially especially so where there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith
and credit.
 As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of
mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents
which transpired;
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence
submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.
The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

3. NO. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.

Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing, second hearing, by filing a
"Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" , "Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the
Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" , "Comment and Manifestation", "Counter-Affidavit", and a "Motion to Resolve",
ETC.
Moreover, It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary investigation was to be
terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings.
The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted
more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the
rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional
evidence before the DOJ Panel.
This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall resolve the
case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the preliminary investigation simply
because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.

4. NO. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security
And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint or
Information.
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a
state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute
vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
G.R. Nos. 121039-45 October 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS
CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez,
affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 70 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding
accused-appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon and Pepito Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and additionally,
ordering each of them to pay the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two
victims as additional indemnity. While accused-appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito
Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration, it was only on December 6, 1999 that the Office
of the Solicitor General filed its Comment thereto. And since Justice Martinez had retired earlier on February 2,
1999, in accordance with A.M. No. 99-8-09 promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for
reconsideration filed by accused-appellants was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to
herein ponente for study and preparation of the appropriate action.

In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity
and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking
in credibility. He likewise contends that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis-à-vis his whereabouts on the
night of the felony should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan.
Lastly, Mayor Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the "gargantuan" damages awarded on the
ground that the same have no factual and legal bases.

In the same vein, accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their motion for
reconsideration, maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan have been sufficiently impeached by
prior inconsistent statements allegedly pertaining to material and crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that,
they assert that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events.

Preliminarily, it may be observed that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor Sanchez, accused-
appellants have not presented any issue new or different from that which they had previously raised before the trial
court and this Court. Moreover, the issues they have raised have been discussed at length and passed upon by
both the court a quo and by this Court. Thus, on the charge that accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity, in our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), we
declared:

We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field… The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality… Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we
 rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even
by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.

This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez, having failed, in his
motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. Not only that,
accused-appellant’s case has been exhaustively and painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant
Sanchez has not shown by an iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by
publicity in affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of conviction by publicity
leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.

As to the claim that witnesses Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were sufficiently impeached by
prior inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the least. It is hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court
and the appellate courts will respect these findings considering that trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial (People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 [2000]). In the instant case, then Judge Harriet Demetriou found both
Centeno and Malabanan to have testified in a frank, spontaneous, and straightforward manner; and that despite
gruelling cross-examination by a battery of defense lawyers, their testimony never wavered on the substantial
matters in issue.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say that the points raised
have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial court but also by the Court itself, and that the
inconsistencies were found to refer to minor and collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses’
declarations agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the
witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 [2000]). Accused-
appellants have not shown in their motions for reconsideration new evidence to warrant disregard for the above-rule,
nor have they shown that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and
circumstance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave Marie Sanchez, as to
his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and credence is likewise unavailing. While it is
true that statements of children are accorded great probative value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest
defense an accused can concoct. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but
scant consideration (People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]). Moreover, accused-appellant Sanchez’s alibi
cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution that he was at Erais Farm that fateful night. The
alibis of accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not having been
corroborated by any other evidence. The assertions of these accused-appellants as to their innocence are thus
entitled short shrift from this Court.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is, however, meritorious. The
trial court awarded the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil liability for the wrongful death of Eileen Sarmenta,
P106,650.00 for the funeral expenses they incurred, and P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmenta’s earning
capacity; or a total of P3,432,650.00 as actual damages. On the other hand, the Gomez family was awarded by the
trial court a total of P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as follows: P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of
Allan Gomez, P74,000.00 for the latter’s funeral, and P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latter’s earning capacity.

Similarly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the Sarmenta family and
another P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral damages. Lastly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to
pay the Sarmenta and Gomez families the sum of P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation expenses
incurred.
The Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. However, we also
ordered each accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional
indemnity of P350,000.00 each, stating that since each accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of
rape with homicide, jurisprudence dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable for civil indemnity of
P50,000.00, or a total of P350,000.00.

Since the trial court’s award of actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already included civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to pay an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity
would be "double recovery" of damages on the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or
omission. Thus, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount of
actual damages due to the Gomez and Sarmenta families.

As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577 [1997]) that "burial
expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever
presented in the instant case, its award will not be allowed." It is a settled rule that there must be proof that actual or
compensatory damages have been suffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA 784
[1999]). While the funeral expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by the appropriate receipts, the
same is not true for the funeral expenses incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount
of P74,000.00 awarded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce, be deleted. However, as the heirs
of Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This
award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the
purpose of indemnification (see People vs. Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).

The award of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning capacity of Sarmenta and
Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta, at the time of her death, was a graduating student of the
College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for
Large Animals. Allan Gomez was likewise a senior student of the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef
Production. The trial court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life expectancy of
Sarmenta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19 years old at the time of his death, at 39.1 and 40.6
years, respectively. Believing that the victims would have earned a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living
expenses of P8,000.00 per month, the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the amount
recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez families, respectively, for the loss of the earning capacity of Eileen and
Allan.

While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 are baseless in
fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to prove that the victims had any actual income at the time of their
demise, it is well-settled that to be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at
the time of injury or death, be gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings
but for loss of capacity to earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise, the fact that the prosecution did not
present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does
not preclude recovery of the same (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690
[1999]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother testified that Eileen had an offer for employment from Monterey
Farms. On the other hand, Allan Gomez’s mother testified that her deceased son planned to work on a private farm
after graduation.

Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the Court awarded
compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year medical student at UST,
stating that while his scholastic record may not have been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the
assumption that he could have finished the course, would have passed the board in due time, and that he could
have possibly earned as a medical practitioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00.

Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country’s leading educational institution in
agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have graduated in due course. Undeniably,
their untimely death deprived them of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are
entitled to compensation. Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmenta’s and Gomez’s lost time
and capacity to earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the time of death. While the law is clear
that the deceased has a right to his own time — which right cannot be taken from him by a tortfeasor without
compensation — the law is also clear that damages cannot be awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the
judge or the witnesses. In this case, Eileen Sarmenta’s mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic
salary was more or less P15,000.00 per month. Allan Gomez’s mother, on the other hand, testified that her son
could have easily gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per month. Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses are
speculative, insufficient to prove that in 1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a month
had they managed to graduate. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due time
from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than
the minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income
that the two would have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and
other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or P36,000.00/year). Hence, in accordance with the formula
adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta and Gomez’s earning capacity is to be computed as follows:

Net earning = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual

capacity Income – Living Expenses)
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 –
the age of the deceased)
Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
= 2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 – 36,000)
= 39.353 x 60,000
= P2,361,180.00
Heirs of Allan Gomez:
= 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 – 36,000)
= 40.687 x 60,000
= P2,441,220.00

As to the award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families, these must also be
reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of moral damages is left to the discretion of the court
according to the circumstances of each case (Article 2216, Civil Code), the purpose of moral damages is essentially
indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the
defendant’s culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits
of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (Dela
Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the
offender. The death caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the action
of a wealthy family. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the amount of moral damages awarded
to the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, the same is reasonable and justified, this case having dragged on for over eight years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for seven counts of rape
with homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with
MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims as follows:

To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:

1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Funeral expenses 106,650.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,361,180.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation 164,250.00
expenses
 Total P
3,982,080.00
To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Nominal damages 10,000.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,441,220.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation 191,000.00
expenses
Total P
3,992,220.00

SO ORDERED.