PBM Employees vs PBM

Facts:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees
of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel
or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in
the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty
in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can
report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with
the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of
the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired
or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against
policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the
aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which
will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967]

Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum
for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation,
the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with
a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3)
provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the
City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes
and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years
old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its
member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity
as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the
submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760
unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents
to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to
contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional.

Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments
by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at
all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom
to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.
Dela Cruz v Paras

Facts:

1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance
is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses
previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and
Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their
Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance
the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons,
bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:

On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The
title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The
power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for
certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since
there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was
done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a
regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one
of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred.
A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under
review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal
to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with
the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more
than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and inns, was enacted by herein
petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.

Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power on
the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation
and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use
of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private property rights of
individuals.

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with
the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise
of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review
on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the
Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution,
and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to
judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness
of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

TANADA VS. TUVERA 146 S 446

Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of
some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances
which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that
the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the
official gazette.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

GMA Network, Inc. vs. Movie & Television Review and Classification Board

GR no. 148579 | February 5, 2007

Doctrine: “Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR) of the UP law Center are ineffective and may not be enforced (Sec.3, 1987 Administrative Code)”

Facts:

Respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension, and impost penalty based on Memorandum Circular 98-17, against the
petitioner (GMA Network, Inc.) for airing “Muro Ami: The Making” without first securing a permit from it as provided in section
7 of PD 1986. Petitioner move for the reconsideration of the suspension and informed the respondent that it had complied with
the suspension order by going off the air. Respondent deny the motion, likewise, the CA also dismissed the complaint upon
petitioner’s appeal to them.

Issue:

a. Whether or not the MTRCB has the authority to review the show “Muro Ami: The Making” prior to its broadcast by television;
b. Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on the petitioners.

Ruling:

a. YES, Sec. 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, and examine all motion pictures, television programs, including
publicity materials. The only exceptions from it are (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
and/or other departments, and (2) newsreels. “Muro Ami: The Making” was a publicity for the movie “Muro Ami”, therefore it
did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of the MTRCB.

b. NO, Memorandum Circular no. 98-17 has not been registered with the ONAR, as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the sameis yet to
be effective, it is just unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. The 1987 Administrative Code, section 3, expressly
requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Remedies (ONAR) of the UP Law Center three certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and
may not be enforced.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI

FACTS:

DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila. The said lot was earmarked for the construction of Torre de
Manila Condominium project. After having acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to
commence the intended project. However, the City of Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the Building
Permit until such time that issues had been cleared. Consultations after consultations had he been initiated both by the City of
Manila and DMCI-PDI. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and confirming all
previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City for Torre de Manila.

Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent injunction, against the
construction of the project. The KOR argued that the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the monument, an
endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a construction borne out of bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials to stop the construction of Torre de
Manila.

RULING: No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was not even considered as contrary
to morals, customs and public order. The project was way well from the Park where the monument was located. The SC ruled
further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is
a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.” In the case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it
found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the
building was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus
dismissed.

EVASCO

Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of building and other structures such as billboards
within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)

[Note: Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao City Charter), enacted on June
19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the
display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures. With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly
granted the Davao City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures within
its territorial jurisdiction. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)]
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its
implementing measures must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)

[Note: First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures based on prescribed standards as to its
location, design, size, quality of materials, construction anerd maintenance to: (a) safeguard the life and property of Davao City’s
inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and orderly; (c) ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious
aesthetic relationship of these structures as against the general surroundings. Second, the ordinance employs the following rules
in implementing its policy, viz.: (a) Minimum distances must be observed in installing and constructing outdoor billboards (i.e.,
150 meters unobstructed line of sight, 10 meters away from the property lines abutting the right-of-way); (b) Additional
requirements shall be observed (i.e., billboards shall have a maximum total height of 17 meters, the top and bottom lines of
billboards shall follow a common base) in locations designated as “regulated areas” to preserve the natural view and beauty of
the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island; (c) Sign permits must be secured from and proper
fees paid to the city government; and (d) Billboards without permits, without the required marking signs, or otherwise violative
of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing the owner 60 days from receipt of notice to correct and address its violation.
(Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)]

The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so excessive as to be
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. It must be remembered that the local legislative authority has a
wide discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. We accord high respect to the Sanggunian‘s issuance because the local council is in the best position
to determine the needs of its constituents. (Evasco v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018)

MOSQUEDA vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS, G.R. 189185

Facts

Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007

Enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.

To impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.

Subtopic

Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Assosciation, Inc. (PBGEA), herein respondents challenged the ordinance by questioning
its constitutionality before the Regional Trial Court.

PBGEA alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of Police Power, Violated the equal protection clause,
violated due process of law.

RTC RULING

Ordinance is valid.

CA RULING

Reversed Judgment of RTC

Unreasonable and Oppressive

3-month transition period impractical

No reasonable distinction (Equal Protection Violation)

30-meter buffer zone constitutes taking of property w/o due process.

Issue

Subtopic 2

W/N Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007 is violative of the 1987 constitution.

Petitioner reasons out the following:

LGC Sec. 458 (Interest of General Welfare)

LGC Sec. 16

No violation of Equal Protection since distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other
methods.

No need for substantial distinction on the level of concentration since fungicide in the air is already pollution pursuant to Section
5 of RA 8749.

That the 30-meter buffer zone is zone is a valid exercise of police power. That the maintenance of the buffer zone does not
require respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings and that such buffer zones does not deprive its owners of its beneficial
use and such is consistent with the Consitution as the land is made available for a social function.

Issues

Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable
and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in
Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5; and

(c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

SC Rationale

Decision

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with
the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation
of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process
for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use
of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application.
Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the
harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because
it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law

Turks Shawarma Company/Gem Zenarosa Vs. Feliciano Z. Pajaron and Larry A. Carbonilla

G.R. No. 207156.

FACTS:

Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larey A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007 as
head crew. Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal and petitioners also
failed to comply with the requirements of due process. On April 15, 2010, they filed their respective Complaints for constructive
and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive
leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated.

Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their work. They likewise
failed to substantiate their claims that they were not paid labor standards benefits.

The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and illegally dismissed. Then,
petitioners appealed before the NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full the required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners' appeal
was dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. They filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
It held that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection

HELD:No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is
a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."

It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI) that there is
legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to
this intention."

The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the
workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's
appeal [and] is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to
the employees.

Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if we are to allow their appeal to be given due course. After
scrupulously examining the contracting positions and arguments of the parties, we find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring
Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA
in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection due to
noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.

Carmelita Borlongan, Petitioner, vs. Banco de Oro, Respondent

G.R. No. 217617

FACTS:

In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. In 2012,
they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject
property. To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution
sale in a Civil Case pending before Branch 134 of Makati RTC. Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records and found
out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, including
Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements totaling ₱13, 500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho
Corporation.

On July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order directing the service of summons to all the defendants at the business address
of Tancho Corporation and IT appears that respondent BDO already foreclosed the said Fumakilla Compound as early as August
21, 2000, following Tancho Corporation's failure to pay its obligation. BDO already consolidated its ownership of the property on
November 16, 2001. On July 31, 2003, the process server filed an Officer's Return stating that summons remained unserved as
the "defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla Compound]."

After the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her co-defendants, BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by
publication and the RTC granted the motion. BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the
defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing on the motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of the subject property.
The Makati RTC thereafter granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment was issued against the defendants effectively
attaching the subject property on behalf of BDO.
On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying, among others, that the summons and the complaint be served
against Carmelita at the subject property. The Makati RTC granted the motion. On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return
stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is no longer residing at the given address and the said address is
for 'rent,' as per information gathered from the security guard on duty." BDO filed a manifestation stating that it had complied
with the October 28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the publication of the alias summons and the complaint in
People's Taliba on May 15, 2006. Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants including Carmelita,
in default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence ex-parte. On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a
Decision holding the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City alleging in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains
he established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment of the property
was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did not redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that the
surety agreements and all other documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale, based
thereon be nullified.

BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint and the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction and held that it could not
pass upon matters already brought before the RTC Makati and, citing Spouses Ching v.Court of Appeals, the husband of a
judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate and independent action to determine the validity of the levy
and sale of a property.

On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification. Relying on Buado v. Court of
Appeals, the Pasig RTC held that since majority of Eliseo's causes of action were premised on a claim that the obligation contracted
by his wife has not redounded to their family, and, thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not
an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the first place. The Pasig
RTC clarified, however, that it cannot annul the surety agreements supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party
to those agreements and the validity and efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati RTC. Both Eliseo
and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he elevated the matter to the SC via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 218540. The Court issued a Resolution denying
Eliseo's petition. Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Possession and the issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Arguing that the Makati
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of the summons and the other processes of the court was
defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) which was denied by the appellate court. Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the
reconsideration of the CA's November 12, 2014 Resolution but was again denied. Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita filed a Petition
for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 217617 ascribing to the appellate court the commission of serious reversible errors. Hence,
Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and
reconsider its stance.
 Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and involved interrelated issues, on January 25, 2016, the Court
resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 218540 with G.R. No. 217617.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the consolidation of BDO’s ownership over the
subject property.

2. Whether or not Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case filed by the non-debtor husband to annul the levy and
execution sale of the subject property ordered by the Makati RTC against his wife.

HLD:

Yes. It is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there exists a right to be protected
and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on
the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The primary
prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate court is the declaration of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC and
its Decision dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely confined to the prevention of the issuance of the writ of possession and
the consolidation of the ownership of the subject property in BDO's name-the concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI.
Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve the status quo ante, and not to
pre-empt the appellate court's decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of
the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy.

As to the question of the Pasig RTC’s jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint, Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-
party claimants of properties under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action with another court.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is
filed. Nothing shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or
prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a
frivolous or plainly spurious claim. The availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision requires only that that
the claim is a third-party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property was executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a "stranger" to the suit? In Buado v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt
had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file
an independent separate action, distinct from the action in which the writ was issued. A third-party claim must be filed [by] a
person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership or not. By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime
of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Conjugal property cannot be held liable
for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Thus, to
now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the attachment made by the RTC Makati in a separate and independent action will
be to, again, refuse him the due process of law before their property is taken. As the Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce
Constitutional rights, this it will not allow. Hence the petitions are granted.

Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Judge Olalia GR 153675 April 19, 2007 Extradition

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons” that took effect on June 20, 1997.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an
advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years
for each charge.

This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the following Orders: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan
Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said
Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

ISSUE: May a potential extradite be granted bail?

RULING: Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and
convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and
convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently,
this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
“clear and convincing evidence.”

Agabon vs NLRC

Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and
construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on
January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims
Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private
respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.

Issue: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held:

Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment and were already working for
another employer.

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give
the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty,
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.

After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we now determine if the procedures for dismissal were
observed.

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code:

Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due
process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.

In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last known address.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written
notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to
be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284,
the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the
effectivity of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed;
(2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized
cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice
requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did
not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin
notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and
existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad
were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1
applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled
hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law

3. They are not confined to existing conditions

4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided
by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code
vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial document committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. The informations were filed respectively on February
21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional
and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the
next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential
Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto clauses of the Constituiton,
thus decraling it unconstitutional?

HELD:

No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged. Those adversely affected
may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far
from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above
definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner.

This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and,
generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity
to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court
holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.

Gallardo vs People GR 142030 21 April 2005

Facts: Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur filed letter-complaint for alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the
amount representing payment of their salaries by the Municipality of Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo Gallardo with the
Ombudsman. Probable cause was found and information was filed stating that Gallardo caused undue injury to PHW workers.
Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was granted by Sandiganbayan, However Ombudsman Desierto recommended his
disapproval. Petitioner filed motion to quash on the ground that they were not accorded equal protection of the law. They
contend that similar cases were dismissed by Desierto previously ans should be accorded the same to the case at bar.

Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto violated equal protection right of the petitioners on the ground of not uniformly
deciding similar cases?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial
differences, one class may be treated differently from another. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there
were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate
information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and
discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)

The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized
under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.

Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and
validity of the E.O. 97-A.

Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits
provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was
filed.

Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales,
and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base”
only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the
law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection
guarantee.

The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority
to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid
classification.

Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate
the equal protection clause.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same
class.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic
disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered
by foreign-hires and local-hires.

TELEBAP vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of
law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during the period of election.

Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during the period of election.

Held: No. The petition is dismissed.

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only
means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly
deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the
right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and
to intervene when the common good so demands.”

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor
of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities
with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity
of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of
§92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a
social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and
highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that
common good.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO

VS.

GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a
POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article
XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on
the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law
was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals
that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs
to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against
her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality
of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal
protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial
and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is
based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot
be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained.
In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government
while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.