[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May
I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that
‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should
either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage
in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."
(Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863,
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who
do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least
some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-
giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from
it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the constraints
are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in
particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law
is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends,
the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach
to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques
of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications
that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems
to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the
organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A
bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management responsibilities; and (3)
a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy
at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role
as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making
roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit,
Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems
— physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used
to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international
joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the
legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense
of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate activities,
he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up
of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).chanrobles law
library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat
of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the
laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec.
In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
(Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer
(such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising,
they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed
only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure
to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the
equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but
to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by
Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice,
as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by
means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine
Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705
for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a
party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano
Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or
the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the
rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave
Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of
Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer
before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002
with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance
the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on
the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner
having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT
[GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT
WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular
No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein
petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and
is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal
or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section
34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under
Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear
before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself
as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly
clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of
a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason,
the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its
Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for
indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results
from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic rule applies in the
instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute
the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR.,
Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo,
Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for
their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the
attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before
the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any
formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates.
Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954
underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed
that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to
submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E.
Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject
upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain
a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the
Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo
filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang
filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came
on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office
Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the
deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative
Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also
underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law
resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo
Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8,
1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same
university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not
remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to
submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was
not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-
examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back
the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook
is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3%
to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers
because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself
had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have
always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the
chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8,
1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's
code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing
code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because
it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that
I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee
in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the
grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had
used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had
not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state
that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether
I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as
much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant
was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review,
it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance
in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some
of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee
had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he
would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised
mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as
to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me
in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested
me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was
short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously
given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was in
order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my
re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
 xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that
it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the
said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar
examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade
to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613
in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of
the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation
on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with
requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19
of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when
released is final and irrevocable.
 It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so
doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left
alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that
he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained
a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way
of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade
thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer,
stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their
respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-
Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of
so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards
the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence
of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-
Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of
the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-
Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27,
1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific
War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I
got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As
the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners
for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the
committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political
and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
 re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated,
that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made
known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that
I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial,
may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he
was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he
"was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he
stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as
required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should
it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of
former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this
man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as
having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination
papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must
have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired
revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes
a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather
low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the
time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six
subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing
that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given
said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark
and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was
in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject,
Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet.
The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house
a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and
the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent
Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the
request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After
the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V,
pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal
Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the
passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and
likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation;
but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the
Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential
Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period
(Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects,
including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious
scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A &
B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a
bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration
or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would
not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the
notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions.
According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook
has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30,
rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight
(8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for
that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that
he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline
of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and
1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray
the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37,
rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the
initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted
during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed
in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine
Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general
average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's
original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg
and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he
will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the
Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well
as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of
more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be
more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang
to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of
the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent
Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said
re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang
would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three
(3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his
suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the
papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was
revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL
MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo
Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.)
and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification
in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the
Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when
he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31,
rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this
is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and
is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50%
as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo
in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in
all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V,
pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any
case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17,
rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the
Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken
up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case
brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved
Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo,
allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades
in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
 BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject,
had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum
and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing
the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should
be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the
un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile
Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1)
previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these
facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8)
members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court
and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of
the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must
be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose
position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated
by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar
Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether
or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's
admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the
Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of
one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases
involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court
all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably,
with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that
an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted
by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the
Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any
offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court
his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for
physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that
he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime,
is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the
justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty
of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true
situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell,
207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was
stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the
court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the
state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack
of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer
any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court,
to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on
several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent
passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil.
42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and
without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least
the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect
to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations
of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost
passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except
this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations
so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject'
so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes"
(Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding
their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation
and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973,
Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation
of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in
the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
 was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty
and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection
with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one
impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case
and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping
his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show,
did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973
and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is
"essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing
of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of
reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see
Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see
the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by
him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the
official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith
in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which
may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters,
more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same
date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in
the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription
— April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972).
[D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent
to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in
respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement,
his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in
his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under
Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place,
said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the
alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the
investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one.
In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised
to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to
him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under
the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00
(Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00
 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to
respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law)
for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2,
Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951
to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he
was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from
1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he
claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28,
1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the
MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at
2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that
he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to
go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and
City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across
the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp.
28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the
war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in
Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even
while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and
inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-
C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22,
1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's
petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good
moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his
assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession"
(Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously
excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent
had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in
SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in
the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel
as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L.
Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good
moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must
have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the
lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required
to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4
August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify
him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan,
(Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until
the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President
Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog;
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been
convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not
find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15
February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by
Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the
setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v.
Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting
to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the
Resolution of 22 May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has
"already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant
Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes
make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to
the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October
1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the question whether personal forgiveness
is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable
Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutions which are
already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency
or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded
Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment,"
dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which,
according to him, was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and
conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor
of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public
domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land;
caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its
cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan,
Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying
that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution
of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred
action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of
Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case
No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more
reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar
examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting
to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor
were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about
because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in
order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the
RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the
government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No.
3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time
said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court
motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to
become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over
property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no
determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage
of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did
not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair
dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions
for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him
and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials
can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the
oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking
the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
but who are also known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic
preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested
in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm.
Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who
is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.

The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of ₱27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of ₱40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the registration of title of
Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant’s
affidavit dates October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo’s favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. 1

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of
this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment
or opposition was filed against the petition.2

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether
or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s
reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit
and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character
of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application
for reinstatement.3

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.1avvphi1 Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejia’s name was dropped from
the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has
suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and
named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court
does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the
Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse.
Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE
LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de
Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de
Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the
IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case, 1 summarized the antecedents
thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de
Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in
the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting
moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-
18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade
the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's
most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised
in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively
discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral
baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he
used his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's
resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed
against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No.
05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court
with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP in general.2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said
meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees. 3

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP
de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his
letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently
consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. 6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum
where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the
Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227. 7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.8

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. 9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera
as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. 10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of
Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of
Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on
22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for
the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from
the Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in
public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel
the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in
Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION,
thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies
with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to
Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board
of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting
Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."12

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an
unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the
minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice
President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could
question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to
his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel
me.13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14 In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision
to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by
the IBP Board were the following:
 (i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors
for its decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to
withdraw the Petition.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary
Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the
extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He
deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and
expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in
favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court,
kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to
"influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.15

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical
to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion
from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005,
the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. 18 On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position
through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP
Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National
President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the
event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved
by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar. 22

In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him
from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP
Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio
Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP
in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's
Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that
the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning
the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended
that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their
election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of
death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In
the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an
Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix. 24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides
for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the
express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region,
due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI,
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but
because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his
sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de
Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the
 day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov.
Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member
of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47,
par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the
rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.25

The Court's Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE
IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE
MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052] 27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In
the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were
already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003
in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled
him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or
lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative
charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of
an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"

"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that
no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this
case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence
is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for
his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
 The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court
can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where
his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only
when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The
only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer
complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of
officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month
thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter
and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them
to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in
Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On
27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a
of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every
other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer
valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:

"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative
powers."

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously
substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy
as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an
erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's
plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C.
De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge
a second time for an act which he had already answered for.";

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative
Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground
that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents
the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier
administrative case. The complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case
was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is
worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the
suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President.28

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From
Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of
Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity
of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the
qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject
matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the
IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's
suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-
laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can
file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that
he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot
be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three
years. We held in that case that –

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so
because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on
each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the
law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. 30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of
IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for
disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course
pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for
consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or
not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign
jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of
California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final
judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license
to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension
or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he
has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration
of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend
or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. 35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
"Malpractice."36 That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. 37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.38

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance
case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of
Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;40 and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. 41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him
authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified
under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."

By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds
for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that
he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. 42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.43 It means such evidence
which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about
this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness
on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed
in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and
accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence
in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases
supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this
admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself
supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out
that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to
use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money
for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon.
Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera
of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the
character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.48 Respondent violated
his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his
personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients
without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly
sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur
IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de
Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor
as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately
preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may
incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on
the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May
2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has
for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position
vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among
the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members
of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic
rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable
time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant,
IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time.
Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat
of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to
refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the
Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in
fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the
IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove
any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain one's side.56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes
due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one
general statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court
is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice
or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ. 60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.61 Nor is an actual hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this
case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of
the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend
himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him
accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this
resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including
Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining
members" refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested
parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off
which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted
against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various
acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid
cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech
or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we
hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the
IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the
impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably
arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a
majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.63

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental
to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively
perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will
be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority
opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP
provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the
administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the
powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members.
With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are
elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance
with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual
members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption 66 of validity, which shall continue, until and
unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the
IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's
action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as
to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been
previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority
and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's
resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the
Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant
post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and
implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus,
there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the
provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, 68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48
(other officers),72 and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-
in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining
members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority
and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become
President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP
President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-
SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall
succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP
EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much
as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the
nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board
of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election
until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the
Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of
IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced
an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it
impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de
Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in
harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to
pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP
spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should
also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who
are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP
must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By
electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-
2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the
members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before
the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to
bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern
Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth
of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession
in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005,
pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a
copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution,
dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
JBC No. 013 August 22, 2007
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then
Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.1 Subsequent thereto, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed
from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal
cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative
case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the
Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases. 3 On even date, letters4 were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true
copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from
the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.5

In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent
Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his
claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law)
filed by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondent’s direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval
that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows
his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly
shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every
government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable
to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the
government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of
personalities involved. Accordingly, respondent’s continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:

(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Executive Secretary7

In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during
his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary
public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service. 9

In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad
Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such
suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993 11 which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief" that he had no more pending administrative
case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic dismissal" of his administrative case considering that "the issues raised therein
became moot and academic"; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since
he knew he would never be appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then DCA
Lock submitted a Memorandum12 dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of the subject administrative case
against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the
records of said administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.

After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are
reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.

An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered
"yes" to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are
hereunder quoted as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court,
tribunal or any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense or
imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions, give particulars.

But all dismissed (acquitted)

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439

Date of [Dismissal] – August 2, 1995

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814

Date of [Dismissal] – July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and
submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order
No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following data were
gathered:

1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the
NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged
against him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the "Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal
hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to
the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as
follows:

Mindanao Times:

Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal

Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to those allegedly behind his
ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement
on his dismissal from government service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of administrative charges
were hurled against him by some regional employees.

"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process," Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.

"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my name, the only legacy that
I can leave to my children," Quitain said in his statement.

"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case," he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of Secretary Santos. He
was later designated Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name in court from charges of
tampering with an official receipt.

Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against the group that plotted his ouster from office:
He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.
"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them," Quitain said.

"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge
Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge
Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.

xxxx

Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was administratively charged and was consequently dismissed
from the service since he will not be considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the
administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that would be filed against him by
reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to
state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case filed against him because when he resigned
and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein became moot and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the
administrative case because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and
material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any
administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance
of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged
administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain
honestly believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the
status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.

On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a clean record and was qualified to
join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of his
concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of dishonesty
renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and
dishonesty.

Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed
from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.13

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution respondent filed his Comment14 contending that before he filed his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no
knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the case was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding
provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police
Commission, Region XI;

2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who were the same followers involved in the
chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;

3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing criminal charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but
when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the DILG central office in Manila;

5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his
removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on
condition that all pending cases filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet before
the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any
court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against him that he knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted from applying as a judge and would have given his
full attention to the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing embarrassment; and

8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered therein, without his knowledge,
could have probably occurred during his "exile period" when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative
case are null and void since he was denied due process.

Respondent’s Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. 15

OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its Memorandum dated September
3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitain’s explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the
previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to
any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.

The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including
such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution.17

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated
April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in
support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that since all the criminal
cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had
become moot and academic.

Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this information.
His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the
Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,18 Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that "I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process." It
also reads: "Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from
the government service." Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the
OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative
complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer. 19 Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed
an Answer.20 In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one’s side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of due process.21 Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his
resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic.22 Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal
from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,23 this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable
them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important
information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a
vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed."

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty" means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity." 24

Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube, 26 we held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting on his
application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with
his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. 27 We have often stressed that the
conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend
to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 28lavvphil

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation
effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable
resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case."29

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case.
The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation
and its consequent acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to
pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications.30 Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 31

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had
he not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of ₱40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled
to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitain’s 201 File. SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity
is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally
unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie
Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further
alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed
the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
(Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist
and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of
certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted
on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to
extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the
winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show
that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the
lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also
believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent
be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was
a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him
before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the
MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA
LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as
the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the
Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine
Bar.3cräläwvirtualibräry

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.5cräläwvirtualibräry

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and
signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7cräläwvirtualibräry

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a
full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative
body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his
letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning
effective upon your acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY
R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. AGATEP, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by
Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243,
Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243,
Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the
above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they
were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein
were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment."
They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification. 1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply
with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page
or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the
Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground
for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape
liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public
and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the
other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No.
243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers
to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is
hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was
withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission
of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as
Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public
in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably
imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
 In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for
notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The
Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.

In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In
said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent's first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious
or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months
from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough
penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED
and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months." 3

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty.
Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and
Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.4 The term, however,
does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. 5

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty.
Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda.
de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the
Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one
month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon
him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission
on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago,"
docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the
death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending
the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented
evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April
and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against
private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was
adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no
longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent
contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion
to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental
reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as
gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and
told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with
personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this
accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a
case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations
had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan,
respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set
aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution")
dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict
of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie
Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in
I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-
1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however,
that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating
to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation
of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the
employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with
these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering
legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage
in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647).
The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In
re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the
private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by
the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-
client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will
be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer
owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which
he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees
in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no
longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client,
any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal
complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any
confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was
labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as
alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed
stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA
6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor
is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession
and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months
and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney
Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time
invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule
falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel
because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace
Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney
of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna
as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..