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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

1. ARMED FOCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND 2. Alvarez v Ramirez


SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM v RP G.R. No. 143439, 14 October 2005
GR 188956, March 20, 2013
Doctrine: The exception to the disqualification of a
DOCTRINE: No substantive or procedural requirement witness by reason of marriage, is where the marital
requires a witness for a party some sort of authorization relations are so strained that there is no more harmony
to testify as witness for the party presenting him or her. to be preserved, the spouse can testify.
All the Rules require is that the witness possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided FACTS:
therein.
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining
FACTS: Petitioner in its application for land registration witness in a criminal case or arson pending before the
presented its VP of Asset Enhancement Office to testify RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez,
that subject properties were legally acquired by stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of
petitioner pursuant to a land grant under PD 1218. respondent. Esperanza Alvarez was called to the
witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her
RTC initially granted but subsequently denied the land husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify
registration upon the motion for reconsideration of the Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule
OSG on the ground of failure to prosecute for the lack 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
of authorization of the witness to testify on the behalf disqualification.
of petitioner.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending
ISSUE: WON the lack of authorization of witness resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the
constitutes failure to prosecute prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the
other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court
RULING: No. Considering that petitioners presented a issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her
competent witness with regard to the titling of the lot,
testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a
there is no ground for failure to prosecute.
motion for reconsideration but was denied.
No substantive or procedural requirement requires a
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the
witness for a party some sort of authorization to testify
objection of her estranged husband on the ground of
as witness for the party presenting him or her. No law
marital privilege.
or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that
such omission is considered a failure to prosecute. All HELD:
the Rules require is that the witness possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her
therein. husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of
marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Presented witness having all the qualifications and none Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations
of the disqualification was qualified to testify are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
notwithstanding the lack of authorization. preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all
major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the
Land registration GRANTED in favor of petitioner. State has an interest in punishing the guilty and
exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to
offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of
her husband.

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

3. Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co. 4. Abraham v. Recto-Kasten


124 SCRA 553 (1983) G.R. No. L-16741. January 31, 1962
FACTS:
The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Doctrine: Dead Man’s statute - A cross-examination of the
Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres physically disqualified witness is a waiver of the dead man’s privilege,
possessed and cultivated the land through a tenancy even if there was a continuing objection.
agreement. Subsequently, Andres entrusted the land to his
sister, Cristina. After the death of Andres, Cristina FACTS: Juan Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham,
continued as trustee of the deceased. Sr. in the amount of P12.500.00 in Japanese currency notes,
The petitioners, however, discovered that the and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter. The
note was executed in the presence of Florencia Abraham, the
land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel,
creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom as a
purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. Manuel
witness. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made
subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants. The
for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay. Subsequently,
defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Ysmael also died
St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them. intestate leaving the note still unpaid.
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in
favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the In a Special Proceeding for the settlement of the intestate-
subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and estate of Ysmael, Florencia, together with her sons, filed a
ineffective since the defendants allegedly knew that the pleading demanding payment of the amount. During the
property belonged to Andres Guerrero. hearing, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter general and continuing objection to the testimony of
of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. Florencia invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123.
However, her testimonies was subsequently excluded on However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-
the basis of the “dead man’s rule. examined her on the very matters against which he
interposed a general objection.
ISSUE:
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Florencia is
were disqualified on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”? inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute?

RULING RULING: It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the
present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties
(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
mere witnesses by whose testimonies the petitioners against an executor administrator or other
aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who owned the representative of a deceased person, or against such
disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property to matter of fact occurring before the death of such
Manuel. deceased person or before such person became of
The present case is not a claim or demand against unsound mind
the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the
are being sued as claimants of ownership in their witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. It was
individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the
part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead counsel's previous general and continuing objection and
man’s rule is clearly inapplicable. admitted the testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is
difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-
examination on the prohibited matter was merely for the
purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and
predilection" of the witness.

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5. Goñi v. CA representative cross examined the plaintiff as to


144 SCRA 222 (1986) matters occurring during the deceased lifetime.

Doctrine: Dead Man’s Statute is effectively waived when


plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of 6. Tongco v. Vianzon
the estate or counsel for the representative cross 50 Phil. 698 (1927)
examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during
the deceased lifetime. Doctrine: The rule on the prohibition of a party in whose
behalf the action is prosecuted, to testify in a suit
FACTS: Villanueva wanted to buy 3 haciendas owned by involving a claim upon the estate of the deceased, does
TABACLERA but since he had no sufficient funds, he
not apply when the actions were not brought “against”
offered the haciendas to Villegas with Vicente as
guarantor. The amount realized from this transaction the estate, nor were they brought upon claims “against”
was still not enough, so he entered into a promise to the estate.
sell 3 lots of one of the haciendas with Vicente.
Subsequently, 2 of the 3 lots were subject of a lease to FACTS: Anastacia Vinzon is the widow of Marcelino
Vicente for 5 years. When Villanueva died, the Tongco who died intestate. His niece was named
inventory included the 3 lots in question. Vicente administratrix of his estate. Before he died, the
instituted an action for recovery of property and deceased had presented claims in a cadastral case in
damages against the heirs and Goni, the administrator. the name of the conjugal partnership which was
TC and CA ruled in favor of Vicente. thereafter declared as the exclusive ownership of his
widow after his death. The second case involved was
ISSUE: WON Vicente may testify on matters of fact the complaint for the recovery of specified property
occurring before the death of Villanueva which filed by the administratrix againt the widow. The
constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate in administratrix attacked the RTC ruling that the widow
violation of the dead man statute. was competent to testify.

RULING: Yes, the object and purpose of the rule is to ISSUE: Whether or not the widow was competent to
guard against the temptation to give false testimony in testify.
regard to the transaction in question on part of the
surviving party and further to put the two parties to a HELD: Yes.
suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity
of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the The object and purpose of the statute on the
party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the prohibition is to guard against the temptation to give
party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving false testimony in regard to the transaction in question
party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of on the part of the surviving party. However, it should
fictitious claims against the deceased. This case remain not be neglected the equally important rule that the law
within the ambit of the protection because the was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
defendants-heirs are properly the representatives of designed to suppress the truth.
the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the
decedent’s right by decent or operation of law, but The actions were not brought against the administratrix
more importantly because they are so placed in of the estate, nor where they brought upon claims
litigation that they are called on to defend. Such against the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is
protection, however, was effectively waived when one by the administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the
counsel for petitioners crossed examined Vicente. A estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy
waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral
representative of the estate or counsel for the proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and
there is no defendant.

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

stockholders and officers therefore, they are not disqualified


from testifying.

7. Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf 8. Razon v. IAC


84 Phil. 330 (1949) (207 SCRA 234, 1992)

Doctrine: The dead man’s statute, however, delimits the


Doctrine: Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court disqualifies only parties or assignors of prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a
parties, the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation case against the administrator or its representative of
are not disqualified from testifying for or against the an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim deceased person.
or demand against the estate of a deceased person as
to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such Facts:
deceased person. E. Razon, Inc. was organized by Enrique Razon. Some of
its nominal incorporators withdrew, thus Razon
FACTS: distributed their shares to some of his friends, which
Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, included Juan Chuidian, to whom he transferred 1,500
a foreign corporation registered and licensed to do business shares of stock. It was agreed between the two that
in the Philippines, holding 1,000 shares of stock of which 545 Chuidian was only given the option to buy the said
had not been fully paid but were covered by promissory shares, but Razon would be the owner. A stock
notes in favor of Atlantic Gulf with an agreement that should certificate was issued by the corporation in the name of
he die leaving the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at its option, may Chuidian, and the said transfer was recorded in the
either acquire said shares by returning to his estate the corporate books. The said certificate, however, was
amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the
held by Razon, who delivered it to the Philippine Bank
corresponding shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.
of Commerce. Chuidian thereafter died, and his
Fitzsimmons died Atlantic then filed a claim against the estate
and offered to reacquire the shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon administrator filed an action to recover the certificate
return to the estate of the P64,500 paid thereon. The of shares of stock representing Chuidian's shareholdings
administrator, Marcial Lichauco, however, denied the alleged in the Corporation.Razon testified with regard to the
indebtedness. During trial, Atlantic presented the testimonies true nature of his transaction with late elder Chuidian.
of the chief accountant and assistant accountant, and of the
president and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation. Issue:
The trial court however refused to admit said testimonies on Whether Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition
the ground of incompetency under the Dead Man’s State, as under DMS Rule
the witnesses were not only stockholders and members of
the Board of Directors, but officers as well.
Ruling:
ISSUE: No. It is clear that the testimony of the petitioner is not
W/N the officers of a corporation which is a party to within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed
an action against an administrator disqualified from testifying against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed
under the Dead Man’s Statute? upon claims against the estate.

RULING:
NO. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons
from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a
corporation would be equivalent to materially amending the
statute by judicial legislation. The Dead Man’s Statute
disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; a corporation
has its own personality separate and distinct from its

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

shares? — He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my


letters.
3) Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your
account — YES, several times by letter, but I never
received an answer.
9. Mendezona v. Viuda de Goitia
(GR L-31739, March 11, 1930) Disposition Judgment affirmed.
FACTS:
Defendant has been duly appointed judicial administratrix of the ISSUE:
estate of her deceased husband BENIGNO GOITIA.
Whether the appellees' depositions are admissible.
Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the Tren de HELD: YES.
Aguadas, of which the plaintiff LEONOR MENDEZONA, widow of The first of these questions tends to show the relationship
Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18, 000 and the between the principals and their attorney-in-fact BenignoGoitia
plaintiff VALENTINA IZAGUIRRE Y NAZABAL owns 72 shares up to 1914.
worth P7,200.
Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would
During the period from 1915 to 1926, Benigno Goitia collected not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved
and received certain sums as dividends and profits upon the by the Exhibits.
plaintiffs' stock in the Tren de Aguadas in his capacity as
representative and attorney-in-fact for both of them, which he
has neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffs. As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that the
Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee deponents deny having received from the deceased
of claims and appraisal of the estate of Benigno Goitia, and, BenignoGoitia any money on account of profits on their shares,
upon their disallowance, appealed from the committee's since 1915.
decision by means of the complaints in these two cases. We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact
Defendant, manifested that she has found no more evidence of occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact
any amount received by her late husband than a book of account BenignoAgoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions
where she came upon an item of P90 for Leonor Mendezona, (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure).
and another of P36 for Valentina Izaguirre. The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim
The court ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of the against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a
estate of the deceased BenignoGoitia, to pay the plaintiff Leonor matter of fact which took place BEFORE the death of the
Mendezona the sum of P13,140 with legal interest, and to pay deceased.
the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the
interest. intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection
The defendant appealed from this judgment. should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition
from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate.
To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of
The appellees made depositions before the American consul at one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would be
Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary
Procedure. estate. This was the legislator's intention.
When these depositions were read in court, the defendant The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took
objected to their admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the place before their representative's death, but on the
Code of Civil Procedure.Her objection referred mainly to the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they
following questions: denied that a liquidation had been made or any money
1) Did Mr. BenignoGoitia render you an account of your remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de
partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — YES, until the Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim.
year 1914. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper
2) From the year 1915, did Mr. BenignoGoitia send you evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by
any report or money on account of profits upon your bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in
duty bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

by the banks which drew them, as was the decadents’ usual


practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence.

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10 Garcia vs. Dominga Robles 11. People v. Carlos


G.R. No.180843, 17 April 2013 47 Phil. 626 (1925)
Doctrine: If documents were obtained from the
DOCTRINE: Dead Man’s Statute: If a party to an alleged addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is without the addressee's consent, the privilege should
not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own cease.
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. FACTS:
Defendant killed Dr. Sityar. The victim herein is the
FACTS: doctor of the defendant and his wife. The defendant
Makapugay is the owner of a farm being tilled by Caparas admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that
as agricultural lessee under leasehold agreement. She he did so in self-defense. The trial court found that the
passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and crime was committed with premeditation and therefore
niece while children of Caparas succeeded him. Before constituted murder because of a letter written by the
passing away, Flora appointed niece Amanda as her wife to the defendant. The letter was illegally seized (no
attorney-in-fact. An agreement was entered into by search warrant) by the police and shows that the wife
Amanda and Pedro (one of the children) followed by an feared that the defendant would result to physical
“Agricultural Leasehold Contract”.In said agreements, violence in dealing with Dr. Sityar. The defendant
Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural argues that the letter was a privileged communication
lessee and cultivator of the land.Later sisters of Pedro filed and therefore not admissible in evidence and, in the
a Complaint for nullification of leasehold and restoration absence of premeditation, should consequently be
of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heir (the
guilty of homicide only. Hence, this petition.
wife Dominga), claiming that they entered into an
agreement with brother Pedro to alternately farm the land
ISSUE:
on a ‘per-season basis’; that when Amanda learned of
Whether or not the letter is inadmissible as evidence
Pedro's misrepresentations, she executed an Affidavit
stating that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive
them of their "cultivatory rights"; that in order to correct RULING:
matters, an agreement was executed in their favor INADMISSIBLE. The numerical weight of authority is to
recognizing them as Pedro's co-lessees. the effect that where a privileged communication from
one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third
party, whether legally or not, without collusion and
ISSUE:W/N affidavit and the Agreement made voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
betweenAmanda and petitioners are admissible. spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the
communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
HELD: admissible.
No. Amanda’s declaration covering Pedro’s alleged
admission and recognition of the alternate farming However, in the recent US case, this foregoing doctrine
scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead (i. e., that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
Man’s Statute, which provides that “if one party to the
by the illegality of the means through which the party
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
has been enabled to obtain the evidence) was
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not
overturned. The new doctrine laid down in the recent
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the case states that the illegality of the search and seizure
transaction’. Dominga is placed in an unfair situation by should first have been directly litigated and established
reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the
declaration as a result of her husband Pedro’s prior death. things seized; so that, after such a motion, and then
only, the illegality would be noticed in the main trial and
the evidence thus obtained would be excluded. Our

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Court followed this doctrine and ruled that here in this 12. Uy Chico v. Union Life
case, the illegality of the search and seizure was not 29 Phil. 163 (1915)
"directly litigated and established by a motion, made
before trial, for the return of the things seized”. Doctrine: Communication made by a client to his attorney for
the express purpose of its being communicated to a third
The letter must, however, be excluded for reasons not person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation
discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the and cannot be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial communication between the attorney and his client.
the letter might have been admissible to impeach her
Facts:
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand After the death of his father and before the date of the fire,
and the letter was therefore not offered for that plaintiff purchased his brother’s interest in the dry goods
purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise business, took over and continued it under his father’s name,
had indicated his assent to the statements contained in “Uy Layco.” At the time of the fire, "Uy Layco" was indebted
the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is to the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father.
not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his
possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the
his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure insurance policies belonged to him and alleges that he is not
hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of
the estate, who compromised with the insurance company
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case
for one-half their face value, or P6,000.
to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution
and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this The defendant insurance company sought to show that it was
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary the plaintiff's attorney who had surrendered the policies to
communication and one originally privileged. the administrator with the understanding that such a
compromise was to be effected and agreed to by the plaintiff.
The defendant proves these allegations by presenting the
plaintiff’s attorney.

However, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the


waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the
testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was
privileged.

Issue:
Was the testimony in question privileged?

Ruling:
NO. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the third
person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it,
it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney
and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and
that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or
agent.
The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff
acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies.
Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it
and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.

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13. Regala v. Sandiganbayan petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
262 SCRA 124 (1996) client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

Principle: Exceeptions to rule that a lawyer may not Ruling:


invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
No. The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
identity of his client. United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The
Facts: reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
A complaint was filed by PCGG before the First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
Sandiganbayan for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
among the defendants named in the case are herein blood; Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. attorney-client relationship has been established, privilege
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, does not attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege
Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm).
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and The general rule is however qualified by some important
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the exceptions.
organization and acquisition of the companies included in 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. advice.
Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit Third Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which identity is privileged. Where the government's lawyers have
excluded respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, he in turn undertaking client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their There exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-Motion that to the general rule.Information relating to the identity of a
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them client may fall within the ambit of the privilege 2) when the
(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private client's name itself has an independent significance, such
respondent Roco. that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following The courts finds that the condition precedent required by the
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client client confidentiality privilege it also also constitutes a
relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of transgression by respondent Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the
assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients equal protection clause of the Constitution for it is grossly
covering their respective shareholdings. unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein others.
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions question of the identity of their clients but also on documents
required by respondent PCGG related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of
the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional
Issue: right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at
W/N Sandiganbayan is correct in not holding that, under the it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits such rights.

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14. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co. 15. Orient Insurance v. Revilla
46 Phil. 938 (1924) 54 Phil. 919 (1930)

FACTS Doctrine: Contracts fees and other terms of employment


Barton sought to recover damages from Leyte Asphalt for between attorney and client are not considered as
breach of contract with a judicial pronouncement that he was privileged information.
entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies
specified in the contract. Facts:
Leyte Asphalt owns Lucio Mine, a valuable deposit of Respondent filed a case for recovery of two fire insurance
bituminous limestone and other asphalt products. Anderson, policies issued by the latter. A clause in the policy stated that
the GM of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Baron authorizing in case of loss and such claim is rejected by the insurer and
him to sell their products in several countries upon prices action is not commenced within 3 months, all benefits will be
indicated. Baron had full authority to sell for any sum he saw forfeited. Petitioner alleges that the claim was rejected on
fit in excess of the prices quoted and such was to be his extra April but the action was not instituted till August, more than
and additional profit and commission. 3 months after rejection. Respondent claims they delayed in
Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter instituting an action because petitioner requested such in
written by Baron to Atty. Ingersoll, his lawyer. When the hopes of a compromise agreement. However, during trial,
attorney for the defendant offered the letter in evidence, witness for defendant alleged that he received a letter from
Baron’s lawyer said that unless the defendant’s counsel their attorney on July 13, to file a case. When asked to
explained how the letter came to the defense’s possession, produce such letter, defendant’s counsel refused to reveal
he proposed to object the letter’s admission on the ground the whole letter but only revealed parts to support their
that it was a confidential communication between client and statement, stating that it contained private matters between
lawyer. The trial judge excluded the letter. attorneys and defendant such as contract fees etc.

ISSUE Issue:
WON the letter should be excluded 1. Does the presentation of part of the letter
constitute waiver to present the whole
RULING
No. When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no document?
notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, 2. Are contract fees and other terms of employment
properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to between client and attorney privilege in nature?
try that question.
Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which Ruling:
protects communications between attorney and client, this 1. Yes, the excerpt in question must be considered as
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the proof submitted by defendant, and there can be no
adverse party and it makes no difference how the defense
question that, part of the letter having been
acquired possession. The law protects the client from the
effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the introduced, the whole letter could be properly
confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, examined by Orient, in accordance with the express
containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a provision of Sec. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in 2. No, although contracts between attorneys and
evidence. clients are inherently personal and considered
According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving secrecy private matters, contracts relating to fees are
of communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the
privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and essentially not privilege in nature. Privilege primarily
should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its refers to communications from client to attorney, an
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the idea which of course includes communications from
communications. One who overhears the communication, attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter
protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one
who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in contained privileged matters, such was waived by
original or copy.” introduction in evidence of part of the letter.

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

16. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN 17. United States v. Gordon – Nikkar


G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997 CA Fla. 1975, 518 F.2d 972

Doctrine: For the application of the attorney-client Doctrine: A communication divulged to "strangers" or
privilege, however, the period to be considered is the outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
date when the privileged communication was made by
communication between attorney and client. Also,
the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
attorney-client privilege does not extend to
committed in the past.
communications regarding an intended crime.
FACTS:
Facts:
Respondent Paredes applied for and was granted a free
Appellant, Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was convicted after a trial by
patent over a lot of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision
jury on three counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to
Survey in 1976. However, it was cancelled because it was
distribute approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the
reserved for a school site. The trial court nullified said patent
substantive charges of possession with intent to distribute
and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same
and distribution of the cocaine.
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, a
case of perjury was then filed against him but was dismissed
On appeal, Ana exclaimedthat her conviction be reversed
on the ground of prescription.Another case was filed against
because one of her co-defendants, Brenda March and, was
Paredes for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019
permitted to testify on allegedly privileged conversations
in that he used his former position as Provincial Attorney to
between appellant's attorney (Mr. Estrumsa) and his clients.
influence the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application forfree patent. Sansaet served as counsel of
Brenda pled guilty to one count and testified for the
Paredes in these cases. To evade responsibility for his own
Government. Brenda claims that they had two meetings in
participation in the scheme, Sansaet claimed that he filed
the office Estrumsa. On each of these occasions, several of
falsified documents upon the inducement of Paredes. It was
the co-defendants were present. Brenda further testified that
then that respondent Sansaet offered totestify as a state
Estrumsa's suggestion was to give cover-up testimonies that
witness against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter
none of them possessed the cocaine, but merely happened to
contrived andinduced him to have the graft case dismissed on
be at a party where the cocaine was discovered.
the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-
respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.
Brenda, however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is
unclear whether all codefendants were Estrumsa's clients.
ISSUE: Whether the projected testimony of Sansaet, as
proposed state witness,is barred by the attorney-client Issue:
privilege W/N the statements in Estrumsa's office were protected by
attorney-client privilege.
RULING:
There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. Ruling:
The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by No. At least five persons were present at Estrumsa's office,
the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The and at least one of them (Brenda), and perhaps others, were
reckoning point is when the communication was given, not not clients of Estrumsa. A communication divulged to
when the lawyer was made to testify. The privilege is "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered as
not confined to verbal or written communications but also confidential communication between attorney and client.
physical acts.
Yet even when considering the communication was
The confidential communications thus made by Paredes to privileged, Brenda’s testimony is admissible. The
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime conversations dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to
hide criminal activity. Attorney-client privilege does not
of falsification which had not yet been committed in the
extend to communications regarding an intended crime. It
past by Paredes. Having been made for purposes of a
would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to
future offense, those communications are outside the pale
protect communications designed to frustrate justice by
of the attorney-client privilege. committing other crimes to conceal past misdeeds.

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

McPartlin’s (D) counsel objected on the grounds that


18. U.S. vs. McPartlin they were covered by the attorney-client privilege
595 F. 2d 1321, C.A. Ill., 1979 inasmuch as they were made in confidence to an
attorney for a codefendant for a common purpose
Doctrine: The Lawyer-Client privileged related to both of their defenses.
communication also covers the pooled information Issue:
for any defense purpose common to the Does the attorney-client privilege protect statements
participating defendants. Hence, any made by a defendant in confidence to a codefendant’s
attorney for a common purpose related to both of their
communication that one defendant disclosed to the
defenses?
counsel of the co-defendant pursuant to a common
defense or joint interest is protected by the Ruling:
privilege.
Yes, McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the
Facts: attorney-client privilege because his statements were
This is a criminal prosecution of conspiracy to commit made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant
fraud against the US government. This involves Ingram, for a common purpose related to both defenses. They
herein defendant, as the president of Ingram were made in connection with the project of attempting
Corporation whom was accused of bribing and being in to discredit Benton, a project in which Ingram and
conspiracy with US public officials including McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged.
Congressman McPartlin, herein co-defendant, to get the
winning bid of the government contract for a sludge Uninhibited communication among joint parties and
hauling project. their counsel about matters of common concern is
often important to the protection of their interests.
The former VP of Ingram Corporation was Mr.Benton That is why the attorney-client privilege extends its
and he was an unindicted co-conspirator since he protection to statements made by a defendant in
testified as a witness for the prosecution. It was confidence to a codefendant’s counsel as long as its for
established that in the course of the negotiations during a common defense or joint interest. Thus, McPartlin’s
the conspiracy, Benton keeps a diary of all the meetings (D) objections were well founded. The privilege is not
and telephone conversations specifying details like the limited to situations in which the positions of the
persons involved and the substance of the parties are compatible in all respect, whats needed is
conversations. that the statements were made pursuant to a common
defense.
McPartlin (D) and one of his codefendants, Ingram (D),
knew the Government’s (P) case against them hinged
largely on Benton’s testimony and that it was
imperative than an effort be made to discredit his
diaries, which corroborated much of his testimony.
With his counsel’s consent, McPartllin (D) thus gave two
interviews to an investigator acting for Ingram’s (D)
counsel, the purpose being to determine if there was a
basis for challenging the truth of some of the diary
entries. In the second interview, McPartlin (D) made
certain statements that Ingram (D) felt would be
beneficial to his defense. So Ingram (D) now attempts to
use those statements made by McPartlin to somehow
exonerate himself. When Ingram’s (D) counsel sought
to offer evidence of these statements at trial.

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

1. No. The physician may be considered to be acting in his


professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
19. Lim v. Court of Appeals curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
214 SCRA 273 (1992) disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
Doctrine: In order that the disqualification by reason of covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore
claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while communicated is not stated." One who claims this privilege
he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.
(4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert
would blacken the reputation of the patient. witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course
of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the
Facts: hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly attending to the patient. Her expert opinion excluded
on the ground that the latter has been allegedly suffering whatever information or knowledge she had about the
from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-
after the marriage and until the present." During trial, Juan's patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
counsel announced that he would present as his next witness witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be
Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in excluded.
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought 2. Yes. While it may be true that counsel for the petitioner
to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
had examined Nelly in a professional capacity and had testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Juan's the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness
counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question
information acquired while attending to Nelly in a asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer
professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s
allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the
witness stand, was qualified as an expert witness and was testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony,
asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated communication rule." The particular portions of the
Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted
medicines she had prescribed. in the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in the
private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that
any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that
ISSUES: the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the
privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted
1. Was the information given by the physician in her to a waiver thereof
testimony in open court a privileged communication?

2. Was there a waiver of the privilege?

RULING:

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

20. Krohn v CA
233 SCRA 146 21. Blue Cross Health v. Olivares
G.R. No. 169737, 12 February 2008
Principle: A patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by a medical practitioner may be Doctrine: Refusal to present or allow the presentation of
admitted though without the force and effect of the Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged
testimony of the physician. communication between physician and patient.

FACTS: Facts: Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health


Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc.
Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited In the agreement, ailments due to "pre-existing
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in which conditions" were excluded from the coverage. Barely 38
Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as unfounded or days from the effectivity of her health insurance,
irrelevant. respondent Neomi suffered a stroke. She demanded that
petitioner pay her medical bill. Petitioner refused to pay.
She then filed collection of sum of money.
At the hearing, Edgar tried testify on the contents of the
report, and not the physician who prepared it. This was
In its answer, petitioner maintained that it had not yet
objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr.
privileged communication between physician and Saniel's report.In a letter to petitioner, Dr. Saniel stated
patient. that: [Respondent] Neomi T. Olivares called by phone. She
stated among others that she is invoking patient-physician
The trial court admitted said report which Ma. Paz then confidentiality.
elevated the issue to the CA only to dismiss the petition.
Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel
ISSUE: from submitting his report regarding the medical condition
Whether or not the evidence offered may be admitted. of Neomi. Hence, it contends that the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
RULING: produced should apply in its favor.
Yes. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is
not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or Issues:
obstetrics. He is the patient’s husband who wishes to 1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent
testify on a document executed by medical Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and
practitioners. His testimony cannot have the force and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health
effect of the testimony of the physician who examined care agreement - NO; and
the patient and executed the report. Plainly and clearly,
this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Ruling: We agree with respondents.

Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the


presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was
privileged communication between physician and
patient.

Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to


liability, it should have made its own assessment of
whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition
when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health
out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does at great risk.
not meet the strict standard required under our
jurisprudence. Josielene claimed that the hospital records subject of this
22. JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial"
G.R. No. 179786(July 24, 2013) evidence of the physician that may be regarded as
privileged. To allow, however, the disclosure during
FACTS: discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results
Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition for the declaration of of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan on the ground of patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
mental incapacity due to incessant drinking and excessive — would be to allow access to evidence that is
use of prohibited drugs. Johnny resisted the action, inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physician
claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely memorializes all these information in the patient's records.
duties. He alleged that because of his desire to save their Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
marriage, he even agreed to marriage counseling but physician to testifies on privileged matters he gained while
when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an
injection.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the


Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer
as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation 23. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician's
G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Josielene then
Facts:
filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny's medical
records when he was confined there. The request was DOTC entered into contract with ZTE for the supply of
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in broadband network project, to be financed by China.
evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Senate Committee invited cabinet officials involved
including Neri. He testified that Abalos of COMELEC
ISSUE: offered him 200M in exhange for his approval of the
Whether the medical records subject of the subpoena said project; that then President Arroyo instructed him
duces tecum are covered by physician-patient privilege not to accept it. When asked further about the project,
communication. he invoked "executive privilege".

RULING: Issue:
Yes. The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information Whether or not Ermita correctly invoked the executive
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil privilege.
case be examined without the patient's consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter's reputation. This rule Ruling:
is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the Yes. The elements of the said privilege are: 1) the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give communication relates to a non-delegable power of the
him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a President (power to enter into executive agreements
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
without Legislature's concurrence is recognized); 2)
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
communication is received by a close advisor (Neri as
compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all
cabinet member is covered); 3) no compelling need to
that had transpired between him and the patient might
limit the privilege. The Senate Committee is wrong in

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Evidence Case Digest Batch IV EH 404, 2017-2018

contending that the privilege violates the constitutional In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an
right of the people to public information. This right is ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
subject to limitations provided by law. One of the testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed
limitations is Section 24 (e) of Rule 130, Rules of Court. mother, to testify in the case. However, later on, the
Clearly, the right to obtain information in aid of subpoena was quashed by the RTC as it was oppressive
legislation cannot be equated with right to public and violated Section 25, Rule130 of the Rules of Court,
information, the former (except in highly qualified the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s
sense) when exercised does not follow that the people stepmother. On the other hand, CA rendered a decision
are exercising the right to information. The delicate setting aside the RTC’s Order.
interplay of executive-legislative must prevail over the
right to information. The information sought by the
committee might impair our diplomatic and economic
relations with China given the confidential nature. Issue:
Whether or not court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh
children filed for the correction of the certificate of
birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not
Keh’s daughter.
24. EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
177861, July13, 2010 Ruling:
Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
Facts: “No person may be compelled to testify against his
Spouses Lee and Keh entered the Philippines in the parents, other direct ascendants, children or other
1930sas immigrants from China. They had 11 children. direct descendants.”
In 1948, Leebrought from China a young woman (Tiu),
as housemaid. Respondent Lee-Keh’s children believed The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation from a similar
that Tiu left the household and had a relation with him. provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules
learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or
children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh administrative, filed against parents and other direct
children to request the (NBI) to investigate the matter. ascendants or descendants.

After conducting such an investigation, the NBI But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that
concluded in its report it is not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
because in the hospital records Keh’s declared age did only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family
not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Relative
thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides:
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh “The direct line is either descending or ascending. The
children filed two separate petitions, one of them former unites the head of the family with those who
before the (RTC) for the deletion from the certificate of descend from him. The latter bindsa person with those
live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other from whom he descends.”
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against
petitioner Emma Lee.

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