Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
SO ORDERED.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
618
Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code,
which states: Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed.
Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which
establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of
this Book.
National Building Code; The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), so as to include the regulation of parking fees.
—The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to
expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the
IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code
declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property, and
public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said
provision, which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum
standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site,
design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building
Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains
how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National
Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health,
property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power
of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements
for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code,
are complied with.
Administrative Agencies; The rule-making power of administrative
agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted and it cannot be extended
to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute.—The OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the
minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the
IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners
free of charge. If
619
Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or
included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of
administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must
always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law.
National Building Code; Whether allowing or prohibiting the
collection of such parking fees, the action of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary and local building officials must
pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or
means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.—It is not
sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it
the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the
power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries
with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the
enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between
individuals but also as between private parties and the political society.
True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees,
then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is
worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers
over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or
whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking
fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must
pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or
means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
620
621
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.—Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of
the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to
prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
Taking; A police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use
business property for business purposes amounts to taking of private
property, and the owner may recover therefor.—The power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power
may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule
that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to
taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property
is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that
deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking
and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as
to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a
police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business
property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and
the owner may recover therefor.
Same; Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the
parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their
collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties.—
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the pro-
622
hibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use
of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion
of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that
they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already
an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they
wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the
required parking facilities.
Same; Expropriation; The total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities
has no basis in the National Building Code or its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).—The total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities
has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot
impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment
of just compensation.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for
respondent Robinsons Land Corporation.
Tan, Acut & Lopez for respondent SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
623
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside
of the Decision2 dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision3
dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and
(2) the Resolution4 dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the
same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG.
The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land, Incorporated
(Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la
Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM
Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their
malls to their patrons and the general public.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain
and operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila.
Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out
commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM
City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North
Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have
parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of
parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings
and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking spaces.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons,
_______________
624
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for every
succeeding hour
Shangri-la Flat rate of P30.00 per day
SM Prime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the parking
space is outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours and
59 minutes, and P10.00 for every succeeding hour or
fraction thereof
“In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of
parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code
and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires
malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it is free or not,
both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the
Code is that the parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only
reasonable and logical but finds support in the actual practice in other
countries like the United States of America where parking spaces owned
and operated by mall owners are free of charge.
Figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the land for parking
—something similar to the subdivision law which require developers to
devote so much of the land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines)
provides that “it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the
consumers, promote the general welfare and establish standards of conduct
for business and industry.” Obviously, a con-
_______________
626
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
trary interpretation (i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) would be
going against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for
the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including
the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out in
reality.
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately pointed out
that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the
implementation/enforcement of the National Building Code. After the
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government
units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of the DPWH.
Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/ regulations
formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and
designs including parking space requirements. There is, however, no single
national department or agency directly tasked to supervise the enforcement
of the provisions of the Code on parking, notwithstanding the national
character of the law.”6
“In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and Commerce and
Justice and Human Rights hereby recommend the following:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute the
necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to
enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building Code.
The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise study how refund
can be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect parking
fees.
2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions
of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the
Philippines should enforce the provisions of the Code relative to
parking. Towards this end, the DTI should
_______________
627
_______________
628
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)10 against
respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1210
and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by
Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the
RTC:
_______________
629
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 8/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8
August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order12 of even date which
limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No.
00-1210 to the following:
“The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial determination.
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator
who stands to be affected directly by the position taken by the government
officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building
Officials of the local government units where it
_______________
630
operates shopping malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter of
public interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners
whom it sued. The construction of new and bigger malls has been
announced, a matter which the Court can take judicial notice and the
unsettled issue of whether mall operators should provide parking facilities,
free of charge needs to be resolved.”15
“The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations do not impose that parking spaces shall be provided
by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such directive[,] Ayala Land,
Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM [Prime] are under no obligation to provide
them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:
“Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable
and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes
them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this
Book (1090).[“]
xxxx
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 9/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
The provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like
shopping floor area or customer area found in Rule XIX of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be construed as a directive to
provide free parking spaces, because the enabling law, the Building Code
does not so provide. x x x.
To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM [Prime] to
provide parking spaces for free can be considered as an unlawful taking of
property right without just compensation.
Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use,
the mall operators collect fees. The legal relationship could be either lease
or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect money
which translates into income. Should parking spaces be made free, this right
of mall owners shall be gone. This, without just compensation. Further, loss
of effective control over their property will ensue which is frowned upon by
law.
_______________
15 Rollo, p. 252.
631
The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in another light. They
can be looked at as necessary facilities to entice the public to increase
patronage of their malls because without parking spaces, going to their
malls will be inconvenient. These are[,] however[,] business considerations
which mall operators will have to decide for themselves. They are not
sufficient to justify a legal conclusion, as the OSG would like the Court to
adopt that it is the obligation of the mall owners to provide parking spaces
for free.”16
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify
any award for damages.
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:
“FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,]
Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM
Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their
malls for the use of their patrons or public in general, free of charge.
All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.”17
_______________
632
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 10/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF
THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA
VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN
PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSG’S
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE
OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT
A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.21
_______________
21 Id., at p. 462.
633
_______________
22 Citing Section 35, Chapter XII, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provide:
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 11/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
x x x x
(3) Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any
treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his
judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested by the Court.
x x x x
(11) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court,
tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his
opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; x
x x.
634
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 57.
635
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 12/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
The OSG now comes before this Court, via the instant Petition
for Review, with a single assignment of error:
_______________
24 Id., at p. 33.
25 A Revised IRR took effect on 30 April 2005. Rule XIX of the old IRR was
reproduced in Table VII.4 (Minimum Required Off-Street (Off-RROW)-cum-On-Site
Parking Slot, Parking Area and Loading/Unloading Space Requirements by Allowed
Use or Occupancy) of the Revised IRR.
636
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 13/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues,
greatly contributes to the aim of safeguarding “life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control.” Adequate parking spaces
would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-
charge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control—partially or,
as in this case, absolutely—the imposition of such fees.
637
“Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only
those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable,
and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them;
and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.”
(Emphasis ours.)
_______________
26 Soria v. Desierto, 490 Phil. 749, 754; 450 SCRA 339, 344 (2005).
638
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 14/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
standards and requirements to regulate and control their location,
site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the
Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials in the name of life, health, property, and
public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said
officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements
for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building
Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the
minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX
of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by
building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the
enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative
agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always
be resolved in favor of the basic law.27
_______________
27 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048, 1052; 258
SCRA 404, 407 (1996).
639
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly
referred to Republic v. Gonzales28 and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas29
to support its position that the State has the power to regulate
parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the
public; and it is by virtue of said power that respondents may be
required to provide free parking facilities. The OSG, though, failed
to consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal
backgrounds of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the
occupants of two parcels of land of the public domain to give way to
a road-widening project. It was in this context that the Court
pronounced:
The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been
clothed with full power to control and regulate its streets for the
purpose of promoting public health, safety and welfare. The City can
regulate the time, place, and manner of parking in the streets and
public places; and charge minimal fees for the street parking to
cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and control, to ensure
the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and
for the safety and convenience of the public.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 15/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets;
in contrast, the present case deals with privately owned parking
facilities available for use by the general pub-
_______________
640
_______________
641
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 16/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and,
conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the
imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property
carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations
not only as between individuals but also as between private parties
and the political society.31 True, if the regulatory agencies have the
power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the
power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming
arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do
have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the
use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing
or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the
_______________
31 Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, 143 Phil. 158, 163; 32 SCRA 211, 215
(1970).
642
action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass
the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or
means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.32
Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and
propriety of measures or means, the Court notes that Section 803 of
the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light and
Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to regulate site
occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation in
every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the IRR requires that
a building, depending on its specific use and/or floor area, should
provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, however,
fails to see the connection between regulating site occupancy to
ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis-à-vis
regulating the collection by building owners of fees for the use of
their parking spaces. Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the
former does not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally
escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation conditions at the
malls could be affected by the fact that parking facilities thereat are
free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 17/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
_______________
32 Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 969; 329 SCRA 314,
327 (2000).
643
_______________
644
from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does
not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 18/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.34
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for
public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but
another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent
domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.35
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.36
It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction
of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title
remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the im-
_______________
34 See City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta, 207 Phil. 648, 654; 122
SCRA 759, 764 (1983).
35 Acuña v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 370.
36 Republic of the Philippines v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
136 Phil. 20, 29; 26 SCRA 620, 628 (1969).
645
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 19/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
38 Supra note 34 at 656-657.
646
647
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the
issue persistently raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the
unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said
issue was not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial
conference for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to
submit for resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the
constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will
not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it
has been, settled on other grounds.39
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and
Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29
May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 20/21
1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600
in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
39 Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, 1 December 1995, 250 SCRA 500, 520.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fa96ffa794f806b79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 21/21