G.R. No.

124290 January 16, 1998

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS , HON. JOSE C. DE

GUZMAN, OSCAR D. TAN-QUECO, LUCIA D. TANQUECO-MATIAS, RUBEN D. TANQUECO and
NESTOR D. TANQUECO, Respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

There are two (2) main issues in this petition for review: namely, (a) whether a stipulation in a contract
of lease to the effect that the contract "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee" is
void for being potestative or violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308 of the
Civil Code and, corollarily, what is the meaning of the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the
option of the lessee;" and, (b) whether a lessee has the legal personality to assail the validity of a deed
of donation executed by the lessor over the leased premises.

Spouses Filemon Tanqueco and Lucia Domingo-Tanqueco owned a 512-square meter lot located at No.
2 Sarmiento Street corner Quirino Highway, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 136779 in
their name. On 30 June 1978 they leased the property to petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED)
for a monthly rental of P1,000.00 for the first three (3) years, adjustable by 25% every three (3) years
thereafter. 1 The lease contract specifically states in its Provision No. 1 that "the term of this lease shall
be fourteen (14) years commencing from April 1, 1978 and may be renewed for a like term at the option
of the lessee."

Pursuant to their lease agreement, ALLIED introduced an improvement on the property consisting of a
concrete building with a floor area of 340-square meters which it used as a branch office. As stipulated,
the ownership of the building would be transferred to the lessors upon the expiration of the original term
of the lease.

Sometime in February 1988 the Tanqueco spouses executed a deed of donation over the subject
property in favor of their four (4) children, namely, private respondents herein Oscar D. Tanqueco, Lucia
Tanqueco-Matias, Ruben D. Tanqueco and Nestor D. Tanqueco, who accepted the donation in the same
public instrument.

On 13 February 1991, a year before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Tanquecos notified
petitioner ALLIED that they were no longer interested in renewing the lease. 2 ALLIED replied that it was
exercising its option to renew their lease under the same terms with additional proposals. 3 Respondent
Ruben D. Tanqueco, acting in behalf of all the donee-lessors, made a counter-proposal. 4 ALLIED
however rejected the counter-proposal and insisted on Provision No. 1 of their lease contract.

When the lease contract expired in 1992 private respondents demanded that ALLIED vacate the
premises. But the latter asserted its sole option to renew the lease and enclosed in its reply letter a
cashier's check in the amount of P68,400.00 representing the advance rental payments for six (6)
months taking into account the escalation clause. Private respondents however returned the check to
ALLIED, prompting the latter to consign the amount in court.

An action for ejectment was commenced before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. After trial,
the MeTC-Br. 33 declared Provision No. 1 of the lease contract void for being violative of Art. 1308 of
the Civil Code thus -

. . . but such provision [in the lease contract], to the mind of the Court, does not add luster to defendant's
cause nor constitutes as an unbridled or unlimited license or sanctuary of the defendants to perpetuate
its occupancy on the subject property. The basic intention of the law in any contract is mutuality and
equality. In other words, the validity of a contract cannot be left at (sic) the will of one of the contracting
parties. Otherwise, it infringes (upon) Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, which provides: The contract
must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them .
. . Using the principle laid down in the case of Garcia v. Legarda as cornerstone, it is evident that the
renewal of the lease in this case cannot be left at the sole option or will of the defendant notwithstanding
provision no. 1 of their expired contract. For that would amount to a situation where the continuance
and effectivity of a contract will depend only upon the sole will or power of the lessee, which is repugnant
to the very spirit envisioned under Article 1308 of the New Civil Code . . . . the theory adopted by this
Court in the case at bar finds ample affirmation from the principle echoed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Lao Lim v. CA, 191 SCRA 150, 154, 155.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and later to the Court of Appeals, the assailed decision was
affirmed. 5

On 20 February 1993, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals ALLIED vacated the leased
premises by reason of the controversy. 6

ALLIED insists before us that Provision No. 1 of the lease contract was mutually agreed upon hence valid
and binding on both parties, and the exercise by petitioner of its option to renew the contract was part
of their agreement and in pursuance thereof.

We agree with petitioner. Article 1308 of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the principle
of mutuality of contracts. It provides that "the contract must bind both the contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." This binding effect of a contract on both
parties is based on the principle that the obligations arising from the contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially on their
equality under which it is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract while leaving the other
free therefrom. The ultimate purpose is to render void a contract containing a condition which makes
its fulfillment dependent solely upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject
to statutory restrictions, valid and binding on the parties. This option, which is provided in the same
lease agreement, is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any
other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the
performance by the lessee. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a
renewal if there is compliance with the conditions on which the rights is made to depend. The right of
renewal constitutes a part of the lessee's interest in the land and forms a substantial and integral part
of the agreement.

The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not
render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the
lessee. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not, once he
exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts, both parties are thereafter bound by the new
lease agreement. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed, and the lessee is entitled to retain
possession of the property for the duration of the new lease, and the lessor may hold him liable for the
rent therefor. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently decide to
abandon the premises. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and
the lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment. 7

The case of Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals 8 relied upon by the trial court is not applicable here. In that
case, the stipulation in the disputed compromise agreement was to the effect that the lessee would be
allowed to stay in the premises "as long as he needs it and can pay the rents." In the present case, the
questioned provision states that the lease "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee."
The lessor is bound by the option he has conceded to the lessee. The lessee likewise becomes bound
only when he exercises his option and the lessor cannot thereafter be executed from performing his part
of the agreement.

Likewise, reliance by the trial court on the 1967 case of Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc., 9 is misplaced. In
that case, what was involved was a contract to sell involving residential lots, which gave the vendor the
right to declare the contract called and of no effect upon the failure of the vendee to fulfill any of the
conditions therein set forth. In the instant case, we are dealing with a contract of lease which gives the
lessee the right to renew the same.

With respect to the meaning of the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee,"
we sustain petitioner's contention that its exercise of the option resulted in the automatic extension of
the contract of lease under the same terms and conditions. The subject contract simply provides that
"the term of this lease shall be fourteen (14) years and may be renewed for a like term at the option of
the lessee." As we see it, the only term on which there has been a clear agreement is the period of the
new contract, i.e., fourteen (14) years, which is evident from the clause "may be renewed for a like
term at the option of the lessee," the phrase "for a like term" referring to the period. It is silent as to
what the specific terms and conditions of the renewed lease shall be. Shall it be the same terms and
conditions as in the original contract, or shall it be under the terms and conditions as may be mutually
agreed upon by the parties after the expiration of the existing lease?

In Ledesma v. Javellana 10 this Court was confronted with a similar problem. In the case the lessee was
given the sole option to renew the lease, but the contract failed to specify the terms and conditions that
would govern the new contract. When the lease expired, the lessee demanded an extension under the
same terms and conditions. The lessor expressed conformity to the renewal of the contract but refused
to accede to the claim of the lessee that the renewal should be under the same terms and conditions as
the original contract. In sustaining the lessee, this Court made the following pronouncement:

. . . in the case of Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, a similar issue was resolved by this Court. It was held
that "such a clause relates to the very contract in which it is placed, and does not permit the defendant
upon the renewal of the contract in which the clause is found, to insist upon different terms and those
embraced in the contract to be renewed;" and that "a stipulation to renew always relates to the contract
in which it is found and the rights granted thereunder, unless it expressly provides for variations in the
terms of the contract to be renewed."

The same principle is upheld in American Law regarding the renewal of lease contracts. In 50 Am. Jur.
2d, Sec. 1159, at p. 45, we find the following citations: "The rule is well-established that a general
covenant to renew or extend a lease which makes no provision as to the terms of a renewal or extension
implies a renewal or extension upon the same terms as provided in the original lease."

In the lease contract under consideration, there is no provision to indicate that the renewal will be
subject to new terms and conditions that the parties may yet agree upon. It is to renewal provisions of
lease contracts of the kind presently considered that the principles stated above squarely apply. We do
not agree with the contention of the appellants that if it was intended by the parties to renew the
contract under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract of lease, such should have
expressly so stated in the contract itself. The same argument could easily be interposed by the appellee
who could likewise contend that if the intention was to renew the contract of lease under such new
terms and conditions that the parties may agree upon, the contract should have so specified. Between
the two assertions, there is more logic in the latter.

The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a
contract of lease, the tenant is the one favored and not the landlord. "As a general rule, in construing
provisions relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenants is favored,
and not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected
to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be taken most strongly against himself
(50 Am Jur. 2d, Sec. 1162, p. 48; see also 51 C.J.S. 599).

Besides, if we were to adopt the contrary theory that the terms and conditions to be embodied in the
renewed contract were still subject to mutual agreement by and between the parties, then the option -
which is an integral part of the consideration for the contract - would be rendered worthless. For then,
the lessor could easily defeat the lessee's right of renewal by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous
conditions to prevent the parties from reaching an agreement, as in the case at bar. As in a statute no
word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a contract shall be considered surplusage or superfluous,
meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably avoided. To this end, a
construction which will render every word operative is to be preferred over that which would make some
words idle and nugatory. 11

Fortunately for respondent lessors, ALLIED vacated the premises on 20 February 1993 indicating its
abandonment of whatever rights it had under the renewal clause. Consequently, what remains to be
done is for ALLIED to pay rentals for the continued use of premises until it vacated the same, computed
from the expiration of the original term of the contract on 31 March 1992 to the time it actually left the
premises on 20 February 1993, deducting therefrom the amount of P68,400.00 consigned in court by
ALLIED and any other amount which it may have deposited or advanced in connection with the lease.
Since the old lease contract was deemed renewed under the same terms and conditions upon the
exercise by ALLIED of its option, the basis of the computation of rentals should be the rental rate
provided for in the existing contract.

Finally, ALLIED cannot assail the validity of the deed of donation, not being a party thereto. A person
who is not principally or subsidiarily bound has no legal capacity to challenge the validity of the
contract. 12 He must first have an interest in it. "Interest" within the meaning of the term means material
interest, an interest to be affected by the deed, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest. Hence,
a person who is not a party to a contract and for whose benefit it was not expressly made cannot
maintain an action on it, even if the contract, if performed by the parties thereto would incidentally
affect him, 13 except when he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties
and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no
intervention. 14 We find none in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Considering that
petitioner ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION already vacated the leased premises as of 20 February 1993,
the renewed lease contract is deemed terminated as of that date. However, petitioner is required to pay
rentals to respondent lessors at the rate provided in their existing contract, subject to computation in
view of the consignment in court of P68,400.00 by petitioner, and of such other amounts it may have
deposited or advanced in connection with the lease.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Records, p. 45.

2 Records, p. 11; Exh. "C."

3 ALLIED proposed the following terms for the extension of the lease: (1) Term of Lease: ten (10) years;
(2) Escalation Rate: 10% per annum starting on the second year; (3) Monthly Rental: P8,000/month
on the first year; and, (4) Advance Rental: Six (6) months to be applied to the first six (6) months of
the lease.

4 The counter-proposal: (1) Term: Two (2) years subject to renewal at the sole option of the lessor; (2)
Rent: a) at P80,000 a month payable within the first five (5) days of each month commencing from the
date the lease contract is executed; (b) Twelve (12) months rental payable in advance upon signing of
the lease contract; (3) Deposit: P80,000 to answer for any unpaid obligations of the lease, payable upon
signing of the lease contract and refundable upon the termination of the lease (net of any amount
applied to the payment of any such unpaid obligations).
5 Decision penned by Judge Jose C. de Guzman, RTC-Br. 93, Quezon City; Decision of the Court of
Appeals penned by Justice Jesus M. Elbinias, concurred in by Justices Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr., and
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., CA-G.R. SP. Case No. 30162.

6 Rollo, p. 12.

7 8 Manresa 627.

8 G.R. No. 87047, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 156.

9 No. L-20175, 30 October 1976, 21 SCRA 555.

10 G.R. No. 55187, 28 April 1983, 121 SCRA 794.

11 Shimonek v. Tillanan, 1 P. 2d., 154.

12 Astudillo v. The Board of Directors of PHHC, No. L-28066, 22 September 1976, 73 SCRA 15. See
also Article 1397, Civil Code.

13 House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
75287, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 703.

14 Teves v. The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al., No. L-21498, 27 June 1968, 23
SCRA 1141.
A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016 - AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA
PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), Complainant, v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016

AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS,

INC.), Complainant, v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that
caused delay in the execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.

In its questioned Resolution1, the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 2 of the
Investigating Commissioner,3 who found respondent guilty of violating Canon 12, Rule
12.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the enforcement of a writ
of execution, and recommended that the latter be reprimanded or censured with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same behavior in the future shall merit a harsher
penalty.5chanrobleslaw

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of

subdivision houses and lots.6 Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction &
Development Corporation (Rodman).7 chanroblesl aw

Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,8 under which the latter was to
acquire from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank
financing. In the event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed
to pay the full contract price of P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of P1,323,676.20,
within 15 days from its receipt of the loan disapproval.9chanroble slaw

After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.10 chanrob leslaw

In three separate letters11, complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding
balance of P3,088,577.80.12 Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a
deferred basis within 18 months.13 chan robles law
Rodman made a partial payment of P404,782.56 on 22 March 1999. It also claimed to
have made other payments amounting to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999,
which complainant disputed.14 chanrobles law

Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded
that Rodman vacate the subject property.15 chanrob leslaw

As Rodman remained in possession of the property,16 complainant filed an unlawful

detainer case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.17 chanroble slaw

Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed
for the accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon which the balance of
the purchase price should be paid.18 chanrobleslaw

The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful
detainer case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 19 chanroble slaw

HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma.
Perpetua Y. Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay
damages and attorney's fees.20 Rodman appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board).21 chanroble slaw

In its subsequent Decision,22 the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing
Rodman "to immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall
have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by
complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly
compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per
month."23 chanrob leslaw

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 of the HLURB Board's Decision,

questioning the order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a
rescission of the contract. Rodman filed a Comment/Opposition25 to complainant's
cralaw red

motion and sought a clarification of certain aspects of the Decision,26 but did not move
for reconsideration.

The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution27 modifying its earlier Decision. Thus: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

xxx [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent

(herein complainant) its outstanding balance of P1,814,513.27, including interests and
penalties which may have accrued in the meantime, failing in which, the respondent shall
have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the
complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly
compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per
month.
As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final
and executory.

The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their
efforts were in vain.28 With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six
months, complainant filed a motion for writs of execution and possession 29 before the
HLURB Board.

Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a

Rejoinder30 to complainant's Reply.31 chanroble slaw

In an Order32 dated 10 August 2006, the HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and
remanded the case records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution
of the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order dated 10 August 2006, 33 raising
issues on the computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition 34 and
Rejoinder,35 to which respondent filed a Reply36 and Surrejoinder.37 chanrobles law

On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order38 denying Rodman's Motion for
Reconsideration. It said that the computation of interests and penalties, as well as other
matters concerning the implementation of the final and executory Decision, shall be dealt
with in the execution proceedings before the Regional Office. It furthermore enjoined the
parties from filing any pleading in the guise of an appeal on collateral issues or questions
already passed upon.39
chanroble slaw

On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest 40 before the
HLURB Regional Office, citing the disagreement between the parties as to the reckoning
date of the accrual of interest. Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution and Possession.41 chanrobles law

In its Order42 dated 31 July 2007, the HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the
interest due, arriving at the total amount of P2,685,479.64 as payment due to
complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the HLURB
Board's earlier Resolution.43 chanrobles law

Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution, 44 respondent,
on behalf of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for
Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case for Conference.45 The said motion injected new
issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon
actual receipt of the amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously
turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)

Respondent also filed a Petition46 to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand
letter to Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution.

On 7 November 2007, the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference
to thresh out the problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed
to serve its purpose.

Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and
for the setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt. 47 The motion
alleged that Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had
failed to set the Petition for hearing.48
chanrobleslaw
In an Order dated 23 April 2008,49 the HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for
inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and
Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on the Petition citing the
latter for contempt.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that

Arbiter Aquino should inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino
eventually yielded and ordered the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo
A. Foronda.

When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition.
He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon
first and argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in relation
thereto must be re-evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling x x x."

On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued

by Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be attending the
conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the
re-raffling of the case.

On 16 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda,
claiming that his designation violated due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable
because he was not notified of its conduct despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with
Notice of Re-raffle.

Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter
Foronda could rule on the pending motions.

In a Resolution dated 22 September 2009, Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-
raffle was not an indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction
over a case at the execution stage; (2) the claim of Rodman that its Motion for
Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved was rendered moot
by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the
summary dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution was denied.

The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as

respondent did not file any more pleadings.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT

On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant -
through its vice president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-
Affidavit50 against respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB
case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:51
 1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.

3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

4. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.

In his Comment,52 respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the
HLURB case were the legal blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:

1. It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of
Execution of the HLURB Board's Decision dated 22 June 2005.53 chanroble slaw

2. The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB Board, which as an
appellate body had no jurisdiction to issue the writ.54

Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial
rescission and filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly
contributed to the delay in the resolution of the dispute. 55 chanrobleslaw

Further, respondent argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the
execution of the Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed
on 21 February 2007, as complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the
HLURB Regional Office only in April 2007.56 chanrobleslaw

Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause
of his client with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith. 57 chanrobles law

As respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant

filed Supplemental Complaints58 against him.

The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.59 chanrobles law

On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on the Complaint.60 Neither party filed a
motion for reconsideration or a petition within the period allowed.61
chanrobles law

THE RULING OF THE COURT

Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its
resolution became long, tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of
respondent to delay the actual execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file
pleadings over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined not to do so, and
made unfounded accusations of bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his
propensity to disregard the authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the
detriment of the administration of justice.

The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his client is untenable.

As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to
serve the latter with competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ
every honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due the
latter.62
chanrobles law

Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications.63 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers
are required to exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.64 The Code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of their client. 65
chanrobleslaw

In Millare v. Montero,66 the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or
wrongfully use the judicial process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious
litigation, and frivolous appeals - for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment.

In Garcia v. Francisco,67 a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse -
all of which were rebuffed - to get a favorable judgment. He was found to have violated
his duty as a member of the bar to pursue only those acts or proceedings that appear to
be just, and only those lines of defense he believed to be honestly debatable under the
law.

Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape
liability for his actions that delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.

He even attempted to turn the tables on complainant by pointing out that the "legal
blunders" of the latter's counsel contributed to the delay in the execution of the judgment.
Whether or not the actions or omissions of complainant's counsel brought dire
consequences to its client's cause is not a factor in the instant case. Even assuming for
argument's sake that complainant's counsel committed procedural errors that prolonged
some of the case incidents, these errors did not prejudice the delivery of justice, as they
were later cured. More important, the so-called "blunders" were independent of
respondent's actions, which were the direct cause of the delay.

Respondent argues that he could not have possibly delayed the execution of the
judgment, as no Motion for Execution of Judgment had been filed when the instant
administrative case was instituted. This argument can no longer be considered viable, as
he continued to employ dilatory tactics even after the Writ of Execution had already been
issued, and complainant later filed Supplemental Complaints against him.

What is patent from the acts of respondent — as herein narrated and evident from the
records - is that he has made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders,
and ultimately caused unjust delays in the administration of justice. These acts are in
direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provide: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment
or misuse court processes.
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath68 by disobeying the legal orders of a duly
constituted authority, and disregarding his sworn duty to "delay no man for money or
malice."

While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, we find that
its recommended penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with respondent's
transgression.

Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline's Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(IBP Guidelines), reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer's
negligence causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party. 69 In this case,
respondent's injurious acts were clearly not caused by his negligence in following
procedures or court orders. He knowingly abused the legal process and violated orders
of the HLURB Board and Regional Office with the intent of delaying the execution of a
judgment that had long been final and executory. That he continued to do so even if a
Complaint was already filed against him proved that his acts were deliberate.

Further, ethical violations analogous to respondent's infractions have not been treated as
lightly by the Court.

In Foronda v. Guerrero, the respondent therein was suspended for two years from the
practice of law for filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same
subject matter in violation of Canon 1270 and Rule 12.0471 of the of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Saladaga v Astorga,72 the respondent was found guilty of (1) breach of the Lawyer's
Oath; (2) unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and (3) disrespect for the Court
and causing the undue delay of cases. For these offenses, a penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP, was imposed.

The respondents in Millare73 and Garcia,74 meanwhile, were suspended for one year from
the practice of law.

In Saa v. IBP,75 the petitioner was found to have violated Canon 12,76 Rule 12.04,77 and
Rule 1.0378 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the resolution of a case.
He was also suspended from practice of law for one year.

Thus, We have meted out the penalty of one to two years' suspension in cases involving
multiple violations of professional conduct that have caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice. The IBP Guidelines similarly provide that "suspension is
appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is
injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference
with a legal proceeding."79 chanrobleslaw

Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he should be suspended

from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating

Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath,
for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the
finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Public Information Office, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be
appropriately posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

Upon his receipt of this Decision, respondent shall forthwith be suspended from the
practice of law and shall formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started.
He shall furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance
a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Dated 22 June 2013; Rollo, p. 890.

2 Id. at 891-902.

3
Atty. Manuel T. Chan

4
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment
or misuse Court processes.

5Rollo,
p. 902.

6
Id. at 2.

7
Id. at 4.

8 Id. at 3.

9
Id.

10
Id. at 893.

11
Dated 24 September 1998, 13 January 1999, and 1 February 1999.
12
Id. at 841.

13
Id.

14 Id.

15
Id.

16 Id.

17
Id. at 299-317.

18
Id. at 319-328.

19
Id. at 337-338.

20
Id. at 47-55.

21
Id. at 57-89.

22
Id. at 41-45.

23
Id. at 45.

24 Id. at 117-127.

25 cralaw red Id. at 128-140.

26
Id.

27
Id. at 152-153.

28
Id. at 154-169.

29
Id. at 170-174.

30
Id. at 442-445.

31
Id. at 432-441.

32
Id. at 175-176.

33 Id. at 181-185.

34
Id. at 186-193.

35 Id. at 469-476.

36
Id. at 461-468.
37
Id. at 477-486.

38
Id. at 195-196.

39 Id.

40
Id. at 487-490.

41 Id. at 273-285.

42
Id. at 750-752.

43
Id. at 752.

44
Id. at 746-749, issued on 16 August 2007.

45
Id. at 693-698.

46
Id. at 736-744.

47
Id. at 776-785.

48
Id.

49 Id. at 786-789.

50 Id. at 1-15.

51
Id. at 1-2.

52
Id. at 203-242.

53
Id. at 204.

54
Id. at 207.

55
Id. at 217.

56
Id. at 211.

57
Id. at 230.

58 Id. at 502-508; 583-594; 625-632.

59
Id. at 500.

60 Supra note 1.

61
Id. at 887.
 Pariñas v. Paguinto, 478 Phil. 239-247 (2004), citing Gamalinda v. Alcantara, A.C. No.
62

3695 24 February 1992, 206 SCRA 468.

Millare v. Montero, 316 Phil. 29-37 (1995), citing Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-
63

582 (1986).

64
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 12.

65 Id. Canon 19, Rule 19.01.

66
Millare v. Montero, supra note 63, citing Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions
Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 (1976); Overmeyer v. Fidelista and
Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1971).

67Garcia
v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, 30 March 1993, 220 SCRA 512.

68
chan robles law

I, ___ of ____, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.

69
C. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions

x x x x

6.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with
a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

x x x x

70
Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

71 Supra note 4.

72Saladaga
v. Astorga, A.C. No. 4697, 25 November 2014.

73Millare
v. Montero, supra note 63.

74 Supra note 67.

75
Saa v. Integrated Bar of the Phil., 614 Phil. 203-209 (2009).

76
Supra note 69.

77
Supra note 4.

78
Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

79 Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, C(6.22).