.R. No. 212493, June 01, 2016 - GABRIEL YAP, SR.
DULY Before this court are two consolidated cases involving two petitions for
REPRESENTED BY GILBERT YAP AND ALSO IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, GABRIEL YAP, JR., AND HYMAN YAP, Petitioners, v.
LETECIA SIAO, LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO,
SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.; G.R. No. 212504
- CEBU SOUTH MEMORIAL GARDEN, INC., Petitioner, v. LETECIA SIAO,
LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO, SHELETT SIAO
AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 212493, June 01, 2016
GABRIEL YAP, SR. DULY REPRESENTED BY GILBERT YAP AND
ALSO IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, GABRIEL YAP, JR., AND
HYMAN YAP, Petitioners, v. LETECIA SIAO, LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN
SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO, SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET
SIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212504
CEBU SOUTH MEMORIAL GARDEN, INC., Petitioner, v. LETECIA
SIAO, LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO,
SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Review on Certiorari. These petitions assail the Decision1 dated 9
October 2013 and Resolution2 dated 26 March 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02037.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 212493 are deceased Gabriel Yap, Sr.,
represented by his son and the President of Cebu South Memorial
Garden, Inc., Gilbert Yap; Gabriel Yap, Jr., in his capacity as
Treasurer; and Hyman Yap, as one of the directors, while petitioner in
G.R. No. 212504 is Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc. Respondents in
both cases are Letecia Siao and her children, Lynel, Janelyn, Eleonor,
Shellett and Honeylet.
These consolidated cases arose from a Complaint for Specific
Performance filed by petitioners Cebu South Memorial Gardens, Inc.
and Gabriel Yap, Sr., both represented by Gilbert Yap against
respondents Honeylet Siao and Letecia Siao on 27 April 1999. Gilbert
Yap, in his own behalf, Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap joined the
plaintiffs in their Supplemental Complaint. In their Second Amended
Complaint, the petitioners alleged that Gabriel Yap, Sr. and Letecia
Siao entered into a Certificate of Agreement where the parties agreed
on the following terms:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
1. To convert the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
66716, 66714 and 66713, registered in the names of
Spouses Sergio and Letecia Siao, into memorial lots;
2. To organize themselves into a corporation;
3. To transfer ownership of the parcels of land to Gabriel
Yap who will transfer ownership thereof to the
corporation;
4. To give advance payment to Letecia Siao in the amount
of P100,000.00 per month until Letecia Siao is financially
stable to support herself and her family.3
As a backgrounder, respondent Letecia Siao's husband Sergio Siao was
indebted to petitioner Gabriel Yap, Sr. Petitioners claim that the titles
to the subject parcels of land were in the possession of Gabriel Yap,
Sr. as collateral for the loan. In consideration of condoning the loan,
Gabriel Yap, Sr. returned the titles to Letecia Siao on the condition
that the parcels of land covered by the titles would be developed into
memorial lots.4
Petitioners claimed that respondents refused to transfer the ownership
of the three parcels of land to Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc.,
causing them to be exposed to numerous lawsuits from the buyers of
the burial plots.
Respondents argued that Letecia Siao was coerced to sign the
Certificate of Agreement, rendering it null and void.
A panel of commissioners was appointment to determine the financial
standing of petitioner corporation and the actual money received by
Letecia Siao.
On 31 January 2000 and during the pendency of the case before the
commissioners, respondents filed a Motion for Payment of Monthly
Support5 for Leticia Siao's family and herself. Respondents relied on
the agreement made by the parties during the preliminary conference
to abide by the terms of the Certificate of Agreement. In a
Resolution6 dated 5 April 2000, the RTC granted the motion for
monthly support and ordered Gabriel Yap, Sr. to pay immediately
Letecia Siao the amount of P1,300,000.00. Resultantly, petitioners
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment7 on 24 May 2002 alleging that
respondents had abandoned their defense of the nullity of the
Certificate of Agreement when they agreed to implement its
provisions. Petitioners submitted that the trial court may render a
summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings based on the
admitted facts.
On 1 August 2002, Judge Generosa G. Labra of Branch 23 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City issued an Order denying the
motion and holding that there were no existing admissions or admitted
facts by respondents to be considered. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied on 11 September 2002. Petitioners
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73850,8 through Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, reversed the
trial court's decision and ordered its judge to render summary
judgment in favor of petitioners. The appellate court ruled that by
claiming benefits arising from the Certificate of Agreement,
respondents had invoked the validity and effectiveness of the
Agreement.
Respondents sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the
appellate court. Respondents did not file an appeal before the
Supreme Court within the reglementary period. Thus, the Decision
became final and executory on 7 June 2004 and the same had been
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.9
In compliance with the Order that had become final, on 7 February
2006, RTC Branch 13 of Cebu City Judge Meinrado P. Paredes
rendered a Summary Judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendants to
transfer to the plaintiff-movant the three (3) parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. 66714, 66713 and 66716 after this judgment shall have
become final and executory.
Should defendants fail to do so, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed
to prepare a deed of conveyance or transfer of the said titles to the
plaintiff CSMG, Inc. at the expense of defendants.10ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied. Once
again, respondents filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Summary Judgment rendered by
the RTC.
On 9 October 2013, the Court of Appeals set aside the Summary
Judgment on a technicality. The appellate court found that the
certification against forum-shopping appended to the complaint is
defective because there was no board resolution and special power of
attorney vesting upon Gilbert Yap the authority to sign the certification
on behalf of petitioner corporation and individual petitioners. The
appellate court added that the procedural defects affected the
jurisdiction of the court in that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over the case because the complaints are considered not filed and are
ineffectual. Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration
but they were denied by the appellate court.
The following errors are grounds for the allowance of these petitions:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals made an error in applying the
law when the same resolved to reverse the decision the [c]ourt
a quo on the ground that even if Gilbert Yap is the president of
petitioner corporation the same had no authority to institute the
complaint unless he can produce a board resolution showing his
authority.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred when it entertained
the issue on lack of Certificate of Non-forum shopping when the
raising of said grounds is already barred by the Rules on
Pleading and Omnibus Motion Rule.11
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and acted contrary to law in
reversing the summary judgment and dismissing the complaints
filed by petitioner on ground that the RTC Cebu had no
jurisdiction over the complaint and plaintiff because the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by
the president of the corporation was not accompanied by a
board resolution considering that:
3.1 Gilbert Yap, as President of petitioner, can sign the verification
and certification even without a board resolution. Hence, his
verification and certification is valid. Consequently, the
complaint and second amended complaint are likewise valid.
3.2 The Court of Appeals gravely erred and acted contrary to law in
ruling that the subsequent submission of petitioner's board
resolution cannot be deemed as substantial compliance to the rule
on verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.
3.3 The execution of a verification and certification of non-forum
[shopping] is a formal, not a [jurisdictional] issue. It may be
waived if not raised on time. In the instant case, respondents
waived the alleged [defect] when they failed to raise it in a
motion to dismiss or answer.
3.4 The assailed decision resolved an issue beyond its jurisdiction.
Thus, it is void under the principle of coram non judice.
3.5 The validity of the complaints have been settled with finality. In
its decision dated 10 October 2013, the Court of Appeals thru the
another division (nineteenth division) directed RTC Cebu to
render summary judgment there being no genuine issues to be
tried. The Court of Appeals (Fifth Division) in the present case
violated the doctrine of immutability of judgment when it
dismissed the complaints, thereby effectively directing the trial
court not to render any summary judgment.
 4. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the summary
judgment despite the fact the same is consistent with the
Certificate of Agreement.12
Petitioner Yaps, in G.R. No. 212493 maintain that the signature of the
President of the corporation is sufficient to vest authority on him to
represent the corporation sans a board resolution. Petitioners stress
that the Special Power of Attorney categorically granted Gilbert Yap
the full authority to appear and represent Gabriel Yap, Sr. With respect
to the failure of Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping, petitioners assert that while the two men
share a common interest with petitioner corporation and Gabriel Yap,
Sr., these are not indispensable parties, thus their signatures are not
necessary. Petitioners also submit that the issue of a defective
certification of non-forum shopping was belatedly raised, thus should
not have been considered.13
Petitioner in G.R. No. 212504 adds that the appellate court should
have considered the subsequent submission of the board resolution as
substantial compliance with the Rules. Petitioner also argues that the
appellate court violated the doctrine of immutability of judgment when
it dismissed the complaints thereby effectively directing the trial court
not to render any summary judgment.14
Respondents filed one Comment on both petitions. They argue that
petitioners, except for Gabriel Yap, Sr. are not parties to the Certificate
of Agreement, thus the petitions should be dismissed because as
against them no rights were violated. Respondents insist that the
Certificate of Agreement is void because it involved unliquidated
community properties. Respondents further claim that petitioners,
other than Cebu South Memorial Garden, did not appeal the Summary
Judgment before the Court of Appeals, hence, they are all bound by
the denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment by the RTC. With
respect to the alleged defect in the Certification of Non-forum
shopping, respondents echoed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.15
We will first discuss the procedural aspect of this case where the Court
of Appeals wholly based its decision. The appellate court ruled that the
certification against forum-shopping is defective because it was signed
by Gilbert Yap without a valid board resolution. In the leading case
of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commission on Internal
Revenue,16 the Court, in summarizing numerous jurisprudence,
rendered a definitive rule that the following officials or employees of
the company can sign the verification and certification without need of
a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case. The rationale behind the rule is that these
officers are "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of
the allegations in the petition."17
In Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc v. Euro-Med Laboratories, Pharmacy,
Inc.,18 the President and Manager of Cebu Metro was held by the Court
as having the authority to sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping even without the submission of a written authority
from the board. The Court went on to say:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
As the corporation's President and Manager, she is in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition. In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the
scope of her authority to act within the domain of the general
objectives of the corporation's business and her usual duties in the
absence of any contrary provision in the corporation's charter or by-
laws.19 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Cebu Metro also cited cases wherein the Court allowed officers of a
corporation to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping even without a board resolution, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
xxxx
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we held that the lone
signature of the University President was sufficient to fulfill the
verification requirement, because such officer had sufficient knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
In People's Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA, we held that in
the absence of a charter or by-law provision to the contrary, the
president of a corporation is presumed to have the authority to act
within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within
the scope of his or her usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain
contract or undertaking is outside the usual powers of the president,
the corporation's ratilication of the contract or undertaking and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate president's
actions binding on the corporation.20 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Bolstering our conclusion that the certification of non-forum shopping
is valid is the subsequent appending of the board resolution to
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Board Resolution reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 01
Series of 2013
WHEREAS, the corporation is presently facing a Civil Case entitled
Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc. versus Letecia Siao, Lynel Siao,
Janelyn Siao, Eleanor Faye Siao, Shelett Siao and Honeylet Siao, and
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23707 before the Regional Trial Court
of Ccbu City, Branch 13, and is mostly like to [raise] to the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court by our corporation or by the opposing
party depending on the outcome of the said case.
WHEREAS, the corporation needs to appoint its authorized
representative who will be vested with the authority to sign the
Verification and Certificate of Forum Shopping for any and all pleadings
to be filed before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court as the
need of the case requires.
WHEREAS, the corporation also needs to ratify the action taken by the
president of the corporation in the person of Gilbert Yap who signed
the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping in the
Complaint filed by this corporation before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City last April 27, 1999 and docketed as [Civil Case No. CEB-
23707].
WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved that:
1. The action of the president Gilbert Yap in signing the Verification
and Certificate of Non-forum Shopping in [Civil Case No. CEB-23707]
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on April 27, 1999 is
hereby ratified/affirmed by this Board with all legal effects and
consequences.
2. The corporate president Gilbert Yap is given full authority to sign
the Verification and Certificate on Non-forum Shopping for all
pleadings to be filed with the Court of Appeals and after with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.21
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
The Board of Directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden, through a
Board Resolution, not only authorized the President of the corporation
to sign the Certificate of Forum-Shopping but it ratified the action
taken by Gilbert Yap in signing the forum-shopping certificate.
In Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of
Manila,22 we held that the belated submission of a Secretary's
certification constitutes substantial compliance with the rules, thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Clearly, this is not an ordinary case of belated submission of proof of
authority from the board of directors. Petitioner-corporation ratified
the authority of Ms. Beleno to represent it in the Petition filed before
the RTC, particularly in Civil Case No. 03-108163, and consequently to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf
of the corporation. This fact confirms and affirms her authority and
gives this Court all the more reason to uphold that authority.23 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
In Cosco Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance,24 we cited
instances wherein the lack of authority of the person making the
certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent
compliance by the parties therein:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines,
Inc., the CA dismissed the petition filed by China Bank, since the latter
failed to show that its bank manager who signed the certification
against non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the
CA and said that the case be decided on the merits despite the failure
to attach the required proof of authority, since the board resolution
which was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of
the bank manager as an authorized signatory.
In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the
complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila was instituted
by petitioner's Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping without proof
of authority to sign for the corporation, we also relaxed the rule. We
did so taking into consideration the merits of the case and to avoid a
re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of
justice, since the case had already been decided by the lower courts
on the merits. Moreover, Abaya's authority to sign the certification was
ratified by the Board.25 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station26 it was ruled that the
Assistant Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao, who was then the
highest official representing the bank in the Northern Mindanao area,
is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the subject complaint, signifying his authority in filing
the complaint and to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping.
In Fuji Television Network v. Espiritu,27 we highlighted two rules
relative to certification against forum-shopping:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
xxxx
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will
be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
xxxx
Clearly, a defect in the certification is allowed on the ground of
substantial compliance as in this case.
Applying the above-mentioned rule, the signatures of petitioners
Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap are not indispensable for the validity
of the certification. These petitioners indeed share a common cause of
action with Gilbert Yap in that they are impleaded as officers and
directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden, the very same corporation
represented by Gilbert Yap.
At any rate, any objection as to compliance with the requirement of
verification in the complaint should have been raised in the
proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time.28
In Young v. John Keng Seng,29 it was also held that the question of
forum shopping cannot be raised in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the earliest
opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading.
The Court of Appeals relied on procedural rules rather than on the
merits of the case. On this score, we can remand the case to the Court
of Appeals for an opportunity to rule on the substance of the case. The
Court, in the public interest and expeditious administration of justice,
has resolved action on the merits, instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-
served by the remand of the case or where the trial court had already
received all the evidence of the parties. Briefly stated, a remand of the
instant case to the Court of Appeals would serve no purpose save to
further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.30
Considering that this case has dragged on for 15 years with no
concrete solution in sight, we shall proceed to discuss the merits.
We reiterate the ruling penned by Justice Labitoria of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 7385031 directing the trial court to render a
summary judgment. The issues and arguments posed by respondents
have already been passed upon and resolved by the Court of Appeals.
By appealing the summary judgment, respondents are in effect asking
the Court of Appeals to revisit the same issues. We cannot allow this
under the principle of the "law of the case."
The "law of the case" doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate
court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter
remands the case to the lower court to effect the ruling; the question
settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower
court and in any subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which the legal rule or decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.32
The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to
perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be
impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal. Without it, there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be
free to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the
chance of having propositions rewritten once gravely ruled on solemn
argument and handed down as the law of a given case.33
In the Labitoria decision, the Court of Appeals directed the trial court
to render a summary judgment on the ground that there was no
longer any legal controversy regarding the Certificate of Agreement
when respondents relied on the same agreement to ask for support.
This ruling became the law of the case between the parties which
cannot be disturbed. Respondents cannot raise this same issue in
another petition.
In any case, we affirm the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court, as directed by the Court of Appeals. A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine.34
A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed,
then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and
summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place
of trial.35
Petitioners' complaint seeks for specific performance from
respondents, i.e. to transfer ownership of the subject properties to
petitioner corporation based on the Certificate of Agreement. As their
defense, respondents challenge the validity of the Agreement.
However, respondents filed a motion for support relying on the same
Agreement that they are impugning. In view of this admission,
respondents are effectively banking on the validity of the Agreement.
Thus, there are no more issues that need to be threshed out. As aptly Decision dated 9 October 2013 and Resolution dated 26 March 2014 in
explained by the appellate court: CA-G.R. CV No. 02037 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Summary
Judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-23707 rendered by the Regional Trial
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Clearly, there is no longer any legal controversy in this case which

would justify trial. By claiming benefits arising from the Certificate of Court, Branch 13, Cebu City is AFFIRMED.
Agreement, private respondents had invoked the validity and
effectiveness of the Certificate of Agreement which according to them SO ORDERED. cralawlawlib rary

is the law between the parties.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
After invoking the validity and effectiveness of the Certificate of Jardeleza, J., on wellness leave. chanroblesvi rtual lawlib rary

Agreement, private respondents cannot now be heard claiming that

they could not be required to perform their obligations under the
Certificate of Agreement because the said contract is void or that
because private respondent Leticia Siao had no authority to bind the
other private respondents.

The application of the principle of estoppel is proper and timely in

heading off private respondents efforts at renouncing their previous
acts to the prejudice of petitioner. The principle of equity and natural
justice, as expressly adopted in Article 1431 of the Civil Code, and
pronounced as one of the CONCLUSIVE presumption under rule 131,
Section 3 (a) of the Rules of Court, as follows: "Whenever a party has,
by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such a belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it."

Private respondents, having performed affirmative acts upon which the

petitioner and public respondent based their subsequent actions,
cannot thereafter refute their acts or renege on the effects of the
same, to the prejudice of the latter. To allow private respondents to do
so would be tantamount to conferring upon them the liberty to limit
their liability at their whims and caprices, which is against the very
principles of equity and natural justice.36 (Emphasis Supplied)
Considering the foregoing, we grant the petition. chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'

 February 8, 2017
G.R. No. 202597
SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL and EMMA SERVILLION
PASCUAL, Petitioners
vs.
FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND
CORPORATION and ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA, Register of Deeds,
Butuan City, Respondents
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment
in the Court of Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision
rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in
Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis
pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of
Deeds of Butuan City.1
After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the
preliminary conference on October 4, 2011, and ordered the parties to file their
respective pre-trial briefs.2 Instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance.3 At
the scheduled preliminary conference, the petitioners and their counsel did not
appear.4
On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution
dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment,5 stating:
Section 4 through 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provide, viz:
Sec. 4. Appearance of parties. - It shall be the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be
excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear
in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to
submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admission of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.- The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of
the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.
Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief - x x x
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial.
Petitioners, instead of complying with our order, filed the twin motions, averring
that it behooves us to rule first on their motions before pre-trial could be
conducted, "especially with the incompatibility of a pending Motion for Summary
Judgment vis-a-vis the conduct of pre-trial conference."
Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before
the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of
the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import.
In fact, contrary to petitioners' assertion, it is only at the pre-trial that the rules
allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as
provided by Section 2 (g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall
consider:
x x xx
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment,
or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.
Moreover, in an Order dated October 20, 2011, we noted petitioners and
counsel's special appearance via a new counsel, but failed to accept the same as
the latter was not armed with the appropriate documents to appear as such.
Therefore, it was as if petitioners did not appear during the Preliminary
Conference.
It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended
or dispensed with, or that their motions be resolved first, as the same are
discretionary upon the court taking cognizance of the petition. Furthermore, their
failure to furnish private respondent Robinsons Land Corporation a copy of
their Motion for Reconsideration of our denial of their TRO and/or WPI, and to
submit proof of service thereof to this court is tantamount to failure to obey lawful
orders of the court.1âwphi1
This we cannot countenance. Strict compliance with the Rules is indispensable
for the prevention of needless delays and the promotion of orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Hence, petitioners' failure to comply
with our directives merits dismissal of their petition. We find support in the
provision of Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.
x x xx
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule
48, or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause ...
The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of
technicalities," it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.6
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration (on the
Resolution dated 16 November 2011),7 which the CA denied on January 9, 2012
for being filed out of time.8 Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful Motion for
Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 9 January 2012), which the CA also
denied on June 20, 2012.9
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petition for review for its lack of merit.
1.
Motions and other papers sent to the CA
by private messengerial services arc deemed
filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt
The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on
November 24, 2011.10 Under Section l, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court,11 they had
15 days from receipt (or until December 9, 2011) within which to move for its
reconsideration or to appeal to the Supreme Court. They dispatched the Motion
for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16 November 2011) on December
9, 2011 through private courier (LBC). The CA actually received the motion on
December 12, 2011.12 Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provided that motions sent through private
messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of
the same,13 the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011.
Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution
promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed
resolution final and executory by operation of law.14
2.
Although motions for summary judgment
can be filed before the pre-trial, their
non-resolution prior to the pre-trial should
not prevent the holding of the pre-trial
The petitioners contend that their Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance needed to be first resolved before the pre-trial could
proceed; that the CA erred in declaring that "it is only at the pre-trial that the rules
allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as
provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court;" and that the CA
overlooked their submission in their Opposition with Explanation to the effect that
Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court was superseded by Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated
August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' contentions have no merit.
We consider it erroneous on the part of the CA to declare that "it is only at the
pre-trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court." The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to the
pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 3 5 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory relief to
file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof in his favor
(and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2 of Rule 35 instructs
that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may file the motion for summary judgment (and its
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) upon all or any part thereof "at
any time." As such, the petitioners properly filed their motion for summary
judgment prior to the pre-trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the
requirement of supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).
We remind that the summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper
under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only if there is no genuine issue
as to the existence of a material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.15 It is a method intended to expedite or promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record.16 The term genuine
issue is defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith
and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The
court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents,
affidavits, and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where
the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.17 The party moving for the
summary judgment has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any
genuine issue of fact.18 Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the cause of
action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay.
After the plaintiffs burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to
show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.19
The CA could have misconceived the text of Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 2. Nature and purpose. - The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall
consider:
x x xx
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment,
or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
x x xx
To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has
earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers
the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no
such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper
party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary
motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 3420 (Judgment on the
Pleadings) or Rule 3521 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial
judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is
entitled to counter the motion.
Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first
resolved their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pretrial. They
1âwphi1
could not use the inaction on their motion to justify their nonappearance with their
counsel at the pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that
regard, their appearance at the pre-trial with their counsel was mandatory.
The petitioners argue that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing that
Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective
on August 16, 2004.
The petitioners' argument was unwarranted.
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 still affirmed the
mandatory character of the pre-trial, to wit:
under its heading Pre-Trial in civil cases that, among others, the trial court could
then determine "the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing the
case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial."22 As such,
they could have urged the trial court to resolve their pending Motion for Summary
Judgment during the pre-trial..
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of
Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

x x xx LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
V. The mandatory continuous trial system in civil cases contemplated in
Administrative Circular No. 4, dated 22 September 1988, and the guidelines WE CONCUR:
provided for in Circular No. 1-89, dated 19 January 1989, must be effectively
implemented. For expediency, these guidelines in civil cases are hereunder PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
restated with modifications, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Associate Justice
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Chairperson

A. Pre-Trial BIENVENIDO L. REYES FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
x x xx
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA*
6. Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be a cause for dismissal of Associate Justice
the action. A similar failure of the defendant shall be a cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the basis ATTESTATION
thereof. (Underlining supplied for emphasis)
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Court’s Division.
Measures) - adopted for the purpose of abbreviating court proceedings, ensuring
the prompt disposition of cases, decongesting court dockets, and further
implementing the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 - similarly underscored the mandatory character of the pre-trial, and reiterated
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice