A.

Concurrent Jurisdiction of Ombudsman and

Secretary of Justice
1.
G.R. No. 196842 October 9, 2013
ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and ROSA S. BUSUEGO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1)

Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children);
and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before
the Office of the Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with
designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital, Apokon, Tagum
City.

In her complaint, Rosa painted a picture of a marriage in disarray.

Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred Rosa’s complaint
to the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of Concubinage is not
committed in relation to his being a public officer.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to

conduct preliminary investigation.

HELD:

Yes. The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the

DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers,
without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled
in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and
affirmed in subsequent cases:

The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4

of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government
investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors.
However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting

any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the
respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the
conduct of their investigations

2.

G.R. No. 149991 February 14, 2007

SEVILLA DECIN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPO1 MELZASAR TAYCO, SPO1 JEFFREY CONTRIVIDA, SPO1
SUNNY BECARO, SPO1 GLORIA GONZALES and PO3 ARLO
DEONESA, Respondents.

FACTS:

[Petitioner] Sevilla Decin (wife of deceased Ernie Decin) through the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed a complaint for murder against
[respondents] and SPO2 Jude dela Rama, all members of the Philippine
National Police, Cadiz City, before the Office of the City Prosecutor . . .
docketed as I.S. No. 7697. On 16 September 1997, the City Prosecutor in a
15-page resolution found no basis to indict [the respondents] but found
probable cause against SPO2 Jude dela Rama (dela Rama, for short) to
hold him liable for Murder. Accordingly, the complaint against [respondents]
was ordered dismissed. As the respondents therein were police officers,
the City Prosecutor in the same resolution directed that it "be forwarded to
the Ombudsman for Military" for approval. Said Ombudsman approved the
City Prosecutor’s Resolution in his "review and recommendation" dated 31
October 1997 under OMB-MIL-Crim-97-0766.

Meanwhile, [petitioner] Sevilla Decin as the principal complainant and

aggrieved party in the complaint, appealed the Resolution of 16 September
1997 of the City Prosecutor of Cadiz City to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). In a letter dated 24 November 1997, the DOJ, through Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr. directed [petitioner] Decin to
submit all material and pertinent affidavits and evidence submitted by both
parties in the preliminary investigation, to properly act on her appeal. The
letter warned that "(c)ompliance with the above stated requirements within
five (5) days from receipt hereof is required, otherwise your appeal will be
dismissed."

On 19 May 1998, the DOJ in its 1st Indorsement referred [petitioner]

Decin’s appeal to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
pursuant to RA No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1998, and OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 dated 05 October 1995.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to

conduct preliminary investigation.

HELD:

Yes. Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the

complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on
the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the
information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or
modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary

investigation of criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable
by the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including
those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their
investigation, transmit the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman
or his deputy for appropriate action.

B. Jurisdiction of Courts in Criminal Cases

1.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 223833, December 11, 2017

JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. JOSHUA GERONIMO Y

LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On August 22, 2012, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC Valenzuela
charging Casanas of the crime of Carnapping, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about August 12, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away with him one (1) Racal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ
without the consent of its owner CHRISTOPHER CALDERON y
DORIGON, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant.

A few days later, or on August 19, 2012, the Valenzuela Police Station
received a report that a suspected stolen motorcycle was being sold in
Karuhatan, Valenzuela City.[9] When Police Officer 2 Harvy Arañas (PO2
Arañas) and Police Officer 1 Elbern Chad De Leon (PO1 De Leon)
responded to the report, they saw a man, later on identified as Casanas,
standing beside what turned out to be the subject motorcycle.[10] The police
officers introduced themselves to Casanas and asked for proof of
ownership of the motorcycle, but Casanas could not provide any. PO1 De
Leon then frisked Casanas and found a knife in the latter's
possession.[11] Thereafter, they brought Casanas, the subject motorcycle,
and the knife to the police station. Upon further investigation, the police
officers discovered that the subject motorcycle was registered under
Calderon's name. The next day, Calderon went to the police station and
recovered the subject motorcycle.[12]

For his part, while Casanas admitted that Calderon owned the subject
motorcycle, he denied stealing the same. He averred that he only borrowed
the subject motorcycle on August 18, 2012, but he was unable to return it
on that date as he had a drinking session with his friends.[13] The next day,
he was on his way home onboard the subject motorcycle when policemen
blocked his way and forcibly took him to the police station. Thereat, a police
officer purportedly took a knife from his drawer, which led petitioner to
believe that he was being investigated and detained because of the said
knife

In a Decision[15] dated May 15, 2013, the RTC-Valenzuela found Casanas

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged (Carnapping), and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC--Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
No. Time and again, it has been held that "the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of
those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at
any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in
a motion to dismiss. So that, whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred
by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside

In this case, the Information[33] alleges that Casanas committed the crime of
Carnapping within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela.
However, such allegation in the Information was belied by the evidence
presented by the prosecution, particularly, Calderon's own statements in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay[34] dated August 21, 2012 he executed before
the Valenzuela City Police Station as well as his testimony during trial.
Pertinent portions of the Sinumpaang Salaysay read:

TANONG: Bago ang lahat ay maari mo bang sabihin sa akin ang iyong
tunay na pangalan at iba pang mapapagkakilanlan sa iyong tunay na
pagkatao?
SAGOT: Ako po si Christopher Calderon y Doligon, 25 taong gulang, may-
asawa, tricycle driver, nakatira sa B3 L5 Northville 4B Lamabakin, Marilao,
Bulacan.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC-Valenzuela had no

authority to take cognizance of the instant case as the crime was
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the RTC-
Valenzuela ruling convicting Casanas of the crime charged, as well as the
CA ruling upholding the same, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is
well-settled that "where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter,
the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in
contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case
by reason of res judicata,"[39] as in this case.
2.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019 ]
RUEL FRANCIS M. CABRAL, PETITIONER, VS. CHRIS
S. BRACAMONTE, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:

On September 15, 2009, respondent Chris S. Bracamonte and petitioner

Ruel Francis Cabral executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in
Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight
Corporation (WFC) and Aviver International Corporation (AVIVER).
Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a postdated
check to Cabral in the amount of P12,677,950.15. When the check was
presented for payment, however, the drawee bank in Makati City
dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to
settle the obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against
Bracamonte in Parañaque City. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor
filed with the RTC of Parañaque City an Information.

After arraignment and presentation of prosecution evidence, Bracamonte

moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was improperly
laid in Parañaque City, because the postdated check was delivered and
dishonored in Makati City. Thus, the prosecution failed to show how the
supposed elements of the crime charged were committed in Parañaque
City. In contrast, Cabral maintained that the averments in the complaint and
Information are controlling to determine jurisdiction. Since the complaint
affidavit alleged that negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a
warehouse in Parañaque City where Cabral was convinced to sell his
shares in the two corporations, then the RTC of Parañaque City properly
had jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC of Paranaque is devoid of Jurisdiction?

HELD:

Yes. . Time and again, the Court has held that "territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was
committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took
place."[11] Otherwise stated, the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Thus,
a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of its limited territory. In this relation, moreover,
it has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.[12]

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article

315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of such
crime consists of the following: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating
or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the
offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
Thus, in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is
made. punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check. Deceit has been defined as "the false representation of a matter of
fact, whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

it was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his

complaint affidavit, that the crime of estafa was committed in Parañaque
City because it was there that he was convinced to sell the subject shares
of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate
the assertion. Equally guilty of the same failure to substantiate is the trial
court which relied merely on Cabral's complaint affidavit in connecting the
alleged offense within its territorial jurisdiction. In its Order, the RTC simply
denied Bracamonte's Motion to Quash because "in paragraph 7 of the x x x
complaint affidavit, Cabral narrated that it was during their meeting in the
old warehouse of AVIVER and WFC located at Km. 17, West Service
Road, South Super Highway, Parañaque City that Bracamonte was able to
persuade and convince him to sell his entire shares of stock x x x. There,
they triumphed in misleading and fooling him till finally the latter acceded to
their ploy. It was there that he finally accepted their offer."[16] A perusal of
said Order, however, would show the RTC's failure to cite any evidence
upon which it based its conclusions.

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually
proven by the evidence on record are the following: (1) Cabral and
Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2) Bracamonte issued and
delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of
the agreement; (3) the check was presented for payment and was
subsequently dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court does not see
why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not
only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored
in Makati City, it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the
parties chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from the MOA
because that was where it was executed. It is, therefore, clear from the
foregoing that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the
worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was inflicted
also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.

To repeat, case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-
payment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or
deceit in the issuance of a check. Thus, while Cabral is not wrong in saying
that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may be
prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place, the pieces of evidence on record point only to one place: Makati
City. Time and again, the Court has ruled that "in criminal cases, venue or
where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed
must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not
proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally
liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made
equivalent to proof."[17] Thus, since the evidence adduced during the trial
showed that the offense allegedly committed by Bracamonte was
committed somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed the
action for want of jurisdiction.