1.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Facts:
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF
STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS
PETER L. ONG AND RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN AND CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, v. PANFILO M. LACSON.
(G.R. No. 149453, 01 April 2003, Callejo Sr., J)
Motion for Reconsideration of SC’s Resolution
Doctrines:
Respondent has burden of proof to show that essential elements of
Section 8, Rule 117, ROC are present in the case. Requisite of express consent
to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is made to bar the accused from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express
consent to such provisional dismissal.
The time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117, ROC cannot be applied
retroactively as there is no vested right in procedural law. Time-bar was
conceptualized to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused.
Emergency Recit:
Lacson and other co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the
killing of 11 male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
SC issued a Resolution remanding the case to the RTC Branch 81. It held that the
provisional dismissal of the criminal cases was with express consent of Lacson
and that Section 8, Rule 117 of the ROC could be given retroactive effect. Lacson
filed motion for reconsideration.
SC held that Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the subject criminal
cases. Having invoked the rule, Lacson had burdened of proof to establish the
essential requisites thereof. 1st requisite of express consent to a provisional
dismissal is needed which Lacson failed to comply with since he merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses. He also admitted in the hearing that he did not file any
motion to dismiss the criminal case. 2nd requisite of notice and hearing to the
offended party is also absent.
Since the requisites are not met, the State can thus revive or refile the
criminal cases or file new informations against Lacson and co-accused.
SC also ruled that the time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be
applied retroactively.
In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, Panfilo Lacson and
his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
11 male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. On 28 May
2002, the Supreme Court (SC) issued a Resolution remanding the case to the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 81 for the determination of several factual issues relative
to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117, ROC.
In the Resolution, SC ruled that the provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 was with express consent of Lacson as
he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also
held therein that although Section 8 of Rule 117, ROC could be given retroactive
effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application
are attendant.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to
be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various
offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. If the cases were
revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to
justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule
fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
Respondents filed this Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
contending that:
(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and
(b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
Issue:
Whether Section 8, Rule 117 of the ROC is applicable to said criminal
cases
Whether the time-bar in Section 8, Rule 117 of the ROC should be applied
retroactively
Ruling:
No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the ROC is not applicable to said criminal
cases. Having invoked said rule, respondent Lacson is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the 1st paragraph thereof:
 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. The
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express conse to a provisional dismissal. The mere inaction or silence
or his failure to object does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express
consent to such provisional dismissal. If provisionally dismissed with express
consent, the case may be revived only within the period provided in the new rule.
If provisionally dismissed without consent express consent, case may be revived
or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling
is barred by the statute of limitations.
In the case, Lacson failed to prove that the 1st and 2nd requisite were
present when Judge Agnir Jr. dismissed the criminal cases.
As to the 1st requisite, irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion
for the provisional dismissal. For his part, Lacson merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses as
emphasized in his reply to the CA. He did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or
otherwise. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional
dismissal. During the hearing, he, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally,
and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases
nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
Lacson’s admissions are binding and conclusive upon him. To apply the
new rule in subject criminal cases would be to add to or make exceptions from the
new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein.
As to the 2nd requisite, no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal or of the hearing was served on the heirs of the victims at least 3 days
before said hearing. Such notice would have enabled the offended party or the
heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or
object to the motion on valid grounds. Although the public prosec was served with
a copy of the motion, records do not show that the notices were separately given
to the heirs of the victims. No proof in the records that the public prosec notified
the heirs.
In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public
prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the
respondent's motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing said cases.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were
not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by
the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder
against the respondent.
NO. The time-bar in Section 8, Rule 117 of the ROC should not
be,applied retroactively. Section 8, Rule 117 is not a statute of limitations and
the time-bar therein is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.
Time-bar is a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case
against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The State may
revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there
is a justifiable necessity for the delay.
Procedural laws may be applied retroactively. Such is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected nor is it constitutionally
objectionable as there is no vested right that may attach thereto or arise therefrom.
But a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court.
In the case, time-bar of two years under Section 8, Rule 116 should not
be applied retroactively against the State. Under the rule, there is a fixed time-bar
of 1-2 years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with express
consent and with prior notice to offended party. The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show
a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
Section 8, Rule 117 was conceptualized to enhance the administration of
criminal justice system. The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal
cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or non-availability of its witnesses. Memories of witnesses may
have grown dim or have faded. The accused may become a fugitive from justice
or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the
case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the
benefit of the State and the accused.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999
when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have
only one year and three months within which to revive = period is short of the 2yr
period fixed under the new rule. If the time limit is applied prospectively, the State
would have two years within which to revive. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the
State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results
in the administration of justice.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the
accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and
adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua
non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within
the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002,
is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot
and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED
to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with
deliberate dispatch.
Dissenting: J. Puno:
 The dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express
consent
 It is not clear whether the offended parties had knowledge of the dismissal
of their Informations against respondent Lacson
 Sec. 8, Rule 117 applies retroactively: In the case at bar, it is crystal clear
that the new rule is intended to apply to all provisionally dismissed cases
before its passage. It is a remedial measure to check the continuing
inaction on the part of the State to prosecute pending cases in court. Its
purpose is to press the State to act on cases it has inexcusably put in
deep slumber in our courts of justice. It provides relief to the accused who
are prejudiced when the cases filed in court against them remain dormant
for an unreasonable length of time. In fine, the new rule is a remedial rule
that looks back even as it looks forward. It reaches both the past and the
future. It is both retrospective and prospective.
 2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. FRANCISCO DE
LA ROSA
G.R. No. L-34112 June 25, 1980 DE CASTRO, J
DECISION
DOCTRINE: As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that
the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any
offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations
whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, additional
facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the
prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Berti Hildegard Edery is charged of bringing into
this country 28 pieces of gold bars with their corresponding markings at the
Manila International Airport, Pasay City, sometime on the 8th of October,
1968 by means of false statements, both oral and written and other omissions,
having managed such entry by placing the gold bars in pockets of a vest
cleverly concealed within her person, without lawfully passing them through
the Customhouse of the airport for the purpose of avoiding declaration of the
same to the customs authorities in order that the said gold bars may be
appraised and duties and taxes thereon may be imposed, as said gold bars are
subject to duties, taxes and other charges of which the government was,
accordingly, deprived. On January 10, 1969, the Edery, through counsel, filed
a motion to quash on the ground that the facts contained in the information did
not constitute the offense charged. An opposition was filed by the People,
hereinafter to be referred to as Petitioner. Judge Dela Rosa granted the motion
to quash in view of the disclosure of pertinent facts in this incident of motion
to quash, facts which in justice to accused Edery should have been alleged in
the Information and Amended, as these facts, constituting legal defense and
justification, cannot but be admitted by the Prosecution, as it has done so in
this incident.
FACTS: Berti Hildegard Edery is charged of bringing into this country 28
pieces of gold bars with their corresponding markings at the Manila
International Airport, Pasay City, sometime on the 8th of October, 1968 by
means of false statements, both oral and written and other omissions, having
managed such entry by placing the gold bars in pockets of a vest cleverly
concealed within her person, without lawfully passing them through the
Customhouse of the airport for the purpose of avoiding declaration of the same
to the customs authorities in order that the said gold bars may be appraised and
duties and taxes thereon may be imposed, as said gold bars are subject to
duties, taxes and other charges of which the government was, accordingly,
deprived. In the amended information of January 20, 1969, the following
alleged facts were added:
1. The gold bars amounted to approximately P209,126.40, Philippine
Currency (224,000 Deutsch Marks)
2. The accused has denied carrying with her valuable and taxable items
in her possession; and
3. She did not indicate in her Baggage Declaration and Entry Form that
she had with her said 28 pieces of gold bars."
On January 10, 1969, the Edery, through counsel, filed a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts contained in the information did not constitute the
offense charged. An opposition was filed by the People, hereinafter to be
referred to as Petitioner, to the motion on February 3, 1969, to which a Reply
was filed by the accused also on February 3, 1969.
On February 12, 1969, respondent judge issued an order questioning both the
Information and the Amended Information, concluding that the 28 gold bars
are not ‘imported articles and the conduct of accused consistently indicated the
absence of any intention to import, and that this conduct harmonizes
completely with her act of merely writing the word: ‘TOURIST’ instead of
giving the description of the articles she was carrying, on her ‘Baggage
Declaration And Entry’
Judge Dela Rosa granted the motion to quash in view of the disclosure of
pertinent facts in this incident of motion to quash, facts which in justice to
accused Edery should have been alleged in the Information and Amended, as
these facts, constituting legal defense and justification, cannot but be admitted
by the Prosecution, as it has done so in this incident. This Court finds that the
charge contained in said Amended Information, considered with the facts
herein so disclosed and discussed above, does not constitute an offense and
that accused Edery has a legal defense and justification.
On February 14, 1969, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was opposed by respondent Edery on February 26, 1969. In March 21, 1969,
petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen Consideration of Motion to Quash, 8
praying that the prosecution be allowed to present additional evidence in the
interest of justice. On June 14, 1971, respondent judge issued an order granting
in part petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Consideration of the Motion to Quash,
but confirming his order of February 12, 1969 in that the Information and
Amended Information filed in Criminal Case No. 8174-P did not state facts
constituting the offense charged.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court committed a reversible error in issuing the
afore-mentioned order
RULING: YES. As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground
that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or
any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.
However, as held in the case of People v. Navarro, additional facts not alleged
in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be
invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief Justice Moran
supports this theory. As disclosed by the records, the State Prosecutor admitted
certain facts and participated in the hearings where both parties presented
documentary and testimonial evidence. Thereafter, the respondent court made
a finding that the allegation in the Amended Information, in the light of the
admitted facts as they emerged after the hearing, did not constitute an offense.
The pertinent rule that applies is Rule 117. Section 6 of the ROC. A reading of
the Order of this Court of February 12, 1969, granting the Motion to Quash of
accused, will show that upon the issue raised and upon the evidence,
admission, and arguments of both parties, the Court resolved the issue.
Rejecting the State Prosecutor’s position which he supported with cases, the
more pertinent among which is that of People v. Segovia, the Supreme Court
made the passing remark that "Prima facie, the facts charged are those
described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified by others
appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admission made by the
People’s representative, which admission could anyway be submitted by him
as amendment to the same information."
The rationale for the rule laid down therein is that it would seem to be pure
technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the
judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be
true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it
may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not
required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be
inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no
reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of
undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that
such official’s role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are
convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to
prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding
accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice
From the foregoing facts, the allegations in the Amended Information as to the
alleged falsity of the customs declaration, the alleged omission and other
supposedly false statements become immaterial for being not required to be
made under Executive Order No. 408 and the implementing rules. The
declaration, statements and omissions are therefore, mere superfluities insofar
as accused is concerned. As adverted to earlier, the "forms" were suspended
and need not be accomplished by the said accused. The forms so suspended,
would of necessity, include whatever form would be required to be
accomplished or to be issued by the Central Bank by way of a license or written
permission as mentioned in the "Certification of Declarant," on the reverse side
of which is an enumeration where "written permission from proper authority"
is required. The enumeration, it may be noted, does not include gold bars.
It is to be noted that the essence of the charge against accused Edery is for
failing to declare the 28 gold bars which she carried in her person in landing
here and going to spend the night in Manila Hilton Hotel, which petitioner
would consider an illegal importation resulting in the loss of duties accruing
to the Philippine Government.
Here again is where the facts as established in the hearing and admitted by the
prosecution should have to be considered in resolving the motion to quash.
This is what the respondent court did, and We cannot fault it in this regard.
There is one important and vital circumstance in the instant case that
establishes conclusively that the 28 gold bars are not ‘imported’ articles, and
that their entry into the Philippines for a number of hours did not convert them
into ‘imported’ articles such that their entry resulted in the loss of Customs
duties. This circumstance is the stubborn fact that accused Edery brought in 28
gold bars and in matters of hours she was taking the same 28 gold bars out of
the country. It was at the time she was taking these gold bars out of the country,
only hours after her arrival, that she was arrested by the Customs authorities
at the Manila International Airport. There can be no doubt whatsoever that she
was at the airport, definitely to leave the Philippines with the 28 gold bars.
Certainly, the fact that accused Edery brought the 28 gold bars with her in the
security of the Manila Hilton Hotel, not having violated any law regarding her
‘Baggage Declaration and Entry’, did not convert these 28 gold bars into
‘imported’ articles. Had she arrived by boat and had she left these 28 gold bars
aboard and spent an overnight in Manila, these same gold bars could not have
been converted into ‘imported’ articles. It would be without any legal basis to
say that the classification of articles to ‘imported’ articles and to ‘not imported’
articles could depend on the kind of transportation employed."
That the gold bars were never imported, nor intended to be imported, is given
credence in the light of the undeniable fact that the accused carried them with
her in exactly the same way when she debarked from the air carrier, when she
was to board the plane that would bring her to her real destination, Taipeh,
after spending only a night at the Manila Hilton Hotel. There being no
importation to speak of, it cannot be said that, as is the essence of the charge
against the accused, the latter defrauded the government of the duties and
charges due the articles, if imported. It is of relevance to note that the City
Fiscal of Pasay, after proper preliminary investigation resolved to dismiss the
complaint against the accused.
It must be safe to assume that the City Fiscal found no probable cause to hold
the accused for trial. When the State Prosecutor took over from the City Fiscal
and filed the information, and later an amended information, he must have
thought that trial on the merits would follow, as a matter of course. He did not
reckon on the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in
the amended information do not charge an offense. But such a motion was
filed, and not only was a hearing had thereon, but the prosecution asked the
court to be allowed to present evidence as did the other party, the accused. The
State Prosecutor presented evidence and made certain admissions. This could
have proved to be their tactical mistake. For with all the evidence presented
before the court, the respondent judge cannot discard the same in resolving the
motion to quash, on the mere technicality that the motion should be resolved
solely on the basis of the allegations of the informations, closing its eyes to
evidence aliunde duly presented at the instance of the prosecution itself,
followed by the defense presenting its own evidence. The result was, in effect,
a trial on the merits, and an insistence on the part of the petitioner to restore
the informations already quashed in order that trial on the merits could
proceed, as prayed for in this petition fails to find support upon consideration
of substantial justice. It is a resort to mere technicality so strongly frowned
upon by the courts and expressly discouraged by our own rules of procedure.
It would not also seem in keeping with the true role of the prosecutor to see
that justice is done. 18
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed,
and the order of the respondent judge dated February 12, 1969, quashing the
amended information is affirmed, together with the order dated June 14, 1971
denying the People’s Motion for Reconsideration of the former order. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
3. MERCADO v. CFI OF RIZAL, BRANCH V (August 25, 1982)
G.R. No. L-38753
FERNANDO, C.J.
FACTS:
● The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case
of United States v. Bustos, enunciating the doctrine that the free speech
and free press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to
prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a
superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed
with significance.
● The information in this certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding
to quash an information for libel quoted in full the alleged offensive
telegram.
● Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and
[Communications] Manila In line with President Marcos appeal to give
information on undesirable employees in the government service to
achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image
of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission
as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt
practices considering that she has properties and spending above
what her salary can afford with the husband jobless stop If
investigation confirms this we trust you take necessary action stop In case
you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and
I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter.
Rafael Mercado]"
● It closed with the assertion that Virginia Mercado, private respondent,
"never enriched herself in office."
● There was first a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on
the ground of the telegram being a privileged communication. It was
denied by the lower court.
● Thereafter, through another counsel, came a motion to quash, alleging
that the facts charged do not "constitute an offense." Again, it met with
a denial. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the present
proceeding was instituted.
● In the comment submitted by respondents, the stress was on the absence
of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith. As stated:
● October 14, 1972 — petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman
of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged
 grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules [with a
true copy of the said complaint attached];
● 14 days after the filing — the said petitioner sent the subject libelous
telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication, which was indorsed for investigation to the said Board
of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said
Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board
of Transportation [with a true copy of the said first indorsement attached];
● November 23, 1972 — the petitioner filed an amended administrative
complaint against the private respondent with the same Board of
Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No. 72-1, charging the
private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt
practices, and misconduct or discourtesy [with a true copy of the said
amended compliant attached];
● The private respondent, submitted her answer
● June 26, 1973 — Board of Transportation found the herein private
respondent as innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed
against her
● July 17, 1973 — petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said
Board denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
● While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination
before the Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further harass and malign
the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed with the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the
private respondent and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them
of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped.
● February 9, 1973 — The said office, however, after due hearing, issued
a resolution recommending that the said case be closed for lack of
evidence
● Petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt practices against the
private respondent;
● after due investigation the CIS advised him that the said case is considered
closed for insufficiency of evidence
● The comment was considered as answer and the case was set for hearing.
Prior to such hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum
in lieu of oral argument. As the motion was not acted upon before the date
set for hearing, the parties appeared. Preliminary questions were asked.
● They were then required to file simultaneously their memoranda. Instead
of just filing a memorandum, petitioner had a motion to admit amended
petition enclosing with such motion the amended petition. The
memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof.
● The amendments, however, did not affect the fundamental question raised
as to whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be
the basis for the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition.
● Respondents in due time, after seeking an extension, filed their
memorandum. Thereafter, petitioner even submitted a manifestation, in
effect reiterating contentions previously made.
ISSUE: W/N the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner should be
quashed
RULING: NO
This petition lacks merit.
1. United States v. Bustos, as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision.
It is to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling
antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States
Supreme Court, to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the
test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free
speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very
least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach. The judiciary lives
up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it
has been before. It should continue to be so.
2. Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege,
and this is one such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice.”
What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his
conduct, viz a viz private respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had
pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt
could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The
prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice.
3. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their
stand. In People v. Monton, the question of whether or not a motion to quash
based on a qualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against
the claim of those accused of libel, This Court made clear that malice can be
shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution."
The ponencia of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the
Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not here applicable, because the acquittal
of the accused therein on the ground that the defamatory imputation was
qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein the prosecution
tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, the element of malice."
Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that in the instant case the
information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the
subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of
attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and
reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent of exposing
(him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any
justifiable motive.' Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is entitled
to go to trial and present the necessary evidence to prove malice; and the
denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants' motion to quash,
constitutes reversible error."
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
Concepcion, Jr., Aquino, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
4. MILL v. PEOPLE
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA IN ORDER TO FILE A
MOTION TO QUASI, DEPENDS UPON JUDICIAL DISCRETION. — The defendant
has a right to demur to a complaint before he pleads thereto, but after he has
pleaded not guilty, the withdrawal of such plea in order to demur becomes a
matter of judicial discretion. This ruling applies to a motion to quash. (2
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 780).
2. MOTION TO QUASH; ORDER DENYING OR GRANTING MOTION
INTERLOCUTORY; REMEDY WHEN FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED. — Neither
certiorari nor prohibition will lie against an order of the court granting or
denying a motion to quash an information because the order is merely
interlocutory. If the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and
to decide the motion to quash, appeal in due time from the final judgment
that may be rendered in the case is the only remedy for the public prosecutor
or the accused, as the case may be
FACTS
-Executive Orders Nos. 400 and 58 issued by the President of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines created the City of Greater Manila
whereby Quezon City was absorbed by and became a part of the City of
Greater Manila.
- On August 8, 1946, an information for murder committed in Quezon City,
then a part of the City of Greater Manila, was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 221, against
petitioner Eulogio Mill
- Upon being arraigned on December 14, 1955, in Branch VIII of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, defendant pleaded "not guilty" to this information.
The delay in the arraignment of the defendant for 8 years since the filing of
the information until his arraignment therefor, was due to his success in
evading arrest.
- On October 10, 1946, or before the arraignment of the defendant, Republic
Act No. 54 was enacted by Congress expressly repealing said Executive Orders
Nos. 400 and 58 and restoring Quezon City to its former status as a distinct
and separate chartered city.
- On January 3, 1956, after the passage of Republic Act No. 54, counsel for the
defendant Eulogio Mill filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
motion to quash the information in said case and in another case in which the
same defendant was charged with the crime of frustrated murder (not
involved in these proceedings), apparently committed at the same occasion
-This motion was predicated on the assumption that the Court "had lost
jurisdiction to try these two cases as of the date of the approval of Republic
Act No. 54 and the revival of Quezon City on October 10, 1946
- On January 21, 1956, the City Attorney of Quezon City filed an information
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), which was
amended on January 26, 1956, accusing the petitioner Eulogio Mill of the
same crime of murder for which he had been previously charged in Criminal
Case No. 221 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and to said amended
information the defendant pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment.
- Sometime thereafter, and upon learning that the offense with which he
stands charged in Criminal Case Q-1907 in the CFI of Rizal, Branch VII, Quezon
City, is one for which he had allegedly been in jeopardy in Criminal Case No.
221 of the CFI of Manila, which had been dismissed, defendant Eulogio Mill
filed a motion to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to allow him to submit a
motion to quash. This motion was set for hearing and after the parties were
heard in oral argument, respondent Judge Nicasio Yatco issued in open court
the following order denying the motion to quash filed by accused’s counsel
- Mill filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that said order is
contrary to law and established jurisprudence. But the respondent Judge
after hearing anew the parties in oral argument, denied the motion for
reconsideration
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused may, as a matter of right, withdraw his plea of
"not guilty" to file a motion to quash
HELD: YES.
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, prescribes:
"SECTION 1. Time to move to quash or plead. — Upon being arraigned the
defendant shall immediately, unless the court grants him further time, either
move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both. If
he moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or
overruled he shall immediately plead.”
This section provides that upon arraignment the defendant shall immediately
either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or to do
both. Under the old procedure a defendant who desired to "demur" (a plea
now substituted by the "motion to quash") to the complaint or information
must do so before he pleads thereto, and it was held that while he could
demur as a matter of right before he entered his plea, once he had pleaded
not guilty, his withdrawal of such plea, in order to "demur", became a matter
of judicial discretion. This ruling applies to a motion to quash.
In this ruling the court committed no error. The defendant has a right to
demur to a complaint before he pleads thereto, but he has no right after he
has pleaded not guilty to withdraw that plea and present a demurrer. It is
within the discretion of the court below to grant or deny him permission to
do so.
The information in the case at bar appears to be on its face a sufficient
information, and in the case of U. S, v. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, permission to
withdraw the plea of not guilty in order to interpose a demurrer to the
information in a prosecution for murder was properly denied where the
information appeared to be sufficient. In that case this Court reiterated its
ruling that the withdrawal of a plea of not guilty in order to demur became a
matter of judicial discretion. In the case at bar there is no showing that the
respondent Judge abuse his discretion in not allowing the petitioner to
withdraw his former plea of not guilty.
 5. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMINO PLAZA
(G.R. No. L-18819, March 30, 1963, DIZON, J)
DOCTRINE: Facts alleged in the information which do not constitute a
punishable offense may be quashed by the accused.
EMERGENCY RECIT: An information charged Esperanza Ato de
Lamboyog, Capistrano Lamboyog and Maximino Plaza with estafa,
alleging that the said accused conspiring, cooperating together and helping
one another with accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog and her husband
Capistrano Lamboyog pretending and misrepresenting themselves to be
the sole and absolute owners of a real estate situated at Barrio Ba-an,
Butuan City. Defendant Plaza filed a motion to quash the information on
the grounds that the fact charged do not constitute an offense insofar as
he was concerned. The lower court found it to be well taken and dismissed
the information as against him. The Court on the other hand stated that the
real defect of the information is not that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute a punishable offense but that its allegations, as to Plaza's
participation and possible guilt, are vague. It ruled that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved. But even assuming that the
lower court was right in holding that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute a punishable offense, as far as defendant Plaza was
concerned, the case should not have been dismissed with respect to him.
Instead, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, the lower court should have given the prosecution an opportunity to
amend the information. The order of dismissal appealed from is set aside
and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Facts:
An information charged Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog, Capistrano
Lamboyog and Maximino Plaza with estafa, alleging:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1954, in the City of
Butuan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused conspiring, cooperating together and
helping one another with accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog
and her husband Capistrano Lamboyog pretending and
misrepresenting themselves to be the sole and absolute owners of
a real estate situated at Barrio Ba-an, Butuan City.
"A parcel of agricultural land containing an area of 7,413
square meters, more or less," when in fact and in truth the
above-named accused knew that the said land above
described was already sold in a pacto de retro sale, and
later on converted the same sale into an absolute sale in
favor of Felipe F. Paular, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud said Felipe
F. Paular knowing that said property has been previously
sold to the said Felipe P. Paular in the amount of P400.00,
both accused entered into agreement whereby the said
property was sold by the accused Esperanza Ato de
Lamboyog and her aforementioned husband, to his co-
accused Maximino Plaza and falsely represented the same
property to be free from encumbrance, to the damage and
prejudice of said Felipe F. Paular in the amount of P400.00
excluding the improvements thereon . . . .
Defendant Plaza filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds
that (1) the fact charged do not constitute an offense insofar as he was
concerned;(2) that the information charged more than one offense; and (3)
that the criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription of the crime.
The court found the first ground to be well taken and dismissed the
information as against him. Hence this appeal..
Issue:
Whether the information against Maximino Plaza, on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute a criminal offense. (NO)
Ruling:
A perusal of the information discloses that it charges that three defendants
with "conspiring, cooperating together and helping one another etc.," to
commit the offense charged, while at the same time another portion thereof
would seem to imply that the Lamboyog spouses falsely represented to
their co-defendant, Maximino Plaza, that the property they were selling to
him was free from encumbrance — an allegation justifying the inference
that Plaza did not know that the property he was buying had been
previously sold to the offended party, Felipe F. Paular. In view of this, we
are of the opinion that the real defect of the information is not that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute a punishable offense but that
its allegations, as to Plaza's participation and possible guilt, are
vague.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
But even assuming that the lower court was right in holding that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute a punishable offense, as far as
defendant Plaza was concerned, the case should not have been dismissed
with respect to him. Instead, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, the lower court should have given the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information. That under the
provisions of said rule, the trial court may order the filing of another
information or simply the amendments of the one already filed is clearly in
accordance with the settled rule in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside
and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
8. DOMINADOR LAYOSA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P.
RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and FERNANDO M. DILIG, City Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, respondents.
(G.R. No. L-46080, November 10, 1978, Aquino, J.)
Motion to Quash
DOCTRINE: Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or
subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the
person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court
for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives
the objection.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Layosa filed a petition for certiorari
contending that the trial court have no jurisdiction over his case
since no warrant of arrest has been filed against him. Judge
Rodriguez heard the motion to avoid delay. The court ruled in
favor of the respondents stating that Layosa’s voluntary
appearance at that hearing through his counsel was a submission
to the lower court's jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Dominador Layosa, the collector of customs of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, was charged by the city fiscal in the Court
of First Instance of Palawan with having violated the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). The
information was based on the complaint filed by the assistant
director of the District Anti-Smuggling Action Center.
The gravamen of the charge against Layosa is that he
demanded and received from the patron of the M/V Lady
Angelita I, whenever that vessel docked at the Puerto Princesa
wharf to unload and load cargoes of the San Miguel Corporation,
two to three cases of beer and soft drinks as the consideration for
giving the vessel preferential berthing facilities.
Fiscal filed a motion for Layosa's suspension. Respondent Judge
granted the motion in his order dated April 11, 1977 at Brooke's
Point. He found that a valid information had been filed against
Layosa.
Hence, this petition. He contended that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of
arrest had as yet been issued when the hearing on his
suspension was held and the case was not raffIed to
respondent Judge, that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram
to the fiscal dated March 24, 1977 directed that the record of the
case be elevated for review, and that respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the suspension order.
Judge Rodriguez: to avoid delay, he acted on the motion for
suspension because the case was filed after the raffIing of
the cases between the two branches of the court had been
terminated. He was scheduled to hold sessions at Brooke's Point
and the other Judge was to begin his one month vacation. He
also pointed out that his action on the motion for suspension
was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of this Court
which empowers the Executive Judge to act on interlocutory
matters prior to the raffling of a case.
The case was raffled to Judge Rodriguez, Layosa posted a bail
bond thereafter.
Layosa did not submit a memorandum. Respondent fiscal
(DILIG) in his memorandum alleged that the petitioner had
abandoned his contention as to lack of jurisdiction over his
person.fiscal stressed that the case had been scheduled for trial
at the instance of the petitioner and that the latter had manifested
his willingness to proceed with the trial.
RULING: NO.
There is no question that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
the case upon the filing of the information. The offense charged
is within its jurisdiction. The petitioner was notified of the pre-
suspension hearing. His counsel participated in that
hearing. The requirements of due process were observed.
The law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the
suspension of the accused. Public interest demands a
speedy determination of that question.
It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into
custody when the pre-suspension hearing was held.
However, his voluntary appearance at that hearing through
his counsel was a submission to the lower court's
jurisdiction.
"Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter,
the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the
accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for
that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the
objection." In the instant case, Layosa waived the objection
based on lack of jurisdiction over his person when, as already
noted, he appeared at the pre-suspension hearing and his
counsel cross-examined the prosecution witness.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the order of suspension.
 6.PEOPLE vs. SUPNAD [G.R. No. L-18747. March 30, 1963]
DOCTRINE: Where the facts as found by the court in the civil case
pending appeal merely constitute a defense in the present criminal
case which must be substantiated during the trial and a cursory reading
of the information shows that sufficient allegations have been set forth
therein to render accused-appellees’ acts a criminal violation, it is held
that said facts as found in the pending civil case do not constitute a
prejudicial question in this criminal case.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respondent Supnad was charged with violation
of Par. 2 of Art. 316, of the RPC for defrauding Teresa Bautista by
selling and transferring a 2-story residential house to one Damian
Vasquez, despite the fact that the same has been mortgaged to
Bautista for P2,500 and that it cannot be encumbered, alienated, or
disposed of during the existence of said mortgage without the prior
written consent of the latter. After the arraignment, the accused
contended that the findings of the court in Civil Case No. 39224
constitute a prejudicial question affecting herein criminal case. The trial
court dismissed the case on the ground that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute an offense. The SC held that the trial court
erred in having dismissed the information on such ground.
FACTS: Respondent Supnad was charged with violation of Par. 2 of
Art. 316, of the RPC for defrauding Teresa Bautista by selling and
transferring a 2-story residential house to one Damian Vasquez,
despite the fact that the same has been mortgaged to Bautista for
P2,500 and that it cannot be encumbered, alienated, or disposed of
during the existence of said mortgage without the prior written consent
of the latter.
After the arraignment, the accused raised the issue of prejudicial
question, contending among others that the court should indefinitely
suspend the case, because in Civil Case No. 39224, CFI of Manila
found that when Damian Vasquez bought the house, he knew of the
existence of the mortgage in favor of Teresa Bautista and it is but just
and fair that he should pay the amount of the indebtedness because he
bought said property, fully knowing that accused Supnad had obtained
a loan from Bautista with the said house as security. Supnad further
argued that the provided findings constitute a prejudicial question
affecting the criminal case.
Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case, finding that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute an offense. It held that there
is no allegation that any fraud or misrepresentation was perpetrated on
the buyer Damian Vasquez or that the latter suffered any damage. It
stated that for the class of estafa under Art. 316, par. 2 of the RPC to
exist, it is essential that the fraud or deceit be practiced on the vendee
at the time of the sale; it does not comprehend a supposed
misrepresentation on the mortgagee of the property. Whereas in the
case at bar, there is nothing in the information which charges the
accused with having exercised such a misrepresentation or fraud upon
the offended party.
ISSUE: Whether the facts alleged in the information constitute an
offense.
HELD: Yes. The sufficiency of the information must have to be
determined solely upon such facts as alleged therein. In the instant
case, the facts as found by the court in the civil case, which is not final
because it is pending appeal in the CA, cannot be considered as a
prejudicial question. At most, they would merely constitute as a defense
in the criminal case, which must be substantiated during the trial.
In the case of People vs. Mariano, the CA stated that “[i]f no damage
should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would be committed by
the vendor as the element of damage would then be lacking. If, as a
result of the sale, the party who has a lien upon the property or for
whose benefit an encumbrance was created or constituted should
suffer damages, the vendor should be criminally liable should he have
misrepresented, committed fraud or practiced fraud upon such party.”
In the case at bar, the party who has a lien upon the property in question
or for whose benefit the mortgage was credited or constituted is the
mortgagee, and the expression “such party” refers to the mortgagee
herself. While the appellee as the vendor, had not made
misrepresentations to the mortgagee, because the mortgagee know of
the encumbrance made in her favor, still the vendor-appellee
committed or practiced fraud upon her, because appellee sold to the
vendee the property which they had previously mortgaged to the
mortgagee, without her knowledge and consent.
 7. SUY SUI, petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
(G.R. No. L-5278, 17 February 1953, Paras, C.J.)
PETITION FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE: Failure to move to quash amounts to a waiver of all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the complaint or
information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of
the same.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Suy Sui was charged in CFI Manila with a violation of EO
331, in relation to RA 509. After trial, he was found guilty. CA affirmed the CFI. He was
found to have sold a 10-pound bag of refined sugar to Faustino Caraan for the price of
P2, which is in excess by P0.20 as the max. ceiling price of said commodity is only
P1.80 as per EO 331. Suy Sui filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that
the classification of refined sugar into two groups in EO 331 is ambiguous, and thus,
the case should be resolved in his favor. The respondent argued that since Suy Sui
failed to raise the issue on ambiguity in the CFI and the CA by a motion to quash, he is
deemed to have waived objection. The Supreme Court revesed the appealed decision
and acquitted Suy Sui. Under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to
move to quash amounts to a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash, except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the
court is without jurisdiction of the same.
FACTS:
Suy Sui was charhed in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of
Executive Order No. 331, in relation to Republic Act. No. 509 in the following
information:
"That on or about the 17th day of July, 1950, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and offer for sale to the public at 312 Quezon Boulevard, in the said city, one
bag of refined sugar, 10 lbs. at P2, which price is in excess of P0.20 than that
authorized by law as the maximum ceiling price of said commodity, to wit
P1.80."
After trial, the court found Suy Sui guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine
of P5,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to be
barred from engaging in the wholesale and retail business in the Philippines
for a period of five years, with a recommendation to the President for his
immidiate deportation. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.
Suy Sui, the owner of a grocery store located at Quezon Boulevard,
Manila, was found by the CA to have sold on July 17, 1950 a 10-pound bag of
refined sugar to Faustino Caraan for the price of P2, allegedly in excess by
twenty centavos of the ceiling price fixed in Executive Order No. 331.
Suy Sui then files this petition for review on certiorari wherein he contends
that the classification of refined sugar into two groups contained in Executive
Order No. 331 is ambiguous—an ambiguity which should be resolved in his
favor. He claims that, for the same refined sugar, two ceiling prices for one kilo
are fixed, namely, P0.40 and P0.45, with the result that, if P0.45 is adopted as
a criterion, 10 pounds of sugar would cost approximately P2.02, or P0.02 less
than the amount for which he sold the 10-pound bag of refined sugar to
Faustino Caraan. It is, however, argued on the part of the respondent that Suy
Sui failed to raise the point not only in the Court of First Instance by a motion
to quash but also in the Court of Appeals, as a consequence of which he must
be deemed to have waived the objection.
ISSUE: Whether Suy Sui is deemed to have already waived objection by failing
to raise his point by a motion to quash in both the CFI and CA (NO)
RULING:
In the first place, under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to
move to quash amounts to a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a
motion to quash, except when the complaint or information does not charge
an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. It is apparent that
the point now raised by Suy Sui is in effect that the information does not charge
an offense. In the second place, as an appeal in a criminal proceedings throws
the whole case open for review, it should have been the duty of the Court of
Appeals to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed judgment,
whether they are assigned or not. (People vs. Rorbano, 43 Off. Gaz., 478.) On
the other hand, in Villareal vs. People, (47 Off. Gaz., 191), we held that
notwithstanding the absence of assignments of error, the appellate court will
review the record and reverse or modify the appealed judgment, not only on
grounds that the court had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not
constitute the offense charged, but also on prejudicial errors to the right of
accused which are plain, fundamental, vital, or serious, or on errors which go
to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict; although the rule doing away with
formal assignments of error does not dispense with the necessity of pointing
out technical and non-fundamental errors which do not affect the substantial
rights of an accused to a fair trial, and are not patent.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the petitioner is hereby
acquitted wth costs de oficio. So ordered.
TUASON, J., concurring:
I concur and may state as additional ground for reversing and appealed
judgment the elementary principle that no one can be convicted for an act
which is not punishable by law, whether a motion to quash has or has not been
filed, or whether the point has or has not been raised on appeal. In fact, even
with the defendant's express consent, he cannot be fined or sent to jail for a
supposed criminal offense that does not exist. The appealed decision was
absolutely void and unexecutable.
 10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTEO PENESA
(August 19, 1948)C. A. No. 243 PADILLA, J.
DOCTRINE: Granting that the prosecuting officer did not have a lawful
appointment, he was at least a de facto officer.
FACTS:
Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as husband and wife, in the
barrio of Marupit, municipality of Camalingan, Province of Camarines Sur.
Their daughter and five children of Rosario by her late husband lived with
them. Due to continuous wrangles between Timoteo and Rosario's
children by her late husband, both agreed to part. In pursuance of the
agreement and after dividing the palay, lumber and firewood between
Timoteo and the children of Rosario by her late husband, Timoteo left the
house. Early in the morning of the following day, Timoteo returned to the
house and asked Rosario to live with him in another place. The request
was refused.
Santiago Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario, came to the house and, upon
seeing Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they had agreed
to live apart. Angered by this remark, Timoteo unsheathed his bolo and
assaulted Santiago. Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried
to prevent another blow upon Santiago and had made a remark similar to
that of Santiago before the latter came to the house, was also assaulted
by Timoteo.
At this juncture, Rosario went down through the stairway, preceded by
Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the possession of the bolo
and both fell to the floor. A brother of Rosario appeared upon the scene
and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the hands of Timoteo. As a result
of the assault upon Santiago Cerrado, two wounds were inflicted upon him,
one on the left forearm and another under the left axilla. They were not
serious. Upon Crescensio Doro, the following wounds were inflicted: in the
left palm affecting two fingers, 3 inches long and from 1/2 to 3/4 inch deep,
which on the day of the trial was still bandaged because it was not yet
healed; a cut in the skin not so deep in the left axilla parallel to the left
nipple, 3 inches long; a cut above the elbow of the left arm, 3 inches long
and 1/8 inch deep; and another in the right hand from the index to the little
finger. The one in the left palm which cut the joints of the bones was serious
and, if the hemorrhage was not stopped, it would have resulted in
Crescencio's death.
Upon this evidence the trial court found Timoteo Penesa guilty of frustrated
homicide; and, holding that the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation without any aggravating circumstance.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appellant is guilty of frustrated homicide.
2. Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted.
RULING:
1. No. The trial court found the appellant guilty of frustrated homicide. This
is an error. When he went to the house of Rosario, it was not with the
intention to kill anybody. Neither could the remarks uttered by Crescencio
Doro and Santiago Cerrado have aroused his temper to such an extent as
to engender the desire and intent to kill them.
The finding of the trial court is based on the kind of weapons carried by the
appellant and on the parts of the victims' bodies at which the weapons
were aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. The wounds inflicted upon
the offended parties by the appellant were caused indiscriminately and not
deliberately. Appellant's purpose in going to the house, and not the kind of
weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims' bodies on which the
wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of
his intent.
The crime committed by the appellant against Santiago Cerrado, in the
absence of proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor
or of the required medical attendance, is slight physical injuries; and
against Crescencio Doro is serious physical injuries.
1. No. Granting that the prosecuting officer did not have a lawful
appointment, he was at least a de facto officer. The motion for new trial
was denied properly. The fact that the appellant was detained was no
obstacle for him to secure witnesses for his defense. He could have
secured them through his relatives and friends or through compulsory
process by giving their names to the trial court. The facts set forth in the
affidavit filed in support of the motion for new trial show that the same are
not newly discovered but forgotten evidence. If admitted, the facts in the
affidavit would contradict several points of the appellant's testimony.
The judgment appealed from is thus modified, with costs in both instances
against the appellant.
11. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. PEDRO MANABA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 38725. October 31, 1933.
VICKERS, J.
Doctrine: Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second
time or not when he was tried for rape in the present case depends on
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case.
Emergency Recit: The chief of police of Dumaguete filed a complaint with
the justice of peace of Dumaguete with the crime of rape committed against
Celestina Adapon. The CFI tried and convicted Manaba. However, the case
was dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction because Art. 344 of the RPC
requires that the complaint be filed by the offended party. A complaint was
then filed by the offended party before the CFI. The accused asked for its
dismissal as it will place him in jeopardy for the same offense. However, CFI
denied such motion and he was found guilty for the crime of rape. The Court
ruled that the accused was not placed in jeopardy because the first complaint
was not a valid complaint. Therefore, the judgment in the first case was void
for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros finding the defendant, Pedro
Manaba, guilty of rape. On May 10, 1932, chief of police of Dumaguete
filed a complaint with the justice of peace of Dumaguete with the crime of
rape committed against Celestina Adapon. In the Court of First Instance,
the accused was tried and convicted. But upon motion, the case was
dismissed for the lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter
because the complaint was filed by the chief of police. The offended party,
Adapon, filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint charging Manaba
of the crime of rape. The complaint was referred to the justice of peace for
preliminary investigation. Manaba waived his right to preliminary
investigation, instead asked for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
he had previously been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The motion
was denied. The information was then filed by provincial fiscal with the
Court of First Instance. Manaba renewed his motion for dismissal on the
ground of double jeopardy but the same was denied. Manaba was found
guilty and sentenced “to suffer 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, and the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended
party, Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring,
if any, at P5 a month until said offspring should become of age, and to pay
the costs.”
Issue: Whether the accused was placed in jeopardy.
Ruling: NO.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or not
when he was tried for rape in the present case depends on whether or not
he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by
the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law.
The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
The Court also noted on the specific provision concerning this case. The
case occurred on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised
Penal Code became effective. Pursuant to article 344 par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code: "The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above- named
persons, as the case may be." However, the word “filed” in the Spanish text
is not found, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of the RPC that
was approved by the Legislature.
Furthermore, the accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the
offspring, if should there be any, because the record shows that the accused
is a married man. The lower court also failed to consider the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity.
The defendant is therefore sentenced to suffer 17 years, 4 months, and 1
day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina
Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As thus
modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both
instances against the appellant.
 12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANTOS LOPEZ Y
JACINTO
(G.R. No. L- 1063; November 29, 1947; Tuason, J.)
Petition for Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: a plea of guilty waives only defects which may be taken
advantage of by motion to quash or by plea in abatement. "It does not
cure jurisdictional defects in an indictment; and if the latter is
insufficient, from the standpoint of failing either to confer jurisdiction or
to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, the plea of
guilty confesses nothing."
EMERGENCY RECIT: Lopez was caught to be in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, he was then charged with the violation of sec
484 in connection with the section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amend by CA no. 56 and further by RA. No 4. Sec 2 of the
same Act qualified the act by possession for self-defense or
surrendering the same. The information failed to prove otherwise.
Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the accused is therefore entitled to
the quashal of the information.
FACTS:
On or about the 21st day of August ‘46, in the City of Manila, the
accused willfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control a firearm to wit: one .45 caliber pistol, one clip
containing 7 rounds of ammunitions, without first having procured the
corresponding license or permit from the proper authorities.
Sec 1 of RA no. 4 makes it unlawful to manufacture, dispose, sell,
possess, etc. firearms and ammunition. However, this provision was
qualified by sec. 2 which provides that any person may, without
incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same. Provided that it not
be interpreted to mean as in any way exempting from such liability any
person, without the requisite license, making use of the said articles,
except in self-defense or carrying for the purpose of surrendering them.
xxx
Sec 2 excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to Aug 31 ‘46,
possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used
for any purpose other than self-defense or carried for any purpose other
than surrendering them to the proper authorities.
The Solicitor General contends that "when the appellant pleaded guilty
to the crime charged in the information he is deemed to have admitted
all the material allegations contained therein,"
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has been properly charged under
the information
RULING: NO. It has been seen that mere possession or custody of any
of the articles specified, in that Act, within the time designated in the
proclamation, was not illegal unless the possessor made use of them
or carried them on his person. What the accused could have
prosecuted for using or carrying on his person a firearm, was that he
defended himself with the arm or was on his way to give it up, as the
case might be.
It is then clear that the allegations in the information do not
constitute a cause of action. The information does not state where or
the circumstance were seized from the defendant. It is not alleged that
the accused was using them or carrying them with him. Although one
of the specified grounds of a motion to quash a complaint or information
is "that the facts charged do not constitute an offense," yet failure to
move to quash does not operate a waiver of objections to the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information of the
same.
In the information there are no material allegations which the
appellant could have admitted and on which he could be convicted. Like
a failure to demur, a plea of guilty waives only defects which may be
taken advantage of by motion to quash or by plea in abatement. "It does
not cure jurisdictional defects in an indictment; and if the latter is
insufficient, from the standpoint of failing either to confer jurisdiction or
to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, the plea of
guilty confesses nothing."
 13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VENANCIO C. MANGAMPO,
(G.R. No. L-8818., September 27, 1956, FELIX, J)
DOCTRINE: In pleading a former jeopardy it is not sufficient that the
Defendant simply alleged that he had been once in jeopardy; he must both
allege and prove specifically that the offense, of which he has been
formerly convicted or acquitted, is the same offense for which it is proposed
to try him again.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Accused Mangampo is an independent contractor
engaged in the unloading of cement belonging to the Pan-Philippine
Shipping Co., Inc. from the boat “Banzai Maru.” He Hired the services of
various foremen, watchmen, laborers, etc. but after the laborers rendered
their service, the accused, with intent to defraud refused and failed to pay
their wages despite repeated demands made upon him to do so. Accused
has been found guilty by the trial court as charged in the information. From
this verdict, the accused appealed to the lower court for not taking into
consideration the fact that he was put in double jeopardy for being
previously convincted in Criminal Case No. 24569 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIII.
Facts:
It is alleged in the information that on or about and during the period
comprised between February 8 and 26, 1952, the Defendant Mangampo,
being an independent contractor engaged in the unloading of cement
belonging to the Pan- Philippine Shipping Co., Inc., from the boat (“Banzai
Maru”), hired the services of Tomas Carnecete and 35 others whom he
employed as foremen, watchmen, signalmen, laborers, etc., at the daily
wages and for the number of days mentioned in the indictment, and that
after they had unloaded the same, the Defendant with intent to defraud,
wilfully and feloniously refused and failed to pay their wages despite
repeated demands made upon him to do so, to their damage and prejudice
in the respective amounts given in front of their names.
After proper proceedings and hearing, the Court found Defendant guilty as
charged in the information and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more than 4
years and 8 months of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties of
the law, to indemnify the corresponding laborers in their respective unpaid
wages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
From this verdict Defendant appealed to this Superiority and his counsel
maintains in this instance that the lower court erred (1) in not taking into
consideration the fact that the Defendant-Appellant was put in double
jeopardy because he has been convicted previously in Criminal Case No.
24569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII.
Sometime in February, 1952, Appellant contracted the services of about
286 laborers from Binondo, Manila, and took them to Mariveles, Bataan, to
unload cement from the ship Banzai Maru. The 36 complainants in this
case were among the laborers brought by Appellant to Mariveles who
worked from February 8 to February 26, 1952, inclusive. The agreement
was that Appellant was to pay each laborer or stevedore upon completion
of the work and at different rates of compensation depending on the nature
of the individual work of each laborer. Inspite of the fact that their work had
been terminated and notwithstanding their repeated demands for payment,
complainants have not as yet been fully paid by Appellant. After deducting
the small amounts that Appellant delivered to complainants at the time they
were still in Mariveles, the latter have not yet been paid the balance still
due them as listed above, amounting to the aggregate sum of P4,068.52.
Appellant told complainants that his failure to pay them in full was due to
the fact that the Pan-Philippine Shipping Co., Inc., with whom he had a
contract for services (Exhibit A) has not as yet given him the entire payment
for the stevedoring services. But upon discovering that Appellant was
telling a falsehood — because he had received had signed a quit-claim
deed (Exhibit C) in favor of the Union Trading Company, Inc., by virtue of
which, and in consideration of the sum of P3,900 he released the said
stevedoring services — complainants caused the institution of the present
criminal action.
Forty-five of Appellant’s laborers preferred charges against him with the
City Fiscal’s Office. According to the defense this office divided the action
into 3 cases or groups. The first was filed on November 12, 1953, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Appellant at the instance of 7 of
the unpaid complaining laborers (Criminal Case No. 24569) which was
assigned to Branch XIII of said court and decided on August 16, 1954. This
case is pending appeal in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 13394-R).
The second case was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila on November
17, 1953, in which the offended parties allegedly are the complainants
herein (36). This case was elevated on appeal to the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XIII (Criminal Case No. 27867) and was finally decided
against Appellant on December 17, 1954, who then took the matter up to
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 14132-R), where it is now pending.
Then came the third case which was initiated by the City Fiscal’s Office on
August 5, 1954, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, and
decided by this court on January 24, 1955. This is the case now on appeal
before Us.
Issue:
Whether the motion to quash on the ground of “the Defendant had been
previously convicted and is now in jeopardy of being convicted for the
second time of the same crime for which he is actually prosecuted” should
be granted. (NO)
being no modifying circumstances of criminal liability attending, We
sentence him as follows: In the case of foreman Tomas Carnecete, to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 2 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional; and in the 35 other cases
of unpaid laborers, to suffer in each of said cases the penalty of 3 months
and 11 days of arresto mayor. These penalties are subject to the
aforequoted provisions of the Code that the duration of the complete
sentence herein imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of
time corresponding to the case of Tomas Carnecete, or 3 years and 3 days
of incarceration. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed in all other respects with costs against Appellant.
It is SO ORDERED.

Ruling:

We agree with the Solicitor General that the defense of double jeopardy
in the case at bar has not been established and that the information that
initiated this case charges the Defendant with 36 different and distinct
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 303, i.e., one for each of Appellant’s
laborers whose wages were not paid by their contractor, and as Appellant
has not objected to the information on the ground of multiplicity of offenses
charged, he is deemed to have waived said defect and may be sentenced
for as many crimes as are described in the information and established by
the evidence (People vs. Policher, 60 Phil., 770 U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil.,
260).

Mere mention of criminal case numbers and alleged portions of both

informations for which he has supposedly been tried and convicted
is not sufficient proof of double jeopardy. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs.
Claveria, 29 Phil. 527-529, this Court held, among other things, that:

“In pleading a former jeopardy it is not sufficient that the Defendant

simply alleged that he had been once in jeopardy; he must both
allege and prove specifically that the offense, of which he has been
formerly convicted or acquitted, is the same offense for which it is
proposed to try him again.”

Wherefore, upon finding Defendant-Appellant guilty of 36 violations of

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 303 in relation to Article 315, 3rd and
4th paragraphs, sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and there
 14. G.R. NOs. L-18601-2, January 31, 1963
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
LUALHATI S. MACANDOG, Defendant-Appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: The motion to quash in the slander case challenged
the jurisdiction of the municipal court allegedly because a written
complaint by the offended party therein is absolutely
indispensable. With respect to the slight physical injuries,
appellant claims that the same had already prescribed.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Appeal on questions of law from an order
dated 12 April 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Manila:
These cases are before the court on appeal from an
order of the Judge of the Municipal Court denying the
motion to quash filed by counsel for the defendant.
Taking into consideration that the order denying the
motion to quash is interlocutory in nature, the appeal
is hereby dismissed with costs against the appellant.
The Court held that an order denying the motion to quash is not
appealable, hence the trial shall go on. If judgement is rendered
against the accused, the accused can appeal and raise again the
same question that is now seeking to be reviewed. Macandong
cited Arches v Beldia to support her appeal, but the Solicitor
General said that the decision is misconstrued. When the Justice
of Peace court denied the motion to quash, Macandong brought
the issue by certiorari and prohibition to the CFI of Capiz, this
move was deemed to be erroneous by the Court because the only
remedy that Macandong can invoke is an appeal “in due time”,
wherein it implies that a previous conviction as a result of a trial,
not a remedy to which refers to an interlocutory order denying a
motion to quash.
FACTS:
On November 25, 1960, the City Fiscal's office filed against
appellant, in the Municipal Court of Manila, two informations for
slander and for slight physical injuries. And then on January 20
and 30, 1961, respectively, respectively, accused filed motions to
quash both information, which motions were denied due to lack
of merit on February 10, 1961. The accused appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which was dismissed.
The motion to quash in the slander case challenged the
jurisdiction of the municipal court allegedly because a written
complaint by the offended party therein is absolutely
indispensable. With respect to the slight physical injuries,
appellant claims that the same had already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the municipal court denying
the motions to quash both information is appealable. (NO)
RULING:
It has been held repeatedly by this Court that an order denying
the motion to quash is merely interlocutory, and, therefore, not
appealable.
Sec. 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that
the accused "shall immediately plead" after the motion to quash
is overruled, which thus means that trial shall go on, and if
judgment is rendered against her, she can later on appeal and
then raise again the same question which she is now seeking to
be reviewed.
In support of her appeal, appellant cites the case of Arches vs.
Beldia (G.R. No. L-2414. 27 May 1949.) However as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the decision is misconstrued. After the
motion to quash was denied by the Justice of the Peace Court,
the accused brought the issue, by certiorari and prohibition, to the
Court of First Instance of Capiz, a step which this Court held to
be erroneous, as "appeal in due time was the obvious and only
remedy for the accused-petitioner" therein. The phrase "appeal
in due time" implies a previous conviction as a result of a trial on
the merits of the case, and does not refer to an interlocutory order
denying a motion to quash.
17. BAESA et al., v. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF CAMARINES
SUR, NAGA CITY
[G.R. No. L-30363. January 30, 1971.]
TEEHANKEE, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners (Mariano, Raymundo and Victorio all surnamed Baesa)
were originally charged with the crime of frustrated murder upon complaint of
Joker Arroyo for having attacked him and the information filed by the fiscal
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2059 of the lower court. Arraignment and
trial were set, but there ensued a total of thirteen postponements thereof. reason
for these repeated postponements appears to be that another criminal case for
the same crime and complainant was already pending and being tried by the
same court and judge docketed as Criminal Case No. 1915. Criminal Case
No. 1915 was dismissed but nevertheless Case No. 2059 continued until its
last setting where intervenor did not appear so the lower court dismissed the
case. Five years thereafter, respondent fiscal filed another information, for the
same offense subject of the previous Criminal Case No. 2059, against the same
accused. Petitioners having been duly arraigned on this second information
and having all entered a plea of not guilty, then filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground of double jeopardy. Lower court held that no
jeopardy had been incurred in the previous case. The case was then set three
times for trial and each setting was postponed.
Petitioners contended that their constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Respondent contended that petitioners were in estoppel from invoking the right
to speedy trial by virtue of their agreement to the postponements. The lower
court rendered its decision that the unwarranted delay was without good cause
or justifiable motive. Respondent fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration
stating that the accused play an active role in securing several postponements
and give their express conformity thereto and to the deferment and holding in
abeyance of trial until the termination of a related case, in which cases the
rights of public justice should not be precluded. Lower court held that “thirteen
postponements within a period of six years, without the accused having been
arraigned nor tried once and the filing of the second information after the lapse
of five years and four months from the date of the dismissal of the first case
and almost eleven years from the filing of the original complaint, constitute an
unwarranted delay and a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to
a speedy trial."
ISSUE: WON the denial of quashal motion is correct. YES
RULING: The Court finds that the writ of mandamus was erroneously issued
by the lower court on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. The second
criminal case, No. 7451, was already pending trial before the lower court, and
any and all grounds for dismissal or defenses of the petitioners-accused as to
the information against them, could be raised only in the said case before the
court in which it was pending, which had exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. As already stated, the lower court in its order in the said
criminal case denied their quashal motion, holding that there was no
jeopardy since the accused had not been arraigned in the first case and its
provisional dismissal was "upon the express request of counsel for the
accused" and virtually denying petitioners’ claim of having been denied a
speedy trial, since it ruled that they had to stand trial as charged in the case.
It is from such denial order of the lower court in the criminal case that
petitioners could have sought recourse from a higher court through the special
actions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
As seen from the case at bar, the same judge of the lower court would hold in
the mandamus case that the "unwarranted delay (in the first case) was without
good cause or justifiable motive . . . many of the postponements were
unjustified" contrary to his own actuations as presiding judge in the first
criminal case granting the said postponements and deferment thereof as being
for good and justified cause. The same judge of the lower court would order
in the mandamus case the dismissal of the pending "criminal case against the
accused, contrary to his own adverse order in said criminal case denying the
accused’s claim of double jeopardy and virtually rejecting their claim of denial
of the right to speedy trial.
And in this appeal from the lower court’s decision in the mandamus case for
dismissal of the criminal case, this Court would in effect be constrained to rule
as to which of the lower court’s conflicting actuations in the two cases was
correct, having before it only the record of the appealed mandamus case — but
not the record of the criminal case, which has not been elevated to this Court
since none of the lower court’s actions therein, including the order of denial of
petitioners’ quashal motion, has been questioned or challenged in this Court.
Withal, the lower court appears to have properly denied the quashal motion in
the criminal case, judging from the facts above stated and appearing in the
record of the mandamus case, as the record of said criminal case is not before
the Court. On the authority of People v. Obsania 12 the provisional dismissal
of the first case was properly held by the lower court, in the criminal case now
pending, as not terminating the first case on the merits such as to constitute
double jeopardy, since the dismissal of the first case falls under the ruling
enunciated in People v. Jabajab 13 that while" (I)t is true that a person accused
has a right to a speedy trial . . . the defendant cannot agree to the repeated
postponement of the trial of his cases and then when he finds the Government
absent or unable to go to trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of
said absence and ask for the dismissal of his case."cralaw virtua1aw library
The writ of mandamus issued by the lower court against respondent fiscal to
refrain from the further proceeding with the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
7451 of said court is set aside, and the trial thereof should now be held and
terminated without further delay.
18. PEOPLE v. MANLAPAS ET AL.
(G.R. NO. L-17993, AUGUST 24, 1962, BAUTISTA ANGELO J.)
DOCTRINE: Of course, there being a valid information before a competent
court, and after the accused had pleaded not guilty, the dismissal of the original
information may have the effect of barring further prosecution for the same
offense, in the light of Section 9, Rule 113, of our Rules of Court. But here the
dismissal was qualified; it was made without prejudice to the refilling of
the case in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of
the purview of the rule regarding double jeopardy. Thus, in Jaca vs.
Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, p. 108, we held that the dismissal
contemplated in the abovementioned section of the rule is a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without
prejudice as in the present case.
EMERGENCY RECIT: After the complaint was amended by having it
subscribed by the proper offended party, without conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace court forwarded the record
to the court of first instance where the fiscal filed the corresponding information
as required by law, and that, upon finding that no such investigation has been
made on the amended complaint, the court a quo, motu proprio, dismissed the
case "without prejudice to the refilling of the same in the proper court."
But after the case was refilled, on motion of defense counsel, the court a quo
dismissed the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The government
now comes before us complaining that the court a quo committed a
miscarriage of justice in quashing the information on the aforesaid ground. SC
held that the dismissal does not have the effect of barring further prosecution
of the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. It is because the dismissal
was qualified; it was made without prejudice to the refilling of the case in the
proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of the purview of the rule
regarding double jeopardy.
FACTS:
 Bernardino Albuera, husband of Proserfina Buelo, subscribed to a
complaint charging Protacio Manlapas and Heracleo Inopia with the
crime of attempted rape with robbery before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Baleno, Masbate.
 Having pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived their right to the
preliminary investigation, on motion of the accused, the court
forwarded the record of the case to the court of first instance.
  On motion of the fiscal praying that the case be returned to the court
of origin for further proceedings on the ground that the complaint
was not signed by the offended woman but by her husband, the
record was returned as prayed for.
 A new complaint for attempted rape with robbery was subscribed by
the offended woman, after which the record was again forwarded to
the court of first instance
 It appears that the accused waived their right to be informed of the
nature of the information at the same time entering a plea of not guilty
to the charge. It also appears that defense counsel raised the question
of the court's jurisdiction and asked for a five-day period to present
a motion to quash, but before this could be done, the court, upon
finding that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the
justice of the peace on the amended complaint, motu proprio
dismissed the case "without prejudice to the refilling of the same
in the proper court."
 Another complaint subscribed by the same offended party charging
the two accused with the same offense was filed before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Baleno, Masbate.
 And having waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary
investigation, the justice of the peace court transmitted the case to the
court of first instance where the fiscal filed the corresponding
information.
 Counsel for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy. This was opposed by the fiscal and, acting on both
the motion and the opposition, the court a quo granted the motion and
dismissed the information on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
on the simple ground that it was given due course without the inferior
court first conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, since this
right, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceeding, the most that could have been done being to remand the
case in order that such investigation may be conducted. And it is
unwarranted because after expressly providing that the dismissal was
without prejudice to the refilling of the same in the proper court, the court
a quo adopted an inconsistent attitude when it dismissed the new
information on the ground of double jeopardy. It is action such as this that
gives rise to a miscarriage of justice. The court a quo should be admonished
to be more careful in the performance of its official duties so that mistakes such
as this may be avoided in the future.
Of course, there being a valid information before a competent court, and after
the accused had pleaded not guilty, the dismissal of the original information
may have the effect of barring further prosecution for the same offense, in the
light of Section 9, Rule 113, of our Rules of Court. But here the dismissal
was qualified; it was made without prejudice to the refilling of the case
in the proper court. This, in our opinion, takes this case out of the
purview of the rule regarding double jeopardy.
Thus, in Jaca vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, p. 108, we held that the
dismissal contemplated in the abovementioned section of the rule is a definite
or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal
without prejudice as in the present case.
The court a quo therefore, erred in dismissing the case on the ground of double
jeopardy.

Whether the does the dismissal have the effect of barring further prosecution
of the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. (NO)

RULING:

The thing that strikes our attention right from the start is the unwarranted
attitude of the court a quo in dismissing the case motu proprio based on the
wrong premise that the amended complaint was given due course by the
justice of the peace court without first conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation, albeit "without prejudice to the refilling of the same in the proper
court."

And then, after the case was refilled as suggested, the same court, without
hesitation, granted the motion of defense counsel to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy. This stand is not only erroneous but unwarranted. Erroneous
because the court had no justification whatever in dismissing the case
 19.EUGENIO CABRAL vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, et al.
[G.R. No. L-41692. April 30, 1976. Ponente: ANTONIO, J.]
Doctrines: Under Sections 2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court,
an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription of offenses
is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
Facts: This is a certiorari and prayer of prohibition to nullify the order of
respondent Judge Puno of the CFI in Bulacan, Baliwag branch dated May 21,
1975, reviving the Information in a criminal complaint for falsification of a
public document.
Acting on the complaint of Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an
Information with respondent court, accusing petitioner Cabral of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948
the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before
arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime charged, as the said document of sale was notarized
on August 14, 1948, and registered on August 26, 1948, and since then
Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and
exercised acts of ownership thereon. Judge Juan F. Echiverri, granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of
prescription.
Private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution. This
was opposed by Cabral on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene
in the criminal case, having filed a civil action against the same accused and
on the basis of the same factual averments. Respondent Judge Puno, now
presiding, ordered the Fiscal to make his position.
In the Fiscal’s comment, they expressed the view that the crime has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego only discovered the crime sometime in
October 1970, and that an arraignment and trial should proceed. On May 21,
1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution and reinstated the
Information. Cabral moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground
that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or
amendment''; and (b) by instituting a civil case, respondent San Diego lost his
right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was
denied, as well as the second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N Respondent Judge Puno was correct in reviving the
Information?
Held: No. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25,
1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the
Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become
final and executory.
SC agrees with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an
order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also
provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Cabral was charged with the crime of
falsification. This crime prescribes in ten years. Here, San Diego had actual if
not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.While it is true that
the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such
move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the
legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the
period for appeal.
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to
the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, Silvino San Diego, on
the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of
August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed a civil action against Eugenio Cabral for
the recovery of the same property and damages. There was a pending civil
action arising out of the same alleged forged document.
20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE THEN PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, AND VICENTE ACEVEDA
(G.R. L-32815, JUNE 25, 1980, DE CASTRO, J.)
DECISION
DOCTRINE: The grounds for the motion to quash are (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and (2) the writing is privileged
communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Vicente Aceveda, herein accused, moved to quash
the information for libel filed by Edgardo Biasbas. The respondent
judge granted the motion to quash and dismissed the information.
However, the order of dismissal failed to discuss which of the grounds
set forth in the motion to quash said motion was being sustained. The
OSG contends that neither of the two grounds adverted to is really
“well founded and meritorious”. The Court sustain the submission of
the SolGen. The Court held that the first and second grounds of motion
to quash are equally devoid of merit. Legally defective both in form and
substance, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 18204 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal may not, therefore, be sustained or upheld.
FACTS: Vicente Aceveda posted at the Company’s bulletin board and
circulated unsealed copies of a letter containing libelous matter against
Edgardo Biasbas, Internal Auditor of Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd. The
allegation stemmed from an incident of hold up involving the Delivery Panel
of Arturo Ramos. Edgardo Biasbas conducted the inventory of Ramos Stocks.
Baisbas also did the reconciliation of Ramos’ stock and accountabilities and
supplied the adjuster the figures which were adopted as the losses and claims
against the Insurance Company—which was the task of Aceveda but was
done by Biasbas. Aceveda accused Biasbas of implicating him to pave way for
his dismissal. Aceveda moved that Biasbas be dismissed for
misrepresentation, gross inefficiency and lack of necessary qualifications. He
also accused Biasbas of orchestrating the incident due to the latter’s “greed
and lust of for power and aspiration in one of the vacant managerial positions
in the Company.”
Edgardo Biasbas filed an information for libel Against Aceveda in the CFI of
Rizal. The information contains the allegation “., with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue, integrity and reputation of one Edgardo M.
Biasbas, Internal Auditor of the said Corporation, and with malicious intent of
injuring and exposing the said Edgardo M. Biasbas to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, posted at the Company's bulletin board and circulate unsealed
copies of a letter containing libelous matter.” Aceveda moved to quash the
information which was granted by Respondent Judge Amdor Gomez. The
order of dismissal was granted not only because the motion to quash was not
opposed by the prosecution, but also because the Court finds the same to be
“well founded and meritorious.”
However, the order of dismissal failed to discuss which of the grounds set
forth in the motion to quash said motion was being sustained, and the
reasons in support of the action of the court, or whether both grounds are
found "well founded and meritorious" as may well be what the court a
quo meant with the sweeping statement it made in reaching its unreasoned
conclusion.
The Government contends that neither of the two grounds adverted to is
really “well founded and meritorious.”
ISSUE: W/N motion to quash must be granted.
RULING: No.
1. The Motion to Quash based on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense is without factual or legal basis.
The statement made by respondent Aceveda imputes dishonesty, depravity,
and lack of virtue to the complainant. Specifically, such words as
"misrepresentation, gross inefficiency, lack of necessary qualifications,"
"malicious desire of Mr. Biasbas", "his greed and lust for power and aspiration
for one of the managerial positions," "engages in provincial junket with a
minimum daily expense of P25.00 a day", cannot but bring dishonor and
disgrace to the complainant's reputation to be considered libelous. The
element of publicity is undeniably present as respondent posted at the
company’s bulletin board and circulated unsealed letters bearing such
statements against Biasbas. Maslice as the other element is likewise alleged
in the information. The libelous character of the statements contained in the
letter upon which the libel indictment is based, having been shown, malice is
presumed. The element of identifiability of the offended party or the person
defined is never in doubt from the allegation of the information which quotes
the libelous letter mentioning by name the person defamed and insulted, the
complainant, Edgardo Biasbas.
2. The claim of the accused Aceveda that the letter is a privileged
communication because it is intended to explain what his superior asked of
him which, if not so explained, may cause his dismissal from his position in
the company, and that he had merely expressed opinions of, not derogatory
remarks against, complainant, even assuming such claim to be true, is not a
ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter of defense which must be proved
after trial of the case on the merits.
In See Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui[5] it was held: “The privileged character of
the defamatory statements is a matter of defense. It is not a proper ground
for a motion to dismiss. The fact that the communication is privileged does
not mean that it is not actionable.”
The Court also fail to see in the order of dismissal any intent on the part of
the court of making the lack of opposition filed by the prosecution to the
motion to quash as a ground for its dismissing the case, as constituting lack
of interest, just because notwithstanding the order of the court for the
prosecution to submit its opposition to the motion to quash within three days
from notice, no such opposition was filed. The records show that on the same
day, August 29, 1969, a copy of the order of dismissal was received, a notice
of appeal was prepared and filed September 8, 1969. This is by no means
indicative of lack of interest.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby
set aside, and let the case returned to the Court of origin for proper
further proceedings.
21. People vs. Reyes
G.R. No. L-7712. March 23, 1956, Paras, C.J
Doctrine: Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient,
but the case is dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the
complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar
another prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped from
alleging in the second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong
because the complaint or information was valid.
Emergency Recitation: Bernanrdo Reyes and Mariano Reyes committed a
crime of coercion against Agustin Blasco. The MTC of Manila dismissed the
information because it did not allege the use f violence. The prosecution
appealed to the CFI of Manila but it was dismissed for lack of Merit. Thus, it
appealed before the SC, alleging that the offense charged is coercion or
unjust vexation under Article 287, and violence under such article, is not an
essential element. But the defendant argued that the present appeal will put
them to double jeopardy. The SC ruled in favor of the appellant. It held that,
the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is
dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or
information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another
prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped from
alleging in the second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong
because the complaint or information was valid
Facts:
Bernanrdo Reyes and Mariano Reyes committed a crime of coercion against
Agustin Blasco. The former willfully, unlawfully and feloniously seize, take and
hold possession of the former’s passenger jeep. Upon motion of the
defendants, the Municipal Trial Court of Manila dismissed the information
because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that
the offense charged was coercion under Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The prosecutor appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila however it
was dismissed for lack of merit, thus the prosecution has elevated the case
before the Supreme Court, alleging that the offense charged is coercion or
unjust vexation under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that “Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both,”
under which violence is not an essential element.
However, Defendant- appellees argued that the present appeal would place
them in double jeopardy
Issue: WON the present appeal will put the defendants in double jeopardy
Held: No. “Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient,
but the case is dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the
complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar
another prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped
from alleging in the second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong
because the complaint or information was valid.” (Morgan, Comments on the
Rules of Court 52 ed., Vol. II, p. 802.)
22. JUAN D. CRISOLOGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
PABLO VILLALOBOS
G.R. NO. L-6277 | FEBRUARY 26, 1954
Ponente: REYES, J.
Doctrine: Where an act transgresses both civil and military laws subjects the offender
to punishment by both civil and military authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a
civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the military court, and vice
versa.
Emergency recit: Juan Crisologo was a captain in the USAFFE in the World War II
and a lieutenant colonel of the AFP when he was accused of treason. Before this
accusation, he was under the jurisdiction of the Articles of War with three charges;
two of them were treason. He was dismissed for the charges of treason in the military
court, but the case was transferred to the CFI of Zamboanga and amplified the charges
of treason. Crisologo filed a motion to quash challenging the jurisdiction of the court
and alleging double jeopardy, which the trial court dismissed. The Supreme Court held
that the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the
same offense in the civil courts because the overt acts specified in the Information in
the CFI of Zamboanga are embraced in one single act of treason, since treason is a
continuing crime. Therefore, pushing it further in the CFI of Zamboanga when a
decision was already meted in the military court with constitute double jeopardy. The
motion to quash should be granted.
Facts:
 Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world
war, and at the time of the filing of the present petition, a lieutenant colonel
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of
treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Before he was brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was indicted for
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408 or the Articles of War containing
three charges; two of which (the first and the third) were treason.
o Giving information and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of
the USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese
reputation
o Urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with
the enemy
 Second charge: having civilians killed in time of war.
  He was found innocent of the first and third charges; Guilty on the second
charge and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the military court.
 Republic Act No. 311, which abolished the People’s Court, was then
approved. The criminal case of Crisologo was transferred to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga were charges of treason were amplified.
 Crisologo presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the
court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the
military court.
 The CFI denied the motion.
 Filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which the trial judge dismissed.
 Petition is opposed by Solicitor General as well and denied that Crisologo is
being subjected to double jeopardy.
Issue:
 Whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further
prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts
Ruling: YES.
 Jurisprudential citation: U.S. vs. Tubig
o A soldier of the United States Army in the Philippines was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated
one Antonio Alivia. Upon arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy
in that he had already been previously convicted and sentenced by s
court-martial for the same offense and had already served his
sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that the
province where the offense was committed was under civil
jurisdiction, the military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense.
But on appeal, this court held that "one who has been tried and
convicted by a court martial under circumstances giving that
tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been
once in jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be again
prosecuted in another court of the same sovereignty."
 There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military
laws subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military authority,
a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a
prosecution in the military court, and vice versa. But the rule "is strictly
limited to the case of a single act which infringes both the civil and the
military law in such a manner as to constitute two distinct offenses, one of
which is within the cognizance of the military courts and the other a subject
of civil jurisdiction" and it does not apply where both courts derive their
powers from the same sovereignty.
 It therefore, has no application to the present case the military court has
convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him again
derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that the
charges of treason tried in the court martial were punishable under the
Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly admitted by the Solicitor
General that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
 The offense charged in the military court is different from that charged in the
civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military
court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People's
Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that
the conviction in the court martial was void.
 The amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court.
o While certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the
Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court
martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which
is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally
liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt
acts "he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute but
a single offense."
 It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court
is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that
both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out
by the military court to the petitioner should, in accordance with the
precedents above cited, be a bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the
same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.
 Thus, motion to quash can be granted to Crisologo.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted
and the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered
dismissed.
 23.OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
(G.R. No. L-54558; L-69882, 22 May 1987, Ganayco, J.)
DOCTRINE: As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not
martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners were arrested and charged with subversion. The chief of staff
of the Philippines created Military Commission no. 34 to hear and decide the case. Military
Commission no. 34 passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the
penalty of death by electrocution. They filed a petition arguing that military commissions have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during marital law. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversing their previous decision in Aquino jr. v.
Military Commission no. 2 which allowed military tribunals to try and decide cases of civilians.
FACTS:
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners (Eduardo B. Olaguer,
Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang,
Magdalena De Los Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J.
Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado) were arrested by
the military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in
Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at
Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in
detention at Camp Crame. All of the petitioners are civilians. The petitioners
are charged with subversion. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines created the Military Commission no. 34 to try the criminal case
against the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for 7 offenses
namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and
Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose
Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of
Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting
to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings the petitioners went to this court and
filed the instant petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. The thrust of their
argument is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law.
Pending the resolution of this petition, military commission no. 34 passed
sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of
death by electrocution. Petitioners, in the second petition seeks to enjoin the
said respondents form taking any further action on the case of the petitioners
and from implementing the judgment of conviction rendered by military
commission no. 34 for the reason that the same is null and void.
In resolving these two petitions the court took account of several
supervening events:
1. On January 17, 1981, then president Ferdinand Marcos issued
proclamation no. 2045 officially lifting martial law and the same
revoked general order no. 8 creating military tribunals and directed
that the military tribunals created are hereby dissolved
2. Petitioner Ester Jimenez, Eduardo Olaguer, and Othoniel Jimenez
obtained provisional liberty. The rest have been released sometime
before or after President Corazon Aquino assumed office.
The issue on habeas corpus has been rendered moot and academic as
the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers.
ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians
while the civil courts are open and functioning
RULING: NO.
Prior to this case, the issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions to try
civilians have been ruled upon by a divided supreme court in Aquino, jr. vs
Military Commission no. 2.
Decision:
The court in this case rules that military commission no. 2 has
been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear
the cases against civilians including petitioner. To preserve the safety
of the nation the president, authorized in general order no. 8 the chief
of staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to create military tribunals to
try and decide cases of military personnel and other such cases as
may be referred to them. The military tribunals were vested with
jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts," among others, over crimes
against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations
of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the
emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and
preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.
Petitioner insists that he being a civilian, trial by military commission
deprives him of the right to due process however this argument
ignores the reality of the rebellion and the existence of martial law. It
is, of course, essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law
administrator must have ample and sufficient means to quell the
rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and
punishment of offenders have been considered as necessary in a
state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly
inadequate for the exigency.
This ruling in Aquino jr. v. Military Commission no. 34, has been affirmed in at
least 6 other cases.
Petitioners anchor their argument on their prayer that the ruling in
Aquino jr be appraised anew and abandoned or modified. After a thorough
deliberation on the matter, we find cogent basis for re-examining the same.
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee and Madame Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma in Aquino, Jr.
in so far as they hold that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction
to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and
functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where
the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process
clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system.
Justice Teehankee's dissenting opinion in Aquino jr: “Since we are not
enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on
the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them
which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and
have been regularly functioning.”
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the
Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided
by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power
and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is
not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities.
We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil courts in
the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not
martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof
is of no moment.
(this was also assigned sa rule 112 so cinopy paste ko na lang sya kasi yung facts, issue and ruling ayun na
talaga. Yung issue about motion to quash, hindi talaga sya niraise ng parties. Pero diniscuss lang sya ng
SC sa last part after nila magrule about sa main issue talaga ng case so yun na lang ilalagay ko.)
24.PEOPLE v. CASIANO (FEBRUARY 16, 1961)
G.R. No. L-15309
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
● Ricardo Macapagal filed, with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Rosales, Pangasinan, a complaint, which was amended later on,
charging Rosalina Casiano with "estafa".
● After conducting the first stage of the preliminary investigation and
finding the existence of probable cause, said court issued a warrant
of arrest, whereupon defendant posted a bail bond for her temporary
release.
● When the case was called for preliminary investigation, defendant
waived her right thereto, and, accordingly, the record was forwarded
to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
● The provincial fiscal filed therein an information for "illegal
possession and use of a false treasury or bank notes"
● Defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
● Counsel was granted permission to submit a "motion to dismiss", on
the ground that there had been no preliminary investigation of the
charge of illegal possession and use of a false bank note, and that
the absence of such preliminary investigation affected the
jurisdiction of the court.
● The motion was granted and, a reconsideration of the order to this
effect having been denied, the prosecution interposed the present
appeal.
● Defendant-appellee maintains, and the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan held, that the waiver made by the defendant in the
justice of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a
preliminary investigation of the crime of illegal possession and use
of a false bank note, for this offense does not include, and is not
included in, that of "estafa", to which her aforementioned waiver
referred.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is entitled to a preliminary investigation of the crime
of illegal possession and use of a false bank note as charged in the information
herein. (NO)
RULING:
Regardless of whether or not the crime of "estafa" includes or is included in
that of illegal possession or use of a false bank note or other obligation
payable to bearer, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan erred in holding
that the allegations of the information filed in this case were not included in
those of the aforementioned amended complaint and that defendant-
appellee was entitled to another preliminary investigation of the charge
contained in the information. It erred, also, in dismissing the case for, even if
defendant had a right to such other preliminary investigation, the same was
deemed waived upon her failure to invoke it prior to or, at least, at the time
of the entry of her plea in the court of first instance.
Independently of the foregoing, the absence of such investigation did not
impair the validity of the information or otherwise rendered it defective.
Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the
present case. Hence, had defendant-appellee been entitled to another
preliminary investigation, and had his plea of not guilty upon arraignment not
implied a waiver of said right, the court of first instance should have, either
conducted such preliminary investigation, or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to
make it or remanded the record for said investigation to the justice of the
peace court, instead of dismissing the case, as it did in the order appealed
from.
RULING IN RELATION TO MOTION TO QUASH:
(Sa old Rules of Court, Rule 113 yung Motion To Quash)
Upon arraignment, the defendant may move to quash the information, upon
the ground, among others, that he "has been previously... in jeopardy of
being convicted ... of the offense charged" (Rule 113, Sections 1 and 2,
paragraph [h]). However, if he "does not move to quash the information
before he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the complaint or
information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction
of the same" (Rule 113, section 10). Hence, if he pleads to the charge, without
invoking his immunity from a second jeopardy, the same is deemed waived.
No such waiver or admission is deemed made in the absence of a plea. If the
defendant fails to answer plaintiff's complaint, the allegations thereof are
deemed denied and plaintiff is bound, therefore, to prove them. The same
rule applies to defendants.
Indeed, it is well settled that the immunity must be "specially" pleaded; that
this must be done "at the earliest opportunity"; and that, otherwise, it is
deemed waived.
In the case at bar, there is another circumstance justifying the conclusion that
defendant herein has waived said immunity. Upon issuance of the order of
dismissal complained of, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,
to which the defendant objected upon the ground of double jeopardy. When
defendant filed his brief with this Court, he was well aware, therefore, of the
materiality or pertinence of said defense to the appeal taken by the
prosecution. Yet, he did not avail himself of such defense. This omission must
be due, therefore, to neither ignorance nor oversight on his part. He advisedly
and purposely refrained from invoking said defense. In other words, he
waived it.
Waiver of Objection to Second Jeopardy by Procuring Quashal of First
Indictment. — It may be stated as a general rule that where a person after
being put in jeopardy procures a quashal of the indictment upon which he is
being prosecuted, he cannot thereafter plead former jeopardy when placed
on trial upon another indictment for the same offense. His action in procuring
a quashal of the indictment constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
privilege.
A court has "discretion" to entertain or not to entertain a motion to quash
filed by the defendant based upon a former jeopardy, which came to his
knowledge "after he has pleaded." Although this provision regulates the
procedure in courts of first instance, we find no plausible reason to depart
from its policy in proceedings before appellate courts. Although, as adverted
to above, there are no "pleadings" — in the technical sense of the term — in
appealed cases, the briefs therein filed play the role of said pleadings insofar
as said briefs concretize the issues raised and submitted for determination by
the appellate court. However, defendant herein has not tried to avail himself
of said provision, for she has not moved to dismiss the appeal upon the
ground of double jeopardy. At any rate, she cannot invoke, by analogy the
above quoted provision of Section 10, Rule 113, because the same requires
that knowledge of the former jeopardy be acquired after the plea, whereas
defendant herein knew, before filing her brief with this Court, that the
attempt by the prosecution to seek a review of the order appealed from
opened the door to the issue of double jeopardy. In fact, when the
prosecution moved, in the lower court, for a reconsideration of said order,
defendant objected upon the ground of double jeopardy.
But, even if she may claim the benefits of the aforementioned provision of
Section 10, Rule 113, it should be noted that the same confers upon the Court
"discretion" to entertain the plea of double jeopardy or not. Under the
circumstances surrounding this case — considering particularly that
defendant had induced the lower court to believe erroneously that the crime
charged in the information was not included in allegations of the complaint,
that another preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the
information was necessary, and that in the absence of such other preliminary
investigation the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that the
ends of justice would be defeated, by entertaining now a plea of double
jeopardy, which up to this late stage of the proceedings, has not been set up
in this Court — we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the interest of the
proper administration of justice would be served best by a determination of
the merits of the charge against defendant herein.
25.Pople v. The City Court of Manila, Branch XI et al
(G.R.No. L-36342 April 27, 1983, Relova, J)
Motion to Quash
Doctrine: Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with
an offense cannot he charged again with the same or identical offense
though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, as held
in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution. for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy, if indicted for the new offense. The victim Diolito
dela Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused
was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed
on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already in
jeopardy.
Emergency Recit: The City Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissed the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against private
respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, on the ground of double
jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private respondent having
been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place
the accused in double jeopardy.The Sureme Court affirmed the order
of the lower court for the dismissal of the case.
Facts:
The incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, October
18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On
the same day, the victim Diolito
de la Cruz died. On October 20, 1972, private respondent was
arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. On
October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent. On November 17,
1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent,
issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case
on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be
prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the
offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered
Ruling:
No. Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an
offense cannot he charged again with the same or identical offense
though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, as held
in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution. for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy, if indicted for the new offense. The victim Diolito
dela Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused
was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed
on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already in
jeopardy.
26. PEOPLE v. AURELIO BALISACAN
(G.R. No. L-26376 , August 31, 1966, BENGZON J.P., J.)
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF ACQUITTAL
DOCTRINE: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy.
EMERGENCY RECIT:. Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of
Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing
so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to
present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in
self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to
the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was
acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
FACTS:
 On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality
of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, the herein
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter
wounds that immediately caused his death.
 To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of
guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel.
 At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused
testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense
because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after
the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
 On March 6, 1965, on the basis of the testimony, the court a quo
rendered a decision acquitting the accused.
 The appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its
brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. CA then
found that the trial court erred in acquitting the accused of the offense
charged despite the latter's plea of guilty when arraigned.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
RULING: NO.
It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860,
December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first
entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course
of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty
and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the
charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him.
This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there
can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the
merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its
evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it
clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore,
being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed.
2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge
below already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness
to the prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial
judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further
proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other
branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case
is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge
of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of
evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No
costs. So ordered.
27. PEOPLE v. ELISEA YLAGAN
G.R. NO. L-38442 | November 25, 1933 | Abad Santos, J
Doctrine (Double jeopardy)
It is a sound rule, that the mere silence of the defendant or her failure to
object to the dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent that enables
a case to be filed for a second time and will not fall in purview of double
jeopardy.
Defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial
under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of information.
The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of
second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense.
Summary
Complaint for physical injury was filed against Ylagan. The first one, she
pleaded, not guilty, but trial did not commence since the prosecutor moved
for the dismissal of the case and was granted by the court. A second, same
complaint was filed again in the same court of justice. On arraignment she
pleaded double jeopardy. The acting prosecutor contended that there was no
double jeopardy because the first trial was dismissed prior judgement, and
her silence constitutes consent, which is material because the provision
provides that “A person cannot be tried for an offense…. when the case is
dismissed or otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of
the accused.”
Facts
A complaint for physical injuries against Ylagan was filed in the justice of the
peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas. After preliminary
investigation, the case forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical
injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the
information; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the
deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which motion
was granted by the court.
Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the
same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same
offense of serious physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation,
the case was again forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
information filed in the justice of the peace court was reproduced. Upon
arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy, based on
section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After hearing, the court
sustained the plea and dismissed the case. From this order of dismissal, an
appeal was taken by the Government.
Counsel for the government, however, contends that the first case brought
against Ylagan was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase
"without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the objection of the
accused" or "against the will of the accused".
Issue
Whether there was double jeopardy in this case. (Yes)
Ruling
We can not accept the contention of the counsel for the government. We
believe it a sound rule to lay down, that the mere silence of the defendant or
her failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent
within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right
not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important as the
other constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver can not,
and should not, be predicated on mere silence. (Let it be noted that in rule
117 sec. 7, this rule had been applied. The phrasing of the provision now says,
“withous his EXPRESS consent”)
(In the old law) Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows:
A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to trial
in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or otherwise
terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused.
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, defendant in a
criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the
following conditions:
(1) In a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) upon a valid complaint or information;
(3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of information.
Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been
once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted.
It is true that in United States vs. Ballentine and in other subsequent cases,
this court had held that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the
charges has actually been commenced by the calling of a witness; but we
are now convinced that such a view should be abandoned. There is no
provision or principle of law jeopardy.
All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
after issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is
properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty.
Nota Bene: Just in case relevant, Rationale for Double Jeopardy was
wonderfully quoted in this case:
"Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his
fortune, safely, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness, who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed
by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or
restriction than his own will and pleasure. The accused would never be free
from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending charge, which the
malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his
head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively empowered to authorize, by
an express order to that effect, the repetition of a complaint or information
once dismissed in the cases in which the law requires that this be done. Such
is, in our opinion, the fundamental reason of the article of the law to which
we refer. Thanks to this article, the accused, after being notified of the order
rest dismissing the complaint may, as the case may be, either rest assured
that he will not be further molested, or prepare himself for the presentation
of a new complaint. In either case, the order gives him full information as to
what he may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from being
dissipated as the result of an equivocal and indefinite legal situation. To this
much, at least, one who has been molested, possibly unjustly, by prosecution
on a criminal charge, is entitled."
28. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ARTEMIO M. AGONCILLO, LORENZA Q. AGONCILLO, TEOFISTA
QUIZON, ARTEMIO AGONCILLO, JR., GRACIANO CALICDAN,
WALDEMAR AGONCILLO AND ROSARIO AGONCILLO, defendants-
appellees.
(G.R. No. L-27257, August 31, 1971, FERNANDO, J.)
Appeal from a Decision of Dismissal
Doctrine:
Dismissal in Section 9 of Rule 117 is a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case and not a
dismissal without prejudice. If the accused should deem a
provisional dismissal to be unjust or prejudicial to him, because he has
been deprived of his right to speedy trial, he could and should object
and insist that the case be heard and decided on the merits. Thereafter,
if the prosecution does not present its evidence and if its failure to do
so is unjustified, the court should dismiss the case for failure to
prosecute.
For a dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, it must have the effect of an acquittal.
Emergency Recit:
Agoncilo et. al. invoked double jeopardy when they were
charged anew under Civil Case No. 52002 after they have been
dismissed in Civil Case No. 44686. Both cases involved the same
offense which was a violation of RA 1379 for Agoncillo’s act of having
unlawfully acquired properties during his incumbency as an official of
the Bureau of Customs.
SC held that the invocation is misplaced. The dismissal in Case
No. 44686 was a provisional dismissal or that in which the case was
“dismissed without prejudice ***.” As such, they knew or should have
known that a complaint could be filed against them without violation
of the jeopardy clause. Section 9 of Rule 117 pertains to a definite or
unconditional dismissal which must have the effect of an acquittal in
order to be a bar under the jeopardy clause.
Facts:
 RA 1379 decrees forfeiture in favor of the State of any property
found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee. According to SC, it is criminal or penal in character.
On 18 Oct. 1962, a complaint was filed against Artemio
Agoncillo, an official of the Bureau of Customs for the properties,
presumed prima facie under RA 1379 to have been unlawfully
acquired during his incumbency as they were concealed by being
recorded in the name of his wife, sons, sister-in-law, sister, and
brother-in-law, and should be adjudged to belong to the State.
Agoncillo and co-defendants denied the unlawful acquisition
claiming that RA 1379 is an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. On
4 March 1963, they filed a Manifestation that: on 10 Dec. 1962, they
filed an Answer alleging that they are in danger of being put in
jeopardy for the same offense by reason of the refiling of the instant
case. They claim that SC has made a ruling that RA 1379 is a penal law.
As such, all rights pertaining to the accused in a criminal case are
available to defendants charged under said law.
In the instant case, they will be placed in jeopardy for the same
offense in that: (1) Civil Case No. 52002 is the same as Civil Case No.
44686 which was dismissed previously; (2) they had already pleaded
in the original case thru an Answer; (3) that the case was dismissed
after the plaintiff failed to present evidence on the date of trial which
is considered as an adjudication on the merits.
On 30 Sept. 1966, CFI dismissed the case holding that the plea
of double jeopardy would lie as it has already been barred by the
dismissal of Case No. 44686. Such CFI decision failed to take into
account that the decision in Case No. 44686 was “dismissed without
prejudice ***.”
Issue:
Whether the constitutional right against being twice put in
jeopardy may be relied upon, it being shown that defendants had been
proceeded against in a previous case, which was provisionally
dismissed
Ruling:
No. The jeopardy clause of the Constitution provides a single
prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. In case of acquittal, it
protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had
transpired as a closed chapter in his life and is a bar to unnecessary
litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the
state as well. The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once,
not whenever it pleases the state to do so.
It is the peril of being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense that the Constitution guards against, not for the same
act, except where it is punishable by law or ordinance in which case,
conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution thereof.
The rule is that "not only [must] the second offense charged [be]
exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also
that the two offenses are identical. “Same-evidence” test is required
but the criterion has been restated and expanded with express
mention of “any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information”.
As to Agoncillo, et. al. jeopardy had attached with a valid
complaint having been filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and
defendants having been thereafter arraigned and pleaded. It had not
terminated because there was neither conviction nor acquittal, but
only a dismissal without prejudice. As such, Agoncillo, et. al. knew or
ought to have known that the complaint could be filed again. They
could have objected; they did not. Had they stood fast on what they
conceived to be their rights as defendants, things might have been
different. The jeopardy clause could have been thereafter
appropriately invoked. The dismissal would have been unconditional
in character. But what transpired instead was a dismissal clearly
without prejudice. At the very least, Agoncillo, et. al. were in estoppel.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of September 30, 1966
dismissing this complaint, is hereby reversed and the case is
remanded to it for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

29. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EUSTAQUIO HINAUT, ODONA TAGUBAN and AGAPITO
HINAUT alias BALADOY
GR No. L-11315 March 18, 1959 REYES, J.B.L., J.
DECISION
DOCTRINE: Where the accused signified their conformity with the
provisional dismissal of the case, there was neither acquittal nor dismissal
that would put them twice in jeopardy of the same offense upon the refiling
of the case. The words "with our conformity" imply not merely passive
assent by an active manifestation on the part of the accused of their express
agreement to the provisional dismissal of the case.
EMERGENCY RECIT: On August 17 1955, Accused Hinaut, Taguran
and Hinaut were charge with the crime of theft before the Justice of the
Peace Lopez Jaena. After arraignment, wherein all the defendants pleaded
"not guilty" the prosecution presented its evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, and thereafter rested its case with reservation to introduce
additional evidence, which was stated to be unavailable at the time. The
defense followed, and likewise offered its evidence, but before it had
entirely closed, the Justice of the Peace provisionally dismissed the case.
Accused expressed their consent thereto by placing their thumbmarks (only
Agapito Hinaut signed his name) at the end of the motion, after the word
"with our conformity."
In its order of December 19, 1955, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the
case provisionally as prayed for. About six months later, the prosecution
filed a motion to revive the case, which was granted. The new information
was refiled by the Fiscal on June 1, 1956. The defense appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, and after review of the
above facts the court opined that “when a criminal case, after due
arraignment and plea had been made and after the trial had almost been
completed, even if the case is dismissed with an express conformity of the
accused, the said accused had already been placed in double jeopardy."
Hence, this appeal by the prosecution
FACTS: In a criminal complaint dated August 1 1955, Accused Eustaquio
Hinaut, Odona Taguran and Agapito Hinaut were charge with the crime of
theft before the Justice of the Peace Lopez Jaena. After arraignment,
wherein all the defendants pleaded "not guilty" the prosecution presented
its evidence, both testimonial and documentary, and thereafter rested its
case with reservation to introduce additional evidence, which was stated to
be unavailable at the time.
The defense followed, and likewise offered its evidence, but before it had
entirely closed, the Justice of the Peace provisionally dismissed the case.
Accused expressed their consent thereto by placing their thumbmarks (only
Agapito Hinaut signed his name) at the end of the motion, after the word
"with our conformity."
In its order of December 19, 1955, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the
case provisionally as prayed for. About six months later, the prosecution
filed a motion to revive the case, which was granted by the Justice of the
Peace court in an order dated January 8, 1956. The corresponding
information was refiled by the Fiscal on June 1, 1956.
The defense appealed to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
and after review of the above facts the court opined: "when a criminal case,
after due arraignment and plea had been made and after the trial had almost
been completed, even if the case is dismissed with an express conformity
of the accused, the said accused had already been placed in double
jeopardy." Hence, this appeal by the prosecution.
ISSUE:
1. WON the lower court erred in sustaining accused’s plea for double
jeopardy
2. WON the words "with our conformity" operate as a sufficient
conveyance of express consent within the purview of the Rules of
Court
RULING:
1. YES. The plea of double jeopardy was improperly sustained by the
lower court, contrary to Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
When the accused signified their express conformity with the
provisional dismissal of the case, there was neither acquittal nor
dismissal that would put them twice in jeopardy of the same offense
upon the refiling of the case.
In comparison, the case of Gandicela v. Lutero, wherein it was hinted
that the addition of the words "without prejudice" or "provisional" to a
court’s order dismissing a case are without legal effect, contemplates a
dismissal on the merits amounting to acquittal or a dismissal after
 arraignment and plea without the express consent of the accused. This
is not true in this case, for the dismissal, according to the Justice of the
Peace, was premised on the need of the prosecution to have more time
in securing a missing piece of evidence necessary for the conviction of
the accused.
It is important to note that what was sought for by the Provincial Fiscal,
to which the accused expressed their agreement, was not a simple or
unconditional dismissal of the case, but its provisional dismissal that
prevented it from being finally disposed of. Certainly, the accused
cannot now validly claim that the dismissal was, in effect, on the merits
and deny its provisional was, in effect, on the merits and deny its
provisional character. Even assuming moreover, that there was double
jeopardy, they should be considered as having waived the
constitutional safeguard against the same.
2. YES, for these words imply not merely passive assent but an active
manifestation on the part of the accused of their express agreement
to the provisional dismissal of the case.
"Express Consent" means that "the words ‘No objection’ written on the
motion to dismiss directly conveyed, as undoubtedly they were
intended to convey, the idea of full accordance with the proposed
dismissal. It was not the same as acquiescence manifested by signs,
actions, facts, inaction or silence. It was the same as saying ‘I agree’
although it was not as emphatic as the latter expression. Having
manifested ‘no objection’ to the motion for the express purpose of
obtaining a ruling of the court upon such motion, counsel could not
have meant other than that he was in agreement with the dismissal, and
there is no question that was what the court and the prosecution
understood him to mean; otherwise, trial could have been postponed
instead of the case being temporarily dismissed, there being good
grounds for the continuance”
DISPOSITVE PORTION: Wherefore, the order appealed from is set
aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. No pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.
32.GANDICELA v. LUTERO (March 5, 1951)
GR NO. L-4069
FERIA, J.
FACTS:
 This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner
against the respondent judge of the Municipal Court of the City of
Iloilo.
 May 12, 1950 — The petitioner was charged with the crime of
serious physical injuries in an information filed by the City Fiscal of
Iloilo
 July 17, 1950 — the trial of the case was finally set, "the City Fiscal
appeared for the prosecution and informed the court that there was a
private prosecutor authorized to present the case in court, and that he
is not ready to enter into trial for Fiscal Daguay is the one handing this
case, who is at present appearing in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo."
 The court, "taking into consideration that Attorney Mapa has not
entered had appearance in this case and that this case has been
dragging along for so many weeks, today being the last day set for
trial, hereby orders that this case be dismissed without prejudice
on the part of the City Fiscal, City of Iloilo, to file another information,
with costs de oficio."
 The petitioner contends that "The dismissal of the case without
prejudice by the respondent judge upon the failure of the
prosecution to enter into trial violates the constitutional right of
your petitioner to a speedy trial; the respondent judge ought to
have dismissed the case definitely;" and alleges "That there is no
appeal nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law from the aforementioned order of the respondent judge,
except the petition for certiorari and mandamus."
 September 4, 1950 — the Supreme Court ordered "The respondent in
case L-4069 (Rodolfo Gandicela vs. Hon. Deogracias Lutero, etc.) to
answer the petition in ten days from receipt of copy thereof."
 The respondent Municipal Judge Deogracias Lutero filed his
answer alleging:
1. that the order of dismissal by the respondent on July 17, 1950 is in
accordance with the petition of the petitioner through his counsel, Attys.
Puig and Penaredondo, who appeared for the petitioner as accused in
criminal case No. 6394;
 2. that "the order of dismissal without prejudice is in accordance with the follow the law in dismissing definitely or without prejudice a criminal
circumstances of the case and the protection of the rights of the accused case against a defendant. Besides, the respondent judge, in
to an immediate and speedy trial which the law sanctions;" and "that the dismissing the case without prejudice on the part of the fiscal to
remedy is an appeal to the Court of First Instance if any for the order of the file another information, has acted, not only within the court's
dismissal.
jurisdiction, but correctly, because the case was dismissed with the
express consent of the accused or petitioner, who move for the
 The petitioner does not deny in his reply that the dismissal of the case case.
against him was ordered by the respondent in accordance with the
 If the defendant or petitioner did not move for the dismissal and the
petition of the petitioner's counsel, although said counsel filed
respondent dismissed the case, the dismissal would be definite or a bar
afterwards a motion for reconsideration of said order praying that the
to another prosecution for the same offense, even if the court or judge
dismissal be definite instead of without prejudice, which motion for
erroneously states in the order of dismissal that it be without prejudice
reconsideration was denied by the respondent.
on the part of the city fiscal; to file another information, because the
court can not change the nature and legal effects of such dismissal, and
ISSUE: W/N petitioner may invoke his right to a speedy trial
the petitioner can not be prosecuted again for the same offense.
 But where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the
RULING: NO
dismissal of the case against him, as in the present case, even if the
 After considering the petition of the petitioner and the answer of the
court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is definite or
respondent, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that neither certiorari
does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on the part of
nor mandamus lie in the present case.
the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a
 Not mandamus, because the respondent judge in ordering the bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same
dismissal of the case without prejudice, did not unlawfully neglect the offense. (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil., 851 People vs Salico, 84 Phil.,
performance of a ministerial act or an act which the law specifically 722.)
enjoined him to do so as a duty resulting from his office, since the
respondent could neither grant or refuse to grant the petition of the In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied or rather dismissed without
attorneys for the petitioner to have the case dismissed. pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 And not certiorari, because the respondent judge did not act without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof did not act without prejudice the
criminal case No. 6349 against the petitioner, for the simple reason
that the Municipal Court of Iloilo, presided over by the respondent,
had jurisdiction to dismiss or not to dismiss the case and postpone the
trial thereof to another date;
 and if the municipal court had jurisdiction to dismiss the case
definitely as contended by the petitioner, it had also jurisdiction to
dismiss the case "without prejudice on the part of the city fiscal to file
another information," because a court having jurisdiction to decide
a legal question or in conformity with the law, does not lose its
jurisdiction if the court decide erroneously against or not in
accordance with the law. The existence and subsistence of the court's
jurisdiction does not depend upon the correctness of the court's
resolution.
 And lastly, the respondent judge could not have acted with grave abuse
of discretion, because the court or judge has no discretion but must
33. PEOPLE vs. FRANCISCO DIAZ [G.R. No. L-6518. March 30, dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so
1954] called, but an acquittal of the defendant because of the prosecution's
failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to
FACTS: Francisco Diaz was accused of violation of the Revised Motor another prosecution for the offense even though it was ordered by
the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant,
Vehicles Law, for driving his car in a fast and reckless manner, without in exactly the same way as judgment of acquittal obtained upon the
taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons and defendant's motion.”
damage to property, thereby causing an accident.
The dismissal of the charge in the Pasay City Municipal Court
He pleaded not guilty and his case was dismissed later on “for failure is even a stronger case than the example considered in the case
of the Government to prosecute.” Thereafter, the Assistant City of Gandicela above referred to. Here the prosecution was not
Attorney of Pasay City filed an information charging him of the same even present on the day of trial so as to be in a position to
with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence for hitting and proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of
colliding against the car driven by one Potenciano Eria, thereby causing the accused. The case was set for hearing twice and the
damage to the latter’s vehicle. prosecution without asking for postponement or giving any
explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal of the case,
The court issued an order postponing the arraignment of the accused,
though at the time instance of defendant Diaz may, according
giving the counsel for defendant to file a motion to quash. On the
to what we said in the Gandicela case, be regarded as an
scheduled date, defendant’s counsel filed his motion based on double
acquittal.
jeopardy because of the previous charge of violation of the same law.
The order of dismissal by the Rizal Court of First Instance is
The court sustained the motion to quash, and thereby dismissed the
affirmed, with costs de oficio.
case. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s motion
to quash
HELD: No. it is true that since the defendant himself asked for said
dismissal, at first blush, it may not be considered as coming under the
provisions of Rule 113, section 9 of the Rules of Court which provides
that there is former jeopardy "when a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant." But in the
case of Gandicela vs. Hon. Lutero, the Court held that:
“If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy
trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal but for the trial of the case.
If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the
court believes that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore
without violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the court
shall deny the postponement and proceed with the trial and require
the fiscal to present the witnesses for the prosecution; and if the fiscal
does not or cannot produce his evidence and consequently fails to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court,
upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such
 34. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs.
VICTORIO JABAJAB, accused and appellee.
(G.R. No. L-9238-39, 13 November 1956, Montemayor, J.)
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental
DOCTRINE: It is true that a person accused has a right to a speedy trial.
However, he cannot sleep on said right but must see to it that his case be tried
at an early date.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Victorio Jabajab was charged first with slight physical
injuries in the Municipal Court of Ozamis City, and was later also charged with
serious physical injuries in the same municipal court. He was found guilty in
both cases and was sentenced accordingly. Jabajab appealed to the CFI of
Misamis Occidental where the hearingd of the two cases were both duly
scheduled. Upon petition of the parties, the hearings were postponed
numerous times, sometimes upon their agreement. When the two cases were
called for trial on December 9, 1954, Jabajab appeared with counsel,
apparently ready for trial. However, the Fiscal failed to appear because he had
not been notified of the date of hearing. Hence, counsel for Jabajab moved for
dismissal of the two cases, invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial.
Judge Crispin Borromeo, Justice of the Peace of the capital designated to act
as district Judge, granted the motion and dismissed the two cases provisionally
but reserving to the City Fiscal the right to “refile these two cases if he so
desires in the interest of justice”. MR was denied. The Government appealed
the order of denial to the SC. The SC ruled that Jabajab’s constitutional right
of Jabajab to speedy trial had not been violated. The hearings for both cases
were postponed numerous times, which were sometimes upon their
agreement. Jabajab cannot agree to the repeated postponement of the trial of
his cases and then when he finds the Government absent or unable to go to
trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of said absence and ask
for the dismissal of his case.
FACTS:
Victorio Jabajab was charged with slight physical injuries committed
against Elmo Medina and with serious physical injuries committed against
Regino Alcopra in the Municipal Court of Ozamis City on 19 March 1952 and
21 April 1952. After a joint trial, the Municipal Court found Jabajab guilty in
both cases and sentenced him to arresto menor in the case of slight physical
injuries and to one year prisión correccional and to indemnify the aggrieved
party in the sum of P100 in the serious physical injuries case.
Jabajab appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental. The two cases were set for hearing at the City of Ozamis on
September 2 for the slight physical injuries case, and September 8 for the
other. Upon petition of the parties, the hearings were postponed’ on numerous
occasions, sometimes upon their agreement. When the two cases were called
for trial on December 9, 1954, Jabajab appeared with counsel, apparently
ready for trial. Because the Fiscal failed to appear, counsel for the accused
moved for the dismissal of the two cases, invoking his constitutional right to
speedy trial. The trial court presided by Judge Crispin Borromeo, Justice of the
Peace of the capital designated to act as district Judge, granted the motion,
the Judge saying that inasmuch as Jabajab had not been arraigned since the
information in the two cases were filed in June, 1952, he dismissed the two
cases provisionally but reserving to the City Fiscal the right to “refile these two
cases if he so desires in the interest of justice”.
The City Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration. In the motion he
reiterated his claim that he had not been duly notified of the hearing on
December 9, 1954; that somebody told him of said hearing but that in the
absence of such official notification, he did not feel justified to make the trip to
Oroquieta to appear before the Court, but that as a measure of precaution, he
filed a motion for postponement on December 7. The motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the Government is now appealing the
order of denial.
ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right of Jabajab to speedy trial had been
violated (NO)
RULING: It is true that a person accused has a right to a speedy trial. However,
he cannot sleep on said right but must see to it that his case be tried at an
early date. In the present case, there were several postponements of the
hearing of his two cases, but instead of objecting to the same, Jabajab agreed
to said postponements, and there is nothing in the record to show that it was
the Fiscal who asked for all said postponements. As the Government counsel
well observes, Jabajab cannot agree to the repeated postponement of the trial
of his cases and then when he finds the Government absent or unable to go
to trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of said absence and ask
for the dismissal of his case. Moreover, the City Fiscal claims that he had not
been notified of the hearing set for December 9, 1954, and this, claim was not
contradicted. Furthermore we see no advantage or profit either to Jabajab or
to the Government in dismissing these two cases provisionally because in that
case, the prosecution again would have to file the two cases in the municipal
court, and have Jabajab rearrested, and perhaps bail bonds filed for his
provisional release, and in case of conviction in the Municipal Court, the cases
would have to be elevated to the Court of First Instance for another trial, with
the possibility that the hearing may again be postponed once or twice, or even
more for the reason that, we understand, the trial court does not hold sessions
continuously in one place throughout the year. On the other hand, to reinstate
these two cases would be beneficial to both prosecution and defendants
without materially impairing the rights and interests of the accused, because if
he is innocent, he would sooner be cleared of these two charges.
In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is set aside and these two
cases. are hereby remanded to the trial court with instructions to have the
same tried as soon as possible, with due notification to the parties of the date
of trial. No costs.
LABRADOR, J., concurring.
x x x Jeopardy can be invoked only if the case is finally disposed of or
terminated. Dismissal under Section 9 of Rule 113 implies final dismissal, a
positive termination of the case. If the dismissal contains a reservation of the
right to file another action, the case cannot be said to have terminated and
jeopardy does not attach. This is the reason ex or our ruling in Jaca vs. Blanco,
86 Phil., 452.
calling of a witness in order that a legal jeopardy may attach. The mere
calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance
and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process
of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned,
and required to plead and stand trial.
‘Without the consent of the accused’ used in section 28 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure does not mean ‘over the objection of the
accused’ or against the will of the accused’. The sound rule is, that the
mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal
of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of said
section. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the same
offense is as important as the other constitutional rights of the accused
in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on
more silence.”

xxx
FELIX, J., dissenting:
That is the reason why in the case of People vs. Daylo, 54 Phil. 862, this Court
xxx
held that:
I cannot agree with this disposition of the appeal of the Government, for
“This dismissal of a criminal case of estafa, which has been appealed
the simple reason that the defendant in said 2 cases would be placed in double
from a Justice of the Peace to the Court of First Instance, the former
jeopardy.
being vested with jurisdiction to try and decide, is equivalent to an
acquittal of the defendant in said case, and ‘the filing of a new
Jeopardy has been defined by the courts as:
information in which the case dismissed is included, exposes said
“The peril in which a person is put when he is regularly charged
defendant to a second conviction of one and same offense, and
with a- crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to
therefore constitutes double jeopardy”.
try him” (Com. vs. Fitzpatric, 1 L.R. A. 451).
xxx
xxx
“As commonly used, it must be distinguished from former acquittal
The cases at bar fall squarely by all fours within the scope outlined in our
and former conviction. Obviously, it includes the rules covered by
jurisprudence defining double jeopardy. We see that the defendant was (1)
those 2 terms, but there may be a former jeopardy without a previous
prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or
acquittal or conviction, and this was intended by the court in Com. vs.
information; (3) after he had been arraigned and after he had pleaded to the
Fitzpatrick, supra where it was said: ‘The plea of former jeopardy
information. Not only that, he has been convicted in the Municipal Court of
stands on narrower, more technical and less substantial grounds. It
Ozamis City. It is true that he has appealed from the decisions of the inferior
alleges only that there might have been a conviction or acquittal if the
court to the Court of First Instance and that in virtue of his appeal the decisions
judge trying the case had not made a mistake of law, which prevented
of the Court a quo were vacated, but this effect provided ex or in the law cannot
a verdict’. It might be said that former jeopardy is the genus. See 10
produce at the same time and by the same stroke the wiping out of the vivid
Va. L. Reg. 410 and note (I Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 1690).
facts of defendant’s prosecution in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
complaints and of his arraignment and conviction therefor. The only effect of
xxx
defendant’s appeal in said two cases was merely to make the proceedings in
In the case of People vs. Ilagan, 58 Phil. 851, this Court held that:
the court ad quem a continuation and extension of the proceedings in the court
Under section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now section
a quo. But when for whatever reason rightly or wrongly, the cases on appeal
9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court), a defendant is in legal jeopardy
are dismissed, either before or after defendant’s arraignment in the appellate
when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of
court, such dismissal becomes final and unappealable by the State, because
competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3)
it is up to that moment that the defendant has been placed in jeopardy, and no
after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the
other charges could be later preferred against him, ex or the same offense, ex
information. This overrules the case of United States vs. Ballentine (4
or it would be tantamount and equivalent to placing the defendant in double
Phil., 672) which required the investigation of the charges by the
jeopardy.
xxx
There can be no such waiver of the constitutional right of the defense of
jeopardy, nor that it is recognized or sanctioned in our jurisprudence. What this
Court has held is that “the doctrine of jeopardy requires that this defense, being
an exception, must be opportunely interposed and proved by the accused in
order to have the benefit thereof” (Trinidad vs. Siochi 72 Phil. 241).
x x x It is to be noted in this connection that jeopardy, unlike the defense
of prescription which also requires pleading and proving, is a matter of public
policy, a sacred right guaranteed by our constitution, and Article III, section 1,
paragraph (20) thereof prescribes that:
"(20) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.”
Moreover, the alleged “waiver of the right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense cannot be predicated on the mere silence of
the accused when the prior prosecution was dismissed” (People vs. Ylagan,
58 Phil. 581). Besides, the two cases at bar were provisionally dismissed and
it was not for the defendant to object to that dismissal. The time will come for
him to plead that defense if he is prosecuted for a second time for the same
offense he is charged therein.
35. CARIDAD CABARROGUIS, Petitioner, v. HON.
LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, Judge, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Respondent.
(G.R. No. L-19517. November 30, 1962. Concepcion, J.)
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to section 2 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court "the judgment" — and the order of dismissal in question
had, if completed, such effect — "must be written . . . personally
and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him . . ." The
cases cited by herein petitioner involved written orders of
dismissal, which were signed by the corresponding judges.
Hence, said cases are not controlling in the one at bar.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Cabarroguis was accused of estafa which
Judge San Diego dismissed based on the testimony of Orpilla
that the money borrowed will be returned in goods. The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration which the court
granted. Petitioner filed a motion to quash for she would be in
danger of being placed in double jeopardy. The court held that
the verbal order of dismissal of said case was withdrawn or set
aside, as soon as it was dictated by respondent and before it
could be reduced to writing and signed by her. As a matter of fact,
it was never put in writing. Much less was it ever signed by
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Caridad Cabarroguis is accused of estafa; complainant
therein, Emerita C. Orpilla, was the sole witness for the
prosecution. Orpilla testified that the accused asked money from
her which she would pay in goods like Sewing machines, clothing,
Namarco goods which were pending in the pier for payment of
customs duties. She paid the accused Php 7, 800.00.
Respondent judge dismissed the case because the crime of which were signed by the corresponding judges. Hence, said
estafa described in the Penal Code does not obtain in the case cases are not controlling in the one at bar.
and the bail bond for her provisional release is cancelled.
Moreover, petitioner did not forthwith object, either to the motion
Prosecution sought reconsideration and was allowed to continue of the prosecution for the reconsideration of the verbal order of
the direct examination of the said complaint. dismissal, or to the order of respondent Judge withdrawing or
setting aside the same. Neither did petitioner object to the
Petitioner moved to set aside the order of respondent
continuation of complainant’s examination by the prosecution.
withdrawing her aforementioned order of dismissal, alleging that
What is more, upon the conclusion thereof, petitioner’s counsel
otherwise petitioner would be again "in danger of being
cross-examined the complainant. As alleged in the very petition
placed in jeopardy."
filed herein, said continuation of the presentation of the evidence
The motion was denied that said verbal order of dismissal of for the prosecution had already placed the petitioner twice in
February 28, 1962, without the consent of the accused (petitioner jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, on the assumption
herein), amounted to her acquittal, and that the withdrawal of said that the order of dismissal in question had effectively dismissed
order, followed by the continuation of the examination of the the criminal case. Petitioner’s failure to object, at that time, to the
complainant and the presentation of the other evidence for the taking of said evidence for the prosecution, and the cross-
prosecution, placed the petitioner in double jeopardy. examination of complainant by counsel for the petitioner
amounted, therefore, to a waiver of her constitutional right against
double jeopardy (People v. Casiano, L- 15309 [February 16,
ISSUE: Whether withdrawing the verbal order of dismissal be set 1961]; 14 Am. Jur., 958). Petitioner did not invoke such right until
aside. -- NO about a week later, or on March 7, 1962, when the hearing was
resumed for the reception of the evidence for the defense. The
objection then made by her came too late, in view of her
RULING: The court held that the verbal order of dismissal of said aforementioned waiver.
case was withdrawn or set aside, as soon as it was dictated by
respondent and before it could be reduced to writing and signed
by her. As a matter of fact, it was never put in writing. Much less
was it ever signed by Respondent. For this reason, respondent
contends that said order of dismissal was incomplete and did not
have the effect of acquitting the accused before it was withdrawn.
Indeed, pursuant to section 2 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
"the judgment" — and the order of dismissal in question had, if
completed, such effect — "must be written . . . personally and
directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him . . ." The cases
cited by herein petitioner involved written orders of dismissal,
 36. REYNALDO LAUCHENGCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P.
ALEJANDRO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, and
CLARITA LAUCHENGCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-49034 January 31, 1979
Doctrine: The provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not call for
the filing of a new information if, as in this case, the parties are clearly
made aware, in such order of provisional dismissal, that it is lacking the
impress of finality and therefore could be revived and reinstated.
Emergency Recit: Reynaldo Lauchengo was arraigned, pleaded not guilty
and after the initial presentantion of evidence for the prosecution, the
case was provisionally dismissed but is now being revived and
reinstated without the filling of a new information. The Court held that
in a provisional dismissal, there is no merit to the contention that a
revival of the case would amount to a disregard of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. Petitioner’s reliance on People v.
Court of First Instance of Quezon is misplaced because he failed to
appreciate the true significance of the ruling. Petitioner did not even
attempt to show that the information in this case suffers from any defect.
What is quite obvious is that there is neither a constitutional right
violated nor a procedural rule disregarded in the revival of the case as
ordered by respondent Judge Jose P. Alejandro. Not only was there no
grave abuse of discretion, but the absence of any abuse.
Facts: The question raised in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
as to whether or not upon a criminal case being provisionally dismissed
at the instance of the provincial fiscal with the conformity of the
accused, now petitioner Reynaldo Lauchengco, after he had been
arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and after the initial presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, it could thereafter be revived and
reinstated without the filing of a new information.
Respondent City Fiscal Jose B. Flaminiano of Manila relied on People
v. Consulta as well as Solis v. People to show that no abuse of discretion
was committed by the court in ordering such revival without the need
for any new information. Petitioner submitted a three-page pleading
wherein by a rather constricted interpretation of the earlier case of Solis
v. Agloro, of which the above-cited case of Solis v. People is an
aftermath, he would attempt to negate the force of the above comment
of respondent City Fiscal.
Issue: WON a criminal case being provisionally dismissed at the
instance of the provincial fiscal with the conformity of the accused be
revived and reinstated w/o the filling of a new information
Ruling: YES
1. Solis v. Agloro speaks categorically. In the language of the opinion:
"Neither was there a violation of the constitutional right of
petitioners against being put in jeopardy of punishment. In the order
provisionally dismissing the case, it was explicitly made clear that
defense counsel announced 'the readiness of the accused to give
their express conformity to the provisional dismissal of [their] case.'
More than that, it was therein stated that respondent Judge 'called
for the accused and asked them singly and individually, whether
they are willing to have this case dismissed with their express
conformity, explaining to them that such dismissal will mean
possible revival of this case against them, to which each answered
in the affirmative.' Accordingly, it was set forth in the dispositive
portion that the case 'is hereby ordered dismissed with the express
conformity of the accused Cenon C. Solis, Delfin Solis and
Bonifacio Solis y Lualhati alias Pacio, with cost de oficio.' There
being such a provisional dismissal, there is no merit to the
contention that a revival of the case would amount to a
disregard of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. When the later case of Solis v. People was filed, the
Court, in the decision, pointed out that the ground alleged by the
very accused was the "need for a new information, which would
likewise require that another preliminary investigation be
undertaken, with the intimation that otherwise there would be a
denial of procedural due process.” The ruling was square and to the
point, namely, "that this second attempt to prevent the continuation
 of the prosecution of petitioners is likewise doomed to futility. It
was then categorically set forth that this second petition "is clearly
devoid of merit." Respondent Fiscal could thus vigorously assert
that no new information was necessary.
2. An attempt was made by petitioner to minimize the weight of this
authoritative precedent by saying that the only settled question is
one of double jeopardy. To bolster such an approach, he
invoked People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon. Again there
was a failure on his part to appreciate the true significance of the
ruling. As was pointed out in the last paragraph of the opinion, there
was a dismissal definitive in character as the information failed to
charge an offense. Necessarily, the proper course is not a petition
for certiorari "but the refiling of a valid information, the previous
one being fatally definitive. Petitioner did not even attempt, as he
was devoid of justification, to show that the information in this case
suffers from any defect. What is quite obvious is that there is neither
a constitutional right violated nor a procedural rule disregarded in
the revival of the case as ordered by respondent Judge Jose P.
Alejandro. Not only was there no grave abuse of discretion, but the
absence of any abuse. In the ultimate analysis, to grant the Plea of
Petitioner would be to prefer form to substance.
3. With the resolution of this petition, it should be clear to all and
sundry that the provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
call for the filing of a new information if, as in this case, the
parties are clearly made aware, in such order of provisional
dismissal, that it is lacking the impress of finality and therefore
could be revived and reinstated.
4. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
37. GALMAN, et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice
Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera
Cruz, Members), et al.
G. R. No. 72760; September 12, 1986
TEEHANKEE, C.J.,
DOCTRINE: It is a settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process.
EMERGENCY RECIT: This case is about the assassination of former Senator Benigno
"Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. who was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of
three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be
unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-
hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was
constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate. The fact is that both
majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
“the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations”. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;
that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist
plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the
twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of
them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners
prayed for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes to issue the
restraining order prayed for. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-
vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten
days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearing on the merits because the people are entitled to due process. However,
respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.
Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, the same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy. The court held that there was no
violation. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment. affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that the Sandiganbayan Justices
and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-
Galman murder case.
There was no double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal
cases is denied due process. More so does the rule against the invoking of double
jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a
mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent
of all the respondents-accused.
FACTS:
After three years of exile, former Senator Benigno “Ninoy Aquino, Jr. was
bound to go back to the Philippines. Upon arrival, he was cold-bloodedly killed while
under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000
soldiers.
The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was
revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and
that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
investigate. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas,
that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows
[to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in
agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot
him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and
that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted
Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another,
gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino
and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot.
The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case
headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy
and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public
acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's
above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin.
In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in
the assassination
Petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son,
respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners,
composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former
university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the
Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging
that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law.
They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the
people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the
Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused,
and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to
find out the truth about the Aquino assassination."
Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the
merits in the pending criminal cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a
mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-
trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
At the hearing of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases
before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes. But ten days later, the Court by
the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to
lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision.
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality
and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the
prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded:
The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an
unbiased prosecutor.
On December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its
decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual first in that
respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who
was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and
evidence submitted by the prosecution.
In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict
of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986,
the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the
prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition
of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondent.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per
its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate
Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear
and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and
pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their
findings to this Court for proper disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause
RULING:
No. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment, affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration and revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the
extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. The
Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division)
would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room
where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to
the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist. Also predetermined was the final outcome of the case" of total
absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was,
therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the
same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty
participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another
prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer
in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination.
According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said
Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no
evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except
the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the
accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The
monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang
personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President
Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied.
In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. Impartial court
is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling
and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio
its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used
as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth.
More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the
truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it
are void.
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process.
As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, Where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its right
to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
(Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]
which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the
authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig
the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined
final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-
accused..
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must be tried
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted.
The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent
Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-
trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally
known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth behind the
vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as expressed in my
dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran, and so that justice may be done, I vote for
the re-trial prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed by the
prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant, evidence which,
if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it is, the prosecution failed to
fully ventilate its position and to lay out before respondent Court all the pertinent
facts which could have helped that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus,
failed in its task.
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to end, from
the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment, which absolved the
accused, en masse, from any and an liability, is equally culpable for miscarriage of
justice. Due process of law, which "requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal" and the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo
vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the detriment
of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment rendered null and void
ab initio. There having been no trial at all in contemplation of law, there is likewise
no judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the
accused to the plea of former jeopardy the proceedings must have been valid (State
vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W., 757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would make ineffective a plea of
jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W. 1047).
The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even assuming
without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place, they were not a party
to the same; and, for those who were charged only either as accomplices or
accessories, they contend that their alleged offense involved only a cover-up in the
investigation of the crimes so that, whatever pressure was exerted could only have
benefited the principals, consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them
twice in jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction secured
fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96
So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar
where both the prosecution and the Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and
collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement
to file the murder charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the
accused could no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the
"categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices and accessories so that
not all of them would be denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently conceived for
their benefit and for the purpose of protecting them from subsequent prosecution.
It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs.
Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682).
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not previously disclosed
to the Court were found by the Commission constituted by this Court, purposely to
inquire and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be duly established by sufficient
evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling
and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case ...;" and that there exists "adequate
credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the outcome of the case;
..." I join in granting petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
I am readily persuaded that it is to our national interest that all relevant evidence
that may be now available be provided an opportunity to be received and made
known so that whatever is the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained. I, therefore,
vote for a declaration of mistrial and for nullifying the proceedings of the referred
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the ordering of
are trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring:
Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the petition on its
merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were still for the future, I
concurred in the result of this Court's action on two grounds-(1) the right of the
accused to speedy trial and (2) the presumption in law that judicial acts are regularly
performed and that public officers have discharged their duties in accordance with
law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial misgivings and more
than overcome the presumption of regular performance of official duty upon which
I based my concurrence. What were some of these misgivings now given substance
by the investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the accused nor the
prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We had the unusual
phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent lawyers and law professors,
and retired Justices assuming the uncommon role of alleging not only a biased
Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan holding back its own evidence. Instead of
allowing the heated passions and emotions generated by the Aquino assassination
to cool off or die down, the accused insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with the Supreme
Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in its Comment, the
Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look into the exercise of its
jurisdiction. There was the further matter of television cameras during trial, their
effect on the witnesses and the judges, and other mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Commission now shows that there was more to these
misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that time. The Court's
opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why the Sandiganbayan was not
an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an unbiased prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated litigations
and continuous harassment of a person who has already undergone the agony of
prosecution and trial for one and the same offense. It certainly was never intended
to cover a situation where the prosecution suppresses some of its own evidence,
where the accused correctly and eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and
where the court appears to have made up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a failure of
trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not possibly result in a just or
valid decision.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to the
judgment of acquittal we must insure that absolutely no indication of bias, pre-
judgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case. Neither our final
resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons involved, pakikisama, utang na
loob for an appointment or reappointment, or any other extraneous matters should
color or influence the future course of this case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally expressed opinions
about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be neither a prosecutor or judge
in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future proceedings to be fair they
should be above any suspicion of partiality, bias, rancor, or vindictiveness. It would
be unfortunate if, in the conduct of further proceedings in this case, erroneous
impressions may arise that a prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or
innocence of any accused. Having just declared a mistrial, we should not again
declare the retrial as another mistrial, ad infinitum.
38. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MONICO O.
CERVERA
G.R. No. L-26395. November 21, 1969.
Doctrine: A literally insulting remark does not necessarily constitute
defamation. A remark that is literally insulting may be made without the
slightest intention of casting any aspersion upon the person to whom it is
addressed or even as an expression of affection or of joy upon seeing him.
Emergency Recit: Two complaints were filed by Elequin against Cervera. The
cases were tried jointly. Cervera was acquitted from slight oral defamation but
was found guilty of light threats. On appeal, Cervera moved to quash the
information on light threats on the belief that his acquittal from slight oral
defamation was bar to his prosecution to light threats. The motion was denied
but was reconsidered and such resulted to the dismissal of the information
filed. CFI ruled that the offense of oral defamation was necessarily included
in that of light threats, and that, in view of defendant's acquittal in the case for
oral defamation, his prosecution for the offense of light threats would place
him in double jeopardy. However, the Court ruled that CFI ered in its decision.
The 1st complaint was only for the purpose of insulting the complainant while
the 2nd complaint alleged that Cervere threatened to kill complainant. Thus, his
acquittal from the 1st complaint cannot bar the 2nd complaint because it was
alleged herein that Cervera threatened to kill Elequin. Therefore the case is
remanded to CFI for further proceedings.
Facts: On September 29, 1962, Ambrosio Elequin filed, with the Municipal
Court of Sibalom, Antique, two criminal complaints against Monico O.
Cervera. In the first complaint (Criminal Case No. 682) Cervera was charged
with grave oral defamation, later changed to slight defamation. The second
complaint (Criminal Case No. 683) charged Cervera for grave threats. Cervera
filed a motion to quash the second complaint upon the ground: (1) that the
charge therein should have been for light threats, the acts imputed to him
having been allegedly committed in the heat of anger; and (2) that he would
be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. The motion was
denied and the cases were tried jointly. Cervera moved to dismiss both cases
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The said court rendered judgment in 2 cases, acquitting him
for slight oral defamation but finding him guilty of light threats.
Cervera appealed with the Court of First Instance wherein the provincial fiscal
filed an information charging Cervera with light threats (Criminal Case No.
428). He moved to quash the information for light threats, upon the ground
that his acquittal from slight oral defamation was bar to his prosecution to light
threats, both the oral defamation and light threats having been committed in
one and same occasion. The court of first instance denied the motion to quash,
holding that the offense of oral defamation, of which the defendant had been
acquitted, was not necessarily included in the offense of light threats.
A motion for reconsideration was filed relying upon the case of People v
Yebra. The CFI then reconsidered the decision and dismissed the information
upon the theory that having been committed on the same occasion, the offense
of oral defamation was necessarily included in that of light threats, and that, in
view of defendant's acquittal in the case for oral defamation, his prosecution
for the offense of light threats would place him in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether the CFI’s ruling was correct in holding that the prosecution for
light threats would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Ruling: NO.
The prosecution for light threats would not place the accused in double
jeopardy because the 1st complaint which acquitted Cervera from slight oral
defamation did not include allegations for the offense of light threats. The 1st
complaint did not allege that the remarks were uttered with the intention of
intimidating the complainant. Meanwhile the 2nd complaint alleged that
Cervera threatened to kill the complainant. Thus, 1st complaint, when
considered in its entirety, strongly suggests the intention of asserting that the
acts therein set forth were performed for no other purpose than to insult the
complainant. The crime of light threats was not included in the 1st complaint.
Although the 2 cases were heard and decided at the same time, they were 2
different cases. Supposed that they were exactly identical, it will not be proper
to punish the accused twice and that, accordingly, he should be and was
convicted in one case only, and acquitted in the other. In such event, it would
be clear that said judgment of conviction would not violate the constitutional
injunction against double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Therefore, CFI erred in dismissing the information in the present case. The
case is then remanded to CFI fpor further proceedings.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, utter to the undersigned the following words
in the Visayan dialect, to wit:
"'Baboy ikaw; wala huya; Hijodepota ikaw; Bastos, patay huya mabato ikaw?
Sabat; Caron badilon ta; Palotawon co caron ikaw sa suba,' and other words of
similar import, which when translated into English, means: 'You are pig;
Shameless; Son of a Bastard (whore); Shameless (rough); you will fight? Answer.
I will shoot you and throw your body into the river,' and words of similar import."
2nd complaint (Criminal Case No. 683)
"That on or about September 28, 1962, between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while the undersigned was inside the restaurant of Juana de los Santos,
situated in the vicinity of the public market, within the Poblacion of Sibalom,
Antique, . . . the said accused MONICO O. CERVERA, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, threaten to kill the undersigned and throw
his body into the river, when he uttered the following words, as follows, to wit:
"'Caron badilon ta; Patyon ta; Caron palotawon co caron ikaw sa suba; Pa lukpon
co ang olo mo; Sabat cay badilon to ikaw,' and words of similar import, and which
when translated into English reads as follows: 'I will shoot you; I will kill you; I
will throw your body into the river; I will blast your head; Answer and I will shoot
you,' and other words of similar import."
People v Yebra
In the Yebra case, the trial court dismissed the information, upon the ground that
it charged two offenses, namely libel and threats, committed and made in a letter
written and sent by the defendant. In reversing the order of dismissal, this Court
held that the libelous remarks contained in said letter were merely preparatory acts
culminating in the final threat, which was the offense committed by the defendant.

1st complaint (Criminal Case No. 682)

"That on or about September 28, 1962, between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while inside the restaurant in the poblacion of Sibalom, Antique,
Philippines, . . . the said accused MONICO O. CERVERA did then and there,
 41. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
BERNABE BUSCAYNO, JOSE MA. SISON and JULIET SISON, petitioners, vs.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS NOS. 1, 2, 6 and 25, GENERAL FABIAN VER, GENERAL
FIDEL RAMOS, LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, CAPTAIN
MELCHOR A. ACOSTA and REVIEW BOARD OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58284, November 19, 1981
AQUINO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be terminated by means of a
final conviction, acquittal or dismissal without his express consent, If the case is not
yet terminated, then jeopardy does not set in. After the accused has been put in
jeopardy, the filing against him of another charge for the same offense or for an
attempt or frustrated stage thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is included in the offense originally charged places him in double jeopardy.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
In Criminal Case No. MC-1-92, Buscayno, with 91 other persons including Sison and
his wife, Juliet de Lima, Saturnino Ocampo and Mila Astorga-Garcia, were charged
with rebellion before Military Commission No. 1 in a charge sheet dated March 18,
1977. Buscayno was arrested and detained, soon he waived his right to be present
and counsel, but just wanted to have a record of the trial. During arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty. Soon Juan David entered his appearance as Buscayno’s counsel
and filed in this Court in behalf of Buscayno a petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition. The Commission thus found all the accused guilty and had imposed death
by firing squad. Sison and spouses were arrested on November 10, 1977 by virtue of
arrest, search and seizure orders issued by the Secretary of National Defense.
Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus catchall petition for habeas
corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory
verbiage, praying for the decision of Military Commission No. 2 convicting Buscayno
of subversion and murder and sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared
void because he was denied his constitutional right to present evidence and that he
be released from detention. They also prayed for the charges of rebellion and
subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy.
FACTS:
Bernabe Buscayno alias “Commander Dante” and Jose Ma. Sison alias “Amado
Guerrero”, alleged subversives classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and
Traditional Armed Group personalities", were wanted by the authorities since
1971. In Department Order No. 610, the Undersecretary of National Defense
Efren Plana fixed 150,000php and 50,000php as prize to any person who kills,
captures or causes the killing, capture or surrender of Buscayno and Sison,
respectively, or who furnishes information directly leading to and which is the
proximate result of their killing or capture.
Even before Buscayno's arrest, he and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. (arrested on
September 23, 1972) were charged before Military Commission No. 2 in an
amended charge sheet dated August 14, 1973 with subversion or violation of the
Anti-Subversion Law, RA 1700. It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arms, the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan and the New People's Army, constituting an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the government by force or placing it under the control
of an alien power.
Buscayno was arrested on August 26. 1976 in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico,
Pampanga by operatives of the armed forces. He was detained in the
Constabulary Security Unit at Camp Crame. He waived his right to be present and
to have counsel, said that he was not challenging any member of the tribunal. He
just wanted to have a record of the trial. He pleaded not guilty. He also answered
in writing that he did not want to present any evidence. Juan David, the counsel
that eventually represented Buscayno, thus filed in behalf of Buscayno a petition
for habeas corpus and prohibition with this Court. As there was no restraining
order issued, the Commission continued its proceedings and soon found all the
accused guilty as charged and imposed death by firing squad.
On the other hand, Sison and spouses were arrested on November 10, 1977 by
virtue of arrest, search and seizure orders issued by the Secretary of National
Defense, as they were also charged with rebellion on two counts before Special
Military Commission No. 1. Even before her arrest, Juliet Sison, with 55 other
persons including Victor Corpus, was charged with subversion before Military
Commission No. 6, alleging that 56 accused in 1968 and for sometime prior and
subsequent became and have remained officers and ranking leaders of the CPP
and the NPA, the CPP's military arm, and the CPP’s front organizations whose
objective is the overthrow of the government for the purpose of establishing a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power. That they engaged in extensive indoctrination,
agitation and promotion of rallies (10 instances) and in propagandas, speeches,
teach-ins, messages, lectures, all intended to promote the communist pattern of
subversion (11 instances).
On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus
catchall petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in
repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory verbiage, and prayed that the decision of
Military Commission No. 2 dated May 1, 1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion
and murder and sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void
because he was denied his constitutional right to present evidence and that he
be released from detention. They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and
subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double
jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have been placed in double jeopardy. (NO)
RULING:
In Sec. 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, "same offense" means the offense
charged, or an attempt to commit it or a frustrated stage thereof, or "any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information." For an accused to be in jeopardy, it is
necessary that (1) a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction is filed against him; (2)
the charge is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction; and, (3) after he had
pleaded to the charge, he was convicted or acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
Buscayno was charged with subversion together with Aquino in a 1973 charge
sheet. Jose Ma. Sison was charged with subversion in a 1978 charge sheet. His
wife, Juliet de Lima, was charged with subversion in a 1972 charge sheet. The
three petitioners were all charged with rebellion in an amended charge sheet
dated November 8, 1977. Only the subversion case against Buscayno was decided
but the decision is still subject to review.
Because no case against the petitioners has been terminated, it is evident that
they cannot invoke the rule on double jeopardy. The petitioners have not yet
been placed in jeopardy. In Bulaong vs. People, Bulaong was charged with
rebellion in the CFI of Laguna and later with subversion in the CFI of Manila. It
was held that the defense of double jeopardy should be interposed by Bulaong
in the subversion case. He could not plead double jeopardy in the rebellion case
because the subversion case had not yet been terminated.
The issue on double jeopardy raised by the petitioners was resolved by this Court
in People vs. Liwanag alias Linda Bie. was charged in 1960 with subversion for
being an officer and ranking member of the CPP and HMB. He filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy because he had already
been convicted of rebellion based on the same overt acts allegedly constituting
the crime of subversion, but this was denied. After trial he was convicted. He
appealed to this Court where he again raised the issue that the charge of
subversion placed him in double jeopardy.
It was held that there was no double jeopardy because Liwanag was convicted of
rebellion for acts committed before the Anti-Subversion Law took effect while
the subversion charge referred to his act of having remained an officer and
ranking leader of the CPP and HMB from the time the Anti-Subversion Law took
effect on June 20, 1957 up to his capture in 1960. Moreover. the crime of
subversion is distinct from rebellion.
The rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the acts committed by
them on or about February 4, 1972 and during the period from August, 1973 to
February, 1974. The subversion charge against Buscayno involved his acts
committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge against
the Sison spouses referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime
prior and subsequent. The common denominator of the rebellion and subversion
charges is that the petitioners committed overt acts as alleged communists or
leftists. The overt acts in the two charges are different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It may
be committed by non-communists without collaborating with the agents of an
alien power. In contrast, the crime of subversion came into existence when the
communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a new social
economic and political order.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
FERNANDO, C.J. concurring and dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition that with the approach taken the conclusion
reached by the Court expressed with his usual clarity in the able ponencia of justice
Aquino was inevitable I find myself unable to agree with my brethren on the question
of the scope of our power of review over military tribunals, especially so where the
accused are civilians. Moreover, while it is not inaccurate to state that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the suspension of the right
to bail.
xxxxxxxx
1. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case where the
writ of habeas corpus had been sued out to liberate a person detained by
virtue of the sentence of a court-martial, the civil courts exercise no
 supervisory or correcting power by the writ of habeas corpus over the
proceedings of a court-martial and no mere errors in their proceedings are
open to consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. That
being established, the habeas corpus must be denied and the petitioner
remanded. That wanting, it must be sustained and the petitioner
discharged." ... As otherwise stated the rule is that the proceedings of a
military or naval court cannot be reviewed upon habeas corpus when it
appears that such tribunal had jurisdiction over the offense charged and
that the offender was a person amenable to its authority."
xxxxxxx
What minimizes the difficulty facing a detained person, triable by a military
tribunal, is this categorical pronouncement by Justice Antonio, speaking for
the Court, in the aforesaid Aquino v. Military Commission decision: "It is
important to note here that an accused being tried before a military tribunal
enjoys the specific constitutional safeguards pertaining to criminal trials.
Thus, he is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf, and to be exempt from being a witness
against himself.
xxxxxxxx
The well-settled doctrine announced as early as 1924 by Justice Malcolm in
Conde v. Rivera and subsequently reiterated, the latest case being Gumabon
v. Director of Prisons that came out in 1971, to the effect that a denial of a
constitutional right may oust the Court of jurisdiction, finds pertinence. In
this petition, however, counsel failed to invoke such a principle, relying
instead on Jovito Go not falling within Proclamation No. 1081. There is
plausibility to the argument that under the ruling in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile,
the offense for which Go was indicted is not included in the crime of
insurrection or rebellion which supplied the basis for preventive detention
under martial law proclamation. That is not decisive of the controversy
before us in view of the fact, as mentioned above, that a military tribunal is
vested with jurisdiction where the prosecution is one for kidnapping."
2. I am for the reexamination of the doctrine that the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus carries with it the suspension of the right to
bail….As set forth in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the
majority was of that view but unfortunately there was one vote short of the
necessary six affirmative votes at that time.
3. The petition made mention of the efforts of counsel to have the President
transfer the cases to the civil courts. The success of such endeavor would be
for me a cause for gratification. It would mean that the lifting of martial law
would likewise put an end to the jurisdiction of military tribunals over
civilians, necessitated by the past period of emergency. At any rate, to the
extent that the evidence before respondent Military Commission found in
the records was offered with due regard to the constitutional rights of an
accused, it could still be relied upon by the court to which the cases may be
transferred. In the event that such efforts would not be attended to with
success, it would be desirable, to my way of thinking, if there be only one
military commission to continue with the trial of petitioners.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The principal questions presented in the case at bar assert (1) the constitutional right
of civilians like petitioners to the judicial process of civilian trials by the regular civil
courts composed of judges trained in the law whose objectivity and independence
are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and are nurtured by the judicial
tradition as against the executive process of trial by military tribunals composed of
military officers, specially so with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981
through the President's Proclamation No. 2045, and (2) petitioners' constitutional
right to bail unless it could be shown that evidence of guilt for the capital offense of
subversion for which they are charged were strong.
In Sison particularly, the Court in dismissing the petition, unanimously noted that
"(T)he President of the Philippines has announced that the military tribunals are
being phased out. With the official lifting of martial law under Proclamation No. 2045
and the revocation thereunder of General Order No. 8 creating military tribunals, and
pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Sison on the phaseout of military
tribunals, there is no longer any justification for continuing to subject petitioners-
civilians to trial by military commissions in derogation of the judicial power vested
exclusively in the civil courts.
It should be noted that there has been no showing by respondents that the cases
against petitioners fall within the only exception provided in Proclamation No. 2045
wherein the military tribunals which are therein dissolved may make a "final
determination.” Neither the respondents nor the State claim, much less have shown,
that the transfer of petitioners' cases to the civil courts would result in "irreparable
prejudice" to the State because of double jeopardy or that such transfer to the civil
courts would render further prosecution "difficult, if not impossible" in the face of
petitioners' assertion and insistence that the military tribunals have no jurisdiction
over them as civilians.
 DEMOCRITO SILVESTRE, petitioner, vs. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 21,
and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-46366 March 8, 1978
FERNANDEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Double jeopardy is one of the grounds to quash an information. A motion to quash
information may be filed only before the defendant enters his plea. Since the defense
of double jeopardy is one of the grounds to quash an information it must be pleaded
at the time of arraignment, and it shall be deemed waived if not raised on time. Under
double jeopardy, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
After an information for homicide against petitioner had been filed on the Court of
First Instance, and petitioner had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the
charge, the victim’s father requested the Commanding General of the Philippine
Constabulary to investigate the case. The judge Advocate General’s Office conducted
a preliminary investigation, and thereafter filed with respondent Military
Commission a charge for murder committed by a band against the petitioner, his wife
and two other accused. Petitioner was arraigned before the Military Commission
where he pleaded not guilty. After the Military Commission had commenced the trial
of the murder case with the taking of the testimony of one witness, petitioner asked
the Commission to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The Military
Commission denied the motion. The Supreme Court held that the defense of double
jeopardy must be pleaded at the time of arraignment and is deemed waived if not
raised on time. Petition for certiorari and prohibition denied and the criminal
proceedings in the Court of First Instance ordered held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the murder case by the Military Commission.
FACTS:
On November 6, 1976, a Saturday, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jose
Balatbat was hacked to death at Capitol Site, Quezon City, allegedly by Democrito
Silvestre, who afterwards surrendered to the Quezon City police. In the evening,
Silvestre’s statement was taken in the presence of his lawyer, and on November
7, 1976, a Sunday, the witnesses were questioned by the police, after which they
were brought to the Assistant Fiscal on inquest duty to subscribe and swear to
their statements. However, the widow, father and mother of Jose Balatbat were
not among those questioned.
On November 8, 1976, Assistant City Fiscal David M. Reyes filed an information
for homicide with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City against
Silvestre, and that the case was assigned to Branch XVIII of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Quezon City. During the arraignment, Silvestre pleaded not
guilty, and thus the case was set for trial. On December 22, 1976 Marcelo
Balatbat, the father of the deceased, wrote the Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary requesting investigation of the killing of his son, to which
the Criminal Investigation Service conducted an investigation and found that the
attack on Jose Balatbat was treacherous and that Silvestre was aided in the killing
by his wife, Remedios Pamintuan Silvestre; as well as Eduardo Dizon.
Based on the findings, the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) conducted a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder committed by a band instituted
against Silvestre, his wife, and Eduardo Dizon. The Court of First Instance at
Quezon City set the trial of the homicide case on January 26, 1977, but the trial
was not set due to the absence of the presiding Judge Ernani Patio for he was on
vacation, so the trial was set on March 21, 1977. During which the private
prosecutor filed a motion for postponement, of which the CFI cancelled the
scheduled hearing in view of the preliminary investigation being conducted by
the JAGO of the charge of murder committed by a band. Trial was set again on
April 25, 1977, the private prosecutor filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance praying for the remand of the case to the military commission.
On May 23, 1997, Silvestre was arraigned before Military Commission No. 21 and
he pleaded not guilty. The CFI denied the prosecution's motion to remand the
case to the military commission and set the homicide case for trial on July 7, 1977
while Military Commission No. 21 commenced the trial of murder by a band.
ISSUE: Whether or not Military Commission No. 21 has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss
Criminal Case No. MC-21-23, which thus puts him in double jeopardy. (NO)
RULING:
In Bulaong vs People, petitioners were charged with the crime of rebellion. Soon
the Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (RA 1700). After the enactment,
Agaton Bulaong was arrested and another information was filed with the CFI of
Manila, charging Agaton Bulaong with subversion as well. While the case for be heard (for the victim was yet lying in state) when there appears to be evidence
subversion was still pending, the case for rebellion was decided by the CFI of justifying the subsequent filing of the more serious crime of murder in band. Such
Laguna adversely against Agaton Bulaong, who appealed to the CA, which then undue haste deprived the State of due process in its right to prosecute the petitioner
affirmed the decision of the CFI of Laguna. and his co-accused for murder and in effect rendered void the first charge of
homicide.
Under Sec. 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is
available to the accused only where he was either convicted or acquitted or the Civilian placed on trial for civil (as distinguished from military) offenses under general
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent law are entitled to trial by judicial process and not by executive or military process
There is no double jeopardy in the case of Bulaong for he has not been convicted and since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military
government and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military
or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
subversion. Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his
committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have
consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court.
remained open and have been regularly functioning.
Following the doctrine in Bulaong, Silvestre cannot legally claim that the filing
AQUINO, J., concurring:
of Criminal Case No. MC-21-23 with Military Commission No. 21 has placed him
in double jeopardy. Neither the homicide case pending in the CFI at Quezon City I concur in the result. However, to do justice, the murder charge pending in the
nor the murder case committed in band before the military commission has been Military Commission should be transferred to the Court of First Instance at Quezon
terminated. When Silvestre was arraigned, he knew that there was a pending City where it should be raffled and prosecuted by a competent state prosecutor.
homicide case against him in the CFI at Quezon City. Instead of filing a motion to
quash, he entered a plea of not guilty before the Military Commission No. 21.
After having pleaded not guilty, Silvestre entered into trial in the murder case
committed by a band. It was only after one witness for the prosecution had
testified before the Military Commission No. 21 that the Silvestre filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Silvestre is deemed to have waived the
defense of double jeopardy for failure to raise it on time. On this ground alone,
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition may be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby denied.
Proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-7027 pending before the respondent CFI of
Quezon City, are hereby ordered held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
charge for the offense of murder committed by a band by the respondent
Military Commission No. 21.

SEPARATE OPINION:
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Justice Fernandez insofar as it holds that the filing
of the second charge of murder with respondent military commission after the
precipitate filing by an assistant fiscal of the first charge of homicide with respondent
court of first instance. The main opinion correctly finds that there was undue haste
(less than two days right after the killing and petitioner's surrender) on the part of
the police and an assistant fiscal of Quezon City in having right away filed a mere
charge of homicide against petitioner without giving the victim's family a chance to
44. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , , v. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION], ALEJANDRO E.
GAMOS, AND ROSALYN G. GILE ,
G.R. Nos. 232197-98, December 05, 2018
TIJAM, J.
FACTS:
Two separate complaints were filed against former Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon Mayor Gamos, Municipal Accountant Gile, and Municipal
Treasurer Laco for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(First Complaint; Amount: P6,380,725.84) and of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code (Second Complaint; Amount: P2,226,500), arising
from alleged illegal cash advances made in the years 2004 to 2007.
● Gamos, Gile, and Laco were directed to submit their counter-
affidavits in response to the said complaint. They filed a motion
for extension of time to file. They filed the said counter-
affidavits, wherein they prayed for the dismissal of the cases for
being malicious, baseless, and premature.
● Second Complaint was filed. Same thing happened (1st
Complaint) with the Second complaint.
● They requested for the review of the audit reports on which the
complaints were based.
● Resignation of then Deputy OMB for Luzon, Jalandoni and the
resignation of then OMB Gutierrez Consolidated Resolution
was approved by the then Acting OMB Casimiro.
The OMB investigating officer found that it is premature to determine
criminal and administrative liabilities considering that the COA audit
reports, upon which the complaints were based, were not yet final. Thus,
the dismissal of the complaints was recommended.
● Two Informations for malversation of public funds were filed
against Gamos, Gile, and Laco before the Sandiganbayan.
● For several times Gamos failed to appear before the said court
for his arraignment despite notice. Thus, Sandiganbayan issued
a Resolution, directing Gamos to show cause why he should not
be cited in contempt.
● Gamos and Giles filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
capricious and vexatious delay in the OMB's conduct of
preliminary investigation to the damage and prejudice of the
accused
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases, finding undue delay in the
preliminary investigation before the OMB to the prejudice of
respondents' right to a speedy disposition of their cases. The
Sandiganbayan found that seven years have passed since the filing of
the First Complaint in 2008 until the filing of the Informations before it.
According to the said court, while the accused may have contributed to
the delay for filing several motions for extension to file their pleadings,
it took the OMB two years to act upon the complaints. According to the
graft court, it took another two years before the OMB investigating
officer resolved to grant the motion for reconsideration of Gallanosa and
Robillos, a delay which has not been satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution.
Finding that the graft court's dismissal of the criminal cases was void,
we ruled that there was no acquittal or dismissal to speak of, hence,
respondents' right against double jeopardy will not be violated in the
reinstatement of said criminal cases. Further, we considered the
petitioner's misleading assertion that respondents were not yet arraigned
and were even directed to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt for their refusal to appear in the arraignment, as well as the
fact that the dismissal of the cases was at their instance, thus ruling out
the attachment of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
YES (1) WON there was undue delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, violating respondents' right to a speedy disposition of
cases; and
YES (2) WON respondents' right against double jeopardy was violated.
RULING:
A second hard look at the sequence of events reveals that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding undue delay in the OMB's conduct
of the preliminary investigation. Indeed, while there may be no gap in
the sequence of events and developments in the preliminary
investigation that may be considered as delays in the conduct thereof, a
wholistic view of the entire preliminary investigation would disclose
certain shortcomings on the part of the OMB, resulting undue delays in
the proceedings, which, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, were
not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution.
First. It took the investigating officer 2 years and 8 months from the
filing of the First Complaint only to issue a resolution stating that it
found out that it was premature for the OMB to determine criminal and
administrative liabilities considering that the COA was, at that time, still
reviewing its findings.
Second. It took (7) months before the Acting OMB approved the said
Consolidated Resolution and the only reason given by the prosecution
was the resignation of the then Deputy OMB for Luzon and OMB
Gutierrez which is irrelevant and unreasonable.
Third. It was only after the OMB came to know of the COA's denial of
respondents' request when it embark on the investigation and
determination of probable cause.
Fourth. The Order finding probable cause was issued. However, it took
the OMB another year and to approve and to formally file the
Informations. The belated filing cannot justify the OMB's failure to
timely file the Informations upon the finding of probable cause.
*Section 7(a), Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 or the Rules of
Procedure of the OMB (Rules)
Section 7(b), Rule II of the said Rules*
Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration beyond the 5-day
period given for the filing thereof and, hence, should not 'have been
considered by the OMB in the filing of the Informations before the graft
court. Clearly, the filing of a motion for reconsideration should not have
stalled the OMB's duty to promptly file the Informations in court upon
its finding of probable cause.
We find no justifiable reason for the OMB to delay the filing of the
Informations before the Sandiganbayan after it has already determined
the existence of probable cause. No less than our Constitution
guarantees all persons the right to speedy disposition of their cases.
Having established that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled for the
dismissal of the criminal cases against respondents due to undue delay
in the conduct of preliminary investigation, we find that the concept of
double jeopardy becomes relevant.
In our assailed Decision, the Court was misled by the petitioner's
assertion in its petition that respondents were not yet arraigned due to
their refusal to appear therein. It appears, however, in this motion that
respondents have already been arraigned, satisfying thus the third
element. What is crucial, however, is the fourth element since the
criminal cases were clearly dismissed at the instance of the respondents
and the general rule is that the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule,
however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial or disposition of case. Thus, indeed
respondents were the ones who filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan, the dismissal thereof was due to the
violation of their right to speedy disposition, which would thus put them
in double jeopardy should the charges against them be revived.
 48. Corpus et al. vs. Pamular
G.R. No. 186403, September 05, 2018 Leonen, J.
Doctrine:. Sec. 7 Rule 117:
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Emergency Recitation: An information for murder was files against Samonte
for killing Espinosa. Later a witness said that it was mayor Corpus who
instructed Samonte to kill Espinosa. The complaint was dismissed by the RTC
but Prosecutor Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Espinosa’s
murder. Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review before the
DOJ. Thus, they argued that Judge Pamular should desist from amending the
information in view of the said petition. Also, substantial amendment of
information is prejudicial to their rights because it will put them in double
jeopardy.
The SC ruled in their favor. Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of arraignment.
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case
of a pending petition for review of the prosecutor's resolution filed before the
Department of Justice.
And, the constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy is
procedurally bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides When an accused has been convicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Facts: Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street,
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught
in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceeding,
an information for murder was filed against Samonte. Upon arraignment,
Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self- defense.
Alexander Lozano, a one of the witnesses, executed in his affidavit that it was
Mayor Corpuz who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. However, the RTC
dismissed the complaint of Angelito’s wife and the attached affidavits of
witnesses against Corpuz and Samonte.
Later, Provincial Prosecutor Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus
for Angelito's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before
the Regional Trial Court. Despite Florendo taking over the case, Assistant
Public Prosecutor Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution, where he
reinstated the Regional Trial Court Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of
the murder complaint against Corpus.
Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information, praying
for the admission of the amended information. Samonte and Corpus opposed
this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion. They averred that
Judge Pamular's action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was
already arraigned. Samonte and Corpus also claimed that the issuance of a
warrant of arrest should be suspended because the latter intended to appeal
through a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9, 2009
before the Department of Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion
with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from acting further on the
Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed with the
Department of Justice. However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular
granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached
amended information.
Corpuz and Samonte asserts Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended:99
Rule 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(c)
A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period
of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office.
Also, they cite Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which prohibits substantial amendment of information that is
prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment.
Issue:
(1) WON Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further
proceedings on the Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant
of arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. despite the pendency of his and
petitioner Carlito Samonte's Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.
(2) WON the amendment of information is prejudicial to the right of the
accused
Held:
(1) Yes.
respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners' motion to
suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the pendency of their Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice.
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the grounds for suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of
the prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 before the
Regional Trial Court, informing it about their pending Petition for Review of
the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice.
Also filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on
February 9, 2009.Thus, the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10,
2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and
further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
(2) Yes.
The Constitutional provision on double jeopardy guarantees the invocation of
the law not only against the danger of a second punishment or a second trial
for the same offense, "but also against being prosecuted twice for the same act
where that act is punishable by . . . law and an ordinance."
When a person is charged with an offense and the case against him or her is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other way without his or
her consent, he or she cannot be charged again with a similar offense. Thus,
"[t]his principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.
The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy is procedurally
bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides
……
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
....
In substantiating a claim for double jeopardy, the following requisites should
be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as in the first.