HABEAS CORPUS
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER
and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no.
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas
corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,1 or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.2 Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his
capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that
behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the
imprisoned without sufficient cause.4 It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of
the Court of Appeals and its resolution8 dismissing the
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as
the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio9 is to annul
that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda
K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda
and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty
(30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was
in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely:
Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52);
Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the
United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months
in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged
that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose
of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo City a petition10 for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and
instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents11 refused
petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon
petitioner’s manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio
Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland
Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards and
Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to
allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda
Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting
visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of
refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously
issued be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be
DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are
herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention,13 or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.15 Jksmä â Ó
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty
that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern
his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there
was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to
seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of
Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the
court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to
make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members
but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have
no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Esä m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent
with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not
involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of
a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat
of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the
petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and
nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of
Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth
G. R. No. 148468 - January 28, 2003 Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in
February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
LEANDRO MENDOZA, Respondents.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation,
x---------------------------------------------------------x received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis
G. R. No. 148769 - January 28, 2003 "Chavit" Singson through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the
EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE said amount to the Foundation's treasurer who later deposited
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE it in the Foundation's account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly
accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of
x---------------------------------------------------------x
engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on
the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the
G. R. No. 149116 - January 28, 2003
filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal
complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB
Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation,
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph
Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman,
of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas No. 0-00-1757.
corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder
wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed their
several others. respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman
conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on
April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia,
that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged
with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
several Informations against former President Estrada, who
earlier had resigned from his post as President of the Republic
of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with
plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an amended
Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-
accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was
recommended for the provisional release of all the accused,
including petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division
which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through
ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts,
OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting
OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS,
OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT
IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable cause against
him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time
with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable
Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the
Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges
against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended Information
charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for
the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date for the arrest
of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National
Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been
detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27,
2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for
hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part, petitioner's co-accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the
arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001
schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of
the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition
for bail can and should be heard before petitioner's arraignment
on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal
Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the
reception of evidence on petitioner's petition for bail on May 21
to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner's
petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early
arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner
and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a
manifestation questioning the propriety of including Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's)
petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001
resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition for bail to June 18
to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecution's
pending motions as well as petitioner's motion that his petition
for bail be heard as early as possible, which motion the
prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The
court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been
resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause
to hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the
petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The
Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the
trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it
on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June
15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June
26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its
May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did
not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on
the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does
not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended
Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative
of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged
in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have been
illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-gotten
wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and
the amended Information charges him of bribery and illegal
gambling.10 By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his
motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner's
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his
petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the
hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending
incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even
before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions
of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court
on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court
declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of
the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively
denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of
the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due
proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his
motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash the amended Information.
Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said
resolution.12 The motion to fix bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he
was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment
of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that
there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the
Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to petitioner to file a
motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued
by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan
proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead,
impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material
inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him
do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged,
under the said amended Information, for more than one offense.
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with
the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing
the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which
denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June
25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of
its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'S MOTION TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS
AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE
THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information and alleged to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in
Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN
ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information,
he is charged with plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of
the amended Information of a "combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d)
of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He avers that his
single act of toleration or protection of illegal gambling impelled
by a single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite
"combination or series of acts" for plunder. He further claims
that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or
kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over to and
received by former President Joseph E. Estrada "on several
occasions" does not cure the defect in the amended
information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the amended
Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling
and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the
P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President Joseph E.
Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten
wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission
of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all
of them shall be included in the complaint or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged
and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The
Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of
the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.
The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of
the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare for his defense.16 Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.17 The use of derivatives or
synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that
all the accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired
with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder
"through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts or similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of the
amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are
charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly,
on several instances money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,19 we held that the word
"series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances";
it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the
items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word
"combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
"plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges
accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by
a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the
law" and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with
former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2]
of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general
rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the
Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080,
as amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of
the amended information conspired and confederated with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including
petitioner, are charged of having conspired and confabulated
together in committing plunder. When two or more persons
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts
of others. In contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is
the act of each of them.23 Conspirators are one man, they
breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each,
while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words
and declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended
information of bribery and illegal gambling and others. The
Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged
with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is
charged only with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the
information charges more than one offense, namely, bribery
(Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public
funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and
Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in
the information are not charged as separate offenses but as
predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically
Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express reference to
any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate
crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The
said acts which form part of the combination or series of act are
described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from
'malversation' of public funds, the law also uses the generic
terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund.
The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under
other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as
predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations
relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under
the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the
face of the amended Information that petitioner and his co-
accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with
the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that
the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not
crimes separate and independent of the crime of plunder.
Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY
2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD
TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND
COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW
SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR
PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a
determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman
to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded
exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion
in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists
no probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as
against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman
does not even mention him in relation to the collection and
receipt of jueteng money which started in 199828 and that the
Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front
organization put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner,
even though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation
is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation.29 More
importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate
that he knew that the P200 million he received for the
Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since:
(1) the P200 million he received does not constitute "ill-gotten
wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there
is no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no showing that petitioner
participated in a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200
million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is
premised on the absolute lack of evidence to support a finding
of probable cause for plunder as against him,34 and hence he
should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense
of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government
prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while
this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable
cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may
do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this
case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for
a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint
resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating
petitioner from the charge of plunder and committed errors of
law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.37 He also states that during the joint preliminary
investigations for the various charges against Joseph Estrada
and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one
of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished
with copies of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to
refute the evidence presented in relation to the other seven
cases, even though the evidence presented therein were also
used against him, although he was only charged in the plunder
case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus
motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable
cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case
and to proceed to try the same. They further argue that "a
finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of
the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused,"
and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses
in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be
determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by
the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either
newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or irregularities,
which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon
which a motion for reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to
charge petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph
Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the Court
ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable
cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus,
in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of
information against the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual
in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the
contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through
falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising
questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored on the
propriety or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts.
Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari where neither question of fact nor even of law
are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third
issue is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by respondents which would warrant the
granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint
resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding
probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the
Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the
amended Information. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that
probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for
the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of
the Amended Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the
accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining carefully
the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and several other pieces of documentary evidence,
as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former
President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose
"Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda
T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio
dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner's
omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary
investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II,
Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints
and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the
accused.45 It was in light of such findings that the
Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation
that accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the
right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution
dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with
plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation in
connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed
out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in his motion that
there were newly discovered evidence, or that the preliminary
investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which
are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is
not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by
statute.47 The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not
render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of
the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding
and determination of probable cause, since the determination of
the existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that
petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or
that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001
are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was
necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation since
there is nothing to substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an accused
shall not be deemed to have waived his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his
objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said
investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the
instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a
reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence.
Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted by
the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information,
and that petitioner had participated therein by filing his counter-
affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied
his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for
reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment.54 In sum then,
the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings
of the parties, the issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not
petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may
file a motion to quash the amended Information during the
pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of
the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the
People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong
evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5)
Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from
detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition
for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered
a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He
insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does
not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail
hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity,
be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his
arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary
since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is
evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence
during the Senate investigation of the jueteng scandal and the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman.56 Neither
would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present all
its evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised
Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if
made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate
the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings
because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court
expressly provides that evidence present during bail hearings
are automatically reproduced during the trial.58 Petitioner
likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be
arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he be
granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail
hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon
arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it
is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition
for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no
more need for him to file said petition. Moreover, since it is
during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the
precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the
bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of
the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly
informed of the charge against him, especially considering that,
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
evidence presented during such proceedings are considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the
possibility of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an
accused escapes after he has been arraigned.61 The People
also contend that the conduct of bail hearings prior to
arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved
privilege of being appraised of the prosecution's evidence
before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001
and a plea of not guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan
on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in
petitioner's case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to
discuss the controlling precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an
accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his
petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon
as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.64 An accused need not wait for his arraignment
before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the issue
of whether an accused must first be arraigned before he may
be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with
violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition
of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is
allowed to post bail. We held therein that "in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash."66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times
precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before
a complaint or information is filed against him.67 The Court's
pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the
fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well
as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence,
we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash
and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned
before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For
when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling
in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned.
Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong,
he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment;
for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized" under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with
the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file
a motion to quash during the pendency of his petition for bail,
petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail
are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each
other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to
quash may in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein,
thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he
opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in
detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a
motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for
bail or to withdraw one that has been filed.69 He also insists that
the grant of a motion to quash does not automatically result in
the discharge of an accused from detention nor render moot an
application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to
quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.71 Its purpose
is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an
offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may apply
for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face
of the Information.74 An accused may file a motion to quash the
Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right
to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or
when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but
after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong,
does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It must be
conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal
complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and
the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an
accused may become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that
the hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial
of the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada
be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would
negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a
summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted
into a full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save
the court from having to hear the same witnesses and the
parties from presenting the same evidence where it would allow
separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-
conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings, the
Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made was in
the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than
the accused Serapio were to be excused from participating in
the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio, under the
pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the
prosecution only if and when they will already have filed their
petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they
will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody
will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to go through
the process of introducing the same witness and pieces of
evidence two times, three times or four times, as many times as
there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is
not conducive to the speedy termination of a case. Neither can
such procedure be characterized as an orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan
governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by
different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be
heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other
accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing
of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or
to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also
that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution
and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The
Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the
cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and
the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has
a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic
individual protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become
careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant
over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this
Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to
conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into
any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the
evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be offered
therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to
the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused
will of course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the
prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the
accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of
having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the
prosecution adduces essentially the same evident against
them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings
of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former
president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the
proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The
proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-
blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts
alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information since
it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph
Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can
only be charged with having conspired with the other co-
accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from
illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling.81 Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the
prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against
him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the
alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal gambling as
described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information.
With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and
the trial of the former President, the latter will have the right to
cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the
prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If
petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the
prosecution shall have concluded its evidence, the former
President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his
witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition
with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be
prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination
of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty
and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution
of an application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in
his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would
with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the accused
to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict
upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a
greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person,
while as yet it is not determined that he has not committed any
crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No.
26558, is empowered "to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings
and speedy termination of the case,"83 the Court finds that it
gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail
of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada
be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself
acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the "pre-eminent
position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the
matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without
unnecessary delay,"84 only to make a volte face and declare that
after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former President
Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously. In ordering
that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial
of the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E.
Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of
petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the case against
former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the prosecution tried
to delay the bail hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People
aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the
delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of
numerous manifestations and pleadings with the
Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the motion for joint
bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the
original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 2125,
2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital
offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the
Constitution, which states that
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or
this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not
absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on
bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such
person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the
court.90 Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have
provided for an application for bail by a person charged with a
capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the
evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense
is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an
application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense,
a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution
must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is
strong.92 The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to
present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this
purpose.93 When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the
evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail becomes a matter of right.94 Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or
Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's claim that the
prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando,
for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the
records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001,
impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail
petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for
petitioner's application for bail but the same were reset due to Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or
pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail
hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file
through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's application
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan
or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor,
Motions filed by the prosecution:
as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and
by the prosecution:
Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;96
Motions filed by petitioner:
Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada,
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8,
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave
2001;97
to file motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct
ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct a
determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25,
arrest and other proceedings pending determination of probable 2001;98 and
cause;
 Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and
Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed
to the aforesaid delay by their filing of the following motions:
Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080
and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1)excluded from the
Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2) released
from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated
April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of the
case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May
2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case by the
Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001,
filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) days within
which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash in view
of the holidays and election-related distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated
May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial
arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by
Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be confined in
Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson, filed
by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of requests
for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion
for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor
of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution
compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapio's hearing
for bail be reconsidered;
 Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro
Bacani favors their house arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be present at the June 18
and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to trial with
assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest;
Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents; and
Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated
June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, asking for free dates for parties, claiming that denial of
bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order of
prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection and
copying of documents, requesting for status of alias case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
requesting for permission to attend some municipal affairs in
San Juan, Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases
where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital
offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on
said application.101 The rationale for such requirement was
explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra),
citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until
the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail
and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be
a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before
he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled
to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the
prosecution's refusal to present evidence and by the
Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of
guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner
contends that the prosecution launched "a seemingly endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the
conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for
petitioner's arraignment before the commencement of bail
hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner,
Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was
only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it
would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the
evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be
concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire case
upon the accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to quash
and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner
should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies.104 He
further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned
orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings which
it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have
resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to
bail.106 He argues further that the fact that he was arrested and
is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate
the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the
Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper
because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended
information which was earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of
arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of
an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction
to do so.111 In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may
be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender,
for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we
issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even
though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas
corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same115 applies,
because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the
filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for
plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in
fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April
25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus will lie
where the deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has
become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because the hearing on
petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. As stated
earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail
cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be
blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot
be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of
right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not
abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail,118 or has not
even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be
unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The
recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on
his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are
DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan
subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the
petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioner's petition for bail
and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of
petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and
Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissent of Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., no part, prior inhibition in plunder cases.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
I fully subscribe to the ponencia in G.R. No. 148468 that
a) The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on a petition for bail. A person is allowed to
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
b) There is no inconsistency between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash, these two
reliefs not being necessarily antithetical to each other.
c) The joinder of hearing of herein petitioner's bail petition with
the trial of former President Joseph Estrada indeed could unduly
delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to
obtain provisional liberty.
d) The claim of petitioner that the prosecution has refused to
present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail
application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a
hearing thereon hardly finds substantiation. Neither has the
prosecution waived, expressly or even impliedly, its right to
adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner.
e) There is no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in favor of petitioner. Habeas corpus does not lie where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court having jurisdiction
thereover.
In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the issues for
resolution are analogous to those posed in G.R. No. 148965,
entitled "Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [Third
Division], People of the Philippines and Office of the
Ombudsman," decided by the Court on 26 February 2002.
Petitioner Atty. Edward Serapio stands indicted with the former
President, Mr. Joseph E. Estrada, for plunder. Petitioner is
charged with exactly the same degree of culpability as that of
Mr. Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, thusly:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
"The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE', TOGETHER WITH
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. 7659, committed as follows:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER,
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself, AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR a series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
as follows:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING, IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"
Atty. Serapio, in G.R. No. 148769, questions the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of his motion to quash the Amended
Information on the ground that, among other things, it alleges,
at least as to him, neither a combination or series of overt acts
constitutive of plunder nor a pattern of criminal acts indicative of
an overall unlawful scheme in conspiracy with others. In G.R.
No. 149116, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus
motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558),
to conduct a determination of probable cause, and to direct the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges against
him.
In my separate opinion in G.R. No. 148965, which I now
reiterate, I have said:
"Plunder may be committed by any public officer either by
himself or "in connivance" with other persons; it may also be
committed by a person who participates with a public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder. A person may thus be held accountable under the law
by conniving with the principal co-accused or by participating in
the commission of "an offense" contributing to the crime of
plunder. The term "in connivance" would suggest an agreement
or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with or by
another, to connive being to cooperate secretly or privily with
another.1 Upon the other hand, to participate is to have a part
or a share in conjunction with another of the proceeds of the
unlawful act or deed.
"The amended Information alleged "connivance" and would
assume that petitioner and his co-accused had a common
design in perpetrating the violations complained of constitutive
of "plunder."
The Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan has 2 ineffectively charged in the Amended Information for plunder,
declared the anti-plunder law constitutional for being neither
vague nor ambiguous on the thesis that the terms "series" and
"combination" are not unsusceptible to firm understanding.
"Series" refers to two or more acts falling under the same
category of the enumerated acts provided in Section 1(d)3 of the
statute; "combination" pertains to two or more acts falling under
at least two separate categories mentioned in the same law.4
"xxx - xxx - xxx
"The government argues that the illegal act ascribed to
petitioner is a part of the chain that links the various acts of
plunder by the principal accused. It seems to suggest that a
mere allegation of conspiracy is quite enough to hold petitioner
equally liable with the principal accused for the latter's other
acts, even if unknown to him, in paragraph (a) of the indictment.
This contention is a glaring bent. It is, to my mind, utterly
unacceptable, neither right nor just, to cast criminal liability on
one for the acts or deeds of plunder that may have been
committed by another or others over which he has not
consented or acceded to, participated in, or even in fact been
aware of. Such vicarious criminal liability is never to be taken
lightly but must always be made explicit not merely at the trial
but likewise, and no less important, in the complaint or
information itself in order to meet the fundamental right of an
accused to be fully informed of the charge against him. It is a
requirement that cannot be dispensed with if he were to be
meaningfully assured that he truly has a right to defend himself.
Indeed, an unwarranted generalization on the scope of the anti-
plunder law would be a fatal blow to maintaining its
constitutionality given the ratio decidendi in the pronouncement
heretofore made by the Court upholding the validity of the
statute.
"Given the foregoing exegesis, the petitioner, although
could still be prosecuted and tried for a lesser offense, for it is a
recognized rule that an accused shall not be discharged even
when a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense
if he may still be held accountable for any other offense
necessarily included in the crime being charged. It is, however,
the Sandiganbayan, not this Court, which must make this
determination on the basis of its own findings."
WHEREFORE, I accept the ponencia in G.R. No. 148468 but,
as regards G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, I vote for the
remand of the case to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings on the bail application of petitioner and urge that
the incident be resolved with dispatch.
Dissenting Opinion
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.,:
Once again, the Amended Information dated April 18, 2001 in
Criminal Case No. 265581 is subjected to judicial scrutiny, this
time, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure (G.R. No. 148769) filed by petitioner Edward
S. Serapio. For easy reference, let me quote the Amended
Information, thus:
"The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and a.k.a. 'Jose Velarde,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe
a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
'That during the period from June 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being
then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself
and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by
taking undue advantage of his official position, authority,
relationship, connection, or influence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven
million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three
pesos and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines through any or a combination or a
series of overt OR criminal acts, or similar schemes or means,
described as follows:
a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, an aggregate
amount of Five Hundred Forty-Five Million Pesos
(P545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in the
form of gift, share, percentage kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie "Atong" Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or
misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and
benefit, public funds in the amount of one hundred thirty million
pesos (P130,000,000.00) more or less, representing a portion
of the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under
R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
Or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia
Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;
c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain
and benefit, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
to purchase, 351,878,000 shares of stock, more or less and the
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stock,
more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or
less One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty
Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos
[P1,102,965,607.50] and more or less Seven Hundred Forty
Four Million Six Hundred Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of a more or
less One Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos and fifty
centavos [P1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, Commissions or percentages by reason
of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of One
Hundred Eighty-Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P189,700,000], more or less, from the Belle Corporation, which
became part of the deposit in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the
account of "Jose Velarde";
d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, gifts,
shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary
benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the
amount of more or less Three Billion Two Hundred Thirty-Three
Million One Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy
Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos [P3,233,104,173.17]
and depositing the same under his account name "Jose
Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
CONTRARY TO LAW.'"2
In G.R. No. 148965,3 I stood apart from the majority of my
brethren in denying the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
filed by Jose "Jinggoy," E. Estrada against the Sandiganbayan,
People of the Philippines and Office of the Ombudsman. I
articulated in my Dissent the various reasons why I could not
join the majority in sustaining the afore-quoted Amended
Information. Now, I am taking this second occasion to reiterate
them, hoping that the majority will have a change of mind and
resolve to re-examine its Decision.
Consistent with my previous Dissent, it is my view that petitioner
Edward S. Serapio, like Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, may not be
validly prosecuted for the crime of plunder under the Amended
Information.
To be forthright, the obvious error in the foregoing Information
lies in the fact that it joined together four distinct conspiracies in
a single continuing conspiracy of plunder and indiscriminately
accused all the persons who participated therein of the said
resulting crime. Simply put, the Amended Information is a mere
fusion of separate conspiracies. It is akin to that of "separate
spokes meeting at a common center, without the rim of the
wheel to enclose the spokes." This is legally impermissible.
Such kind of information places the accused's primary right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him in jeopardy.
I must reiterate what I have pointed out in G.R. No. 148965.
There exists a distinction between separate conspiracies,
where certain parties are common to all the conspiracies, but
with no overall goal or common purpose; and one overall
continuing conspiracy with various parties joining and
terminating their relationship at different times.4 Distinct and
separate conspiracies do not, in contemplation of law, become
a single conspiracy merely because one man is a participant
and key figure in all the separate conspiracies.5 The present
case is a perfect example. The fact that former President
Estrada is a common key figure in the criminal acts recited
under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended
Information does not automatically give rise to a single
continuing conspiracy of plunder, particularly, with respect to
petitioner Serapio whose participation is limited to paragraph
(a). To say otherwise is to impute to petitioner or to any of the
accused the acts and statements of the others without reference
to whether or not their acts are related to one scheme or overall
plan. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature, in
drafting R.A. No. 7080, to authorize the prosecution to chain
together four separate and distinct crimes when the only nexus
among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all.
There lies a great danger for the transference of guilt from one
to another across the line separating conspiracies.
The principle laid down above is no longer novel in other
jurisdictions. Various American decisions had expounded on
the matter. In Battle vs. State,6 a judgment of conviction was
reversed on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the
indictment was insufficient, thus:
"Among the requirements for the allegations in an indictment to
be sufficient are (1) the specificity test, i.e., does the indictment
contain all the elements of the offense pleaded in terms
sufficient enough to apprise the accused of what he must be
prepared to meet, and (2) is the indictment pleaded in such a
manner as to enable the defendant to plead prior jeopardy as a
defense if additional charges are brought for the same offense.
x x x Further, our Supreme Court has recently considered the
criteria for sufficiency in conspiracy cases in Goldberg vs. State,
351 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1977),7 as this court has likewise done
in State vs. Giardino, 363 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).8 Applying the principles developed in the above cases to
the instant cause, we are of the opinion that Count I of the
indictment was insufficient. It is impossible to ascertain whether
the indictment charges that appellant conspired with Acuna and
Hernandez jointly or severally, or whether appellant conspired
entirely with persons unknown. Also, it is impossible to tell
whether appellant met with Acuna and Hernandez jointly or
severally, or whether appellant conspired entirely with persons
unknown. Also, it is impossible to tell whether appellant met with
Acuna and Hernandez jointly or severally, or whether appellant
met with persons unknown to plan the murder of Torres.
Because appellant was left to guess who these other
conspirators might be and because the vagueness of the
allegations did nothing to protect him from further prosecution,
we are of the opinion that they were too vague and indefinite to
meet the requirements set forth above. Accordingly, in our
opinion the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count I of the
indictment for conspiracy against appellant." (Footnote
supplied)
In State vs. Harkness,9 a demurrer to the information was
sustained on the ground that an information charging two
separate conspiracies is bad for misjoinder of parties where the
only connection between the two conspiracies was the fact that
one defendant participated in both. The Supreme Court of
Washington ruled:
"[W]e see no ground upon which the counts against both the
Harknesses can be included in the same information. While they
are charged with crimes of the same class, the crimes are
alleged to have been committed independently and at different
times. The crimes are related to each other only by the fact that
the prescriptions used were issued by the same physician. x x
x We find ourselves unable to agree with the appellant that the
misjoinder is cured by the conspiracy charge. It is doubtful if the
count is sufficient in form to charge a conspiracy. x x x
Reference is made in the count, to counts one to six, inclusive,
for a specification of the acts constituting the conspiracy. When
these counts are examined, it will be seen that they charge
separate substantive offenses without alleging any concert of
action between the Harknesses."
Thus, when certain persons unite to perform certain acts, and
some of them unite with others who are engaged in totally
different acts, it is error to join them in an
information.10 Otherwise stated, defendants charged with two
separate conspiracies having one common participant are not,
without more, properly joined, and similarity of acts alone is
insufficient to indicate that series of acts exist.11 Joinder may be
permitted when the connection between the alleged offenses
and the parties is the accused's awareness of the identity and
activity of the other alleged participants.12 There must be a
showing of one overall common goal to which the participants
bind themselves.
Apparently, the factual recitals of the Amended Information fail
to sufficiently allege that petitioner Serapio deliberately agreed
or banded with the rest of the accused for the purpose of
committing Plunder. There is no averment that he conspired
with them in committing the crimes specified in paragraphs (b),
(c) and (d) of the Amended Information, such as
misappropriation of the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur;
receipt of commissions by reason of the purchase of shares of
stock from the Belle Corporation; and acquisition of unexplained
wealth.
To my mind, the Amended Information only makes out a case
of bribery "in toleration or protection of illegal gambling." While
he is being charged for the "crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080," his alleged participation therein
is limited to what is specified under paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information.
The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts." The
determining factor of R.A. No. 7080, as can be gleaned from the
Record of the Senate, is the plurality of the overt acts or criminal
acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten
wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals or exceeds
fifty million pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of plunder if he performs only a single criminal act.13
It is the majority's position that since there is an allegation of
conspiracy at the inception of the Amended Information, the
criminal acts recited in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) pertain to
petitioner as well, the act of one being the act of all. This is an
obvious non sequitur. Even the Amended Information, on its
face, cannot admit such a construction.
First, it bears noting that the Amended Information named the
co-conspirators of former President Estrada individually and
separately in each of the four predicate offenses. Paragraph (a)
named petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, "Atong" Ang, Yolanda
T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, John Does and Jane Does as co-
conspirators in the crime of bribery. Paragraph (b) named Alma
Alfaro, "Atong" Ang, Eleuterio Ramos Tan, Delia Rajas and
other John Does and Jane Does as co-conspirators in the crime
of malversation of public funds representing a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated to the Province of Ilocos
Sur. Paragraph (c) and (d) named John Does and Jane Does
as co-conspirators in the purchase of the Belle's shares and in
the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the amount of
P3,233,104,173.17 under the account name "Jose Velarde."
Is it logical to infer from the Amended Information the existence
of a single continuing conspiracy of plunder when the factual
recital thereof individually and separately named the co-
conspirators in each of the predicate offenses? I must reecho
my answer in G.R. No. 148965, i.e., an outright no. A single
agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one
conspiracy. By the same reasoning, multiple agreements to
commit separate crimes constitute multiple conspiracies. To
individually and separately name the co-conspirators in each of
the predicate offenses is to reveal the absence of a common
design. The explicit clustering of co-conspirators for each
predicate offense thwarts the majority's theory of a single
continuing conspiracy of plunder. It reveals a clear line
segregating each predicate offense from the other. Thus, the
act of one cannot be considered as the act of all.
Second, the allegation of conspiracy at the inception of the
Amended Information basically pertains to former President
Estrada as the common key figure in the four predicate
offenses. Allow me to quote the pertinent portion, thus:
"That during the period from June 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being
then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself
and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by
taking undue advantage of his official position, authority,
relationship, connection, or influence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven
million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three
pesos and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines through any or a combination or a
series of overt OR criminal acts, or similar schemes or means,
described as follows: x x x."
From the foregoing allegation, it can be reasonably construed
that former President Estrada conspired with all the accused in
committing the four predicate offenses. However, whether his
co-accused conspired with him jointly or individually for the
commission of all, or some or one of the predicate offenses is a
question that may be answered only after a reading of the entire
Amended Information. I note with particularity the phrase in the
Amended Information stating, "by himself and/or14 in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." The phrase
indicates that former President Estrada did not, in all instances,
act in connivance with the other accused. At times, he acted
alone. Consequently, as alleged in the succeeding paragraphs
(a), (b), (c) and (d), his co-accused conspired with him
individually and not jointly. Petitioner Serapio cannot therefore
be associated with the former President in all the latter's alleged
criminal activities.
Of course, I cannot ignore the use of the phrase "on several
instances" and "aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00" in
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. At first glance, this
may be construed as attributing to petitioner Serapio a
"combination or series of overt act." However, a reading of the
Amended Information, in its entirety, readily reveals that the said
phrases pertain to former President Estrada, the principal
accused in the case. Allegedly, the former President, on several
instances, received or collected an aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00, more or less from illegal gambling in the form
of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit "by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie "Atong" Ang, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, petitioner Serapio and John Does and Jane Does. We
have already explained the implication of the phrase "by himself
and/or in connivance." Consequently, the acts committed by
former President Estrada on the several instances referred to
cannot automatically be attributed to petitioner.
Third, petitioner's criminal intent to advance the unlawful object
of the conspiracy (plunder) is not sufficiently alleged in the
factual recitals of the Amended Information. Corollarily, the
intent required is the intent to advance or further the unlawful
object of the conspiracy.15 This means that so far as the relevant
circumstances are concerned, both parties to the agreement
must have mens rea.16 There is no conspiracy to commit a
particular crime unless the parties to the agreement intend that
the consequences, which are ingredients of that crime, shall be
caused.17 In the present case, while there is an allegation that
former President Estrada "willfully, unlawfully and
18
criminally" amassed ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17, none is mentioned with regard to
petitioner. There is nothing in the Amended Information that
suggests whether or not petitioner has the mens rea to engage
in the commission of the serious crime of plunder. Indeed, there
are no allegations that he "willfully, unlawfully or criminally"
joined with the rest of the accused to amass ill-gotten wealth.
This renders the Amended Information fatally defective with
respect to petitioner. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent: these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity.19 Imperatively, an information charging that a
defendant conspired to commit an offense must allege that the
defendant agreed with one or more persons to commit the
offense.20
And fourth, the statement in the accusatory portion of the
Amended Information cumulatively charging all the accused of
the crime of Plunder cannot be given much weight in
determining the nature of the offense charged. It is a
jurisprudentially-embedded rule that what determines the
"nature and cause of accusation" against an accused is the
crime described by the facts stated in the information or
complaint and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble
thereof.21 In the recent En Banc ruling in Lacson vs. Executive
Secretary,22 citing the 1954 case of People vs.
Cosare23 and People vs. Mendoza,24 this Court held:
"The factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information."25
Thus, in the event that the appellation of the crime charged, as
determined by the public prosecutor, does not exactly
correspond to the actual crime constituted by the criminal acts
described in the information to have been committed by the
accused, what controls is the description of the said criminal
acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the
public prosecutor.26
There is a caveat that an information under the broad language
of a general conspiracy statute must be scrutinized carefully as
to each of the charged defendants because of the possibility,
inherent in a criminal conspiracy charge, that its wide net may
ensnare the innocent as well as the culpable.27
Let it be stressed that guilt should remain individual and
personal, even as respect conspiracies. It is not a matter of
mass application. There are times when of necessity, because
of the nature and scope of a particular federation, large numbers
of persons taking part must be tried by their conduct. The
proceeding calls for the use of every safeguard to individualize
each accused in relation to the mass. Criminal they may be, but
it is not the criminality of mass conspiracy. They do not invite
mass trial by their conduct. True, this may be inconvenient for
the prosecution. But the government is not one of mere
convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake with every citizen,
in his being afforded the individual protections, including those
surrounding criminal trials.28 The shot-gun approach of a
conspiracy charge could amount to a prosecution for general
criminality resulting in a finding of guilt by association. The
courts should, at all times, guard against this possibility so that
the constitutional rights of an individual are not curbed or
clouded by the web of circumstances involved in a conspiracy
charge.29
Corollarily, petitioner prays in G.R. No. 148468 for this Court to
issue a writ of habeas corpus. The Amended Information being
fatally defective, it is imperative that petitioner be dropped from
the Amended Information and proceeded against under a new
one charging the proper offense. In the absence of a standing
case against him, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is in
order."30

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. No.

148769 and G.R. No. 148468.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
O. MANCAO, petitioners, MENDOZA, respondents.
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents. MELO, J.:

---------------------------------------- On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an

"angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001 weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting
and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the
vs. National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
AL., respondents. Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
---------------------------------------- leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter
effected.
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality
vs. to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO before the Court –
VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents. (1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance
---------------------------------------- of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino,
and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,
prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
vs.
corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO
Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition
and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G.
R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political
party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as
having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6,
2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly,
the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless
arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a
particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the
"rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions
to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement
Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint
Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice
Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which
means that preliminary investigations will
henceforth be conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No.
147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No.
147810, p. 24)
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to
warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion,
as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson
Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799
(Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the
extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an
individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in
his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to
determine whether or not he should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject
of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be
held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should
the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can
charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is
without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the
arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily,
petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail
themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition
and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65,
Rules of Court).1âwphi1.nêt
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations
likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest,
petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the informations against
petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is
finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering that
as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against
any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the
same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court,
for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly
issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders
issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to
be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of
the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not
even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future.
The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in
support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its
purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-
an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-
Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to
petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to
the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not
issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award
(Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time,
petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in
imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of
fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will
not be arrested without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147799
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against
Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary
which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or
interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion…" Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed
forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of textual standards that the court may use
to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at
such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might
 decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces
may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-
Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no
longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-
in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of
the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v.
Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus,
it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is
it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime
of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the
party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose
legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is
invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief
affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1],
Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the
Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and
147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without
the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to
or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, separate opinion.
Kapunan, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., on leave. constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be
fully addressed.

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR
O. MANCAO, petitioners, O. MANCAO, petitioners,
vs. vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents. BERROYA, respondents.

---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001 G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs. vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET
AL., respondents. AL., respondents.

SEPARATE OPINION ----------------------------------------

VITUG, J.: G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
warrantless arrests for acts related to, or connected with, vs.
the May 1st incident but respectfully dissent from the order SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO
of dismissal of the petitions for being said to be moot and VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
academic. The petitions have raised important P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO
PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
characterized as belonging "in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms."
Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search
and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked
among a people know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear
where homes, persons and possessions are subject at
any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the
police.1
Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar O.
Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction from the Court against their impending warrantless
arrests upon order of the Secretary of Justice.2 Petitioner Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to enjoin the
arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely, Senator Juan
Ponce-Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan and General Panfilo Lacson.3 Separate
petitioners were also filed by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile.4 Former Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda,5 Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago,6 Senator Gregorio B.
Honasan, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
7
Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition
leaders and police officers stems from the following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was
arrested upon the warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan in
connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him.
Several hundreds of policemen were deployed to effect his
arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's supporters, who
were then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills
Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A skirmish ensued
between them and the police. The police had to employ batons
and water hoses to control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada
rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada
and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then
brought to Camp Crame where, with full media coverage, their
fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.
Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at
the EDSA Shrine to show its support for the deposed President.
Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial
candidates including petitioner Lacson, as well as other political
personalities, spoke before the crowd during these rallies.
In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son
were brought to the Veterans memorial Medical Center for a
medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would
be transferred to Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided
to march to Malacañang Palace. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to guard the premises of the presidential
residence. The marchers were able to penetrate the barricades
put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and
were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañan. As they were being
dispersed with warning shots, tear gas and water canons, the
rallyists hurled stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted.
Scores of people, including some policemen, were hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been
dispersed, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila:
Presidential Proclamation No. 38
DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones
and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the
mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed
groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting
upon the instigation and under the command and
direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into
Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing
the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize
power, and have and continue to rise publicly, shown
open hostility, and take up arms against the duly
constituted Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and to deprive the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her
powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing
crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have
continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to
overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize
political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress
the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law
hereby recognize and confirm the existence of an actual
and on-going rebellion compelling me to declare a state
of rebellion;
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO.
1 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution calling upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National police to
suppress and quell the rebellion.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
The President likewise issued General Order No. 1
which reads:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 1
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPIENS AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones
and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the
mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed
groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting
upon the instigation and under the command and
direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into
Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing
the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize
political power, and have and continue to rise publicly,
show open hostility, and take up arms against the duly
constituted Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and
prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of
rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have
continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to
overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize
political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress
the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under
the Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 38,
dated May 1, 2001, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine national
police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the
opposition were ordered arrested. Senator Enrile was arrested
without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Likewise arrested without warrant the following day was former
Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. Senator Honasan and Gen.
Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so
far failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda was
temporarily released upon recognizance while Senator Ponce
Enrile was ordered released by the Court on cash bond.
The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether
the arrest or impending arrest without warrant, pursuant to a
declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President of the above-
mentioned persons and unnamed other persons similarly
situated suspected of having committed rebellion is illegal,
being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the
Bill of Rights under the Constitution.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the
power to call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless
violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion.9 In the latter two cases,
i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety
requires, also (a) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state
of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion).
The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is
vague and amorphous and does not give the President more
power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As
Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such
a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term
means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected
rights, such as the right to due process,10 the rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances,11 and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures,12 among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the
Court held that:
x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on
one hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the
write of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the
other hand) places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the three powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
xxx
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in
using the "calling out" power because it is considered as
the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of
which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in
appropriate cases, review by this Court.
On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" is to arrest persons without warrant and
detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional
safeguards for the citizens' civil liberties, the so-called "state of
rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law without declaring
on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye so as to practically make it unjust and
oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution.14 In an
ironic sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to
effect warrantless arrest and detention for an unbailable offense
places a heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the
declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in
safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for
martial law or suspension is limited to a period not exceeding
sixty day; (2) The President is mandated to submit a report to
Congress within forty-eight hours from the proclamation or
suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to
review by Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or
suspension. If Congress is not in session, it shall convene in 24
hours without need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof or its extension is subject to review by the
Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding.15
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty.
Without these rights, all other individual rights may not exist.
Thus, the very first section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights,
Article III, reads:
 SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially
against government impairment, Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the
President or any person acting under her direction to make
unwarranted arrests. The existence of "lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion" only authorizes the President to call out
the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the declaration of martial law authorizes the President
to order the arrest of any person. The only significant
consequence of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby the
detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself
authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even
then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the
following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration
of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation
that it exists, and that the armed forces may be called to prevent
or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration does not
justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant
issued by a court. In very circumscribed instances, however, the
Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113
provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A police
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
xxx
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the
constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights that a person
may only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest
issued by a "judge" after determining "personally" the existence
of "probable cause" after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its
requirements should, therefore, be scrupulously met:
The right of a person to be secure against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal
liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and
so deserving of full protection.16
A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had
facts and circumstances before him which, had they been
before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of
probable cause of the commission of an offense and that the
person arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense.
That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when
arrested, the person "arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" in the
presence of the arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense
which had "just been committed," that the police officer making
the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it."
Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without
warrant for acts of rebellion ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule
113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17 where
this Court held:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assault against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.18
Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a
person who "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit" rebellion and may be arrested without a
warrant at any time so long as the rebellion persists.
Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein,
although effected a day or days after the commission of the
violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court
because at the time of their respective arrests, they were
members of organizations such as the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United
Front Commission, then outlawed groups under the Anti-
Subversion Act. Their mere membership in said illegal
organizations amounted to committing the offense of
subversion19 which justified their arrests without warrants.
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be
arrested for their alleged participation in the "rebellion" on May
1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to
overthrow the government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing that the
persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit the offense of
rebellion.20 In other words, there must be an overt act
constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the
arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21 the term" in his
[the arresting officer's] presence" was defined thus:
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or
within the view of an arresting officer or private citizen
when such officer or person sees the offense, even
though at a distance, or hears the disturbance created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; or
the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated,
at the time the arrest is made.22
This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest
of Senator Enrile. In the Court's Resolution of May 5, 2001 in
the petition for habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court
noted that the sworn statements of the policemen who
purportedly arrested him were hearsay.23 Senator Enrile was
arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious
speeches. Consequently, his arrest without warrant cannot be
justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest without a
warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been
committed and the arresting officer or private person has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person arrested has committed the
offense.
At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being
inapplicable to the cases at bar, Umil is not without any strong
dissents. It merely re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case
decided during the Marcos martial law regime.25 It cannot apply
when the country is supposed to be under the regime of
freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the following
Justices in the motion for reconsideration of said
case26 are apropos:
FERNAN C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the
arresting officers are not sure what particular provision
of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it
is that law enforcement agents and even prosecutors
are not all adept at the law. However, erroneous
perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks,
especially if it would result in the violation of any right of
a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person
has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the
merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was exercising a right
which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law,
is beside the point. No person should be subjected to
the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers
wrongly perceived his action.27 (Underscoring supplied)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion
Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint the other
dissenting Justices in their observations regarding
"continuing offenses." To base warrantless arrests on
the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for
the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.
Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses
where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy
or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has
convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found
roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person
is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a
personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel
and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The
grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If
warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be
Congress and not this Court which should draw strict
and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who
are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately
lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the
Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how
well-grounded on past events, that the petitioner would
probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet
does not validate warrantless arrests. I cannot
understand why the authorities preferred to bide their
time, await the petitioner's surfacing from underground,
and ounce on him with no legal authority instead of
securing warrants of arrest for his
apprehension.28 (Underscoring supplied)
CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-
Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the
cases before us is a step back to that shameful past
when individual rights were wantonly and systematically
violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seem some of us
have short memories of that repressive regime, but I for
one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate
defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss
over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal,
would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of
national security. Whatever their ideology and even if it
be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than
any other person in this country. That is what democracy
is all about.29 (Underscoring supplied)
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of
"continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence,
cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest.
Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the
elements of the offense charged are shown to have
been committed by the person arrested without warrant,
the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to
dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed
elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person
arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The
capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the
"continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased
where the crime charged does not consist of
unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and
end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding
of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson)
but rather or such problematic offenses as membership
in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a
subversive association or organization. For in such
cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral
in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization
involved. Note, for instance, the following acts which
constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any
subversive association:"
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book
or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other
document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such or
association or organization in any form whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or
organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other
forms;
xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such
association or organization in furtherance of any plan or
enterprise thereof;
xxx
g) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or
any other type of publication to promote the objectives
and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx
k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning
action, objectives, or purposes of such association or
organization.
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the
constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and
seizures makes the law enforcement work of police
agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's
function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not
designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather
to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police
forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of
the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which
themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise
they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer
ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which
make our policy worth protecting and
saving.30 (Underscoring supplied)
It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the
fateful day of May 1, 2001 up to the present. If respondents have
ample evidence against petitioners, then they should forthwith
file the necessary criminal complaints in order that the regular
procedure can be followed and the warrants of arrest issued by
the courts in the normal course. When practicable, resort to the
warrant process is always to be preferred because "it interposes
an orderly procedure involving 'judicial impartiality' whereby a
neutral and detached magistrate can make informed and
deliberate determinations on the issue of probable cause."31
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are
supposed to possess is precisely the reason the framers of the
1987 Constitution have reposed upon them alone the power to
issue warrants of arrest. To vest the same to a branch of
government, which is also charged with prosecutorial powers,
would make such branch the accused's adversary and accuser,
his judge and jury.32
A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of
its burden of proving probable cause. The declaration does not
constitute a substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the
courts, which must still judge for itself the existence of probable
cause. Under Section 18, Article VII, the determination of the
existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of proclaiming
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus rests for which the President is granted ample,
though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the
determination of probable cause is a purely legal question of
which courts are the final arbiters.
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have
announced that the lifting of the "state of rebellion" on May 7,
2001 does not stop the police from making warrantless
arrests.33 If this is so, the pernicious effects of the declaration
on the people's civil liberties have not abated despite the lifting
thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or who
prepared the list of those to be arrested for alleged complicity in
the "continuing" crime of "rebellion" defined as such by
executive fiat. The list of the perceived leaders, financiers and
supporters of the "rebellion" to be arrested and incarcerated
could expand depending on the appreciation of the police. The
coverage and duration of effectivity of the orders of arrest are
thus so open-ended and limitless as to place in constant and
continuing peril the people's Bill of Rights. It is of no small
significance that four of he petitioners are opposition candidates
for the Senate. Their campaign activities have been to a large
extent immobilized. If the arrests and orders of arrest against
them are illegal, then their Constitutional right to seek public
office, as well as the right of he people to choose their officials,
is violated.
(1) Give DUE COURSE to and GRANT the petitions;
(2) Declare as NULL and VOID the orders of arrest
issued against petitioners;
(3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining
respondents, their agents and all other persons acting
for and in their behalf from effecting warrantless arrests
against petitioners and all other persons similarly
situated on the basis of Proclamation No. 38 and
General Order No. 1 of the President.
SO ORDERED.

In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the

issues raised in these cases affecting as they do the basic
liberties of the citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it
behooves us to rule thereon now, instead of relegating the
cases to trial courts which unavoidably may come up with
conflicting dispositions, the same to reach this Court inevitably
for final ruling. As we aptly pronounced in Salonga vs. Cruz
Paño:34

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and

controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.

Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court,

considered the last bulwark of democracy, for relief. If we do not
act promptly, justly and fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?

WHEREFORE, I vote as follows:

[G.R. NO. 175864 : June 8, 2007]
ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, Petitioner, v. THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING
JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu
City, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the
instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained
in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), Regional Office VII, received information that
Adam was engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu
City and neighboring cities and municipalities. After evaluating
the information, Police Chief Inspector Josefino Ligan, PDEA
VII Asst. Regional Director for Administration/Operation,
together with FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao,
planned an entrapment operation.
The events leading to the arrest of Adam, as summarized in the
Resolution of the Department of Justice dated November 10,
2006, are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, at about 2:00 P.M., Yap and Tuliao were able
to contact the informant and inquired from him if he was really
sincere with his words and the latter replied affirmatively. Ligan
immediately composed a team and planned for an entrapment
operation against respondent and her cohorts. A short briefing
was conducted where Yap was tasked to receive the shabu
while Tuliao would be the back up and at the same time the
arresting officer. They prepared a Pre-Operation Report and the
same was coordinated with the Tactical Operation Center of
Cebu City Police Office. The pre-arranged signal in the
operation was that Yap would miscall them once the transaction
is consummated. x x x
On or about 9:30 P.M. of the same day, the team, including Yap,
Tuliao and the informant, proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu
City for the said purpose. Upon arrival thereat, Yap and the
informant proceeded to Pizza Hut while Tuliao stayed behind
near the parking area and so with the members of the team
closely watching them. When Yap and the informant entered
Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting for them. They
immediately approached her and the informant introduced Yap
to respondent as his former customer. They had a short
conversation and Yap asked respondent if she has with her the
item. Respondent told him that it is in her car at the parking area.
Respondent asked where the money is. Yap told her no problem
as long as she has the item, he will give her the money.
Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking area so
that she could give it to him and there, she got inside her car.
She took the shabu inside the compartment of her Toyota
Fortuner with plate number YCX 965 and handed to him one (1)
packed medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
filled with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Upon receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it
was really shabu or not and when he noticed that it was shabu,
he immediately miscalled the members of the team informing
them that the transaction was consummated and subsequently
held respondent. He then introduced himself as PDEA 7
operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car, assisted
Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering and
transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed her that she
is under arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and
likewise apprised her of the Miranda Doctrine in the language
she knew and understood but she opted to remain silent. After
which, they asked her name and she introduced herself as
Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married, businesswoman
and a resident of Celiron, Iligan City. They brought her along
with the confiscated items to their office for proper disposition.
Later on, they found out that the item that Yap bought from
respondent, marked "LA" dated 07-07-06 with Yap's signature,
weighing 50.27 grams which was submitted before the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, yielded positive results
for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu,
a dangerous drug.
Respondent denies the charge against her. She claims that she
is a trader of ready to wear clothing. As such, she frequently
travels to different Asian countries to buy goods for sale in Cebu
and in Mindanao. She supplies various boutiques in Cebu City,
including Salad Dressing at SM, D. Blaz., Beauty Land and
Lovely's Closet. She also operates a beauty parlor in Talamban.
Respondent claims that on July 7, 2006, at around 10:00 in the
evening, she was at Pizza Hut, Fuente Osmeña Boulevard,
together with her four children and their "yayas". A friend of
hers, Ana, had called her earlier in the day saying that she
would pay off her loan to her (respondent) at Pizza Hut that
evening. Ana arrived a short time later. They were eating when
Ana received a call over her cellphone. From the gist of it, Ana
was talking to a certain Rose. Respondent did not mind them
because the conversation was only between Ana and Rose. A
short time later, a woman, who was introduced to her by Ana as
a certain Rose, arrived. Ana and Rose then proceeded to talk
with each other, and respondent did not mind them. A while
after, respondent saw Ana hand over a parcel to Rose, and the
latter, on the other hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then
left. As respondent was about to leave, Ana requested that she
be allowed to hitch a ride and respondent agreed. When they
were outside, respondent noticed a vehicle blocking her car,
making it impossible for her to back out into the road, without
hitting the car. She then beeped her car. Instead of moving their
car, one of the men went down and thereafter, entered her
vehicle and demanded for the bag that was allegedly given to
Ana by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana since they
claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men pointed their
guns at respondent, including her children, claiming that they
were elements of PDEA and they were placing her under arrest
for illegal drug trafficking. They then grabbed respondent's
green bag and from then on, she was never able to recover the
contents thereof, including the bag itself. Thereafter,
respondent was brought to the PDEA office where a certain
Ryan Rubi was also booked for alleged drug trafficking. During
her conversation with Ryan Rubi, she found out that he was
arrested a few hours earlier likewise by the PDEA, and during
his alleged arrest, he was required to produce a drug trafficker
in exchange for his release. Having been unable to produce
any, he was charged. The name of Rose cropped up, and he
said that during his arrest, the police officers informed him that
they were after Rose. His wife was out to raise money for his
release, or to produce a drug trafficker so that he can be
released. It was further ascertained by Ryan Rubi that this Rose
was actually arrested by the police officers but was conditionally
released on condition that she would produce someone who
would take her place. Thereafter, he claimed that he overheard
them refer to a certain Ana, who said that she would also
produce respondent to take her place. The circumstances of
respondent's arrest and that of the said Ryan Rubi are closely
intertwined. In the police blotter, the vehicle pertaining to
respondent, which is the Toyota Fortuner was ascribed to Ryan
Rubi, while the latter's vehicle was ascribed to her. x x x1
The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case
but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an
information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2
of R.A. No. 9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-77562 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 58.
On Petition for Review before the Department of Justice,
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold
Adam liable for the offense charged, to wit:
A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the records, particularly
the affidavit of arrest, reveals that no payment was ever made
by the police officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust
operations. The police officers have not even alleged in their
affidavits that payment was made to respondent in exchange for
the shabu. No buy-bust money was ever presented. The
certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust money.
These stick out like a sore thumb in the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements to be
established in the prosecution of the drug "buy-bust" cases, that
is, "the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore" is
wanting. It was aptly said in the case of People v. Alilin, 206
SCRA 773, that: "To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited
drugs, the same must be clearly and unmistakably
established."2
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
to withdraw the information.3 PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on
December 8, 2006.4
In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, stated that at the
hearing of the motion to withdraw information on January 5,
2007, it was found that:
In the affidavit of FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao,
there is indeed no mention of their preparation of a buy bust
money before, during or after their briefing prior to the alleged
buy bust operation, nor is there any mention of the price or
consideration of the sale. What is merely stated is that they had
enough money.
xxx
Further convincing this court that there was no buy bust money
prepared are the following:
a) In the "Pre-Operation Report" dated July 7, 2006, bearing
Control Number 07-07-2006-03, there is no mention of the buy-
bust money in the operational requirements;
b) In the "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same date and entry number
02422;
c) In another "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same date and entry number
02422 there is a mention in "Facts of the Case" the recovery of
"3 bundles of boodle money with two (2) pieces of genuine five
hundred peso bills wrapped with newspaper and packed with
packaging tape." However, while the name of the suspect is
indicated in this excerpt is Lovely Adam y Impal and the
evidence enumerated are as follows:
1) one (1) medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
filled with crystalline substance believed to be shabu;
2) one (1) unit Nokia cellphone;
3) one (1) unit Toyota Fortuner with plate number XCX 956
registered under the name of Lovely Adam;"
the narration of the facts of the case in said excerpt also
included the following statement: "Likewise, the apprehending
officers seized one (1) unit cellular phone (Sony Erickson) and
the Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number GHC color black
registered under the name of Roberto Rubi, which was used by
the aforementioned suspects in transporting illegal drugs."
This Roberto Rubi could not have been arrested together with
accused herein because there is no mention of such fact in the
Affidavit of Officers Yap and Tuliao.
In fact, the head of the arresting team of herein accused
Josefino D. Liga[n] filed a Motion to Withdraw Said Excerpt
because there was an inadvertent interchange of facts in
another case obviously against Mr. Rubi.
The problem, however, is that from the Excerpts presented, it is
not clear to this court to which case the mention of boodle
money applies. This court cannot merely assume or conclude
that the boodle money has reference to the case of herein
accused because as stated, nowhere in the separate affidavits
of office[r]s Tuliao and Yap can one find any mention of such. It
is not even mentioned in the other "Excerpt" also dated July 10,
2006 also submitted by the PDEA.5
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime
charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the
release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another valid
ground. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Accordingly, the "Motion to Withdraw Information" is hereby
GRANTED and the accused is ordered immediately released
unless another valid ground exists for her continued detention.
The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is ordered to turn over to this
court within three (3) days from receipt hereof the dangerous
drug described in the information which shall in turn be
confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition unless the
prosecution intends to refile or file another case against the
accused which it deems appropriate as double jeopardy has not
attached.
SO ORDERED.6
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve
a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function
of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic
freedom of physical liberty.7
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released
upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore,
the petition has become moot.8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY
PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO
WYCOCO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot
be inquired into through habeas corpus.
Antecedents
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging
petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa
in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the
others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers
in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application the private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a
preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining
Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge
Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her
cohorts without bail.2 On the next day, the entire records of the
cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings
and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.3
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and
detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary
investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he
issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant
of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior
finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals
(CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from
detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas
corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a
motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest
considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the
entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no
authority to lift or recall the warrant.5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA
denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit,
explaining:
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort
to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if
petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is
allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not a petition for
habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a
petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal Judge
or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the Municipal Judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation shall transmit his resolution, together
with the record of the case, including the warrant of arrest, to
the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same and order
the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause
is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy available to
petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion
to be released from detention on the grounds alleged in the
instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her
petition for habeas corpus,8 but the CA denied the motion on
November 19, 2003.9
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised
as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court
discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement
of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure
freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that
court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended
as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place
of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and
void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides
for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should
not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial
must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before
resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are
extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of
law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be
preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities,
which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for
relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is
not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a
proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having
the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that
the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his
statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the
only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question
to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive
the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of
liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of
right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by
proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only
object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-
settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person
in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record.12
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were
lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16,
2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving
"all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations.
– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall
include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of
arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting
its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers that a probable cause
existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge
Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her
cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s
petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and
detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge
Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal
authority to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the
MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations
was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of
the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas
corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the
restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired
into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by
Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have
the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court
of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful
authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who
has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not
extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by
which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face.
It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states:
Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly
committed by Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the
Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant
of arrest because of its having been issued without an
exhaustive examination of the complainants and the witnesses
in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable
cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its
issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were
enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.14
Mangila fails to persuade.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after
examining Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila
and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against
her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes
from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of
the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas costs of suit.
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could
assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that SO ORDERED.
there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional
rights.15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the

issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating
judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the
existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time
constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for
that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the
release of the detainee if no probable cause should beultimately
found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no
need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure
her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring
the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her
arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been
meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of
the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for
appropriate action.17 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the
writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
another available remedy.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions

promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003 in
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE
MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for injunctive relief seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 17,
2013 as well as its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 123759. In the main, petitioner questions the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 in Caloocan
City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and decide a special civil action
for habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor residing
in Quezon City.
The Facts
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed
before the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas
corpus, docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In
the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina
Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent's
biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to
return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent
indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where
she can be served with summons and other court processes, to
wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan
City; (2) 118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office
at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor,
Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue
cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a
writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to
court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several
attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally
serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of
the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of
the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as
witnessed by respondent’s counsel and barangay
officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the
scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for
Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC,
Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground
of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011,
respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office
of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her
counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s
motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to the
pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-Caloocan.4
The falloof the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is
hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the case is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte
issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-
Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8,
2011. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the
alias writ upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10, 2011.6 In compliance,
the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as well
as the Alias Writ during the preliminary investigation of the
kidnapping case.7
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special
appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed
before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus
petition,8 claiming, among others, that she was not personally
served with summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner,
jurisdiction over her and Criselda’sperson was not acquired by
the RTCCaloocan.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order
denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen.
Cruz,9 where the Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being
an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and
action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in
ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the Court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as
petitioner herein.10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily
require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s given
address, for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she
may be found for as long as she was handed a copy of the court
process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the
sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a copy of the writ,
albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired
jurisdiction over her person.11 The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion
(Motion to Quash Alias Writ; Motion to Dismiss)filed by
respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante dated August 11, 2011
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is
hereby directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez Cada
before this Court on February 10, 2012 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the
issued Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May
17, 2013,13 dismissed the petition for certiorari in the following
wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 of Caloocan
City is DIRECTED to proceed with due dispatch in Spec. Proc.
Case No. C-4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving utmost
consideration tothe best interest of the now nearly 14-year old
child.
SO ORDERED.14
In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when
respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the
designated Family Court in Caloocan City.15 It also relied on the
certification issued by the punong barangay of Brgy. 179,
Caloocan City, stating that petitioner is a bona fide resident
thereof, as well as the medical certificate issued by Criselda’s
doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her address is "Amparo
Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the
appellate court ruled that service of summons is not required
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as
the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on
summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place
in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being
a special proceeding.17
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 27, 2013
Resolution.1âwphi1
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the
RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeascorpus petition
filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or
not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person
of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ
issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was
served a copy thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took
cognizance of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served
with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
proceeding
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the
case, petitioner relies on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and
maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have been
filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place
of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be
found.18 As to respondent, she asserts, among others, that the
applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC.19
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As
provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the
absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family
Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts
in places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be
enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on
custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof,
issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.
(emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial
region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs within the judicial
region where enforcement thereof is sought.21
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
finds relevance. Said provision, which contains the enumeration
of judicial regions in the country, states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are
hereby created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each of
the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa,
and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper
as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National
Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family
court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City
both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals
that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody
of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found.
(emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to
begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions,
in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent.22
In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues
raised.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated May 1 7, 2013 and its Resolution dated
December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY
JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of
liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is
not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of
Appeals Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting
Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan
Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in
Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, .
. . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca,
Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts
of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained
that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police
"pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang
Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19,
2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not
arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo
and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his
departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then
detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he
was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made
him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the
Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he
is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of
Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning
the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He
maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of
Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ
returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of
Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to
file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing
and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set
on September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail
Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden,
however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He
also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to
September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the
Writ. However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the
Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr.,
Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante,
Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office of
the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled.
The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1,
2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant
Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the
Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed.
Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer
availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information,
Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by
the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day
of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to
order his release from detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially
charged"29 under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest
against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled,
was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a
court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the
Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not
been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31 A
Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name
"Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he]
was out of the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December
19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification34 from
Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure from and
arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued
by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines
Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court
granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his
immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its
Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found
that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made
under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even
assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in
the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that
"[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper
remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of
Appeals denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the
Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of
Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a
Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S.
Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the
Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not
duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his
liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in
appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the
Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to
hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's
Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly
filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo
was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of
a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:

First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second,
whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
I First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden
correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made
through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in
instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or
any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ
and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that
which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ
designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable,
the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas
corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s]
the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition
for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is
a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus
was filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B.
Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court
made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of
Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the
Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of
virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely
delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final
say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this
court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic
is more apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior
court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only
resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show
cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the
petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her
liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court,
the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are
devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas
corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior
court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed
before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the
merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for
Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from
detention.68

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal
before the Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court
of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme
Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court,"
citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus,
"acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of
the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was
appealable to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court
then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the
Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court
"acquired the power and authority to determine the merits"74 of
petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for
Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court,
not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the
court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before
the Court of Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus
"was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom."77 The remedy of
habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature,
consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally
protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and
deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other
processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario
Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol),
Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and
Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their
respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
were serving their sentences, this court promulgated People v.
Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion
with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol,
Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and
argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to
them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua,
and Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas
corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to
cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure
that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board
of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The
Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native
habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-
hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution,
Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao
reservation were imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on
behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the
reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the
Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio
v. Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of
Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex
workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded
up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were
expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their
consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported
women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return
of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a
Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for
failure to make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his
acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally
deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty,
specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the
women, "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by
the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on
the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that
commands the production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the
final decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the
petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is
essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy
judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty.
Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the
petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of
merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the
public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be
suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued
if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint then has
become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty.
Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order
allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan
Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's
arrest,115 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao
Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was
detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty.
Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp
Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on
an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano,
the military informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos
Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty.
Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the
military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested
based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria,
Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal
Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a
Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required
Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of
Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos),
and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue
(General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This
court set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General
Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers,
according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered
the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar
on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar,
however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-
Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an
Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for
rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for
Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal
Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion.
According to them, no preliminary investigation was conducted
before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar were deprived of their right to due process.
Consequently, the Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling
that it became moot and academic with the filing of the
Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in
court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense,
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration
is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer
lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus
in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato
Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias
Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a
warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings,
however, Informations against them were filed before this
court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court,
rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic,
thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against
the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the
extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash
the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a
motion to quash complaint or information based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of
a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."136 If the accused
avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
"hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the
information are not to be
considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or
information]."139 If the motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not
constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution
"an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after
amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case.
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a
lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived
of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of
the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged
and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo,
of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without
a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be
made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on- personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before
the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove
that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest
petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his
right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition
for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty.
Risonar in the "disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner
Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and
contest any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty.
Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting
opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the
lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar,
together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due
process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for
habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information
without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of
Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The
fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The
petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a
warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative
PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be
rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA
and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very
issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and
necessity as declared by the President himself. The majority
decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes
arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who
witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of
committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a
citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto
violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the
rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense
"has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in
point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an
offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of
just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has
committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information
could not just be filed against the petitioners without due
process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for
filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged
could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of
the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo"
will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of
preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of
Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and
Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is
evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person
named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine
passport,148 his identification card from the Office on Muslim
Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance
from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his
picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."
None of these government-issued documents showed that
petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in
the country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao
Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7,
2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20,
2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi
Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that
he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines
SV870 on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is
probably the most complex case pending in our courts. The
case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which
have become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014,
111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed
petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To
require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further
illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we
resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that
he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging
neither his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen
who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty
without due process of law and the government that has all the
"manpower and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly
indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the
citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo,
it must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in
our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally
deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
granted.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19,
2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden,
Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan
Maiang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the

case to this court is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles
G.R. No. 231671
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
RENE B. GOROSPE, and SENATOR LEILA M. DE
LIMA, Petitioners
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by Senate
President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, as represented by House Speaker
Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231694
FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TANADA, BISHOP
EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, BISHOP
BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO.
ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH BULANGIS and
CASSANDRA D. DELURIA, Petitioners,
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE
SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, President, Senate of the
Philippines, and PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, Speaker,
House of the Representatives, Respondents
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially
assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent Congress of the
Philippines (the Congress), composed of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, to convene in joint session and
therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23,
201 7 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte).
Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a
state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not
e:xceeding sixty (60) days effective from the date of the
proclamation's issuance.
In the Petition for Mandamus of Alex.antler A. Padilla (Padilla),
Rene A.V. Saguisag (Saguisag), Christian S. Monsod
(Monsod), Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Rosales), Rene B.
Gorospe (Gorospe), and Senator Leila M. De Lima (Senator
De Lima), filed on June 6, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No.
231671 (the Padilla Petition), petitioners seek a ruling from the
Court directing the Congress to convene in joint session to
deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216, and to vote
thereon.1
In the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator
Wigberto E. Tanada (Tanada), Bishop Emeritus Deogracias
Iniguez (Bishop Iniguez), Bishop Broderick Pabillo (Bishop
Pabillo ), Bishop Antonio Tobias (Bishop Tobias), Mo.
Adelaida Ygrubay (Mo. Y grubay), Shamah Bulangis
(Bulangis), and Cassandra D. Deluria (Deluria), filed on June
7, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231694 (the Tañada
Petition), petitioners entreat the Court to: (a) declare the
refusal of the Congress to convene in joint session for the
purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216 to be in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ of mandamus directing the
Congress to convene in joint session for the aforementioned
purpose.2
Respondent Congress, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Consolidated Comment on
June 27, 2017. Respondents Senate of the Philippines and
Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senate
President Pimentel), through the Office of the Senate Legal
Counsel, separately filed their Consolidated Comment (Ex
Abudanti Cautela) on June 29, 2017.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of
islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public
safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May
25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session, President
Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation No.
216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the Senate, through
Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives,
through House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (House Speaker
Alvarez).
According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his
Report to the Congress, the declaration of a state of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the series of
armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against
civilians and government authorities, institutions, and
establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute
terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and foreign
armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow lawless violence, terror,
and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate
purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province
in Mindanao.
Representatives from the Executive Department, the military,
and other security officials of the government were thereafter
invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House
of Representatives for a conference briefing regarding the
circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the
President's proclamation and report.
On May 29, 2017, the briefing before the Senate was
conducted, which lasted for about four (4) hours, by Secretary
of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenza (Secretary Lorenzana),
National Security Adviser and Director General of the National
Security Council Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. (Secretary
Esperon), and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) General Eduardo M. Afio (General Año).
The following day, May 30, 2017, the Senate deliberated on
these proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 388,3 which expressed support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No.
390,4 which called for the convening in joint session of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to deliberate on
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving
seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative
votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No.
495 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate
Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of
2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Whole of Mindanao.’"6
P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only
nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it as
opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were
against its approval and adoption.7
On May 31, 201 7, the House of Representatives, having
previously constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole
House,8 was briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C.
Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary
Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours.
After the closed-door briefing, the House of Representatives
resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House
Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full
Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo
Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No.
216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"9 The House of Representatives proceeded to
divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution
through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members
who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured
the majority vote.10
The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the
proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to
deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216. After the debates, however, the proposal was rejected.11
These series of events led to the filing of the present
consolidated petitions.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The Padilla Petition
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether
Congress is required to convene in joint session, deliberate,
and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the
Constitution" and submit the following arguments in support of
their petition:
[I] THE PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
[i] THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
[ii] PETITIONERS, AS PART OF THE PUBLIC AND AS
TAXPAYERS, POSSESS LEGAL STANDING TO FILE THIS
PETITION.
[iii] PETITIONER [DE LIMA], AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS,
HAS LEGAL STANDING TO FILE THIS PETITION.
[iv] THE CASE AND THE ISSUE INVOLVED ARE RIPE FOR
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
[II] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION,
SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS, AND CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT
SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE
DELIBERATIVE BODY.
[i] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES
THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[ii] THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS IS FOR
CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE
BODY.
[iii] THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMED IN FORTUN v.
GMA THAT CONGRESS HAS THE "AUTOMATIC DUTY" TO
CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[iv] LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT ALSO RECOGNIZES
CONGRESS' DUTY TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[III] THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT AS A SINGLE
DELIBERATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE VII, [SECTION] 18
OF THE CONSTITUTION IS A MANDATORY, MINISTERIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF CONGRESS, WHICH CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.12
Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy in
this instance and that their case is ripe for adjudication.
According to petitioners, the resolutions separately passed by
the Senate and the House of Representatives, which express
support as well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216, injure their rights "to a proper [and]
mandatory legislative review of the declaration of martial law"
and that the continuing failure of the Congress to convene in
joint session similarly causes a continuing injury to their
rights.13
Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they all
have locus standi in their "assertion of a public right" which
they have been deprived of when the Congress refused and/or
failed to convene in joint session to deliberate on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senator De Lima adds that
she, together with the other senators who voted in favor of the
resolution to convene the Congress jointly, were even
effectively denied the opportunity to perform their
constitutionally-mandated duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of
the Constitution, to deliberate on the said proclamation of the
President in a joint session of the Congress.14
On the propriety of resorting to the remedy
of mandamus, petitioners posit that ''the duty of Congress to
convene in joint session upon the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not require the exercise of discretion." Such
mandate upon the Congress is allegedly a purely ministerial
act which can be compelled through a writ of mandamus.15
As for the substantive issue, it is the primary contention of
petitioners that a plain reading of Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution shows that the Congress is required to convene in
joint session to review Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a
single deliberative body. The performance of the constitutional
obligation is allegedly mandatory, not discretionary.16
According to petitioners, the discretionary nature of the phrase
"may revoke such proclamation or suspension" under Article
VII, Section 18 of the Constitution allegedly pertain to the
power of the Congress to revoke but not to its obligation to
jointly convene and vote - which, they stress, is mandatory. To
require the Congress to convene only when it exercises the
power to revoke is purportedly absurd since the Congress,
without convening in joint session, cannot know beforehand
whether a majority vote in fact exists to effect a revocation.17
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 this
Court described the "duty" of the Congress to convene in joint
session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint
session when former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the
Congress clearly recognized its duty to convene in joint
session.19
The mandate upon the Congress to convene jointly is
allegedly intended by the 1986 Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to serve as a protection against potential abuses in
the exercise of the President's power to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is "a
mechanism purposely designed by the Constitution to compel
Congress to review the propriety of the President's action x x x
[and] meant to contain martial law powers within a democratic
framework for the preservation of democracy, prevention of
abuses, and protection of the people."20
The Tañada Petition
The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:
I. A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS
TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION THAT A JOINT
SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A DECLARATION
OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATORY.
II. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES
LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND INTERROGATORY
PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL LAW.
III. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES
THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN
WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF
MARTIAL LAW AND THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS
IMPLEMENTATION.
IV. THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED
THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS BE CONVENED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL
LAW.21
Similar to the contentions in the Padilla Petition, petitioners
maintain that they have sufficiently shown all the essential
requisites in order for this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review, in that: (1) an actual case or controversy exists; (2)
they possess the standing to file this case; (3) the
constitutionality of a governmental act has been raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutionality of the
said act is the very lis mota of the petition.
According to petitioners, there is an actual case or controversy
because the failure and/or refusal of the Congress to convene
jointly deprived legislators of a venue within which to raise a
motion for revocation (or even extension) of President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and the public of an
opportunity to be properly informed as to the bases and
particulars thereof.22
Petitioners likewise claim to have legal standing to sue as
citizens and taxpayers. Nonetheless, they submit that the
present case calls for the Court's liberality in the appreciation
of their locus standi given the fact that their petition presents "a
question of first impression - one of paramount importance to
the future of our democracy - as well as the extraordinary
nature of Martial Law itself."23
Petitioners contend that the convening of the Congress in joint
session, whenever the President declares martial law or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is a public
right and duty mandated by the Constitution. The writ
of mandamus is, thus, the "proper recourse for citizens who
seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance
of a public duty, especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution."24
For this group of petitioners, the Members of the Congress
gravely abused their discretion for their refusal to convene in
joint session, underscoring that "[w]hile a writ
of mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, or to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, this admits of certain
exceptions, such as in instances of gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority, when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy."25
As to the merits, petitioners assert that the convening of the
Congress in joint session after the declaration of martial law is
mandatory under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
whether or not the Congress is in session or there is intent to
revoke. It is their theory that a joint session should be a
deliberative process in which, after debate and discussion,
legislators can come to an informed decision as to the factual
and legal bases for the declaration of martial law. Moreover,
"legislators who wish to revoke the martial law proclamation
should have the right to put that vote on historical record in
joint session - and, in like manner, the public should have the
right to know the position of their legislators with respect to this
matter of the highest national interest."26
Petitioners add that a public, transparent, and deliberative
process is purportedly necessary to allay the people's fears
against "executive overreach." This concern allegedly cannot
be addressed by briefings in executive sessions given by
representatives of the Executive Branch to both Houses of the
Congress.27
Petitioners further postulate that, based on the deliberations of
the Members of the ConCom, the phrase "voting jointly" under
Article VII, Section 18 was intended to mean that a joint
session is a procedural requirement, necessary for the
Congress to decide whether to revoke, affirm, or even extend
the declaration of martial law.28
Consolidation of Respondents' Comments
Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on
their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or
extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.29 In the absence
of such duty, the non-convening of the Congress in joint
session does not pose any actual case or controversy that
may be the subject of judicial review.30 Additionally,
respondents argue that the petitions raise a political question
over which the Court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioners' avowal that they are citizens and taxpayers is
allegedly inadequate to clothe them with locus
standi. Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Petitioners must show that they have a direct and
personal interest in the Congress' failure to convene in joint
session, which they failed to present herein. A taxpayer's suit
is likewise proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of the Congress. However, in these
cases, the funds used in the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao are taken from those funds already appropriated by
the Congress. Senator De Lima's averment of her locus
standi as an incumbent member of the legislature similarly
lacks merit. Insofar as the powers of the Congress are not
impaired, there is no prejudice to each Member thereof; and
even assuming arguendo that the authority of the Congress is
indeed compromised, Senator De Lima still does not have
standing to file the present petition for mandamus because it is
not shown that she has been allowed to participate in the
Senate sessions during her incarceration. She cannot,
therefore, claim that she has suffered any direct injury from the
non-convening of the Congress in joint session.31
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to
information, as enshrined under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security
are considered as a valid exception to the right to information
of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's
right to participate in the deliberations of the Congress
regarding the factual basis of a martial law declaration may be
restricted in the interest of national security and public safety.32
Respondents allege that petitioners failed to present an
appropriate case for mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only
issue when the act to be compelled is a clear legal duty or a
ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or
respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station.33
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is
their ministerial duty to convene in joint session whenever
martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended in the absence of a clear and specific
constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18
does not use the words ''joint session" at all, much less impose
the convening of such joint session upon the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting
when the action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the
proclamation or suspension.34
Indeed, prior concurrence of the Congress is not
constitutionally required for the effectivity of the proclamation
or suspension. Quoting from the deliberations of the framers of
the Constitution pertaining to Article VII, Section 18, the
Congress points out that it was the intention of the said
framers to grant the President the power to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a
period not exceeding sixty (60) days without the concurrence
of the Congress. There is absolutely nothing under the
Constitution that mandates the Congress to convene in joint
session when their intention is merely to discuss, debate,
and/or review the factual and legal basis for the proclamation.
That is why the phrase "voting jointly" is limited only in case
the Congress intends to revoke the proclamation.35 In a
situation where the Congress is not in session, the
Constitution simply provides that the Congress must convene
in accordance with its rules but does not state that it must
convene in joint session. Respondents further refer to the
proper procedure for the holding of joint sessions.
Respondents brush aside as mere obiter dictum the Court's
pronouncement in the Fortun case that it is the duty of the
Congress to convene upon the declaration of martial law. That
whether or not the Congress should convene in joint session in
instances where it is not revoking the proclamation was not an
issue in that case. Moreover, the factual circumstances in
the Fortun case are entirely different from the present cases.
The Congress then issued a concurrent resolution calling for
the convening of a joint session as the intention - at least as
far as the Senate was concerned - was to revoke the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. The Fortun case
then cannot be considered a legislative precedent of an
"automatic convening of a joint session by the Congress upon
the President's proclamation of martial law."36
Respondents argue that the remedy of certiorari is likewise
unavailing. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.37 The Congress has
the duty to convene and vote jointly only in two (2) instances,
as respondents have already explained. The Congress had
even issued their respective resolutions expressing their
support to, as well as their intent not to revoke, President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. There then can be no evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty on the
part of the Congress if there is no duty to begin with.38
Respondents respectfully remind the Court to uphold the
"constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government."39 The Court may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the Legislature and it is not within the province of the
courts to direct the Congress how to do its work. Respondents
stress that this Court cannot direct the Congress to convene in
joint session without violating the basic principle of the
separation of powers.40
Subsequent Events
On July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla
Petition, filed a Manifestation, calling the attention of the Court
to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day period of
validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Despite the
lapse of said sixty (60)-day period, petitioners exhort the Court
to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the
Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.
On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and,
with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor versus
eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved the
extension of the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
After a meticulous consideration of the parties' submissions,
we synthesize them into the following fundamental issues:
I. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of these consolidated petitions;
II. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the
Court's exercise of its power of judicial review;
III. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to
convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution;
and
IV. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be
issued in the present cases.
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court's jurisdiction over these
consolidated petitions
The principle of separation of powers
The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our
tripartite system of government. It is implicit in the manner that
our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the
powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of
government. In Belgica v. Ochoa,41 this Court had the
opportunity to restate:
The principle of separation of powers refers to the
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative
branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through
the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the
power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have
been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[ e
]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere." Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law." The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division,
it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Lack of independence would result in the inability of one
branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted.)
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed as an
unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the
Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive
issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation
of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the
President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court
may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of
the Judiciary to declare "what the law is."42 It is worth repeating
here that:
[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.43 (Emphases supplied.)
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of
separation of powers, they argue that these petitions involve a
political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true
that the Court continues to recognize questions of policy as a
bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.44 However, in
a long line of cases,45 we have given a limited application to
the political question doctrine.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,46 we
emphasized that the Court's judicial power as conferred by the
Constitution has been expanded to include "the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Further, in past cases, the Court has exercised its power of
judicial review noting that the requirement of interpreting the
constitutional provision involved the legality and not
the wisdom of a manner by which a constitutional duty or
power was exercised.47
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.
(AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association,
Inc.,48 we explained the rationale behind the Court's
expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Citing former Chief Justice and
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion in his
sponsorship speech for Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, we reiterated that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
Existence of the requisites for judicial review
Petitioners' legal standing
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the
following capacities: (1) Padilla as a member of the legal
profession representing victims of human rights violations, and
a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a human rights lawyer, former
member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod
as a framer of the Philippine Constitution and member of the
1986 Con Com, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of
human rights violations committed under martial law declared
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer; (5)
Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6) Senator De Lima
as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human
rights advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of
the Commission on Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 231694, while petitioner
Tañada sues in his capacity as a Filipino citizen and former
legislator, his co-petitioners (Bishop Iniguez, Bishop Pabillo,
Bishop Tobias, Mo. Ygrubay, Bulangis, and Deluria) all sue in
their capacity as Filipino citizens.
Respondents insist that none of the petitioners have legal
standing, whether as a citizen, taxpayer, or legislator, to file
the present cases.1avvphi1
The Court has consistently held that locus standi is a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. The question is whether the
challenging party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy so as to assure the existence of concrete
adverseness that would sharpen the presentation of issues
and illuminate the court in ruling on the constitutional question
posed.49
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not
the duty, to interfere and see that a public offense be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied.50 When a citizen exercises this "public right" and
challenges a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive
or legislative action, he represents the public at large, thus,
clothing him with the requisite locus standi. He may not sustain
an injury as direct and adverse as compared to others but it is
enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he
is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the
vindication of a public right.51
Verily, legal standing is grounded on the petitioner's personal
interest in the controversy. A citizen who files a petition before
the court asserting a public right satisfies the requirement of
personal interest simply because the petitioner is a member of
the general public upon which the right is vested.52 A citizen's
personal interest in a case challenging an allegedly
unconstitutional act lies in his interest and duty to uphold and
ensure the proper execution of the law.53
The present petitions have been filed by individuals asserting
that the Senate and the House of Representatives have
breached an allegedly constitutional duty to convene in joint
session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216.
The citizen-petitioners' challenge of a purportedly
unconstitutional act in violation of a public right, done in behalf
of the general public, gives them legal standing.
On the other hand, Senator De Lima questions the Congress'
failure to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216, which, according to the petitioners, is
the legislature's constitutional duty.
We have ruled that legislators have legal standing to ensure
that the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges of
the Members of the Congress remain inviolate.54 Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action - or in
these cases, inaction - which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.55
Actual case or controversy
It is long established that the power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases or controversies. There is an actual case or
controversy where there is a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, where the contradiction of
the rights can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.56
There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court:
on the one hand, the petitioners' assertion that the Congress
has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to
deliberate on Proclamation No. 216; and, on the other, the
respondents' view that so convening in joint session
is discretionary on the part of the Congress.
Petitioners seek relief through a writ
of mandamus and/or certiorari. Mandamus is a remedy
granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled.57 Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only
if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.58 With
respect to the Court, however, certiorari is broader in scope
and reach, and it may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board, or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, but
also to set right, undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.59
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the
Congress that constitutes neglect of their constitutional duties,
the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an
actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When
an act or omission of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but, in fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.60
Respondents aver that the Congress cannot be compelled to
do something that is discretionary on their part nor could they
be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the absence of any
mandatory obligation to jointly convene on their part to affirm
the President's proclamation of martial law. Thus, petitioners
are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in their petitions
for mandamus and/or certiorari; consequently, no actual case
or controversy exists.
There is no merit to respondents' position.
For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and give
due course to the petitions, it is sufficient that the petitioners
set forth their material allegations to make out a prima
facie case for mandamus or certiorari.61 Whether the
petitioners are actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs
prayed for is exactly what is to be determined by the Court
after careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and
submissions.
Liberality in cases of transcendental importance
In any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may
brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless,
exercise its power of judicial review in cases of transcendental
importance.
There are marked differences between the Chief Executive's
military powers, including the power to declare martial law, as
provided under the present Constitution, in comparison to that
granted in the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,62 such powers were seemingly limitless,
unrestrained, and purely subject to the President's wisdom and
discretion.
At present, the Commander-in-Chief still possesses the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
proclaim martial law. However, these executive powers are
now subject to the review of both the legislative and judicial
branches. This check-and-balance mechanism was installed in
the 1987 Constitution precisely to prevent potential abuses of
these executive prerogatives.
Inasmuch as the present petitions raise issues concerning the
Congress' role in our government's system of checks and
balances, these are matters of paramount public interest or
issues of transcendental importance deserving the attention of
the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty, and weight as
precedents.63
Mootness
The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the
present petitions (i.e., that the Congress be directed to
convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to
affirm or revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably have
been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60)
days that the President's martial law declaration and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were
effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the subsequent
extension by the Congress of the proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus over the whole of Mindanao after convening in joint
session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the Court's own decision
in Lagman v. Medialdea,64 wherein we ruled on the sufficiency
of the factual bases for Proclamation No. 216 under the
original period stated therein.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the jurisprudential rules
regarding mootness were succinctly summarized, thus:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss
it on ground of mootness.
xxxx
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.65 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty
reasons for the Court to proceed with the resolution of these
consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the
preceding discussion, these cases involve a constitutional
issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A definitive
ruling from this Court is imperative not only to guide the
Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify
the parameters of congressional conduct required by the 1987
Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the factual
precedents that gave rise to these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly
under Article VII, Section 18
We now come to the crux of the present petitions - the issue of
whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically
convene in joint session in the event that the President
proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part
thereof.
The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not
constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or
suspension.
By the language of Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
allarmed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-
Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces,66 in recognition that the President, as Chief
Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.67 However, to safeguard against possible abuse by
the President of the exercise of his power to proclaim martial
law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the same provision,
institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power
through the two other co-equal and independent branches of
government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular,
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requires the
President to submit a report to the Congress after his
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the
power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or
suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation
and/or suspension.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of the Congress
when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz.:
a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President;
c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in
the same manner. extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four
hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.
There is no question herein that the first provision was
complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the
issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017.
The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as
these concern factual circumstances which are not availing in
the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the initial
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and the
17th Congress was still in session68 when President Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017.
It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein:
"The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is
clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application. According to the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index
animi sermo or "speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba
legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."69
In Funa v. Chairman Villar,70 the Court also applied the verba
legis rule in constitutional construction, thus:
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must he given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. If possible, the
words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning, save where technical terms are employed. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates
the verbal legis rule in this wise:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to he assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions arc couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it. based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there
are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum. (Emphases supplied.)
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In
its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the
Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may
exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The
use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he
Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x
x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,71 but
in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement
that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting
jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer
to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject to the
discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already
be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in
joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language
in the Constitution,72 still, the requirement that "[t]he
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly
applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the
provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is
obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under
all circumstances.
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers'
specific intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President's
proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority
of its Members, voting jointly.
The Court recognized in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary73 that:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A. doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced· the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.
However, in the same Decision, the Court issued the
following caveat:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give US no light as to the views. of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.'' The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.74 (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear
meaning of the relevant provision in Article VU, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to
vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas co1pus. Based on the Civil Liberties Union
case, there is already no need to look beyond the plain
language of the provision and decipher the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Nonetheless, the
deliberations on Article VII, Section 18 of the 1986 ConCom
does not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it
mandatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation and/or suspension, so it
could deliberate as a single body, regardless of whether its
Members will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.
What is evident in the deliberations of the 1986 ConCom were
the framers' intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior
concurrence by the Congress for the effectivity of the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President's
proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority
of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Commander-in-Chief clause was initially drafted, the
President's suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus required the prior concurrence of at least a majority of
all the members of the Congress to be effective. The first line
read, "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion[;]" and the
next line, "In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the
members of the Congress, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus."75
The Commissioners, however, extensively debated on
whether or not there should be prior concurrence by the
Congress, and the exchanges below present the
considerations for both sides:
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the
Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law
there is no need for concurrence of the majority of the
Members of Congress because the provision says "in case of
actual invasion and rebellion." If there is actual invasion and
rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is
need for immediate response because there is an attack.
Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical
because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. They say
that in case of rebellion, one cannot even take his car and go
to the Congress, which is possible because the roads are
blocked or barricaded. And maybe if the revolutionaries are
smart they would have an individual team for each and every
Member of the Congress so he would not be able to respond
to a call for a session. So the requirement of an initial
concurrence of the majority of all the Members of the
Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be
impractical as I can see it.
Second, Section l5states that the Congress may revoke the
declaration or lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a
justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is
subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis,
I agree that there is no need for concurrence as aprerequisite
to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. x x x
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with
Section 15, we delete the phrase "and, with the concurrence of
at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress..."
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or also
the declaration of martial law.
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is
suggesting that .this would be an exclusive prerogative of the
President?
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But
even that period of 60 days may be shortened by the
Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that
the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the
proclamation.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. x x x
We are back to Section 15, page 7, lines 1 and 2. I just want to
reiterate my previous proposal to amend by deletion the
phrase "and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all
the members of Congress."
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment
because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the
President the right to determine the factors which may lead to
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling
reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or
rebellion. And in previous interpellatioi1s regarding this
phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion
or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act
quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only
good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it
automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to
inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Given cur traumatic experience during the past
administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to
determine these factors, especially the existence of an
invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining
whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the
attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the
past ac ministration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by
Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him
purportedly under Article VII, Section 10(2) of the Constitution,
wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas"
provision.
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these
lawless elements of the Communists and other armed
aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the
Philippines by armed violence and force, have assumed the
magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General
Order No. 3, also promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of
wanton destruction of lives and properties, widespread
lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now
prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been
brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a
criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
Philippines in order to take over the government by force and
violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion
of an actual war against our people and the legitimate
government...
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law in our
country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still
insist on the deletion of the phrase "and, with the concurrence
of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress"?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.
Marcos he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and
national consciousness. But given the possibility that there
would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient
safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman
has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine
the factual bases because the paragraph beginning on line 9
precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof
and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days
from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is
supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here we
are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or
rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that
there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos
was able to do all those things mentioned.
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing
what Mr. Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and
there may be another Marcos. What we are looking for are
safeguards that are reasonable and, I believe, adequate at this
point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even
during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect
the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask
that there should be a concurrence on the part of the
Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the
end of such 60 days.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more
comfortable if we provide for a legislative check on this
awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-
in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a
presidency that cannot act under those conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the
proper or appropriate authority.
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very
unlikely that the concurrence of Congress would be available;
and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order
to deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual
circumstances to expediency.
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is
trying to protect the country in the event of an invasion or a
rebellion.
MR. SUAREZ. No. But in both instances, we would be seeking
to protect not only the country but the rights of simple citizens.
We have to balance these interests without sacrificing the
security of the State.
MR. MONSOD. I agree with the Gentleman that is why in the
Article on the Bill of Rights, which was approved on Third
Reading, the safeguards and the protection of the citizens
have been strengthened. And on line 21 of this paragraph, I
endorsed the proposed amendment of Commissioner Padilla.
We are saying that those who are arrested should be judicially
charged within five days; otherwise, they shall be released.
So, there are enough safeguards.
MR. SUAREZ. These are safeguards after the declaration of
martial law and after the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
MR. MONSOD. That is true.76 (Emphases supplied.)
Ultimately, twenty-eight (28) Commissioners voted to remove
the requirement for prior concurrence by the Congress for the
effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, against only twelve (12) Commissioners who voted to
retain it.
As the result of the foregoing, the 1987 Constitution does not
provide at all for the manner of determination and expression
of concurrence (whether prior or subsequent) by the Congress
in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the
instant cases, both Houses of the Congress separately passed
resolutions, in accordance with their respective rules of
procedure, expressing their support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
In contrast, being one of the constitutional safeguards against
possible abuse by the President of his power to proclaim
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for how the
Congress may exercise its discretionary power to revoke the
President's proclamation and/or suspension, that is, "voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session."
The ConCom deliberations on this particular provision
substantially revolved around whether the two Houses will
have to vote jointly or separately to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus; but as the Court reiterates, it is
undisputedly for the express purpose of revoking the
President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Based on the ConCom deliberations, pertinent portions of
which are reproduced hereunder, the underlying reason for the
requirement that the two Houses of the Congress will vote
jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to facilitate
the process of revocation of the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I want to ask the
Committee a clarifying question on line 4 of page 7 as to
whether the meaning here is that the majority of all the
Members of each House vote separately. Is that the intent of
this phrase?
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. We would like a little discussion on that
because yesterday we already removed the necessity for
concurrence of Congress for the initial imposition of martial
law. If we require the Senate and the House of
Representatives to vote separately for purposes of revoking
the imposition of martial law, that will make it very difficult for
Congress to revoke the imposition of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. That
is just thinking aloud. To balance the fact that the President
acts unilaterally, then the Congress voting as one body and
not separately can revoke the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, voting jointly.
FR. BERNAS. Jointly, yes.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. May I comment on the statement made by
Commissioner Bernas? I was a Member of the Senate for 12
years. Whenever a bicameral Congress votes, it is always
separately.
For example, bills coming. from the Lower House are voted
upon by the Members of the House. Then they go up to the
Senate and voted upon separately. Even on constitutional
amendments, where Congress meets in joint session, the two
Houses vote separately.
Otherwise, the Senate will be useless; it will be sort of
absorbed by the House considering that the Members of the
Senate are completely outnumbered by the Members of the
House. So, I believe that whenever Congress acts, it must be
the two Houses voting separately.
If the two Houses vote "jointly," it would mean mixing the 24
Senators with 250 Congressmen. This would result in the
Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House. This
violates the purpose of having a Senate.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that that is the practice and,
precisely, in proposing this, I am consciously proposing this as
an exception to this practice because of the tremendous effect
on the nation when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended and then martial law is imposed. Since we have
allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we
should make it a little more easy for Congress to
reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of
the people.
MR. RODRIGO. Maybe the way it can be done is to vest this
function in just one of the Chambers - to the House alone or to
the Senate alone. But to say, "by Congress," both House and
Senate "voting" jointly is practically a vote by the House.
FR. BERNAS. I would be willing to say just the vote of the
House.
MR. RODRIGO. That is less insulting to the Senate. However,
there are other safeguards. For example, if, after 60 days the
Congress does not act, the effectiveness of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
ceases. Furthermore, there is recourse to the Supreme Court.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that there is this recourse to the
Supreme Court and there is a time limit, but at the same time
because of the extraordinary character of this event when
martial law is imposed, I would like to make it easier for the
representatives of the people to review this very significant
action taken by the President.
MR. RODRIGO. Between the Senate being absorbed and
controlled by the House numerically and the House voting
alone, the lesser of two evils is the latter.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. x x x
In connection with the inquiry of Commissioner Monsod, and
considering the statements made by Commissioner Rodrigo, I
would like to say, in reply to Commissioner Bernas, that
perhaps because of necessity, we might really have to break
tradition. Perhaps it would be better to give this function of
revoking the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the writ or extending the same to the House of
Representatives, instead of to the Congress. I feel that even
the Senators would welcome this because they would feel
frustrated by the imbalance in the number between the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives.
Anyway, Madam President, we have precedents or similar
cases. For example, under Section 24 of the committee report
on the Legislative, appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, and
bills authorizing increase of public debt are supposed to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
Besides, we have always been saying that it is the Members of
the House of Representatives who are mostly in touch with the
people since they represent the various districts of our country.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. I would prefer to have the vote of both Houses
because this is a very serious question that must be fully
discussed. By limiting it alone to the House of
Representatives, then we lose the benefit of the advice and
opinion of the Members of the Senate. I would prefer that they
would be in joint session, but I would agree with Father
Bernas that they should not be voting separately as part of the
option. I think they should be voting jointly, so that, in effect,
the Senators will have only one vote. But at least we have the
benefit of their advice.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. I was the one who proposed that the two
Houses vote separately because if they vote jointly, the
Senators are absolutely outnumbered. It is insulting to the
intelligence of the Senators to join a session where they know
they are absolutely outnumbered. Remember that the
Senators are elected at large by the whole country. The
Senate is a separate Chamber. The Senators have a longer
term than the Members of the House; they have a six-year
term. They are a continuing Senate. Out of 24, twelve are
elected every year. So, if they will participate at all, the Senate
must vote separately. That is the practice everywhere where
there are two chambers. But as I said, between having a joint
session of the Senate and the House voting jointly where it is
practically the House that will decide alone, the lesser of two
evils is just to let the House decide alone instead of insulting
the Senators by making them participate in a charade.
MR. REGALADO. May the Committee seek this clarification
from Commissioner Rodrigo? This vC1ting is supposed to
revoke the proclamation of martial Jaw. If the two Houses
vote separately and a majority is obtained in the House of
Representatives for the revocation of the proclamation of
martial law but that same majority cannot be obtained in the
Senate voting separately, what would be the situation?
MR. RODRIGO. Then the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension continues for almost two months. After two
months, it stops. Besides, there is recourse to the Supreme
Court.
MR. REGALADO. Therefore, that arrangement would be very
difficult for the legislative since they are voting separately and,
for lack of majority in one of the Houses they are precluded
from revoking that proclamation. They will just, therefore, have
to wait until the lapse of 60 days.
MR. RODRIGO. It might be difficult, yes. But remember, we
speak of the Members of Congress who are elected by the
people. Let us not forget that the President is also elected by
the people. Are we forgetting that the President is elected by
the people? We seem to distrust all future Presidents just
because one President destroyed our faith by his declaration
of martial law. I think we are overreacting. Let us not judge all
Presidents who would henceforth be elected by the Filipino
people on the basis of the abuses made by that one President.
Of course, we must be on guard; but let us not overreact.
Let me make my position clear. I am against the proposal to
make the House and the Senate vote jointly. That is an insult
to the Senate.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman yield to a question?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. So, in effect, if there is a joint
session composed of 250 Members of the House plus 24
Members of the Senate, the total would be 274. The majority
would be one-half plus one.
MR. MONSOD. So, 148 votes.
MR. RODRIGO. And the poor Senators would be absolutely
absorbed and outnumbered by the 250 Members of the
House. Is that it?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is one of the implications of the
suggestion and the amendment is being made nonetheless
because there is a higher objective or value which is to
prevent a deadlock that would enable the President to
continue the full 60 days in case one House revokes and the
other House does not.
The proposal also allows the Senators to participate fully in the
discussions and whether we like it or not, the Senators have
very large persuasive powers because of their prestige and
their national vote.
MR. RODRIGO. So, the Senators will have the "quality votes"
but Members of the House will have the "quantity votes." Is
that it?
MR. MONSOD. The Gentleman is making an assumption that
they will vote against each other. I believe that they will
discuss, probably in joint session and vote on it; then the
consensus will be clear.
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, the purpose of the
amendment is really to set forth a limitation because we have
to avoid a stalemate. For example, the Lower House decides
that the declaration of martial law should be revoked, and that
later on, the Senate sitting separately decides that it should
not be revoked. It becomes inevitable that martial law shall
continue even if there should be no factual basis for it.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, if this amendment is adopted,
we will be held responsible for a glaring inconsistency in the
Constitution to a degree that it distorts the bicameral system
that we have agreed to adopt. I reiterate: If there are
deadlocks, it is the responsibility of the presidential leadership,
together with the leaders of both Houses, to overcome
them.77 (Emphases supplied.)
When the matter was put to a vote, twenty-four (24)
Commissioners voted for the two Houses of the Congress
"voting jointly" in the revocation of the President's proclamation
of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and thirteen (13) Commissioners opted for
the two Houses "voting separately."
Yet, there was another attempt to amend the provision by
requiring just the House of Representatives, not the entire
Congress, to vote on the revocation of the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an
amendment?
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. On Section 15, page 7, line 4, I propose to
change the word "Congress" to HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES so that the sentence will read: "The
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension or extend the same if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it."
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, the proposed amendment is
really a motion for reconsideration. We have already decided
that both Houses will vote jointly. Therefore, the proposed
amendment, in effect, asks for a reconsideration of that vote in
order to give it to the House of Representatives.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, the opposite of voting
jointly is voting separately. If my amendment were to vote
separately, then, yes, it is a motion for reconsideration. But
this is another formula.
xxxx
MR. DE CASTRO. What is the rationale of the amendment?
MR. RODRIGO. It is intended to avoid that very extraordinary
and awkward provision which would make the 24 Senators
meet jointly with 250 Members of the House and make them
vote jointly. What I mean is, the 24 Senators, like a drop in the
bucket, are absorbed numerically by the 250 Members of the
House.
xxxx
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President, we need the wisdom of
the Senators. What is at stake is the future of our country -
human rights and civil liberties. If we separate the Senators,
then we deprive the Congressmen of the knowledge and
experience of these 24 men. I think we should forget the
classification of "Senators" or "Congressmen." We should all
work together to restore democracy in our country. So we
need the wisdom of 24 Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I just answer. This
advice of the 24 Senators can be sought because they are in
the same building. Anyway, the provision, with the amendment
of Commissioner Monsod, does not call for a joint session. It
only says: "the Congress, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session" - it does not say
"joint session." So, I believe that if the Members of the House
need the counsel of the Senators, they can always call on
them, they can invite them.78 (Emphasis supplied.)
The proposed amendment was not adopted, however, as only
five (5) Commissioners voted in its favor and twenty-five (25)
Commissioners voted against it. Thus, the power to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both
Houses of the Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members.
Significantly, the Commissioners only settled the manner of
voting by the Congress, i.e., "voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members," in order to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but they did not
directly take up and specify in Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution that the voting shall be done during a joint
session of both Houses of the Congress. In fact,
Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo expressly observed that
the provision does not call for a joint session. That the
Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's
proclamation and/or suspension in a joint session can only be
inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who
pushed for the "voting jointly" amendment that the Members of
the House of Representatives will benefit from the advice,
opinion, and/or wisdom of the Senators, which will be
presumably shared during a joint session of both
Houses. Such inference is far from a clear mandate for the
Congress to automatically convene in joint session, under
all circumstances, when the President proclaims martial law
and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, even when Congress does not intend to revoke the
President's proclamation and/or suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to
convene in joint session as the provision on revocation under
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even
come into operation in light of the resolutions, separately
adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance
with their respective rules of procedure, expressing support for
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is
specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate
and House of Representatives already separately adopted
resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of both
Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their
already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision
in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation
did not even come into operation and, therefore, there is no
obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint
session.
Practice and logic dictate that a collegial body will first hold a
meeting among its own members to get a sense of the
opinions of its individual members and, if possible and
necessary, reach an official stance, before convening with
another collegial body. This is exactly what the two Houses of
the Congress did in these cases.
The two Houses of the Congress, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, immediately took separate actions on
President Duterte's proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 216, in accordance with
their respective rules of procedure. The Consolidated
Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), filed by the Senate and
Senate President Pimentel, recounted in detail the steps
undertaken by both Houses of the Congress as regards
Proclamation No. 216, to wit:
2. On the date of the President's declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, Congress was in session (from May 2, to June 2,
2017), in its First Regular Session of the 17th Congress, as
evidenced by its Legislative Calendar, otherwise known as
Calendar of Session as contained in Concurrent Resolution
No. 3 of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.x x
x about the same. Xxx
3. During the plenary session of the Senate on the following
day, 24 May 2017, privilege speeches and discussions had
already been made about the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This prompted Senator Franklin M. Drilon to move to
invite the Secretary of National Defense, the National Security
Adviser and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to brief the senators in closed session on what
transpired in Mindanao. Submitted to a vote and there being
no objection, the Senate approved the motion. x x x
4. On 25 May 2017, the President furnished the Senate and
the House of Representatives, through Senate President
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and Speaker Pantaleon D.
Alvarez, respectively, with copies of his report (hereinafter, the
"Report") detailing the factual and legal basis for his
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
5. On or about 25 May 2017, invitation letters were issued and
sent by the Senate Secretary, Atty. Lutgardo B. Barbo to the
following officials requesting them to attend a briefing for the
Senators on 29 May 2017 at 3:00 p.m. at the Senators'
Lounge at the Senate in a closed door session to describe
what transpired in Mindanao which was the basis of the
declaration of martial law in Mindanao: (a) Secretary Delfin N.
Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense (hereinafter,
"Secretary Lorenzana"); (b) Secretary Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., National Security Adviser and Director General of
the National Security Council (hereinafter, "Secretary
Esperon"); and (c) General Eduardo M. Año, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereinafter, "Gen. Año").
The said letters stated that the Senators requested that the
President's Report be explained and that more details be given
6. On 29 May 2017, about 3:30 p.m., a closed door briefing
was conducted by Secretary Lorenzana, Secretary Esperon
and other security officials for the Senators to brief them about
the circumstances surrounding the declaration of martial law
and to inform them about details about the President's Report.
The briefing lasted for about four (4) hours. After the briefing,
the Senators had a caucus to determine what could be publicly
revealed.
7. On the same day, 29 May 2017, the House of
Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of
the Whole on 31 May 2017 to consider the President's Report.
8. On 30 May 2017, two (2) resolutions were introduced in the
Senate about the proclamation of martial law. The first one
was P.S. Resolution No. 388 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No. 388")
introduced by Senators Sotto, Pimentel, Recto, Angara, Binay,
Ejercito, Gatchalian, Gordon, Honasan, Lacson, Legarda,
Pacquiao, Villanueva, Villar and Zubiri which was entitled,
"Expressing the Sense of the Senate, Supporting the
Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017, entitled "Declaring
a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" and Finding no
Cause to revoke the Same." The second one was P.S.
Resolution No. 390 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No. 390") introduced
by Senators Pangilinan, Drilon, Hontiveros, Trillanes, Aquino
and De Lima which was entitled, "Resolution to Convene
Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No.
216 dated 23 May 2017 entitled, "Declaring a State of Martial
Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao." x x x
9. Discussions were made on the two (2) proposed resolutions
during the plenary deliberations of the Senate on 30 May
2017. The first resolution to be discussed was P.S.R. No. 388.
During the deliberations, amendments were introduced to it
and after the amendments and the debates, P.S.R. No. 388
was voted upon and it was adopted by a vote of seventeen
(17) affirmative votes and five (5) negative votes. The
amended, substituted and approved version of P.S.R. No. 388,
which was then renamed Resolution No. 49, states as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 49
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE
NOT TO REVOKE, AT THIS TIME, PROCLAMATION NO.
216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED, "DECLARING A STATE
OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
MINDANAO."
WHEREAS, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII,
Section 18, provides that:
"... in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he (President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law...";
WHEREAS, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a
State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao," on May 23,
2017 (the "Proclamation");
WHEREAS, pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on
May 25, 2017, and within forth-eight hours after the issua.11ce
of the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to the Senate
his report on the factual and legal basis of the Proclamation;
WHEREAS, on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by
the Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security Council
(NSC) on the factual circumstances surrounding the
Proclamation as well as the updates on the situation in
Mindanao;
WHEREAS, on the basis of the information received by the
Senators, the Senate is convinced that President Duterte
declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao because actual
rebellion exists and that the public safety requires it;
WHEREAS, the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series of
2017;
WHEREAS, the Proclamation does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, which among others, guarantees respect
for human rights and guards against any abuse or violation
thereof: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of
the Senate, that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 at this time.
Adopted. x x x"
xxxx
10. Immediately thereafter, P.S.R. No. 390 was also
deliberated upon. After a prolonged discussion, a vote was
taken on it and nine (9) senators were in favor and twelve (12)
were against. As such, P.S.R. No. 390 calling for a joint
session of Congress was not adopted. x x x
11. In the meantime, on 31 May 2017, the House of
Representatives acting as a Committee of the Whole was
briefed for about six (6) hours by officials of the government
led by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea
(hereinafter, "Executive Secretary Medialdea"), Secretary
Lorenzana and other security officials on the factual
circumstances surrounding the President's declaration of
martial law and on the statements contained in the President's
Report. During the evening of the same day, a majority of the
House of Representatives passed Resolution No. 1050
entitled, "'Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House
of Representatives to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte As It
Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled,
'Declaring A State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao."' In
the same deliberations, it was likewise proposed that the
House of Representatives call for a joint session of Congress
to deliberate and vote on the President's declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. However, after debates, the proposal was not carried.
x x x.79
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of
Representatives placed President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their
power to revoke such a proclamation vested by the
Constitution on the Congress. Each House timely took action
by accepting and assessing the President's Report, inviting
over and interpellating executive officials, and deliberating
amongst their fellow Senators or Representatives, before
finally voting in favor of expressing support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and against calling for a joint
session with the other House. The prompt actions separately
taken by the two Houses of the Congress on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 belied all the purported
difficulties and delays such procedures would cause as raised
in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen). As earlier pointed out,
there is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by
the Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and absent a specific mandate for the Congress to
hold a joint session in the event of concurrence, then whether
or not to hold a joint session under such circumstances is
completely within the discretion of the Congress.
The Senate and Senate President Pimentel explained in
their Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), that, by
practice, the two Houses of the Congress must adopt a
concurrent resolution to hold a joint session, and only
thereafter can the Houses adopt the rules to be observed for
that particular joint session:
It must be stated that the Senate and the House of
Representatives have their own respective Rules, i.e., the
Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of
Representatives. There is no general body of Rules applicable
to a joint session of Congress. Based on parliamentary
practice and procedure, the Senate and House of
Representatives only adopt Rules for a joint session on an ad
hoc basis but only after both Houses have already agreed to
convene in a joint session through a Concurrent Resolution.
The Rules for a Joint Session for a particular purpose
become functus officio after the purpose of the joint session
has been achieved. Examples of these Rules for a Joint
Session are (1) the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 9, 2016 Election
adopted on 24 May 2016; and (2) the Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress on Proclamation No. 1959 (Proclaiming a
State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, Except for
Certain Areas) adopted on 09 December 2009. The only time
that the Senate and the House of Representatives do not
adopt Rules for a joint session is when they convene on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session to receive or listen
to the State of the Nation Address of the President and even
then, they adopt a Concurrent Resolution to do so.
The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both
Houses to first adopt a Concurrent Resolution to hold a joint
session. This is achieved by either of two (2) ways: (1) both
the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously
adopting the Concurrent Resolution - an example would be
when the two (2) Houses inform the President that they are
ready to receive his State of the Nation Address or (2) For one
(1) House to pass its own resolution and to send it to the other
House for the latter's concurrence. Once the joint session of
both Houses is actually convened, it is only then that the
Senate and the House of Representatives jointly adopt the
Rules for the joint session. x x x80 (Emphases supplied.)
With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives
adopting a concurrent resolution, no joint session by the two
Houses of the Congress can be had in the present cases.
The Court is bound to respect the rules of the Congress, a co-
equal and independent branch of government. Article VI,
Section 16(3) of the 1987 Constitution states that "[e]ach
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings." The
provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the
formulation, adoption, and promulgation of its rules; and as
such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference.81 Moreover, unless there
is a clear showing by strong and convincing reasons that they
conflict with the Constitution, "all legislative acts are clothed
with an armor of constitutionality particularly resilient where
such acts follow a long-settled and well-established practice by
the Legislature."82 Nothing in this Decision should be
presumed to give precedence to the rules of the Houses of the
Congress over the provisions of the Constitution. This Court
simply holds that since the Constitution does not regulate the
manner by which the Congress may express its concurrence
to a Presidential proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Houses of the
Congress have the discretion to adopt rules of procedure as
they may deem appropriate for that purpose.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein
that both Houses of Congress already separately
expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility and the
provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a
joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely
different scenario if either of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress,
resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene
in joint session to vote jointly on the revocation of the
proclamation and/or suspension. Given the foregoing
parameters in applying Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, Justice Leonen's concern, expressed in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, that a deadlock may result
in the future, is completely groundless.
The legislative precedent referred to by petitioners actually
supports the position of the Court in the instant cases. On
December 4, 2009, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1959, entitled "Proclaiming a State of Martial
law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, except for Certain
Areas." The Senate, on December 14, 2009, adopted
Resolution No. 217, entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense
of the Senate that the Proclamation of Martial Law in the
Province of Maguindanao is Contrary to the Provisions of the
1987 Constitution." Consequently, the Senate and the House
of Representatives adopted Concurrent
Resolutions, i.e., Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 14 and
House Concurrent Resolution No. 33, calling both Houses of
the Congress to convene in joint session on December 9,
2009 at 4:00 p.m. at the Session Hall of the House of
Representatives to deliberate on Proclamation No. 1959. It
appears then that the two Houses of the Congress in 2009
also initially took separate actions on President Macapagal-
Arroyo's Proclamation No. 1959, with the Senate eventually
adopting Resolution No. 217, expressing outright its sense that
the proclamation of ma11ial law was unconstitutional and
necessarily implying that such proclamation should be
revoked. With one of the Houses favoring revocation, and in
observation of the established practice of the Congress, the
two Houses adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint
session to vote on the revocation of Proclamation No. 1959.
For the same reason, the Fortun case cannot be deemed a
judicial precedent for the present cases. The factual
background of the Fortun case is not on all fours with these
cases. Once more, the Court points out that in
the Fortun case, the Senate expressed through Resolution No.
217 its objection to President Macapagal-Arroyo's
Proclamation No. 1959 for being unconstitutional, and both the
Senate and the House of Representatives adopted concurrent
resolutions to convene in joint session for the purpose of
revoking said proclamation; while in the cases at bar, the
Senate and the House of Representatives adopted Senate
Resolution No. 49 and House Resolution No. 1050,
respectively, which expressed support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216, and both Houses of the Congress voted
against calling for a joint session. In addition, the fundamental
issue in the Fortun case was whether there was factual basis
for Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it was mandatory
for the Congress to convene in joint session; and even before
the Congress could vote on the revocation of Proclamation No.
1959 and the Court could resolve the Fortun case, President
Macapagal-Arroyo already issued Proclamation No. 1963 on
December 12, 2009, entitled "Proclaiming the Termination of
the State of Martial Law and the Restoration of the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of
Maguindanao." Furthermore, the word "automatic" in
the Fortun case referred to the duty or power of the Congress
to review the proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, rather than the joint
session of Congress.83
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The Congress, if not in
session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension convene in accordance with its
rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is
not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to convene within
twenty-four (24) hours from the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason required
to convene immediately if in session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the
President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess.
To ensure that the Congress will be able to act swiftly on the
proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution
provides that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours
without need for call. It is a whole different situation when the
Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the
proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular
sessions, as what happened in these cases. Second, the
provision only requires that the Congress convene without call,
but it does not explicitly state that the Congress shall already
convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states
that the Congress "convene in accordance with its rules,"
which can only mean the respective rules of each House as
there are no standing rules for joint sessions. And third, it
cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to convene
immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of
the Congress promptly took action on Proclamation No. 216,
with the Senate already issuing invitations to executive officials
even prior to receiving President Duterte's Report, except that
the two Houses of the Congress acted separately. By initially
undertaking separate actions on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 and making their respective
determination of whether to support or revoke said
Proclamation, the Senate and the House of Representatives
were only acting in accordance with their own rules of
procedure and were not in any way remiss in their
constitutional duty to guard against a baseless or unjustified
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus by the President.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without
a joint session, the public cannot hold the Senators and
Representatives accountable for their respective positions on
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate records
completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the
Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S.
Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While it is
true that the House of Representatives voted on House
Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with
its rules. Per the Rules of the House of Representatives:
RULE XV
Voting
Sec. 115. Manner of Voting. -The Speaker shall rise and state
the motion or question that is being put to a vote in clear,
precise and simple language. The Speaker shall say "as many
as are in favor, (as the question may be) say 'aye'". After the
affirmative vote is counted, the Speaker shall say "as many as
are opposed, (as the question may be) say 'nay"'.
If the Speaker doubts the result of the voting or a motion to
divide the House is Carried, the House shall divide. The
Speaker shall ask those in favor to rise, to be followed by
those against. If still in doubt of the outcome or a count by
tellers is demanded, the Speaker shall name one (1) Member
from each side of the question to count the Members in the
affirmative and those in the negative. After the count is
reported, the Speaker shall announce the result.
An abstention shall not be counted as a vote. Unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by these rules, a
majority of those voting, there being a quorum, shall decide
the issue.
Sec. 116. Nominal Voting. - Upon motion of a Member, duly
approved by one-fifth (1/5) of the Members present, there
being a quorum, nominal voting on any question may be
called. In case of nominal voting, the Secretary General shall
call, in alphabetical order, the nan1es of the Members who
shall state their vote as their names are called.
Sec. 117. Second Call on Nominal Voting. - A second call on
nominal voting shall be made to allow Members who did not
vote during the first call to vote.1avvphi1 Members who fail to
vote during the second call shall no longer be allowed to vote.
Since no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution
No. 1050, then the votes of the individual Representatives
cannot be determined. It does not render though the
proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the
public to information when it did not
convene in joint session.
The Court is not swayed by petitioners' argument that by not
convening in joint session, the Congress violated the public's
right to information because as records show, the Congress
still conducted deliberations on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216, albeit separately; and the public's right
to information on matters of national security is not absolute.
When such matters are being taken up in the Congress,
whether in separate or joint sessions, the Congress has
discretion in the manner the proceedings will be conducted.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public
deliberation process on the proclamation of martial law: one
that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body.
They insist that the Congress must be transparent, such that
there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of
the proclamation's factual bases and subsequent
implementation shall be openly discussed and where each
member's position on the issue is heard and made known to
the public.
The petitioners' insistence on the conduct of a "joint session"
contemplates a mandatory joint Congressional session where
public viewing is allowed.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the
discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are
generally open to the public,84 but each House may decide to
hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the
subject matter to be discussed and deliberated upon.
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 82. Sessions Open to the Public. - Sessions shall be
open to the public. However, when the security of the State or
the dignity of the House or any of its Members are affected by
any motion or petition being considered, the House may hold
executive sessions.
Guests and visitors in the galleries are prohibited from using
their cameras and video recorders. Cellular phones and other
similar electronic devices shall be put in silent mode.
Section 83. Executive Sessions. - When the House decides to
hold an executive session, the Speaker shall direct the
galleries and hallways to be cleared and the doors closed.
Only the Secretary General, the Sergeant-at- Arms and other
persons specifically authorized by the House shall be admitted
to the executive session. They shall preserve the
confidentiality of everything read or discussed in the session.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Rule XLVII of the Rules of the Senate similarly sets forth the
following:
SEC. 126. The executive sessions of the Senate shall be held
always behind closed doors. In such sessions, only the
Secretary, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and/or such other persons
as may be authorized by the Senate may be admitted to the
session hall.
SEC. 127. Executive sessions shall be held whenever a
Senator so requests it and his petition has been duly
seconded, or when the security of the State or public interest
so requires. Thereupon, the President shall order that the
public be excluded from the gallery and the doors of the
session hall be closed.
The Senator who presented the motion shall then explain the
reasons which he had for submitting the same.
The minutes of the executive sessions shall be recorded m a
separate book. (Emphasis supplied)
From afore-quoted rules, it is clear that matters affecting the
security of the state are considered confidential and must be
discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session,
excluding the public therefrom.
That these matters are considered confidential is in
accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the exercise of
their right to information, the government may withhold certain
types of information from the public such as state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security
matters.85 The Court has also ruled that the Congress'
deliberative process, including information discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive session,86 may be kept out of
the public's reach.
The Congress not only recognizes the sensitivity of these
matters but also endeavors to preserve their confidentiality. In
fact, Rule XL VII, Section 12887 of the Rules of the Senate
expressly establishes a secrecy ban prohibiting all its
members, including Senate officials and employees, from
divulging any of the confidential matters taken up by the
Senate. A Senator found to have violated this ban faces the
possibility of expulsion from his office.88 This is consistent with
the Ethical Standards Act89 that prohibits public officials and
employees from using or divulging "confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public."90
Certainly, the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
involves intelligence information, military tactics, and other
sensitive matters that have an undeniable effect on national
security. Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session
during which the legislators shall openly discuss these
matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is to effectively
compel them to make sensitive information available to
everyone, without exception, and to breach the recognized
policy of preserving these matters' confidentiality, at the risk of
being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled from Congress
altogether.
That these are the separate Rules of the two Houses of the
Congress does not take away from their persuasiveness and
applicability in the event of a joint session.1âwphi1 Since both
Houses separately recognize the policy of preserving the
confidentiality of national security matters, then in all
likelihood, they will consistently observe the same in a joint
session. The nature of these matters as confidential is not
affected by the composition of the body that will deliberate
upon it - whether it be the two Houses of the Congress
separately or in joint session.
Also, the petitioners' theory that a regular session must be
preferred over a mere briefing for purposes of ensuring that
the executive and military officials are placed under oath does
not have merit. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries In Aid of Legislation91 require that all witnesses at
executive sessions or public hearings who testify as to matters
of fact shall give such testimony under oath or affirmation. The
proper implementation of this rule is within the Senate's
competence, which is beyond the Court's reach.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of
mandamus or certiorari
For mandamus to lie, there must be compliance with Rule 65,
Section 3, Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
perfom1ance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent,
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requirements for a
petition for mandamus to prosper:
[T]hus, a petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that
the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has
long been established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.92 (Emphases
added.)
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that
the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must however,
be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.93
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court
issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of
legislative duty,94 we must distinguish the present controversy
with those previous cases. In this particular instance, the Court
has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of
Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear
ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and
in complete disregard of the separate actions already
undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint
session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke
said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ
of certiorari.
As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction,
a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act
of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.96 It bears to
mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a
writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very same act
- which, in the Tañada Petition, the non-convening by the two
Houses of the Congress in joint session - is contradictory, as
the former involves a mandatory duty which the government
branch or instrumentality must perform without discretion,
while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of the
government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically. Nevertheless, if the Court is to
adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it still finds the same to
be without merit. To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress
decided to no longer hold a joint session only after
deliberations among their Members and putting the same to
vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure.
Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the President's
issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its
concurrence thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L.
OSORIO, Petitioner, v. ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA; ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA;
ASSOCIATE PROSECUTION ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA
G. SURIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MANILA; COLONEL ROBERT M. AREVALO,
COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE
ARMY; COLONEL ROSALIO G. POMPA, INF (GSC),
PA, COMMANDING OFFICER, MP BATALLION, HHSG,
PA; AND CAPTAIN TELESFORO C. BALASABAS, INF
PA, AND/OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF
SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a
soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official capacity.
If a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders
of a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before the
civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the
argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.
This resolves the Petition1 for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 141332 dated July 27, 20152 and February
22, 2016.3 The Court of Appeals found that custody over
Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio) was by
virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt.
Osorio's Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.4
Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito
Palparan (Major General Palparan),5 SSgt. Osorio was
charged in two (2) Informations before Branch 14,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping
University of the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño
(Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan). The
accusatory portion of these Informations read:
CRIM. CASE NO. 3905-M-2011
That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of
one Raquel Halili at Barangay San Miguel, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, acting as private
individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of
nighttime and with the use of a motor vehicle, forcibly
abduct KAREN E. EMPEÑO, a female person, and
deprive her of liberty by detaining her against her will
first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall
of Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan; the camp of the 24th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Limay,
Bataan; and, a resort/safehouse in Iba, Zambales, from
June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than three (3)
days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing
disappearance, to the damage and prejudice of KAREN
E. EMPEÑO and her heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis in the original)
CRIM. CASE NO. 3906-M-2011
That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of
one Raquel Halili at Barangay San Miguel, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, acting as private
individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of
nighttime and with the use of a motor vehicle, forcibly
abduct SHERLYN T. CADAPAN, a female person, and
deprive her of liberty by detaining her against her will
first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall
of Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan; the camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Limay,
Bataan; and, a resort/safehouse in Iba, Zambales, from
June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than three (3)
days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing
disappearance, to the damage and prejudice
of SHERLYN T. CADAPAN and her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Emphasis in the original)
Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on
December 19, 2011.8
The next day, at about 3:00 p.m., SSgt. Osorio was
arrested by Colonel Herbert Yambing, the Provost
Marshall General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
SSgt. Osorio was turned over to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame,
Quezon City and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail.
He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is
currently detained.9
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his
liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition10 for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015. Impleaded
as respondents were Presiding Judge Teodora Gonzales
of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan,
the judge who issued the warrants of arrest; Assistant
State Prosecutors Juan Pedro Navera and Irwin A.
Maraya, and Associate Prosecution Attorney Ethel Rhea
G. Suril, who filed the Informations for kidnapping and
illegal detention; and Colonel Robert M. Arevalo, Colonel
Rosalio G. Pompa, and Captain Telesforo C. Balasabas,
SSgt. Osorio's superiors.11
SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a
civil court such as the Regional Trial Court, had
jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he
was a soldier on active duty and that the offense charged
was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative,
SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman had
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because
among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a
public officer with salary grade higher than 28.12
SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged with the
felony of kidnapping and serious illegal detention because
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,13 the felony
may only be committed by a private individual, not a
ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.14 Lastly, he claimed deprivation of due
process because he was allegedly charged without
undergoing proper preliminary investigation.15
The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio's
confinement was "by virtue of a valid judgment or a
judicial process[.]"16 Under Republic Act No. 7055,
Section 1, a crime penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, even if committed by a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, is to be tried "by the proper
civil court." The only exception to this rule is when the
crime is "service-connected," i.e., those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97
of the Articles of War,17 in which case, the courts-martial
have jurisdiction. Since the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention is punished under the Revised
Penal Code and is not "service-connected," the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos City properly took cognizance of
the case and, consequently, the warrants of arrest
against SSgt. Osorio were issued under a valid judicial
process.
As to SSgt. Osorio's other arguments, the Court of
Appeals said that they "should be resolved through other
appropriate remedies such as a motion to quash."
According to the Court of Appeals, habeas corpus is not a
"writ of error," and questions relating to procedure or
merits of the case cannot be addressed in habeas corpus
proceedings.18
In its July 27, 2015 Resolution,19 the Court of Appeals
denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Habeas Corpus. SSgt.
Osorio's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
in the Court of Appeals February 22, 2016 Resolution.20
On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for
Review on Certiorari.21 Upon the directive of this Court,
respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed their Comment22 on the Petition.
SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being illegally deprived
of his liberty because he was charged with an "inexistent
offense." He argues that kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can only be committed by a private person, not
by a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.23
Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio
adds that only courts-martial have jurisdiction to hear,
try, and decide a criminal case against him. In the
alternative, SSgt. Osorio argues that the Ombudsman
and Sandiganbayan, not the Department of Justice or the
Regional Trial Court, have jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation and to hear, try, and decide the
criminal case because one of his co-accused, Major
General Palparan, was an officer in the Philippine Army
with a rank higher than colonel and with a salary grade
of 28.24
Lastly, SSgt. Osorio claims that he was deprived of his
right to due process of law because no preliminary
investigation was allegedly conducted in this case.25
Respondents counter that a public officer such as SSgt.
Osorio may be charged under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention. A
public officer detaining a person without authority is
acting in a private, not official, capacity. Since
kidnapping is not part of the duties of an officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents argue that
SSgt. Osorio acted in a private capacity when he took
part in illegally detaining Empeño and Cadapan.26
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents argue that the
Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of the case.
Under Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines charged with crimes or
offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code "shall be
tried by the proper civil court." The only exception is
when the crime is "service-connected," in which case,
courts-martial assume jurisdiction. Considering that
kidnapping is not a "service-connected" offense, SSgt.
Osorio was properly charged before a civil court.27
Lastly, respondents argue that no writ of habeas corpus
should be issued in this case. Respondents contend that
habeas corpus "does not extend beyond an inquiry into
the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and
the validity of the process upon its face."28 Habeas
corpus, being an extraordinary remedy, "will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his [or her]
liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued
by the court which has jurisdiction to do so."29
The principal issue for this Court's resolution is whether
or not a writ of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo
L. Osorio's proper remedy. Subsumed in the resolution of
this issue are the following: first, whether or not a civil
court may take cognizance of a criminal case against a
soldier on active duty; and, second, whether or not a
public officer may be charged with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, considering that the provision speaks of "any
private individual."
This Petition must be denied.
I having proved that he was not the accused Butukan S.
Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.
The "great writ of liberty"30 of habeas corpus "was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom."31 Habeas corpus is an
extraordinary,32 summary,33 and equitable writ,
consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal
liberty."34 Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient."35
The restraint of liberty need not be confined to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the writ. Habeas
corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy36 or when there is an alleged violation of the
liberty of abode.37
In In re: Saliba v. Warden,38 this Court allowed the
issuance of the writ due to mistaken identity. Instead of
Butukan S. Malang, authorities arrested and detained
one Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) for his alleged
participation in the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo,
Malang named in the arrest warrant, and that he was in
Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage at the time of the incident,
was ordered released. To detain a person, when he has
proven that he is not the person accused of the crime, is
a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the
implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in
the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.39 With liberty being a constitutional right,
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of
scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be
further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.40
However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be
issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court.41 The restraint then has become
lega1.42 Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic.43 Rule 102, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order
of the court, the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.44 This
ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the
information or the warrant of arrest45 based on one or
more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3
of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash
the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed
by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information ... for insufficiency
on its face in [a] point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."46 An accused
filing a motion to quash "hypothetically admits the facts
alleged in the information" and cannot present evidence
aliunde or those extrinsic from the Information.47
The effect of the grant of the motion to quash depends
on the grounds availed of. When the defect in the
complaint or information can be cured by amendment,
the grant of the motion to quash will result in an order
directing the amendment.48 If the ground is that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall
give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment."49 If, despite amendment, the complaint
or information still suffers from the same defect, the
complaint or information shall be quashed.50
As an exception, the Court said in In re: Salibo that a
motion to quash would be ineffectual because none of
the grounds would have applied under the circumstances
of that case. The information and warrant of arrest were
issued on the premise that the accused named Butukan
S. Malang and the person named Datukan Malang Salibo
were the same person, a premise proven as false. An
amendment from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" in the information will not cure this
defect.
II
In availing himself of habeas corpus, SSgt. Osorio mainly
contends that the Regional Trial Court that issued the
warrants for his arrest had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the kidnapping case against him. SSgt.
Osorio argues that courts-martial, not civil courts, have
jurisdiction to try and decide a case against a soldier on
active duty. In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argues that
the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan should have
conducted the preliminary investigation and decided the
kidnapping case against him since his co-accused, Major
General Palparan, had a rank higher than colonel and had
salary grade 28 at the time of the commission of the
offense.
SSgt. Osorio's claim lacks merit. The Regional Trial Court
properly took cognizance of the kidnapping case against
him.
Republic Act No. 7055,51 Section 1 provides that if the
accused is a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under
the Revised Penal Code, civil courts shall have the
authority to hear, try, and decide the case, thus:
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special
penal laws, or local government ordinances regardless of
whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court except
when the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the
offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the
President of the Philippines may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper
civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the
court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other
special laws, or local government ordinances.
Under this Section, the only time courts-martial may
assume jurisdiction is if, before arraignment, the civil
court determines that the offense is "service-connected."
These service-connected offenses are found in Articles 54
to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War, to wit:
ARTICLE 54. Fraudulent Enlistment ...
ARTICLE 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment ...
ARTICLE 56. False Muster ...
ARTICLE 57. False Returns-Omission to Render Returns
...
ARTICLE 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion ...
ARTICLE 59. Desertion ...
ARTICLE 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert ...
ARTICLE 61. Entertaining a Deserter ...
ARTICLE 62. Absence Without Leave ...
ARTICLE 63. Disrespect toward the President, Vice-
President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of
National Defense ...
ARTICLE 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer ...
ARTICLE 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior
Officer ...
ARTICLE 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-
Commissioned Officer ...
ARTICLE 67. Mutiny or Sedition ...
ARTICLE 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition ...
ARTICLE 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders ...
ARTICLE 70. Arrest or Confinement ...
ARTICLE 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners ...
ARTICLE 73. Report of Prisoners Received ...

ARTICLE 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Proper Authority
...
ARTICLE 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities ...
ARTICLE 76. Misbehaviour Before the Enemy ...
ARTICLE 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to
Surrender ...
ARTICLE 78. Improper Use of Countersign ...
ARTICLE 79. Forcing a Safeguard ...
ARTICLE 80. Captured Property to Be Secured for Public
Service ...
ARTICLE 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property
...
ARTICLE 82. Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the
Enemy ...
ARTICLE 83. Spies ...
ARTICLE 84. Military Property — Willful or Negligent Loss,
Damage or Wrongful Disposition ...
ARTICLE 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military
Property Issued to Soldiers ...
ARTICLE 86. Drunk on Duty ...
ARTICLE 87. Misbehaviour of Sentinel ...
ARTICLE 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions ...
ARTICLE 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions
...
ARTICLE 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs
Redressed ...
ARTICLE 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures ...
ARTICLE 92. Dueling ...
....
ARTICLE 95. Frauds Against the Government Affecting
Matters and Equipments ...
ARTICLE 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman ...
ARTICLE 97. General Article ...
SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime
punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code.[52 Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the
case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by the
Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the
crime of kidnapping.53 The processes which the trial court
issued, therefore, were valid.
Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he
committed was not service-connected. The case filed
against him is none of those enumerated under Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War.
Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a
soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to
detain a person, the public officer must be able to show
the existence of legal grounds for the detention. Without
these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have
acted in a private capacity and is considered a "private
individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable
by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary detention
punished with significantly lower penalties.
The cases cited by respondents are on point. In People v.
Santiano,54 members of the Philippine National Police
were convicted of kidnapping with murder. On appeal,
they contended that they cannot be charged with
kidnapping considering that they were public officers.
This Court rejected the argument and said that "in
abducting and taking away the victim, [the accused] did
so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the
pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, that
they [committed the crime]."55 This Court, thus, affirmed
the conviction of the accused in Santiano.
In People v. PO1 Trestiza,56 members of the Philippine
National Police were initially charged with kidnapping for
ransom. The public prosecutor, however, filed a motion
to withdraw information before the trial court and filed a
new one for robbery. According to the public prosecutor,
the accused cannot be charged with kidnapping because
the crime may only be committed by private individuals.
Moreover, the accused argued that the detention was
allegedly part of a "legitimate police operation."
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw. It
examined the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet
presented by the defense and found that it was neither
authenticated nor its signatories presented in court. The
defense failed to show proof of a "legitimate police
operation" and, based on Santiano, the accused were
deemed to have acted in a private capacity in detaining
the victims. This Court affirmed the conviction of the
police officers for kidnapping.
It is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with
and be convicted of kidnapping
as Santiano and Trestiza illustrated. SSgt. Osorio's claim
that he was charged with an "inexistent crime" because
he is a public officer is, therefore, incorrect.
Further, since SSgt. Osorio is charged with a crime
committed in a private capacity, the Sandiganbayan
cannot take cognizance of the case. Under Presidential
Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan was created and
was vested jurisdiction over crimes or offenses
committed by public officers in relation in to their
offices.57
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were
issued by the court that has jurisdiction over the offense
charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal;
hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is already moot and
academic.[58 SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue
the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies, the first of which would be a motion to quash,
filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the
facts charged do not constitute an offense; the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so.59
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July 27, 2015 and
February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 141332 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.