Case #67

G.R. No. L-22794 January 16, 1968

RUFO QUEMUEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Manglapus Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of libel, 1 with which he is
charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and
eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but imposed, instead the
penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the
offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six (6) months, in case of
insolvency, aside from the costs.

Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because: 1) it
awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from the
decision of the trial court, which made no award of such nature; 2) the assessment of
damages in a criminal case, in which the civil action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial
courts (and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof that damages had been sustained
by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity
constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional.

Petitioner's contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased 2 and the indemnity is part of
the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas vs. Director of Prisons, 3 this Court held that:

The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty, it being expressly provided by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that
every person criminally liable is civilly liable.

Although the authority to assess damages or indemnify in criminal cases is vested in trial
courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passess to the appellate
court. Thus, this Court has, in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial
court, although the offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party
who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the accused. 4
As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered mental anguish, lost
sleep, or could not look his neighbor straight in the eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very
nature, libel causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the
offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel
cases; that "where the article is libelous per se" — as it is in the case at bar — "the law
implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases is not "required to introduce
evidence of actual damages," at least, when the amount of the award is more or less
nominal, as it is in the case at bar. 5

Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt", within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of "debt". Insofar as said
injunction is concerned, "debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from
contract", express or implied. In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the
case at bar arises, however, from a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As a consequence,
the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not violate the
constitutional injunction. 6

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Rufo Quemuel.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
CASE #68
ORIEL MAGNO v. CA, GR No. 96132, 1992-06-26
Facts:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he did not
have complete equipment... he lacked funds with which... to purchase the necessary equipment to
make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International
Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed... car repair service equipment of which Mancor
was a distributor. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
(Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance for
brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of
the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00.
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that
the same would be paid as... a short term loan at 3% interest.
petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement
After the documentation was completed, the equipment... were delivered to petitioner who in turn
issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the
same to Corazon Teng.
Issues:
four counts of the aforestated charges subject of... the petition... petitioner could not pay LS Finance
the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that
petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit.
Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4)
checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
Ruling:
finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg.
22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-
35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective... amounts reflected in subject checks
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the
loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to
continue paying possibly... due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just
that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable
in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No.
22) violated.
It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with
regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was... covered by L.S. Finance Management.
the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
Principles:
the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree.
CASE #69

ROSANA ASIATICO Y STA. MARIA v. PEOPLE, GR No. 195005, 2011-09-12

Facts:
Petitioner Rosana and her co-accused Aldrin Estrella y Sta. Maria (Aldrin) were charged in
two (2) separate Informations with violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 before the RTC.
have in her possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic containing
0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,... commonly known as "shabu,"
Rosana pleaded not guilty
Around 8:00 p.m. of January 19, 2005, an informant went to the office of the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force... to report the illegal drug trade of accused-
appellant alias "Joy" and Aldrin alias "Amok" in Barangay Bagong
Silang.
the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area with the informant. They parked their mobile
car along Daang Bakal Street and proceeded to strategical locations. PO1 Angara and the
informant headed to J. Luna Street where accused-appellant was allegedly... selling "shabu."
The informant spotted accused-appellant and together with PO1 Angara, they approached
her. He introduced PO1 Angara as buyer of "shabu." PO1 Angara wanted to buy three
hundred pesos (P300) worth of "shabu." The accused-appellant only had two... hundred
pesos (P200) worth in her possession but she assured PO1 Angara that more supplies were
coming. After a few minutes, Aldrin arrived in the scene and showed them two (2) plastic
sachets containing three hundred pesos (P300) worth of "shabu." All of a sudden,... Aldrin
decided to back out then whispered to accused appellant that there was something bulging on
the waist of poseur-buyer. PO1 Angara sensed that his disguise was discovered and he
immediately performed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap. PO1 Madlangbayan...
immediately advanced to arrest accused appellant and Aldrin.
recovered one (1) plastic sachet from her. PO1 Angara frisked Aldrin and recovered two (2)
plastic sachets from him.
Issues:
the propriety of the penalties imposed,
Ruling:
We, however, modify them for they are not in accord with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL)
RA 9165 provides that illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is penalized
with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine
ranging from three hundred thousand pesos (PhP 300,000) to four hundred... thousand pesos
(PhP 400,000).
The imposed fine of PhP 300,000 is proper under the premises. As regards the imprisonment
sentence, the courts a quo erred in imposing a straight penalty of "imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one day."
Sec. 1 of the ISL mandates that, in case of a special... law, the accused shall be sentenced "to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." Thus, applying the ISL to the imposable penalties... under Sec. 11(3) of RA 9165,
We find, under the circumstances, the penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, to be
proper.
Rosana Asiatico is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as... minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum.
Principles:
RA 9165 provides that illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is penalized
with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine
ranging from three hundred thousand pesos (PhP 300,000) to four hundred... thousand pesos
(PhP 400,000).
case #70

GR No. 164891

June 6, 2011

Virginia M. Guadines v. Sandiganbayan, Et. Al.

Facts: Petitioner ownes and manages V.M. Construction Supply, an entity that provides

construction materials. There was a bidding conducted by the municipal treasurer of the

Polilio, Quezon, Naime Ayuma, upon the instruction of the Provincial Treasurer of

Quezon. The contract was eventually awarded to the petitioner’s company. Subsequently,

a purchase order was issued by the Provincial Government of Quezon for construction

materials in the total price of P 83,228.00. On a later date, the materials, consisting of

lumber were stockpiled along the road about five meters away from the Navotas Bridge.

A team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources officials then confiscated

73 pieces of lumber stockpiled by the petitioner-supplier. Custody of these lumber were

taken by Bernie Azaula, who was then Barangay Captain and member of the

Sangguniang Bayan. Upon the completion of repair and construction of the said bridge in

accordance with Kapasiyahan issued by the Municipal Government, despite warnings

from forest rangers, payment was made in favor of the petitioner, as the specified

contractor in the agreement, pursuant to the purchase order. Thus, petitioner questions the

decision of the Sandiganbayan to return said amount to the Province of Quezon. The

Sandiganbayan has reduced the amount, representing payment of confiscated lumber to

P 70,924.00

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is authorized to receive payment for fulfillment of her

obligations in the contract.

Held: The Supreme Court, in concurrence with the decision of the Sandiganbayan, held that the

petitioner is not authorized to receive payment. In the first instance, the lumbers provided
were acquired in a manner contrary to forestry laws. Therefore, it caused undue injury to

the government. Also, the High Court held that basic is the rule that contracts should not

be contrary to existing laws and regulations When the government confiscated the

materials consisting of lumber, they have acquired ownership over the thing. Thus, the

right of ownership by petitioner ceased upon confiscation. The Sandiganbayan, in its

decision, cited Article 1240 of the Civil Code, which states that payment shall be made to

the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest

or any person authorized to receive it. Since the lumber had already been confiscated, the

petitioner has no right to receive payment. The payment of the made in her favor by the

Province of Quezon did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, petitioner’s claims were

found without merit.

case #71

Alonte vs. Savellano - GR No. 131652, March 9, 1998

BAYANI M. ALONTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR.,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping

Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was
alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s
house. The case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Biňan. The
counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit
of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of
venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to
the Manila Regional Trial Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found
probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness
of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented
that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further
deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no
showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it ―not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.‖ Mere silence
of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has
not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision
earlier promulgated is nullified.
CASE #72

People vs. Gaffud

G.R. No. 168050. September 19, 2008

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Bernardino Gaffud
Ponente: C.J. Puno

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. was found guilty of two (2)

counts of murder for killing Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador by
means of fire. Evidence for the prosecution presented the following:

1) That on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador, while on his way
to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador, heard two gunshots and
thereafter saw the house of his uncle burning. He saw three persons
within the vicinity of the burning house, one of whom he identified as
appellant Gaffud, Jr.
2) That Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at about 8:00 PM that
evening, heard successive gunshots and saw the deceased’s house
burning.
3) That prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado Ballang saw the
appellant a few meters away from the house of the deceased.
4) That earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of
Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, went to the house of
the appellant to inquire about her husband’s share in the construction of
the barangay hall. Dominga also related that had earlier filed a complaint
against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.

In his appeal, the appellant argued that the court failed to rule and
resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, despite the fact that there was
no proof as to what overt acts he committed which would constitute the
crime of murder.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2)
separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.

HELD:
1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule is that in the
absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in
the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear
and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. In the case at
bar, however, direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of
the victims was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no longer essential for the
conviction of accused-appellant.

2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime, although two or more
crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The burning the
house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter
and his daughter, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime
of double murder. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime.