Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim,
6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question,
not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to
promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the
theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation
of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case,
the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by

Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of
the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them,
such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return
for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute
and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may
be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter
by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would
not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights,
duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during
military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes
against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as
against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to
be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader
for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the
ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order
in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the
enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land
Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him
a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such
action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were
compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him
aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and
even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting
enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action
of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime
against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the
United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to
section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section
2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable,
to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question
of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that
the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that
of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way
treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty
of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
 This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to
be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in
a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While
there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable
acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-
preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency
arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its
enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to
the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be
enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is
advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law,
during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to
which was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.

"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of
which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.

"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on
him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the
federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from
the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa.
(8 Wright), 492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which
he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and
temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it
and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while
domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his
residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the
King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both
expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within
the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are
under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently
founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an
implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will
demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they
acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their
own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only
by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property
 in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be
inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation
might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for
they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3
Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him
who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives;
that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to
the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the
citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which
arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising through some circumstance
or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that
arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal
allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common
law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve
years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)

Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives.
15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his
state — the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political
person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who
operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters
or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its
sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International
Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in
character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of
the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal
obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)

Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection
which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign,
correlative with the protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege

(ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and
qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.

xxx xxx xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until
by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a
temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States,
16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the
revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities
above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides
somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible
that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their
minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules
whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est
moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and
in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may
be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy
occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our
government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our
Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy
of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation.
Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no
possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality
and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or
"suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people
ceased to be what they are.

The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her
husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising
his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed
with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for
her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is

unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p.
752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The
advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal
by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts
did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United
States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By
such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the
Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been
sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the
same Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and
adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic
federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of
unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared
the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress.
Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to
the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when
there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme
Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no
power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on
treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his
theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during
the Japanese occupation.

Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and
later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should
have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those
renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them
were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.

"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the
country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to
the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely
did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military
or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the
citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable.
Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is
dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the
social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be
dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens
are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that
duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way
that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should
continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of
personal protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the
puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285),
and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently
accept petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we
cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino
people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the
only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the
enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept
that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall
by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and
fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude,
amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our
own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only
provokes repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification,
resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical
ideologies between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of
attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our
enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly
brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our
citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further
slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change
human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking
man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology
remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on
hatred?

The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally
recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and
ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of
invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice
immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the
covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-
hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium
of the invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory
since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act,
creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed
between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive
departments have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of
Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time
the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to
expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner,
could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical
fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous
agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the
theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash
the pending treason cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted
principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that
the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that
the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories,
urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the
provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to
accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in
nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is
an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under
petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even
since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that
our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle
of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing
by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the
Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on
December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall
continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing
the President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United
States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section
1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be
in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the
possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including
invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have
available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for
treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed
without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal
technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing
the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of
having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through
the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they
acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese
occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain
other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the
allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was
not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty
here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
 I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.

(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold
in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as
International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and
inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages
which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential
excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least
under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account,
proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling
international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical
fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.

But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for
entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the
instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the
contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but
to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only
in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and
governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous
Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report
to President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously

sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought
about by the action of governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as
did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled
principles to new situations.

xxx xxx xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the
earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to
power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war
by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to
those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle
that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.

The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the
most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in
common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as
an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by
pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States
Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war between
nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it
has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and
subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and
the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete
many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of
its Codes and treaties.

This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is
a crime.

Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-
eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International
crime. . . .

The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the
representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of
aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of
 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that
"war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."

xxx xxx xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in
legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace.
("U.S.A. — An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information,
Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).

When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no
other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction
between the just and the unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he
alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.

In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson
says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally
declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the
paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of
the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common
sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the
same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League
of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th
Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he
says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.

It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and
later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly
unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack
against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in
support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those
periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson,
and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.

Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war
which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first
week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument
of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by
pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules
and principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to
the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the
outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the
course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the
rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban
and condemnation of the pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a

war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory
in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or
posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan
in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific
war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only this sense should we speak here —
with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's
house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either
to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or
right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar,
the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short
of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to
prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan,
and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be
forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted
the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government
has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in
Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other
United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this
country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument
of national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the
Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply
to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles
of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a
justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our
own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the
Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them
during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how
could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people
to their country and government?

(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when Japan occupied
the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still
the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to
a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to
the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of
their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the
individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance
to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions,
personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.

The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to
swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp.
1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the
authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to
him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)

The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the
occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful
sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign,
but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of
Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied
territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may
compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — . . . willingly to submit to
his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's
laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the
inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot
exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule,
he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws,
which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.

(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's
country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of
allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and
therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be
something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The
outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible
action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings,
and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible
pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them
to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For
them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished
by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they
were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely
adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would
only tend to aggravate their crime.

II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and
after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth
sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that
sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said
Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was
essentially to be the identical government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be
changed.

Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were
and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the
Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the
Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in
article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued,
along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional provision
further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding
officials under this Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before,
and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments
sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never
transferred from that people — they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has
never been any change in its respect.

If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to
be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the
Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the
commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the
Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that
the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence — that they
became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a
minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for
the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically
independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the
same — only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we
have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political
nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory."
(Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)

The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will
naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his
command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare,
1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason
under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior
to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States
necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other
construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated
cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its
Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military
operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely
disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the
district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February
20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines
shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders
provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and
regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the
application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the
Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."

The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter
phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily
selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers
instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that
they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive
needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of
the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant
"takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of
sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to
endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology,
and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials
who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International
Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and
order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in
the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations,
article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary
allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance
and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295),
citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II.
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied
territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we
would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:

To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted
to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two
puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but
would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously
submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and
legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue owing
allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to
owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.

The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and taken out of the
territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to
a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75
Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination.
And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is
merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal
sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to
be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is
obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its
authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not
take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we
were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that
the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind
that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws
that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven
therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its
action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the
legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial
sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the
occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not
safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III,
Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the
inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the
control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which
prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be
prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of
the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.

In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning
of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution,
because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as
we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of
the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a
constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear
intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as
regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied
upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because,
under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so
far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to
sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As
analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States — the court of highest human authority on that subject —
and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its
enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and
while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or
disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in
favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant
and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and
Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine,
in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods,
by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying
duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States,
and after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the
United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were
properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the
United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of
the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to
decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most
summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of
the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine
during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods
imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. .
. . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of
the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants
who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon
them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be
deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties
only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into
the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of
Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been
imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that
American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are
not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would,
if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from
authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed
belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so
decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished
Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay,
more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the
purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and
that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense
done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United
States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty
itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it
may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is
the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the
plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the
conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of
international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the
right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an
exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even
plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete,
without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military
occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to
take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a
recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a
territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the
inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious
power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public
Law [1931], p.364.)

The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to
argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it
is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate.
Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he
is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws
of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or
neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can
expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States
the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of
such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual
practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not
mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the
political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or
should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local
law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)

When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
"elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated.
This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the
delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to
obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14);
and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the
military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said
inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not
exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to
demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of
taking part military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the
inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if
compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of
international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an
alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say
savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the
Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have
been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or
otherwise fight as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting
forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's
military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by
America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of
destruction.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the
Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food
and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because
they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is
easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or
otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the
Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent
occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants
of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they
remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from
taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so
doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when
it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major
conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary
prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military
achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should
be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little
more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in
barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by
Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent
occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde,
International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)

Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of
traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen.
Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can
make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the
thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died
during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their
inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole,
passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they
preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese
barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-
Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular
soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of
military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the
parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the
returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese
army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and
informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act
offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with.
We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible
for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted
more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the
occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for
acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way
legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the
obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete
control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and
pressure — and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government
— that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to
release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise,
one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did
not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the
pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and
degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of
himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines
ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation.
Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute
books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding
upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws
. . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating
what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the
Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President
of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."

The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to
take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants,
and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political
laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has
made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political
nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the
time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious
power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force
by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw
voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of
the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are
necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better
position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.

"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against
the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts,
just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of
policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined
to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts
that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but nobody
supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There
are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system.
It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long
run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken
from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some
reflection.

If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the
Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the famous and significant words of
President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an
admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation
that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and
conscience to their country.

Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military
occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed
against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none
other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of
sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion
and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended
by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty
resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people
sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was
subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition
to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear
that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The
framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document was
ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have
announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their
posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines
was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the
Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed
was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the
exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which,
collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily
appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and
executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the
control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life
which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental
agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in
the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States,
those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental
machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do
not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they
were originally created.

By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State,
and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to
itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus,
States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise
a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist,
and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing
consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is
complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not
political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-
called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central
Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their
several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty
of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such
an amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the
characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size,
efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-
government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the
American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United
States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no
sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised
by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested.

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that
such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or
by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or
electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the
States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-
sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government
possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States
and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving
its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or
against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess,
sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of
the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the
Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines
Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases
pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby
insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative
under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however,
that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for
treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines,
the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under
the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to
owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been
modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should
be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.

In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in
the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a
sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the
light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S.,
308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over
the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be interpreted to
refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United
States.

No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943,
that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government
of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since
said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation
of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1)
no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946,
withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it
was General MacArthur, and not President Osmeña who was with him, that proclaimed on October
23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given
official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and
not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-
President of the Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial
because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against
the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

80 Phil. 138

TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not
guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea as to
counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with
reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The
defendant was found guilty of count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death
and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single
detail. Juanito Albaño, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other
Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness
carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the
American was taken to the Kempetai head quarters, after which he did not know what happened
to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the
accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused struck the flier with a
piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the
American was walking as well as his captors, And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see
Juanito Albaño, except at night when he and Albaño had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it, (People vs. Apolinar Adriano, 44
Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries
charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to the technical
designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex
crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
"1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for
the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
companions did apprehend Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows;
thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati,
Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and
back and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained
for 7 days;
"2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, lead, guide and accompany a group of
Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the
herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce
from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo
Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them fist blows on the face and in other
parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo
Ponce was released the following day while his brother Macario Ponce was detained and
thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
"3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6
Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, Municipality of Mandaue for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as
guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope,
tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin
were taken about ½ kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;
"7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipino
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for
guerrilla activities."
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason
law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was
patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One
without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U. S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, end a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude
the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to
prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead of relying dn them as an element of
treason. It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can
not be regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase
the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since
they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
It is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not been
substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In his first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial
court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation
of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved
for obvious reasons".
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and
regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused
was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 82.) It is presumed that the
procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the
contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial
court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because,
as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did not
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a
matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best,
although it was not the best of a willing worker," We do not discern in the record any indication
that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Garin
did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his
sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the
appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusiòn perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in
this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with
costs of this instance against the appellant.
80 Phil. 138

TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not
guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea as to
counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with
reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The
defendant was found guilty of count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death
and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single
detail. Juanito Albaño, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other
Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness
carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the
American was taken to the Kempetai head quarters, after which he did not know what happened
to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the
accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused struck the flier with a
piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the
American was walking as well as his captors, And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see
Juanito Albaño, except at night when he and Albaño had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it, (People vs. Apolinar Adriano, 44
Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries
charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to the technical
designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex
crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
"1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for
the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
companions did apprehend Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows;
thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati,
Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and
back and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained
for 7 days;
"2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, lead, guide and accompany a group of
Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the
herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce
from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo
Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them fist blows on the face and in other
parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo
Ponce was released the following day while his brother Macario Ponce was detained and
thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
"3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6
Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, Municipality of Mandaue for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as
guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope,
tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin
were taken about ½ kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;
"7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipino
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for
guerrilla activities."
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason
law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was
patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One
without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U. S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, end a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude
the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to
prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead of relying dn them as an element of
treason. It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can
not be regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase
the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since
they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
It is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not been
substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In his first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial
court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation
of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved
for obvious reasons".
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and
regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused
was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 82.) It is presumed that the
procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the
contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial
court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because,
as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did not
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a
matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best,
although it was not the best of a willing worker," We do not discern in the record any indication
that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Garin
did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his
sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the
appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusiòn perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in
this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with
costs of this instance against the appellant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-
appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge
Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.

In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been committed according to the information as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority,
armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and
confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain
and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop
the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and
Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk
towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their
cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said
accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that
the said victims were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the
said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus
the accused have performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de
Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely
medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his
death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)

An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam
Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one
of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision
of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a
regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)

In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan
Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July
10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn).
The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-
named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and
keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value
of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979,
Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk-
Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the
bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought
by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de
Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who
were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of
Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought
with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island
at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that
night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).

The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and
Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went
to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep
in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him,
Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.

On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a
place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p.
47, tsn).

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied
by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and
Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going
ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the
group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-
54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and
Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh
positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas
Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the
engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat
as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other
pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the
same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When
the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed
de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio
de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by
Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de
Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it
on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that
remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio
de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat,
the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he
was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the
mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and
Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine
 Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to
the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).

On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf,
de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took
from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to
get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)

As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who
should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court
which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following
claims of the appellants are not convincing:

1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on
any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at
sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.

2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily
Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to
an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating
the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also
makes this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true,
why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified
against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of
the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or
fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated
murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to
whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the
offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not
crediting the report of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under
detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and
Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed
them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and
Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali
were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy
among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this

case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de
Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were
talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two
accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to
the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested
of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained
unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy
 and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57;
People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the
act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.)
The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall
be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime.
It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M.
No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and
40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro
near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to
paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel,
as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name
"Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the
Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine
Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship
arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel
which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March
14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles
from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on
March 30, 1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo
to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea.
On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning
not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted
passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco
at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to
the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the
incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K.
Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin
was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI
agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No.
532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,

CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9)
other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the
vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter
returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their
testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed
the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and
Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of
March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told
that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of
employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping
on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts,
Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel
"Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered
to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company
paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng,
Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to
locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on
board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the
port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain
the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the
purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed
toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and
did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the
Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong
and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later
turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor
did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took
samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under
the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon
arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the
cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from
"M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time,
Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for
the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul
Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to
offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of
the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco,
who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was
told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being
billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A
person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also
checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel
was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by

this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the
principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong
San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no
longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally,
to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency,
with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount
is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to
the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer
return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay,
jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the
accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of
Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail
of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.
 (pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr.
Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due
process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel
for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court
discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas
had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during
the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements
without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of
counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the
pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The
crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed
by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and
seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or
robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law
of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial
court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in
fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by
direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any
participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he
had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of
qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified
piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters.
In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or
territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its
territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and
implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what
are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?;
(3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they
were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of
the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only
be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants,
as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants
were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment
(Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman
is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were
sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the
record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally,
knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul
Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of
rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-
called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more
stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-
appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit
from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information
is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to
convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court
that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial
judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of
the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as
among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30
o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said
vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough
Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to
the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the
vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for
more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their
leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of
the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba
and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified
the said Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2,
1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be
off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of
participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were
hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao"
which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks
and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without
even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for
a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience.
As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was
at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping,
suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is
easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to
have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to
prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest
respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284
SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are
times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal
design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro,
while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from
the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to
provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be
present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view
of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant

Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto
Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said
corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their
families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a
relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off
Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while
Loyola at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in

Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons
out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any
person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage
of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in
Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement
nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
 complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and
hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen
the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-
appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer
was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is
likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a
principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway

robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of
police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by
such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall
be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with
Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete
evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino,
40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the
crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had
failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo
by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by
buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He
even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi
Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the
illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates
with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-
134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List
was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in
the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-
appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily
discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and
prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant
Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991,
Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-
CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration"
(for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH",
Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation"
and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel
from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm,
the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo
transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the
Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit
"11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration"
upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A
CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on
the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of
diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was
likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the
transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that
he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the
cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a
highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the
very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed
or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did
not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check
the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi
Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor;
he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should
also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than
US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo
was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money
for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in
addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware
that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his
superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine,
but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel.
Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port
and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said
acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an
intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the
nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi
Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-
lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in
the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the

physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
 administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Chapter II – Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the state

G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated September
15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft, and the resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed
as follows:

"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable
Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said
owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.

The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:

 "[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while
on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.

With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45.
Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came
from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,
appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was
driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to
transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait
until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa
Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt.
Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed
with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the
vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.

After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with
kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised
₱1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he
was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he
told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty
Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters
where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up
in jail for a week."4

On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worth ₱55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from
TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant
National Power Corporation in the amount of ₱55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed,
to wit:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to
Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No
civil indemnity and no costs."6

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:

"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;

(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
 (c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."

The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:

"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court
cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017,
January 21, 1991, it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of
practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R.
No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989),
it was ruled that 'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant
upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no
criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836,
the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a warrant where the
accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not only
authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant."7

Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the
trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof, which reads:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits
of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;8 (2) seizure of evidence
in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search;11 (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.14

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar
was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 1âwphi1.nêt
I. Search of moving vehicle

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.15 Thus, the rules governing search
and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by
the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also
allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of
the State.17

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.19 The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula
but is resolved according to the facts of each case.20

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or
police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted by
the exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.23 A checkpoint
may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening
the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;27 (5) where
the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area.29

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.

In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the
body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:

"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion
allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . .
In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from
outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area
protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the
open window of a home."

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his
possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential
information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana;32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that
said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.33

In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.

Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:

"ATTY. SANTOS

Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?

A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in
the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.

Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?

A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?

A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir."35

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to
be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of
a search without a warrant.

In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police
authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:

"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x,
CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with
immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
 This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited
drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has
become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none
exists in this case.

II. Plain view doctrine

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.

Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.38

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they
were placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath
the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his
vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified
mere seizure of the articles without further search.40

III. Consented search

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the
consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that
there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the
specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an
implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.42 The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked
on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;45 (7) the nature of
the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given.47

In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted
in this wise:

"WITNESS
 Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?

A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is that incident?

A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes

driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati
leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged
him, sir.

Q Did the vehicle stop?

A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and
by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.

Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

Q What was the answer of Caballes?

A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.

Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you
do?

A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the
Cavinti area, sir."48

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said
search. In People vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In
upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was
"urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he
allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,52 the accused
admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of
their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it
was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening
the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a
clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they
could see the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are
only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you
can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search. 1âw phi 1.nêt

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.55

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's
vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by
uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his
consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful
whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked
during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that
he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a
clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind,
this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct
examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they
searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.56

Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the

warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed
to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that
the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because
he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can
only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.WHEREFORE, the impugned decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial
Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established

beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No.
885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
 penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.

As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.

The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:

That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to
the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.

Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,

composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).

Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.

After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three
(3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo
Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.

Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).

To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert

was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).

Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38
caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away
from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as
Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).

On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,

Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.

The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.

Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)

Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)

On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.

Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
 Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an
inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.

Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question
propounded or not.

With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)

Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that
among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of
accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons
who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.

After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.

On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision
as follows:

From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.

He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.

All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,

Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.

After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-
June 15, 1983)

In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of

explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or
contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those
questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by
 an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.

To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her
to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him.
(TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)

To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of

Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by

the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance
with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18,
1983)

Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)

On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm,
was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22,
1983)

After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE
LAWFUL.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION
TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid
manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos
for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused
allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."

If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
 A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis
of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown,

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who
was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982).
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal.
The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)

xxx xxx xxx

 . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).

That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest is evident from the records:

A CALAMBA:

Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not
armed with an arrest warrant?

A None Sir.

Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?

A No Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you
went there?

A But he was twenty meters away from his house.

Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?

A Yes Sir.

Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?

A Yes Sir.

Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?

A No Sir.

Q What did you tell him?

A That we received information that you have a firearm, you

surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.

Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?

A I did not.

Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?

A Yes Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?

A It was buried down in his horse.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?

A Yes Sir.
 (TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.

There is another aspect of this case.

In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.

Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV
of the Bill of Rights winch provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .

The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.

The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the
failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.

The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office
was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.

With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.

We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):

xxx xxx xxx

. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.

The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):

. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 . . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .

In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.

Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19,
1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4,
1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):

It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to
be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has
resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum
in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:

While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.

Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime
with which he has been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus
Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera,
Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.

The facts are as follows:

On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as
follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and
Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY
DETENTION, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private
persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one
Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and
immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando
Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis supplied.)

CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.

Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.

(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA

Assistant Provincial Fiscal

All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an
opposition thereto.

Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated
April 25, 1973.

Hence, this petition.

Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2

The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which
was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is,
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.

The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner
Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
elements of the crime are present.

The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of
the law, the judges or mayors.4

Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when
the former made this finding in the questioned order:

Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with
the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered
Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority
vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5

In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that
the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the
authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is
neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing
to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet
considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12

We disagree.

Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various
cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.

In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass
through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him
that he was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14

In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound
and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the
justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day
when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime,
Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16

Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the
barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce
all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an
emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio.20

In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to
say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For
public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.

"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order,
what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where
possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.

"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he
may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to
those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.24

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can
be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.

Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only
sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27

Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of
such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not
only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only
one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution.31 lawphi 1

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy
has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial,
is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused
cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded
to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
— issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to

the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äw phï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
 which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
 3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners

are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
 The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude
that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in
the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored,
he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
 It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to

suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
 Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this
long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly
be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing
the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping
and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and
the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing

an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where
this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by
the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants
on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue
in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in
the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this
Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,

cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to

promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It
is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of

the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at
the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P.
Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellant.

Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ
of mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of the
peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was filed of the following
tenor:

The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and municipality
of Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca,
Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion committed as
follows:

That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid
accused, while holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas,
in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ",
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed,
through the chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard
belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church and is
devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned
complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was
compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed
in grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the
Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code.

(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES

Parish Priest
Complainant

(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)

The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement
regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts and of the
witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal, instead of
filing the corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:

The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. The
said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats,
the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the
Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to
the Church of Christ.

The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not
constitute the offense complained of considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code. At most they might be chargeable with having threatened the parish priest, or with
having passed through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert,
commenting on the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything
constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies;
plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of
causing the passage through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one
who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious
feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case,
reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another information for the crime found to have been
committed by the accused.

From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due course by
the court by virtue of an order of this court.

The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to wit, that the
churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said church, and it is
through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish priest and through force
and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of the religious sect known as the
Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he would not have come to the
conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the crime defined and penalized by article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the accused
had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act complained of
took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the fiscal was discussing
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of them, but must admit
them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a question of law, not one of
fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of
the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those
professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint
constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should
the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said
facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense
complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code,
as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.

The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law,
without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dispositive part on the ground that the lower court, without determining if the
churchyard of the Catholic Church is a place devoted to religious worship or not, held that the
passage through the said churchyard of a funeral conducted in accordance with the rites of another
religion is not offensive to the feelings of the Catholic. If that funeral with ceremonies of another
religion had been made to pass inside the church, it would without question be offensive top the
feelings of the Catholics. The lower court, through the provincial fiscal, is thus under a duty to
determine: (1) If the churchyard is a place devoted to the religious worship of the Catholic Church,
and (2) if the funeral held under the rites of another religion was made to pass through the said
churchyard.

If the churchyard of the Catholic Church is like some of those seen in Manila churches where
anyone can pass and where goods are even sold to the public, then it is not a place devoted to
religious worship, and the fact that a funeral to pass through it, does not constitute a violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, but, at most, the offense of threats if it is true that the parish
priest was threatened when he prohibited the passage of the funeral.

LAUREL, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

It is an accepted doctrine of construction that criminal statutes must be strictly interpreted. In fact, no
person should be brought within the terms of the penal law who is not clearly so within, and no acts
should be pronounced criminal unless so defined and penalized by law. The offense imputed to the
defendants herein is defined in article 133 which is as follows:
 ART. 133. Offending religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall
perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

As defined, two essential elements must be present under this article, to wit: (1) That the facts
complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of
any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful. It is admitted that the whole incident happened in the "atrio" or "patio" of the Catholic
Church of Lumban, Laguna. There was no celebration of any religious ceremony then. The "atrio"
coming from the Latin "atrium" means, an open space, generally closed, fronting a building or a
church. In this case it is a churchyard. While occasional religious ceremonies may be performed in
the "atrio", nevertheless this does not make the "atrio" a place devoted to religious worship under
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, any more than a public plaza, a street or any other place
occasionally used for religious purposes. But assuming that the churchyard in this case is "a place
devoted to religious worship" — contrary to what we see and know (Justice Brown, in
Hunter vs. New York O. & W. Ry. Co., 23 N.E., 9, 10; 116 N.Y., 615) — is the act complained of
"notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful?" The imputed dereliction consist in that "los
acusados arriba nombrados, estando dirigiendo el entierro segun el rito de una secta religiosa
llamada "Iglesia de Cristo", del cadaver de uno que en vida se llamada Antonio Macabigtas,
voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente hicieron que dicho entierro pasase, como en efecto paso, por el a
trio de la Iglesia Catholica Romana frente a dicha Iglesia, el cual a trio es propiedad de dicha Iglesia
y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos de esta Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos deesta
Iglesia, contra la oposicion del infrascrito denunciantea quien los acusados mediante fuerza y
amenazas de maltrato obligaron a cederles el paso del entierro por dicho atrio." (Emphasis is mine.)
As I see it the only act which is alleged to have offended the religious "feelings of the faithful" here is
that of passing by the defendants through the "atrio" of the church under the circumstances
mentioned. I make no reference to the alleged trespass committed by the defendants or the threats
imputed to them because these acts constitute different offenses (arts. 280, 281 and 282-285) and
do not fall within the purview of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. I believe that an act, in order
to be considered as notoriously offensive to the religious feelings, must be one directed against
religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule; the offender, for instance, mocks,
scoffs at or attempts to damage an object of religious veneration; it must be abusive, insulting and
obnoxious (Viada, Comentarios al Codigo Penal, 707, 708; vide also Pacheco, Codigo Penal, p.
359).

Why, may I ask, should the mere act of passing of the corpse or funeral cortege in or through a
private property be characterized as notoriously offensive to the feelings of any religion or of its
adherent or followers?

The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed by the name of the Lord. (Job. I. 21.)

In this case, the Lord has recalled the life of one of His creatures: and it must be His wish
that the remains shall have the right of way that they may be buried "somewhere, in
desolate, wind-swept space, in twilight land, in no man's land but in everybody's land.

Rather than too many religions that will make us hate one another because of religious prejudices
and intolerance, may I express the hope that we may grasp and imbibe the one fundamental of all
religions that should make us love one another!

I must decline to accept the statement made in the majority opinion that "whether or not the act
complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must
be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is
possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not
otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith." (Emphasis is mine.) I express
the opinion that offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or less
broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be gauged having in view the
nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be
viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion .Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the
offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given
religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and
arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious
intolerance and persecution." (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.)

I think that the ruling of the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the case and in reserving to the
provincial fiscal the presentation of another complaint or complaints under other provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, is correct and should be upheld.
 G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,

vs.

FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.

GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE,
petitioners,

vs.

HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT.
COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA

AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR

MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

 G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.

NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,

vs.

THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,

Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R.
No. 85727.

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:

The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein
and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained
by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
 The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings,
and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.
The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto,
viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the
case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions
for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
 A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the
Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated
for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification,
it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood
of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car
identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.

As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder
with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.

Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.

On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as
Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since
the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been
released on bail. 2

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the
said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier
case:

From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set
them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of
the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion
thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the
charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the
early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4

In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the
defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in
form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ of
habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need
not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

II

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was
an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel
group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the
house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation
grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y
Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents
about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of
the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance;
"Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
 In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance
and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-
NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles
were found and taken under proper receipt:

a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;

e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;

f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);

i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess
the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the
CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement,
although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a
ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra
arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily
admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the
place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel
group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from
Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
 (1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;

(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;

(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.

Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St.,
Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military
agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about
11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the
presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found
ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a
cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result,
Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the
voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no
knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were released from custody.

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after
which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of
Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the
petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia
Roque remains for resolution.

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or
members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or
members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier
stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she
was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.

III
 In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they
had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13
August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino
at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military
agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be
loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry
firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65
containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine
containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as
"Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were
forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were
unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void
for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the
parties were heard.

The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because
there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they
were apprehended.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and
void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, reads:
 Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for
a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor
in the manner prescribed in this Rule.

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed
against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:

This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the
accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed
against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.

IV

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified
under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record
of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal
PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II,
Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head
of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car
of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters
for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny
Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.

On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and
detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
 It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest
without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested
without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.

The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim
that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the
said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the
arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as
counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence
submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of
P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-
depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners
in the rebel movement.

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at
Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It
was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members
of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody
has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication
equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.

The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members
of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid
and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person were
letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra,
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did
come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents,
not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?
 As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest
without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot
be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of
the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper
taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time,
place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of
petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents
were found in their possession.

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp,
but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude
tat they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.

IV

In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not
warranted.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers
and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and
protection.

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he
was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he
went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type
jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men
did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was
brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and
detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of
the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained,
restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Sedition).
 The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant
of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon
of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.

Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on
nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower
the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we
heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced
the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but
he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering
of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila where he was heard to say:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts,
bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis
supplied)

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.

VII

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record
of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by
the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his
companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without
warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning.
Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by
his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
 On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing
that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed
against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of
said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence against him).

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based
upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court
after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye

II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.
For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics
of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated therein.

VIII

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any
court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as
amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter,
abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order
of commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim
that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and
strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with
the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence
against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court
that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind
the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the
freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon
express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed
by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal,
with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom
the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to
take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's
detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has
done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas
corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the
courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu
vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00
to P10,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED