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D. Suárez (&)
Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, CA, USA
e-mail: dsuarez@usc.edu
J. H. Marshall
San Miguel de Allende, Mexico
e-mail: jhm_1969@yahoo.com
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deux groupes et mettent également en lumière les niveaux globaux de capacité dans
ce secteur. L’analyse prend en compte une variété de dimensions organisationelles
liées à la capacité, telles que les caractéristiques structurelles et les pratiques con-
crètes de gestion. Les résultats suggèrent que les ONG internationales (ONGI)
possèdent généralement une capacité supérieure, mais que les niveaux globaux de
capacité sont relativement bas selon une variété de mesures. En conclusion, nous
présentons une analyse exploratoire de clusters qui identifie quatre groupes distincts
de NGO en fonction de leur capacité, offrant ainsi une image plus détaillée de la
diversité au sein de ce secteur. Ces résultats serviront non seulement pour établir un
agenda de recherches futures sur les progrès accomplis dans ce secteur, mais seront
aussi utiles aux études comparées d’ONG et aux programmes de développement de
capacité.
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percepciones adicionales sobre la diversidad dentro del sector. Estos hallazgos serán
útiles para la investigación comparativa de ONG y para los programas de creación
de capacidad, además de ayudar a establecer una agenda para que las futuras
investigaciones monitoricen el progreso.
Introduction
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Much of the literature on capacity building in the international context discusses the
policies of multilateral donor agencies, emphasizing changing perceptions of how to
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achieve development. For example, the World Bank and other large multilateral
agencies originally stressed direct lending to nation-states as an attempt to increase
institutional capacity (Fox and Brown 1998; Franks 1999; Kuhl 2009). Over time
this policy gave way to broader technical training approaches and a focus on human
resource development, reflected in efforts to transfer knowledge from the developed
world to the developing world and build local human capital. These policies have
extended to capacity-building programs for NGO development partners, organiza-
tions that can interface between local communities and public agencies. But
measuring and even defining capacity in organizations has proven to be quite
challenging (Brinkerhoff 2008; Kuhl 2009).
As the author of one of the first practical books on the management of
international development NGOs clarifies: ‘‘Improving capacity is a common aid
objective. Like other development concepts, there is little agreement on the
characteristics of organizational capacity or how to increase it’’ (Fowler 1997,
p. 187). Difficulties in defining and measuring NGO capacity are not limited to
international contexts or to development, with many studies of nonprofits (NGOs) in
the United States and England struggling to explain the term (Letts et al. 1999;
Kendall and Knapp 2000; Cairns et al. 2005). At the most basic level, capacity
refers to ‘‘a set of attributes that help or enable an organization to fulfill its
missions’’ (Eisinger 2002, p. 117). Nevertheless, applying this concrete and sensible
definition to organizations becomes problematic in practice because capacity has
multiple dimensions.
To begin with, in many instances capacity captures potential, or latent aspects of
organizations that presumably enable them to expand their repertoire of activities.
Characteristics of the staff, leadership, and the board fit into this category, where
more educated staff and engaged board members with diverse skills supposedly
translate into capacity. Rather than capturing actual activities of organizations, these
types of measures are treated as resources that can be mobilized when necessary.
Other aspects of NGOs define or characterize the infrastructure of an organization,
but these features still identify potential rather than activity. For instance, the size of
an organization could be relevant to capacity if larger organizations are presumed to
have more available resources for getting work done. Similarly, the age of an
organization might influence capacity, especially if younger organizations confront
the ‘‘liability of newness’’ and the need to overcome initial operational challenges
(Korten 1987).
Besides looking at the characteristics of an organization and its staff, leadership,
and board, a complementary approach to investigating capacity emphasizes the
activities of the NGO. To begin with, formalization (organizational definition) refers
to many of the basic operational practices that separate NGOs from informal civil
society groups and social movement organizations (Roberts et al. 2005). NGOs that
develop a formal mission statement, create a board of directors, and develop
standard operating procedures are more formalized than NGOs that operate with
looser controls, and formalization could imply capacity. In addition, rationalization
refers to the adoption of modern management practices like strategic planning, the
creation of annual reports, and practices related to monitoring and evaluation
(Carman 2009; Hwang and Powell 2009; Carman and Fredericks 2010). These
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Cambodia once was the center of the Khmer Empire, an empire that reached its
zenith between the ninth and the thirteenth century and then declined slowly
(Chandler 2008). After a period as a French Protectorate, Cambodia became a
sovereign nation-state in 1953, and in 1975 a communist group led by Pol Pot took
control of the country. The Khmer Rouge, as the insurgents were called,
implemented an extremely repressive regime whose agrarian policies also caused
famine, leading to the deaths of as many as 2 million people during their short reign
(Kiernan 2002; Gottesman 2004). In fact, nearly one quarter of the Cambodian
population died during the roughly 4 years the Khmer Rouge were in power,
1
The Civicus survey discusses the institutional environment for NGOs (the political and regulatory
context) while also integrating measures of individual participation in organizations, value orientations
toward participation in civil society, and indicators of NGO capacity. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for drawing our attention to this tool.
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In order to analyze issues such as capacity across the entire NGO sector in
Cambodia, it was necessary to create a nationally representative sample. There are
roughly 3,000 NGOs in the official registration lists maintained by the Ministry of
Interior (for local NGOs) and Council of Ministers (for international NGOs). In
theory these lists define the total NGO population in Cambodia, but a more realistic
population corresponds to the NGO directory maintained by another government
agency, the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC). As of August 2010,
there were 1,240 NGOs listed in this directory.2 The CDC directory is easily
accessed through an online search function (www.cdc.khmer.biz), and membership
is more regularly updated compared with the Ministry of Interior and Council of
Ministers lists.
The sample was created in August 2010 based on the CDC online directory. A
total of 230 NGOs were chosen randomly, divided evenly between international and
local NGO categories.3 The intended sample of 230 was reduced to 180
organizations that we could actually verify as being active.4 After initial contact
these 180 NGOs received a formal letter of invitation to participate in the survey.
The letter was then followed up by phone calls, emails and, in some cases,
re-sending the letter of invitation. Of the 180 organizations we attempted to
interview we were successful in 135 cases. This gives a survey response rate of
135/180, or 75 %. These did vary somewhat significantly by NGO type: 83 % of
local NGOs were interviewed versus 67 % of international NGOs (p = 0.01).
We use weights to address the potential bias introduced by non-response and
non-proportional sampling across local and international NGO categories. For
2
We chose to use the CDC list because the larger lists from the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of
Interior are not updated regularly and are missing a great deal of data on how to contact the NGOs (i.e.,
phone numbers, addresses, emails). Admittedly our approach could overlook some of the very smallest
organizations that are operational yet do not end up on the CDC list.
3
We sampled INGOs and NGOs evenly because we were concerned about potential non-response
problems, especially in relation to our overall sample size. There are many more NGOs than INGOs, and
by oversampling the INGOs we increased the likelihood of having a sufficient number of each for valid
statistical analysis.
4
This process involved phone calls, emails, website, and phone directory searches, and actual visits to
offices.
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5
We also are grateful to several scholars who conducted research on Ugandan NGOs and provided us
with a copy of their survey.
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6
Other fields represented in the sector include environment, governance, and arts and culture. In general,
we did not find major capacity differences by field, but the small sample size for some of the fields makes
statistical comparison problematic.
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Infrastructure
Age category .000***
1–5 years 15.8 14.0 18.6 –
6–10 years 29.2 25.8 35.0 –
11–20 years 48.5 60.2 28.8 –
20? years 6.6 0.0 17.8 –
Age (mean, years) 12.6 11.6 14.4 .104
Size category .001***
Less than $10,000 USD 8.4 13.2 0.0 –
$10,000–$25,000 14.6 20.5 4.4 –
$25,000–$50,000 8.5 9.9 6.2 –
$50,000–$100,000 18.6 20.6 15.0 –
$100,000–$250,000 12.6 13.7 10.5 –
$250,000–$500,000 13.7 11.3 17.9 –
$500,000–$1 million 9.7 6.8 14.8 –
More than $1 million 14.0 4.0 31.2 –
Size (mean, 1–8 scale) 4.6 3.8 6.0 .000***
No financial constraints 19.1 11.0 33.0 .003**
No equipment constraints 54.7 43.4 73.9 .001***
No transport constraints 50.7 35.7 76.3 .000***
Note Unless otherwise stated, all numbers are percentages. –, not applicable
Significant at *** p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05
influence a variety of outcomes, and we find that INGO leaders have significantly more
business experience than NGO leaders (Hwang and Powell 2009; Leroux and Wright
2010).7 Unlike many of the indicators for leadership, the measures for staff training
and needs do not reveal statistically significant differences in professionalization
between INGOs and NGOs (Cumming 2008).
Table 2 also contains our results for governance in NGOs. Almost all
organizations in our sample have a board of directors (88 % of local NGOs and
93 % of INGOs). Most boards are quite small, with an average of six members, and
boards meet approximately three times a year. Differences between INGOs and
NGOs are statistically significant for these measures, with boards of INGOs
involving more members and meeting more regularly.8 The relative infrequency of
meetings suggests weak NGO-board ties, and 20 % of leaders did not know how
7
Our survey did not ask about the value orientations of leaders, indicators that would have been useful
for capturing the organizational culture of an NGO. While we have some data on the characteristics of
leaders (gender, race, age), we do not present that information as part of capacity. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to these issues.
8
For INGOs *70 % report having boards that meet in other countries (i.e., the home country). Another
15 % have boards that are established in Cambodia, while about 8 % of INGOs have boards that meet
both locally and in another country.
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Note Unless otherwise stated, all numbers are percentages. –, not applicable
*** Significant at p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05
many members were on their board or how frequently the board met. If these
responses are additional indicators of the relationship between the board and the
leadership in an NGO, then governance may be one of the larger capacity challenges
in the sector.
Moving from our measures of potential to our measures of actions in NGOs,
Table 3 discusses formalization and rationalization. Formalization refers to basic
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Formalization
Mission statement 84.7 84.5 84.9 .959
Manual of procedures (SOPs) 94.4 96.0 91.6 .290
Written a grant proposal 88.5 91.8 83.0 .132
Produces an annual budget 91.1 87.3 97.3 .028*
Produces financial reports .354
Never 4.4 6.2 1.3 –
Annually 28.6 29.1 27.9 –
Twice per year 10.6 11.9 8.4 –
Quarterly 21.8 17.3 29.4 –
Monthly 34.6 35.6 33.0 –
Compares planned to actual expenses .158
Never 6.8 10.7 0.0 –
Annually 12.5 13.9 10.0 –
Twice per year 8.6 7.3 10.9 –
Quarterly 16.7 14.6 20.2 –
Monthly 55.5 53.4 58.9 –
Rationalization
Independent financial audit 59.8 53.7 69.8 .080?
Strategic planning 76.1 70.5 85.5 .061?
Annual reports 88.7 84.8 95.3 .069?
Hires consultants 40.1 33.7 51.0 .056?
Maintains active website 67.0 50.2 95.1 .000***
Sets program targets 76.7 72.6 83.5 .165
Quantitative needs assessments 52.1 51.1 53.6 .786
Formal needs model (i.e., PRA) 14.6 18.2 8.4 .095?
Program evaluations 87.7 83.5 94.5 .077?
Quantitative program evaluations 31.7 24.8 43.2 .028*
Note Unless otherwise stated, all numbers are percentages. –, not applicable
?
Significant at *** p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05, p\.10
activities that separate NGOs from more informal civil society organizations, and
rationalization captures the extent to which NGOs adopt and embrace management
practices. Starting with formalization, *85 % or more of NGOs develop a mission
statement, create a manual of standard operating procedures, write grant proposals,
and produce annual reports. The only major difference between INGOs and NGOs
is with respect to producing annual budgets, where 87 % of local NGOs produce
those documents compared to 97 % of international NGOs. In order to get a better
sense of how NGOs use financial data, we also asked about financial reports and
comparisons of actual expenditures to planned expenditures. The majority of NGOs
and INGOs compare planned to actual expenditures on a monthly basis, and most
organizations produce financial reports quarterly or more frequently.
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Financial resources
Funding sources (mean, 1–8 scale) 2.3 2.3 2.3 .987
International NGO 59.4 58.8 60.5 .843
National NGO 10.6 16.9 0 .002**
United Nations 3.5 3.5 3.4 .972
Governments 30.3 22.3 43.7 .012*
Multilateral donors 16.7 19.8 11.4 .177
Foundations 22.8 20.8 26.2 .466
Individual donations 56.9 55.5 59.3 .670
Earned income (PSR) 29.4 32.1 24.8 .380
Relational embeddedness
Belongs to professional networks 80.5 85.3 72.8 .128
Network memberships (mean) 2.2 2.3 2.1 .731
Voluntary certification awareness 43.1 39.6 49.1 .288
Positive government relations 57.1 52.3 64.9 .158
Training for government 53.0 47.7 61.8 .126
Lobby government 32.6 30.2 36.6 .450
Express community complaints 40.0 43.2 29.2 .099?
Consults community about needs 22.2 20.1 25.9 .458
Consults partners about needs 23.9 20.8 29.3 .305
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9
No organizations have funding from the Cambodian government.
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Few studies have attempted to create typologies of capacity in the nonprofit sector,
and cluster analysis provides a useful statistical tool for defining categories of
organizations. In our case, we considered two possible outcomes from the cluster
analysis of our 135 sampled organizations. The first was a fairly straightforward
ordering of capacity along a low-to-high scale, as in Carman and Fredericks’ (2010)
analysis of outcome measurement capacity. However, we also anticipated results
where NGO groups would cluster by ‘‘latent’’ capacity (infrastructure, human
resources, governance) and concrete actions (formalization, rationalization, external
relationships), aligning with our conceptual frame. Based on the actual results we
find a combination of these alternatives, with two high-capacity groups that differ
primarily by the extent to which they emphasize external relations. A third cluster is
a medium capacity group with moderately high scores for formalization and
rationalization, and the fourth group is low for all dimensions of capacity. In the
following paragraphs we briefly describe these four groups (using the output
summarized in Table 5), which we term networkers, translators, aspirants, and
laggards.
Networkers
Networkers represent the first of two high-capacity groups in Table 5. This group of
NGOs is the smallest of the clusters, with 14 organizations (or roughly 10 % of the
sample), and the group is dominated by local organizations with substantial
resources. Because many studies emphasize the importance of building the local
NGO sector in developing countries, rather than relying entirely on international
NGOs, this cluster demonstrates that an important group of professionalized local
NGOs are operating in Cambodia (Lewis 2007; Brinkerhoff 2008). These
organizations on average have slightly more than $500,000 in revenue (annual),
and they have adopted the large majority of ‘‘best practices’’ in NGO management.
For instance, all of the organizations in this cluster engage in strategic planning,
produce annual reports, and commission independent audits. But the aspect of NGO
management that most distinguishes this group from other clusters is the extent to
which they emphasize external relations. All of the organizations in this cluster
participate in networks, and they average far more memberships than organizations
in other clusters. These NGOs are especially linked to government, with over 60 %
of leaders having government experience. Moreover, these NGOs are the most
likely to have (foreign) government funding, they are the most likely to train
government staff, and the most likely to lobby and advocate on behalf of local
communities. In many respects, these organizations resemble quasi-NGOs (QUAN-
GOs), organizations with dense ties to government, yet the NGOs in our sample
receive no funding from the Cambodian government.10
10
The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for mentioning similarities to QUANGOs.
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Table 5 continued
Note Several variables from earlier tables are not included in this table because they do not help to clarify
cluster membership (means are similar across clusters). The sample size does not reach the total of 135
due to missing data
Significant at *** p \ .01, ** p \ .05, * p \ .10
Translators
Translators are the second high-capacity group in our study. The 42 organizations in
this cluster are labeled as translators for three reasons. First, the group is dominated
by international NGOs, or organizations that specialize in humanitarian and
development work. Over 70 % of the NGOs in this cluster are international, well
above the mean for the sample as a whole. Prior research suggests that INGOs are
‘‘carriers’’ of modern practices, acting as translators between global and local
contexts (Boli and Thomas 1999; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002; Drori et al.
2006). Second, the organizations in this cluster are active in training government
employees, indicating that they do in fact play a direct role in building capacity.
Third, in related research we find that local NGOs with funding from international
NGOs are much more likely to monitor and evaluate their work, suggesting that
INGOs also have an indirect role in spreading ideas about appropriate management
practices (Marshall and Suárez 2012).
The organizations in this cluster are larger than organizations in other clusters,
with an average of *$500,000 in revenues, and they are the most firmly established
(the oldest). NGOs in this group also have similar levels of formalization and
rationalization as the networkers. For example, the leaders in this group are the most
educated of the leaders in the four clusters, and at least 90 % of the organizations in
this group develop strategic plans, create annual reports, and actively maintain their
websites. The only major difference between translators and networkers has to do
with the extensiveness of social ties, or linkages to the broader environment.
Translators are professionalized nonprofits, and they are more embedded in
networks than NGOs in the remaining two clusters, but they are characterized more
by financial monitoring and controls than by memberships in associations.
Aspirants
The aspirants are a unique group in our study because they are substantially lower in
their adoption of standard management practices than networkers and translators,
yet they can be characterized as having mid-range capacity for the large majority of
formalization and rationalization measures. For instance, over 90 % of the
organizations in this cluster have governing boards and produce annual budgets,
but less than 80 % have a mission statement or have produced a strategic plan.
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Moreover, the NGOs in this group are much less likely than the two high-capacity
groups to commission independent audits or hire consultants, and they are less
involved in developing needs assessment models for their programs. Nevertheless,
these organizations monitor their finances as regularly as the networkers, and they
seem to be quite aware of management trends.
Besides the formalization and rationalization characteristics that differentiate
them from the other clusters, the aspirants also tend to be much smaller and more
likely to be based in the provinces (rather than the capital, Phnom Penh). As an
indicator of capacity, in this instance size appears to be quite relevant, as these
NGOs are much smaller than those in the high-capacity clusters. Finally, in
comparison to the translators and the networkers, the aspirants are not very involved
in developing external relations. Though the translators can be distinguished from
the networkers by their lower reliance on external relations, it is important to
reiterate that the translators are much more active in networks than aspirants.
Laggards
The fourth and final group of NGOs in our study is the laggards. The laggards are
labeled as such because they are nearly identical to the aspirants with respect to size,
age, and concentration in the provinces, but they are lower than the aspirants on
virtually every measure of capacity. Compared to the other clusters, these
organizations have leaders with the least education and who have served their
organizations the longest, and they also have the least educated staff who have
attended trainings the least frequently. The organizations in this cluster are not
necessarily resisters to professionalization, but the lack of human resources may
pose challenges for adopting common management practices.
Viewed in this manner, it might not be entirely surprising that these organizations
are substantially less likely than NGOs in other clusters to have a website, to
develop strategic plans or annual reports, or even to have annual budgets and
mission statements. At the same time, the organizations are laggards in the sense
that they are not newcomers to the development scene, having an average of more
than 11 years in operation. The organizations are not particularly active in external
relations either, with just over 60 % belonging to networks. In fact, the laggards are
the most isolated of all the clusters, perhaps reducing their likelihood of exposure to
new practices and contacts that could help to implement those management
practices.
Discussion
The number of NGOs continues to expand globally, and in many countries NGOs
are an important economic force and driver of development (Boli and Thomas 1999;
Roberts et al. 2005; Anheier and Salamon 2006). NGOs are a powerful social force
at the local and international level too, bringing communities together for civic
events and influencing policy through advocacy campaigns. Despite the growing
role of NGOs in service provision and advocacy at both the global and local levels,
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very few studies have presented systematic data on the characteristics and
management structures of these organizations (Edwards and Fowler 2002; Barr et al.
2005; Barr and Fafchamps 2006; Lewis 2007).
We contribute to the extant literature by addressing capacity in local and
international NGOs in Cambodia, a country where NGOs play a pivotal
development role. Using data derived from a nationally representative stratified
random sample of NGOs, the results highlight important differences between local
and international NGOs as well as variability in many of our measures of capacity.
The variability in the measures for capacity suggests differences that go beyond the
local-international dichotomy, and a cluster analysis indeed revealed four distinct
NGO groups. The four clusters suggest that it might be possible to target
interventions to strengthen capacity, offering several implications for our study and
potential areas for future research.
The formal networks that exist in Cambodia provide diverse trainings for
members, and our interviews clarify that those trainings are relevant for improving
capacity in the sector. Given that the two lowest capacity groups in our sample are
the groups with the fewest network memberships, improving the reach of
intermediary network organizations could produce substantial capacity improve-
ments in the NGO sector overall. Simultaneously, NGOs could be encouraged to
consider the importance of extending beyond the boundaries of their organizations.
A growing body of literature in public and nonprofit management stresses the
growing interdependence of organizations and the relevance of collaboration
(Fowler 1997; Vangen and Huxham 2003; Suárez 2011). Building networks might
be useful for increasing capacity as well as for creating new collaborative
opportunities.
Besides drawing attention to the relevance of intermediary organizations, our
results offer alternatives for how to approach capacity-building initiatives. On the
one hand, capacity-building programs could target the low capacity organizations
that potentially have the most to gain from assistance. On the other hand, the middle
capacity organizations already have adopted a variety of important management
practices and may be very amenable to additional training. These organizations
might be the most eager to learn and implement new ideas. Capacity-building
initiatives could consider targeting organizations in rural areas as well, using high-
capacity organizations to assist in training other organizations. If foundations and
government donor agencies were to integrate funding for collaborative training into
their current initiatives, they may be able to avoid some of the common pitfalls of
the past (Wing 2004).
Extending this idea, the group of NGOs we identified as ‘‘translators’’ in our
statistical analysis could be especially useful for collaborative training initiatives.
The organizations in this cluster are active in training government employees and
they belong to a variety of intermediary organizations, but they could become more
engaged at the community level. The large majority of the translators are INGOs
based in Phnom Penh. To extend their reach they could partner with local NGOs in
the provinces and integrate capacity building into their programming, or translators
could work more directly with intermediary organizations that already provide
trainings in the provinces. Though most INGOs make significant contributions to
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development, in some instances they have been viewed as opportunistic and quick
to follow resources (Dichter 2003). Since the organizations in the translator cluster
have operated in the country longer than organizations in any other cluster, they
appear to be quite committed to Cambodia, and collaborations could be a way to
leverage their resources.
While our study has a variety of practical implications, future research can
extend this work in several directions. First, our study builds from other academic
work on NGO capacity, yet no definitive methods or metrics exist for assessing
capacity. Moreover, many different NGOs, development agencies, foundations and
consulting groups have their own legitimate approaches to capacity measurement
and capacity building (Bond 2012; Interaction 2012; McKinsey and Company 2012;
TCC Group 2012). To encourage greater exchange among practitioners and
academics, we attempt to be as transparent about our measures as possible, both in
our tables and in our descriptive results. New studies can extend or challenge the
framework we have created here by distributing capacity surveys to a broad
audience, sharing empirical results, and debating measurement issues.
Second, capacity is not a straightforward, unambiguous synonym for organiza-
tional effectiveness (Fowler 1997; Sowa et al. 2004; Schuh and Leviton 2006;
Christensen and Gazley 2008). Sociological institutionalism suggests that organi-
zations adopt management practices to appear modern, not simply because of
evidence that given practices produce clear benefits (Drori et al. 2006; Hwang and
Powell 2009). The implication is that many management practices are ‘‘rationalized
myths’’ that provide legitimacy for organizations without necessarily improving
their ability to achieve mission (Staw and Epstein 2000). In order to assess this
argument for NGOs, future research should identify the linkages between capacity
and effectiveness, a very challenging task.
Depending on the service being provided or the particular NGO field (i.e., human
rights, health), the relevant aspects of capacity that contribute to effectiveness may
be very specific (Herman 1990; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Dart 2010). In addition,
it is not entirely clear that a sum total of capacity measures can be used to ‘‘pick
winners’’ and isolate the most effective organizations. Though some relationship or
correlation likely exists between capacity and effectiveness, the association does not
have to be linear, and understanding performance requires a deep knowledge of why
NGOs build capacity and how NGOs enact that capacity (Herman and Renz 1999;
Sowa et al. 2004; Millesen et al. 2010). Complicating the issue even further, some
empirical studies find that a specific dimension of capacity can be relevant for an
outcome in one situation and not necessarily in another. Taken together, prior
research dramatizes the importance of context when considering the relationship
between capacity and performance (Eisinger 2002; Leroux and Wright 2010).
Finally, beyond exploring how capacity influences organizational effectiveness,
future research also should study potential tradeoffs to capacity building. Some
studies of NGOs in the United States find that professionalization leads to decreases
in community involvement, indicating that capacity building programs are not a
panacea for strengthening civil society (Staggenborg 1988; Skocpol 2003). While a
great deal of faith exists in the potential for NGOs to build social capital and
contribute to democratic governance in countries throughout the world,
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Acknowledgments We would like to thank Bunly Seng and his research team for helping us to
implement the survey.
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