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A Detailed Examination of
Scientific Method
by Craig Rusbult, Ph.D.

This page takes a closer look at a variety of topics

that have been introduced in two introductory pages.
If you haven't done it yet, I suggest that you first
read The Simplicity of Basic Scientific Method
and An Overview of Scientific Method.

Most links in this page are italicized links that will keep you
inside the page and will be very fast, and (unless you're using
MS IE-Explorer for Mac) your browser's BACK-button will return
you to where you were. But the rare non-italicized links
open a new page in a new window, so this big page will remain
open in this window and you won't have to wait for it to relaod.

For easy navigation inside the page, there are three options:
A. click on any link in the brief Table of Contents below,
B. click on any element in the image-map that follows it, or
C. click on any link in the detailed Table of Contents.

1. empirical factors 4. evaluation of theory 7. problems and projects

2. conceptual factors 5. generation of theory 8. cultural thought styles
3. cultural-personal factors 6. generation of experiment 9. creativity & criticality

And at the end of this page, the main ideas in these 9 sections
are condensed in the introductory Overview of Scientific Method.
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Detailed Table of Contents

These links are all inside-the-page, even though (to make them easier to read) they're not
italicized.

Introduction: a disclaimer , coping with inconsistent terminology , the nine sections ,

and framework / elaboration.

1. Empirical Factors: experimental system , theories , supplementary theories ,

predictions , hypothetico-deductive logic , degree of agreement , degree of predictive
contrast , previous and current hypotheses.

2. Conceptual Factors: Simplicity (logical systematicity , simplified models , coping

with complexity , tensions between conflicting criteria , false but useful), Constraints on
Components (preferences and motivations , constraints on unobservable components),
Scientific Utility (theory structure and cognitive utility , alternative representations ,
simplification and cognition , a synthesis , cognitive utility and research utility ,
acceptance and pursuit , relaxed conceptual standards , utility in generating experiments ,
testability), External Relationships (overlapping domains and shared components ,
sharing a domain , external connections , levels of organization , theories with wide scope
, external relationships viewed as internal relationships , unification as a goal of science ,
moving from description to explanation , consilience with simplicity , a narrowing of
domains).

3. Cultural-Personal Factors: the joy of science , other psychological motives and

practical concerns , metaphysical worldviews and ideological principles , opinions of
"authorities" , social-institutional contexts , science affects culture and culture affects
science , personal consistency and feedback , thought styles , controversy.
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4. Theory Evaluation: delay , intrinsic status and relative status , variable-strength

conclusions and hypotheses , conflicts between criteria.

5. Theory Generation: selection and invention , retroduction and deduction ,

retroduction and hypothetico-deduction , domain-theories and system-theories ,
retroductive generalization , strategies for retro-generalizing , retroduction and induction ,
generation and evaluation , invention by revision , analysis and revision , internal
consistency , external relationships.

6. Experimental Design (Generation-and-Evaluation): field studies , goal-directed

design , learning about systems and theories , learning about experimental techniques ,
anomaly resolution , crucial experiments , heuristic experiments and demonstrative
experiments , logical strategies for experimental design , vicarious experimentation ,
customized design , taking advantage of opportunities , thought-experiments in design ,
four contexts for thought-experiments.

7. Goals and Actions in Problem Solving: preparation , goal-constraints , secondary

goals , primary goals , questions or objectives or problems , project formulation and
decision , action generation and evaluation , conclusion , persuasion , 3Ps and 4Ps ,
interactions between stages and activities , interactions between and within levels.

8. Thought Styles: a definition , effects on observation and interpretation , conceptual

ecology , a puzzle and a filter , the 4Ps and thought styles , variations , communities in
conflict.

9. Productive Thinking: motivation , memory , creativity and critical thinking.

OVERVIEW of Scientific Method (at end of this page)

DIAGRAM of Scientific Method (at end of this page)

Introduction
A DESERVEDLY HUMBLE DISCLAIMER.

Compared with my description of science in the "overview of scientific method" page,

this "details of scientific method" page is intended to be more complete, but not fully
complete. Each topic in my elaboration has been studied for years (or even lifetimes) by
numerous scholars. In many cases, ideas that I cover in a few paragraphs are the topic for
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an entire book, which can treat these ideas with greater detail and sophistication than in
my brief summary.

TRYING TO COPE WITH INCONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY.

In developing a model of Integrated Scientific Method (ISM), one major challenge was
the selection of words and meanings. If everyone used the same terms to describe
scientific methods, I would use these terms in ISM. Unfortunately, there is no consistent
terminology. Instead, there are important terms -- especially model, hypothesis, and
theory -- with many conflicting meanings, and meanings known by many names. Due to
this inconsistency, I have been forced to choose among competing alternatives. Despite
the linguistic confusion, over which I have no control, in the context of ISM I have tried
to use terms consistently, in ways that correspond reasonably well with their common
uses by scientists, philosophers, and educators. {details about terminology }

NINE SECTIONS.

The framework of ISM is divided into nine sections: three for evaluation factors
(empirical, conceptual, and cultural-personal), three for activities (evaluating theories,
generating theories, and experimental design), and one each for problem solving, thought
styles, and productive thinking. Sections 1-6 assume that during problem formulation
there already has been the selection of an area of nature to study; and in Sections 1-4 and
6, there is already a theory about this area.

FRAMEWORK and ELABORATION

. The "Goals of ISM" page makes a distinction between the ISM framework and an
elaboration of this framework by myself or by others. The overview describes the ISM
framework with minimal elaboration. In this "details" page there is lots of elaboration,
but much of this is a discussion of concepts that I consider a part of the ISM framework
because they are essential for accurately describing science. Therefore, the ISM
framework includes everything in the overview, and more. Perhaps in the future I will
try to define the precise content-and-structure of the ISM framework, but for now this
definition remains flexible, partly because my own concept of the framework keeps
changing as I continue to think about the methods used by scientists.

The following elaboration assumes the reader is familiar with the "Overview of
Scientific Method" as background knowledge. As a reminder, and so you can easily
review, at the beginning of each section there is a link to the corresponding description
(located at the end of this page) from the overview. And at the end of each section there
is a link to the Table of Contents at the top of this page.
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REFERENCES.

The references cited in this page are listed in another page.

1. Empirical Factors in Theory Evaluation

For a background foundation, read An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 1.

Theory evaluation based on observations, using hypothetico-deductive logic, is often

considered the foundation of scientific method. I agree.

EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEM

. In ISM, an experimental system is defined as everything involved in an experiment.

For example, when x-rays are used to study the structure of DNA, the system includes the
x-ray source, DNA, and x-ray detector/recorder, plus the physical context (such as the
bolts and plates used to fix the positions of the source, DNA, and detector).
Data is often collected more than once during an experiment. Early observations can
measure initial conditions that characterize the experimental system (such as x-ray
wavelength, and geometry of the source-DNA-detector setup) and are required to make
predictions. Later, to measure final conditions, scientists collect data (such as an x-ray
photograph) that is labeled "observations" in ISM.

THEORIES are humanly constructed representations intended to describe or describe-

and-explain a set of related phenomena in a specified domain of nature.
An explanatory theory guides the construction of models; each model is a
representation of a system's composition (what it is) and operation (what it does).
Composition includes a model's parts and their organization into larger structures.
Operation includes the actions of parts (or structures) and the interactions between parts
(or structures).
With a descriptive theory, a model describes only observable properties and their
relationships, and makes predictions about observable properties. A model can include a
partial composition-and-operation description of a system, but this is not required as a
necessary function of the theory.
An example of a descriptive theory is Newton's theory of gravitational force, which
does postulate compositional entities (bodies with mass) and causal interactions (each
body exerts an attractive force on the other), but does not describe a mechanism for the
interactions that cause the force, even though (using its equation, F = GMm/rr) it can
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make predictions that are usually quite accurate.

An example of an explanatory theory is atomic theory, which postulates unobservable
entities (protons, electrons,...) and interactions (nuclear, electromagnetic,...) in an effort to
explain observable properties. Questions about the legitimacy of postulating
"unobservables" has been one source of conceptual constraints for the types of
components used in scientific theories.
It can be useful to distinguish between descriptive and explanatory theories, even
though there is no distinct line; Newton's theory explains some, and atomic theory does
not explain all. And my simple treatment here is only a summary of the more
sophisticated analyses by philosophers who try to define what constitutes a satisfactory
explanation in science.

SUPPLEMENTARY THEORIES include, but are not limited to, theories used to
interpret observations. Shapere (1982) analyzes an "observation situation" as a 3-stage
process in which information is released by a source, is transmitted, and is received by a
receptor, with scientists interpreting this information according to their corresponding
theories of the source, the transmission process, and the receptor.
The label "supplementary" is based on assumptions about goals. For example, in the
early 1950s when "DNA chasers" were generating and evaluating theories for DNA
structure, this DNA theory was the main theory, while theories about x-rays (including
their generation, transmission, interaction with DNA, and detection) were the
supplementary theories. But these x-ray theories -- in a different context, during an
earlier period of science when the main goal was to develop x-ray theories -- were
considered to be the main theories.

PREDICTIONS.

By using a model that is based on a specified system and theory, scientists can make
predictions in more than one way: by logical deduction beginning with a composition-
and-operation model, by calculation, by "running a model" mentally or in a computer
simulation, or by inductive logic that assumes the results will be similar to those in
previous experiments with similar systems. If predictions can be made in several ways
for the same system, this will serve as a cross-check on the predictions and on the
predicting methods. {more on thought experiments}
It can be useful to think of combining two sources -- a general domain-theory (that
applies to all systems in a domain) and a specific system-theory (about the
characteristics of one system, especially about the initial system-conditions) -- in order to
predict the final system-conditions. Thinking in terms of a domain-theory and a system-
theory is also useful for the retroductive generation of ideas for a theory. { In additon to
"retroductive generation..." in Section 5, I've recently written more about how a domain-
theory and system-theory are combined to construct a model and make predictions, in the
Overview of Scientific Method. }

HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE LOGIC is represented, in the ISM diagram, with a

box (adapted from Giere, 1991) whose dual-parallel shape symbolizes two parallel
relationships --- between mental and physical experiments, and between model-system
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and prediction-observation similarities. This logic gets its name by combining

hypothetico (from the top of the box) with deductive (from the left side of the box).
{ The ISM definitions for model and hypothesis are also adapted from Giere (1991). }
Since predictions can be made using deductive logic and also inductive logic, should
we also think about the characteristics and uses of "hypothetico-inductive" logic?
Typically, during "if-then logic" based on an explanatory model (that proposes a
composition and operation), what are the relative contributions of deduction and
induction? And when we generalize by using the inductive logic that "if systems are
similar, then observations will be similar," how much deductive logic is being used when
we try to estimate how "similarities and differences in systems" will translate into
"similarities and differences in observations"? These questions are interesting, and they
will be pursued more thoroughly at a later time.

DEGREE OF AGREEMENT.

In formal logic, "deductive" inference implies certainty. But in scientific hypothetico-

deduction, deductive inference often produces probabilistic predictions. For example, a
genetics theory may predict that 25% of offspring will have a recessive variation of a
trait.
Often, observation also involves uncertainties, such as random fluctuations; and data
collection may involve subjective decisions such as assigning specimens into categories.
For many experiments, a reliable estimate for degree of agreement requires the use of
sophisticated techniques for data analysis that take into account the sample size,
variability, and representativeness, and the statistical nature of predictions and
observations. These techniques produce a probabilistic answer, not a simple yes or no.
For example, scientists could estimate the agreement for a theory that a certain variation
is recessive, when 4 of 20 offspring (instead of the predicted 5-of-20) have this variation.

DEGREE OF PREDICTIVE CONTRAST can help a critical thinker decide whether it

is valid to infer that an agreement (between prediction and observation) indicates a
similarity (between model and system). It is necessary to challenge this inference
because, according to basic principles of logic, when a theory predicts that "if T, then P"
and P is observed, this does not prove T is true.
For example, consider a theory that Chicago is in Wisconsin, which produces the
deductive prediction that "if Chicago is in Wisconsin, then Chicago is in the United
States." When a geographer confirms that Chicago is in the U.S., does this prove the
theory is true? No, because alternative theories, such as "Chicago is in Illinois" and
"Chicago is in Iowa," make the same correct prediction.
Another example is used by Sober (1991), who describes one way to test a theory that
John is an Olympic weightlifter; you ask John to lift a hat. The Olympic Weightlifter
Theory (OW) predicts that he can lift the hat, and he does. But plausible alternative
theories (like "John is a 98-pound weakling, not an Olympic weightlifter") predict the
same result, so this experiment offers little support for OW despite its correct prediction.
In an effort to cope with the logical limitations of considering only agreement, a
scientist can ask any of five roughly equivalent questions:
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"Was the prediction likely to agree with the data even if the model under
consideration does not provide a good fit to the real world?" (Giere, 1991, p. 38)
Would the results be surprising if the model was not a good representation of
the system? (this question applies the "Surprise Principle" of Sober, 1991)
Should an agreement between predictions and observations elicit a response of
"So what?" or "Wow!" ?
To what extent does the experiment provide a crucial test that can discriminate
between this theory and alternative theories?
What is the degree of contrast between the predictions of this theory and the
predictions of plausible alternative theories?

For any experiment, a degree of predictive contrast can be estimated by asking one or
more of these five questions. For example, the results of the hat-lifting experiment are
likely to occur even if OW is false, so we wouldn't be surprised by this observation even
if OW was false, and a response of "so what" is justified; the experiment does not
discriminate between theories, because there is no contrast between the predictions of
OW and the predictions of plausible alternative theories.
A consideration of predictive contrast is useful because it functions as a
counterbalance to the skeptical principle that a theory is not proved by agreement
between predictions and observations. Despite the impossibility of proof, the status of a
theory increases when it is difficult to imagine any other plausible theory that could make
the same correct predictions. Of course, an apparent lack of alternative explanations
could be illusory, due to a lack of imagination, but scientists usually assume that a high
degree of predictive contrast increases the justifiable confidence in a claim that there is a
connection between a prediction-observation agreement and a model-system similarity.

PREVIOUS AND CURRENT HYPOTHESES

An empirical evaluation should include all experiments, past and present that seem
relevant for achieving the goals of the evaluators. When they generate a theory from
multiple sources of data, scientists use art and logic.

Table of Contents

2. Conceptual Factors in Theory Evaluation

An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 2

A theory is constructed from components that are propositions used to describe

empirical patterns [in a descriptive theory] or to construct composition-and-operation
models [in an explanatory theory] for a system's composition (what it is) and operation
(what it does).
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ISM follows Laudan (1977) in making a distinction between empirical factors and
conceptual factors, and between conceptual factors that are internal and external. Internal
conceptual factors (regarding components and logical structure) involve the
characteristics and logical interrelationships of a theory's own components, while external
conceptual factors are the external relationships between a theory's components and the
components of other theories (either scientific or cultural-personal). Because this is such
a long section, it is split into four parts: three to discuss internal characteristics
(simplicity, constraints, utility), and one for external relationships.

2A. Simplicity
LOGICAL SYSTEMATICITY.

To illustrate logical structure, Darden (1991) compares two theories that claim to
explain the same data; T1 contains an independent theory component for every data
point, while T2 contains only a few logically interlinked components. Even if both
theories have the same empirical adequacy, most scientists will prefer T2 due to its
logical structure.
When one component is not logically connected to other components, it is usually
considered an ad hoc appendage that makes a theory less logically systematic and less
desirable. If scientists perceive T1 as an inelegant patchwork of ad hoc components that
have no apparent function except to achieve empirical agreement with old data, they will
not be impressed with T1's predictions, and will they not expect T1 to successfully
predict new data.
Another perspective: T1 has specialized components, by contrast with the generalized
components of T2.
Internal consistency, with logical agreement among a theory's components, is highly
valued. Systematicity is weakened by an independence of components (with no
relationships) as in T1, but inconsistency among components (with bad relationships) is
the ultimate non-systematicity.

SIMPLIFIED MODELS.

Even though a complete model of a real-world experimental system would have to

include everything in the universe, a more useful model is obtained by constructing a
simplified representation that includes only the relevant entities and interactions, omitting
everything whose effect on the outcome is considered negligible.
For example, when scientists construct a model for a system of x-rays interacting with
DNA, they will ignore (implicitly, without even considering the possibility) the bending
of x-rays that is caused by the gravitational pull of Pluto. Or scientists can make an
explicit decision to simplify a model.
One simplifying strategy is to construct a family of models (Giere, 1988) that are
variations on a basic theme --- for example, by starting with a stripped-down model as a
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first approximation, and then making adjustments. When applying Newton's Theory to a
falling object, a stripped-down model might ignore the effects of air resistance and the
change in gravitational force as the ball changes altitude. For some purposes this
simplified model is sufficient. And if scientists want a more complete model, they can
include one or more "correction factors" that previously were ignored. The inclusion of
different factors produces a family of models with varying degrees of completeness, each
useful for a different situation and objective.
For example, if a bowling ball is dropped from a height of 2 meters, air resistance can
be ignored unless one needs extremely accurate predictions. But when a tennis ball falls
50 meters, predictions are significantly inaccurate if air resistance is ignored. And a
rocket will not make it to the moon based on models (used for making calculations) that
do not include air resistance and the variation of gravity with altitude. In comparing
these situations there are two major variables: the weighting of factors (which depends
on goals), and degrees of predictive contrast. Weighting of factors: for the moon rocket
a demand for empirical accuracy is more important than the advantages of conceptual
simplicity, but for most bowling ball scenarios the opposite is true. Predictive contrast:
for the rocket there is a high degree of predictive contrast between alternative theories
(one theory with air resistance and gravity variations, the other without) and the complex
theory makes predictions that are more accurate, but for the bowling ball there is a low
degree of predictive contrast between these theories, so empirical evaluation does not
significantly favor either model.

COPING WITH COMPLEXITY.

A common strategy for developing a simple theory about a complex system is to

tolerate a reduction in empirical adequacy. For example, Galileo was able to develop a
mathematical treatment of physics because he was willing to relax the constraints
imposed by demands for empirical accuracy; he did not try to obtain an exact agreement
with observations. His approach to theorizing -- by focusing on the analysis of imaginary
idealized systems -- was controversial because Galileo and his critics disagreed about the
fundamental goals of science, because Galileo challenged the traditional criterion that
exact empirical agreement was a necessary condition for an adequate theory. In this area,
Galileo and his critics disagreed about the fundamental goals of science.

TENSIONS BETWEEN CONFLICTING CRITERIA.

These conflicts are common. For example, in a famous statement of simplicity known as
Occam's Razor -- "entities should not be multiplied, except from necessity" -- a
preference for ontological economy ("entities should not be multiplied") can be overcome
by necessity. But evaluation of "necessity," such as judging whether a theory revision is
improvement or ad hoc tinkering, is often difficult, and may require a deep understanding
of a theory and its domain, plus sophisticated analysis.
A common reason for non-simplicity is a desire for empirical adequacy, since
including additional components in a theory may help it predict observations more
accurately and consistently. Another reason is to construct a more complete model for
the composition and operation of systems.
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Sometimes, however, there is a decision to decrease completeness in order to achieve

certain types of goals. In this situation, although scientists know their model is being
made less complete, whatever loss occurs due to simplification (and it may not be much)
is compared with the benefits gained, in an attempt to seek a balance, to construct a
theory that is optimally accurate-and-useful. Potential benefits of simplification may
include an increase in cognitive utility by making a model easier to learn and use, or by
focusing attention on the essential aspects of a model.
If it is constructed skillfully, with wise decisions about including and excluding
components, a theory that is more complete is usually more empirically adequate. But
not always. A model can be over-simplified by omitting relevant factors that should be
included, or it can be over-complicated by including factors that should be omitted. Due
to the latter possibility, sometimes simplifying a complex model will produce a model
that makes more accurate predictions for new experimental systems, as explained by
Forster & Sober (1994).

FALSE BUT USEFUL.

Wimsatt (1987) discusses some ways that a false model can be scientifically useful.
Even if a model is wrong, it may inspire the design of interesting experiments. It may
stimulate new ways of thinking that lead to the critical examination and revision (or
rejection) of another theory. It may stimulate a search for empirical patterns in data. Or
it may serve as a starting point; by continually refining and revising a false model,
perhaps a better model can be developed.
Many of Wimsatt's descriptions of utility involve a model that is false due to an
incomplete description of components for entities, actions, or interactions. When the
erroneous predictions of an incomplete model are analyzed, this can provide information
about the effects of components that have been omitted or oversimplified. For example,
to study how "damping force" affects pendulum motion, scientists can design a series of
experimental systems, and for each system they compare their observations with the
predictions of several models (each with a different characterization of the damping
force); then they can analyze the results, in order to evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of each characterization. Or consider the Castle-Hardy-Weinberg Model
for population genetics, which assumes an idealized system that never occurs in nature;
deviations from the model's predictions indicate possibilities for evolutionary change in
the gene pool of a population.

Table of Contents

2B. Constraints on Components

PREFERENCES and MOTIVATIONS.

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Scientific communities develop preferences for the types of components that should
(and should not) be used in a theory. For example, prior to 1609 when Kepler introduced
elliptical planetary orbits, it was widely believed that in astronomical theories all motions
should be in circles with constant speed. This belief played a role in motivating
Copernicus:

Copernicus attacks the Ptolemaic astronomy not because in it the sun moves
rather than the earth, but because Ptolemy has not strictly adhered to the precept
that all celestial motions must be explained only by uniform circular motions or
combinations of such circular motions. ... It has been generally believed that
Copernicus's insistence on uniform circular motion is part of a philosophical or
metaphysical dogma going back to Plato. (Cohen, 1985; pp 112-113)

In every field there are implicit and explicit constraints on theory components --- on
the types of entities, actions and interactions to include in a theory's models for
composition and operation. These constraints can be motivated by beliefs about ontology
(after asking "Does it exist?") or utility (by asking "Will it be useful for doing science?").
For example, an insistence on uniform circular motion could be based on the ontological
belief that celestial bodies never move in noncircular motion, or on the utilitarian
rationale that using noncircular motions makes it more difficult to do calculations.

CONSTRAINTS ON UNOBSERVABLE COMPONENTS.

A positivist believes that scientific theories should not postulate the existence of
unobservable entities, actions, or interactions. For example, behaviorist psychology
avoids the concept of "thinking" because it cannot be directly observed. A strict
positivist will applaud Newton's theory of gravitation, despite its lack of a causal
explanatory mechanism, because it is an empirical generalization that is reliable and
approximately accurate, and it does not postulate (as do more recent theories of gravity)
unobservable entities such as fields, curved space, or gravitons. But most scientists,
although they appreciate Newton's descriptive theory for what it is, consider the absence
of explanation to be a weakness.
some comments about terminology: Positivism was proposed in the 1830s by Auguste
Comte, who was motivated partly by anti-religious ideology. In the early 20th century a
philosophy of logical positivism was developed to combine positivism with other ideas.
In current use, "positivism" can be used in a narrow sense (as Comte did and as I do
here) or it can refer to anything connected with logical positivism, including the "other
ideas" and more. Logical positivism can also be called logical empiricism. {Notice that
empiricism (i.e., positivism) is not the same as empirical. A theory that is non-empiricist
(because it contains some components, such as atoms or molecules, that are
unobservable) can make predictions about empirical data that can be used in empirical
evaluation. }
Although positivism (or empiricism, the name typically given to current versions) is
considered a legitimate perspective in philosophy, it is rare among scientists, who
welcome a wide variety of ways to describe and explain. Many modern theories include
unobservable entities and actions, such as electrons and electromagnetic force, among
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their essential components. Although most scientists welcome a descriptive theory that
only describes empirical patterns, at this point they think "we're not there yet" because
their limited theory is seen as just a temporary stage along the path to a more complete
theory. This attitude contrasts with the positivist view that a descriptive theory should be
the ending point for science.
The ISM framework includes two types of theories (and corresponding models) --
descriptive and explanatory -- so it is compatible with any type of scientific theory,
whether it is descriptive, explanatory, or has some characteristics of each. My own anti-
positivist opinions, which are not part of the ISM framework, are summarized in the
preceding paragraph, and are discussed in more depth on a page that asks Should
Scientific Method be Eks-Rated?

Table of Contents

2C. Scientific Utility

Theory evaluation can focus on plausibility or utility by asking "Is the theory an
accurate representation of nature?" or "Is it useful?" This section will discuss the second
question by describing scientific utility in terms of cognitive utility (for inspiring and
facilitating productive thinking about a theory's components and applications) and
research utility (for stimulating and guiding theoretical or experimental research).
Theory evaluation based on utility is personalized --- it will depend on point of view and
context, because goals vary among scientists, and can change from one context to
another.

THEORY STRUCTURE and COGNITIVE UTILITY.

Differences in theory structure can produce differences in cognitive structuring and

problem-solving utility, and will affect the harmony between a theory and the thinking
styles -- due to heredity, personal experience, and cultural influence -- of a scientist or a
scientific community. If competing theories differ in logical structure, evaluation will be
influenced by scientists' affinity for the structure that more closely matches their
preferred styles of thinking.

ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS.

Even for the same theory, representations can differ. For example, a physics theory can
symbolically represent a phenomenon by words (such as "the earth orbits the sun in an
approximately elliptical orbit"), a visual representation (a diagram or animation depicting
the sun and the orbiting earth), or an equation (using mathematical symbolism for objects
and actions). More generally, Newtonian theory can be described with simple algebra (as
in most introductory courses), by using calculus, or with a variety of advanced
mathematical techniques such as Hamiltonians or tensor analysis; and each mathematical
formulation can be supplemented by a variety of visual and verbal explanations, and
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illustrative examples. Similarly, the same theory of quantum mechanics can be

formulated in two very different ways: as particle mechanics by using matrix algebra, or
as wave mechanics by using wave equations.
Although two formulations of a theory may be logically equivalent, differing
representations will affect how the theory is perceived and used. There will be
differences in the ease of translation into mental models (i.e., in ease of learning), in the
types of mental models formed, and in approaches to problem solving. Often, cognitive
utility depends on problem-solving context. For example, an algebraic version of
Newtonian physics may be the easiest way to solve a simple problem, while a
Hamiltonian formulation will be more useful for solving a complex astronomy problem
involving the mutually influenced motions of three celestial bodies. Or consider how an
alternate representation -- made by defining the mathematical terms "force x distance"
and "mvv/2" as the verbal terms "work" and "energy" -- allows the cognitive flexibility of
being able to think in terms of an equation or a work-energy conversion, or both.

SIMPLIFICATION and COGNITION.

If a theory is formulated at differ levels of simplification, these representations will

differ in both logical content and cognitive utility. A more complete representation will
(if the mind can cope with it) produce mental models that are more complete; and in
some contexts these models will be more useful for solving problems. But in other
contexts a simpler formulation may be more useful. For example, a simpler model may
help to focus attention on those features of a system that are considered especially
important.
In designing models that will be used by humans with limited cognitive capacities,
there is a tension between the conflicting requirements of completeness and simplicity. It
is easier for our minds to cope with a model that is simpler than the complex reality. But
for models in which predicting or data processing is done by computers, there is a change
in capacities for memory storage and computing speed, so the level and nature of
optimally useful complexity will change. High-speed computers can allow the use of
models -- for numerical analysis of data, or for doing thought-experiment simulations (of
weather, ecology, business...) -- that would be too complex and difficult if computations
had to be done by a person.

A SYNTHESIS?

Philosophy of science and cognitive psychology overlap in areas such as the structuring
of scientific theories (studied by philosophers) and the structuring and construction of
mental models (studied by psychologists). Research in this exciting area of synthesis is
currently producing many insights that are helping us understand the process of thinking
in science, and that will be useful for improving education.

COGNITIVE UTILITY and RESEARCH UTILITY.

Of course, these two aspects of scientific utility are related. In particular, cognitive
utility plays an important role in making a theory useful for doing research.
 15

ACCEPTANCE and PURSUIT.

Laudan (1977) observes that even when a theory has weaknesses, and evaluation
indicates that it is not yet worthy of acceptance (of being treated as if it were true),
scientists may rationally view this theory as worthy of pursuit (for exploration and
development by further research) if it shows promise for stimulating new experimental or
theoretical research:

Scientists have investigated and pursued theories or research traditions which

were patently less acceptable, less worthy of belief, than their rivals. Indeed, the
emergence of virtually every new research tradition occurs under just such
circumstances. ... A scientist can often be working alternately in two different,
and even mutually inconsistent research traditions. (Laudan, 1977; p. 110,
emphasis in original)

Laudan suggests that when scientists judge whether a theory is worthy of pursuit,
instead of just looking at its momentary adequacy, they study its rate of progress and
potential for improvement. Making a distinction between acceptance and pursuit is
useful when thinking about scientific utility, because a theory can have a low status for
acceptance, but a high status for pursuit. If a theory is judged to be worthy of pursuit but
not acceptance, it needs development but it shows enough promise to be considered
worth the effort.

RELAXED CONCEPTUAL STANDARDS.

According to Darden (1991) it may be scientifically useful to evaluate mature and

immature theories differently. In a mature theory, scientists typically want components
to be clearly defined and logically consistent. But in an immature theory that is being
developed, there are advantages to temporarily relaxing expectations for clarity and
consistency:

Working out the logical relations between components may require some period
of time. And it may even be useful to consider generating hypotheses inconsistent
with some other component; maybe the other component is the problematic one.
(Darden, 1991; p. 258)

For a developing theory, some criteria are less rigorous, but other characteristics --
such as a flexibility that allows easy revision, and extendability for adapting to a
widening domain -- may be more important than in a mature theory.

UTILITY IN GENERATING EXPERIMENTS.

A new theory can promote research by offering a new perspective on the composition
and operation of experimental systems, and by inspiring ideas for new systems and
techniques. { Of course, even after a theory has passed through the pursuit phase and is
generally accepted, there may be opportunities for experimenting (to explore the old
 16

theory's application for new systems) and theorizing. But often the opportunities for
exciting research are more plentiful with a new theory. }

TESTABILITY.

Usually, to stimulate experimentation a theory must predict observable outcomes. Even

when theory components are unobservable and thus cannot be tested by direct
observation, they can be indirectly tested if they make predictions about observable
properties. These predictions fulfill the practical requirement, in hypothetico-deductive
logic, for testability --- which requires predictions that can be compared with
observations. Testability is useful for scientifically evaluating a theory's plausibility, but
it is not logically related to whether or not a theory is true. And even if a theory is not
empirically testable, it can be scientifically useful if it contributes to a more accurate
critical evaluation of other theories.

Table of Contents

2D. External Relationships

OVERLAPPING DOMAINS and SHARED COMPONENTS. The external
relationships between scientific theories can be defined along two dimensions: the
overlap between domains, and the sharing of theory components. If two theories
never make claims about the same experimental systems, their domains do not overlap;
if, in addition, the two theories do not share any components for their models, then these
theories are independent. But if there is an overlapping of domains or a sharing of
components, or both, there will be external relationships.

SHARING A DOMAIN. If two theories with overlapping domains construct different

models for the same real-world experimental system, these are alternative theories in
competition with each other, whether or not they differ in empirical predictions about the
system. In this competition, the intensity of conceptual conflict increases if there is a
large overlap of domains, and a large difference in components for models. { There can
also be conflict (which may or may not be conceptual) if there is a contrast in
predictions. }
Usually, as in the case of oxidative phosphorylation, one theory emerges as the clear
winner after a period of conflict. But not always. For example,

In the late nineteenth century, natural selection and isolation were viewed as rival
explanations for the origin of new species; the evolutionary synthesis showed that
the two processes were compatible and could be combined to explain the splitting
of one gene pool into two. (Darden, 1991, p. 269)

Of course, a declaration that "both factors contribute to speciation" is not the end of
inquiry. Scientists can still analyze an evolutionary episode to determine the roles played
 17

by each factor. They can also debate the importance of each factor in long-term
evolutionary scenarios involving many species. And there can be an effort to develop
theories that more effectively combine these factors and their interactions.
A different type of coexistence occurs with Valence Bond theory and Molecular
Orbital theory, which each use different types of simplifying approximations in order to
apply the core principles of quantum mechanics for describing the characteristics of
molecules. Each approach has advantages, and the choice of a preferred theory depends
on the situation: the molecule being studied, and the objectives; the abilities, experience,
and thinking styles of scientists; or the computing power available for numerical
analyses. Or perhaps both theories can be used. In many ways they are complementary
descriptions, as in "The Blind Men and the Elephant," with each theory providing a
useful perspective. This type of coexistence (where two theories provide two
perspectives) contrasts with the coexistence in speciation (where two theories are
potential co-agents in causation) and with the non-coexistence in oxidative
phosphorylation (where one theory has vanquished its former competitors).

SHARING A COMPONENT. The preceding subsection describes the competition that

occurs when two theories construct different models for the same system. By contrast, in
this subsection the same type of theory component is used in models constructed for
different systems.
Even if two theories do not claim the same domain, there is conflict if both theories
contain the same type of component but disagree about its characteristics. For example,
in the late 1800s a thermodynamic theory, based on the earth's rate of cooling, contained
a component for time; and this time had to be less than 100 million years, in order to
correctly predict the known observations. But theories in geology and evolutionary
biology constructed theories that required, as an essential component, an earth that is
much older than this time interval.
For awhile this conflict motivated adjustments, mainly for theories in geology and
biology. But in 1903 the discovery of radioactive decay radioactive decay -- which
provides a large source of energy to counteract the earth's cooling -- modified the
characterization of the earth as an experimental system. With this newly revised system
and the unchanged theory of thermodynamics, a calculation showed the earth to be much
older, consistent with the original theories in geology and biology.

When two or more theories are in conflict, as described above, there is a conceptual
difficulty for all of the theories, but especially for those in which scientists have less
confidence. Conversely, agreement about the characteristics of shared components can
lend support to these components. For example, many currently accepted theories
contain, as an essential component, time intervals of long duration. Physical processes
occur during this time, and these processes are necessary for empirical adequacy in
explaining observations; if the time-component is changed to a shorter time (such as the
10,000 years suggested by young-earth creationists) the result will be erroneous
predictions about a wide range of phenomena. Theories containing an old-earth
component span a wide range, with domains that include ancient fossil reefs, sedimentary
rock formations (with vertical changes), seafloor spreading (with horizontal changes) and
continental drift, magnetic reversals, radioactive dating, genetic molecular clocks,
 18

paleontology, formation and evolution of stars, distances to far galaxies, and cosmology.
In a wide variety of theories, the same type of component (for amount of time) always
has the same general value: a very long time. This provides support for the shared
component -- an old earth (and an old universe) -- and this support increases because an
old earth is an essential component of many theories that in other ways, such as the
domains they claim and the other components they use, are relatively independent. This
independence makes it less likely -- compared with a situation where two theories are
closely related and share many essential components, or where the plausibility of each
theory depends on the plausibility of the other theory -- that suspicions of circular
reasoning are justified. { Of course, the relationships that do exist between these old-
earth theories can be considered when evaluating the amount of circularity in the support
claimed for the shared component. }

But in these theories, is the age of the earth a component or a conclusion? It depends
on perspective. In most cases the age can be viewed as a conclusion reached by "solving
an equation" (such as the one describing the earth's rate of cooling) for time; all of the
theories claim to describe the same type of phenomenon (involving time), so they share a
domain rather than a component. But it also makes sense to think of time as a component
because, in each case, time is one aspect of a theory whose main goal is to explain the
phenomenon being studied -- a fossil reef, rock formation, seafloor spreading,... -- not to
explain the time. Or perhaps the long time-interval can be viewed as a supplementary
theory that in each area is needed to produce adequate models. With any of these
perspectives, the conclusion (of strong support for a long period of time) is similar.

EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS. In each example above, there was a connection

between theories due to an overlapping domain or a shared component. The remainder of
this subsection will examine different types of connections between theories, and the
process of trying to create connections between theories.

LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION. Theories with a shared component can differ in their

level of organization, and in the function of the shared component within each theory.
For example, biological phenomena are studied at many levels -- molecules, cells, tissues,
organs, organisms, populations, ecological systems -- and each level shares components
with other levels. Cells, which at one level are models constructed from smaller
molecular components, can function as components in models for the larger tissues,
organs, or organisms that serve as the focus for other levels. Or, in a theory of structural
biochemistry an enzyme might be a model (with attention focused on the enzyme's
structural composition) that is built from atomic components and their bonding
interactions, while in a theory of physiological biochemistry this enzyme (but now with
the focus on its operations, on its chemical actions and interactions) would be a
component used to build a model.

THEORIES WITH WIDE SCOPE. Another type of relationship occurs when one
theory is a subset of another theory, as with DNA structure and atomic theory. During
the development of a theory for DNA structure, scientists assumed the constraint that
DNA must conform to the known characteristics of the atoms (C, H, O, N, P) and
 19

molecules (cytosine,...) from which it is constructed. When Watson and Crick

experimented with different types of physical scale models, they tried to be creative, yet
they worked within the constraints defined by atomic theory, such as atom sizes, bond
lengths, bond angles, and the characteristics of hydrogen bonding. And when describing
their DNA theory in a 900-word paper (Watson & Crick, 1953) they assumed atomic
theory as a foundation that did not need to be explained or defended; they merely
described how atomic theory could be used to explain the structure of DNA.
There is nothing wrong with a narrow-scope theory about DNA structure, but many
scientists want science to eventually construct "simple and unified" mega-theories with
wide scope, such as atomic theory. Newton was applauded for showing that the same
laws of motion (and the same gravitational force) operate in a wide domain that includes
apparently unrelated phenomena such as an apple falling from a tree and the moon
orbiting our earth, thus unifying the fields of terrestrial and celestial mechanics. And
compared with a conjunction of two independent theories, one for electromagnetic forces
and another for weak forces, a unified electro-weak theory is considered more elegant
and impressive due to its wide scope and simplifying unity.

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS viewed as INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS. By

analogy with a theory composed of smaller components, a unified mega-theory is
composed of smaller theories. And just as there are internal relationships between
components that comprise a theory, by analogy there are internal relationships between
theories that comprise a mega-theory. But these relationships between theories, which
from the viewpoint of the mega-theory are internal, are external when viewed from the
perspective of the theories. In this way it is possible to view external relationships as
internal relationships.
This treatment assumes that it can be useful (even if sometimes difficult) to distinguish
between levels of theorizing --- between components, sub-theories, theories, and mega-
theories. When these distinctions are made, in some cases the same types of relationships
that exist between two lower levels (such as components and sub-theories) will also exist
between other levels (such as components and theories, sub-theories and theories, or
theories and mega-theories).
I have found the analogy between internal and external relationships to be useful for
thinking about the connections between levels of theorizing. At a minimum, it has
prevented me from becoming too comfortable with the labels "internal" and "external".
And when these simple labels no longer seem sufficient, there is a tendency for thinking
to become less dichotomous, which often stimulates a more flexible and careful
consideration of what is really involved in each relationship. This heightened awareness
is especially useful when considering the larger questions of how theories relate to each
other and interact to form the structure of a scientific discipline, and how disciplines
interact to form the structure of science as a whole.

UNIFICATION AS A GOAL OF SCIENCE. It is doubtful whether constructing a

Grand Unified Theory of Everything -- so that eventually sociology can be explained in
terms of elementary particle physics -- is possible (O'Hear, 1989). And it is rarely a
worthy goal in terms of scientific utility; at the present time, in most fields, most
scientists will perform more useful research if they are not working directly on
 20

constructing a mega-theory to connect all levels of science. But making connections at

low and intermediate levels of theorizing can be practical and important.

MOVING FROM DESCRIPTION TO EXPLANATION. Often, a known empirical

pattern is converted into an explanatory theory when a composition-and-operation
mechanism is proposed. For example, Newton's physics explained the earlier descriptive
theory of Kepler, regarding the elliptical orbits of planets. Another descriptive theory,
the Ideal Gas Law (with PV = nRT), was later explained by deriving it from Newtonian
statistical mechanics. And the structure of the Periodic Table, originally derived in the
late 1800s by inductive analysis of empirical data for chemical reactivities, with no
credible theoretical mechanism to explain it, was later derived from a few fundamental
principles of quantum mechanics. Explaining the Periodic Table was not the original
motivation for developing quantum theory; instead, it was a pleasant surprise that
provided support for the newly developed theory. And because quantum mechanics also
explained many other phenomena, over a wide range of domains, it has served as a
powerful unifying theory.

CONSILIENCE WITH SIMPLICITY. The concept of consilience, which is a way to

define the size of a theory's domain, depends on the number of "classes of facts" (not just
the number of facts) explained by a theory. Making a useful estimate of consilience often
requires sophisticated knowledge of a domain, because it requires categorizing raw data
into classes, and judging the relative importance of these classes.
Usually scientists want to increase the consilience of a theory, but this is less
impressive when it is done by sacrificing simplicity. An extreme example of ad hoc
revision was described earlier; theory T1 achieves consilience over a large domain by
having an independent theory component for every data point in the domain. But
defining a collection of unrelated components as "a theory" is not a way to construct a
simple consilient theory, and scientists are not impressed by this type of pseudo-
unification. There is too much room for wiggling and waffling, so each extra component
is viewed as a new "fudge factor" tacked onto a weak theory.
By contrast, consider Newton's postulate that the same gravitational force, governed by
the same principles, operates in such widely divergent systems as a falling apple and an
orbiting moon. Newton's bold step, which achieved a huge increase in consilience
without any decrease in simplicity, was viewed as an impressive unification.
Although "consilience with simplicity" can be a useful guideline, it should be used
wisely. Simplicity is not the only virtue (and sometimes it is not a virtue at all), so the
unique characteristics of each situation should be carefully considered when judging the
value of an attempted unification.

A NARROWING OF DOMAINS. Sometimes, instead of seeking a wider scope, the

best strategy is to decrease the size of the domain claimed for a theory.
For example, in 1900 when Mendel's theory of genetics was rediscovered, it was
assumed that a theory of Mendelian Dominance applied to all traits for all organisms.
But further experimentation showed that for some traits the predictions made by this
theory were incorrect. Scientists resolved these anomalies, not by revising their theory,
but by redefining its scope in order to place the troublesome observations outside the
 21

domain of Dominance. Their initial theory was thus modified into a sub-theory with a
narrower scope, and other sub-theories were invented for parts of the original domain not
adequately described by dominance. Eventually, these sub-theories were combined to
construct an overall mega-theory of genetics that, compared with the initial theory of
dominance, had the same wide scope, with greater empirical adequacy but less simplicity.
Two types of coexistence: when each competing theory describes a causal factor, or
when each provides a useful perspective. A third type of coexistence, described in the
paragraph above, is when sub-theories that are in competition (because they describe the
same type of phenomena) "split up" the domain claimed by a mega-theory that contains
both sub-theories as components; each sub-theory has its own sub-domain (consisting of
those systems in which the sub-theory is valid) within the larger domain of the mega-
theory.
Newtonian Physics is another theory whose initially wide domain (every system in the
universe!) has been narrowed. This change occurred in two phases. In 1905 the theory
of special relativity declared that Newton's theory is not valid for objects moving at high
speed. And in 1925, quantum mechanics declared that it is not valid for objects with
small mass, such as electrons. Each of these new theories could derive Newtonian
Physics as a special case; within the domain where Newtonian Physics was
approximately valid, its predictions were duplicated by special relativity (for slow
objects) and by quantum mechanics (for high-mass objects). But the reverse was not
true; special relativity and quantum mechanics could not be derived from Newton's
theories, which made incorrect predictions for fast objects and low-mass objects.

Even though quantum mechanics is currently considered valid for all systems, it is
self-limited in an interesting way. For some questions the theory's answer is that "I
refuse to answer the question" or "the answer cannot be known." But a response of "no
comment" is better than answers that are confidently clear yet wrong, such as those
offered by the earlier Bohr Model. Some of the non-answers offered by quantum
mechanics imply that there are limits to human knowledge. This may be frustrating to
some people, but if that is the way nature is, then it is better for scientists to admit this (in
their theories) and to say "sorry, we don't know that and we probably never will."

Table of Contents

3. Cultural-Personal Factors in Theory Evaluation

An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 3

THE JOY OF SCIENCE. For most scientists, a powerful psychological motivation is

curiosity about "how things work" and a taste for intellectual stimulation. The joy of
scientific discovery is captured in the following excerpts from letters between two
scientists involved in the development of quantum mechanics: Max Planck (who opened
 22

the quantum era in 1900) and Erwin Schrodinger (who formulated a successful quantum
theory in 1926).

[Planck, in a letter to Schrodinger, says] "I am reading your paper in the way a
curious child eagerly listens to the solution of a riddle with which he has struggled
for a long time, and I rejoice over the beauties that my eye discovers."
[Schrodinger replies by agreeing that] "everything resolves itself with
unbelievable simplicity and unbelievable beauty, everything turns out exactly as
one would wish, in a perfectly straightforward manner, all by itself and without
forcing."

OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES and PRACTICAL CONCERNS. Most

scientists try to achieve personal satisfaction and professional success by forming
intellectual alliances with colleagues and by seeking respect and rewards, status and
power in the form of publications, grant money, employment, promotions, and honors.
When a theory (or a request for research funding) is evaluated, most scientists will be
influenced by the common-sense question, "How will the result of this evaluation affect
my own personal and professional life?" Maybe a scientist has publicly taken sides on an
issue and there is ego involvement with a competitive desire to "win the debate"; or time
and money has been invested in a theory or research project, and there will be higher
payoffs, both practical and psychological, if there is a favorable evaluation by the
scientific community. In these situations, when there is a substantial investment of
personal resources, many scientists will try to use logic and "authority" to influence the
process and result of evaluation.

METAPHYSICAL WORLDVIEWS. Metaphysics forms a foundation for some

conceptual factors, such as criteria for the types of entities and interactions that should be
used in theories. One example, described earlier, was the preference by many
astronomers, including Copernicus, for using only circular motions at constant speed in
their theories.
Metaphysics can also influence logical structure. Darden (1991) suggests that a
metaphysical worldview in which nature is simple and unified may lead to a preference
for scientific theories that are simple and unified.
A common metaphysical assumption in science is empirical consistency, with
reproducible results --- there is an expectation that identical experimental systems should
always produce the same observations. (with "the same" interpreted statistically, not
literally)
Metaphysical worldviews can be nonreligious, or based on religious principles that are
theistic, nontheistic, or atheistic. Everyone has a worldview, which does not cease to
exist if it is ignored or denied. For example, to the extent that positivists (also called
empiricists) who try to prohibit unobservables in theories are motivated by a futile effort
to produce a science without metaphysics, they are motivated by their own metaphysical
worldviews.

IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES are based on subjective values and on political goals

for "the way things should be" in society. These principles span a wide range of
 23

concerns, including socioeconomic structures, race relations, gender issues, social

philosophies and customs, religions, morality, equality, freedom, and justice.
A dramatic example of political influence is the control of Russian biology, from the
1930s into the 1960s, by the "ideologically correct" theories and research programs of
Lysenko, supported by the power of the Soviet government.

OPINIONS OF "AUTHORITIES" can also influence evaluation. The quotation marks

are a reminder that a perception of authority is in the eye of the beholder. Perceived
authority can be due to an acknowledgment of expertise, a response to a dominant
personality, and/or involvement in a power relationship. Authority that is based at least
partly on power occurs in scientists' relationships with employers, tenure committees,
cliques of colleagues, professional organizations, journal editors and referees, publishers,
grant reviewers, and politicians who vote on funding for science.

SOCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS. These five factors (psychology,

practicality, metaphysics, ideology, authority) interact with each other, and they develop
and operate in a complex social context at many levels -- in the lives of individuals, in the
scientific community, and in society as a whole. In an attempt to describe this
complexity, the analysis-and-synthesis framework of ISM includes: the characteristics of
individuals and their interactions with each other and with a variety of groups (familial,
recreational, professional, political,...); profession-related politics (occurring primarily
within the scientific community) and societal politics (involving broader issues in
society); and the institutional structures of science and society.
The term "cultural-personal" implies that both cultural and personal levels are
important. These levels are intimately connected by mutual interactions because
individuals (with their motivations, concerns, worldviews, and principles) work and think
in the context of a culture, and this culture (including its institutional structure,
operations, and politics, and its shared concepts and habits of thinking) is constructed by
and composed of individual persons.
Cultural-personal factors are influenced by the social and institutional context that
constitutes the reward system of a scientific community. In fact, in many ways this
context can be considered a causal mechanism that is partially responsible for producing
the factors. For example, a desire for respect is intrinsic in humans, existing
independently of a particular social structure, but the situations that stimulate this desire
(and the responses that are motivated by these situations) do depend on the social
structure. An important aspect of a social-institutional structure is its effects on the ways
in which authority is created and manifested, especially when power relationships are
involved.

What are the results of mutual interactions between science and society? How does
science affect culture, and how does culture affect science?

SCIENCE AFFECTS CULTURE. The most obvious effect of science has been its
medical and technological applications, with the accompanying effects on health care,
lifestyles, and social structures. But science also influences culture, in many modern
societies, by playing a major role in shaping cultural worldviews, concepts, and thinking
 24

patterns. Sometimes this occurs by the gradual, unorchestrated diffusion of ideas from
science into the culture. At other times, however, there is a conscious effort, by scientists
or nonscientists, to use "the authority of science" for rhetorical purposes, to claim that
scientific theories and evidence support a particular belief system or political program.

CULTURE AFFECTS SCIENCE. ISM, which is mainly concerned with the operation
of science, asks "How does culture affect science?" Some influence occurs as a result of
manipulating the "science affects culture" influence described above. If society wants to
obtain certain types of science-based medical or technological applications, this will
influence the types of scientific research that society supports with its resources. And if
scientists (or their financial supporters) have already accepted some cultural concepts,
such as metaphysical and/or ideological theories, they will tend to prefer (and support)
scientific theories that agree with these cultural-personal theories. In the ISM diagram
this influence appears as a conceptual factor, external relationships...with cultural-
personal theories. For example, the Soviet government supported the science of
Lysenko because his theories and research supported the principles of Marxism. They
also hoped that this science would increase their own political power, so their support of
Lysenko contained an element of self-interest.

PERSONAL CONSISTENCY. Some cultural-personal influence occurs due to a

desire for personal consistency in life. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1956), if there is a conflict between ideas, between actions, or between
thoughts and actions, this inconsistency produces an unpleasant dissonance, and a person
will be motivated to take action aimed at reducing the dissonance. In the overall context
of a scientist's life, which includes science and much more, a scientist will seek
consistency between the science and non-science aspects of life. { Laudan has proposed
a model for dissonance-driven "reticulated" change in science. }
Because groups are formed by people, the principles of personal consistency can be
extrapolated (with appropriate modifications, and with caution) beyond individuals to
other levels of social structure, to groups that are small or large, including societies and
governments. For example, during the period when the research program of Lysenko
dominated Russian biology, the Soviets wanted consistency between their ideological
beliefs and scientific beliefs. A consistency between ideology and science will reduce
psychological dissonance, and it is also logically preferable. If a Marxist theory and a
scientific theory are both true, these theories should agree with each other. If the theories
of Marx are believed to be true, there tends to be a decrease in logical status for all
theories that are inconsistent with Marx, and an increase in status for theories consistent
with Marx. This logical principle, applied to psychology, forms the foundation for
theories of cognitive dissonance, which therefore also predict an increase in the status of
Lysenko's science in the context of Soviet politics.
Usually scientists (and others) want theories to be not just plausible, but also useful.
With Lysenko's biology, the Soviets hoped that attaining consistency between science
policy and the principles of communism would produce increased problem-solving
utility. Part of this hope was that Lysenko's theories, applied to agricultural policy,
would increase the Russian food supply; but nature did not cooperate with the false
theories, so this policy resulted in decreased productivity. Another assumption was that
 25

the Soviet political policies would gain popular support if there was a belief that this
policy was based on (and was consistent with) reliable scientific principles. And if
science "plays a major role in shaping cultural...thinking patterns," the government
wanted to insure that a shaping-of-ideas by science would support their ideological
principles and political policies. The government officials also wanted to maintain and
increase their own power, so self-interest was another motivating factor.

FEEDBACK. In the ISM diagram, three large arrows point toward "evaluation of
theory" from the three evaluation factors, and three small arrows point back the other
way. These small arrows show the feedback that occurs when a conclusion about theory
status already has been reached based on some factors and, to minimize cognitive
dissonance, there is a tendency to interpret other factors in a way that will support this
conclusion. Therefore, each evaluation criterion is affected by feedback from the current
status of the theory and from the other two criteria.

THOUGHT STYLES. In the case of Lysenko there was an obvious, consciously

planned interference with the operation of science. But cultural influence is usually not
so obvious. A more subtle influence is exerted by the assumed ideas and values of a
culture (especially the culture of a scientific community) because these assumptions,
along with explicitly formulated ideas and values, form a foundation for the way
scientists think when they generate and evaluate theories, and plan their research
programs. The influence of these foundational ideas and values, on the process and
content of science, is summarized at the top of the ISM diagram: "Scientific
activities...are affected by culturally influenced thought styles." Section 8 discusses
thought styles: their characteristics; their effects on the process and content of science;
and their variations across different fields, and changes with time.

CONTROVERSY. Among scholars who study science there is a wide range of views
about the extent to which cultural factors influence the process and content of science.
These debates, and the role of cultural factors in ISM and in science education, are
discussed on the "Hot Debates about Science" page. Briefly summarized, my opinion is
that an extreme emphasis on cultural influence is neither accurate nor educationally
beneficial, and that even though there is a significant cultural influence on the process of
science, usually (but not always) the content of science is not strongly affected by
cultural factors.

Table of Contents

4. Theory Evaluation
This is a relatively short section because I don't want to duplicate the many discussions
of evaluation in Sections 1-3 (three types of evaluative inputs), 5 and 6 (using evaluation
to generate theories and experiments), 7 and 8 (evaluation in research and thought styles),
 26

and 9 (critical thinking). And the EKS-RATED page discusses many controversial ideas
related to theory evaluation.
The overview briefly describes the main concepts of evaluation: inputs from three
types of factors (empirical, conceptual, and cultural-personal), and an output of status that
is an estimate of a theory's plausibility and/or usefulness; decisions to retain, revise, or
reject; pursuit and acceptance; rationally justified confidence instead of proof or
disproof; intrinsic status and relative status.
This section will not review these concepts, but will discuss (in more detail than
elsewhere) four topics: delayed decision, intrinsic and relative status, variable-strength
conclusions and hypotheses, and conflicts between different evaluative criteria.

DELAY. A fourth option for a decision (in addition to retain, revise, and reject) is not
shown in the ISM diagram: there can be a delay in responding, while other activities are
being pursued. Sometimes there is no conscious effort to reach a conclusion because
there is no need to decide. However, a decision (and action) may be required even
though evaluation indicates that only a conclusion of "inconclusive" is warranted. In this
uncomfortable situation, a wise approach is to make the decision (and do the action) in a
way that takes into account the uncertainties about whether or not the theory is true.
If a conclusion is delayed and a theory is temporarily ignored while other options are
pursued, and this theory is eventually revived for pursuit or acceptance, then in hindsight
we can either say that during the delay the theory was being retained (with no application
or development) or that it was being tentatively rejected with the option of possible
reversal in the future. But if this theory is never revived, then when it was ignored it was
actually being rejected.

INTRINSIC STATUS and RELATIVE STATUS. A theory has its own intrinsic
status that is an estimate of the theory's plausibility and/or usefulness. And if science is
viewed as a search for the best theory -- whether "the best" is defined as the most
plausible or the most useful -- there is implied competition, so each theory also has a
relative status.
A change in the intrinsic status of one theory will affect the relative status of
competitive theories. In the ISM-diagram this feedback is indicated by a small arrow
pointing from "alternative theories" to "status of theory relative to competitors."
A theory can have low intrinsic status even if it is judged to be better than its
competitors and therefore has high relative status, if evaluation indicates that none of the
current theories is likely to be true or useful. For example, before publication of the
famous double helix paper in April 1953, an honest scientist would admit that "we don't
know the structure of DNA." After the paper, however, among knowledgeable scientists
this skepticism quickly changed to a confident claim that "the correct structure is a
double helix." In 1953 the double helix theory attained high intrinsic status and relative
status, but before 1953 all theories about DNA structure had low intrinsic status, even
though the best of these would, by default, have high relative status as "the best of the
bad theories."

VARIABLE-STRENGTH CONCLUSIONS and HYPOTHESES. In ISM the

concept of "status" (Hewson, 1981) is a reminder that the conclusion of theory evaluation
 27

is an educated estimate rather than certainty. This concept is useful because it allows a
flexibility that doesn't force thinking into dichotomous yes-or-no channels.
Another stimulater of flexible, careful thinking is ISM's definition (based on Giere,
1991) of a hypothesis as a claim that a system and a theory-based model are similar in
specified respects and to a specified (or implied) degree of accuracy. With this
definition, different hypotheses can be framed for the same model. The strongest
hypothesis would claim an exact correspondence between all model-components and
system-components, while a weaker hypothesis might claim only an approximate
correspondence, or a correspondence (exact or approximate) for some components but
not for all. If a theory is judged to be only moderately plausible, the uncompromising
claims of a strong hypothesis will be rejected, even though scientists might accept the
diluted claims of a weak hypothesis.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN CRITERIA. Some of the tensions between different types

of evaluation criteria are briefly outlined in this sub-section. { Each conflict is discussed
in more detail elsewhere. }
An estimate of predictive contrast requires a consideration of how likely it is that
"plausible alternative theories" might make the same predictions. The word "plausible"
indicates that empirical adequacy (by making correct predictions) is not the only relevant
constraint on theory generation. To illustrate, Sober (1991, p. 31) tells a story about
explaining an observation (of "a strange rumbling sound in the attic") with a theory
("gremlins bowling in the attic") that is empirically adequate yet conceptually
implausible.
When a theory is simplified (which is usually considered a desirable conceptual factor)
the accuracy of its predictions may decrease (which is undesirable according to empirical
criteria). In this situation there may also be conflicts between the conceptual criteria that
a theory should be complete (by including all essential components) and simple (with no
extraneous components), because usually there is inherent tension between completeness
and simplicity.
There can also be conflict between explanatory adequacy and the positivist claim that a
theory should not try to explain observations by postulating unobservable entities, actions
or interactions.
There are varying degrees of preference in different fields (and by different scientists)
for unified theories with wide scope, relative to other criteria.
Interaction between empirical factors occurs when there is data from several sources.
Scientists want a theory to agree with all known data, but to obtain agreement with one
data source it may be necessary to sacrifice empirical adequacy with respect to another
source.
And there can be conflict between cultural-personal factors and other factors, as
discussed in Section 3.

Table of Contents
 28

5. Theory Generation
An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 5

SELECTION AND INVENTION. Scientists can generate a theory by selecting an old

theory or -- if there is some dissatisfaction with old theories, or if a curious scientist just
wants to explore other possibilities -- by inventing a new theory. { As defined in ISM,
the revision of an existing theory is invention, and the revised theory is called a "new
theory" even though it is not totally new. Invention thus includes the small-scale
incremental theory development that is common in science, not just the major conceptual
revolutions that, although important, are rare. } In the following discussion the process
of "selection and/or invention" will usually be called "generation" or "proposal".

The rest of this section describes strategies for selecting or inventing theories.

RETRODUCTION and DEDUCTION. In contrast with deductive logic that asks, "If
this is the model, then what will the observations be?", retroductive logic -- which uses
deduction supplemented by imaginative creativity -- asks a reversed question in the past
tense, "These were the observations, so what could the model (and theory) have been?"
The essence of retroductive inference is doing thought-experiments, over and over, each
time "trying out" a different model that is being proposed (by selection or invention) with
the goal of producing deductive predictions that match the known observations.
Basically, the goal is to find a theory that, if true, would explain what has been observed.
Retroduction is useful when, after an experiment is over, scientists are not sure that
they know how to interpret what happened. In this context of uncertainty they search for
a theory (either old or new) that will help them make sense of what they have observed.

RETRODUCTION and HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTION are logically identical

except for timing; in retroduction a theory is proposed after observations are known.
Both try to answer the same question -- Is the model similar to the system? -- by
comparing predictions with observations in order to estimate degrees of agreement and
predictive contrast. Both types of logic can be used as inputs for "empirical evaluation of
current hypothesis." And both are limited to an "if... then maybe..." conclusion, in
contrast with the "if... then..." conclusion of deductive logic. But compared with
hypothetico-deduction, with retroduction there should be more concern about the
possibility of using ad hoc adjustments to achieve a match between predictions and
known observations. This concern applies to retro-selection, and even more to retro-
invention.

DOMAIN-THEORIES and SYSTEM-THEORIES. A theory-based model of an

experimental system is constructed from two sources: a general domain-theory (about
the characteristics of all systems in a domain) and a specific system-theory (about the
characteristics of one experimental system). During retroduction, either or both of these
theories can be revised in an effort to construct a model whose predictions will match the
known observations.
But a system-theory and domain-theory are not independent. While playing with the
 29

possibilities for revising these theories, an inventor may discover relationships between
them. In particular, a domain-theory (about all systems in the theory's domain) will
usually influence a system-theory about one system in this domain.
An interesting example of revising a system-theory was the postulation of Neptune. In
the mid-1800s, data from planetary motions did not precisely match the predictions of a
domain-theory, Newtonian Physics. By assuming the domain-theory was valid, scientists
retroductively calculated that if the system contained an extra planet, with a specified
mass and location, predictions would match observations. Motivated by this newly
invented system-theory with an extra planet, astronomers searched in the specified
location and discovered Neptune. Later, in an effort to resolve the anomalous motion of
Mercury, scientists tried this same strategy by postulating an extra planet, Vulcan,
between Mercury and the Sun. But this time there was no extra planet; instead, the
domain-theory (Newtonian physics) was at fault, and eventually a new domain-theory
(Einstein's theory of general relativity) made correct predictions for the motion of
Mercury. In these examples, both of the components used for constructing a model were
revised; there was a change in the system-theory (with Neptune) and in the domain-
theory (for Mercury).
In another example, described earlier, the discovery of radioactivity in 1903 caused a
revision of a system-theory for the earth's interior geology. This revised system-theory,
combined with observations (of the earth's temperature) and a domain-theory
(thermodynamics), required a revision in another theory component (the earth's age),
thereby settling an interfield conflict that began in 1868.
What are the results of theory generation? In the ISM-diagram, arrows point from
theory generation to system-theory and domain-theory, because both are needed to
construct a model. Three more arrows point to "theory" and "supplementary theory"
(because both can be used for constructing a domain-theory) and to "alternative theory"
because a newly invented theory competes with the original unrevised theory. Or the
original theory might become an alternative, since labeling depends on context; what
scientists consider a main theory in one situation could be alternative or supplementary in
other situations.

RETRODUCTIVE GENERALIZATION. If there is data from several experimental

systems, the empirical constraints on retroduction can be made more rigorous by
demanding that a theory's predictions must be consistent with all known data. This
process of retroductive generalization generates a theory whose domain includes all the
systems. In fact, the domain is usually larger than all of the systems combined, because
the domain-theory is assumed to be valid for a whole class of systems; this class extends
beyond (and contains as a subset) the systems for which there is available data.
A generalization also occurs when an existing theory is selected for application to a
system that was not within the domain previously claimed for the theory.
A summary: Retroductive generalization converts many models (each for one system)
into a general theory (for many systems), or it widens the domain of an existing theory.
But in deduction (which is used during retroduction or hypothetico-deduction) a general
theory is applied to construct a specific model for one system.
 30

STRATEGIES FOR RETRO-GENERALIZING. When retroduction is constrained

by multiple sources of data, it may be easier to "cope with the complexity" if a
simplifying strategy is used. Instead of trying to think about all the systems at once, first
infer a model for one system, and then apply "the principles for this model" (i.e., a theory
from which the model could be derived) to construct models for the other systems, to test
whether this theory can be generalized to fit all the known data.
A more holistic strategy is to creatively search the data looking for an empirical pattern
that, once recognized, can provide the inspiration and guiding constraints for inventing a
composition-and-operation mechanism that explains the pattern. This process begins
with no theory; then there is a descriptive theory (based on an empirical pattern) that can
be converted into an explanatory theory. While searching for patterns, a scientist can try
to imagine new ways to see the data and interpret its meaning. Logical strategies for
thinking about multiple experiments, such as Mill's Methods of inquiry, can be useful for
pattern recognition and theory generation.

RETRODUCTION and INDUCTION. Most of the discussion above has focused on

the use of deductive logic during retroduction. Usually, however, retroduction also
involves some inductive logic. At this time I won't try to separate (or to interrelate) the
typical functions and contributions of deduction and induction. But the eclectic nature of
generative inference should be recognized: usually, a scientific "inference to the best
explanation" involves a creative blending of logic that is both inductive and deductive.
top of page

GENERATION AND EVALUATION. Although C.S. Peirce (in the 1800s) and
Aristotle (much earlier) studied theory invention, as have many psychologists, most
philosophers separated evaluation from invention, and focused their attention on
evaluation. Recently, however, many philosophers (such as Hanson, 1958; and Darden,
1991) have begun to explore the process of invention and the relationships between
invention and evaluation. Haig (1987) includes the process of invention in his model for
a "hypothetico-retroductive inferential" scientific method.
Generation (by selection or invention) and evaluation are both used in retroduction,
with empirical evaluation acting as a motivation and guide for generation, and generation
producing the idea being evaluated. It is impossible to say where one process ends and
the other begins, or which comes first, as in the classic chicken-and-egg puzzle.
The generation of theories is subject to all types of evaluative constraints. Empirical
adequacy is important, but scientists also check for adequacy with respect to cultural-
personal factors and conceptual criteria: internal consistency, logical structure, and
external relationships with other theories.

INVENTION BY REVISION. Invention often begins with the selection of an old (i.e.,
previously existing) theory that can be revised to form a new theory.

ANALYSIS AND REVISION. One strategy for revising theories begins with analysis;
split a theory into components and play with them by thinking about what might happen
if components (for composition or operation) are modified, added or eliminated, or are
reorganized to form a new structural pattern with new interactions.
 31

According to Lakatos (1970), scientists often assume that a "hard core" of essential
theory components should not be changed, so an inventor can focus on the "protective
belt" of auxiliary components that are devised and revised to protect the hard core.
Usually this narrowing of focus is productive, especially in the short term. But
occasionally it is useful to revise some hard-core components. When searching for new
ideas it may be helpful to carefully examine each component, even in the hard core, and
to consider all possibilities for revision, unrestrained by assumptions about the need to
protect some components. By relaxing mental blocks about "the way things must be" it
may become easier to see theory components or data patterns in a new way, to imagine
new possibilities.
Or it may be productive to combine this analytical perspective with a more holistic
view of the theory, or to shift the mode of thinking from analytical to holistic.

INTERNAL CONSISTENCY. Another invention strategy is to construct a theory,

using the logic of internal consistency, by building on the foundation of a few assumed
axiomatic components.
In mathematics, an obvious example is Euclid's geometry. An example from science is
Einstein's theory of Special Relativity; after postulating that two things are constant
(physical laws in uniformly moving reference frames, and the observed speed of light),
logical consistency -- which Einstein explored with mental experiments -- makes it
necessary that some properties (length, time, velocity, mass,...) will be relative while
other properties (proper time, rest mass,...) are constant. A similar strategy was used in
the subsequent invention of General Relativity when, with the help of a friend (Marcel
Grossmann) who was an expert mathematician, Einstein combined his empirically based
physical intuitions with the powerful mathematical techniques of multidimensional non-
Euclidean geometry and tensor calculus that had been developed in the 1800s.
Although empirical factors played a role in Einstein's selection of initial axioms, once
these were fixed each theory was developed using logical consistency. Responding to an
empirical verification of General Relativity's predictions about the bending of light rays
by gravity, even though Einstein was elated he expressed confidence in his conceptual
criteria, saying that the empirical support did not surprise him because his theory was
"too beautiful to be false."

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS. Sometimes new ideas are inspired by studying the

components and logical structure of other theories. Maybe a component can be borrowed
from another theory; in this way, shared components become generalized into a wider
domain, and systematic unifying connections between theories are established.
Or some of the structure in an old theory can be retained (with appropriate
modification) while the content of the old components is changed, thereby using analogy
to guide the logical structuring of the new theory.
Another possibility is mutual analysis-and-synthesis; by carefully comparing the
components of two theories, it may be possible to gain a deeper understanding of how the
two are related by an overlapping of components or structures. This improved
understanding might inspire a revision of either theory (with or without borrowing or
analogizing from the other theory), or a synthesis that combines ideas from both theories
into a unified theory that is more conceptually coherent and has a wider empirical scope.
 32

And sometimes a knowledge of theories in other areas will lead to the recognition that
an existing theory from another domain can be generalized, as-is or modified, into the
domain being studied by a scientist. This is selection rather than invention, but it still
"brings something new" to theorizing in the domain. And the process of selection is
similar to the process of invention, both logically and psychologically, if (as in this case)
selection requires the flexible, open-minded perception of a connection between domains
that previously were not seen as connected.

Table of Contents

6. Experimental Design (Generation-and-Evaluation)

An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 6

When scientists generate and evaluate experiments (i.e., when they design
experiments), they consider the current state of theory evaluation; they check for gaps in
their knowledge of systems; and they do thought-experiments for a variety of potential
experimental systems, looking for systems that might produce useful results.

FIELD STUDIES. In ISM an "experiment" includes both controlled experiments and

field studies. In a field study a scientist has little or no control over the naturally
occurring phenomenon being studied (such as starlight, a dinosaur fossil, or an
earthquake) but there is some control over how to collect data (where to dig for fossils,
and how to make observations and perform controlled experiments on the fossils that are
found; or what type of seismographic equipment to use and where to place it, and what
post-quake fieldwork to do) and how to analyze the data.

GOAL-DIRECTED DESIGN. Sometimes experiments are done just to see what will
happen, to gather observations for an empirical database that can be interpreted in the
future. Often, however, experiments are designed to accomplish a goal. The next five
subsections (with *s) examine some ways in which the pursuit of scientific goals can
motivate and guide the design of experiments

* LEARNING ABOUT SYSTEMS AND THEORIES. Theory evaluation can

provide essential input for experimental design, by revealing four types of "trouble spots"
to investigate by experimentation. If there is anomaly, maybe an experiment can localize
its source, or test options for theory revision. If there is a lack of support for (or against)
a theory, a well designed experiment may provide more evidence. If there is low
predictive contrast, scientists can try to design a "crucial experiment" that discriminates
between the competitive theories. And if there is conceptual difficulty, this can inspire an
experiment to learn more about the problematic aspect of the theory.
Or scientists can be motivated by domain evaluation. When they examine their
 33

empirical knowledge of a domain, they may find a gap in system knowledge that reveals
an opportunity for learning. Thus, when scientists design an experiment they can be
mainly interested in learning about either a theory or an experimental system.
For either type of goal, interpretive logic is available. For a particular experimental
system, if scientists assume they know the system-theory, they can make inferences
(either hypothetico-deductive or retroductive) about a domain-theory. But if they assume
the domain-theory is known, their inferences are about a system-theory.
This principle, that inference can involve a domain-theory or system-theory, is useful
for designing experiments with different goals. For example, scientists may assume they
know a domain-theory about one property of a chemical system, and based on this
knowledge they design a series of experiments for the purpose of developing system-
theories that characterize this property for a series of chemical systems. But the goal
changes when scientists use a familiar chemical system and assume they have an accurate
system-theory (about a number of chemical properties that are well characterized due to
the application of existing domain-theories) in order to design an experiment that will let
them develop a new domain-theory about another chemical property.
Often, however, both types of knowledge increase during experimentation. Consider a
situation where scientists assume a domain-theory about physiology, and use this theory
to design a series of experiments with different species, in order to learn more about each
species. While they are learning about these systems, they may also learn about the
domain-theory: perhaps it needs to be revised for some species or for all species; or they
may persuade themselves about the truth of a claim (that the same theory can be
generalized to fit all the species being studied) that previously had been only an
assumption.
Sometimes, in the early stages of developing a theory in an underexplored domain,
scientists can assume neither a system-theory nor a domain-theory; their knowledge gap
is both empirical and theoretical, with very little data about systems, and no satisfactory
theory. An example of dually inadequate knowledge occurred in the early 1800s when
atomic theory was being developed, and chemists were also uncertain about the nature of
their experimental systems, such as whether in the electrolysis experiment of "water -->
hydrogen + oxygen" the hydrogen was H or HH, the oxygen was O or OO, and the water
was HO or HOO or HHO.

* LEARNING ABOUT EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES is another possible goal.

For example, x-ray diffraction can now be used to help determine the structure of
molecules. But in the early days of xray experiments the major goal was to learn more
about the technique by studying variables such as xray wavelength, width and intensity of
beam, angle of incidence, sample preparation and thickness, and type of detector. This
knowledge was then used to design theories about the correlations between x-ray
observations and molecular structure.
In pursuing knowledge about a new technique, a powerful strategy is to design
controlled cross-checking experiments in which the same system is probed with a known
technique and a new technique, thus generating two data sets that can be compared in
order to "calibrate" the new technique. For example, if a familiar technique records
numerical data of "40.0, 50.0, 60.0, 70.0, 80.0" for five states of a system, and a new
technique measures these states as "54.4, 61.2, 67.1, 72.2, 76.8" we can infer that a "new
 34

54.4" corresponds to an "old 40.0," and so on.

A similar strategy can be used for qualitative calibration. For example, if we somehow
know that four solutions contain ions of Li, Na, K and Cs, we can observe the color
produced when a wire is dipped into each solution and placed in a flame. Based on this
descriptive domain-theory for these applications of the flame technique, we can then
remove the labels from the bottles, test each solution in a flame, and infer system-theories
about the contents of each bottle. This strategy, in a more sophisticated form but using
similar logic, was employed by Watson and Crick in 1953 when x-ray observations
helped them retroductively infer a structure for DNA.

* ANOMALY RESOLUTION. If predictions and observations do not agree, two

possible causes are an inadequate system-theory or domain-theory. In either case, maybe
a new experiment can localize the anomaly to a faulty theory-component, and further
experiments can test options for revising this component.
A third possible cause of anomaly is misleading observations. For example, in an
experimental system that includes a voltage meter, an inaccurate meter might read 4.1
Volts when the actual voltage is 5.7 Volts. If the observation of 4.1 Volts is assumed to
be accurate, scientists may try to revise a domain-theory or system-theory even though "it
doesn't need fixing." But if there are good reasons to believe the model is accurate,
scientists can do a troubleshooting analysis -- similar to the logic used by an
automechanic (or physician) trying to determine what has gone wrong with an engine (or
body) -- in an effort to find the cause of anomaly. After the faulty meter is discovered
and the system-theory is revised to include "a meter that reads 28% low," predictions will
match observations. Or the faulty meter can be replaced by a meter that produces
accurate observations.
Another type of anomaly occurs when scientists are surprised, not by a disagreement
between observations and predictions, but by a difference between observations and
previous observations in similar (or apparently identical) experiments. The surprise
arises due to a metaphysically based assumption of reproducibility, an expectation that
the same system should always produce the same results. (of course, "the same" must
often be interpreted statistically)
Or maybe what actually happened is more interesting than what was planned, as in the
unexpected occurrence of penicillin or Teflon, and the anomaly is an opportunity for
serendipitous discovery that will result in a publication, a patent, or even a Nobel Prize.

* CRUCIAL EXPERIMENTS. Sometimes instead of anomaly there is agreement, but

with too many theories. In this situation a sensible strategy is to design a more
discriminating "crucial experiment" whose outcome will lend clear support to one
competitor or the other. When designing for this goal, an effective strategy is to run
thought-experiments (for all competitive theories, for a variety of potential experimental
systems) and check for predictive contrast.
For example, to test an Olympic Weightlifter Theory, asking John to lift 10 pounds or
1000 pounds will be useless, but asking him to lift an intermediate weight (an amount
that could be lifted by an OW but not by others) would provide useful information.
Or consider a liquid that conducts electricity well. One explanation is that the liquid
contains NaCl in water. This system-theory produces a high degree of agreement --
 35

because domain-theories (involving NaCl, water, dissolving, ions, and conductivity)

predict that aqueous NaCl will conduct electricity -- but this retroductive inference is
uncertain due to low predictive contrast, because many other system-theories (such as
water with HCl, NaOH, or KBr; or NaCl in methanol) also predict high conductivity. In
an effort to eliminate alternative theories, a scientist could design other experiments, such
as testing for acidity or basicity (to test for HCl or NaOH), observing the flame color (for
Na or K), determining the density, flammability or odor (for methanol), and so on. These
experiments could support the NaCl/water theory or weaken it, but could not prove it
true. In this example the scientist assumes the adequacy of domain-theories (involving
ions,...) in order to evaluate the status of alternative system-theories. But in other
situations the status of one or more domain-theories might be the focus of evaluation.

* HEURISTIC EXPERIMENTS and DEMONSTRATIVE EXPERIMENTS differ

in their objectives (Grinnell, 1992). Early in their explorations, to learn more about a
domain or theory, scientists design heuristic experiments. Later, the goal can shift toward
the design of impressive demonstrative experiments that will be useful for persuading
others about a domain-theory or system-theory by clearly highlighting its strengths or
weaknesses.
For either type of experiment, but especially for demonstration, a useful strategy is to
think ahead to questions that will be raised during evaluation. These questions -- about
sample size and representativeness, systematic errors and random errors, adequacy of
controls for all relevant factors, predictive contrast, and so on -- can be used to probe the
current empirical knowledge, searching for gaps that should be filled by
experimentation. When doing this it is wise to be brutally critical, at least as tough as
one's critics will be, by trying to imagine their toughest questions and challenges, and
answering them.
Often an informative heuristic experiment will also be effective for demonstration. For
example, a crucial experiment that distinguishes between plausible alternatives is useful
in any context. But there can be significant differences in the motivation of scientists
when they design an experiment; are they mainly interested in learning or persuading?
For example, do they want to increase a sample size to address their own doubts, or
because this will be more persuasive in a paper they plan to publish? And the two goals
will often produce different experiments. For example, do scientists run a novel
experiment because they are curious about what will happen, or a familiar experiment
that has been refined to "clean up the loose ends" so it becomes a more impressive
demonstration of what is already known?
A typical shift in experimental design, as knowledge increases and motivations change,
is that during an early heuristic phase, knowledge may not provide much guidance, but in
a later demonstration phase there is enough knowledge (of theories and/or systems) that
its guidance can be more focused and precise.

LOGICAL STRATEGIES for experimental design. To facilitate the collection and

interpretation of data for any of the goals described above, logical strategies are
available. Scientists can use hypothetico-deduction or retroduction to make inferences
 36

about a domain-theory or system-theory. Or they can calibrate a new experimental

technique with cross-checking logic that compares data from the new technique and a
familiar technique.
Logical strategies -- such as the systematic variation of parameters (individually or in
combinations) to establish "controls", to discover correlations, and to determine the
individual or combined effects of various factors -- can be useful for designing clusters of
experiments to generate data that is especially informative. One such strategy is Mill's
Methods for experimental inquiry. Complementary "variations on a theme" experiments
can be planned in advance, or improvised in response to feedback from previous
experimental results.
By using inductive logic, a descriptive or explanatory theory can be generalized into an
unexamined part of a domain. In making the logical leap of generalizing observations (or
principles) from a small sample to a larger population, scientists depend on two main
criteria: statistical analysis (by considering sample size, degree of agreement,...) and
sampling accuracy (by asking whether the sample accurately represents the whole
population). These criteria can be used for controlled experiments or field studies.
In addition to these types of logic, each area of science has its own principles for
designing experiments. In certain types of medical or social science experiments, for
example, there are usually design features such as "blind" observation and interpretation,
or controls for psycho-physical placebo effects and for motivational factors (Borg & Gall,
1989) such as the John Henry Effect, Pygmalion Effect, and Hawthorne Effect.

VICARIOUS EXPERIMENTATION. So far, this discussion has not challenged an

implicit assumption that the only way to collect observations is to do an experiment. But
one scientist can interpret what another observes, so a "theoretician" can vicariously
design-and-do experiments by reading (or hearing) about the work of others, in order to
gather observations for interpretation.
This strategy won a Nobel Prize for James Watson and Francis Crick. They never did
any productive DNA experiments, but they did gather useful observations from other
scientists: xray diffraction photographs (from Rosalind Franklin), data about DNA's
water content (also from Franklin), data about the ratios of base pairs (from Erwin
Chargaff), and information about the chemistry and structure of DNA bases (from Jerry
Donohue). Then they interpreted this information using thought-experiments and
physical models, and they retroductively invented a theory for DNA structure. Even
though they did not design or do experiments, a similar function was performed by their
decisions about gathering (and paying close attention to) certain types of observations.

CUSTOMIZED DESIGN. Effective problem formulation is customized to fit the

expertise and resources of a particular research group. For example, if members of one
group are expert at theorizing about a certain molecule, they may use a wide variety of
experimental techniques (plus reading and listening) to gather information about their
molecule. Another group, whose members have the expertise (and the expensive
machine) required to do a difficult experimental technique, may search for a wide variety
of molecules they can study with their technique.
 37

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES. Often, new opportunities for

scientific research emerge from a change in the status quo. A newly invented theory can
stimulate experiments with different goals: to test the theory and, if necessary, revise it;
to explore its application for a variety of systems within (or beyond) its claimed domain;
or to calculate the value of physical constants in the theory.
New experimental systems can be produced by new events (a volcanic eruption,...) or
by newly discovered data (rocks on Mars,...) or phenomena (such as radioactivity in
1896, or quasars in 1960). New experiments can include field studies of natural
phenomena, and controlled experiments such as the labwork used to study dinosaur
bones.
New instrumentation technologies or observation techniques can produce opportunities
for designing new types of experimental systems. When this occurs a scientist's goal can
be to learn more about an existing theory or domain by using the new tool, or to learn
more about the tool. Scientists can design their own instruments, or they can use
technology developed mainly for other purposes, or they can provide motivation for
developing new technologies by making known their wishlist along with a promise that a
market will exist for the new products. Or old technologies can be used in a new way,
such as setting up the Hubble Telescope on a satellite above the optically distorting
atmosphere of the earth.

When an area opens up due to any of these changes, for awhile the possibilities for
research are numerous. To creatively take advantage of a temporary window of
opportunity, an open-minded awareness (to perceive the possibilities) and speed (to
pursue possibilities before they vanish due to the work of others) are often essential. For
example, Humphrey Davy used the newly developed technique of electrolysis to discover
7 elements in 1807 and 1808. Of course, in science (as in the rest of life) it helps to be
lucky, to be in the right place at the right time, but to take advantage of opportunity a
person must be prepared. As Louis Pasteur was fond of saying, "Chance favors the
prepared mind." Many other scientists were working in the early 1800s, yet it was Davy
who had the most success in using the new technique for discovery.

THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS IN DESIGN. Mental experiments -- done to quickly

explore a wide variety of experimental possibilities ranging from conventional techniques
to daring innovations -- serve as a preliminary screening process to decide which
experimental systems are worthy of further pursuit. Because thought-experiments are
quick and cheap, compared with physical experiments that typically require much larger
investments of time and money, they are an effective strategy for generating and
evaluating ideas for experiments.
Usually, mental experiments are a prelude to physical experiments. But thought-
experiments can be done for their own sake, to probe the logical implications of a theory
by deductively exploring systems that may be difficult or impossible to attain physically.
One famous example is the use of imaginary rockets and trains by Einstein during his
development of relativity theory.

FOUR CONTEXTS FOR THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS. Thought-experiments play

a key role in three parts of ISM. In each context a prediction is generated from a theory
 38

by using deductive logic, but there are essential differences in objectives. During
experimental design the divergent objectives -- looking for outcomes that might be
interesting or useful -- are less clearly defined than in retroduction where, despite a
divergent search for theories, the convergent goal is to find a model whose predictions
match the known observations. And in hypothetico-deduction, mental experiments are
even more constrained, being done with only one theory and one system.
In addition, thought-experiments can be used for deductive exploration, by using a
theory to imagine what would happen in an exotic difficult-to-attain system. In this
context there are no physical constraints, so the only limits are those imposed by the
imagination. And the only cost is the time invested in designing and running the mental
experiments.

Table of Contents

7. Goals and Actions in Problem Solving

As an introduction to this section, you should read Section 7 of the overview which
provides a coherent overview of: problem formulation (by defining a now-state and a
goal-state) and problem solving; scientific projects for improving our knowledge
(which includes observations and interpretations); preparation and persuasion; and
levels of problems (mega-problem, problem, sub-problems, actions) interacting with
action evaluation.

PREPARATION. Before and during problem formulation, scientists prepare by

learning the current now-state of knowledge about a selected area of nature, including
theories, observations, and experimental techniques. Early in the career of a scientist, as
a student, typically most preparation comes by reading books and listening to teachers,
with supplementation by first-hand experience in observation and interpretation. Later,
when a scientist is actively involved in research, typically there is a shift toward an
increased reliance on the learning that occurs during research, but some learning still
occurs by reading and listening. When a scientist becomes more intellectually mature,
less knowledge is accepted solely due to a trust in authority, because there is an increase
in the ability and willingness to think critically.
As suggested by Perkins & Salomon (1988), knowledge utilization can be viewed from
two perspectives: backward-reaching and forward-reaching. Scientists can reach
backward in time, to use now what they have learned in the past by reading, listening,
and researching. Or they can focus on learning from current experience, because they are
looking forward to potential uses of this knowledge in the future.
Because one scientist can interpret what another observes, sometimes an effective
strategy for collecting data is to be a "theoretician" by reading (or hearing) about the
experiments of others, for the purpose of gathering observations that can then be
interpreted.
 39

GOAL-CONSTRAINTS. Nickles (1981) provides an in-depth analysis of problem

solving, and suggests that a problem is defined by specifying a set of constraints on its
solution, which is done by specifying the characteristics of a goal-state (or a class of goal-
states) that would be considered a satisfactory solution. Thinking of a goal-state in terms
of "constraints" offers an interesting perspective.

SECONDARY GOALS. The primary goal of science is an improved knowledge about

nature. But scientists are often motivated by cultural-personal factors such as satisfying
their "psychological motives and practical concerns" by achieving concrete secondary
goals: obtaining funds for research, getting a paper published,...

PRIMARY GOALS. Knowledge about nature includes both observations and

interpretations. Although the ultimate goal of science is to produce theories
(interpretations), immediate goals (such as funding and publications) often involve the
design and execution of experiments to produce observations that can then be interpreted.

QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES or PROBLEMS. Although ISM describes projects in

terms of problem solving, scientists can define their goal as answering a question,
achieving an objective, or solving a problem. Although there are subtle differences
between these perspectives, they are basically equivalent.

PROJECT FORMULATION and DECISION. The movement from problem to

project requires evaluation and decision. Members of a research group must evaluate the
potential benefits of a proposed project, compared with other alternatives, and ask the "so
what" question -- "Why should we do this?" -- in order to decide whether it is likely to be
a wise investment of their time and effort.
The ISM definition of a problem differs from that of Nickles (1981, p. 109) who states
that "a problem consists of all the conditions or constraints on the solution plus the
demand that the solution...be found." Nickles' definition of a problem (constraints plus
demand) corresponds to my definition of a project. ISM and IDM distinguish between
problems and projects because this makes it easier to discuss the actual practice of
science and design, where problems can be formulated (or simply recognized) even if
their solution is not actively pursued. And I think the ISM-IDM definition of a problem
is more commonly used by people in a wide range of areas, which makes it easier to
discuss problems with straightforward simplicity, without being misunderstood.
When deciding whether a problem solution should be pursued, an important
consideration is the existence of actions that may lead to a solution. In other words, are
there valid reasons for hope? An effective problem formulation aims for a level of
difficulty that is appropriate --- that is challenging (usually but not always this is
necessary for achieving significant results) yet is capable of being solved with the
available resources of time, people, knowledge, equipment, materials, and money.
Although it is possible to commit resources and launch a project based on an
assumption that a problem can be solved, or a conviction that it must be solved, usually a
decision to pursue a project is preceded by some planning of specific actions. Because
the amounts of preliminary action-planning vary from one project to another, it can be
 40

useful to define a project as either "a problem plus a decision to pursue a solution," or as
"a problem and a plan for solving it, plus a decision to pursue this plan of action."

ACTION GENERATION AND EVALUATION. In an effort to solve a problem,

scientists invent, evaluate, and execute actions that involve observation (design and do
experiments or field studies, make observations, or learn the observations of others) or
interpretation (organize data to facilitate pattern recognition, analyze and synthesize, use
algorithms and heuristics, select or invent theories, evaluate theories, or review the
interpretations of others).
Probing often involves recurring cycles of observation-and-interpretation:
interpretations (of previous observations) are used to design experiments which produce
observations that are used in further interpretation, and the cycle begins again. During
each cycle there can be an increase in knowledge for both observations and
interpretations, as well as a preparation for future cycles.
Action generation-and-evaluation, whether done to decide "what to do next" or to
make long-term plans, is oriented toward seeking a solution. An awareness of the current
"state of the problem" serves as a guidance system for the effective planning of actions.
To develop and use this awareness, the evaluator tries to understand the constantly
changing now-state so this can be compared with the goal-state (which is as an aiming
point that orients the search for a solution) in order to search for problem gaps (specific
ways in which the now-state and goal-state differ) that can guide the planning of actions
designed to close these gaps.
The process of action evaluation, which is itself an action, is analogous to the process
of theory evaluation. Of course, evaluation must be preceded by another important
action, the generation (by selection or invention) of ideas for the potential actions that
will be evaluated.

CONCLUSION. The central step in action evaluation -- comparing the current now-
state with the goal-state -- can be viewed as an evaluation of potential solutions. As the
project continues, usually the now-state becomes increasingly similar to the goal-state.
Eventually the now-state may be evaluated as satisfactorily similar, based on criteria
defined by the problem constraints, and the problem is solved. Or at some point there
may be a decision to abandon the project, at least temporarily, because progress toward a
solution is slow, or because despite satisfactory progress the research group decides that
working on another project is likely to be even more productive.

PERSUASION. The persuading can be internal (within a research group, in discussions

about how to execute or interpret the research) or external. With external persuasion the
goal might be to convince others that observations made by the research group are
accurate, or that a proposed theory is worthy of acceptance (as plausible, useful
knowledge) or pursuit (to investigate by further research), that a paper should be
published, or that a proposed project should be supported financially.

3Ps and 4Ps. A 3Ps model of science (Peterson & Jungck, 1988) interprets scientific
problem solving in terms of posing, probing and persuasion. A brief summary of the 3Ps
 41

is that scientists pose a problem, then probe the problem in an effort to solve it, and try to
persuade themselves and others that their solution is satisfactory. This simple model,
which portrays the overall flow of research, was initially proposed for the main purpose
of influencing science education. In this role it has stimulated a great deal of productive
thinking about science and science education, thereby attracting many enthusiastic
advocates, including myself. When discussing the actions that occur during a project, it
is convenient to use a "4Ps" terminology (the original 3Ps, plus one I've added) that, in
addition to being compact, is intrinsically clear because the common meaning for each
term is the intended meaning in ISM. The 4Ps are preparing (reading,...), posing
(formulating a problem), probing (doing actions to probe the problem and pursue a
solution), and persuading.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ACTIVITIES AND STAGES. The 4Ps can be viewed

as 4 activities and as 4 stages, with interactions between the activities and stages.
For example, persuading activity begins in the posing stage. First, if problem
constraints are chosen so they conform to the evaluation criteria of the dominant
scientific community, a solution that satisfies these constraints is more likely to be
accepted by other scientists. Second, if action evaluation persuades a research group to
pursue a solution for a problem, the group may try to persuade a grant-funding agency
that their project is worthy of support.
Later, the persuading stage of a current project can affect the posing stage of projects
in the future, which are more likely to be supported if the current persuasion can convince
the community that the current project (and its people and their problem-solving
approach) should be considered successful.
When are "plans for probing" made? During the posing stage there is often some
preliminary planning of actions to solve the problem. Later, during the probing stage
these plans are modified and supplemented by improvised planning, done in response to
the constantly changing now-state. Finally, during the persuading stage, when it seems
that a solution has been achieved, there should be a rigorous self-critical evaluation of
one's own arguments for the proposed solution; this close scrutiny often leads to a
recognition of gaps in support, and to the planning of additional probing activities for
observation or interpretation.
The posing activity for a future project can begin during any stage of a current project,
whenever there is an idea for a spinoff project whose goal is to solve a new problem.
Similarly, at any time there can be plans for immediate action to probe the current
problem, or delayed action to probe a different problem in the future.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AND WITHIN LEVELS. A comprehensive history of

science would see many groups working on a wide range of interconnected projects over
long periods of time. One aspect of this grand story is the connections between projects,
and between actions within a project. These connections can be analyzed by examining
different levels of problems and problem-solving activity: mega-problem, problems, sub-
problems, and actions. Overlaps often occur within and between levels, with an extended
research group working on many problems and sub-problems simultaneously; or several
groups can work on the same problem or on different parts of a family of related
problems.
 42

A group can increase the effectiveness of its actions by coordinating its work on all of
the sub-problems that contribute to the solution of a larger problem. And if a group is
working on several problems simultaneously, an action may help to solve more than one
problem. Or projects can be related sequentially; work on a current project may inspire
ideas for a future project, and at the same time the current project is using results from an
earlier project while these results are being written up for publication. A family of
related projects, simultaneous or sequential, can be produced by developing variations on
a research theme.
Some of the most important interactions involve knowledge. During a current project,
scientists can search backward for what they have learned (about observations and/or
interpretations) from their past work, or they can look forward to potential future uses for
what is being learned now, or sideways for possibilities of sharing knowledge among
concurrent research projects. Learning that occurs during research will help the group
that does the research, in their current and future projects. And if a group's work is
published or is shared informally among colleagues, their experience can help other
scientists learn.

Table of Contents

8. Thought Styles
An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 8

This section describes what thought styles are, and how they affect the process and
content of science.

A DEFINITION. As described by Grinnell (1992), a cell biologist with an insider's

view of science, a scientist's thought style (or the collective thought style for a group of
scientists) is a system of concepts, developed from prior experience, about nature and
research science. It provides the "operating paradigm" that guides decisions about what
to study, and how to plan and do the research-actions of observing and interpreting.
These concepts (about nature and science) are related to the social and institutional
structures within which they develop and operate. But even though many ideas are
shared in a scientific community, some aspects of a thought style vary from one
individual to another, and from one group to another. There are interactions between
groups, and each individual belongs to many groups. { The following treatment will not
explicitly address this complexity, and will usually refer to "a thought style" or "the
thought style" as if only one style existed. }

EFFECTS ON OBSERVATION AND INTERPRETATION. Thought styles affect

the process and content of science.
The influence of a thought style may be difficult to perceive because the ideas in it are
 43

often unconsciously assumed as "the way things are done" rather than being explicitly
stated. But these ideas exist nevertheless, and they affect the process and content of
science, producing effects that span a wide range from the artistic taste that defines a
theory's "elegance" to the hard-nosed pragmatism of deciding whether a project to
develop a theory or explore a domain is worth the resources it would require.
A thought style will influence (and when viewed from another perspective, is
comprised by) the problem-posing and problem-solving strategies of individuals and
groups. There may be a preference for projects with comprehensive "know every step in
advance" preliminary planning, or casual "steer as you go" improvisational serendipity.
One procedural decision is to ask "Who will do what during research?" Although it is
possible for one scientist to do all the activities in ISM, this is not necessary because
within a research group the efforts of individual scientists, each working on a different
part of the problem, can be cooperatively coordinated. Similarly, in a field as a whole,
each group can work on a different part of a mega-problem. With a "division of labor,"
individuals or groups can specialize in certain types of activities. One division is
between experimentalists who generate observations, and theorists who focus on
interpretation. But most scientists do some of both, with the balance depending on the
requirements of a particular research project and on the abilities and preferences of
colleagues.
There will be mutual influences between thought styles and the procedural "rules of
the game" developed by a community of scientists to establish and maintain certain types
of institutions and reward systems, and procedures for deciding which people, topics, and
viewpoints are presented in conferences and are published in journals. A thought style
will affect attitudes toward competition and cooperation and how to combine them
effectively, and (at a community level) the ways in which activities of different scientists
and groups are coordinated. The logical and aesthetic tastes of a community will affect
the characteristics of written and oral presentations, such as the blending of modes
(verbal, visual, mathematical,...), the degree of simplification, and the balance between
abstractions and concrete illustrations or analogies.

A thought style will tend to favor the production of certain types of observation-and-
interpretation knowledge rather than other types. Effects on observation could include,
for example, a preference for either controlled experiments or field studies, and data
collection that is qualitative or quantitative. There will also be expectations for the
connections between experimenting and theorizing.
An intellectual environment will favor the invention, pursuit and acceptance of certain
types of theories. Some of this influence arises from the design of experiments, which
determines what is studied and how, and thus the types of data collected. Another
mechanism for influence is the generation and selection of criteria for theory evaluation.
For example, thought styles can exert a strong influence on conceptual factors, such as
preferences for the types of components used in theories, the optimal balance between
simplicity and completeness, the value of unified wide-scope theories, the relative
importance of plausibility and utility, and the ways in which a theory or project can be
useful in promoting cognition and research. Thought styles will influence, and will be
influenced by, the goals of science, such as whether the main goal of research projects
should be to improve the state of observations or interpretations, whether science should
 44

focus on understanding nature or controlling nature, and what should be the relationships
between science, technology, and society.

The influence exerted by thought styles and cultural-personal factors is a hotly debated
topic, as discussed on the EKS-Rated page.

CONCEPTUAL ECOLOGY. The metaphor of conceptual ecology (Toulmin, 1972)

offers an interesting perspective on the effects of thought styles, based on analogy
between biological and conceptual environments. In much the same way that the
environmental characteristics of an ecological niche affect the natural selection occurring
within its bounds, the intellectual characteristics of individuals -- and of the dominant
thought styles in the communities they establish and within which they operate -- will
favor the development and maintenance of certain types of ideas (about theories,
experiments, goals, procedures,...) rather than others.

a PUZZLE and a FILTER. Bauer (1992) compares science to solving a puzzle. In this
metaphor (from Polanyi, 1962) scientists are assembling a jigsaw puzzle of knowledge
about nature, with the semi-finished puzzle in the open for all to see. When one scientist
fits a piece into the puzzle, or modifies a piece already in place, others respond to this
change by thinking about the next step that now becomes possible. The overall result of
these mutual adjustments is that the independent activities of many scientists are
coordinated so they blend together and form a structured cooperative whole.
Bauer supplements this portrait of science with the metaphor of a filter, to describe the
process in which semi-reliable work done by scientists on the frontiers of research, which
Bauer describes in a way reminiscent of the "anything goes" anti-method anarchy of
Feyerabend (1975), is refined into the generally reliable body of knowledge that appears
in textbooks. In science, filtering occurs in a perpetual process of self-correction, as
individual inadequacies and errors are filtered through the sieve of public accountability
by collaborators and colleagues, journal editors and referees, and by the community of
scientists who read journal articles, listen to conference presentations, and evaluate what
they read and hear. During this process it is probable, but not guaranteed, that much of
the effect of biased self-interest by one individual or group will be offset by the actions of
other groups. Due to this filtering, "textbook knowledge" in the classroom is generally
more reliable than "research knowledge" at the frontiers, and the objectivity of science as
a whole is greater than the objectivity of its individual participants. { But a byproduct of
filtering, not directly acknowledged by Bauer, is that the collective evaluations and
dominant thought styles of a scientific community introduce a "community bias" into the
process and content of science. }

THE 4Ps AND THOUGHT STYLES. The puzzle and filter metaphors provide useful
ways to visualize posing and persuading, respectively. While scientists watch what
others are doing with the puzzle of knowledge, they search for gaps to fill, for
opportunities to pose a problem where an investment of their own resources is likely to
be productive. And the process of filtering is useful for describing the overall process of
scientific persuasion, including its institutional procedures.
PREPARATION. There are mutual influences between thought styles and three
 45

ways to learn. First, the formal education of students who will become future scientists is
affected by the thought styles of current scientists and educators; in this way, current
science education helps to shape thought styles in the future. Second, thought styles
influence what scientists learn from their own past and current research experience, to use
in future research. Third, thought styles influence the types of ideas that survive the
"filtering" process and are published in journals and textbooks.
POSING. The thought style of a scientific community will affect every aspect of
posing a problem: selecting an area to study, forming perceptions about the current state
of knowledge in this area, and defining a desired goal-state for knowledge in the future.
Problem posing is important within science, and it plays a key role in the mutual
interactions between science and society by influencing both of the main ways that
science affects culture. First, posing affects the investment of societal resources and the
returns (such as medical-technological applications) that may arise from these
investments. Second, the questions asked by science, and the constraints on how these
questions are answered, will help to shape cultural worldviews, concepts, and thinking
patterns.
PROBING. As described above, both types of probing activities -- observation and
interpretation -- are influenced by thought styles.
PERSUASION. For effective persuasion, arguments should be framed in the
structure of current knowledge (so ideas can be more easily understood and appreciated
by readers or listeners), with an acceptable style of presentation, in a way that will be
convincing when judged by the standards of the evaluators, by carefully considering all
factors -- empirical, conceptual, and cultural-personal -- that may influence the evaluation
process at the levels of individuals and communities. Doing all of these things skillfully
requires a good working knowledge of the thought styles in a scientific culture.

VARIATIONS. Thought styles vary from one field of science to another, and so does
their influence on the process and content of science. For example, the methodology of
chemistry emphasizes controlled experiments, while geology and astronomy (or
paleontology,...) depend mainly on observations from field studies. And experiments in
social science and medical science, which typically use a relatively small number of
subjects, must be interpreted using a sophisticated analysis of sampling and statistics, by
contrast with the statistical simplicity of chemistry experiments that involve a huge
number of molecules.
Differences between fields could be caused by a variety of contributing factors,
including: 1) intrinsic differences in the areas of nature being studied; 2) differences in
the observational techniques available for studying each area; 3) differences, due to self
selection, in the cognitive styles, personalities, values, and metaphysical-ideological
beliefs of scientists who choose to enter different fields; 4) historical contingencies.

CHANGE. A model that is useful for analyzing change in science is proposed by

Laudan (1984), whose "reticulated model of scientific rationality" is based on the mutual
interactions between the goals, theories, and methods of scientists. When a change in
one of these produces a dissonant relationship between between any of them, in order to
reduce the dissonance there will be a motivation to make adjustments that will improve
the overall logical harmony. {examples}
 46

Variation and change are a part of science, and the study of methodological diversity
and transformation can be fascinating and informative. But these characteristics of
science should be viewed in proper perspective. It is important to balance a recognition
of differences with an understanding of similarities, with an appreciation of the extent to
which differences can be explained as "variations on a theme" -- as variations on the
basic methods shared by all scientists.

COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICT. One interesting example of variation was a

competition, beginning in 1961, to explain the phenomenon of oxidative phosphorylation
in mitochondria. In 1960 the widely accepted explanation assumed the existence of a
chemical intermediate. Even though an intermediate had never been found, its eventual
discovery was confidently predicted, and this theory "was...considered an established fact
of science. (Wallace, et al, 1986; p 140)" But in 1961 Peter Mitchell proposed an
alternative theory based on a principle of chemiosmosis. Later, a third competitor,
energy transduction, entered the battle, and for more than a decade these three theories
-- and their loyal defenders -- were involved in heated controversy.
This episode is a fascinating illustration of contrasting thought styles, with radically
different approaches to solving the same problem. Advocates of each theory built their
own communities, each with its base of support from colleagues and institutions, and
each with its own assumptions and preferences regarding theories, experimental
techniques, and criteria for empirical and conceptual evaluation. All aspects of science --
including posing with its crucial question of which projects were most worthy of support
-- were hotly debated due to the conflicting perspectives and the corresponding
differences in self-interest and in evaluations about the plausibility and utility of each
theory.
Eventually, chemiosmotic theory was declared the winner, and in 1978 Mitchell was
awarded the Nobel Prize in chemistry.

Table of Contents

9. Productive Thinking
An Overview of Scientific Method, Section 9

Even though science occurs in the context of a community, it is done by individual

scientists. Interactions with colleagues can stimulate productive ideas, but an idea always
begins in the mind of an individual. The mental operations that occur within a scientist
are summarized, in the ISM diagram, by "motivation and memory, creativity and critical
thinking." Similar cognitive processes are involved, whether the focus of generation and
evaluation is to produce an action (an experiment,...) or a theory.
 47

MOTIVATION. Motivation inspires effort. For a scientist, motivating factors include

curiosity -- such as asking (when generating a theory) "What would nature be like if...? or
(when generating an experiment) "What would happen if we...?" -- and a taste for
intellectual stimulation, along with practical concerns and psychological motives, such as
a desire to receive project funding or to be accepted into a prestigious professional
organization.
Often, necessity is the mother of invention. For example, Newton invented a theory of
calculus because he needed it to fill a gap in the logical structure of his theory for
celestial mechanics. His immediate practical goal was finding a method to show that the
gravitational force produced by (or acting on) a spherically symmetric object is exactly
the same as if all the object's mass was concentrated at a point in the center of the sphere.
Calculus did show this, which enabled Newton's theory to make easy calculations for the
approximate forces acting on planetary objects.
Conversely, an absence of perceived need can hinder invention. For example, there
are clear benefits to having more than one theory, because competition usually produces
lively pursuit with more testing that is designed to falsify a theory, and a more objective
evaluation with less danger of accepting a theory because "it's all we have." But despite
these benefits, usually a scientist who already has one theory will not try to invent an
alternative; based on a study of research in classical genetics, Darden (1991, p. 268)
found that "a single scientist usually proposed one alternative and began testing
predictions from it; other scientists did likewise."

MEMORY. Although memory is not sufficient for productive thinking, it is

necessary to provide raw materials (theories and exemplars, analogies and metaphors;
experimental techniques and systems/observations; problem-solving algorithms and
heuristics,...) for processing by creative, critical thinking.
For example, theory generation by either selection or invention requires memory.
With selection a theory is proposed from memory. With invention a theory is proposed
from imagination, but this usually occurs by the revising or combining of existing ideas,
in a mental process that blends memory and imagination.
Productive thinking can be nourished by ideas from a wide variety of sources. To
build the solid foundation of knowledge required for productive research, scientists
engage in preparation by reading and listening, and learning from experience.
To stimulate and guide the process of thinking, knowledge must be in the "working
memory" of a scientist. There are two ways to get knowledge into the mind: ideas can
be retrieved from internal storage in the scientist's long-term memory, or they can be
retrieved from external storage in notes, articles or books, in computer memory (locally
or on the internet), or from the memory of colleagues.

CREATIVITY and CRITICAL THINKING. These two aspects of thinking are

discussed in the same subsection because they complement each other, with a blending of
both required for productive thinking. In defining creativity, Perkins (1984) emphasizes
the criterion of productivity:

Creative thinking is thinking patterned in a way that leads to creative results. ...
The ultimate criterion for creativity is output. We call a person creative when that
 48

person consistently gets creative results, meaning, roughly speaking, original and
otherwise appropriate results by the criteria of the domain in question. (pp. 18-19)

Of course, getting "appropriate results by the criteria of the domain" requires critical
evaluation. This close connection between creativity and criticality is similar to the
connections between generation and evaluation. In fact, it can be useful to consider
generation and evaluation as the result of creative thinking and critical thinking,
respectively. This perspective is adopted in the "red plus blue makes purple" color
coding used in the ISM diagram: generation plus evaluation yields productive thinking in
design. But this interpretation, although interesting, is not logically rigorous, because a
process of generation that is truly productive (to get a high-quality idea, not just an idea)
is usually guided by critical evaluation, even in the initial stages, so equating generation
with pure creativity is not justified. Instead, it's better to consider the entire combination
of "motivation and memory, creativity and critical thinking" that results in productive
thinking with the generation of a theory (or experiment, product, strategy, action,...) that
is evaluated as being useful, and actually is useful.
Considering the close connection between creativity and criticality, perhaps a process
of productive thinking that skillfully combines creative and critical thinking could be
called "creatical" thinking? Well, maybe not. But calling it productive is certainly
appropriate.

The process of inventing useful ideas requires both modes of thinking (creative and
critical) but being overly critical, especially in the early stages of invention, can stifle
creativity. We shouldn't hinder the motion of a car by driving with the brakes on, and we
shouldn't hinder the flow of creativity by thinking with restrictive criticism. But a car
needs brakes, and a creative person needs critical thinking. One strategy for creativity is
to "play games" with the modes by shifting the balance in favor of creativity for awhile,
by experimenting with different balances between the modes during different stages in
the overall process of productive thinking.
For example, instruction designed to enhance creative thinking often uses a technique
of brainstorm and edit. During an initial brainstorming phase, critical restraints are
minimized (this can be done in various ways) to encourage a free creativity in generating
lots of ideas; in a later editing phase these ideas can be critically checked for plausibility
and/or utility. During the brainstorming phase, inventors can afford to think freely (by
consciously trying to see in a new way, to imagine new possibilities without critical
restrictions) because they have the security of knowing that their wild ideas will not be
acted on prematurely before these ideas have been critically evaluated during the editing
phase that follows. The principle of this strategy is to allow the effective operation of
both creativity and criticality.

Viewing a situation from new perspectives can increase creativity. By contrast,

sometimes a knowledge of "the way things are" and (especially) a certainty about "the
way things must be" can block new perspectives and hinder creativity. The following
passage describes a dilemma and suggests a strategy:
 49

Human "theories of the world" are essential to our learning and making sense of
the world. However, there is a curious paradox about schemata. Just as they are
the basis of human perception and understanding, so too are they "blinders" to
interpretations that fall outside their scope. ... Creativity involves the ability to go
beyond the schema normally used to approach a problem... and reframe the
problem so it might appear in a different light. Characteristically, the creative
person has the ability to look at a problem from one frame of reference or schema
and then consciously shift to another frame of reference, giving a completely new
perspective. This process continues until the person has viewed the problem from
many different perspectives. (Marzano, et al, 1988, p. 26)

Productive thinking often involves a tension between tradition and innovation.

Sometimes new ideas are needed, but often a skillful application of old ideas is the key to
success. Seeing from a new perspective, or perhaps just seeing more clearly from a
familiar perspective, can inspire the inventing of a new idea or the remembering of an old
idea. For example, when a new organic compound is discovered (in nature) or
synthesized (in the lab), instead of inventing new experiments it may be more productive
to use an existing methodology consisting of a system of experiments that in the past
have been useful for exploring the properties of new compounds.
There may be a similar tension between other contrasting virtues, such as persevering
by tenacious hard work, or flexibly deciding to stop wasting time on an approach that
isn't working and probably never will. A problem solver may need to dig deeper, so
perseverance is needed; but sometimes the key is to dig in a new location, and flexibility
(not perseverance) will pay off.

One of the most important actions in science (or in life) is to recognize an opportunity
and take advantage of it, whether this involves observation or interpretation. In science
the imaginative use of available observation detectors — either mechanical or human, for
controlled experiments or planned field studies, for expected or unexpected results — can
be highly effective in converting available information into recorded data. Following
this, an insightful interpretation of observations can harvest more meaning from the raw
data. Sherlock Holmes, with his alert awareness, careful observations, and clever
interpretations, provides a fictional illustration of the benefits arising from an effective
gathering and processing of all available information. Of course, being aware, careful,
and clever are also valuable assets for a real scientist.

ENDNOTES

two examples of "reticulated" change in science:

Conceptual criteria are formulated and adopted by people, and can be changed by
people. In 1600, noncircular motion in theories of astronomy was considered
inappropriate, but in 1700 it was acceptable. What caused this change? The theories of
Kepler and Newton. First, Kepler formulated a description of planetary motions with
 50

orbits that were elliptical, not circular. Later, Newton provided a theoretical explanation
for Kepler's elliptical orbits by showing how they can be derived by combining his own
laws of motion and principle of universal gravitation. For a wide range of reasons,
scientists considered these theories -- which postulated noncircular celestial motions -- to
be successful, both empirically and conceptually, so the previous prohibition of
noncircular motions was abandoned. In this case the standard portrait of science was
reversed. Instead of using permanently existing criteria to evaluate proposed theories,
already-accepted theories were used to evaluate and revise the evaluation criteria.
Laudan (1977, 1984) describes a similar situation, with conflict between two beliefs,
but this time the resolving of dissonance resulted in a more significant change, a change
in the fundamental epistemological foundations of science. Some early interpretations of
Newton's methods claimed that he rigidly adhered to building theories by inductive
generalization from observations, and refused to indulge in hypothetical speculation.
Although these claims are disputed by most modern analyses, they were influential in the
early 1700s, and the apparently Newtonian methods were adopted by scientists who tried
to continue Newton's development of empiricist theories (with core components derived
directly from experience), and philosophers developed empiricist theories of knowledge.
But by the 1750s it was becoming apparent that many of the most successful theories, in
a variety of fields, depended on the postulation of unobservable entities. There was a
conflict between these theories of science and the explicitly empiricist goals of science.
Rather than give up their non-empiricist theories, the scientists and philosophers "sought
to legitimate the aim of understanding the visible world by means of postulating an
invisible world whose behavior was causally responsible for what we do observe. ... To
make good on their proposed aims, they had to develop a new methodology of science,...
the hypothetico-deductive method. Such a method allowed for the legitimacy of
hypotheses referring to theoretical entities, just so long as a broad range of correct
observational claims could be derived from such hypotheses. (Laudan, 1984; p. 57)"

GOALS and NON-GOALS

what it is:
Integrated Scientific Method (ISM) is a model of scientific action.
It is a synthesis of ideas -- mainly from scientists and philosophers,
but also from sociologists, psychologists, historians, and myself -- that
describes the activities of scientists: what they think about and what they do.
It shows how the mutually supportive skills of creativity and critical thinking
are intimately integrated in the problem-solving methods used by scientists.

and what it is not:

Because I agree with the consensus that no single "method" is used by
all scientists at all times, I am not trying to define the scientific method.
Therefore, it is most accurate (and most useful) to view ISM,
 51

not as a rigorous flowchart for describing a predictable sequence,

but as a roadmap that shows possibilities for creative wandering.
ISM is mainly intended to help people understand science and
to be useful for education (for teachers and students,
and designers of "thinking skills" instruction),
not for a deep study of science by scholars.

{ details about goals }

Here are brief descriptions of science from the

smaller Overview of Scientific Method page
(with links to the detailed descriptions above),
followed by a visual representation in the ISM-diagram:

1. Hypothetico-Deductive Logic, and Empirical Factors in Theory Evaluation

This tour of ISM begins with hypothetico-deductive logic, the foundation for modern
science that provides a "reality check" to guide the invention, evaluation, and revision of
theories.

In ISM an experimental system (for a controlled experiment or field study) is defined

as everything involved in an experiment, including what is being studied, what is done to
it, and the observers (which can be human or mechanical). When a physical experiment
is done with the experimental system, observation detectors are used to obtain
observations.

A theory is a humanly constructed representation intended to describe or explain the

observed phenomena in a specified domain of nature. By using a general domain-theory
(which is claimed to be valid for all experimental systems in a domain, and involves a
theory plus a foundation of supplementary theories) combined with a specific system-
theory (about the characteristics of one experimental system), scientists construct an
explanatory model that is a simplified representation of the system's composition (what it
is) and operation (what it does). After defining an explanatory model (for composition-
and-operation, made by applying a general domain-theory to a specific experimental
system that has been characterized by a system-theory), a thought experiment can be
done by asking, "IF this model is true, THEN what will occur?", thereby using deductive
logic to make predictions.
Or, based on a descriptive model that is limited to observable properties and their
relationships, scientists can make predictions by using inductive logic, by making a
deductive generalization that "IF this situation is similar (or identical) to previous
situations, THEN we should expect a result that is similar (or identical)."
Usually, predictions (and evaluations) are based on logic that is both deductive and
 52

inductive.

Most of this page was written in 1997. Later, in April 2006, I said in the "Designing of
Scientific Theories" section of An Introduction to Scientific Method,
In their daily work, scientists rarely design large-scale generalized theories, such as
the theories of gravity, invariance, or evolution developed by Newton, Einstein, or
Darwin. Instead, they typically are applying generalized theories that already are
accepted, in their study of particular systems (and experimental situations) for which they
are designing small-scale specialized mini-theories or sub-theories.

Later, I'll take the time to think about this more rigorously and will incorporate these
concepts into the box above, to describe the relationships between different types of
theories: domain, system, mini, and sub.

The dual-parallel shape of the hypothetico-deductive "box" (whose 4 corners are

defined by the model and system, predictions and observations) symbolizes two parallel
relationships. The left-side process (done by mentally running a theory-based model)
parallels the right-side process (done by physically running a real-world experimental
system). There is also a parallel between the top and bottom of the box. At the top, a
hypothesis is a claim that the model and system are similar in some respects and to some
degree of accuracy. At the bottom is a logical comparison of predictions (by the model)
and observations (of the system); this comparison is used to evaluate the hypothesis,
based on the logic that the degree of agreement between predictions and observations
may be related to the degree of similarity between model and system. But a theory can
be false even if its predictions agree with observations, so it is necessary to supplement
this "agreement logic" with another criterion, the degree of predictive contrast, by asking
"How much contrast exists between the predictions of this theory and the predictions of
plausible alternative theories?" in an effort to consider the possibility that two or more
theories could make the same correct predictions for this system.

Estimates for degrees of agreement and predictive contrast are combined to form an
empirical evaluation of current hypothesis. This evaluation and the analogous
empirical evaluations of previous hypotheses (that are based on the same theory as the
current hypothesis) are empirical factors that influence theory evaluation.

{ the detailed version of Section 1 is available earlier in this page }

2. Conceptual Factors in Theory Evaluation

In ISM the conceptual factors that influence theory evaluation are split into internal
characteristics and external relationships.
 53

Scientists expect a logical internal consistency between a theory's own components.

And when evaluating a theory's logical structure, one common criteria is simplicity ,
which is achieved by postulating a minimum number of logically interconnected theory-
components. Also, in each field of science there are expectations for the types of entities
and actions that should (and should not) be included in a theory. These "expectations
about components" can be explicit or implicit, due to scientists' beliefs about ontology
(what exists) or utility (what is useful).
The external relationships between theories (including both scientific and cultural-
personal theories) can involve an overlapping of domains or a sharing of theory
components. Theories with domains that overlap are in direct competition because they
claim to explain the same systems. Theories with shared components often provide
support for each other, and can help to unify our understanding of the domains they
describe. There is some similarity between the logical structures for a theory (composed
of smaller components) and for a mega-theory (composed of smaller theories), and many
conceptual criteria can be applied to either internal structure (within a theory) or external
relationships (between theories in a mega-theory).

{ the detailed version of Section 2 is available earlier in this page }

3. Cultural-Personal Factors in Theory Evaluation

During all activities of science, including theory evaluation, scientists are influenced
by cultural-personal factors. These factors include psychological motives and
practical concerns (such as intellectual curiosity, and desires for self esteem, respect
from others, financial security, and power), metaphysical worldviews (that form the
foundation for some criteria used in conceptual evaluation), ideological principles (about
"the way things should be" in society), and opinions of authorities (who are
acknowledged due to expertise, personality, and/or power).
These five factors interact with each other, and operate in a complex social context that
involves individuals, the scientific community, and society as a whole. Science and
culture are mutually interactive, with each affecting the other. The effects of culture, on
both the process of science and the content of science, are summarized at the top of the
ISM diagram: "scientific activities... are affected by culturally influenced thought
styles."
Some cultural-personal influence is due to a desire for personal consistency between
ideas, between actions, and between ideas and actions. For example, scientists are more
likely to accept a scientific theory that is consistent with their metaphysical and
ideological theories. In the diagram this type of influence appears as a conceptual factor,
external relationships... with cultural-personal theories.
 54

{ the detailed version of Section 3 is available earlier in this page }

4. Theory Evaluation
A theory is evaluated in association with supplementary theories, and relative to
alternative theories. Inputs for evaluating a theory come from empirical, conceptual,
and cultural-personal factors, with the relative weighting of factors varying from one
situation to another. The immediate output of theory evaluation is a theory status that is
an estimate of a theory's plausibility (whether it seems likely to be true) and/or usefulness
(for stimulating scientific research or solving problems). Based on their estimate of a
theory's status, scientists can decide to retain this theory with no revisions, revise it to
generate a new theory, or reject it. {or delay a decision} When a theory is retained after
evaluation, its status can be increased, decreased, or unchanged. A theory can be retained
for the purpose of pursuit (to serve as a basis for further research) and/or acceptance (as a
proposed explanation, for being treated as if it were true). According to formal logic it is
impossible to prove a theory is either true or false, but scientists have developed
analytical methods that encourage them to claim a "rationally justified confidence" for
their conclusions about status. Each theory has two types of status: its own intrinsic
status, and a relative status that is defined by asking "What is the overall appeal of this
theory compared with alternative theories?"

{ the detailed version of Section 4 is available earlier in this page }

5. Theory Generation
Generating a theory can involve selecting an old theory or, if necessary, inventing a
new theory. The process of inventing a new theory usually occurs by revising an
existing "old theory." Some strategies for invention are: split an old theory into
components that can be modified or recombined in new ways; borrow components (or
logical structure) from other theories; generalize an old theory, as-is or modified, into a
new domain; or apply the logic of internal consistency to build on the foundation of a
few assumed axiom-components. Often, a creative analysis of data (to search for
patterns) is a key step in constructing a theory.

Theory generation is guided by evaluation factors that are cultural-personal,

conceptual, and empirical. There is a close relationship between the generation and
evaluation of a theory. { Similarly, the generation and evaluation of an action (such as an
experiment) are closely related. }

Empirical guidance is used in the creative-and-critical process of retroduction -- a

thinking strategy in which the goal is to generate (to propose by selection or invention) a
 55

theory whose predictions will match known observations. If there is data from several
experiments, retroduction can aim for a theory whose predictions are consistent with all
known data. During retroduction a scientist, curious about puzzling observations and
motivated to find an explanation, can adjust either of the two sources used to construct a
model: a general domain-theory (that applies to all systems in a domain) and a specific
system-theory (about the characteristics of one system). Usually, a scientific "inference
to the best explanation" involves a creative use of logic that is both inductive and
deductive.
With retroduction or hypothetico-deduction (which are similar, except that in
retroduction a model is proposed after the observations are known), similar logical
limitations apply. Even if a theory correctly predicts the observations, plausible
alternative theories might make the same correct predictions, so with either retroduction
or hypothetico-deduction there is a cautious conclusion: IF system-and-observations,
THEN MAYBE model (and theory). This caution contrasts with the definite conclusion
of deductive logic: IF theory-and-model, THEN prediction.

{ the detailed version of Section 5 is available earlier in this page }

6. Experimental Design (Generation-and-Evaluation)

In ISM an "experiment" is defined broadly to include both controlled experiments and
field studies. Three arrows point toward generate experiment, showing inputs from
theory evaluation (which can motivate and guide design), gaps in system-knowledge
(that can be filled by experimentation, and provide motivation) and "do thought
experiments..." (to facilitate the process of design). The result of experimental design
(which combines generating an experiment with evaluating an experiment) is a "real-
world experimental system" that can be used for hypothetico-deductive logic.
Sometimes experiments are done just to see what will happen, but an experiment is
often designed to accomplish a specific goal. For example, an experiment (or a cluster of
related experiments) can be done to gather information about a system or experimental
technique, to resolve anomaly, to provide support for an argument, or to serve as a crucial
experiment that can distinguish between competing theories. To facilitate the collection
and interpretation of data for each goal, logical strategies are available. When using these
strategies, scientists can think ahead to questions that will be raised during evaluation,
regarding issues such as sample size and representativeness, the adequacy of controls,
and the effects of random errors and systematic errors.
Often, new opportunities for experimenting (and theorizing) emerge from a change in
the status quo. For example, opportunities for field studies may arise from new events
(such as an ozone hole) or new discoveries (of old dinosaur bones,...). A new theory may
stimulate experiments to test and develop the theory, or to explore its application for a
variety of systems. Or a new observation technology may allow new types of
 56

experimental systems. When an area of science opens up due to any of these changes,
opportunities for research are produced. To creatively take advantage of these
opportunities requires an open-minded awareness that can imagine a wide variety of
possibilities.

Thought-experiments, done to quickly explore a variety of possibilities, can help

scientists evaluate potential experimental systems and decide which ones are worthy of
further pursuit with physical experiments that typically require larger investments of time
and money.
Thought-experiments play a key role in three parts of ISM: in experimental design,
retroduction, and hypothetico-deduction. In each case a prediction is produced from a
theory by using deductive logic, but there are essential differences in timing and
objectives. And sometimes mental experiments are done for their own sake, to probe the
implications of a theory by deductively exploring systems that may be difficult or
impossible to attain physically.

{ the detailed version of Section 6 is available earlier in this page }

7. Problem-Solving Projects
The activities of science usually occur in a context of problem solving, which can be
defined as "an effort to convert an actual current state into a desired future state" or, more
simply, "converting a NOW-state into a GOAL-state." If the main goal of science is
knowledge about nature, the main goal of scientific research is improved knowledge,
which includes observations of nature and interpretations of nature. Before and during
problem formulation, scientists prepare by learning (through active reading and listening)
the current now-state of knowledge for a selected area, including observations, theories,
and experimental techniques. Critical evaluation of this now-state may lead to
recognizing a gap in the current knowledge, and imagining a potential future state with
improved knowledge. When scientists decide to pursue a solution for a science problem
(characterized by deciding what to study and how to study it) this becomes the focal point
for a problem-solving project.
Problem formulation -- by defining a problem that is original, significant, and can be
solved using available resources -- is an essential activity in science. During research a
mega-problem (the attempt by science to understand all of nature) is narrowed to a
problem (of trying to answer specific questions about one area of nature) and then to sub-
problems and specific actions. In an effort to solve a problem, scientists generate,
evaluate, and execute actions that involve observation (generate and do experiments,
collect data) or interpretation (analyze data, generate and evaluate theories); action
generation and action evaluation, done for the purpose of deciding what to do and
when, is guided by the goal-state (which serves as an aiming point in searching for a
 57

solution) and by an awareness of the constantly changing now-state. Evaluation of

actions [or theories] can involve persuasion that is internally oriented (within a research
group) or externally oriented (to convince others).

{ the detailed version of Section 7 is available earlier in this page }

8. Thought Styles
All activities in science, mental and physical, are affected by thought styles that are
influenced by cultural-personal factors, operate at the levels of individuals and sub-
communities and communities, and involve both conscious choices and unconscious
assumptions. A collective thought style includes the shared beliefs, among a group of
scientists, about "what should be done and how it should be done." Thought styles affect
the types of theories generated and accepted, and the problems formulated, experiments
done, and techniques for interpreting data. There are mutual influences between thought
styles and the procedural "rules of the game" that are developed by a community of
scientists, operating in a larger social context, to establish and maintain certain types of
institutions and reward systems, styles of presentation, attitudes toward competition and
cooperation, and relationships between science, technology and society. Decisions about
which problem-solving projects to pursue -- decisions (made by scientists and by
societies) that are heavily influenced by thought styles -- play a key role in the two-way
interactions between society and science by determining the allocation of societal
resources (for science as a whole, and for areas within science, and for individual
projects) and the returns (to society) that may arise from investments in scientific
research. Thought styles affect the process and content of science in many ways, but this
influence is not the same for all science, because thought styles vary between fields (and
within fields), and change with time.

{ the detailed version of Section 8 is available earlier in this page }

9. Mental Operations
The mental operations used in science can be summarized as "motivation and memory,
creativity and critical thinking." Motivation inspires effort. And memory — with
information in the mind or in "external storage" such as notes or a book or a computer
file — provides raw materials (theories, experimental techniques, known observations,...)
for creativity and critical thinking. At its best, productive thinking (in science or in
other areas of life) combines knowledge with creative/critical thinking. Ideally, an
effective productive thinker will have the ability to be fully creative and fully critical, and
will know, based on logic and intuition, what blend of cognitive styles is likely to be
 58

productive in each situation.

{ the detailed version of Section 9 is available earlier in this page }

color symbolism: The connections between generation (red) and evaluation (blue) are
symbolized by purple — because red plus blue makes purple (with pigments) — in the
"creativity and critical thinking" part of the diagram (which is described in Section 9) as a
 59

reminder of the continual productive interplay between creative thinking (the main mode
of thinking in generation) and critical thinking (the main mode of thinking in evaluation).