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Tens of thousands of Muslim Rohingya have fled Myanmar, many taking to the sea
to try to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The latest surge in refugees was
prompted by a long-building crisis: the discriminatory policies of the Myanmar
government in Rakhine state, which have caused hundreds of thousands of
Rohingya to flee since the late 1970s. Their plight has been compounded by the
responses of many of Myanmar’s neighbors, which have been slow to take in
refugees for fear of a migrant influx they feel incapable of handling.
The Rohingya trace their origins in the region to the fifteenth century when
thousands of Muslims came to the former Arakan Kingdom. Many others arrived
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Bengal and the Rakhine
territory were governed by colonial rule as part of British India. Since independence
in 1948, successive governments in Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989, have refuted
the Rohingya’s historical claims and denied the group recognition as one of the
country’s 135 ethnic groups. The Rohingya are largely identified as illegal Bengali
immigrants, despite the fact that many Rohingya have resided in Myanmar for
centuries.
Both the Myanmar government and the Rakhine state’s dominant ethnic Buddhist
group, known as the Rakhine, reject the use of the label "Rohingya," a self-identifying
term (PDF) that surfaced in the 1950s and that experts say provides the group with a
collective, political identity. Though the etymological root of the word is disputed,
the most widely accepted origin is that "Rohang" is a derivation of the word
"Arakan" in the Rohingya dialect and the "ga" or "gya" means "from." By identifying
as Rohingya, the ethnic Muslim group asserts its ties to land that was once under the
control of the Arakan Kingdom, according to Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan
Project, a Thailand-based advocacy group.
What is the legal status of the Rohingya?
The Myanmar government refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship status, and as a
result the vast majority of the group’s members have no legal documentation,
effectively making them stateless. Though Myanmar’s 1948 citizenship law was
already exclusionary, the military junta introduced a citizenship law in 1982 whose
strict provisions stripped the Rohingya of access to full citizenship. Until recently,
the Rohingya have been able to register as temporary residents with identification
cards, known as "white cards," which Myanmar’s regime began issuing to many
Muslims (both Rohingya and non-Rohingya) in the 1990s. The white cards conferred
(PDF) some limited rights but were not recognized as proof of citizenship. Although
the temporary cards held no legal value, Lewa says that the IDs did represent some
minimal recognition of temporary stay for the Rohingya in Myanmar.
In 2014 the government held a UN-backed national census—its first in thirty years.
The Muslim minority group was initially permitted to self-identify as "Rohingya,"
but after Buddhist nationalists threatened to boycott the census, the government
decided the Rohingya could only register if they identified as Bengali.
Similarly, under pressure from Buddhist nationalists protesting the Rohingya’s right
to vote in a 2015 constitutional referendum, then-President Thein Sein cancelled the
temporary ID cards in February 2015, effectively revoking their newly gained right to
vote—white card holders had been allowed to vote in Myanmar’s 2008 constitutional
referendum and 2010 general elections. In the 2015 elections, which were widely
touted as being free and fair by international monitors, no parliamentary
candidate was of the Muslim faith. "Country-wide anti-Muslim sentiment
(PDF) makes it politically difficult for the [central] government to take steps seen as
supportive of Muslim rights," writes the International Crisis Group.
Despite the documentation by rights groups and researchers of
systematic disenfranchisement, violence, and instances of anti-Muslim campaigns
(PDF), Muslim minorities continue to "consolidate under one Rohingya identity"
says Lewa.
Why are the Rohingya fleeing Myanmar?
Government policies, including restrictions (PDF) on marriage, family planning,
employment, education, religious choice, and freedom of movement have
institutionalized systemic discrimination against the ethnic group. The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Parliamentarians for Human Rights wrote in
April 2015 that "the longstanding persecution of Rohingya has led to the highest
outflow of asylum seekers by sea [in the region] since the U.S. war in Vietnam."
Rakhine state is also Myanmar’s least developed state, with more than 78 percent of
households living below the poverty threshold, according to World Bank estimates.
Widespread poverty, weak infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities
exacerbate the cleavage between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya. This tension is
deepened by religious differences that have at times erupted into conflict.
Violence broke out in 2012, when a group of Rohingya men were accused of raping
and killing a Buddhist woman. Groups of Buddhist nationalists burned Rohingya
homes and killed more than 280 people, displacing tens of thousands of people.
Human Rights Watch described the anti-Rohingya violence as amounting to crimes
against humanity (PDF) carried out as part of a "campaign of ethnic cleansing." Since
2012, the region’s displaced population has been forced to take shelter in squalid
refugee camps. More than 120,000 Muslims, predominantly Rohingya, are still
housed in more than forty internment camps, according to regional rights
organization Fortify Rights.
Many Rohingya have turned to smugglers, choosing to pay for transport out of
Myanmar to escape persecution. "The fact that thousands of Rohingya prefer a
dangerous boat journey they may not survive to staying in Myanmar speaks
volumes about the conditions they face there," says Amnesty International’s Kate
Schuetze. Fleeing repression and extreme poverty, more than eighty-eight thousand
migrants took to sea from the Bay of Bengal between January 2014 and May 2015,
according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
A series of attacks on security posts along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border in
October 2016 revived ethnic violence in Rakhine state. Local government and
authorities blamed Rohingya militants for the attacks, prompting an inflow of
military and police forces to support a manhunt for those responsible and to tighten
security. Dozens of people were killed in raids and more than thirty thousand
displaced internally. "There's historical precedent for the authorities using lethal
force against Rohingya in the area and we're concerned a crackdown is unfolding,"
says Matthew Smith, chief executive of Fortify Rights, a Southeast Asia-based
advocacy group.
Human Rights Watch released satellite imagery showing the fresh destruction of
hundreds of Rohingya homes in October and November 2016, the most deadly spate
of violence since 2012. Reports in November indicated that the security lockdown
was also preventing the entry of much-needed food and medical care from
international agencies into villages. Later that month, John McKissick, head of the
UN refugee agency, said the Myanmar government was carrying out "ethnic
cleansing" of the Rohingya people. Malaysia’s foreign minister described the
Myanmar government’s actions as ethnic cleansing and called on stopping the
practice. Separately, protestors gathered in cities in Thailand, Indonesia, and
Bangladesh to condemn the killing and persecution of Rohingya. Meanwhile, the
Myanmar government has focused its messaging on its efforts to "maintain peace and
stability" in the country.
"An international response that consists primarily of assigning blame for this
humanitarian tragedy is no longer tenable. It is time for the international community to
organize a realistic, workable solution."— Priscilla Clapp, senior advisor at the United
States Institute of Peace and former U.S. mission chief in Myanmar.
At least 65,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar - a third of them
over the past week - since the army launched a crackdown in the north of Rakhine
state three months ago, according to the UN.
The announcement on Monday came the same day as Yanghee Lee, the UN's human
rights envoy for Myanmar, began a 12-day visit to probe violence in the country's
borderlands.
"Over the past week, 22,000 new arrivals were reported to have crossed the border
from Rakhine state," the UN's relief agency said in its weekly report.
The exodus of Rohingya from northern Rakhine began after Myanmar's army
launched clearance operations while searching for fighters behind deadly raids on
police border posts in October.
Human rights groups say the military campaign has been marred by abuses so
severe they could amount to crimes against humanity.
In Bangladesh, escapees from the persecuted Muslim minority have given harrowing
accounts of security forces committing mass rape, murder and arson.
The stories have cast a pall over the young government of Aung San Suu Kyi, with
mainly Muslim Malaysia being especially critical.
Myanmar's government has said the claims of abuse are fabricated and launched a
special commission to investigate the allegations.
Last week, it presented its interim report, denying accusations of "genocide and
religious persecution" and saying there was insufficient evidence that troops had
been committing rape.
The report came days after a video emerged showing police beating Rohingya
civilians, something the government said was an isolated incident after the officers
were arrested.
On Monday, the UN's Lee began her own investigation with a visit to Kachin state,
where thousands have been displaced by fighting between ethnic rebels and the
army.
Lee, who has faced threats and demonstrations on previous visits over her
comments on Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya, is due to visit Rakhine before
leaving on January 20.
Hardline Buddhist monk Wirathu caused outrage when he called her a "whore in our
country" for criticizing controversial legislation considered discriminatory to women
and minorities.
........................................
Rohingya issue in Bangladesh and what are the role of Bangladesh on mitigating the
crisis of Rohingya?
Rohingya’s are probably one of the only ethnic groups in the world whose existence is
denied despite their presence. They are one of the 136 ethnic groups in Myanmar had
been most widely used as a political Pawn in the country.
Rohingya’s constitute 1% of total population and 4% of the Arakhan state population of
Myanmar. Although they have become pawns in the game of colonial and postcolonial
politics. Now around 32000 registered Rohingya’s are living in 2 refugee camp in Ukhia
aand Teknaf. The Bangladesh government has introduced free education up to class 6,
vocational skill training, computer training and primary and secondary healthcare to
prepare them for better life when they voluntarily return to their Homeland. Besides, 3-5
lakhs undocumented Rohingya’s are staying in different parts of Bangladesh.
Refugee International estimates that 29000 Rohingya live in official refugee camps in
Bangladesh, while another 20000 are in unofficial camps, read the article like it
categorically denied legal protections and humanitarian assistance. Although the
UNHCR has expressed its willingness to help the Bangladeshi government cover the
cost of additional services and registering refugees. Bangladesh refuses to act. The
UNHCR and other internal NGOs have offered numerous proposal for ways to improve
the situation, but the government continues to drag its feet.
Why the Bangladesh, the homeland of Muslim Bengali, reluctant to take on more
Muslim Rohingya refugees? An obvious answer it would seem, is Bangladesh's own
poverty and economical framework policy. However, the real explanation is more
complex. Bangladesh has proven to be recalcitrant on the Rohingya issues for 2 closely
interwind reasons such as Governmental incapacity and a complex Bangladesh and
Myanmar borders.
There are very tangible and viable steps that Bangladesh can pursue to alleviate the
dire plight of the rohingyas.
Firstly, Bangladesh trying to resolve the growing Rohingya crisis using international
channels
Secondly, seeking support from United Nations and unhcr to handle the situation
Then, To formulate a well migrant policy comply with international standards
Finally, to keep pressuring Myanmar government through some ASEAN member
countries and International NGOs.
In conclusion, Bangladesh is a peaceful country since the emergence of Bangladesh.
She has been living in peaceful co-existence. Her foreign policy is Friendship to all but
malice to none. The Rohingya from Myanmar has become a major problem for
Bangladesh. The Rohingya are being tyrannized by the Myanmar government for which
they have entered into Bangladesh as a political victim and as a refugee.
........................................
The epic victory of the National League for Democracy in the landmark national
election in Myanmar in November 2015 grabbed worldwide headlines. Not so the
Rohingyas refugee crisis. In fact, the Rohingyas emergency has received far less
media attention than its magnitude would seem to warrant, possibly due to the
concurrent migration crisis in Europe. Indeed, the differences in media coverage
between the two humanitarian emergencies are striking, especially considering their
many similarities, including the thousands of lives at risk, the hundreds of deaths at
sea, the involvement of smugglers, and the ambiguous behavior of the concerned
countries regarding the migrants’ acceptance and their international protection.
However, one of the biggest (and most important) differences between the two
emergencies is that in the Rohingya case, unlike in the European context, none of
the involved states is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor its 1967
Protocol. Furthermore, the lack of a formal regional asylum framework has made the
Rohingyas emergency that much more acute—and tragic.
The story of their persecution dates back even before the establishment of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, precisely during Second World War. During the
war the Rohingyas declared their loyalty to the British, while the remaining part of
the population, the Arakanese (Arakan is the former name of Rakhine State),
decided to side with the Japanese. Even after the establishment of Myanmar in
1948, this Muslim minority had to face a constant anti-Rohingya campaign
characterized by denial of their rights and discrimination. The anti-Rohingya events
culminated in violent episodes carried out by the military junta in 1978 and again in
1991 which drove 200,000 and 250,000 Rohingyas, respectively, out of the country
to Bangladesh, where they immediately found protection.[3] In addition to the
violence against Rohingyas in subsequent years—including the destruction of
mosques and schools in Rakhine State—discrimination against them was
institutionalized politically with the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law.[4] The
new law denied them Burmese citizenship making them stateless. Myanmar’s
government does not recognize Rohingyas among the national races (like it does for
Barman or Arakanese) even if there is evidence proving they were born in the
country, and thus refers to them as “Bengali,” illegal immigrants.[5]
The Rohingya community has suffered the abridgement of fundamental rights, such
as freedom of movement, religion, employment, and access to education—a
situation made worse by additional measures taken against ethnic identity that limit
their rights to get married or even to have children.[6] Consequently, over the years
Myanmar, and especially the Rakhine State, has registered an increase in the
number of people fleeing the country, mainly towards safer neighboring States.[7]
Figure 1. Refugees from Myanmar (1978-2014)
Although this data refers to all Myanmar refugees, and therefore also includes those
escaping other forms of persecution, what is interesting here is the escalation of the
exodus occurring in 1978 and 1992-1993, during discriminatory measures
undertaken by Burmese authorities against Rohingyas. The data also shows,
beginning in 2005, a sharp rise in the number of stateless people and Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs)—undoubtedly including some Rohingyas.
It is also important to note that the persecution of Rohingyas has fueled widespread
tension among local ethnic groups, as confirmed by several episodes of violence
caused by Rohingyas. This is demonstrated in 2012 when a young Arakanese
women was raped and killed by three Rohingyas giving rise to fights and several
deaths in a number of villages.[8] Fighting ensued, including Arakanese and
Buddhist monks, as well as the national army, which instead of securing the region,
watched or even joined the Arakanese mobs. Inevitably, thousands of individuals
were forced to flee, crossing borders illegally, through the Naf River or alternative
maritime routes, in order to reach safer states, such as Bangladesh, Thailand,
Malaysia, and—more recently—Indonesia.
Therefore, the 2015 exodus, during which thousands of Rohingyas fled the country
on hazardous journeys by boat, is just a consequence of the escalation of
discrimination and violence occurring in the Rakhine region.
Since 1978, Bangladesh has represented the first destination of Rohingya asylum
seekers, considering the proximity, the common religion, and—most importantly—
because Bangladeshi authorities initially recognized the humanitarian needs of
these undocumented Myanmar migrants. According to U.N.H.C.R., about 32,000
registered Rohingyas currently live in two government-run camps, near Cox’s Bazar,
in Kutupalong and Nayapara, while it is estimated that an additional 200,000
unregistered Rohingya refugees live nearby in unofficial camps.[9] Although it might
seem a relief that this contingent of asylum seekers settled in a safer country, life in
these camps is dire, as many of them live without enough food, and have very
limited access to education and work opportunities.[10]
Although Bangladesh has proven to be open to this minority, it is clear that it is not,
or maybe cannot be, totally committed to finding a durable solution to this issue.
After all, Bangladesh ranks among the poorest and most populated country in the
region.[11] This leads to national authorities being more focused on internal
questions (in particular with reference to a possible labor market unbalance, as
Rohingyas would accept unskilled jobs at lower wages). Furthermore, Bangladeshi
politicians have always regarded Rohingyas acceptance and settlement as
temporary. Paradoxically, Bangladesh itself has considered this Myanmar minority
as illegal migrants, denying them the possibility to obtain citizenship.
Moreover, following the spring 2015 migration emergency, Bangladesh has turned
away new migrants, and has declared on several occasions the intention to start a
repatriation program. Luckily, this plan was not accomplished;[12] however it gave
rise to a “ping-pong” strategy with the other destination countries, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Indonesia that evidently shows their reluctance to take any
international responsibility.[13]
What the media described during May and June 2015 is just the tip of the iceberg
with long-lasting humanitarian crisis, which, worst of all—apart from the numbers of
refugees, the human trafficking, and the deaths—has an absence of any
international attention. Instead, regional actors inevitably are more involved in
refugee protection.
At the same time, rejection of migrants and projects for refugees’ assisted return are
not the proper answer at the moment, since their lives are still at risk. In fact, a top
official in Aun San Suu Kyi’s administration has said that addressing Rohingya
tension is not a top priority of the nation.[15] Moreover, Myanmar cannot be
considered politically stable, especially from the ethnic point of view. Besides the
Rohingyas issue, the country has still to manage tensions (which often turn into
conflicts) among other minorities (Shan, Karen, Kachin, and Lisu) that, together,
account for 40 percent of Myanmar’s population. Not even the recent national
ceasefire agreement, signed with eight armed groups, would grant some sort of
stability in the region.[16]
In recent years, natural hazards, climate change, and international and civil wars
have all contributed to more and more people fleeing their homes. Issues related to
international migration—not just those specifically pertaining to refugees—are no
longer simply a national problem. On the contrary, such issues pose challenges that
can only be addressed effectively and humanely with focused international attention
and concerted action.
Some initiatives in this direction have already been organized, as in May and
December 2015, where two international meetings were held among the directly
affected countries, aiming at coping with the migration emergency.[18] In last
December’s meeting, Southeast Asian representatives met in Bangkok to define a
common strategy on crucial issues, such as migrant protection, irregular migration
prevention, and the fight against human smuggling.[19]
In the long run, it is possible to envision cooperation with the European Union and
the United States. Indeed, European states share similar experiences with ASEAN
ones, but, at the same time, have an established framework of regional cooperation.
In this sense, European Union, besides supporting funding—that has already
granted—through international forums and cooperation, can provide useful tools to
be used in addressing refugee and migrant management.
Moreover, as in the ASEAN case, both European Union and United States could,
eventually, make pressure in the region with sanctions that previously have been
used against the junta, in the attempt to mitigate the root causes of this migratory
emergency. In fact, if it is true that Myanmar is moving towards democracy,
authorities will have to implement reforms against ethnic and religious
discrimination, as well as secure the ethnic areas. In this process, Mynamar could
find Western actors as solid partners, who have humanitarian and economic
interests in collaborating with Myanmar.
The development of the Rohingyas emergency will depend, in the end, on the
concerned States’ intentions. ASEAN nations must choose between a short-run
strategy with immediate results or a long-run program, supported by international
actors, which could establish a shared legal framework, sustainable from the
political and humanitarian point of view.