PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HON.

HEGENIO MACADAEG,
HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, and
ANTONIO GUILLERMO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-4316. May 28, 1952

Facts:
There was a petition filed on the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Hon.
Hegenio Macadaeg, Hon. Potenciano Pecson, and Hon. Ramon San Jose, judges of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), to restrain from taking jurisdiction and preventing the cognizance of the petitioned
amnesty filed by the respondent Antonio Guillermo, a.k.a. Silver. Herewith, the respondent was
convicted and sentenced by the court on the ground for murder per G.R. No. L-2188, dated May 19,
1950.

There were legal basis in which the petition predicated for (1) that there was a prior expressed
judgement against the respondent as convicted for murder resulting to the withdrawal of his amnesty
entitlement, and as followed (2) the cognizance of the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can be
possible only when the case at court is on a pending appeal.

On June 5, 1950, the respondent filed for motion for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied. Hence, June 20, 1950, the respondents filed a motion on court “for the suspension of the
proceedings and reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission” even before the
motion for reconsideration was acted upon, but the motion was denied on July 13, 1950.

The respondent applied for amnesty dated July 8, 1950 with the respondent Commission. On
August 2, 1950, the records of the case against the respondent were remanded to the CFI of Ilocus
Norte for the execution of the judgement. At this day, November 9, 1950, the case was set for hearing
over the opposition of the Solicitor General. It was at this stage that this action of prohibition was filed
in the Court.

Issue:
WON Antonio Guillermo is covered by the amnesty and the Commission has jurisdiction over
the petition of the amnesty

Ruling:
Finding of the court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty due to his
conviction. Thereupon, the murder committed was not in the furtherance of the resistance of the
movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two guerilla units. The application for amnesty
was contested by the fact that he was found guilty of murder by which the rules on criminal procedures
do not include amnesty as one of the defenses which shall have to expressly plead. (Sec. 1, Rule 113,
Rules of Court)

On the second ground upon the prohibition is based that the jurisdiction of the Seventh Guerilla
Amnesty Commission is beyond the scope of the case at court. The Commission can take cognizance
only of cases which are a pending appeal on the Court. However, the claim to the jurisdiction of the
amnesty was invalidated by the rendered decision of the court over the respondent Guillermo’s criminal
case.

Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by the
court on November 24, 1950, made absolute, with costs against respondent Antonio Guillermo, a.k.a.
Silver. He may not raise again the issue in any tribunal, judicial or administrative and is now estopped
from contesting the judgment of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling.

__________________________________________

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, and

HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, RTC,
Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.

G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998.

Facts:
Federico C. Suntay applied for petition letter against Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay over administering
the liability of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, who died without living a will.

Emilio Aguinaldo-Suntay (Son of Federico C. Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay has three
children, namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo, and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco-
Suntay. The marriage lasted for only four years and resulted to filing of separation at the court. On June
3, 1967, the court declared the marriage null and void and no effect as between the parties.

Emilio Aguinaldo-Suntay diagnosed with schizophrenia, and it even manifested as early as 1955.
Unfortunately, the disease worsened in time. On June 1, 1979, Emilio A. Suntay predeceased Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay his mother, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter died on June 4, 1990 without leaving
a will.

Five years later, the respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) an issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the intestate estate of her late
grandmother. Federico anchored his opposition on the fact that Isabel is an illegitimate child of Emilio,
and has no right of the succession of Cristina’s instate estate as per the Art. 992 of the Civil Code states.

Issue:

WON Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is an illegitimate child?

Ruling:

No, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay is a legitimate child.

 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides children born as such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same right, status and obligations as acknowledged natural children
under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in
bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by the final judgement of a competent court in an action for annulment. Hence, Isabel
is governed by the effects of the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: “children conceived
of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are so called natural children by legal fiction.”

Wherefore, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

__________________________________________

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Divion.

RICHARD PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SHARON IRONS, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. 1-03-2992. February 22, 2005.

Facts:
On January 1999, Richard Philipps and Sharon Irons began dating. At the time, the defendant
informed Philipps that she was married a year ago and claimed that she has been divorced from her
husband, Dr. Adebowale Adeleye.

In a short period of time, the two got engaged and planned to be married soon. During their
relationship both parties made an agreement that they will engage in a sexual intercourse but by the
use of condom in the intention of having no children yet until they are officially married. The entire
course of their relationship both parties engaged in intimate sexual relationship acts thrice, with two of
those things occurring on the same date.

Vaginal penetration never occurred; the parties engaged only in the acts of oral sex. Defendant
told plaintiff she did not want to have sexual intercourse due to her menses. On or around the 19 th of
February and March in the year 1999, the defendant “intentionally engaged in oral sex with the plaintiff
so that she could harvest his semen and artificially inseminate herself,” and “did artificially inseminate
herself.”

On May 1999, the defendant confessed to Philipps that she is still married to her Dr. Adebowale
Adeleye. But the defendant told the plaintiff that she was planning to officially get divorced and was
applying for the dissolution of their marriage, which was filed May 20, 1999. As soon as the plaintiff
learned that the defendant is still married he ended their relationship. Unknowingly, the defendant is
pregnant. On November 21, 2000, Irons filed a “petition of Paternity and other relief” against the
plaintiff, claiming that both parties had sexual relationship eight to ten months before Serena’s was
born (December 1, 1999).

The plaintiff asserted that he had no knowledge of the pregnancy of the defendant. He also
claimed that it’s the daughter of Dr. Adeleye since; she was named after Adeleye in the birth certificate.
Then, the plaintiff filed complaint against the defendant before the Circuit Court of Illinois for:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), Fraudulent Misrepresentation, and Conversion.

Issue:

WON the Defendant-Appellee Sharon Irons is liable for the IIED, Fraudulent Misrepresentation,
and Conversion appealed by the Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Philipps

Held:

The first count argued that the Defendant has intentionally caused him severe emotional
distress. He stated in his complain that Irons’ outrageous action inflicted him emotional distress; the
plaintiff’s right to know was violated in the action committed by the defendant through her scientific
knowledge on successfully procuring the defendant’s semen and impregnating herself. The intended act
of the defendant contravenes the desire of the plaintiff wish to have children after marriage. The
unintended pregnancy made the plaintiff so upset that he was nauseating and unable to eat. It caused
him “terrible nightmare.” The stated facts are substantial element for the ruling of the Court.

In the second count, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation, the defendant introduced herself to the
plaintiff fraudulently as infertile. The misrepresentation made the plaintiff to act in the reliance of the
truth. But the court has seen insufficient material to support the plaintiff’s argument since; the act did
not cause the plaintiff to financial loss or economic harm.

In the third count, the plaintiff argued that his sperm was taken from him without his permission
and converted it to the personal use of the defendant by impregnating herself. But the court contested
the claim of plaintiff. The act committed should manifest the element of the plaintiff’s argument. The
plaintiff had to prove (1) he had the right to property, (2) he had the right of the absolute and
immediate possession of the property, (3) the defendant assumed unauthorized control of the property,
and (4) the plaintiff demanded possession. However, the defendant rebutted the argument by stating
that the delivered sperm was a gift, if he wanted to retain possession, he should have taken proper
precautions, such as using condom. Henceforth, he was unable to satisfy the substantial element to the
claim of Conversion.

For the reasons set forth above the judgement of the circuit of the Court of Illinois the II and III
counts are AFFIRMED, while the I count is REVERSED, and the cause is remanded.