[CASE BrieF NO.

2010-0097]
Maelotisea S. Garrido vs.
Attys. Angel E. Garrido and
Romana P. Valencia

It is not important that the acts complained of were committed before the lawyer complained of was
admitted to the practice of law.
Date: August 10, 2019Author: staredecisis2 Comments

CASE BrieF NO. 2010-0097

CASE: Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Attys. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia

[A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010]

PONENTE: Per Curiam

SUBJECT:

1st Legal Ethics:

i. Lawyer’s Oath;

ii. Disbarment Case– Gross Immorality; Desistance of the Private complainant;

Prescription; Good Moral Character

iii. Code of Professional Responsibility – Canon 7

iv. Practice of Law

“It is not important that the acts complained of were committed before the lawyer

complained of was admitted to the practice of law. “

FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.

Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) be-

fore the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging

them with gross immorality.

Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.

Sometime in 1987, one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked

with her claiming that the former is a child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her

daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall to-

gether with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and An-

geli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively.

Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating

among others that the said child is the daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia.

In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their resi-

dence. Since he left the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give

Maelotisea the needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who

stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as

he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Mae-

lotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. As

he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Gar-

rido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided

his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial dif-

ficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial

support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children

were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Vic-

torino, who finished a special secondary course.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became

a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the

death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea

were born before he became a lawyer.

On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She

explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the mar-

riage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage

of Atty. Garrido with Constancia.

In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Mae-

lotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she wanted to

maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) chil-

dren.

ISSUES:

1st Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the

alleged immoral acts were committed before he was admitted to the Philippine

Bar?

2nd Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.

3rd Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.

4th Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense that the marriage between Atty. Garrido

and Maelotisea is void tenable.

RULING:

A. Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determi-

nation of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Ad-

mission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is

a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.

The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the com-

plaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he ap-

plied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a

member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the

acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the prac-

tice of law. The possession of good moral character is both a condition prece-

dent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to re-

tain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not pre-

clude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question

concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a

lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable

presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this

may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admis-

sion to the Bar.

B. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the na-

ture of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affi-

davit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the dis-

barment proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these

proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after

she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s ex-

amination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance.

We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to

disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely because of compassion

(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing

friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

C. The undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.

Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbar-

ment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the

highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;

thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other

women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his rea-

son for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclu-

sive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he

was already married to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an ex-

cuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstand-

ing the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of

an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while

his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral

and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and

on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea

upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a

daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia

(who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his mar-

riage with Maelotisea was not “valid.”

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in

Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into

while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohab-

ited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his

wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more

than ten (10) years.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profes-

sion, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of

the ethical rules of the profession.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that

show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of

the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a

criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when

committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the com-

munity’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of

disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,

conduct.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his

admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsi-

bility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage in unlaw-

ful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which

demands that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the le-

gal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which pro-

vides that, “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fit-

ness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a

scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”

D. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea

was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who

bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off

Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man

with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Gar-

rido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driv-

ing him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship

with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s

presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children

for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed

outside of the prism of law.

Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Respon-

sibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profes-

sion. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the high-

est standards of morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of

good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and

must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the commu-

nity. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to

the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective real-

ity. To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics

of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opin-

ion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held

by the public in the place where she is known. The requirement of good moral

character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to

protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4)

to protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as

the other.

The Fallo:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,

violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03

of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immoral-

ity, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

———————————————-

THINGS DECIDED:

A) Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of

a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.

B) It is not important that the acts complained of were committed before the law-

yer complained of was admitted to the practice of law.

C) The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a con-

tinuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in

the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial

inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral

fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo).

D) In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of

disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, complainant’s affidavit of de-

sistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceed-

ings.
E) Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but

must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance

with the highest moral standards of the community.

F) The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1)

to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect pro-

spective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is

as important as the other.

‘Stand by things decided’ ~ Stare Decisis

People v Leoncio Santocildes, Jr. Y Siga-an

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2013
FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine years old. The court ren-

dered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However, during the proceeding, accused-appel-

lant was not represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a Notice of Appeal and praying that

the judgment against him be set aside on the ground that he was denied of his right to be represented

by a counsel which results to the denial of due process. The Office of the Solicitor General maintains

that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during the trial was not a member of the Bar, he

was afforded due process since he was given opportunity to be heard and records reveal that said per-

son handled the case in a professional and skillful manner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine Bar may represent an accused in a criminal

proceeding.

HELD:

NO.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even

the most intelligent or educated man may be convicted without a counsel, not because he is guilty but

because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. A person has

the right to due process, he must be heard before being condemned - a part of person's basic rights.

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in the Constitution (Art. III,Secs. 12 & 14(2)], Rules of

Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1 of Rule 115), Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and the Rules of Court (Sec.

1 of Rule 138)

The assailed judgment is Set Aside, and the case is hereby Remanded to the trial court for new trial.

People v Leoncio Santocildes, Jr. Y Siga-an PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY
GODOY JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REY-
NOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON - Case Digest
Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY

JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON

Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Rey-
noso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial
board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written
by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994
issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The com-
plaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, dis-
courteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the
integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice ob-
jectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases
filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic re-
view.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is com-
mitted against a lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate or Higher Court

Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or
the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sover-
eign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdic-
tion has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given con-
troversy. Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal
effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the
one contemned will punish a given contempt.

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for con-
tempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are
triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and
respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: and in or-
der that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedi-
ence to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the
general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:

1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper re-
gional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a pros-
ecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the
case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves ques-
tions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the differ-
ent courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representa-
tive of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the author-
ity and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appel-
late court , and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with con-
tempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both the
moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as
the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses
against the administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punisha-
ble by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may
have made the order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to
the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate to the
subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its
parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divi-
sions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a
given matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the
most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The
cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is availa-
ble after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not
available in a contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper cir-
cumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of or-
ders entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute
which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdic-
tion before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where
contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa.
Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is
taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such
contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main
case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqual-
ified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt
proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the
regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge
and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of or-
ders so entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for
contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need
to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial
extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by an-
other court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for
contempt of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punish-
able in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on
the basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of
the right to be
tried before the court actually contemned.

The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the
entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the ap-
pellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there
is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the ap-
pellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for in-
direct contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has
accordingly resolved the same.