In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be (1) During trial, the custodian of the records
rds of the property attested that the copy of the deed of
made at the proper time, and (2) the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must
be made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is
made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying
the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.
Although the Deed was objected to, the ground stated by Lorenzana is that it is
self-serving. Failing to raise the objection that the photocopy is not the best
evidence, the same was correctly admitted by the RTC.
Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez (GR No. 170604, Sept. 2, 2013)
Petitioner: ​HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON
Respondents: ​HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon.
They averred that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina
Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by TCT No. 84797, and
that their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime. Upon their
parents’ deaths, they had continued possession of the property as heirs, paying the real
property taxes due thereon.
They could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy is
on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact. The original copy contained an entry
stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of
repurchase. They alleged that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the
deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Consequently, they
prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of
sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the Register of Deeds
and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six
months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property; and that she had
then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given
6-month period. The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public.
sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of
Manila.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It opined that although the deed itself could not be
presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its
execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It opined that before secondary evidence as to the
contents of a document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the] document must
first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss. In the case at bar, Atty.
Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged
deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted
for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This, petitioners failed to do.
Issues:
1. Whether the prerequisites for the admission of secondary evidence has been
complied with.
2. Whether the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with the right to
repurchase has been established.
Ruling:
1. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other
than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the
existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the
court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as
respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a
slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting;
and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing,
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 33
there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is
in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld
for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. Lastly, the rule protects
against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only
when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. ​Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies
only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of
the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.
In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, the principal issue was whether or not the
deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had
really existed. Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to
address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the
presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should
have simply addressed and determined whether or not the “existence” and “execution” of
the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
2. Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase.
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a
collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her
inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence
and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on
evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of
the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or
unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a
writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the
lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary
evidence. In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the
existence of the deed.
First, the medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him
to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and
Camilon were then residing in order only to negotiate and consummate the sale of
the property
Second, the annotation on the deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry
in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the
existence of the deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a
deed of sale with right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of
Deeds. By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon
could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized
by him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
Third, respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the property was
further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did
not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would
have herself asserted and exercised her right to take over the property, legally and
physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period
stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name and paying
the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity
of her claim against the respondents.
Thus, the respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
Flores y De Leon v. People (GR No. 222861)
Petitioner: ​PO2 JESSIE FLORES y DE LEON
Respondent: ​PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
● Petitioner was arrested via an entrapment operation conducted by the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) pursuant to a complaint lodged by
private complainant Roderick France (France). He was arrested for asking for a
bribe of ₱2,000.00 from France during a traffic accident. (France got into an
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 34
 accident, petitioner issued a traffic violation ticket and confiscated his license,
France was asked to prepare ₱2,000.00 to retrieve his license)
● Petitioner posted a bail bond of ₱100,000.00 for his conditional release. Upon
arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
● The prosecution presented the following witnesses: France, PO2 Aaron Ilao (PO2
Ilao) and PO2 Richard Menor (PO2 Menor) of the PAOCTF. The defense, on the
other hand, presented petitioner, Robert Pancipanci (Pancipanci) and
photographer Toto Ronaldo (Ronalda) as its witnesses.
● RTC found petitioner guilty of simple robbery (extortion). It ruled that the
prosecution established all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
● Petitioner appealed to the CA. He averred that the RTC incorrectly convicted him
of simple robbery by giving weight on pieces of evidence in violation of the Best
Evidence Rule. He argued that the prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies
and the original pieces of the marked money were never even presented. He also
assailed the failure of the prosecution to present the forensic chemist who made
the laboratory report which found traces of ultraviolet powder on his index finger.
He further argued that the RTC disregarded the testimonies of the defense
witnesses which clearly showed that he did not extort any money from France.
Moreover, he reiterated that his exoneration from the administrative case arising
from the same set of facts should have been sufficient basis for the dismissal of
the criminal case.
● CA denied the appeal. It held that the best evidence rule admits of some
exemptions which were present in this case.1âwphi1 It stated that the Complaint
Sheet dated June 28, 2000 and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
France were public records under the custody of a public officer, hence, the
presentation of the photocopies as evidence, was deemed sufficient. It further held
that the said documents were identified by the private complainant during trial and
he attested to the veracity of the contents thereof. With regard to the photocopy of
the TVR, the CA ruled that the same should be admitted since petitioner himself
admitted in his direct testimony that he indeed issued it. As to the marked money,
the CA held that the non-presentation of the original marked money did not create
a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as the serial numbers were duly
recorded in the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF requesting the ultraviolet
fluorescent powder dusting after the entrapment operation.
Issue: ​Whether the non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is fatal to
the cause of the prosecution
Ruling:
● No. In People v. Tandoy, the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only
when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is
only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
● In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other
substitute evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion Jr (GR No. 223274)
Petitioner: ​RCBC Bankard Services Corporation
Respondent: ​Moises Oracion, Jr. and Emily L. Oracion
Facts: ​Respondents applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card accommodations
with the issuance of a credit card (Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum). They used the
credit card in purchasing different products but failed to pay petitioner even at least the
minimum amount due. Petitioner attached to its complaint for Sum of Money against
respondents "duplicate original" copies of the Statements of Account (SOA) and the Credit
History Inquiry.
MeTC issued summons but the respondents failed to file their answer. The MeTC
dismissed it on the ground that petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to establish its case by
preponderance of evidence because of the fact that the records shows that the signature in
the attachments in support of the [complaint] are mere photocopies or stamp mark in this
case.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and argued that what it attached to the complaint
were the "duplicate original copies" and not mere photocopies; that these documents are
computer generated reports, in which case, they could simply present another set of printed
Duplicate Original Copies for the MTC's examination. But the RTC found petitioner's appeal
to be without merit justifying that the petitioner's insistence that it attached Duplicate
Original Copies of the [SOAs] and the Credit History Inquiry in its complaint is entirely for
naught, as such documents could not be considered as original.
The petitioner filed an appeal invoking the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Issue: ​Whether the electronic document submitted by the petitioner can be regarded as
equivalent of original documents
Ruling: No​. Procedurally, petitioner cannot invoke for the first time on appeal the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to justify its position. And even without this procedural obstacle, the
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 35
Court does not agree that that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed
electronic documents.
According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic
document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed
by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed.
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of
electronic documents. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. — Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means: (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same; (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Clearly, petitioner has not complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because
it failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible
as electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.
National Power Corporation v. Codilla Jr (GR No. 170491)
Petitioner: ​NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
Respondent: ​HON. RAMON G. . HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC
of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI
SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED SHIPPING
COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED
Facts:
● M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCOR’s
Power Barge. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co. for the alleged damages caused on petitioner's
power barges.
● NAPOCOR led a formal offer of evidence before the lower court. Private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. objected to
petitioner's formal offer of evidence.
● Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and
excluding from the records attached evidence because of NAPOCOR’s failure to
produce the originals. NAPOCOR contends that "the photocopies offered are
equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.
However, the court ruled that the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic
evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
● NAPOCOR’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against respondent judge to the
CA was likewise dismissed. There is no sufficient showing that the respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The pieces of petitioner's documentary
evidence which were denied admission were not properly identified by any
competent witness as the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and
participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence
and said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported
documents or papers.
● Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in
providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except
in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not
shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary
pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
Issue: ​Whether the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence
Ruling: NO.
● NAPOCOR maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes
of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
included in the section's catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means".
● JUST IN CASE, but you may skip this: In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies
are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall
enumerate the following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
○ 1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;
○ 2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioner's power barges
207 and 209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed
by Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer; ​cTECIA
○ 3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.,
with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received;
○ 4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was lled up and
accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of
the Jurat were handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;
○ 5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received;
○ 6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by
petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
○ 7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 36
 signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten notations;
○ 8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testi candum written using a
manual typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten
notation when it was received by the party;
○ 9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and
maintenance agreement between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations
and every page containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;
○ 10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to Rex
Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date
it was received. The sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or handwritten
notations;
○ 11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to Virgilio
Asprer and manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures
and/or handwritten notations; ​EACIaT
○ 12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;
○ 13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and
Bautista and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;
○ 14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary
Public, together with other handwritten notations.
● On the other hand, in the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Electronic document"
refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.
● The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. An
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.
● What differs an electronic from a paper-based document is the manner by which
the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic
document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
● The information in the photocopies reveal that not all of the contents therein, such
as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person's signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
● Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the
original writing itself, except in the following cases:
○ (a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
○ (b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
○ (c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a
public officer;
○ (d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified
copy of which is made evidence by law;
○ (e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole."
● When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
● The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a)
the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; ​(b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
de but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place
or places.
● However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted on offering the photocopies
as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in
accordance with the exceptions.
● NAPOCOR continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the trial
court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented and now prays
that it be allowed to present the originals or to lay the predicate for the admission
of secondary evidence.
● Petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judge's denial of admission of
its aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its
prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents
that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary
evidence.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 37
Bartolome v. Maranan (AM No. P-11-2979)
Complainant​: ​ELLA M. BARTOLOME
Respondent​: ​ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE
Facts:
This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit-complaint that Ella M.
Bartolome ​filed against Rosalie B. Maranan, charging her with extortion, graft and
corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of
P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for
annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case
decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of the
case.
To put an end to the respondent's extortion activities, the complainant decided to report the
matter to the police authorities. During the entrapment operation conducted by police
officers of Imus Police Station, the respondent was apprehended inside the premises of the
RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from the complainant.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint:
1. ​the transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her
and the respondent;
2. ​A copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the
respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of
marriage;
3. ​A copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was
apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of
Imus Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.;
4. ​and a versatile compact disc ​(VCD) containing the video taken during the
entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.
In her Comment, the respondent denied the accusations against her. She alleged her belief
that Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not indicate the
complainant's exact address.
The OCA submitted its Report to the Court finding enough evidence to prove the
respondent's involvement in anomalous activities
Issue:
Whether the Court may admit the evidence presented by the petitioner
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence
of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. 25 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these
rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases.
Maliksi v. COMELEC (GR No. 203302)
Petitioner:​ MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI
Respondent: ​COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN
Facts:
Emmanuel L. Maliksi (Maliksi) and Homer T. Saquilayan (Saquilayan) were both mayoralty
candidates for the Municipality of Imus, Cavite during the 10 May 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Saquilayan as
the duly elected municipal mayor garnering a total of 48,181 votes as against Maliksi’s
39,682 votes.
Maliksi filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (trial court),
questioning the results of the elections in 209 clustered precincts. In its 15 November 2011
Decision, the trial court declared Maliksi as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Imus,
Cavite. The trial court ruled that Maliksi garnered 41,088 votes as against Saquilayan’s
40,423 votes.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 38
Saquilayan filed an appeal before the COMELEC. The COMELEC First Division, after
inspecting the ballot boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrity of the ballots had
been compromised. To determine the true will of the electorate, and since there was an
allegation of ballot tampering, the COMELEC First Division examined the digital images of
the contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards.
The COMELEC First Division found that Maliksi obtained a total of 40,092 votes. On the
other hand, Saquilayan obtained a total of 48,521 votes. The COMELEC First Division
therefore nullified the trial court’s decision and declared Saquilayan as the duly-elected
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
First Division’s Resolution which was denied by the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the COMELEC First Division did not err in ordering the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards instead of
recounting the physical ballots. It ruled that the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images in the CF cards are not without basis since a Division, through its Presiding
Commissioner, may take such measures as he may deem proper to resolve cases pending
before it. The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that Maliksi was not denied due process
because he never questioned the Order of decryption by the COMELEC First Division nor
did he raise any objection in any of his pleadings. Further, the ballot images are not mere
secondary images, as Maliksi claimed. The digital images of the physical ballots, which are
instantaneously written in the CF cards by the PCOS machines the moment the ballots are
read and counted, are equivalent to the original for the purpose of the best evidence rule.
The COMELEC En Banc accorded higher evidentiary value to the ballot images because
their integrity are more secure for the following reasons:
(1) the digital images are encrypted to prevent unauthorized alteration or access;
(2) the ballot images cannot be decrypted or in anyway accessed without the
necessary decryption key;
(3) the ballot images may only be decrypted using a special system designed by
the COMELEC and not by any ordinary operating system or computer;
(4) the CF cards storing the digital images of all the ballots used in the 10 May
2010 elections are kept in a secured facility within the Commission to prevent
unauthorized access.
Hence, Maliksi filed the present petition before the Court where he assailed the use by the
COMELEC First Division of the ballot images in the CF cards. He alleged that the best and
most conclusive evidence are the physical ballots themselves, and when they cannot be
produced or when they are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence of
the votes cast.
Issue: Whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence that should
only be used when the physical ballots are not available.
Held:​ No.
In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Panotes and Panotes v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
​
Vinzons-Chato, the Court ruled that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form
the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369.” ​The Court
declared that the printouts of the ballot images in the CF cards “are the functional equivalent
of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision
of votes in an electoral protest.” In short, both the ballot images in the CF cards and the
printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots
filled up by the voters.
Maliksi further alleged that the ballot images in the CF cards should merely be considered
as secondary evidence and should be resorted to only when the physical ballots are not
available or could not be produced. He is mistaken. Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC is clear
on this issue. It states:
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. - An electronic document shall be
regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule
if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately.
SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. - When a document is in two or
more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a
counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by mechanical or electronic recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by
other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies
or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the
same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu
of the original.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 39

The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated and written in the CF cards
when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts
produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are the
equivalent of the original. As pointed out by the COMELEC, “[t]he digital images of the
physical ballots are electronically and instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines
once the physical ballots are fed into and read by the machines.”Hence, the ballot images
are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF
cards are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have the same
evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots.
MCC Industrial Sales Corp v. Ssangyong Corp (GR No. 170633)
Petitioner: ​MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP (MCC)
Respondent: ​SSANGYONG CORP (SYC)
Facts:
MCC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products and SYC is one of its suppliers. The two corporations would
conduct business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. SYC
would send a pro forma invoice containing the product order and MMC would affix its
signature thereto to confirm the order and send the pro forma invoice back to SYC.
On 13 April 2000 SYC sent a pro forma invoice for 220 MT of hot rolled stainless steel for
$1,860 per MT. MCC affixed its signature thereto. However, MCC failed to pay for the order.
SYC, in order to maintain good business relation, divided the payment into two tranches. It
also negotiated for a discount such that the new price is $1,700 per MT. Still, MCC failed to
fulfill its obligation with SYC.
SYC filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages. It presented four pro forma
invoices to evidence its claim. MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC ruled in favor of
SYC, stating that the admissibility of the pro forma invoices is supported by the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000 (RA 8792). The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, ruling that the pro
forma invoices are considered as "electronic documents" under RA 8792.
Issue:
1. Whether the pro forma invoices are admissible as "electronic documents" under
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
2. Whether the pro forma invoices are admissible under the ordinary rules of
evidence.
Ruling:
1. No. The pro forma invoices are not electronic documents. A facsimile or telecopy is
not an electronic document. The deliberations in the Senate on RA 8792 states:
As drafted, ​it would not apply to telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes​, unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone
conversations since the information is not recorded. It would apply to
voice mail since the information has been recorded in or by a device
similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not covered. Though
when the video is transferred to a website, it would be covered because
of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a computer
system on a compact disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. ​A
computer or a similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as
printouts are themselves electronic records being just the means of
intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the
printout would be paper record subject to the usual rules about copies,
but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of
this bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose
computer origin is never again called on are treated as paper records. In
that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the record
is irrelevant to its reliability.
(tl;dr: the original printout of an electronic document, i.e. a document or
record that is either created or stored using a computer, is governed by
RA 8792. the photocopy of the original printout is governed by the
ordinary rules on evidence)
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 40
 In this case, a facsimile operates the same as a scanner or photocopier machine.
Meaning, the facsimile copy of the pro forma invoices are not admissible under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Thus, ordinary rules on evidence applies.
2. No. Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary
evidence, admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states:
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
namely:
(a) the loss or destruction of the originalwithout bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of
routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to
raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy;
and
(c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search
has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action,
more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.
SYC failed to prove the requisites of admissibility of secondary evidence. However,
the Court ruled in its favor since MCC did not object to some other facsimile pro
forma invoices presented by SYC.
SECTION 4. ORIGINAL OF DOCUMENT
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. SMP Inc (GR No. 175466 Resolution, Dec. 23, 2009)
Petitioner: ​BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
Respondent: ​SMP, INC.
Facts: ​Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as Sales Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the
acceptance and servicing of a purchase order of CLOTHESPAK MANUFACTURING
PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags or sacks of General purpose (GPS) polystyrene
products. The ordered products were delivered, for which delivery receipts were issued.
As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks in favor of plaintiff SMP and delivered the
same to Maria Teresa Michaela Ong. When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their
maturity dates, the drawee bank dishonored and returned said checks for the reason
"Account Closed."
In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company
against Clothespak for a recovery of sum of money with prayer for issuance of preliminary
attachment. The Court granted the writ.
Hence, the instant case is filed by SMP, Inc. to recover from the attaching bank the value of
the goods it claims ownership and for damages. SMP, Inc. alleges that there was wrongful
attachment of the goods for ownership of the same was never transferred to Clothespak.
The former anchors its claim of ownership over the goods by virtue of the Provisional
Receipt No. 4476 issued by Sales Executive Maria Teresa Michaela Ong to Clothespak with
the words, ​"Materials belong to SMP Inc. until your checks clear.​"
Defendant bank assails the admissibility of the receipt for it is a mere triplicate copy; the
original and duplicate copies were not presented in court, in violation of the Best Evidence
Rule. Neither was there secondary evidence presented to conform to the rule.
Issue: ​Whether the evidence is admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence
obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized exceptions when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 41

However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioner's contention, the receipt presented by
SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate copy of the provisional receipt
was executed at the same time as the other copies of the same receipt involving the same
transaction.
Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document. --
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of
inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
Originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals.
The ownership of the general purpose polystyrene products was retained by SMP, until after
the checks given as payment by Clothespak cleared. This was evidenced by provisional
receipt issued by SMP to Clothespak. The agreement between SMP and Clothespak
involved a contract to sell defined under Article 1478 of the Civil Code.
Capital Shoes Factory Ltd v. Traveler Kids Inc (GR No. 200065)
Petitioner: ​CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD.
Respondent: ​TRAVELER KIDS, INC.
Facts:
● Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL), a foreign
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and trading of children's shoes and
similar products, and respondent Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes,
sandals and other footwear entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed that
TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its China factory.
After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began manufacturing the
goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications of TKI. CSFL then
shipped the goods to TKI.
● It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of the purchase
price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the balance of seventy (70%)
percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from the date of delivery of
the goods.
● For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and shipments
made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. CSFL
granted numerous concessions and extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to
make a partial payment on its unpaid accounts.
● As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S.
$325,451.39, exclusive of the interest accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL also
manufactured $92,000.00 worth of children's shoes and sandals pursuant to the
design and specifications of TKI in its purchase orders. Both verbal and written
demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the payment of its unpaid accounts,
but to no avail.
● CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against TKI
before the RTC. ​During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified several sales
invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The latter
objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being presented were
mere photocopies.
● RTC issued the Order admitting all the exhibits offered by CSFL.
● TKI filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the exhibits formally offered by
CSFL were inadmissible in evidence for being mere photocopies.
● RTC issued the order denying TKI's motion for reconsideration, ruling that the
sales invoices and order slips could be admitted because the duplicate originals of
the invoices were already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL's
officer and principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu).
● Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorari with prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before
the CA in which it reiterated its argument regarding the inadmissibility of the
photocopied evidence.
● As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC continued the
proceedings and directed TKI to present evidence. TKI refused, citing the petition
for certiorari it filed with the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC considered TKI's
right to adduce countervailing evidence as waived and ordered CSFL to submit its
memorandum. 1
● CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI's petition. Applying Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the CA explained that while it was true that the original
copies of the sales invoices were the best evidence to prove TKI's obligation,
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 42
 CSFL merely presented photocopies of the questioned exhibits. It stated that
Chiu's testimony merely established the existence or due execution of the original
invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original invoices, only the
photocopies, contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: ​Whether the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips which were
duplicated originals
Ruling:
● Yes. Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 4. Original of
document. — (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
● Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL's principal witness, was able to satisfactorily
explain that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of
invoices and order slips, and not mere photocopies. (“Those originals are from our
company because one copy was sent to the customer and one we keep in our
company. Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office.”)
● The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly
explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular
transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court
combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the
documents offered were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with
her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were
prepared at the same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4 (b), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted
as part of the testimony of Chiu.
SECTION 5. WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS UNAVAILABLE
Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lagman (GR No. 165487)
Petitioner: ​COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION
Respondent: ​ANTONIO LAGMAN
Facts: ​: Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority
(NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay in his
warehouse. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse
Bond No. 0330 & 02355 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos
was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through
the NFA was the obligee.
In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were
executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with (Ban Lee Lim), (Reguine) and
Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country
Bankers and to reimburse Country Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to be
paid or become liable to pay thereunder
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the
loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the
warehouse receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety
bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the
(RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1
year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never
renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5 November 1990, Country Bankers
issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that
no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond
supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and
severally liable to pay Country Bankers. The trial court rationalized that the bonds remain in
force unless cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA and cannot be unilaterally cancelled
by Lagman.
Lagman anchors his defense on two (2) arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds have
expired and 2) the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which
allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to
produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the presentation of
secondary evidence; Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and
processed by Country Bankers; Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of
the 1990 Bond.
Issue: ​Whether a photocopy of a document is admissible as secondary evidence.
Ruling: NO. ​A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is
shown that the original is unavailable Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 43
 Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are
actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the
second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and
the fourth was in his possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for the non- production of the original instrument. When more than
one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may
not be used without accounting for the other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals,
Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond
but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country
Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for
the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989
Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure
the original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he
apparently was able to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented
with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the
original.
SECTION 6. WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS IN ADVERSE PARTY’S CUSTODY OR
CONTROL
Josef v. People (GR No. 146424)
Petitioner: ​ALBINO JOSEF ALBINO JOSEF,
Respondent:​PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AGUSTIN ALARILLA AGUSTIN
ALARILLA
Facts:
● From June to August, 1991, Josef, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of
shoes, purchased materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of leather
products from Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which the former issued a total of 26
postdated checks against his account.
● When Alarilla presented these checks for encashment, they were dishonored
because the accounts against which they were drawn were closed.
● Josef drew and delivered a new set of postdated checks in replacement of the
dishonored ones. Alarilla returned to Josef the originals of the dishonored
postdated checks but retained photocopies thereof. When Alarilla deposited the
replacement checks in his account these were also dishonored by the drawee
bank.
● As a result, the Alarilla led criminal complaints against Josef for violation of BP 22.
The Provincial Prosecutor led 26 Informations against Josef for the original 26
postdated checks.
● The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts and imposed the penalty of six
months for each conviction. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision,
affirmed the trial court.
● Josef claims the following defenses: 1) he has already paid private respondent the
amount of the checks in cash; 2) the trial court was incorrect to accept as evidence
photocopies of the original checks​ and 3) he acted in good faith.
Issue: ​WON the photocopies of the checks were admissible as evidence
Ruling: YES.
● The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
○ 1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for
value;
○ 2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
○ 3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
All three elements are present here.
● On the procedural aspect, Josef claims that, under the Best Evidence Rule, the
trial court should not have admitted in evidence the photocopies of the checks until
after he had been given reasonable notice to produce the originals. The Court of
Appeals, in disposing of this contentio stressed that the raison d'etre of the
proscription against the admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution
of the original thereof is to prevent the commission of fraud on the part of the
offeror who is in possession of the best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced
secondary evidence:
○ Josef admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the subject
checks were in his possession. He never alleged that the photostatic
copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence were not faithful
copies of the originals of the checks. By his testimony, he thereby
admitted that the photostatic copies of the checks were the faithful
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 44
 reproductions of the originals of the checks in his possession. Hence, the
Prosecution may mark and offer in evidence the photostatic copies of the - ​Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner
checks evidence the photostatic copies of the checks. pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then
○ Josef was thus estopped from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on
Revised Rules of Evidence. He cured whatever flaw might have existed in September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again offered to
the prosecution's evidence. repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check and
● Regarding petitioner's allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is replacing the same with two other checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for
immaterial, the offense in question being malum prohibitum.
P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then
returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to
Bayani Magdayao v. People (GR No. 152881)
make good on his promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00.
Petitioner​: ​ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO
Respondent​: ​PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
- ​After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his
counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial.
Facts:
- ​On September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City, Philippines, Engr, Bayani Magdayao,
- ​In a Special Manifestation, ​the petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the
knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution's failure to
bank, PNB, Dipolog Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
produce the original thereof. On July 8, 1996, the trial court issued an Order
make, draw, issue and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to
denying the petitioner's motion. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereon
the latter, PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of SIX
was, likewise, denied by the trial court.
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00), which check, when presented for
payment with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and refused payment for the
- ​On January 29, 1996, ​the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds, and despite repeated demands
petitioner of the crime charged. t​ he CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
made by the private complainant on the accused, the latter, failed to make good
of the trial court.
the check's value, to the damage and prejudice of RICKY OLVIS.
Issue:
- ​ hen arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
W
Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence t​hat which is substitutionary in
guilty.
nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court
- ​When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to
adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. The prosecution
Ruling:
presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination
No.
that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount
The Court ​agrees with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce
of P600,000.00.
in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more
specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor
- ​Olvis deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account with the
thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor.
BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check
for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion of
the check.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 45
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original thereof.
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice.
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse
party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court
and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must
prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the
said party to produce the document.
The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or ​via a ​subpoena duces tecum​, provided that the
party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party
has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
In this case, Olvis testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latter's offer to pay the
amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other
for P200,000.00.
In petitioner’s "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that
he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that
he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance
of the need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact
that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy thereof ​because the
original was in his possession​.
The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the
court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do
following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that of
the prosecution's.
SECTION 7. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC
RECORD
Saad Agro-Industries Inc v. Republic (GR No. 152570)
Petitioner:​ Saad Agro-Industries Inc
Respondent​: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for Lot
No. 1434, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon,
Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 said lot, while the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over the said lot.
​
Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of
Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a
complaint for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408
and and reversion of Lot No. 1434 to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the
issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous,
following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of
Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after Urgello filed a letter- complaint with the
Regional Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, DENR Region VII, Cebu
City, about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of dikes within the
area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to show that the
subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such
before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. According to the trial court, the
issuance of the free patent and title was regular and in order, and must be accorded full
faith. Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT, petitioner's purchase of the
property was also declared legal and valid. The trial court also denied the
complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 46

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's judgment. It held
that timber or forest lands, to which the subject lot belongs, are not subject to private
ownership, unless these are first classified as agricultural lands. Thus, absent any
declassification of the subject lot from forest to alienable and disposable land for agricultural
​
purposes, the officers erred in approving Orcullo's free patent application and in issuing the
​
OCT; hence, title to the lot must be cancelled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
invalidated the sale of the lot to petitioner. However, it declared that Urgello's Fishpond
Lease Agreement may continue until its expiration because lease does not pass title to the
lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be renewed.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR officer's testimony.
It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect that if there was no
classification yet of an area, such area should be considered as a public forest. Such
opinion was premised on the officer's construction of a provision of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on the land classification map (L.C.
Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961
as inadmissible, finding that "the plaintiff has not duly proved the authenticity and contents."
According to petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a certified true copy nor
one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official having legal custody of the original
thereof, and thus should not have been made the basis of the cancellation of the free patent
and title.
Issue:​ Whether the LC Map may be presented as evidence.
Held:​ No.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original title were truly
erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so. The Court
finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those of the appellate court are more in
accord with the law and jurisprudence.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest
​
reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961. However, at the hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial
court denied admission of the map for the purpose of showing that the subject lot falls within
a timberland reserve after respondent had failed to submit either a certified true copy or an
official publication thereof. The Court observes that the document adverted to is a mere
photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue print as insisted by respondent. A
mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map.
Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is unnecessary
since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public office. Evidence,
indeed, is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office. However, to prove its contents, there is a need to present a
​
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. In addition, while the L.C. Map
may be considered a public document and prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein,
the map, to be admissible for any purpose, must be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record.
Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent
inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve.
Bunagan-Bansig v. Celera (AC No. 5581)
Petitioner: ​ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG (BANSIG)
Respondent: ​ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA (ATTY. CELRA)
Facts:
Bansig filed a Petition for Disbarment against. Atty. Celera. On 8 May 1997 Atty. Celera and
Gracemarie Bunagan entered into a contract of marriage. Bansig is the sister of Bunagan.
On 8 January 1998, Atty. Celera entered into another contract of marriage with Ma. Cielo
Alba. Both marriages were evidenced by a certified true copy of the certificate of marriage
by the Civil Registry of Manila.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 47
Atty. Celera was ordered to file his comment. However, in more than five occasions he
employed dilatory tactics by constantly changing his address. He also did not file his
comment.
The IBP recommended for his disbarment.
Issue:
1. Whether the evidence submitted is admissible and sufficient to disbar Atty. Celera.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. –
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Barrozo/Daniel/Garcia/Generillo/Gonzales/Lapina/Tagoc​ 48