G.R. No.

L-30061 February 27, 1974 (55 SCRA 607)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Ponente: Antonio, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.
FACTS:
On September 5, 1964, the accused admitted and was found to be in possession
of a revolver and the ammunition without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be
entitled to exoneration because he had appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties
as peace officer. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs.
Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero, wherein the accused were acquitted for through
their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be “peace officers.”
Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court
found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on
the ground that the rulings in Pp vs. Macarandang and in Pp vs. Lucero were reversed
and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, wherein the accused was convicted although he was
a confidential/secret agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that
confidential/secret agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license
to carry a firearm. Hence, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
RULING:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New
Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by the
Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally
passed, since the court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretatio
legis vim obtinet”— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
 Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant
may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is
acquitted, with costs de oficio.