ARTICLE 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on

the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

1. Ty vs CA

GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had
their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January
1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void.
AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested
rights of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD: SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that
petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation
where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and
the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for
as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
 2. Domingo v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 104818, 17 September 1993

FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a
suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some
of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was
void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand,
Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order
to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

RULING: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith
that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed
from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from
the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.

Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
 3. Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed
a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
 4. Mercado vs Tan

VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

FACTS: The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the
institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March
1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after
the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993
the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite
this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time
he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?

RULING: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article 40 of
the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the
second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And
what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage.

Dissenting Opinion:

VITUG, J.:

At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an
indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a
defense against the criminal charge.

The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations on its
application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant petition is a
criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul
G. Mercado for bigamy.

Article 40 of the Family code reads:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family code requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; without such
declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in
similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would
daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of
remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed
essential when the "marriage," for instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both
parties had not at all given consent to the "marriage." Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family
Code has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of
Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.

In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal
law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:

"Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article
349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set
aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:

"xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America
requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation."

Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in
bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity,
however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of
being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence
between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

 5. Carino vs Carino

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts: During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under
the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of
P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the
marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of
acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Ruling: Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall
within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of
marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article
148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
ART 41-42

ART 41: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, in case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

ART 42: The subsequent marriage referred to in the proceeding article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment of annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio

1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative,
that the marriage be declared null and void.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second,
Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to
circumvent the law on marriage.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to
respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired.
On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding
that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already
died.

Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling: No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court
order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed
and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
 2. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

485 SCRA 376 (2006)

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity
of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved.

Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years later, a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, which
has been granted. Bailon, subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and
designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former.

SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the
basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice.

Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her
marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it
remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code
and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the
spouse‘s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s
marriage prior to the former‘s death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
 3. EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants

G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005

Facts: Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his
parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C.
Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single”. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. In January 2001, Eduardo took all his
clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. In August 2001, Tina
became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a GRO.
He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but
she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when
he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to
indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith
and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private
complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The CA rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral damage
when it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219
of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The
standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was
single. He even brought his parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the same assurance
– that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry the him, who even stated in the certificate of marriage
that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all
the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her,
Tina had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single
woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have
married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was
not her lawful husband.

The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with Tina were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did
not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. The Court thus declares
that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
ART 45-46

ART 45: A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

1) That the party in whose behalf is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other ad both lived together as husband and wife;
2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious
and appears to be incurable.

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of
the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at
the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in
jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000
in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state
and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed
to file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of
consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to
the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

ART 48-49

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment. (88a)

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to
remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent. (n)

Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995,
trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating
that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than
having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of
the State in the proceedings.

HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the
prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

Maquilan vs. Maquilan

Facts: Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita
had a paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her paramour. The two were convicted
of the crime charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages before the RTC, imputing
psychological incapacity on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered into a Compromise
Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the compromise
agreement.

Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise
Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent
judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge denied the motion.
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law
that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in
the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her
share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.

To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from
sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final
and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since
adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. He also argued
that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the provincial
prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is also void.

Issues:

1. Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to the instant case?

2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant case?

3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in
the conjugal properties?

4. Does the absence of the public prosecutor nullify the compromise agreement?

5. May the compromise agreement be nullified on the ground that petitioner was not intelligently and
judiciously informed by his counsel of the consequential effects of the agreement?

Held:

1. No. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case. Article 43 of the Family
Code refers to a subsequent marriage that is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.

2. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided
the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the
validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article
2035.

3. The contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially
approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must
stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family
Code.

4. While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the
failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This
Court fully concurs with the findings of the CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor
General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to see to it
that their evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the
subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of
marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being
repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the
private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of
the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.

4. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that
any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in
the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been
recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's
property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the
present case. (Maquilan vs. Maquilan, G.R. NO. 155409, June 8, 2007)
EN BANC

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT
OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

RESOLUTION

Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003

March 4, 2003

Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna

Ynares-Santiago, on leave

Corona, on official leave

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE

MARRIAGES

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imperceptibility of action or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te complete facts
showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage based
on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute parental authority
did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the
parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party
has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or
person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party; or by the insane
spouse during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after coming to
reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five
years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the
force, intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapability continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage; and

(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the
case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting
the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support of common children,
visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly
requiringurgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be
filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the
petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting
the cause of action.

(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation
rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.

(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and
certification must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or
through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping
shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul
general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.

(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its
filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.

Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by
the following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines and in such places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served
on the respondent at his last known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem
sufficient.

(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data: (a)
title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and
the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last
issue of publication.

Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other
ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.

Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-
fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of collusion within
ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for hearing and If convinced
that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It
shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and submit
the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case
study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.

Section 11. Pre-trial. -

(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the
pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.

(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall
ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.

(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the
public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of
summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to
respondent at his last known address.

Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:

(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law,
indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;

(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the
nature and purpose thereof;

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect
as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the
case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and
proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit
within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any
collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters
not prohibited by law.

The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the
court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such
other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.

Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of
the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the
conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the
ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any
of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by the
parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;

(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or
suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.

(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those
stated in the pre-trial order.

The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or
modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such
as the following:

(a) The civil status of persons;

(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(c) Any ground for legal separation;

(d) Future support;

(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(f) Future legitime.

Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the
press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines
on the record that requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of
truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to
embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to
decency or public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be
made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court.

Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file
its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may
be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the
parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the
parties have no properties.
 If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of
this Rule.

The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded
and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage is located.

Section 20. Appeal. -

(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion
for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing
a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.

Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The
court shall issue the Decree after;

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place
where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper
Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the
Decree the approved deed of partition.

Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the
Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children
affected.

Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party
shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the
Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics
Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of
the copy of the Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the
Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner
and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party
dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed
and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular
courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding
upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.