Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Edited by
Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank,
and Ferran Martínez i Coma
PART I
Corroding Public Trust and Triggering Protest 23
PART II
Catalyzing and Preventing Electoral Violence 87
PART III
Conclusions 131
Figures
1.1 A model of contentious elections 5
1.2 The predicted risks of contentious elections in hybrid regimes 13
2.1 Interaction effect for electoral integrity * party identification
(Azadlyq) 36
2.2 Interaction effect for electoral integrity * party identification
(none) 37
3.1 Support for protest against election fraud in Russia, December
2011 51
3.2 The socioeconomic background of protesters 53
3.3 Probability of definitely supporting protest over election unfairness 57
4.1 The gap in electoral fraud under dictatorship 74
4.2 Predicted probabilities of turnover and protests 77
5.1 Sub-Saharan African elections with significant pre-electoral
violence 95
5.2 Ethnic fractionalization and ethnic voting 97
5.3 Ethnic voting and pre-electoral violence 100
7.1 The distribution of contentious elections 141
7.2 The risks of contentious elections by level of democratization 143
Tables
2.1 Mass perceptions of electoral integrity by party identification 33
2.2 The propensity to vote 35
2.3 Propensity to vote, controlling for party identification 39
3.1 Support for electoral protest 54
viii Figures and Tables
Elections that work well are essential for democracy. Alas, there are many contests
around the world that end in heated disputes, generating mass protests, deadly
violence, and even revolutionary upheavals. Sore losers commonly challenge the
process and outcome, with cries of fraud, whether based on legitimate grievances
or mistrustful suspicions. In fragile states, such as Kenya, Afghanistan, or Thailand,
the result can be disastrous for stability, peace, and development. Even long-
established democracies such as the United States and Canada are not immune
from growing party polarization, increased public debate, and litigious appeals over
the rules of the electoral game.
To address concern about these issues, this book brought together a wide range
of scholars and practitioners. The volume is part of the Electoral Integrity Project
(EIP), a six-year research project generously funded by the award of the Kathleen
Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate from the Australian Research Council, and at
Harvard by support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the
Roy and Lila Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, and the
Australian Studies Committee. The project focuses on the challenges of electoral
integrity around the world, including why it matters, why electoral integrity fails,
and what can be done to address these problems. Draft research papers, which
formed the basis for these chapters, were originally presented at the pre-American
Political Science Association (APSA) Workshop on Challenges of Electoral
Integrity held in Chicago on August 28, 2013. As well as the contributors, we
would also like to thank all the workshop participants, who provided such lively
and stimulating comments, especially the panel discussants including Jan Teorell,
André Blais, and Nikolay Marinov.
As always, this book also owes immense debts to many friends and colleagues.
The EIP project is located in the Department of Government and International
xiv Preface and Acknowledgments
During the post-Cold War era, concern has risen about the proliferation of
contentious elections and the number of polls held in a pervasive climate of fraud,
mistrust, and intolerance that have ignited massive protests and violence.1 Far from
having beneficial consequences, contentious elections raise red flags by potentially
undermining democratic transitions in countries emerging from dictatorship,
furthering instability and social tensions in fragile states, increasing uncertainty
and risks for investors, and jeopardizing growth and development in low-income
economies (Paris 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Paris and Sisk 2009; Collier
2009).
The most violent and disruptive contests are exemplified by the 2007 Kenyan
election, which attracted global headlines and international concern when rival
community leaders organized tit-for-tat coercion. This led to thousands injured,
widespread rape, an estimated 1,200 deaths, about 42,000 houses and many
businesses looted or destroyed, and more than 300,000 people displaced, costing
the country more than one billion dollars and deterring potential investors
(UNHCR 2008; Kiai 2008; Chege 2008; Gutierrez-Romero 2013). The extent
of the disruption was exceptional. But, alas, the 2007 Kenyan election was not
an isolated occurrence. During the last decade, estimates from the Hyde and
Marinov NELDA dataset suggest that around 12 percent of all elections worldwide
saw opposition boycotts, 17 percent experienced post-election riots or protests,
and 18 percent had electoral violence involving at least one civilian fatality.2
To address these concerns and to deepen our understanding of these
phenomena, this book brings together research from a wide range of scholars of
international relations, comparative politics, and political behavior. This intro-
ductory chapter advances a new conceptual and theoretical framework useful for
understanding the risks of contentious elections. Building upon this foundation,
2 Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma
we then outline the overall plan of the book and indicate how contributors build
on this theory. Using both surveys within specific countries, as well as broader
types of cross-national evidence, successive chapters focus on how contentious
elections affect citizens’ attitudes and behavior, as well influencing broader
challenges to stability arising from leadership overthrow, electoral violence, and
nationalist demands for secession. The conclusion presents a global perspective
and cross-national evidence demonstrating that the risks of contentious elections
are heightened under three conditions: in hybrid regimes (which are neither full-
blown democracies nor dictatorships), in contests lacking fair procedures and
impartial electoral authorities to serve as umpires, and in some of the world’s
poorer societies and most fragile states. The conclusion also summarizes the book’s
main findings and considers their broader implications for social science and for
the public policy agenda.
Legitimacy, in Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1983: 64) words: “involves the capacity
of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political
institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.”
What are the sources of legitimate authority? In his seminal exposition, Max
Weber posited several ideal types, including traditional authority (such as customary
patrimonial arrangements for leaders and elites or the belief that the monarch is
divinely sanctioned to rule in theocracies), charismatic authority (flowing from the
personal popularity of the leader), and rational-legal authority (where authority is
derived from the institutional office allocated by the rule of law and constitutional
principles). Each of the first two classic Weberian ideal types of authority can still
be observed in a handful of contemporary states. Nevertheless the global spread
of elections for the national legislatures in nearly all countries worldwide, and
the use of direct elections for many executives, means that in most countries today
governing authority derives from holding offices determined by the formal
constitutional principles and electoral laws (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Norris
2014). This is true not just in long-established democracies, but also in popularly
elected autocracies. Elections for national office are held today in most
independent nation states worldwide, with the exception of a handful of outliers
where the executive rules through one-party regimes lacking the fig-leaf of any
direct elections for the national legislature (such as in Communist China), through
family connections in absolute monarchies (such as emirs governing Saudi Arabia
and Oman), through military juntas (such as in Egypt, after the army seized power
and the Muslim Brotherhood was imprisoned and outlawed), and in personal
dictatorships lacking direct elections (such as Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya). Legitimacy
crises are triggered in states for diverse reasons. For instance, a major money-in-
politics corruption scandal can bring down leaders. A government can be blamed
for a severe failure of public policy, such as a financial disaster or currency crisis,
which rocks the foundation of the state. Deadly violence can undermine the state’s
capacity to protect its peoples and borders due to inter-communal tensions,
demands for secession, civil wars, or military invasions. Or a ruling leader may
die in office or be deposed by a coup without an obvious successor. But a crisis
of legitimacy through contentious elections represents another additional risk—
one that is greatly heightened by the spread of popular contests around the globe;
and the dangers are compounded in many divided societies holding elections as
part of peace-building initiatives after decades of bloodshed.
Therefore consensual elections ideally provide a mechanism to settle disputes
over legitimate authority in a peaceful, democratic, lawful, and orderly way. Such
contests can channel and curb competition among rival visions of society, leaders
and political parties by securing agreement over the underlying rules of the game.
Legitimacy flowing from the ballot box is one of the most effective and efficient
mechanisms to ensure that citizens comply with the authority of elected rulers,
facilitating the process of governance by voluntarily respecting the rule of law,
and providing the state with revenues through complying with the honest
4 Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma
payment of taxes. In the absence of electoral legitimacy, ruling elites can seek to
govern through multiple alternative non-democratic mechanisms, including
through patronage and clientalism, through populist and ideological appeals to
followers, and, in repressive states, through the threat or use of force and coercion
(Svolik 2012). Contentious elections, however, are expected to prove deeply
problematic for regime stability, because they raise fundamental doubts about the
legitimate authority of electoral management bodies, actors, and the rules of the
game. Such challenges, by their nature, cannot be resolved easily through the
standard mechanisms of the ballot box or the regular policy-making process.
To clarify the reasoning, the first step in the model predicts that flawed and failed
contests will usually damage public trust and confidence in electoral authorities,
procedures, and outcomes. Malpractices that prevent elections from meeting
international standards can occur for many reasons: as demonstrated elsewhere,
some of the most overt malpractices used by rulers include imprisoning dissidents,
harassing adversaries, coercing voters, vote-rigging counts, and finally, if losing,