EZRA MAY A.

CORONA
Subject: Civil Procedure
Case No. 7(Misjoinder of causes of action, Rules of Court No. 2 Sec. 5 &6)
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013
UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J. MARTINEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH
168, Respondents.

FACTS:
Consing Jr. obtained for himself and his mother (Cecilia Dela Cruz) various loans amounting to P18,000,000 from
Unicapital. The loans were secured by Real Estate Mortgage (REM) constituted on parcel of land in Cavite registered
under the name of the mother of petitioner In pursuance with the option to purchase on the mortgaged property,
Unicapital agreed to purchase one half of the property. The payment was set off by the loans of the petitioner while
the other half was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc (PBI), a joint venture partner of the Unicapital. Before both
companies could develop the land and transfer the titles, they discovered that the property was in the names of Po
Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng. Thus, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of
April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.

Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later amended to Complex
Action for Injunctive Relief before the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager
Mariano Martinez, Dela Cruz and Does 1-20 which prayed that: (a) he be declared as a mere agent of Dela Cruz, and
as such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning the subject
property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from speaking about him in a
derogatory fashion; and (c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the amount of
₱2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱1,000,000.00, all per month,
reckoned from May 1, 1999 and until the controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees and costs of suit..

On the other hand, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez filed separate Motions to Dismiss Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, considering that: (a) no document was attached against which Consing,
Jr. supposedly derived his right and against which his rights may be as certained; (b) the demands to pay against
Consing, Jr. and for him to tender post-dated checks to cover the amount due were well within the rights of Unicapital
as an unpaid creditor, as Consing, Jr. had already admitted his dealings with them; (c) the utterances purportedly
constituting libel were not set out in the complaint; and (d) the laws supposedly violated were not properly identified.

Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited that the RTC-Pasig City did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that
Consing, Jr. failed to pay the proper amount of docket fees and maintained that the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction
over their supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised Securities Act, which is supposedly lodged with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, they pointed out that Consing, Jr.’s complaint suffers from a
defective verification and, thus, dismissible.

Similar to Unicapital et al.’s course of action, PBI and its General Manager, Martinez, sought the dismissal of Consing,
Jr.’s complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action. They also denied having singled out Consing, Jr.
because their collection efforts were directed at both Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz, which should be deemed as valid
and, therefore, should not be restrained.

RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution denying the above mentioned motions to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.’s
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled
that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from the courts. It
also noted that the elements of libel in a criminal case are not the same as those for a civil action founded on the
provisions of the Civil Code, and therefore, necessitates a different treatment. It equally refused to dismiss the action
on the ground of non-payment of docket fees, despite Consing, Jr.’s escalated claims for damages therein, as
jurisdiction was already vested in it upon the filing of the original complaint. Unperturbed, Unicapital and PBI, et al.
moved for reconsideration therefrom which was, however, denied by the RTC-Pasig City in an Order for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

The CA rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig City in
refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint. At the outset, it ruled that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee
is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment will not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. It also refused
to dismiss the complaint for lack of proper verification upon a finding that the copy of the amended complaint
submitted to the RTC-Pasig City was properly notarized. Moreover, it upheld the order of the RTC-Pasig City for
Unicapital and PBI, et al. to submit their comment due to the alleged existence of a similar case filed before the RTC-
Makati City.

CA also concurred with the RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action. It found that
Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr. was properly
constitutive of a cause of action as the same, if sufficiently proven, would have subjected him to "defamation of his
name in business circles, the threats and coercion against him to reimburse the purchase price, fraud and falsification
and breach of fiduciary obligation." Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek to recover his claims against
any particular provision of the corporation code or the securities act but against the actions of Unicapital and PBI, et
al.; hence, Consing, Jr.’s complaint was principally one for damages over which the RTC has jurisdiction, and, in turn,
there lies no misjoinder of causes of action. Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration therefrom but
the same was denied by the CA.
EZRA MAY A. CORONA
Subject: Civil Procedure
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et. al.’s motion
to dismiss?

Ruling:
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a
complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants.

Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint properly states a cause of action since the allegations there insufficiently bear
out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code. Records show that Consing, Jr.’s complaint
contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their
demands against him.

Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect,
or other personal condition.

To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also lead to the payment of moral damages under Article
2219(10) of the Civil Code. The Court also finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would
necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling.

Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally finds that the causes of action in SCA No.
1759 were not – as Unicapital, et al. claim – misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and PBI, et al.
violated certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised Securities Act.80

The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in a
misjoinder of causes of action:
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of
said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction.

A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for
any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought damages for
Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of making him sign numerous documents and their use of the same against
him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and damages case which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.

Therefore, there was no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even
on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not result in the dismissal
of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of causes of action is not
a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately."

Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has long
been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.

Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered" claim for
damages to the tune of around ₱2,000,000.00 per month may balloon to a rather huge amount by the time that this
case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by then fall due shall be subject to assessment and any
additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien against the judgment as explicitly provided under Section 2, Rule
141 of the Rules.

Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s complaint was properly verified, suffice it to state that since
the copy submitted to the trial court was duly notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and that it was only Unicapital, et
al.’s copy which lacks the notarization, then there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the rules on
pleadings.

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital
et al.’s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be denied.
EZRA MAY A. CORONA
Subject: Civil Procedure
Case No. 20(Certification against forum shopping)
G.R. No. 212493, June 01, 2016
GABRIEL YAP, SR. DULY REPRESENTED BY GILBERT YAP AND ALSO IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, GABRIEL YAP, JR.,
AND HYMAN YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
LETECIA SIAO, LYNEL SIAO, JANELYN SIAO, ELEANOR FAYE SIAO, SHELETT SIAO AND HONEYLET SIAO, Respondents.

Facts:
These consolidated cases arose from a Complaint for Specific Performance filed by petitioners Cebu South Memorial
Gardens, Inc. and Gabriel Yap, Sr., both represented by Gilbert Yap against respondents Honeylet Siao and Letecia
Siao on 27 April 1999. Gilbert Yap, in his own behalf, Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap joined the plaintiffs in their
Supplemental Complaint. In their Second Amended Complaint, the petitioners alleged that Gabriel Yap, Sr. and
Letecia Siao entered into a Certificate of Agreement where the parties agreed to convert the parcels of land registered
in the names of Spouses Sergio and Letecia Siao, into memorial lots; to organize themselves into a corporation; to
transfer ownership of the parcels of land to Gabriel Yap who will transfer ownership thereof to the corporation; and to
give advance payment to Letecia Siao in the amount of P100,000.00 per month until Letecia Siao is financially stable
to support herself and her family.

As a backgrounder, respondent Letecia Siao's husband Sergio Siao was indebted to petitioner Gabriel Yap, Sr.
Petitioners claim that the titles to the subject parcels of land were in the possession of Gabriel Yap, Sr. as collateral
for the loan. In consideration of condoning the loan, Gabriel Yap, Sr. returned the titles to Letecia Siao on the
condition that the parcels of land covered by the titles would be developed into memorial lots.

Respondents argued that Letecia Siao was coerced to sign the Certificate of Agreement, rendering it null and void.
During the pendency of the case to the commissioner, respondent relied on the agreement made by the parties during
the preliminary conference to abide by the terms of the Certificate of Agreement. Hence, petitioners for a motion for
summary judgment. Petitioners submitted that the trial court may render a summary judgment or judgment on the
pleadings based on the admitted facts. RTC held that there was no admission of facts and denied the motion for
summary judgment. CA reversed the trial court's decision and ordered its judge to render summary judgment in favor
of petitioners.

In compliance with the order of CA, RTC rendered summary judgment in favor of petitioner. Court of Appeals,
however, set aside the Summary Judgment on a technicality. The appellate court found that the certification against
forum-shopping appended to the complaint is defective because there was no board resolution and special power of
attorney vesting upon Gilbert Yap the authority to sign the certification on behalf of petitioner corporation and
individual petitioners. The appellate court added that the procedural defects affected the jurisdiction of the court in
that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaints are considered not filed and are
ineffectual.

Issue:
Whether the certification against forum shopping is defective because it was signed by Gilbert Yap without a valid
board resolution.

Ruling:
NO. In the leading case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commission on Internal Revenue, the Court, in
summarizing numerous jurisprudence, rendered a definitive rule that the following officials or employees of the
company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation,
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager,
(4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
The rationale behind the rule is that these officers are "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition."

Bolstering our conclusion that the certification of non-forum shopping is valid is the subsequent appending of the
board resolution to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Board of Directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden,
through a Board Resolution, not only authorized the President of the corporation to sign the Certificate of Forum-
Shopping but it ratified the action taken by Gilbert Yap in signing the forum-shopping certificate.

Clearly, a defect in the certification is allowed on the ground of substantial compliance as in this case. Applying the
above-mentioned rule, the signatures of petitioners Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap are not indispensable for the
validity of the certification. These petitioners indeed share a common cause of action with Gilbert Yap in that they are
impleaded as officers and directors of Cebu South Memorial Garden, the very same corporation represented by Gilbert
Yap. At any rate, any objection as to compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should have
been raised in the proceedings below and not in the appellate court for the first time. Moreover, this case has dragged
on for 15 years with no concrete solution in sight, hence it must proceed to discuss the merits

The Court of Appeals relied on procedural rules rather than on the merits of the case. On this score, we can remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for an opportunity to rule on the substance of the case. The Court, in the public
interest and expeditious administration of justice, has resolved action on the merits, instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case or where the
trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case to the
Court of Appeals would serve no purpose save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.
EZRA MAY A. CORONA
Subject: Civil Procedure
The issues and arguments posed by respondents have already been passed upon and resolved by the Court of
Appeals. By appealing the summary judgment, respondents are in effect asking the Court of Appeals to revisit the
same issues. We cannot allow this under the principle of the "law of the case."

The "law of the case" doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on
appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court to effect the ruling; the question settled by the appellate
court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court

In any case, we affirm the summary judgment rendered by the trial court, as directed by the Court of Appeals. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine.

Petitioners' complaint seeks for specific performance from respondents, i.e. to transfer ownership of the subject
properties to petitioner corporation based on the Certificate of Agreement. As their defense, respondents challenge
the validity of the Agreement. However, respondents filed a motion for support relying on the same Agreement that
they are impugning. In view of this admission, respondents are effectively banking on the validity of the Agreement.
Thus, there are no more issues that need to be threshed out.
EZRA MAY A. CORONA
Subject: Civil Procedure
Case No. 32(Pretrial, Mandatory Presence of Parties)
G.R. No. 202597
SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL and EMMA SERVILLION PASCUAL, Petitioners
vs.
FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION and ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA,
Register of Deeds, Butuan City, Respondents

Facts:
On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) in order
to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in
Butuan City (RTC) ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City.

After the responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the preliminary conference and ordered the
parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. However, instead of filing their pre-trial brief, the petitioners filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. At the scheduled preliminary conference,
the petitioners and their counsel did not appear. Thus, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for annulment of judgment, stating ROC 18, Sec. 4-6.

Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is
mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean
dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import.

Moreover, the petitioners and counsels made special appearance via a new counsel, but failed to accept the same as
the latter was not armed with the appropriate documents to appear as such. Therefore, it was as if petitioners did not
appear during the Preliminary Conference.

It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended or dispensed with, or that their
motions be resolved first, as the same are discretionary upon the court taking cognizance of the petition.
Furthermore, their failure to furnish private respondent Robinsons Land Corporation a copy of their Motion for
Reconsideration of our denial of their TRO and/or WPI, and to submit proof of service thereof to this court is
tantamount to failure to obey lawful orders of the court.

The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of technicalities," it is equally important
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.

Petitioners then filed their Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16 November 2011),which the CA
denied on January 9, 2012 for being filed out of time. Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful Motion for
Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 9 January 2012), which the CA also denied on June 20, 2012 file a. Hence,
they appealed by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
Whether or not the court erred in its decision of dismissing the action with prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to
appear during the Preliminary Conference.

Ruling:
NO. The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011. The CA actually
received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date
of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011. Needless to
remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not
stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by operation of law.

To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed the pre-trial may
be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the
rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34
(Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu
proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary
judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.

Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have first resolved their Motion for Summary
Judgment before holding the pre- trial. They could not use the inaction on their motion to justify their non-appearance
with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their appearance
at the pre-trial with their counsel was mandatory.

The petitioners' argument was unwarranted on the contention that their non-appearance was not mandatory, positing
that Section 2(g), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC issued on July 13, 2004 but effective on August 16, 2004.