RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC.,APOLINARIO M.

ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO

BULAWIN, petitioners,vs.MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR.,in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B.
BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square
meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 2001 which it rented out to the public and became
the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.

On July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02,
Series of 2002 10 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others the construction of any
structures, permanent or temporary, on Capayas Island, except if authorized by the local government.
The approved the subject ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis
Occidental (SP).

Issue: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners?

Ruling: YES

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56.Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. —

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission
of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the
mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources of the SP. 35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed
from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB; 36 hence, it should
be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above.

Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.

1
3. [G.R. No. 187587. June 5, 2013.]

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES —
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondent.

[G.R. No. 187654. June 5, 2013.]

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, petitioner,
vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES — PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondent.

FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation.
The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.
(R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads:

"P.S. — This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos" 2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3
on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Issue: WON the addendum has the force and effect of law? Should be considered as part of the law
despite its non-publication?

Ruling: NO.

It is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette.

The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law and the Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the
note never had any legal force and effect.

2
1. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue
District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners, vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,
INC., Respondent.

DOCTRINE: A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of
days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up
to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."

FACTS:

Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in
1997. Respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 for the first quarter of 1997. Thus, claimed
for tax refund for amounting to ₱26,318,398.32

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer required Primetown to submit additional documents, however, its
claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition was filed within the two-year period.

HELD: Yes. The Petition was filed within the two-year period.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods.

3
G.R. No. 183449 : March 12, 2012]

ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault before the MTC. The MTC issued its Judgment
finding petitioner guilty. The RTC affirmed the judgment of the MTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, praying for an extended period of 15 days from
May 21, or until June 5, within which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for
review on June 5. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner argues that
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, “If the last day of the period, as thus computed,
falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run
until the next working day.”

Issue: Whether or not the period of extension commenced on May 19 (the original due date).

Held: Yes. The Court clarified the above-quoted provision when it issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, which
states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall be
counted from the original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for extension
was filed. The extension granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period.

In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19, a Saturday.
Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, the next
working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time.
Petitioner here should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21,
2007.

4
3. [G.R. NO. 174238 : July 7, 2009]

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent
spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00
each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution
to prove the elements of the crime. On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the
RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint for collection of a sum of money based on the same loaned amount
of P600,000.00 previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only
prospective application

ISSUE:

WON Rules on Criminal Procedure may be retroactively apply

RULING:

YES. Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even
to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.

5
 1. Famanila v. Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 76
FACTS:

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. (NFD) hired Roberto Famanila as messman for Hansa Riga, a
vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited. While
assisting in the loading operations when Hansa Riga, Famanila experienced dizziness and subsequently
collapsed. He was diagnosed of cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm.

Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines due to his condition and thereafter declared permanently,
totally disabled.

Authorized representatives convinced him to settle his claim by accepting the amount of US $13,200.
Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the receipt Feb. 20,1991 release. Petitioner
however filed a complaint praying for an award of disability benefits claiming that his disability vitiated his
consent which makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract is void and unenforceable due to vitiated consent.

RULING:

NO. there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated in account of his disabilities. A vitiated consent
does not make a contract void and unenforceable - A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement.

Under the civil code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influences or fraud. If
consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable. Disability is
not among the factors that may vitiate consent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6
 1. Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987
FACTS:

Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a
Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason
that this is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE:

WON a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in
question.

RULING:

YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of
law continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death.
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the
death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.

7
Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. 18176, October 26, 1966

FACTS:

Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able
to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until
1955. Eventually they pursued their separate way.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as,
the latter's whereabouts is unknown; summons was served by publication. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that
defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer. the lower court dismissed plaintiff's
complaint, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2)
that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject was subject to the jurisdiction before Philippine trial courts?

RULING:

Yes. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment
of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff
is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in
addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into
the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

2. ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010

FACTS:

Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA. Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one year. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period. Respondent
filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally
dismissed. Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner established its claim upon invoking the application of a foreign law.

RULING:

NO. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge. The employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract. Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones)
to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours.

8
Tuna Processing v Phi. Kingford, GR 185582, February 29, 2012

FACTS:

Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines while Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Due to circumstances, Kingford withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly, reneged on
their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against respondent. To enforce the
award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Award before the RTC of Makati City. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner
lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from
entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?

HELD:

YES. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case. The Act specifically provides
exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause, it becomes
bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity
of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of
the result.

Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS:

Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. Prior to his death,
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein. In the project partition, the executor divided the
residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd
marriages. Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children. The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:

TEXAN LAW. It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

9
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.

FACTS: Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates
issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of
Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County
Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate
court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering
Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated
appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in
the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the domiciary administrator in New York is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates in question.

RULING: No.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the
decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Moreover, probate court has authority to issue the order
enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of
stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to
"the stock certificates " be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation
owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts.

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners, vs. MINORU
KITAMURA, Respondent.

FACTS: Nippon Engineering, a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in
the infrastructure projects of the Philippine government entered into agreement with Kitamaru to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH
engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction
supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project
manager in the contract. Nippon’s general informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance
and damages filed by the respondent.

RULING: Yes. In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by
law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is
one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these
grounds unsound.

10
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

FACTS: (BMSI), hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected
by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon
International for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment
contract. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1
company.

Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action & forum
non conveniens. Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid
choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It
also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, which necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction.

RULING:
a. YES. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can
proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, Petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City,
HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS: On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also
married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single,
respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

ISSUE: WON the provisions of the Civil Code will apply and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING: YES. As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still
fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

11
8. SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner vs Atty. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent

FACTS: Petitioner Samson R. Pacasum (Pacasum) and respondent Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos)
were married on December 28, 1992.3 However, Pacasum discovered that Zamoranos was previously
married to one Jesus De Guzman (De Guzman) on July 30, 1982.4 On December 14, 2004, Pacasum filed an
administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against Zamoranos on the ground that she
had contracted a bigamous marriage.5

In her answer to the complaint, Zamoranos raised as a defense the dissolution of her previous marriage
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (the Muslim Code). 6 Prior to her marriage with De
Guzman, she had converted to Islam. In 1983, however, she and De Guzman divorced, as evidenced by
the Decree of Divorce7issued by Presiding Judge Kaudri L. Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court of Isabela,
Basilan in Case No. 407-92.8

ISSUE:

WON the Sharia Court can dissolve the first marriage of de Guzman.

RULING: Yes.

With respect to the divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman, the Decree of Divorce was issued on
June 18, 1992 by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul, who was the presiding judge of the Shari 'a Circuit Court,
Third Shari'a District, Isabela, Basilan.34 It states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman appeared when the
case was called for hearing. It further recites that both parties converted to the faith of Islam prior to their
Muslim wedding, and that it was Zamoranos who sought divorce by tafwid, with De Guzman having
previously delegated his authority to exercise talaq.35 Thus, on its face, the divorce appears valid, having
been issued for a cause recognized under the applicable law by a competent court having jurisdiction
over the parties. And, as neither party interposed an appeal, the divorce has attained finality.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-
be: “Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.” But the
next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram: “NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING
VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE”. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

ISSUE: WON there was in fact a breach of promise to marry was in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the NCC.

RULING:

YES. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite

12
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age.
Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated
such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal
knowledge. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job. In her state of unemployment
Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of
marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child
she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

ISSUE: WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her.

HELD: NO In its decision, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not
consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and
had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual
passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction. One cannot be
held liable for a breach of promise to marry.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS: Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral character and reputation, duly
respected in her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987, against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an
Iranian citizen. The complaint for damages is due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.

Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love
on the condition that they will get married. Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him
in Guilig, Dagupan City. A few weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, and
Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is already married to a girl in Bacolod City.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

HELD:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This,
notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on
account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background and poverty. From the beginning,
obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. His was nothing but pure lust which

13
he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal
of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino
concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.

MARY JANE ABANAG, Complainant, vs.NICOLAS B. MABUTE, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC), Paranas, Samar,Respondent.

FACTS: Abanag filed a complaint against Mabute for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct with the OCA,
alleging that the latter courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on his promise that he
would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She got pregnant, and Mabute tried to have her get an
abortion. When Abanag did not agree, Mabute grew cold and eventually left her. Her depression resulted
in a miscarriage.

Mabute filed his answer to the complaint, denying the allegations and claimed that the charges were
baseless, false, and fabricated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mabute can be administratively sanctioned on the grounds of breach of promise to marry?

HELD:

NO. The immoral conduct is defined as conduct that is willful, flagrant, and shameless, and that shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify
suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.

Mabute’s acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. SC finds
that the sexual relations between the parties were consensual. Mere sexual relations between two
unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.

Hermosisima V. CA 103 Phil 629

FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as

complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima,
as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Soledad then a teacher and
petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner
that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD:

It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee

overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the
present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to
the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

14
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former, his
mother and natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: On June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. In her complaint, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him
at Hotel Enrico and that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. Amelita asked Ivan to
bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita
inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they
repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, as a result of which Amelita got
pregnant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of promise to marry maybe a basis for recovery of damages?

RULING:

No, as regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the
theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the
Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.

ABUSE OF RIGHTS

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, petitioners, vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at
the second floor of Robinson's in Cebu City. She fitted two jeans then decided to purchase the black jeans
Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt. While she was walking a Guess
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted
that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. When she arrived at the Cebu
Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu
Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and
attorney's fees?

RULING:

Yes, there is an abuse of right.

Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay
for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official
receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify
from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not.
However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in
the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.

15
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now BDO UNIBANK, INC.), petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE D.
GOMEZ, respondent.

FACTS:

Josephine D. Gomez was a teller of the PCIB when a certain Harrington opened Savings Account. The
following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts issued by the Bank of New Zealand.

Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the
drafts were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. Flores answered in the affirmative.

The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that she had asked the
approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.

On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before
the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her
salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an abuse of right by PCIB?

RULING:

Yes, Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil
Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of
negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made
deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still pending. When Josephine asked for legal
and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any.

3. G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, vs. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building. Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages alleging that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property. In order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents illegally set-up and installed two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;

ISSUE: (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy. YES.

Ruling: The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. The RTC, thus, considered that
petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business
office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’
property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy.

16
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE
VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG,
Respondents.

FACTS: On January 21, 1991, Editha at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. Her daughter
Grace immediately send a telegram to her sister Zenaida thru RCPI for which she was issued a receipt. The
telegram was delivered to Zenaida 25 days later . On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a
messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger
who previously was assigned to deliver the same. On April 17, 1992, Editha died.

On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses,
filed a complaint against RCPI before the (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late
Editha for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of rights? YES.

Ruling : In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It took
25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not
only of Grace but also her co-respondents. It disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed
each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained
of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are
among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional
rights arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the
Court declared invalid in CIR vs. CA. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending
that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the scope of her authority.

Issue: May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office? YES.

Ruling: Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there
is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of
the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.

17
I. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,
JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.

FACTS: After twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with another woman. Charmaine subsequently filed a
criminal complaint for concubinage and the City Prosecutor found probable cause. Petitioner, in order to
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings and argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage.

RULING: No. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, and so long as there is no judicial declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a
woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage.

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites but they did not live
together. While his marriage with respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage. The
respondent when she learned about petitioner’s marriage another, filed an information charging petitioner
with bigamy with the (RTC) of Quezon City.

Petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent
on the ground that he was forced to marry her and that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by
another man at the time of their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a prejudicial question and had to be resolved first
before criminal and administrative case be rendered judgment?

RULING: No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private
respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue,
because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability, is untenable.

18
H. CAPACITY TO ACT

CATALAN, vs. BASA

FACTS:

On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service due to
his "schizophrenic reaction, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, and
pointless speech among others.

On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, a document was executed,
titled "Absolute Deed of Donation," wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN
one-half of the real property. Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus
Basa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation.

RULING:

Yes. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at
the time of the donation. A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the
evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the
fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the
incompetence of Feliciano.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant Geluz for the first time in 1948. In 1950, she became
pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her
parent, she had herself aborted by defendant. After the marriage w/ the plaintiff., she again became
pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by defendant. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant and she again
repaired to the defendant's clinic and was again aborted of a 2-month old fetus, in consideration of the
sum of P50. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages s upon the provisions of the initial Art. 2206 of the NCC.

ISSUE:

Whether an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may
recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:

No. This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a person, does
not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed w/ personality. Art. 41. For civil purposes, the
fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However,
if the fetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

19
1. Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu 37 Phil. 215

FACTS:

The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs
of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to
give their consent into the contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased mother
Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of
contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age.

HELD:

Yes. The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and entered into by
minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on
estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which state that “whenever a party has, by its own
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to
be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be
permitted to falsify it.

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADORMONREAL, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April 1994. It
was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder, where the victim was a guest and
suddenly shot at Llona with their guns.

For their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were at their family residence and drinking. The RTC
convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. It is
important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder.
What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, a minor during the time of the commission?

HELD/RATIO:

Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended. The witness positive
identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when
they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired
to kill and had done so with treachery. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due
to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age.

20
1. Hernandez vs Santos, G.R. No. 169217, August 7, 2009

FACTS:

Lulu inherited a considerable amount of property from her maternal uncle as well as from her mother. Her
father and step siblings administered her properties from 1969 to 1993. During the said period, a
considerable portion of her properties were fraudulently disposed of. When Lulu discovered this, she asked
the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita. Jovita was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight,
upon medical examination it was found out that the latter was suffering from tuberculosis, rheumatism, and
diabetes. Jovita, the respondent herein filed a petition for guardianship and alleged that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. The
petitioners questioned the order granting the petition for guardianship claiming that the opinions of Lulu’s
attending physicians regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in
psychiatry.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for guardianship should be granted? - YES

HELD:

Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental
sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted
with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Where the sanity of a person is
at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.

2. People v Bulagao, GR 184757, Oct. 5, 2011

FACTS:

While in the care of the DSWD, AAA testified that she was raped by her step brother Aniceto Bulagao on
two separate occasions. Later on after she was released from the custody of the DSWD, she recanted her
testimony and claimed that she only made up the stories because she was angry with her step brother.
Before the recantation, Bulagao in his defense claimed that he was suffering from mental retardation
based on the mental examination conducted upon him which yielded a result of an IQ below 50. Bulagao
was convicted hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Bulagao was proper? – YES

HELD:

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of
will at the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at
the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstances of insanity be considered.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. In this case, neither the acts nor the answers of the accused in his testimonies show
complete deprivation of intelligence of free will.

21
3. Oropesa v Oropesa, GR 184528, April 25, 2012

FACTS:

Nilo Oropesa, the son of General Cirilio Oropesa, filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of his
father alleging that the latter was afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for 10 years and that
his judgment and memory was impaired which made him an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by
people around him, particulary by her voluptuous chikababe girlfriend. Gen. Oropesa opposed the
petition for guardianship. The petition was denied and affirmed by the CA hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether General Oropesa is considered an “Incompetent” who should be placed under guardianship? –
NO

HELD:

A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.
Where the sanity of a person is at issue, experet opinion is not necessary and that the observations of the
trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice. In this case, it
is the observation of the court that the oppositor is still sharp, alert, and able.

4. Crewlink v Teringtering, GR 166803, October 14, 2012

FACTS:

On two occasions, Teringtering jumped off the vessel where he was employed as an Oiler. On the first
occasion, he was saved by a co-employee. But on the second, he successfully achieved his goal of
committing suicide. His wife now comes to the LA to ask that the company where her husband worked be
ordered to pay her a total of USD 58,000 for death compensation, among others. She claimed that the
reason her husband jumped off was because the latter suffered from a psychotic disorder or Mood
disorder Bipolar Type and that it was enough that he died during the term of his contract and while still on
board the vessel. The company claimed that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits because her
husband committed suicide. ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of USD 58,000 has reasonable basis? –

HELD:

No. The company was able to substantially prove that Jacinto’s death was attributable to his deliberate
act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that
her husband was suffering from mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to
support her claim of Jacinto’s insanity. The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial
evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left
with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer.

22
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee, vs. MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Two criminal cases were filed against Boaquina for the crime of rape of his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old
mental retardate whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the Accused-Appellant brought AAA to a house, which she
described to have many rooms. Thereat, the Accused-Appellant undressed her and himself, laid on top of
her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ. She resisted the
Accused-Appellant’s ravage acts by kicking him several times, but was overcome with fear because he
had a knife about five (5) inches long. After an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00 o’clock in the same
evening, the Accused-Appellant again raped her by undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina.
Again, she felt pain in her vagina. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant threatened to kill her if she told
anyone about the incident.

AAA also testified, among others, that the Accused-Appellant took her away from their house in one (1)
evening of February 2002 when her parents were then already asleep. They walked the streets and later
rode a Palces bus in which no other passengers were on board as it was already nighttime.

BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open court that the Accused-Appellant, who had been staying in their
house, is AAA’s uncle because the Accused-Appellant and her husband, CCC, are first cousins.
Preliminarily, BBB testified that AAA, who was born on April 16, 1982, attained an educational level of Grade
6 only because of her low comprehension and that she cannot even be relied upon to run errands as she
can only follow simple instructions or tasks if well-explained to her. AAA is unlike any normal child because
she cries and scampers away when there are visitors around; she has never attended any party, dance
events, or any social gathering; and had poor grades in school.

Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist conducted psychiatric and psychological tests on AAA. Dr. Escuadra
testified that AAA suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She also diagnosed AAA with mild
mental retardation because of her intellectual quotient (IQ) of only 55, which meant that her mental age is
equivalent to that of nine (9) to ten (10) – year old child. Dr. Escuadra elaborated that the psychiatric tests
and psychological tests performed on AAA are different from each other because the former refers to the
examination of the patient’s mental capacity while the latter refers to the evaluation of the patient’s
intelligence quotient. She also averred that AAA was poor in arithmetic and economics; that it took her
some time to answer even simple questions; that her answers were short and monosyllabic; and that AAA
cooperated during the sessions only when BBB is present. Finally, Dr. Escuadra testified that AAA disclosed
to her the events that transpired during the rape incident in February 2002.

The Accused-Appellant denied forcing AAA into a relationship with him and added that during his stay with
CCC’s family, he courted a female neighbor with whom AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings
for him. He dissuaded her at first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not become
sweethearts. Also, on one occasion, AAA went inside his bedroom and suggested that they should leave
the place since her parents will not approve of their relationship.

RTC - found accused-appellant guilty of rape

ISSUE: WON the prosecution failed to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that
he raped a woman who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason.

RULING: NO.

It is settled in jurisprudence that carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape
because such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.8 In a recent case, we had
declared that in cases of rape involving a victim suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or

23
intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between
the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.9

Previously in People v. Dalandas, the SC described in detail the nature of mental retardation as well as its
different degrees as defined in the modern and the old intelligence quotient (IQ) scales:

Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by
impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation
to the daily demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a
slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is
usually reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation
according to their level of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:

The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot,
having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-
year old child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent
to that of the average seven-year old child; (c) moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a
maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child.
Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In
People v. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who
was suffering from a "borderline mental deficiency."11

In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra who personally conducted the
psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established that the victim is afflicted with mild mental retardation. She
further testified that AAA was also suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA
possesses an IQ of 55 with a mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-year-old person.

In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadra’s testimony, appellant argued that Dr. Escuadra admitted that the
psychological test result was only furnished to her by the psychologist who conducted AAA’s psychological
exam and that the said psychologist was not presented in court.3 We find this argument unmeritorious.
What was clear from Dr. Escuadra’s testimony was that her psychiatric evaluation yielded the same
diagnosis as the psychological examination with respect to the victim’s mental retardation. 14 The
presentation of the psychologist who conducted the psychological examination could be dispensed with
as the same would have merely been corroborative.

In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the determination of mental retardation is deeply rooted in
medical psychology, we had previously ruled that evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can
prove mental retardation or abnormality.1 Furthermore, we held that mental retardation can be proved by
evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the
observation of the trial court.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the mental retardation of the victim was not proven,
we likewise uphold the appellate court in finding that AAA’s testimony adequately showed how appellant
utilized force and intimidation to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her.

While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be difficult to determine, still, it can
be ascertained by deducing from the manner she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime
committed. For as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, and her demeanor is consistent with one who has been a victim of
rape, bolsters her credibility with the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience, thus, must be
given full faith and credit.

24
Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded [person] may be a
credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court.20

(e) Civil Interdiction

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May
2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos
admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that
the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated
that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the
order of probation.

ISSUE:

WON Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City.

RULING:

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment
is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for
any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any
time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false
material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still
states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving
the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can
file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 40, Local Government Code:

25
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.

Revised Penal Code:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if
conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this

article shall last during the term of the sentence.

26
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right
of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage
shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in
any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of
the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective
public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so
run.

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he
stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor?

The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition
under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a
ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against
Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor,
a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code
can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law
expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

27
NATURAL PERSONS

Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of.
Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art. 2206 which CA sustained.

ISSUE:

WON husband can claim damages for the death of the unborn fetus?

HELD:

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth
determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was
aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action
for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There
could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it
received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can
recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the
abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the
husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against theappellant,
but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

2. Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for
Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was on her
38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed
that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or
must have acquired juridical personality.

Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus
without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit:
1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further
contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence,
according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived.

Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N only one with juridical personality can die.

28
HELD:

No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all
definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.

ISSUE:

W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.

HELD:

Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks
without depending upon its mother.

3. Quimiging v Icao, 34 SCRA 134

Facts:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had
close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, she
became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
for monthly support (P120.00), damages and attorney’s fees.

Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the
orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for
amendment of complaint.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a
child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further
amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint
to state a cause of action.

Issue:
Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held:
Yes. Petition granted.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It
is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb).

29
4. De Jesus v. Syquia

G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933

FACTS:

Cesar Syquia was 23 years old and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila possessing a
considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in
Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia
Loanco, 20 year old unmarried girl was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in
making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten
with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor and he even wrote a letter to
a rev. father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he
was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and
“junior’s” sake. The defendant asks his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements
at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they
lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly
departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the note to the padre with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

RULING:

The recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the
case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice
to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement
in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that
the writing shall be indubitable.

It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights
and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the
acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different
from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific
name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child
requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

30
It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in
which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enceinte a second time, when the idea entered the defendant’s head of abandoning her. The
law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father’s resolution to concede the status.
The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is
unimportant. The word “continuous” in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.

The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach
of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary
to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

5. Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante

FACTS:

Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an
ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. Fragrante dies while his application was still pending.  At the time of his death,
his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the
deceased through authorizing the said intestate estate with its special or judicial administrator, appointed
by the Court, to maintain and operate the plant.

Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante cannot be substituted as the applicant for
the deceased and is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of
the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was
applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as
deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived
after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the

31
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of
those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of
the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death like his pending application at the commission.

6. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics

G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976

FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate
of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized
to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria’s land, which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was
levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security
under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on
Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy
sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of
Oria’s testate estate.

ISSUE:

Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in
juridical capacity.

RULING:

Yes. The lower court’s decision in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria’s land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. Quality Plastics upon
receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumlaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they
acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

Pertinent provisins of the Civil Code state that:

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and
by will.

32
No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. He had no more
civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost
through death.

7. G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional
Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for
"Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS,
NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

PADILLA, J.:

DOCTRINE: Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

BP Blg. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.”

Article 294: “The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be
made in the following order: Among descendants and ascendants the order in which they are called to
the intestate succession of the person who has a right to claim support shall be observed.”

FACTS:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein
private respondents filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite
her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time
the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner
Tomas Eugenio.

The RTC in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
Christian Missionary, Inc. Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal
custody of her body. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent
court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action. A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

33
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of
the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is
not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the
Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner and held that the ultimate facts show that if the
person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the Vargases as
the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court,
considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only
revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body
of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec.
19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the RTC then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants
or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman.

ISSUES:

1. W/N RTC had jurisdiction over such proceedings and/or had authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead. YES, Court did not lose
jurisdiction over the nature and matter of the case because it could entertain the case through
allegations of the petition as to who should be given the custody of the deceased’s body by virtue
of Batas Pambansa Bld. 129.
2. W/N custody of the deceased’s body should be given to the deceased’s siblings. YES, Article 294
used as basis; Since the deceased had no surviving spouse, children, or ascendants, custody of the
body fell onto her siblings because Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages.

RULING:

1.) Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that
what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the
nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be
granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana
was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima
facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is
insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements
and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ
of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise
of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition.

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in
order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are

34
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as
a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

2. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the
rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine
Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled
in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists
in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between
a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

8. G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

TUASON, J.:

Doctrine: Evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

FACTS: (From CA’s findings) On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging,
the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought

35
refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and
San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding
around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside
the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the
ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek
a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former
neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was
shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front
of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed,
trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the
shelter because the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino
Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and
his daughter-in-law.

"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67
years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while
the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."

These finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the
holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and
the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory
presumption must be applied. The reasoning of the CA for its conclusion is that the testimony of the sole
witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German
Club in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes
after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we
may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the instant his
son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that
Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have
died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like
her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by
splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we
can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she
died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died later than her son, and we
are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. Indeed, it could be said that the purpose
of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence
the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who
was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

The main question represented in the RTC and CA related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have occurred in
this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd.
Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was
declared to have survived his mother.

It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The
importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice
versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present
petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the
deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

36
It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of
evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under
article 33, be held to have died at the same time.

ISSUE: WON Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother Angela Joaquin. YES, based on the testimony of
Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be arrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The
presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should
prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect(3) circumstantial or (4) inferential.

RULING: Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not
(1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of
the sexes, according to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would
inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and
no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it
present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific
evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the
facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different
legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)

It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the
evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where
there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

It is our opinion that the testimony of Francisco Lopez contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out
of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was
the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15
meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and
unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had
tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from
leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time,
of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left
her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not

37
so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred
about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was
the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin
Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was still alive when her son
expired.

The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs.
Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative, and the probabilities, in the light of the known
facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow
the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away from protective walls.
Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the
Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela
Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its
collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly
not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for
"inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate,
4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co.,
80 N.Y.). 622.)

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory —
that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.

ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER

1. G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN
DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
City, Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

DOCTRINE: Rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

FACTS: Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) and petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz
(Jenie) were living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but

38
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino".

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live
Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father 3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit
of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino. 4 Both affidavits attested,
inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child,
and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions
of which read:

AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19

YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER
31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN
OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME
IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.

xxxx

AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA

CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN,
TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS,
THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE
BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR
HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL.6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

By letter,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s
application for registration of the child’s name because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child
(either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity –
or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to
Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name is a
violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides that an illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique
constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the
above-quoted provision of law.

The trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned,
citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten

39
document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows: 2.2 Private
handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by
him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. The trial court held that even if Dominique was the
author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of
paternity.1avvphi1Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the
private handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by
him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for
the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted
provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16

Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the child’s paternity.17 The OSG, in its
comment, submits that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his]
paternity of the child.

ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can
be considered as a recognition of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation
of Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. NO. 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his
father’s surname. YES.

RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. 19

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition
by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. x x x x

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
XXX
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed
by petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the

40
child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography
have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in
2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique
died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they
sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions
affecting him.22 It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development."25

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his
birth certificate.

2. G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners, vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

DOCTRINE: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular
accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of
which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which
stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and,
(2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was
changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

41
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They
contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between
Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage
between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

Petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation,
the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to
Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick
as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous.

On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, dismissed the petition without
prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a
family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
having been denied, they filed the present petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14

ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct
entries in the civil registrar? NO

RULING: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry
in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or
a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
and due process is properly observed.16

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records 17 and
that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art.
17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
provided in said Code.1avvphi1

42
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted
marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on
the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the
therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to
declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth
but to establish that they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no
blood relation at all between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with
"Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed
as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not
Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to
be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to
be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present
case.

3. G.R. No. 170645 July 9, 2010

NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS, substituted by FRANCISCO BALDOS and MARTIN BALDOS, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a. REYNALDO ESTARES BALDOS, Respondents.

DOCTRINE

Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the civil
register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity. It is not
for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the
certificate to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth.

FACTS

Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was not
registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on 11 February 1985. His
certificate of live birth5indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves
Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.

On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint,6 docketed
as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that
Reynaldo was not really her son.

43
RTC OLONGAPO’s Decision

In its 16 August 1999 Order,7 the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned as
follows:

A thorough examination of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the evidence of the defendant
shows that apart from the scornful denial of plaintiff that defendant is her son, all documentary evidence
available points to the contrary. The declaration of two disinterested persons, who were neighbors of the
petitioner and his deceased husband, has never been refuted.

No one was presented by plaintiff to corroborate her stand.

Undeterred, Nieves appealed to the Court of Appeals. She insisted that the late registration of Reynaldo’s
birth was contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 (P.D. No. 651).

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 8 August 2005 Decision,9 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Order. The appellate court held
that P.D. No. 651 did not proscribe the late registration of births of persons born before 1 January 1974. The
Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of the decree was to encourage registration of births as well
as deaths.

ISSUE

Whether or not the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.

RULING

YES.

Since Reynaldo was born on October 30, 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of
P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo's birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known
as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on February 27, 1931. As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to
the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as amended, occurring from February
27, 1931 onwards. Considering that the late registration of Reynaldo's birth took place in 1985, National
Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation of
Act No. 3753 in this case.

Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the local civil registrar
within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the reglementary period is
considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed registration of birth,
is required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending application for delayed registration.
If after ten days no one opposes the registration and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt
that the birth should be registered, he should register the same.

Reynaldo's certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have gone through
the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on March 8, 1995, after the lapse of
ten long years from the approval on February 11, 1985 of the application for delayed registration of
Reynaldo's birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should have done so within the ten-day period
prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth
of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo
was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping
statements of Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.

44
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the civil
register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
there. As a public document, a registered birth certificate enjoys the presumption of validity. It is not for
Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his birth certificate, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate
to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the CA correctly
denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo's birth.

Petition is DENIED. Resolution of the CA is AFFIRMED.

Notes:

Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act Requiring the Registration of Births and Deaths in
the Philippines which Occurred from 1 January 1974 and thereafter, provides:

Sec. 1. Registration of births. — All babies born in hospitals, maternity clinics, private homes, or elsewhere
within the period starting from January 1, 1974 up to the date when this decree becomes effective,
irrespective of the nationality, race, culture, religion or belief of their parents, whether the mother is a
permanent resident or transient in the Philippines, and whose births have not yet been registered must be
reported for registration in the office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth by the physician, nurse,
midwife, hilot, or hospital or clinic administrator who attended the birth or in default thereof, by either
parent or a responsible member of the family or a relative, or any person who has knowledge of the birth of
the individual child. The report referred to above shall be accompanied with an affidavit describing the
circumstances surrounding the delayed registration.

Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. — The registration of the birth of babies referred to in the preceding
section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree without fine or fee of
any kind. Babies born after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending physician, nurse, midwife,
hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in default of the same, by either parent or a responsible member
of the family or any person who has knowledge of the birth.

The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or the hospital or clinic
administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register the new born child. If there
was no attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the parents or
the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of failure to register the new
born child.

4. G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs.

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DOCTRINE

Registration of the foreign divorce decree should be done with judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

FACTS

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert

45
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration
of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

RTC LAOAG’s Ruling

The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES (related to the topic of ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER)

1. Whether or not the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted out of line in registering the foreign decree
of divorce.

RULING

1. YES!

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of
the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign

46
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1a

ISSUE (Persons and Family Relations)

2. Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

2. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.”

The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

5. G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG), Respondent.

DOCTRINE

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

FACTS:

47
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez
Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." 2 Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college 3 showing that he carried the surname
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. 4 In the 1998,
2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using
the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."5

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,6 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20,
2008.8 And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court
which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte

By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil
Registrar of Makati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in
herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";

3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]…
(emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial
court by Order of July 2, 2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court
on pure question of law.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through
appropriate adversarial proceedings.

48
RULING:

YES.

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings. Since respondents desired
change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and not Rule 103. Rule 108
clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the
entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before
the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from
improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in
the case.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated

49