Second Batch

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In
the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides
in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name
of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased
partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption
of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to
acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner
in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were
well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them
carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased
partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is
no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a
law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in
Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston.
The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name
of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds
of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed
why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated
May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for
their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to
Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross
or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of
such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the
death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for
himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's
reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article
primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-
over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of
its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership
and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from
the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members,
such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on
its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where
there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for
business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the
practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business
or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or
trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of
their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon
warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or
former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more
active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners
and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time
as the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is
proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the
active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never
a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues
to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in
the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al.
quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green
even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties.
The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision
or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use
of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a
rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local
custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as
a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme
Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered
like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the
era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as
the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The
best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in
that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and
"OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known
as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in
their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding
the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14,
1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no
imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James
Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known
as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in
their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding
the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14,
1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no
imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James
Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
#Footnotestêñ.£îhqwâ£
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39,
Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.

8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164
NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2, Canons of Professional
Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 were also adopted
by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The American Bar Association adopted Canons 33 to 45
in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47 where
already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar Association was approved and it
provided that the Association "adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar
Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7
20 Article 12, Civil Code.
21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).
22 Art. 8, Civil Code
23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.
24 Art. 11, Civil Code.
25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953), pp. 9-10.
EN BANC
A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON

UY, Complainant, v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Complaint1 for disbarment directly filed before this court by complainant Wilson Uy, the designated
administrator of the estate of Jose Uy. This Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari)
with engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari is charged with the use of
information that is false and/or appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain pleadings.2
On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court praying
that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241.3
Hofileña was initially designated administratrix.4 However, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order designating
Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other
children.5 In its Order6 dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose
Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution8 dated September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña
was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these
proceedings (i.e., in the Comment dated May 27, 2009 filed before the Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El indicated
the following details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose Uy.11 In the course of the
proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to
have been the treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy.12 In its Order13 dated April 20, 2010, the Regional
Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the
following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.16
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to Wilson Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated December 8,
2010. In signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the following details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for
Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration20 dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the
following details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,22 Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari
appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of
Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional
details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-
El.25cralawred
Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied
with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional
details of another lawyer.
In its Order27 dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as
no verified petition asking that she be so cited had been filed.28
On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment.29 Pointing to Maghari's act
of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated
the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court directed Maghari to file his Comment on Wilson Uy's
Complaint.
This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, received Maghari's Comment31 on March 2, 2015.
For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and
of what proper penalty may be meted on him.
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by complainant. However, he insists that he
did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were mere overlooked errors:
For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had been printed and ready for signature, all
what [sic] he did after cursorily going over it was to affix his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name,
without giving any special or particular attention to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers", considering that
these are matters of record and are easily verifiable, thus he gains nothing by "the usurpation of professional details
of another lawyer" and has no sinister motive or ill-purpose in so doing[.]32
He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He
faults complainant for "nitpicking"33 and calls him a "sore loser"34 and a "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely "making
a mountain out of a molehill"36 and is predisposed to "fault-finding."
He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant,"37 he has provided what are supposedly his correct professional
details:
2009
IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009
2010
IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City

MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2011
IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City

PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2012
IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City

MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II
Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and respondent admits their existence. This
court would perhaps be well counseled to absolve respondent of liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap
on the wrist if all that was involved were a typographical error, or otherwise, an error or a handful of errors made in
an isolated instance or a few isolated instances. So too, if the error pertained to only ' one of the several pieces of
information that lawyers are required to indicate when signing pleadings.
None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from
it. First, respondent violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he
did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes is a pattern of deceit.
Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he
deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly
changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts and legal
processes. Respondent toyed with the standards of legal practice.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath
entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a
lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court and client:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.
No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's
actions. His insolent and mocking violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to
society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession.
The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his
duties to his client. Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he took to be
admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an officer of
the court. He was not even a good citizen. As respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to
members of the legal profession, we find it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
III
The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this requirement, and the consequences
of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him,
stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or
indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through
his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he
or she has read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer
asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal
practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under
the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly
proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a
pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not
only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in this
respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the inclusion of the "number and date of their official receipt
indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current
year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code,42 a lawyer must indicate his professional tax
receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a counsel's contact details.
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage
in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact,
been admitted to the Philippine bar.45 With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the
IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of
information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus lawyers."46 Paying professional
taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been
statutorily devolved to local government units.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized
mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and
enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."47
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice.
These pieces of information aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due
process, and facilitate better representation of a client's cause. In Juane v. Garcia,48 this court took occasion to
expound on the significance of putting on record a counsel's address:
The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar that it is their inescapable duty to
make of record their correct address in all cases in which they are counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have
been in the past when, because of failure to inform the court of the change of address, litigations were delayed. And
this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the other parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases
in court because of such negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a setback
in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure to receive notice because the
latter has changed the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor. It is only when some such
situation comes about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he has incurred both to
his client and to the cause of justice. It is then that the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly
declared that he "will conduct" himself "as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." Too late.
Experience indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it could prove very expensive.49
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard
them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal
practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the
standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign
compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the
profession that one brandishes.
IV
We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that respondent acted in manifest bad faith, thereby exhibiting a
pattern of insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and intent to make a mockery of courts and legal processes.
In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Altenative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny
K.H. Uy, respondent appropriated four of the five details (i.e., IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt
number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number) that Atty. Natu-el indicated in the Comment
dated May 27, 2009, which the latter signed and filed before the Court of Appeals. Atty. Natu-el's details are
reproduced as follows:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as follows:

Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)
In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent used what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt
number and professional tax receipt number:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)
The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number,
which respondent previously appropriated for himself.
In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011, respondent used what was supposedly his correct
IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. However, he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of
Attorneys number:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)
It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum54 dated March 8, 2012, that all the
professional details that respondent indicated are supposedly his own:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are products
of mere inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow found their
way into respondent's own pleadings. Certainly, these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer
themselves from a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must have actually
performed the act of copying and transferring; that is, someone must have intended to copy and transfer them.
Moreover, the person responsible for this could have only been respondent or someone acting under his
instructions; the pleadings on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and
professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification and addition show active
human intervention to make something more out of markings that could otherwise have simply been reproduced.
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were discarded while some were retained.
The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but
no longer his IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number. This gradual act of segregating information—
discarding some while retaining others, and retaining less over time—reveals that the author of these markings must
have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded from those that were to be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is
inconsequential. As this court has stated in Gutierrez v. Zulueta:55
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence of his
secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all
the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office
secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary
action by simply disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the office secretary.
Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.56
In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has complied with the requirements of paying his dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, paying his annual professional tax, and completing the necessary units for
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in the periods concerned. To put it plainly, there would be no need for him to
use incorrect information if he had complied with all pertinent regulations.
In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his correct professional details. We emphasize,
however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies of the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other
supporting documents. All that he relies on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent,
himself, was in a better position to produce the documents that could prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the
very least, suspicious. It can very well mean that they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from producing them.
The latter would be more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation the basic presumption "[t]hat evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."57
Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a
false IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance
number a total of seven (7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times.
In failing to accurately state his professional details, respondent already committed punishable violations. An
isolated inaccuracy, regardless of the concerned lawyer's lack of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative
severity. In Bumactao v. Fano,58 respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano was suspended from the practice of law for the
singular violation of indicating wrong MCLE compliance details:
Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308". .
. . . The admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent endeavors to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the
MCLE providers - PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter — and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise
attributes the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" to his secretary / liaison, an "honest mistake . . .
because of the pressure of his many duties."
We are not impressed.
Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires "practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable. . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."
At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sort of
negligence that is hardly excusable. As a member of the legal profession, respondent ought to have known that non-
compliance would have resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may file before any tribunal. The grave
consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding, respondent (by his own account) admits to having complacently
relied on the statements of MCLE providers. His negligence, therefore risked harm not only upon himself - he being
now burdened with the present complaint as a direct consequence - but worse, upon his clients, the reliefs they
seek through their pleadings being possibly rendered inoperative.59
This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers who have willfully engaged in acts of deceit and
falsehood.
In Flores v. Chua,60 respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was disbarred on this court's finding of "a habit, attitude, and
mindset not only to abuse one's legal knowledge or training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues
and values which the legal profession demands from its members."61 Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to have
notarized a document that he knew to have been falsified so as to make it appear that a person had personally
appeared before him; this was part of a bigger design to defraud another.
In Nunga v. Viray,62 respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years
after having been found to have notarized a document despite the lapse of his commission as a notary public.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores,63 respondent Atty. Ernesto B. Flores was suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) years after being found to have falsely stated that he did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve
himself of the charge of forum shopping when, in fact, he had perfected an appeal.
Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e) of the Local Government Code, Bar Matter No. 1132,
and Bar Matter No. 1922, a total of seven (7) times. The sheer multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we are
only dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether isolated or manifold, these inaccuracies alone already warrant
disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall be discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even
larcenous intent.
Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a matter of clerical errors. He
willfully used false information. In so doing, he misled courts, litigants—his own client included— professional
colleagues, and all others who may have relied on the records and documents on which these false details appear.
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of
which is this court, considering that this court is the author of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated.
It is this court that requires respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number, IBP official receipt number, and
MCLE compliance number.
Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local Government Code, respondent similarly made a
mockery of an act of the legislature.
Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also appropriated for himself another lawyer's professional details in
seven (7) separate instances.
In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for three constituent acts of larceny, taking, use, and
profiting.
Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details that belonged to another. In these seven instances, he
used the same swiped details in his own pleadings. So too, in these seven instances he personally benefited. In
these instances, respondent succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid pleadings and avoided the fatal
consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He was able to pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that
could have been terminated as soon as his deficient pleadings were recognized.
All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional larceny are similarly acts of deceit. In using false
information taken from another, respondent misled courts, parties, and colleagues into believing that he was
faithfully, truthfully, and decently discharging his functions.
Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive courts. He was not only insubordinate and disobedient of
regulations; he was also dishonest, deceitful and duplicitous. Worse, he was mocking and contemptuous.
VI
The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of gravity that warrants suspension from the practice of
law for an extended period.
This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is much graver. The confluence of: (1) respondent's many
violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules violated; (3) the frequency—nay, pattern—of falsity and deceit; and (4)
his manifest intent to bring courts, legal processes, and professional standards to disrepute brings to light a degree
of depravity that proves respondent worthy of being sanctioned. Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and
ridiculed courts, respondent rightly stands to be at the receiving end of disciplinary action.
Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds for disciplining lawyers as specified by Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court. His deception is well demonstrated. He ran afoul of every single word, save perhaps his
name, in the Lawyer's Oath. Then again, it was his own signature, his own name, that respondent Pacifico M.
Maghari, III had disgraced.
Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's foremost duty "to uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land V and promote respect for law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the
same Code requires lawyers to "not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court" Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule
10.03 imposes upon lawyers the duty of faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of procedure [and] not misusing] them to
defeat the ends of justice." Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts."
Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many issuances of this court as regards the information that
members of the bar must indicate when they sign pleadings. He did so in a manner that betrays intent to make a
mockery of courts, legal processes, and professional standards. By his actions, respondent ridiculed and toyed with
the requirements imposed by statute and by this court. He trampled upon professional standards established not
only by this court, in its capacity as overseer of the legal profession, but by the Republic itself, through a duly
enacted statute. In so doing, he violated his duty to society and to the courts.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues."
In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing counsel, respondent did not only fail to observe common
courtesy. He encroached upon matters that, ultimately, are personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore, not
only an act of trickery; it is also act of larceny. In so doing, he violated his duty to the legal profession.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity to the cause of his client," while
Canon 18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with competence and diligence."
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own client at risk. Deficiencies in how
pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party's cause as unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing,
respondent violated his duty to his clients.
It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did was to deviate from required formalities. Respondent was,
himself, quite dismissive, stating that he did nothing more than "cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention
to details . . . that. . . are matters of record and are easily verifiable."64 It is equally tempting to think it would be
excessive of this court to engage in an overly rigid, pedantic emphasis on formalistic niceties.
However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise be dismissed as empty formalities are, in fact, necessary
solemnities. They are not ends in themselves but crucial means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility
of the legal profession. They are vital to the dispensation of justice. The significance of these solemnities, along with
the legal profession's "high standard of legal proficiency, . . . morality, honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]"65 put in
contrast with how respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standards that his profession
demands, demonstrates the propriety of momentarily suspending respondent from engaging in legal practice.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of the very same badges—his place
in the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his
continuing training and competence—that are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such
contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason for preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging
in the profession these badges signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct,
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent
Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part. I inhibit due to relation to a party.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 1-18.
2
Id. at 15, Complaint.
3
Id. at 19, Order.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 19-21.
7
Id. at 22, Motion for Execution.
8
Id. at 22-24.
9
Id. at 26-29.
10
Id. at 29.
11 Id. at 19, Order.
12 Id. at 3, Complaint.
13
Id. at 30-31.
14
Id. at 32-35.
15
Id. at 35, Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny
K.H. Uy..
16
17
Id. at 46-49.
18
Id. at 49, Reply.
19
20
Id. at 50-53.
21
Id. at 53, Motion for Reconsideration.
22
23 Id. at 55-57.
24
Id. at 57, Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum.
25
26 Id. at 59-66, Motion to Cite Magdalena Uy in Contempt of Court.
27
Id. at 113-115. Penned by Presiding Judge Estefanio S. Libutan, Jr.
28
Id. at 115, Order.
29
Id. at 1-17.
30 Id. at 118, Notice.
31
Id. at 121-130.
32
Id. at 126, Maghari's Comment.
33
Id. at 121.
34 Id.
35
Id.
36 Id. at 124.
37
Id. at 126.
38
Id.
39Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876, 884 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].
40
Bar Matter No. 1132 (2003) — Re: Request to Require Lawyers to Indicate in the Pleading their Number in the
Roll of Attorneys. — The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to GRANT the
request of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte to require all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all papers and pleadings submitted to
the various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the requirement of indicating the current Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt or Life Member Number.
41 Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings, motions and papers signed and filed by them
in any court in the Philippines, the number and date of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year; provided, however, that such official
receipt number and date for any year may be availed of and indicated in all such pleadings, motions and papers
filed by them in court up to the end of the month of February of the next succeeding year.
42
Section 139. Professional Tax. -
....
(e) Any person subject to the professional tax shall write in deeds, receipts, prescriptions, reports, books of account,
plans and designs, surveys and maps, as the case may be, the number of the official receipt issued to him.
43 Re: Number and Date of MCLE Certificate of Completion/Exemption Required in All Pleadings/Motions (2008).
44
A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC (2007) — Re: Statement of Contact Details of Parties or Their Counsels in All Papers and
Pleadings Filed with the Supreme Court. — Acting on the Memorandum dated May 28, 2007 of Clerk of Court Ma.
Luisa D. Villarama submitting for consideration and approval of the Court the proposal "that parties or their counsels
be required to indicate in all their pleadings filed before this Court their contact details, e.g., telephone number, fax
number, cellular phone number or e-mail address, in addition to the requirement of indicating the counsel's current
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) number, IBP Official Receipt or Life Member number and Roll of Attorneys number
as mandated in Bar Matter No. 1132.
45
N.b., signing the Roll of Attorneys is the final definitive act that qualifies one as a member of the Philippine bar.
46
683 Phil. 141, 175 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
47
Bar Matter No. 850 (2001), Rule 1, sec. 1.
48
134 Phil. 747 (1968) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].
49
Id. at 754.
50
Rollo, p. 29.
51
Id. at 35.
52
Id. at 49.
53
Id. at 53.
54
Id. at 55-58.
55 A.C.No. 2200, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 607 [Per Curiam. En Banc]
56 Id. at 610.
57
Rules of Court, Rule 131, sec. 3(e).
58 A.C. No. 10286, April 7, 2014 [Unsigned Resolution, Third Division]
59
Id.
60
366 Phil. 132 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
61
Id. at 152.
62 366 Phil. 155 (1999) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
63 350 Phil. 889 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
64Rollo, p. 126.
65
Ventura v. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 430, 433 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the
practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance
and received the following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano),
MCLE's Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS
ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement on (sic)
January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE
Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report
and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE
Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise
in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption
nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish respondent with
complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days
from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5
August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be
granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE
Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged
to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the
province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50
years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of
the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd
to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the
1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI
revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national
canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL
RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and
COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS,
including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national
elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of the
Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice
Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament
in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in
the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when
Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the
country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables
and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5)
Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an
exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with
the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application in
a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be
exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the
applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law."
The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings filed with
the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No.
1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for
Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking
out of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of
notification to explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides
that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be
listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013.
The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed
against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number for
the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the
pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance
with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the
MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012
which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from
15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The
records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the
MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods.
Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to
convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent,
through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge
Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE
compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE
Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to
respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His
application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7
February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the
First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60
days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could
comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE
Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice
stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL
BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units
earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his
deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No.
850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to
send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for
exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14
February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying with
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office
only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process"
in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption.
However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year
to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application
for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE
Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office
warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the
MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member,
there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his
listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice
law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of
Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend
him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate
attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already
been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid
the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated acting member per Special Order No. 2147 dated 24 August 2015.
[1Rollo, p. 68.
2
The MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation was not attached to the letter and was
actually forwarded to the Court only on 22 August 2013.
3
Rollo, pp. 73-76.
4
Not 15 August 2013 as stated in the Court's 9 December 2013 Resolution.
5
Rollo, pp. 84-87.
6
Id. at 85-86.
7
This was amended in the Court's Resolution dated 14 January 2014 in Bar Matter No. 1922.
8
Section I, Rule 1.
9Rollo,
p. 94.
10
Id. at 92. Not 7 February 2013 as respondent stated in his Compliance and Comment.
11
Id. at 91.
EN BANC
[G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth

Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO
CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP.,
VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the
Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels
and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in
the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly 'intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents
Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection
with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.14 ςrνll
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the Fifth
Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No.
0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5,
2001.17 ςrνll
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could
not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19 ςrνll
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our
way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: 'A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness
in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate,
including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application
to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from
those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to
govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation.
The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only
three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial
and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20 ςrνll
The nineteenth century has been termed the 'dark ages' of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York 'Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the
same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working
to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations - e.g., the 'do no
falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation
the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.21 ςrνll
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
- the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes
and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves.
Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and
the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their
members.22 ςrνll
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23 ςrνll
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24 ςrνll
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the 'revolving door or 'the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service.25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and
'congruent-interest conflicts. 'Adverse-interest conflicts' exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.26 On the other hand,
'congruent-interest representation conflicts' are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new
canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified
them both for 'adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest representation conflicts.29 The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31 ςrνll
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.32 ςrνll
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study
the 'adequacy and effectiveness' of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between 'the inspirational and the
proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for
negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36 ςrνll
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the
ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the 'restatement format,
where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was
intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement 'because the only enforceable standards were the black
letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative
discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter
rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature.38 ςrνll
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988,
this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase 'investigated and passed upon with the word
'intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both 'adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest
conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the 'adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a 'congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of 'matter referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the 'intervention made by the former government lawyer on the 'matter. The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined 'matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the
'matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40 ςrνll
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes
reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Board decided as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
.. .
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the 'matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. - Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising
or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect
and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary
for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
.. .
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer
by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as
they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
'matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the 'drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
'matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza
which is the 'matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the 'matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is
not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged
ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central
Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality
of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does
not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the 'intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. 'Intervene means,
viz.:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance. .. 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events. .. 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE. .. 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river. ..)41 ςrνll
On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.42 ςrνll
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word 'intervene. Under the first interpretation, 'intervene
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under
the second interpretation, 'intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word 'intervention under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do
not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as 'x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer 'should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase 'which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers.
The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the
lawyer, while in the government service, had 'substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that 'a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to
be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is
not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted
to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for
government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to
reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for
higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government
service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice
of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, 'to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less
appealing to enter.47 ςrνll
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted
'the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel
of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was 'so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary.48 Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as 'a dangerous game.49 In
the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify
in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will
be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51 The client with
a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: 'An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.53 He adds: 'Any system
that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence.54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed
with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the
trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on
the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the
legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected
in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand
an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.60 ςrνll
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who
'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure
how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent 'sides' to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity
of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service.61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: 'The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies.63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as 'probably excessive.64 He opines 'x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client - the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the 'best government lawyers - the
ones who were hardest to beat - not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised
Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the 'excessive influence of
former officials' or their 'clout.66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the
rationale for his warning, viz: 'Much of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x.67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: 'x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials
that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their
friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved
by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ.., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ.., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family Group and the
directors and officers of GENBANK.
2 Rollo, pp. 240, 242.
3 Rollo, p. 7.
4
Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.
5
Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.
6 Rollo, pp. 217-218.
7 Rollo, p. 143.
8
Rollo, pp. 216-220.
9
Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.
10
Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.
11
Rollo, p. 63.
12
Rollo, p. 61.
13
Rollo, pp. 57-63.
14
Rollo, p. 178.
15
Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The 'Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners' in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayan's Second Division. However, the motion was ultimately resolved by the
Sandiganbayan's Fifth Division in its proceedings held on July 11, 2001.
16
Rollo, p. 42.
17
Rollo, p. 43.
18
Rollo, pp. 2-40.
19 Rollo, pp. 12-14.
20
Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: 'An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).
25
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).
26
Id. at 457.
27
Ibid.; The use of the word 'conflict is a misnomer; 'congruent-interest representation conflicts' arguably do not
involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the
former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.
28
Supra, note 20.
29
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1963),
DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).
30
Supra, note 25 at 458.
31 Supra, note 20.
32 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).
33
Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly encompassing." ABA
Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: 'A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
34
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary Rules. .. are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action."
35
DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility
while he was a public employee.
36
Supra, note 20.
37
Ibid.
38
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): 'The other rubric formerly used for dealing with
disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any
new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted,
disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since
'impropriety is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized
that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved. .. by the very general concept of appearance of
impropriety.
39
Supra, note 32.
40 See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.
41
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993).
42 Id.
43
Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of 'intervene which is 'to occur, fall, or come in between points
of time or events.
44Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of 'intervene which is 'to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification, and the second definition of 'intervention which is 'interference that may affect the interests of
others.
45
46
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
47
Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger Lawyers, 1976
Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).
48
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education of New York City v.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326,
331 (D.D.C. 1980).
49 Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).
50
Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in August 1986. The
motion for disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.
51
United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
52
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746
F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
53
Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, Duke L.J.,
Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.
54
Ibid.
55
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
56
57
Id. at p. 321.
58
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
59
Supra, note 38.
60United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.
1983).
61
Supra, note 53 at 44.
62
Ibid.
63 Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.
64
Ibid.
65
Id. at 45.
66
Id. at 42.
67
Id. at 42-43.
68
Id. at 43.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of
Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them
to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5 When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act
of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to
the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth
and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards
any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed
the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled
her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however,
he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was
not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In
other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least
once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve
full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From
The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-14849.
2
Complainant's sister-in-law.
3
Hereafter, "Elizabeth and Pastor."
4
Hereafter, "Barangay 723."
5
These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March 26, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
6
Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
7
Report and Recommendation dated October 15, 2004 of Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila of the IBP-CBD.
Id., pp. 103-106.
8
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
9
Supra note 7.
10 CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.
11
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526. (emphasis in the original)
12
The Local Government Code of 1992.
13 This rule of statutory construction means that a special law repeals a general law on the same matter.
14
Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special sessions upon the call of the local chief executive or
a majority of the members of the sanggunian when public interest so demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
15
This rule of statutory construction means that the express mention of one thing excludes other things not
mentioned.
16
Id.
17
See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 179; Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, 20
December 1978, 87 SCRA 303.
18 Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
19
Id.
20 See Section 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT.

EN BANC
March 18, 2014
A.C. No. 5329
HEINZ R. HECK, Complainant,

vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative complaint was brought against a City Prosecutor whose manner of dealing with the complainant,
a foreigner, had offended the latter. We dismiss the complaint because of the complainant's failure to prove that the
respondent thereby breached any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics. Indeed, every lawyer who is
administratively charged is presumed innocent of wrongdoing.
In September 2000, complainant Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano
A. Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City. According to Heck, he was a victim of the "faulty, highly improper, suspicious
anomalous and unlawful practice" by the respondent, who had obstructed justice by delaying cases and
disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo A. Adaza, his business partners
and friends.1
The controversy arose from the filing in 1999 by Heck of a criminal case for unjust vexation against one Oliver
Cabrera in the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) in Cagayan de Oro City. After the case against him was
dismissed, Cabrera countered with two criminal cases against Heck — one charging the latter with illegal
possession of firearms (I.S. No. 2000-1860) and the other with unlawful incrimination of an innocent person
(Criminal Case No. 1232). Atty. Adaza represented Cabrera in both cases. The OCP initially dismissed I.S. No.
2000-1860 for insufficiency of evidence, but Atty. Adaza moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal. The
respondent granted the motion for reconsideration. Heck challenged the order of the respondent. In the meantime,
other pending complaints against Cabrera (for unjust vexation and grave threats) were also dismissed because of
prescription and insufficiency of evidence. Heck moved for the reconsideration of the dismissals twice, but his
motions were denied.2
Heck claimed that on September 11, 2000, the respondent scheduled a meeting at his office to be attended by
Heck, his lawyer, his wife and Atty. Adaza. However, Atty. Adaza did not attend the meeting. Heck alleged,
however, that Atty. Adaza and the respondent held their own separate "private meeting," for which reason Heck
questioned the propriety of the private meeting and the possibility of connivance between the respondent and Atty.
Adaza.3
On September 13, 2000, Heck, accompanied by one Ullrich Coufal, went to the respondent’s office to pick up
documents supposedly promised to him. But he was denied the documents by certain ladies sitting outside the
respondent’s office who behaved arrogantly. Upon arriving at his office, the respondent pushed through the people
crowding outside the office. The actuations of the respondent at the time were described by Heck thuswise:
That Prosecutor Gamotin, Jr. entered his office, the door was held open by a chair. Passing the door, Prosecutor
Gamotin, Jr. furiously KICKED the chair who [sic] was holding the door to his office open, sending the chair flying
onto the other chairs at his conference table. Then he SLAMMED the door, almost hitting the face of Mr. Coufal,
who had tried to followed [sic] Prosecutor Gamotin, Jr. Observing such behaviour
I asked (sic) Mr. Coufal that we better leave. We left disgusted the office, (sic) leaving smiling faces behind us.4
On September 15, 2000, Heck, his wife, child, and counsel went to the respondent’s office for another meeting. Atty.
Adaza arrived and went straight inside the respondent’s office and then called Heck and his group in as if the office
was his own. On that occasion, Heck was told that if he agreed, all cases would be settled and withdrawn. Heck
then asked why the respondent was still entertaining Atty. Adaza despite his having been already suspended from
the practice of law by the Supreme Court. The respondent raised his voice asking how Heck had learned about the
suspension, and whether it was a final decision of the Supreme Court.5 Moreover, Heck recalled:
That the City Prosecutor x x x now was screaming at me, as no one has ever screamed at me in my sixty (60) years
of live [sic]. That he x x x "never received such information and that this Supreme Court decision is not final", he was
now repeating himself again and again. Here Adaza came in and remarked (when Gamotin Jr. was catching his
breath) that he, Adaza had appealed against this decision[)] Gamotin, Jr. continued screaming at me, (")that he,
(Gamotin) is the ["]Authority and the Law."6
Heck stated that he tried to explain his situation calmly to the respondent, but the respondent continued screaming
at him, saying:
You foreigner, go home here we the law of the Filipinos, I am the Authority.7
Heck then left the office of the respondent upon the prodding of his counsel. He claimed that his wife and child
became very scared.
In his response to the charge of Heck, the respondent averred that: (1) he had no personal knowledge of Atty.
Adaza’s suspension, because such information had not been properly disseminated to the public offices; (2) there
were no irregularities in the filing and resolution of the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Adaza; (3) the September
11, 2000 meeting had not been arranged by him, but by Heck’s counsel in order to discuss the possibility of
settlement; hence, he did not take part in the meeting; (4) he did not display any act of violence, particularly the
kicking of the chair and slamming of the door, aside from such acts being improbable because of his age and build;
(5) the September 14, 2000 meeting was between the parties’ counsels to discuss ways to settle their cases, and
Heck was the one who did not agree to the suggestion of withdrawing the cases; (6) it was Heck who acted
arrogantly when he challenged the respondent’s authority in allowing Atty. Adaza to appear in court despite his
suspension; and (7) he admitted that when Heck uttered the words: I will not believe the authorities of the
Philippines, he slightly raised his voice to respond: If you will not believe the authorities of the Philippines, you have
no place in this country, you can go home.8
Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidante
It appears that Heck had filed administrative complaints against the respondent in the Department of Justice (DOJ);
as well as in the Office of the Ombudsman.9
On October 12, 2001, the DOJ issued a letter-resolution dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Heck
against the respondent, finding no cogent basis for the charge of abuse of authority and corruption; and ruling that in
any case the respondent had already retired from government service as of June 6, 2001, rendering the
administrative case moot and academic.10
Meantime, the administrative cases in the Office of the Ombudsman were referred to the Public Assistance Bureau
and the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of that office. In its Investigation Report, the FFIB recommended
that: (1) the investigation of the complaint be considered closed and terminated without prejudice to its reopening
should new evidence enough to establish a prima facie case against the respondent become available; and (2) the
alleged breach by Atty. Adaza of his suspension from the practice of law and the permission given by the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City be referred to the Supreme Court.11
The records were first referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, then to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation of the merits of the disbarment case against the respondent, and for its report and recommendation.12
In its Report and Recommendation filed on June 6, 2011,13 the OBC observed that although there was no clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence of misconduct as to warrant the penalty of disbarment, the respondent’s
conduct should be sanctioned; that his act of privately entertaining Atty. Adaza and his brother, as well as allowing
his office to be used for a meeting even in his absence raised doubt on his integrity; that the respondent’s reaction
to Heck’s tirade against the country’s justice system, particularly the respondent’s retort that Heck should go back to
his country if he did not believe in the Philippine authorities, constituted decorum that was so unbecoming of a
lawyer.14
Thus, the OBC recommended:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Respondent’s prayer to dismiss the case
for lack of merit be DENIED and that he be SEVERELY REPRIMANDED with stern warning that a similar act in the
future will be dealt with more seriously.15
Ruling of the Court
Like the OBC, we consider that the evidence adduced by the complainant insufficient to warrant the disbarment of
the respondent. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the
Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution only for the most imperative
reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and member of the bar.16
However, unlike the OBC, we do not find any justification to sanction the respondent. A lawyer like the respondent is
not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of
wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly
show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal
ethics. Otherwise, the lawyer merits exoneration.
To begin with, the holding of the meeting between Atty. Babarin, Heck’s counsel, and Atty. Adaza in the
respondent’s office was not suspicious or irregular, contrary to the insinuation of Heck. We are not unmindful of the
practice of some legal practitioners to arrange to meet with their opposing counsels and their clients in the premises
of the offices of the public prosecutors or in the courthouses primarily because such premises are either a
convenient or a neutral ground for both sides. Accordingly, holding the meeting between Heck and his adversary,
with their respective counsels, in the respondent’s office did not by itself indicate any illegal or corrupt activity. We
also note that the respondent was not present in the meeting.
Secondly, we cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck’s unexpected tirade in his
presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Heck’s disrespectful remark
against Philippine authorities in general. Any self-respecting government official like the respondent should feel
justly affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence, including harsh words like those uttered by
Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified in making the utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected
to maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and their emotions are like those of
other normal people placed in unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now
view the actuation of the respondent in reacting to Heck’s utterance. The Court will not permit the respondent’s good
record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to Heck’s remark.
Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the respondent’s actuations to be arrogant and overbearing, but it is
not fair for us to take the respondent to task in the context of the events and occasions in which the actuations
occurred in the absence of a credible showing that his actuations had been impelled by any bad motive, or had
amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics.
Lastly, Heck complains that the respondent still entertained Atty. Adaza despite the latter having been already
suspended from the practice of law.1âwphi1 The respondent explains, however, that he "had no personal
knowledge of Atty. Adaza’s suspension and that such information was not properly disseminated to the proper
offices."
We are inclined to believe the respondent’s explanation.
The Court meted on Atty. Adaza the suspension from the practice of law in its decision promulgated on March 27,
2000 in Adm. Case No. 4083 entitled Gonato v. Adaza.17 When Heck confronted the respondent on September 15,
2000 about his allowing Atty. Adaza to practice law despite his suspension, the respondent asked when Heck had
learned of the suspension. The respondent thereby implied that he had been unaware of the suspension until then.
We believe that the respondent was not yet aware of the suspension at that time. In Heck v. Atty. Versoza (Adm.
Case No. 5330, December 5, 2000),18 the Court clarified that Atty. Adaza's suspension became final and effective
only after his receipt on September 5, 2000 of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and
explained that he would be denied his right to due process if his suspension were to be made operative on March
27, 2000, the date when the Court ordered his suspension for six months. The Court further clarified in Heck v. Atty.
Versoza that the courts in the country as well as the public would be informed of the suspension only after the lapse
of a reasonable period after September 5, 2000 considering that as a matter of policy the circularization of the order
of suspension could be done only after the decision upon the suspension had attained finality.
It was possible that at the occasion when Atty. Adaza appeared before the respondent on September 15, 2000, his
suspension had not yet attained finality, or that the order of suspension had not yet been known to the respondent.
Accordingly, it will be unjustified to hold the respondent liable for allowing Atty. Adaza to practice law and to
represent his client in the OCP of Cagayan de Oro City.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against respondent ATTY. CASIANO A.
GAMOTIN, JR.; and CONSIDERS this administrative matter closed and terminated.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

(ON LEAVE)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 2.
2
Id. at 194-195.
3
Id. at 6.
4
Id. at 8.
5 Id. at 9-11.
6
Id. at 11.
7
Id. at 12.
8
Id. at 42-47; Comment of the respondent.
9
Id. at 197.
10
Id. at 72-73.
11
Id. at 198.
12
Id. at 193.
13
Id. at 194-201.
14 Id. at 200.
15 Id. at 20.
16 Kara-an v. Pineda, A.C. No. 4306, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 143,146.
17 328 SCRA 694.
18 Unpublished resolution.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against
Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s
oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners, Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his
co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged
that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was
assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto
ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng
kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga
detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should prepare and furnish
her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to
give her the necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing motions before
the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter was assisted by
Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the
latter’s criminal case for rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier
when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for Consolidation of Trial
of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise
scolded for relying on the Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to represent
them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative
complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed several administrative cases
against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously
detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does
not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-
detainees as one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both
parties were required to submit their respective position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation.10 The
Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of
service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged
lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-
detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the inmates since the
charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to file the instant case since he was not
directly affected or injured by the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were
attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the
judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be
dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza
degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP Board of Governors
denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was
transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty. Mendoza
profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against
Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is
not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda,
Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed
by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s
statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated this complaint when
he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-
detainees who are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine
laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice
and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by
cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities. It
seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his
criticisms against her. In his Reply19, he made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao
english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO.
While Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals
with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for compassion
so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty.
Mendoza—that she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang
puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such
as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule
1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free
to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty.
Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that
end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit
of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as excessive and not
commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms
of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and
disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of
mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or
her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the
imposable penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a
PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and
the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these
reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice
to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly
meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-10.
2
Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 4.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 5-9.
6
Id. at 33-39.
7 Id. at 33.
8
Id. at 35.
9
Id. at 145.
10
Id. at 141-150.
11
Id. at 148.
12 Id. at 149.
13
Id. at 150.
14
Id. at 140.
15
Id. at 158-160.
16 Id. at 165.
17
Rule 139-B, Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
xxxx
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
xxxx
18 Rollo, p. 147.
19 Id. at 48-57.
20
Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 4.
22
Ala v. Judge Peras, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2283, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 193, 214.
23
Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol v. Florido, A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 182, 187.
24 Buado v. Layag, 479 Phil. 808, 817 (2004); Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341 (2004).
25
Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez, 544 Phil. 447, 463 (2007).
26
Rollo, p. 159.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 11069, June 08, 2016
RONALDO C. FACTURAN, Complainant, v. PROSECUTOR ALFREDO L. BARCELONA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint1 for disbarment anchored on gross misconduct or
serious gross misconduct in office, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer or prosecutor filed by
complainant Ronaldo C. Facturan (complainant) against respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr.
(respondent) before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on June 4, 2004, he filed a complaint for qualified theft against Pilar Mendoza (Mendoza),
Jose Sarcon @ Jo (Sarcon), Elezar Barcelona (Elezar), Rodrigo Arro (Arro), and Joseph Montero (Montero;
collectively, Mendoza, et al.) before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Alabel, Sarangani Province. The case was
docketed as I.S. No. 04-211 and assigned for preliminary investigation to Prosecutor Faisal D. Amerkhan
(Prosecutor Amerkhan).2
Thereafter, or on October 26, 2004, Prosecutor Amerkhan forwarded the records of the case, together with his
Resolution recommending the prosecution of Mendoza, et al. and the corresponding Information, to respondent for
his approval and signature. However, respondent neither approved nor signed the resolution. Instead, he removed
the case records from the office of the Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his residence, where they were
kept in his custody. It appears that the respondents in I.S. No. 04-211 were personally known to respondent, as
Elezar is his cousin, while Mendoza, Sarcon, Arro, and Montero are his close friends.3
Aggrieved, complainant sought4 the intervention of then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales
(Secretary Gonzales), who, through then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño (Chief State Prosecutor Zuño),
endorsed5 complainant's concerns to State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote (State Prosecutor Pinote). Unfortunately,
State Prosecutor Pinote could not take appropriate action on I.S. No. 04-211 as the case records were still in the
possession of respondent who failed to turn them over despite the directive to do so.6
On July 20, 2005, complainant learned that the case records had been turned over to the Provincial Prosecution
Office but without Prosecutor Amerkhan's Resolution and Information. Neither did respondent approve nor act upon
the same, prompting complainant to file the present complaint for disbarment against him.7
In his defense,8 respondent claimed that the "alleged malicious 'delaying' or the perceived concealment of the case
record[s] was neither intentional nor due to favoritism,"9 as he had inhibited himself from I.S. No. 04-211, which was
the reason why this case was assigned to Prosecutor Amerkhan.10 Respondent averred that as early as October
2004, complainant already knew that he was predisposed to disapprove the resolution prepared by Prosecutor
Amerkhan, as the controversy merely involved a boundary dispute.11 Thus, he advised Prosecutor Amerkhan to
conduct a clarificatory hearing instead of prematurely concluding the preliminary investigation.12 However,
Prosecutor Amerkhan failed to do so, resulting in the delay in the resolution of I.S. No. 04-211,13
Furthermore, respondent asseverated that, except for the fact that a criminal information had been filed on
September 8, 2006, he was no longer aware of any development in I.S. No. 04-211, having been subsequently
detailed to the DOJ in Manila and recently, to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City.14 He asserted that
complainant and Prosecutor Amerkhan manipulated the filing in court of I.S. No. 04-211 through the original
resolution prepared by the latter.15
The OCA indorsed16 complainant's Affidavit-Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which then
set17 the case for mandatory conference on June 26, 2007. However, only the respondent appeared, prompting the
IBP to terminate the mandatory conference and ordered the submission of the parties' position
papers.18 Unfortunately, the parties did not submit the required position papers.19
The IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report20 dated March 20, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP, through Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid), found respondent to have violated Canons 1821 and 18.0322 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period ranging from six (6) months to two (2) years upon the discretion of the IBP Governing Board.23
The IBP found that the case records of I.S. No. 04-211 were removed by respondent from the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and kept in his possession.24 Records also show that he failed to timely turn over the said case records
upon order of State Prosecutor Pinote.25 In fact, the case records remained in his possession even after he had
been detailed to the DOJ in Manila in February 2005. From the foregoing, respondent's neglect to perform his duty
was apparent.26
Furthermore, respondent failed to perform his duty of approving or disapproving Prosecutor Amerkhan's
recommendation pertaining to I.S. No. 04-211.27 As such, he is also guilty of violating Canon 6.0128 of the CPR for
his failure the case records in his possession.29
In a Resolution30 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the foregoing
recommendation and suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP's factual findings and recommendation to hold respondent administratively liable,
but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, but instead, of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The
pertinent rules provide:
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar
only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.31 In this regard, Rule 6.02 above-
quoted is particularly directed to lawyers in the government service, enjoining them from using one's public position
to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties.32
In Ali v. Bubong,33 the Court recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing
the interest of relatives.
In this case, respondent's accountability regarding I.S. No. 04-211 has been duly established. When Prosecutor
Amerkhan forwarded to respondent the case records of I.S. No. 04-211, together with the resolution recommending
the filing of the appropriate information in court, respondent failed to take action thereon, as records are bereft of
evidence showing that he either approved or disapproved it. As the IBP had correctly opined,34 if respondent did not
concur with the findings and recommendation of Prosecutor Amerkhan, who conducted the preliminary investigation
of the case, respondent should have timely disapproved his recommendation to enable complainant to take the
appropriate remedy to challenge the disapproval. Moreover, the Court notes respondent's defense35 that
complainant was already aware beforehand that he (respondent) was inclined to disapprove the resolution prepared
by Prosecutor Amerkhan, whom he ordered to conduct a clarificatory hearing on the case. However, if such was the
case, then nothing could have prevented respondent from proceeding to disapprove the resolution. Yet, as the
records bear out, he absolutely took no action thereon.
Worse, respondent removed the case records from the office of the Provincial Prosecutor and, when directed to turn
them over, failed to do so notwithstanding his assignment to the DOJ in Manila in February 2005. As a result, no
further action had been taken on I.S. No. 04-211 in the meantime. In fact, as of June 30, 2005, respondent still had
not complied with State Prosecutor Pinote's directive to return not only the case records of I.S. No. 04-211, but all
the cases previously assigned to him as well.36 Needless to state, respondent ought to have known that without the
case records, no further action could be taken on any of those cases. His assignment to the DOJ in Manila in
February 2005 should have even prompted him to turn over the case records of I.S. No. 04-211 for appropriate
action, but he still failed to do so, without any plausible reason.
Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses in the handling of I.S. No. 04-211 and his failure to timely
return the case records thereof for further action, despite the directive to do so, it can only be inferred that
respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor.
Such refusal, under the circumstances, evidently worked to the advantage of the respondents in I.S. No. 04-21.1 -
which included respondent's cousin, Elezar - as the absence of the case records in the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor resulted in the delay in the filing of the appropriate criminal information in court against them. Hence, it is
apparent that respondent used his public position as a prosecutor to advance and protect the private interest of his
relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.
Indeed, respondent's actions and omissions in this case, i.e., his failure to resolve I.S. No. 04-211 and to turn over
the case records thereof despite orders to do so, appear to have been committed for the benefit of and to safeguard
private interests. As a lawyer who is also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession.37 It bears stressing that a lawyer in public office is expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.38 Accordingly, the Court finds that suspension for a period of one (1) year,39 as recommended by the IBP,
should be meted upon respondent.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairperson),** Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Sereno, C.J. on leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Endnotes:
**Per
Special Order No. 2354 dated June 2, 2016.
1Rollo,
pp. 4-5.
2
Id. at 4.
3
Id.
4
See letter dated March 6, 2005; id. at 6.
5
Id. at 7.
6
Id. at 8.
7 Id. at 4-5.
8
Id. at 19-23.
9
Id. at 19.
10 Id.
11
Id. at 19-20.
12
Id. at 20.
13
Id. at 21.
14 Id. at 20.
15
Id. at 21.
16
See 1st Indorsement dated August 16, 2005; id. at 2.
17
See Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing dated May 29, 2007; id. at 30.
18 See Order dated August 7, 2007 signed by Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.; id. at 34-35.
19
Id. at 40,
20 Id. at 39-47.
21
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
22
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
23Rollo,
p. 47.
24
Id. at 45.cralawred
25 Id.
26 Id. at 46.cralawred
27 Id. at 46.
28
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
29Rollo,
p. 46.
30 Id. at 38, including dorsal portion. Issued by IBP National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic.
31Olazo v. Justice Tinga (ret.), 651 Phil. 290, 298 (2010).
32Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18,2013, 698 SCRA 683, 691-692.
33 493 Phil. 172 (2005).
34
Rollo, p.. 46.
35 Id. at 19.
36
See id. at 8.
37
Huyssen v. Gutierrez, 520 Phil. 117, 131 (2006).
38Vitriolo v. Dasig, 448 Phil. 199, 209 (2003).
39
See Re: Resolution of the Court Dated 1 June 2004 In G.R. No. 72954 Against Atty Victor C. Avecilla, 667 Phil.
547 (2011).
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig)
against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when
he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void
by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting,
constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue
his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as
evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved
to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to
file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his
comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no
other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was
merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents
they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3,
Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same
was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig
knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that
Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an
unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he
and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences,
i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be
given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the
administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the
complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint
was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint,
the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He
claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same
already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and
required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by
respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should
sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the
complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at
respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite
service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation
"RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with
the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all
notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that
in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent
entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to
respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure
to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment
of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions
dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his
comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution
dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to
REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent
II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No.
922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address,
i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering
that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts,
the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per
their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4,
2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case
was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a
registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera
be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the
court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be
an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues
despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the
failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in
the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of
Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the
Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second
marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place
barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting
at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as
the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also
clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the
certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of
two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence
given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him
unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made
a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the
complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of
and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a
copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is
a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of
the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is
pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint.
The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach
respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations -
both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial
process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the
Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus,
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal
file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies
thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
On Leave
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Footnotes
* On leave.
** Acting Chief Justice.

1
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2
Id. at 4.
3 Id. at 5.
4
Id. at 6.
5
Id. at 14.
6
Id. at 8.
7
Id. at 10-13.
8
Id. at 17.
9
Id. at 18.
10
Id. at 23.
11
Id. at 24-25.
12 Id. at 27.
13 Id. at 28-31.
14 Id. at 39.
15 Id. at 42.
16 Id. at 43-44.
17
Id. at 46.
18 Id. at 48.
19 Id. at 50-51.
20
Id. at 49-53.
21
Id.
22
In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
23
Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, 538 Phil. 501, 511 (2006).
24
See Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37.
25
Id. at 53.
26 See Sebastian v. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 224 (2007).

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Spouses
Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent) for grave
misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.
The Facts
In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter2 dated February 15,
2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous
utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients.
Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings3 that were attached to the demand letter were intended to
sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and
besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified complaint.
However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered6 to furnish the Court the complete and correct address of
respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the Court resolved,7 among others,
to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory
conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw
Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings. Likewise, the
notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus,
in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers
together with documentary exhibits, if any.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for
defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court and
fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.12chanrobleslaw
The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint. Moreover, despite
repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file his pleadings,
respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the process, purposely
delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that respondent be held in contempt of
court.13chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification
the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and recommendations of the
IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them to
settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character. It also
imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks and estafa. The
relevant portion of the demand letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement offices revealed that
the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our search
being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations. Other record check outcomes and
results use we however opt to defer disclosure in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the
need for them arise, [sic]
All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate entities, for the
necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information
Systems Act of 2008."
x xxx
II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they proved to be "worthless
and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d)
SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.
III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage of her
helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART. 318,
OTHER DECEITS. RPC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of complainants
to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against
them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a
court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in shame
and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been copy furnished with the
demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the mandatory
hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v.
Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at
the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for
his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules of Court."18chanrobleslaw
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are
licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly.21 Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his
duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L. Torres and
Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof,
and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case, the
Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law should be meted upon
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur
Endnotes:
1Rollo,
pp. 1-3.
2
Id. at 5-10.
3
Id. at 11-27.
4 Id. at 2.
5
Id. at 97.
6
See Resolution dated September 28,2011; id. at 100.
7 Id. at 103-104.
8
Id. at 106.
9 See Order dated August 27, 2014 and Order dated October 24, 2014; id. at 107-108.
10
Id. at 108, including dorsal portion.
11
Id. at 115-117.
12
Id. at 117.
13
Id. at 116-117.
14
See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2015-542 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A.
Marohomsalic; id. at 114, including dorsal portion.
15Barandon,
Jr. v, Ferrer, Sr., 630 Phil. 524, 530 (2010).
16
See Demand Letter dated February 15, 2009, rollo, pp. 7-9.
17
271 Phil. 654(1991).
18
Id. at 659.
19Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., supra note 15, at 532.
20
Gimeno v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 11, 25.
21
Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 104 (2003).
22
507 Phil. 397 (2005).
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6567 April 16, 2008
JOSE C. SABERON, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant)
charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive
language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo
Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank's
registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various
checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife, despite alleged full
payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative
Defenses3 to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon]
and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain –
x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis,"
complainant filed the present complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to
seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the
bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in
full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and "her children" who
were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment6 to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was "nothing abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper" in the way he used the word "blackmail" to characterize the suit against his clients;
and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages
upon the other party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,8 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held
that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is criminally
charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that person's act as
blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor his case
on the legal merits of his client's claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 159 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary and irrelevant to the case,"
respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that
respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP Board of Governors disapproved the
recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the case to this Court.11
Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition filed on March 7,
2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B12 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for violating the
mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be "reduced to
writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based."
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to be in
accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of suspension
should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is
therefore an infraction involving moral turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint against him is a
harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer
objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which he had backed
up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against his clients. That
being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just
like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious imputations of wrongdoing
against his clients – the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting
himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language was used, he was
only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of some
infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant's indignation for which he asked the latter's and this
Court's clemency.
In his Reply,13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment reveals the latter's propensity to deliberately state
a falsehood; and that respondent's claim that the administrative complaint was a "harassing act," deducible from the
"fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its
owner," is bereft of factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal cases he and his
wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel arising
from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.14
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.16
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged.17 In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.18
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a court but
before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a
court, was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,19 thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he
nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.20
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.
Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it
suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance
of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and
propriety in making such remark or comment.21
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been
considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.22 The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged
the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting
in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and
impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case
material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x
x x. 23
Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the ascription of
'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the subject
matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's alleged alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the
bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the further
allegation that the Petition was "another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for
financial gain." Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering that complainant
and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests
and seek redress of their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a "Notice of Resolution" was
transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January 18,
2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP Board of
Governors' decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is based. Thus
Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator
with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period
not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for the decision
as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in agreement, but
also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached the judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.24
With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered disbarment
and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great
caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges.25
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous character as
to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for
his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty
of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a
repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1-5. Filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 22, 2004.
2
Id. at 6-11.
3 Id. at 12-19.
4
Id. at 13; p. 2 of the Answer.
5
Id. at 26-35. Denominated as "Traverse to Reply," the rejoinder stated on paragraph 4, as follows:
4. Most notably, after Respondents revealed that the instant Petition is a mere ruse employed by
Petitioner to blackmail the former for financial gain and after ample showing that this action is
baseless and fruitless, petitioner, finding his foot in his mouth, now changes gear and goes amuck
by raising new matters purely extraneous to his original cause of action x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
6
Id. at 40-47. Filed before the OBC on February 1, 2005.
7
Id. at 192.
8 Id. at 187-190.
9
Canon 15- A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
10
Rollo, p. 186.
11
Id. at 185.
12
Section 2(c) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within (15)
days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
13
Rollo, pp. 243-249.
14 Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397, 420.
15
Rubio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84032, August 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 60, 63.
16
Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 408, 421; Nuñez v. Astorga, A.C. No.
6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 364, citing Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. Florido, 465 Phil. 1, 7
(2004); Cruz v. Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 211, 219.
17
Section 20(f) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Vide Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, 455 Phil. 1, 21 (2003).
18
Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 465, 473; Torres v. Javier, supra.
19
A.C. No. 2343, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 459, 462.
20
Supra, citing Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA
1, 17.
21
Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 17 at 19.
22Torres v. Atty. Javier, supra note16 at 418; Villalon v. Buendia, 315 Phil. 663, 667 (1995); Gutierrez v.
Abila et al., 197 Phil. 616, 621 (1982).
23
Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 21. Vide Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007, 517
SCRA 74, 83; Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010, 1013 (1961).
24
Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, April 27, 2001, 357 SCRA 406, 412, cited in Cruz v. Cabrera, supra
note 16 at 216-217.
25
Nuñez v. Astorga, supra note 16 at 354.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in
CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from
being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice
Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification;
(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial
commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She
also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm
Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her
parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and
violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno
posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting clients' interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the
same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party,
Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental
incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive
and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007,Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature
were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use
several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and
accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel.
Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and
her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this
basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.17 After this, both
parties were required to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting
interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained
several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given
time."19 However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is
not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even
after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's
former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to
defend them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its
lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty.
Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally
unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language
when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22 For violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months
for employing abusive and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully
supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty
and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission,
if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in
its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms
them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide
notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary
public.1âwphi1 Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR number, IBP
number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's
typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information. However, he denied
that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial
register and was never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his
signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as
a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have
obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the
alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document
before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission, were
stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several
offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:
Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year

Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
Persons
Petition for Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
Duplicate copy
Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and
provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary
public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of
simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure
that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary
public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial
services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the
notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no
other person, other than the notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address and
prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active notarial
registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial
services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed
with public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each
lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of
Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a
clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting
clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.1âwphi1
In Aniñon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting
interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's
client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the
case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected
to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment
of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other
hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against
Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged
corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the
Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he
had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any
confidential information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and

abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings,
whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
(emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious
extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and
immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System,
and the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor
performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and
to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing,
is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 493; issued on November 19, 2011.
2
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, July 6, 2004.
3
Rollo, pp. 3-9.
4
The respondent was admitted to the Bar on May 2, 2002.
5
The respondent received his notarial commission on May 9, 2002.
6 Rollo, pp. 3-4.
7
Id. at 4.
8
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
9
Rollo, pp. 5-7.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id. at 509.
12
Id. at 66-81.
13
Id. at 67-68.
14
Id. at 69.
15
Id. at 71-72.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 494.
18
Id. at 494-513.
19
Id. at 508.
20
Id. at 501-502.
21 Id. at 503-504.
22
Id. at 511-512.
23
Id. at 512.
24
Id. at 493.
25
Id. at 514-523.
26
Id. at 531-532.
27
Rollo, pp. 507-508.
28
Section 1(b), 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
29
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Notarial Practice Rules, a notary public is empowered to perform the
following notarial acts:
1. acknowledgments;
2. oaths and affirmations;
3. jurats;
4. signature witnessings;
5. copy certifications; and
6. any other act authorized by these Rules;
30 Maria v. Cortez, A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 87, 93.
31
A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 76.
32
Id. at 82.
33
Id.
34
Rollo, p. 40.
35 Id. at 509.
36Saberon
v. Larong, 574 Phil. 510, 517 (2008).
37
Id.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by
complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages against his own
brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the
said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-
00086893 /Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint.
Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not
2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not
just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave
threats and estafa5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was furnished a copy · of the complaint, he discovered that,
through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: " x x x Better
dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as
shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble]
as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong
polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for
damages, which stated that Maximina "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a
manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount
of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing
and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to
Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule
7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos.
8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise
Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned
civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was
used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to
unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the
crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x. "14
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the
case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for
disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and
the expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so
gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication
between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his
dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014
with modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.19
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and
the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the
public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a
manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession.1âwphi1 The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy,"
"inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and
injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages
that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately.
To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly
intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's
insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct
against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the
crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an
admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a
lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to
observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private
lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in
this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member
of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another
lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult
Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional
conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently
reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the
CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.29
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose
the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo
is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as
the expunction thereof from the records.30
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well
as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-6.
2
Entitled "Orlando O. Ailes v. Marcelo O. Ailes Jr., et al." before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
docketed as Civil Case No. C-22601; id. at 7-13.
3
Complainant erroneously wrote "MCLE Compliance No. 11-00086899" in his Complaint dated April 16,
2012, id. at 2-3. See also Certification of MCLE Office dated February 16, 2012; id. at 14.
4
Id. at 2-3. See also p. 12.
5
Id. at 16-22.
6
Id. at 17-21.
7
Id. at 25-26.
8 Id. at 27-28.
9
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Adopting the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education for Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (August 22, 2000).
10Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All
Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption
(June 3, 2008).
11
See Answer; rollo, pp. 49-52.
12
Id. at 51.
13
See Maximino's Position Paper dated November 14, 2012; id. at 84.
14 Id. at 93. Penned by Judge Mario V. Manayon.
15 Id. at 192-195. Penned by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.
16 Id. at 191. Penned by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic.
17 Id. at 276-280.
18
Id. at 287.
19
Id. at 220-230.
20 Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., 630 Phil. 524, 530 (2010).
21 Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio, Jr., 611 Phil. 1, 13 (2009).
22
See Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre, 496 Phil. 799, 809-810 (2005).
23
Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., supra note 20, at 532.
24
520 Phil. 149, 161 (2006).
25
Nunez v. Astorga, 492 Phil. 450, 459-460 (2005).
26
Spouses Gibes v. Deciembre, supra note 22.
27
Asa v. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9, 20 (2006).
28
Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio Jr., supra note 21, at 14 citing Saberon v. Larong, 574 Phil. 510 (2008).
29
See Spouses Gibes v. Deciembre, supra note 22, at 811.
30
Bar Matter No. 1922. x x x
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B.
De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and
repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in
the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother
against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant
claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title
presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly
confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the
lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which
deed of donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16
Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant
narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and
reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a
judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University
of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation
of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government
office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent
alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo
Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118
and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished,
respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the occupants
of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should
be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he was
no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further
claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except
honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a
copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to perform the
functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this
Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February
2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions
basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted
the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described
complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife
of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[]
of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent is
guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has
submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action
which was used in a complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is
respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No.
1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the
positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and
receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any government
office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's
recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused
complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder,
respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's
and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case.
While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the
barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such
certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent
submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against
Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was
the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18
October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in
Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is
apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed.
In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was
brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of the
complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title,
we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists.
There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The
remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or
counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an
examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative
case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and
Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely
confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a
parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent
allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's
family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts
authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature
witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as
counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring with
the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof.
Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were
filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any
concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover,
charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against the
counsel allegedly favored by the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval,
Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice
to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his designation
except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that
complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent
and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability.
Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his
permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his
previous administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined from
accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17 Clearly, respondent
knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law
practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives
constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even
disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action
issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his
client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying
willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a
judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not
a mere error in judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the
same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all
courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
Sereno, C. J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Caguioa, J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 2-7.
2
Id. at 171-184.
3
Id. at 176.
4
Id. at 245-248.
5 Id. at 266-272.
6
Id. at 283-287.
7
Id. at 583-591.
8 Id. at 591.
9 Id. at 582.
10 Id. at 174.
11 Id. at 176.
12 Id. at 267.
13 574 Phil. 510, 517 (2008). Citations omitted.
14
Section 412, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
15
Rollo, p. 22.
16
A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 766.
17
See Lingan v. Calubaquib, A.C. No. 5377, 30 June 2014 727 SCRA 341.
18
659 Phil. 48 (2011).
19
Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 8776, 22 March 2015, citing Santos, Sr. v. Atty. Beltran, 463 Phil. 372 (2003), further
citing Spouses Whitson v. Atienza, 457 Phil. 11 (2003).
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia),
both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty.
Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a
co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed
on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case
filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since
he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the
signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo
to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his
supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen
signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a
counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and
that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public
document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification
of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing
by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in
a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of
Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted
standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information.
They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted
by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and
documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao
was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the
Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was
reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on
the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated
23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed
against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary.
He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were
found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon.
The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent
is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice
constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office,
failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he
failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law
up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law
Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law
firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is
hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration
dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’
Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty.
Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature
to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim
of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law
partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he
gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had
an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty.
Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the
Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find
proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality
of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I.
2
Docketed as OMB-V-C-05-0207-E.
3
Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.
4
IBP Records (Vol. I), p. 14.
5
Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1612.
6 Sub-Office Report No. 0008-2005.
7
IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6.
8
Id. at 1.
9
478 Phil. 378, 389 (2004).
10 529 Phil. 876 (2006).
11
RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Section 3.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY,
BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the
performance of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED.
Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio
C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.
(Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay
(respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13,
2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha
Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on
March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to Eduardo Samson and
Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen,
notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy
Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco and Violeta
Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on
April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March
27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos
Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna
Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on
April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta,
notarized on March 18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development Corporation, notarized on
March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps.
Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps.
Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan
notarized on March 14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that
they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico.
The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a
common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who
signed them or the documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and
returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the
letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP
National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the
latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a
formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of
the country,"4 and that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated
September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009,
respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he was out of
the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization
act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his
secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When the case was called
for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation
reiterating his original position and requesting that his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was
terminated and the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a
position paper,9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as Investigating Commissioner
found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were
not authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III,
however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He
admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed
by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established
that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records
especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the
standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the
opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as
such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution,11 dated September
28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended that by admitting
and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with leniency.
Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which
had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September
28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while
he was out of the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his
notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering
that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A
notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent
cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the
acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge.
He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court
and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was
a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public
takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has been
practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His
experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial
duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was
deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation
of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly
affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function
of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.15 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9
of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to
practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he
virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away, were
clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be
converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere
sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a
privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared
on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public,
the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take lightly complaints of
unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system
hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court
REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period
of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately,
with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's
personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Mcmher in lieu of Associate .Justice Arimo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1888 dated
November 28, 2014.
1 Rollo. p. 78.
2
Id. at 9-10.
3 Id. at 10.
4
Id. at 2.
5 Id. at 1.
6
Id. at 58.
7 Id. at 59-60.
8
Id. at 67.
9
Id. at 72-74.
10
Id. at 79-80.
11
Id. at 78.
12
Id. at 82-86.
13
Id. at 90.
14 Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana, 608 Phil. 727, 736 (2009).
15
Agbulos v. Viray, A.C. No. 7350, February 18, 2013, 691 SCRA 1, 8.
16
Ang v. Gupana, A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014.
17
Agadan v. Kilaan. A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRJ\ l, I 0.
18
Talisic v. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014.

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Republic of the Philippines

July 30, 1979

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.

3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.

4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.

5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.

10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.

11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.

13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.

18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.

20 Article 12, Civil Code.

21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22 Art. 8, Civil Code

23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City

IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City

IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City

IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City

Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.

The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as follows:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

We are not impressed.

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

The Antecedent Facts

a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

The Ruling of this Court

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

[G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The Board decided as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The provision reads in part:

On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:

Balancing Policy Considerations