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IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES


49 SCRA 22

FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September
1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.”
The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The
Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:
Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by
the Commission to “integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term
“Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by
government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based
on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice


and the rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures,
through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of
its power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the
Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of


association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the
lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not
compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already
a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings,
participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual
dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise
of the police power of the state”
Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues
paid b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer
opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration.
Survey showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while
that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine


who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of
his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief
Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various
companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-
judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as


Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a
lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.

CAYETANO v MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991


FACTS:

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed by President Corazon Aquino as the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he
failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should
have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.

Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.


2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until
1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.

2. What constitutes practice of law?

RATIO DECIDENDI:

1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-


entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the
public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since
no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of
the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in
trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,


PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of
Attorneys

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took
the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on
13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found
said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was
not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently
forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his
acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error
of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to
have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is


presumed to know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought
that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just
an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of


the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves
in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court
imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of
P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the
practice of law.
In re: Medado
B.M. No. 2540. September 24, 2013.
Sereno, C.J.

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the 1979 bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath on 7 May
1980. He was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar
Office when he went home ti his province for a vacation.

ISSUE:
WON Medado be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:
Yes. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “A lawyer shall not, directly
or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.” Previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-
fledged lawyer, the Court cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, the Court see
it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution.

Telesforo Diao v. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963. Bengzon, J.

As provided by the Rules, the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath that
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-
legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.” Further, passing
the Bar examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. Diao was not
qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it and passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been
obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.

FACTS

In 1953, Telesforo Diao was admitted to the Bar. About 2 years later, Severino Martinez charged
him having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor General investigated and later recommended
Diao’s name to be erased from the roll of attorneys because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the
following particulars:
Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing
College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he
had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Diao admits the first charge, but
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of U. S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. As to
the second charge, he asserted he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing
College, in his school records.

ISSUE
Whether or not Diao should continue practicing law despite not completing the prelaw
requirements. (NO)

RULING Diao’s explanation is not acceptable since the “error” or “confusion” was of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree,
and then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests because the Rules provide, and
the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education.” Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it and passed it, and
was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses
must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
Caronan v. Caronan

Facts:
Complainant and respondent are full siblings and both completed their secondary
education at Makati High School where they graduated in 1993 and in
1991, respectively. Complainant graduated at the University of Makati in 1997 with a
degree in Business Administration. He married Myrna G. Tapis in 2001 with
whom he has two daughters. Concurrently, respondent enrolled at Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) for one year and then transferred to Philippine Military
Academy in 1992 where he was discharged after a year. Respondent was not able to
obtain any college degree since then. In 1999, respondent enrolled in St Mary’s Law
School in Nueva Vizcaya and passed the Bar examinations in 2004.
Complainant had knowledge of such events but did not mind as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him. In 2009, complainant realized
that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes.
Complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged
use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law. Respondent
denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed
the administrative case filed against him, and which case had already been declared
closed and terminated by the Supreme Court in A.C. No. 10074.32
Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse,
Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and
harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints
against thembefore the Ombudsman. On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued his Report and
Recommendation, finding respondent GUILTY of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant's name, identity, and academic records. Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick
A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll
of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. He also
recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the
judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) erred in their ordering that (a)
the name “Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name
“Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

Ruling:
No. Respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. The Court hereby resolves that: (1) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and
STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys; (2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in
the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer; (3) respondent is
BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
( 4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and (5) the Office of the Court Administrator is
ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the
country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a
warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

PRACTICE OF LAW:
PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESDENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original
action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent
Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service
Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his
nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory
retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the
DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:
Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or
out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and
experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on
equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction
to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for
moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED

IN Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)


FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical
injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February
11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned
to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he
passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a
petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his
probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement
of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. In short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fitfor admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was possessed of good moral character.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the application
for permission to take the barexaminations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

Facts:

Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three pending criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City,
namely: two Grave Oral Defamation, and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle
his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident
and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him constitute
dishonesty
(2) Whether or not he can use the appellation “Atty.”

Ruling:

First Issue:

Yes. The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or
omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative
body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases.
His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar.

Second Issue:

His use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use
of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia
District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared
that: persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter
is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it
seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot
and academic.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law.

Penalty: the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court

People vs. Villanueva 14 SCRA 109, May


27, 1965
Posted on June 19, 2018
FACTS:

City Attorney Ariston Fule, after securing the


permission from the Secretary of Justice, has appeared as
a defense counsel of accused for malicious mischief. Atty.
Fule would be considered on official leave of absence at
work whenever he does the appearance before the Court. He
did not receive any compensation from the service he
rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Fule is considered engaging in


the practice of law.

RULING:

Yes, he is a private prosecutor in that criminal case,


however, this practice is allowed only as long as there is
a permission from his immediate supervisor. Since he sought
first the approval of the Secretary of Justice, his
appearance as a private counsel is legal.
Lawyer's Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

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