THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

1957-02-28 | G.R. No. L-10016

D E C I S I O N EN BANC Mariage – Void Marriage - Bigamous

LABRADOR, J.: Appeal

Facts:

The accused marry Maria Gorrea in Cebu City. While his wife was still living, he also married Maria Faicol
in Iloilo City. Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939.

After said death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City only to suffer injuries to her eyes because
of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. And on January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria
Faicol to iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.

During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Magsalang on
October 3, 1953, in Cebu.

Issue:

Controlling: Whether or not Proceso Aragon’s second marriage is valid

General: Whether or not the accused (Proceso Aragon) is liable for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Code

Ruling:

No. The accused was freed from the special contract of marriage when his first wife died, however, the
second marriage is illegal and void because the marriage was contracted while his first wife was still
subsisting.

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of Act 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.
(People v. Mendoza)

No, Article 349 of the Revised Code punishes only 'any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.' Since the complaint was instituted by
the second wife, whose marriage with the Proceso Aragon was void because it was not renewed after the
death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into, the prosecution for bigamy cannot
prosper. Notably, the last marriage was a valid one.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the
second bigamous marriage. So ordered
Dissenting Opinion:

REYES, A., J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said"

"Article 349 of the Revised Code punishes with prision mayor 'any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.'

"Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts.

"'This is a sound opinion.,' says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz.,
3145, 'and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that until be competent
authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the
attack in the family exists.'"

I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate
the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.