Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p.
1)
IN RE CUNANAN (Odronia)
Doctrine: Everything in relation with the admission to the bar is under the
supervision of the Supreme court as properly provided in Article VIII, sec.
5 (5). Any attempt of the legislature to alter its requirements shall be deemed
unenforceable.
Issue: Whether the Congress may enact laws adjusting the passing rate
requirement in the Bar exams which would affect some of the unsuccessful
bar takers. -NO
Facts: R.A 972 was enacted by the congress decreeing that those who
failed the Bar exams in the year 1946 to 1955, but have obtained an average
grade of 70 in the year 1946-1951, 71 in the year 1952, 72 in the year 1953,
73 in the year 1954, and 74 in the year 1955 and had no grade lower than
50 in any subject shall be admitted to the bar. In accordance with the newly
enacted law, 604 unsuccessful Bar takers who claim that they should be
granted the effects of the law, have filed their petitions seeking for their
admission to the bar.
As reviewed by the Supreme court, the legislative intent of the law
is to give chance to the unsuccessful Bar takers to be admitted to the bar,
which according to them, was caused by the lack of reading instruments
and materials which they could have used to properly prepare. It is important
to note that these examiners took the examination right after great world war
II hence, it is only just to adjust the passing rate requirement in favor of the
unfortunate examiners.
SC: No! The newly enacted law of the congress shall be deemed void and
unenforceable. As provided for in the Constitution, particularly Article VIII
section 5 (5), it is the sole duty of the Supreme court to govern and
promulgate rules in order to protect and enforce constitutional rights with
regards to the admission to the bar. Allowing the Congress to enact such
law would promote encroachment of the judicial power by the legislative
branch which is prohibited by the Constitution by virtue of the principle of
the separation of powers of the branches of the government.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that there are no legal
precedents which can be applied in the current petition. Even in other
countries, there have been attempts to enact such laws however, none of
them have been enforced and given effect. Being a member of the Bar is a
privilege given only to those who have shown mastery, and proper
understanding of the written laws of the country. To allow the enforcement
of the law would provide for a dangerous precedent. Even those who have
not shown the necessary skills and knowledge of the law will be allowed to
practice with could lead to unfortunate events. Every case a lawyer handles
dictates whether a person will be allowed to live, have liberty, or possess
property hence, only those that are absolutely qualified should be given to
practice the law.
Lastly, the argument of the Legislature that the unsuccessful Bar
takers had poor results during their exams was because of the lack of
reading materials is erroneous. It is true that the country suffered greatly
because of the 2nd world war however, there were still many materials
readily available to the examiners right after the country assumed liberty.
The legal precedents, books, and legal journals already available before the
War were still accessible after it ceased.
The practice of law affects the life, liberty, and possession of
properties of the people hence, it should not be treated with light regard.
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP (Tan)
Facts: In 1962, Administrative Case No. 526 was filed praying for the Court
to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were
admitted, and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file memoranda.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor”, and this was signed by President Marcos.
In 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the
"earnest recommendation" and "with the views from its Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" — that the Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption of an appropriate
Court Rule."
Issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
SC: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and
financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up
by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession
based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Designed
to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures,
through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
There are 14 purposes of an integrated Bar:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession
to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys
in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on
the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
(1) YES, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its
power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the
Bar.
(2) YES, it is constitutional: freedom of association and of speech, as well
as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the
Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar,
it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar
program without means to defray the concomitant expenses.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members a new system which they have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive new benefits and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do
in the past.
(3) YES, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Surveys
showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
(14,555/15,090 individual votes in favor, 80 local Bar association gave
favorable endorsements, 12,855/13,802 voted in favor of the proposed
Court Rule)

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not

compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled
to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the
payment of annual dues. Assuming arguendo that it does compel a lawyer
to be a member, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the state”
Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues
paid by the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
CAYETANO V. MONSOD (Uy)
Doctrine: the practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. To practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Issue: WON Monsod qualified for the requirement of Chairman of
COMELEC “practice of law for atleast ten years” ? YES.
Facts:
The respondent, Christian Monsod, a member of the Philippine Bar was
nominated by Pres. Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC. The petitioner, Renato Cayetano, opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Regardless, the Commission on Appointments (CA) confirmed his
nomination as Chairman; took his oath of office and on the same day
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Cayetano would then challenge the validity of the confirmation done by the
CA of Monsod’s nomination, he filed an instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition – praying that the appointment of Monsod be declared null and
void.
The respondent’s credentials: (For Recit)
1. Passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55% from
the UP College of Law
2. Had been a paying member of the IBP since 1972-73 and his
professional license fees as a lawyer for more than 10 years.
3. Places he worked for:
A. After the bar he worked for his father’s law office
B. World Bank Group (1963-70) – where he worked as an
operations officer for 2 years in Costa Rica and Panama which enabled him
to get acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank
C. When he returned to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Mercalco Group, as the CEO of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate; and since 1986, he has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or CEO.
D. Former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
of National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) which made
him knowledgeable over election laws. In which he appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the COMELEC
E. Former Chairman of Bishop’s Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development where he was able to work for farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and the urban land reform bill
F. A member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-87), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, where his work was cited by Commission’s President,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and
the party-list system for the House of Representative."
SC:
The Court ruled in the above mentioned credentials and work experience in
the law profession that Monsod was indeed qualified for the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
Under the 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years."
The petitioner gives emphasis on the phrase, who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years for his allegation
against the nomination of Monsod as Chairman. With this the Court provided
numerous definitions from different sources to be able to grasp the exact or
sufficient definition of the phrase.
The practice of law
In general, the practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. To practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
The Court debunked the traditional definition or idea of “the practice of law”
in which it is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts. Under the modern conditions
it consists more than the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Even though
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings
but they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s
role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal
profession.
Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, stated that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. And that the business lawyer has been described
as the planner, and the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. It
need not be stressed that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective.
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage
in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
The practice of law requires in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a
wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. There customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction can be drawn between the part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and the part which involved
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
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character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys.

Difficulty of defining the phrase

As Justice Isagani Cruz stated, the definition of law practice by “traditional

areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by
means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out

of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. This is because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable.

Stages of appointment (Recite ready)

The court provides the 4 stages of a regular appointment:

(1) nomination,
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (CA),
(3) issuance of a commission (CA’s submission of a certificate of
confirmation and the President will also issue a permanent appointment),
and
(4) acceptance (oath taking, posting of bond)

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC (Wenceslao)
Doctrine: Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
Issue: Whether or not the advertisements made by Legal Clinic is
considered as a practice of law? YES
Facts:
Ulep prays the Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes “A” and “B” (mainly advertisements regarding marriage laws) and
to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.
Ulep posits that that the advertisements (mainly advertisements
regarding marriage laws) above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted. However, Legal Clinic states that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in rendering “legal support services” through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines.
Lower Court/s: N/A
SC:
Yes, the Court held that the advertisements made by The Legal
Clinic is considered as a practice of law. It is clear that The Legal Clinic
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers such as foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption. Thus, the practice of giving out legal
information is considered as a practice of law because the said practice is
not limited to merely court appearances but also to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
Dispositive Portion:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN
herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes “A” and “B” of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
BRION V. BRILLANTES (Barretto)
Doctrine:
Issue: Whether or not Brillantes violated the Code and the lawful order
of the court?
Facts: Complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent, Atty.
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this
Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92- 706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. Respondent Brillantes’ dismissal in the aforesaid
case was ordered after he was found guilty of Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila. Petitioner Brion jr. now avers
that respondent violated the decree of perpetual disqualification imposed
upon him from assuming any post in government service, including any
posts in GOCCs, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors
of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special
Consultancy Agreement. Brion jr. contends that while both consultancy
agreements contained a proviso to the effect that nothing therein should be
construed as establishing an employer-employee relationship between
LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to
circumvent our order barring respondent from appointment to a government
agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights
and privileges as a regular employee, which constitute deceitful conduct,
gross misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of the Court, and
show that respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar. Respondent
brillantes admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as
the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative
defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy
contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are
not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent Brillantes willfully violated a lawful order of the
Court. There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198. As
such, our ruling in the Atienza case, which categorically prohibits
respondent’s appointment to any position in any government-owned and
controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and extends to LWUA
positions.
The tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the
consultancy contract cannot be deemed merely advisory in nature. we find
that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions
of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA.
As stated by petitioner in his reply, there is a difference between a
consultant hired on a contractual basis and a contractual employee (whose
appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on
Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and
functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise
of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and
spirit of this Court’s decree in Atienza.
The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath
is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible
minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts.
Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of
government, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a
special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a
contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

receiving compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and
open defiance of the Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
oath as an officer of the court. It is also destructive of the harmonious respondent as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision
relations that should prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such defiance not
only erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence
in the rule of law.

What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that respondent

is no ordinary lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he
is very well aware of the standards of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession. His propensity to try to “get away” with an indiscretion
becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal
“consultancy” contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own mistake,
LWUA terminated said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give
him a “special consultancy.” This travesty could not be long hidden from
public awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by
petitioner. Given the factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar
Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the
Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be
fined and suspended from the practice of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the
Code as well as transgressing his oath as an officer of the court, his
suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos are
in order.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is

found liable for having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our
decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92- 706, entitled Lupo
Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to pay
a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more

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with him for the development into a residential subdivision of the land
BAUTISTA V. GONZALES (Dacua) involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing
Doctrine: The very first Canon of the new Code states that “a lawyer shall fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction by the
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
the law and legal processes,” as well as the Revised Rules of Court which Deeds of Iligan City;
requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws of the land, as well 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein. Hence, any documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
violation of the law by a lawyer may be subjected to suspension or Development Agreement" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's
debarment from the Supreme Court. Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by
respondent against complainant
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales, should be suspended from the 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his
practice of law for having transferred ½ of the properties of the Fortunados client;
to himself, while a civil case involving said properties were still pending? 7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
YES. before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office
Facts: by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
Petitioner Angel Bautista filed a complaint against Atty. Ramon 9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally
Gonzales, charging him with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and tell a lie, he does not tell the truth either.”
violation of lawyer’s oath. It was alleged that the respondent committed the
following acts: Solicitor General:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General, wherein
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado to pay all it was recommended that the Gonzales be suspended from practicing law
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of for a period of 6 months, for having positively committed the following acts:
the value of the property in litigation. (1) transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein during the
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q- (2) concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their
15490; land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, to the execution of said agreement; and
which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q- (3) misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document
15143, while the case was still pending; where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures.

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
SC:
The Supreme Court rules in favor of the suspension of the
respondent for a period of 6 months, as suggested by the Solicitor General.
The Court found that Gonzales committed acts of misconduct which
warranted the exercise of disciplinary power. The records showed that the
following acts were maliciously committed by the respondent:
(1) He prepared a document entitled “Transfer of Rights” which was
signed by the Fortunados. Such document was for the purpose of
assigning to Gonzales 1/2 of the properties of the Fortunados, in
consideration of his legal services, all the while knowing that such
properties were subjected to a civil case pending with the CFI-QC,
because he was the acting counselor in the said case;
In executing the document transferring a portion of the properties to
himself, Gonzales violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any litigation in which
he may take part by virtue of his profession, as such purchase is a breach
of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice.
The very first Canon of the new Code states that “a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes,” as well as the Revised Rules of Court which
requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws of the land, as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein. Hence, any
violation of the law by a lawyer may be subjected to suspension or
debarment from the Supreme Court.
In this case, Gonzales, having violated Act. 1491 of the Civil Code,
must be held accountable both to his client and to society. Art. 1491
disqualifies a lawyer from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in
litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights,
as well as with the client. Hence, the Court holds that the purchase by a
lawyer of his client’s property in litigation constitutes a breach of
professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.
(2) He failed to disclose to the complainant, at the time the land development
agreement was entered into, that the land had already been sold at a public
auction. In doing so, he failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics
of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn
duplicitous conduct. The Court held that a lawyer should observe honesty
and fairness, even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for
disciplinary action against him.
(3) He submitted to the CFI falsified documents purporting to be true copies
of an addendum to the land development agreement. They were made to
appear as though its originals were signed, even though only 2 out of the
supposed 4 signatories, actually signed the original copies submitted to
court, knowingly misleading the court to believe that the originals were
signed by all 4 signatories. The Court ruled that such conduct constitutes
willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner
consistent with the truth, that a lawyer should never seek to mislead the
court by an artifact or false statement of fact or law.
Thus, under the circumstances, the Court clearly established in this
case that on multiple counts, that the respondent violated the law and the
rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to
assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has
“miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the
Bar. The Court therefore, agrees with the Solicitor General, that Atty.
Gonzales shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6
months.
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
FELICIANO V. BAUTISTA (Dimen)
Doctrine: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bautista-Lozada's appearance as counsel of
her husband while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willful
disobedience which is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. No (ground only for suspension)
Facts: On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution
suspending Atty. Lozada (respondent) for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty
of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from
notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely."
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction entitled “Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,”
where complainant (Feliciano) was one of the respondents, Feliciano
lamented that Atty. Bautista-Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff
and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the
proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, Feliciano submitted certified true
copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the
counsels, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty.
Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.
In her Comment on November 19, 2007, Atty. Bautista-Lozada explained
that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of
her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she
believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not
within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave
injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice
but to give him legal assistance.
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. In its
Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as
imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-
CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Bautista-Lozada be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.
SC Ruling: No, Atty. Bautista-Lozada should be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months. In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt
is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of
her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts,
conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law.
Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of
Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it
she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through
and in behalf of her husband and actively participated in the it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year
suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is
law. found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two warrant a more severe penalty.
(2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it.
Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While the Court understand her devotion and desire
to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty.
Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court
who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Lozada would have
deserved a harsher penalty, but the Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always
look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in
this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation
was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence,
she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it
proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib

and Jimmy P. Baliga, citing Molina v. Atty. Magat, where the Court
suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months
for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing
her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession

of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and
honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
LAENO V. AGUSTIN (Escudero)
Doctrine: Mere accusations without sufficient proof will not merit the
disbarment of a lawyer.
Issue: WON Atty. Ferdinand S. Agustin violated Canon 16; and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for accepting the
donation of the lot from his mother
Facts:
1. This is a Verified Complaint against Atty. Ferdinand S. Agustin (Atty.
Agustin) for accepting a donation that is the subject matter of a
pending litigation.
2. The subject matter of the case was an agreement to sell a property
of Perpetua Marcelina (Atty. Agustin’s mother) amounting to
P6,500,000.00. Perpetua issued a check amounting to
P1,500,000.00 as payment of the unpaid balance. However, the
check was dishonored. E.M. Laeno was compelled to file a
complaint to recover the unpaid balance.
3. RTC ruled in favor of E.M. Laeno, ordering Perpetua to pay the
remaining amount, interest, damages and other expenses. The
decision was affirmed by the CA.
4. Laeno then filed a Motion for Execution before the Regional Trial
Court after the CA Decision became final and executory.
5. Later, Laeno discovered that the property had been transferred to
Atty Agustin. He further learned that it was conveyed by Marcelina
to Atty. Agustin through a Donation Inter Vivos.
6. In his Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment, Laeno alleged that the
transfer of the property in favor of Atty. Agustin violated Article 1409
of the Civil Code; and Canon 16, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
7. Atty. Agustin filed his Answer where he alleged that after E.M.
Laeno sold the property to his mother, Marcelina, Laeno rented it
but was evicted in an ejectment case against him for failure to pay
the rent.
8. According to Atty. Agustin, E.M. Laeno did not have any
enforceable right over the property since they sold it to Marcelina in
2002. Moreover, the action was based on a money claim and not
on a real right to recover ownership; hence, the lot was not the
subject matter of the litigation, and his mother could freely dispose
of her property. He added that Laeno did not have the right or
personality to assail the validity of the donation because they were
not parties to the deed of donation.
9. Atty. Agustin claimed that Laeno was determined to get back the
property that he filed another baseless case before Branch 258,
Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City. In this case, he caused the
attachment of the same property even if Marcelina was not
impleaded as a defendant in the case.
10. Due to the baseless suits filed by Laeno, Atty. Agustin filed an
administrative complaint against him, where the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
recommendation that Atty. Laeno should be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
11. Atty. Agustin argues that Laeno is only using the court to peddle
falsehood and brazen lies through this complaint to get back at him.
He prays that the present complaint against him be dismissed
outright and that Laeno be disbarred instead.
12. Later, the IBP sided with Atty. Agustin for lack of merit. According
to IBP, the action was not a real action to recover ownership but
purely a personal action to recover a sum of money; hence, the lot
was not the subject matter of the litigation and Marcelina could
freely dispose of it.
13. Laeno also did not have any right or personality to question the
donation because he was not a party to the Deed of Donation.
Ruling: No, the Complaint for Disbarment is denied for lack of merit.
In Advincula v. Macabata, this Court held that mere accusations without
sufficient proof will not merit the disbarment of a lawyer.
In this case, Laeno failed to support his accusation that Atty. Agustin
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by accepting the donation
of land from his mother. He merely stated that there was a pending case
over a lot between his client and Marcelina, where Atty. Agustin was
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

Marcelina's counsel and that the title had a notice of lis pendens attached
to it. He failed to cite any law or jurisprudence showing that Marcelina was
prohibited from donating her land to her own son because he was acting as
her lawyer. He could have clarified this during the pre-trial or through his
position paper but he failed to do so as he was absent on the scheduled
date. He also failed to submit his position paper.

In this case, the notice of lis pendens attached to the title of Marcelina did
not prevent her from donating her property to her son. It only served as a
warning to Atty. Agustin that his right to possess the lot would be affected
by the outcome of the case. The right of E.M. Laeno to have the court's
judgment satisfied is still protected despite the donation of the property.

After considering the complaint, the SC finds that Atty. Agustin did not
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Ferdinand S.

Agustin is DISMISSED.

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
GABUCAN V. NARIDO JR. (Hechanova)
Doctrine:
Canon 1 of the CPR requires that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal process.
Issue:
WON Atty. Narido Jr. (respondent) violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) considering that (1) he failed to file a comment or
memorandum as required by the CA, (2) he failed to inform his client
Gabucan of the status of the ejectment case, and (3) he leased the same
property which is the subject of the litigation - YES
Facts:
Gabucan (complainant) filed a complaint with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) against Atty. Narido Jr. (respondent) for violating
Rules 1.01, 18.04, and 20.04 of the CPR.
Gabucan alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land located at
Catarman, Camiguin who hired the services of Atty. Narido Jr. to initiate an
ejectment case against Rogelio Ebalang with the MCTC.
Atty. Narido Jr. then entered into a contract of lease with Gabucan over the
property that would be the subject of the unlawful detainer case. Thereafter,
Atty. Narido Jr. took possession of the litigated property and introduced
improvement by building a shanty.
Pending the review of the petition of Ebalang by the CA, Atty. Narido Jr.
failed to communicate to Gabucan the status of the case, and likewise failed
to file a comment or memorandum as required by the CA. CA granted the
said petition and remanded the case back to MCTC.
Because of the inaction of Atty. Narido Jr., Gabucan hired the services of
another lawyer. MCTC ruled in favor of Gabucan, who then leased the
property to Bernand Guani. Atty. Narido Jr., by coercion and intimidation,
then re-entered the property and had a structure built to obstruct the
passage of the dump trucks of Guani.
Lower Court/s:
IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) suspended Atty. Narido Jr.
from the practice of law for 2 years for violating Rule 18.04 of the CPR. IBP
Board of Governors affirmed the decision of the IBP-CD.
SC:
Yes. Atty. Narido Jr. violated the CPR. The court suspended him from the
practice of law for 1 year: (1) 6 months for violating Art. 1646 in relation to
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, and (2) another 6 months for violating Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.
6-month suspension for violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR
Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. In this case, Atty. Narido, Jr. admitted that
he did not file any comment or memorandum before the CA, since he was
already confident that it was no longer necessary because the CA will affirm
the findings of the lower courts. This is arrogance on the part of Atty. Narido,
Jr. His failure to file the comment or memorandum required by the CA, and
his failure to inform the Gabucan of the status of the case constitutes
inexcusable negligence which entails disciplinary sanction.
Rule 18.04 states that “a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request
for information." In this case, Atty. Narido Jr. claims that he constantly
updated Gabucan through his representative Almonia. However, Atty.
Narido Jr. did not present any document establishing such fact. It is logical
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

that Atty. Narido, Jr. should have at least a document formally informing the
complainant of the status of the case. He stated that he knew that the
complainant was hardly in the Philippines, then it would have been more
prudent, to formally inform the complainant in writing and not merely verbally
through Almonia, which Atty. Narido, Jr. has not proven.
Suspension for violating Art. 1646 of the Civil Code
Art. 1646 in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code provides that lawyers are
prohibited from leasing, either in person or through an agent, property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation to which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
to excuse himself from his unlawful act, claims that the lease is merely a
strategy to prevent Guani to take possession of the property. According to
him, a certain Mrs. Banaag sold the property to Guani, as such, to prevent
the latter from taking possession of the property, complainant suggested to
him, that the latter leased the property from complainant. This allegation is
flawed in many ways. First, if the same was merely a strategy, Atty. Narido,
Jr. should not have asserted that his lease was to expire only on December
14, 2014. Second, if it was true that Guani already bought the property, why
would the latter agree to merely leasing the property? Third, the Police
Blotter indicated that the "lot owned by formerly Ex Mayor Antonio Gabucan
was rented by Mr. Bernard Guani."

As held in Heirs of Juan De Dios E. Carlos v. Atty. Linsangan: Art. 1491(5)

of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or
assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they
have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that the lawyer should not
purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting, is no longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering that
Canon 1 of the CPR is clear in requiring that a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal process and Rule 138, Sec. 3 requires every lawyer to take an oath to
"obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein."

In this case, Atty. Narido, Jr. acquired for himself, interest over
complainant's property, which is the subject of litigation. In fact, even before
the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer, Atty. Narido, Jr., already had
the complainant sign over to him, in the guise of a lease contract, the
complainant's property.
Further, Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides that "A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." In this case, Atty. Narido, Jr.,

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
ARCIGA v. MANIWANG (Maravillas)
Doctrine: A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community"
Issue: Whether or not that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant
was not corrupt or unprincipled as to warrant his disbarment.
Facts: Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked
for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar
in 1975) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to
fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the
birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena T. Arciga and Segundino D. Maniwang got acquainted
sometime in October 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was
a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts
but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine’s Day party in the following
month and renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in
March 1971, they found themselves alone in her boarding house since the
other boarders had gone on vacation, and had sexual congress.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He
continued his law studies in Davao City. Magdalena remained in Cebu. He
sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her. When
Magdalena discovered in January 1973 that she was pregnant, she and
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena’s
parents that they were married although they were not. Segundino
convinced Magdalena’s father to have the church wedding deferred until
after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate
preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed
his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena’s womb. He reassured her
time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child
on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu
in December 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations on April 25, 1975. Several days
after his oath taking, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing
that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July 1975 to
contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack
of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there
only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when
she returned to Davao. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical
injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang.
She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station
and secured medical treatment in a hospital.
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and
that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly
promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

of Magdalena’s shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral
defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent’s cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his
promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
This Court found that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. Considering the facts
of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment
against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SC: No, respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt
nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. An applicant for admission to the
bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite
for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. Immoral conduct has
been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community"

There is an area where a lawyer’s conduct may not be in consonance with

the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer’s behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend
on the surrounding circumstances.

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

ZAGUIRRE V. CASTILLO (Odronia) However, despite this, he still continued his adulterous ways hence, he
should be heavily sanctioned.
Doctrine: Immoral acts committed even before admission to the bar
should be sanctioned.

Issue: Whether the Respondent, Atty Castillo should be suspended for

having sexual relations with another woman during the subsistence of his
marriage. - Yes!

Facts: The petitioner in the case at bar filed a disbarment case against the
respondent, Atty Castillo for allegedly breaching a promise to marry, and
committing adulterous relationship with her. As narrated by the petitioner,
before Atty Castillo was admitted to the bar, they had a relationship which
was the result of her being pregnant. The respondent then promised to
marry her after passing the Bar examinations however, after his admission
to the bar, the petitioner lost communication with him. In her efforts to reach
her, she found out that during their relationship, the respondent was already
married and already had children hence, she filed this petition for
disbarment.
As an answer to this, the respondent did not deny the allegations
arguing that his acts did not constitute immorality because “men by nature
are polygamous”. He further added that his relationship with the petitioner
is “nothing but mutual lust and desire”. He was sanctioned an indefinite
suspension hence this petition.

SC: The Supreme court ruled in favor of the petition, sanctioning the
respondent with an indefinite suspension. The argument of the respondent
is without merit. It is clear that his acts constitute immorality because despite
his knowledge of his existing marriage, he maintained an adulterous
relationship with another and in addition to this, still had the audacity to
promise her a marriage. Further, when these adulterous acts were
committed, he was already a student of the law, hence it can be inferred
that he already have the knowledge that it can lead to him being disbarred.

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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA V. ATTY. LAURENCE CORDOVA (Tan)
Doctrine: An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required
to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is
not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
Issue: Does the reconciliation of the parties excuse the misconduct
committed by respondent?
Facts: In 1988, through an unsworn letter-complaint addressed to then
Chief Justice Teehankee, complainant Salvacion charged her husband,
Atty. Laurence Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the IBP,
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.
A revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her
husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar, was thus later submitted. Respondent was declared in default for
failure to file an answer, and complainant was ordered to present her
evidence ex parte. But, with hearings being repeatedly rescheduled,
complainant failed to appear and submit her evidence before the
Commission.
In 1989, through a telegraphic message, complainant informed the
Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled". The
Commission thus required the parties (respondent and complainant) to
appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic
message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
The IBP Board of Governors thus submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to
support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors summary:
In 1976, Complainant and respondent Cordova were married, out of which
2 children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino
Province, but respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch
Clerk of Court of the RTC-Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely Holgado, who was herself married and left
her own husband and children to stay with respondent. They lived together
in Bislig as husband and wife publicly, using the name Fely Cordova (kapal
mo homewrecker). Respondent gave Holgado funds to establish a sari-sari
store in the public market while failing to support his legitimate family.
In 1986, respondent and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised he would separate from Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued
to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In 1987, complainant found,
upon returning from a trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was again no
longer living with them; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie
along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus.
The RTC-Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with
Luisita Magallanes and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate
family. Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently
from complainant, stating again that they had been reconciled with each
other. (he is literally trash sis cant u see that)
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 Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

SC: NO. After a review of the record, we agree with the IBP that the most he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief
recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming it is period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his
real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with
of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the institution of
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he community at large.
is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted
and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The
in the Bar in good standing. Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits
proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and
In Mortel v. Aspiras, this Court, following the US, held that "the continued continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment... " The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, such as that which makes "a mockery of the
inviolable social institution or marriage." In Mortel, the respondent being
already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher
who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving
the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with
the wife of his own son after the marriage he himself arranged, respondent
was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a

member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for
a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.

In this case, respondent Cordova maintained for about 2 years an

adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which

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Legal Ethics | Jan. 22 (W) Digest | Practice of Law & Canon 1 | In Re Cunanan - Cordova v Cordova (p. 1)

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