E.

STANDARD OF CONDUCT: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY

Cases:
1. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932)

2. Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, 163 SCRA 697, July 29, 1988
Facts:
 In 1963, respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher in a public school in Pangasinan. At that time, the school
was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in
World War II.
 On October 7, 1963 Aquino gathered eighteen pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their
teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein
the stone can be buried.
 The following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging.
These four pupils —Alonso, Alcantara, Abaga and Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
centimeters deep. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent
Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole.
 Then, he left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was
about thirty meters away. He wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could
get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
 A few minutes after Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the
pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to
slide down towards the opening.
 Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the
concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and eventually died.
 Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and
Soriano wherein he lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1.) Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; and (2.) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court

Issue:
Whether or not Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
Ruling:
No, Aquino didn’t exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and
more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being
would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious
danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a
teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from
all harm in his company.
In this case, truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way Aquino did. Were it
not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be
alive today. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great
anguish all these years.
As to the issue of reckless imprudence on the part of Ylarde, the Court held that the degree of care required
to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not
be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average
conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his
own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
Bearing this in mind, we cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
 3. Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co. vs. Phil. Motors Corporation, 55 Phil. 129 (1930)
Facts:
 Culion is the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline used in the fishing trade in the Philippine
Islands. Cranston, representative of the company, decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed
from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner to save on costs. He was referred to Philippine Motors
Corporation which engaged in business as an automobile agency and had authority to deal in all sorts of
machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment. C.E.
Quest, manager of PMC, agreed to do the job.
 Quest brought with him a mechanic and commenced with the work while Gwendoline was anchored in Pasig
River. They were assisted by members of the crew of the Gwendoline. Quest decided to install a Zenith
carburetor. The engine worked fine with gasoline.
 Afterwards, they introduced a baser fuel which was contained in a tank placed on deck above the engine
compartment. It was connected to the carburetor with a tube that was not well fitted. Fuel mixture leaked from
the tank and dripped down into the engine compartment.
o The purpose of this arrangement was to enable the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then,
after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. It was
observed that the carburetor was flooding but Quest think lightly of the matter and said that it will
disappear when the engine is running well.
 After preliminary experiments and adjustments, boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The first part of
the course was covered without any untoward development other than the stopping of the engine few times.
 At around 7:30 in the evening, the engine stopped and connection had to be made with gasoline to start the
engine. Upon switching to the new mixture, a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame
to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of
flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue.
 They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but
the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of
P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as the court found, was P10,000.

Issue:
Whether or not Quest/PMC is liable for the damages.

Ruling:
Yes, loss of the boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will
be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it
does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the
carburetor. When the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate
parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the cause of the flooding of the carburetor. When the back fire
occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was
quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by.
For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor
did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of
work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and
adequate precautions against the danger.
In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing
gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible
harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but
this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack
of skill.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.
 4. Dr. Ninevetch Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188 (1997)

Facts:
 Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her
for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991.
 On March 22, Rowena Umali accompanied her mother to the hospital and spent the night there, for the
operation was to be conducted on the following day. Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to
persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. On the day of the operation, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz
if the operation could be postponed. Because of this, Dr. Cruz called Lydia in her office. Consequently, Lydia
informed Rowena that the operation must go on as scheduled.
 While Lydia’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet ampules, and
Rowena’s sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia, so they
did. A few hours later, the operation was finished. However, Dr. Cruz asked again the family to buy additional
blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank.
 A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was
gasping for breath–apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in
the evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another
hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without
the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other
hospital.
 In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was oozing out from
her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was
already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he
could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock;
disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.
 Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide of Lydia
Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence
against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali’s death.
 Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision in favour of Lydia Umali
o Manifestation of negligence:
1. untidiness of clinic
2. lack of provision of supplies
3. the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong in the way Dr. Cruz
conducted operation
4. no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was conducted
 RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Ruling:
No, Dr. Cruz is acquitted but she is still civilly liable.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
1. Offender does / fails to do an act
2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary
3. Without malice
4. Material damage results from reckless imprudenc
5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender’s employment, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time, place
Moreover, in the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., this Court stated
that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients.
He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical
malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but
also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
 Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the
light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.).
In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused Lydia’s death, so the 4th element of
reckless imprudence is missing.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as
the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood
vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the
probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia’s death.
The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’ allegation that the
cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’ fault or negligence. This probability was
unrebutted during trial.

5. E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914
Facts:
 This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff on the night of August 8,
1909 in Caloocan.
 The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its
suburbs. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that
to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks.
 On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the
horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw
plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of.
 It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the rails
were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the
street.
 Defendant admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended that the
plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was
unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
 The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as
defendant's and apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.

ISSUE
Whether or not plaintiff was negligent upon driving the calesa intoxicated.

RULING
No, the plaintiff was not negligent.
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the
general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can
be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
In this case, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The
conclusion that if he had been sober, he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is
impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.